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By CEP NARA Date 3/12/97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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M-670

Memorandum of Conversation

S/AE FILE COPY

DATE: February 5, 1960

SUBJECT: Sharing of US Nuclear Secrets with Allies

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Manlio Brosio, Italian Embassy
Minister Carlo Perrone-Capano, Italian Embassy
Mr. Foy D. Kohler - EUR
Mr. Robert H. McBride - WE
Mr. Frank E. Maestrone - WE

COPIES TO: EUR (2)
WE-Mr. McBride/Mr. Cameron (1)
WE-Mr. Stabler/Mr. Maestrone (3-2cc)
RA
S/AE
INR

American Embassy, Rome (2)
USRO, Paris

~~PJT~~
~~CAS~~
~~RTE~~
~~RE~~

Mr. Kohler referred to the statement made by President Eisenhower during his news conference of February 3, 1960 regarding the sharing by the United States of its nuclear secrets with its allies. Mr. Kohler characterized this statement as an honest expression of the President's feelings. However, he was authorized to say that at the present time there was no legislation in existence or under preparation to amend the Atomic Energy Act. He thought that perhaps the disarmament conference might produce certain developments which would stimulate the preparation of such legislation. Mr. Kohler remarked that there was still no agreement as to whether it was theoretically practical to disperse nuclear weapons or to retain the present close control. Ambassador Brosio recognized this problem but expressed the belief that the present restrictions were not in keeping with the spirit of the Atlantic Alliance.


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TO THE SECRETARY
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570688 / 384 /
19.17 Request Progress: NATO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLICY PLANNING STAFF

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Nuc Sharing
 S/AE FILE 6874

February 26, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Courtney

SUBJECT: Draft S/AE Memorandum of February 19
 Concerning Nuclear Sharing

1. I am troubled by the recommendation that we should initiate preparations to liberalize sharing arrangements including amendment of the act with particular reference to the deployment of joint arrangement or custody and control of weapons deployed abroad, and the transmission of information.

If by this is meant only the Canadian case, I think we ought to say so explicitly.


If it is meant to open the door to changes in our present posture vis-a-vis the French, then I would strongly disagree and I am reasonably confident that this disagreement would be shared by Gerry Smith who is out sick today. It seems to me that our posture toward France should be that set forth in the WE memorandum by Ed Beigel which you, Gerry, and I all cleared and which opens no door to change of any kind.

If that is our posture toward France then surely it must also be our policy toward other continental countries less advanced in this field.

I understand that in the revised draft there will be no conclusions but in the discussion of this alternative it seems to me that you ought to clarify its import and disadvantage if it applied to more than Canada.


2. I think the paper ought to treat more ostensibly the possibility of some multilateral arrangement. Gerry tells me that in the last NSC discussion of ~~this directive~~ the President showed great interest in this and that his favorable view of sharing seemed to relate to multilateral rather than bilateral arrangements. I am attaching a draft of a paper. Bob Magill and I have been working on in

response

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Spec Asst in Atomic Energy
19.17 Reg and Prog: NATO

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
response to another NSC directive, which calls for a study of more multilateral arrangements. Perhaps some of this could be usefully reflected in the present paper.

3. You may also find helpful the attached summary of an S/P discussion of this problem some time ago which sets forth some of the basic long-term policy considerations bearing on the question of sharing and particularly multilateral sharing. Perhaps some of this broad philosophy regarding the effect of alternative lines of action might go into the paper. I would presume the NSC would want primarily to focus on these kinds of basic considerations?

Henry Owen

SECRET

3/4/60

RM/R
FILE

March 4, 1960

SECRET

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: The Under Secretary *CD D*
S/S

FROM : M - Mr. Merchant *LTH*

SUBJECT: Second Generation MREMs

634
711 56340

Mr. Irwin of Defense gave us orally on March 2 its official reply to the Under Secretary's letter of January 16, 1960 to Secretary of Defense Gates. In essence it is a straight repetition of Mr. Gates' proposal contained in his letter of November 24, 1959 to me. Defense proposes that we provide to a NATO consortium technical and facilities assistance in the amount of \$47.5 million and as grant aid 50 complete missiles and spares at an estimated value of \$50 million. The terms on which this aid would be made available would include acceptance by NATO of deployment of the missiles produced as required by SACEUR, the signing of relevant stockpile agreements, and agreed arrangements for national manning.

*CP DDP want
AM for anyone*

There is no question that Defense is anxious to make an offer sufficiently attractive to invite acceptance. They place great emphasis upon the advantages of NATO solidarity which they consider would be advanced by working out a consortium arrangement along these lines.

There are two needs to be served which are now entangled but separable. First is the honorable discharge of the President's offer made at the NATO meeting of December 1957. The second is the assurance that General Norstad gets the MREMs he states as a requirement (as approved by the JCS) in proper quantity and time phase.

At this point let me say that I have personally reached the conclusion that it would not be in our interest to contribute to or encourage the establishment in Europe of a productive capability to make MREMs. The French Sahara test, various recent German aberrations, the WEU angle, and very recent French attitudes all fortify me

in this

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IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

740.5611/3-460

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Authority	VNO 949520
By	632 NARA Date 4/10/87

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- 2 -

in this conviction. Moreover, I think the establishment of a consortium for this purpose might well be more divisive than solidifying within NATO. The British, for example, as you know, are now opposed to such a scheme. The prolonged period required for negotiating such an agreement with a consortium and then the actual creation of the physical plant facilities lead me to doubt that the program could meet even a part of Norstad's requirements in time. Finally, there seems little doubt that this course would result in a higher cost per missile produced than if they were produced in the United States from production lines already in existence.

Accordingly, I recommend that we make the minimum offer which would meet the President's obligation. My hope would be that NATO would reject it and we could then turn immediately to alternative, and to my mind more attractive, methods of meeting Norstad's requirements.

This leads me to the conclusion that we should add to the terms of the proposal contained in Mr. Dillon's letter of January 16 to Mr. Gates the further conditions which Defense suggests be attached but otherwise stand on Mr. Dillon's proposal. I believe that this will honorably fulfill the President's 1957 offer to NATO.


If upon communication of this position officially to Defense they still insist that a more generous offer be made to a NATO consortium, I recommend that the matter then be put to the President for decision. In this case the pros and cons from the point of view of our national interests of contributing to a missile-making capability on the Continent should be spelled out so that it does not appear that all that is at issue between Defense and State is whether or not we offer \$47.5 million or \$97.5 million as a grant-in-aid contribution.

I attach a draft letter for your signature to Secretary Gates in the foregoing sense.

Attachment.

M:LIMerchant:sp:mfk

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RM/R

FILE

MAR 7 1960

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Dear Tom:


We have continued to wrestle with the thorny problem of medium range ballistic missiles for NATO and the original positions of our two Departments, yours as set out in your letter of November 24, 1959 to Livie Merchant, and ours as stated in Doug Dillon's letter of January 16, 1960 to you.

Jack Irwin told Livie Merchant on March 2nd that Defense stood on the November 24th proposal, i.e., that we provide to a NATO consortium technical and facilities assistance in the amount of \$47.5 million and as grant aid fifty complete missiles and spares at an estimated value of \$50 million. The terms on which this aid would be made available would include acceptance by NATO of deployment of the missiles produced as required by SACEUR, the signing of relevant stockpile agreements, and agreed arrangements for national manning. Both of our Departments have agreed that another condition must be the commitment to SACEUR for NATO purposes of all missiles produced under this program until SACEUR's present and future requirements are met.

After further consideration, we in this Department still stand on our January 16th proposal, i.e., that we should limit our participation in this program to providing to NATO technical and facilities assistance in the amount of \$47.5 million, and that we should not contemplate additional technical and facilities assistance


beyond

The Honorable
 Thomas S. Gates, Jr.,
 Secretary of Defense.

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
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
beyond the time we are satisfied that SACEUR's full requirements have been or can be met. We also accept wholeheartedly Jack Irwin's three additional conditions as described above.

We should also like to point out our feeling that SACEUR's MREM requirement can be met in other ways than through this NATO program.

Most sincerely,




Christian A. Herter



M:ETLong:mfk

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3/18/60

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SECRET

March 18, 1960

TO: The Secretary
 THROUGH: S/S
 FROM: EUR - Foy D. Kohler
 SUBJECT: Mr. Smith's Memorandum of March 16 on
 Second-Generation MRBMs.

I agree that Defense will continue to object to the State position that we should limit our offer to \$47.5 million in technical assistance. I do not agree, however, with Mr. Smith's conclusion that we should continue to adhere rigidly to the State position. The differences between Defense and State are now narrowed to a single issue: should we or should we not accompany our offer of technical assistance with 50 U.S.-produced POLARIS missiles?

The decision on this question is a most difficult one. Mr. Smith cites cogent arguments on one side; I will not review all the arguments on the other, but will point out two major considerations only. These, in my view, are sufficient reason for our finding a middle ground with Defense.


(1) Mr. Smith assumes that an offer of technical assistance only would be rejected by the Europeans. EUR feels, on the contrary, that there is a reasonably good chance that the offer would be acceptable. In fact, an offer of technical assistance only would have certain advantages to the Europeans (i.e., to the French) in their effort to develop their national capability. They could attempt to negotiate for a type of missile more suitable than the POLARIS to their national requirements (i.e., longer range and a bigger warhead). If we accompany our offer of technical assistance with 50 U.S.-produced POLARIS missiles as a starter, we will automatically tie the European production program to POLARIS.

(2) The most important consideration, however, is that an European MRBM production effort is inevitable. The question is whether we are to have one integrated

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within the NATO framework, or, alternatively, development of national capabilities by the French, and, subsequently, by the Germans. There is already no question about this in France; in spite of the cost, there is every indication that the French are determined to go ahead. This is certain to be de Gaulle's view, as witness his position on the French nuclear program. It is also certain to be the position of a post de-Gaulle government, which is bound to be heavily influenced by the military.

More in the future -- but far more serious for its long-term political implications -- is the inevitability of a German program. Embassy Bonn feels this to be the case. As General Norstad made clear, the real problem is a German problem and it is essential that we provide now an "out" for the Germans that will enable them to move forward in a program firmly tied in with NATO. Only by doing this now can we head off later German pressures for an independent national program.

Our choice, therefore, is whether we make an offer which firmly channels the European drive in a NATO direction or whether we make a minimal offer which will free European energies in the direction of national, independent programs.

R7.
EUR:RA:RFessenden:mck:sj

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5/9/60

5/9/60

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By <u>DOD</u>	Date <u>2/8/88</u>
NARS, Date <u>2/8/88</u>	

9 May 1960

5

Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Operations Deputies Meeting, Tuesday, 10 May 1960, Agenda Item No. 7.

J.C.S. 1907/266

Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)

Background: - On 28 Mar 60, a SecDef memo included the following statement: "Mr. Khrushchev has stated that unless a satisfactory agreement on Berlin is reached at the Summit meeting, he will proceed to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany." Further, the SecDef requested the views of the JCS on the following questions related to the above situation and to the Joint Study on Berlin access.

a. Will the U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 be such as to permit implementation of the contingency plans, accepting and being prepared for the risk of general war?

b. What actions are recommended to be taken relating to the Berlin Garrison and the U.S. military interests in Berlin in the event the USSR announces its firm intention to sign a separate peace treaty?

- The Joint Study referred to above was prepared by State-Defense-JCS-CIA, at the direction of the President. The paper outlines the preparatory and supporting political and military actions that are considered necessary for any of the alternative uses of force. It then indicates for each of the four alternatives the specific political and military actions required, political limitations that should be observed and probable Soviet and Free World reactions.

Current Paper: - The current paper contains a proposed memorandum to SecDef stating that:

a. The JCS agree that the U.S. military posture in mid-summer of 1960 will permit the implementation of contingency plans, and the acceptance of the risk of general war. Further, it is pointed out that when it becomes evident that implementation of such plans is inevitable, certain political, economic, psychological and military measures should be taken to convince the USSR that the U.S. is willing to accept the risk of general war. *set, like an attack?*

b. There are no additional military actions to be taken relating to the Berlin Garrison and U.S. military interests in Berlin, other than those that are currently foreseen in tripartite and unilateral plans.

Service Comments: - It is expected that the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force will support the paper as written. The Army is expected to propose certain modifications of a more substantive nature.

Comments and Recommendations: - The International Policy Branch, recommends that the Chairman, JCS, support the paper as

ations: -

F (Concurs) (Non-
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K6 216/ JCS CP/1960/ 9172 Berlin/9005 (28 Mar '60) sec 1

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Department of State

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Action

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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2336, JUNE 11, 3 PM

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WHILE DECISION HAS APPARENTLY BEEN MADE TO SEEK PARTICIPATION
NATO MRBM PROGRAM (SEE EMBTEL 2273) AND THERE IS GROWING
ACCEPTANCE IN FEDGOVT FOR SOME KIND CONTINENTAL DETERRENT
WITH GERMAN VOICE IN ITS CONTROL, AT PRESENT TIME THERE IS
NO DISCERNIBLE MOVEMENT IN FEDREP ACQUIRE INDEPENDENT
NATIONALLY CONTROLLED NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. MEMORY OF LAST
WAR STILL FRESH AND CHANCELLOR HAS BEEN SEVERELY PRESSED TO
OVERCOME GERMAN SUSPICION AND UNEASINESS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT
BUNDESWEHR AND PARTICULARLY ITS EQUIPMENT (WITHOUT WARHEADS)
WITH ATOMIC WEAPONS. DEVELOPMENT OF BUNDESWEHR WAS ONLY
MADE PALATABLE TO GERMAN PUBLIC AS PART OF NATO IN WHICH US
WOULD PROVIDE CONTINUING LEADERSHIP. THERE STILL EXISTS
IN GERMAN PUBLIC STRONG RESISTANCE TO MAKING THEIR NATIONAL
FORCES INDEPENDENT AND EMBASSY HAS OBSERVED NO INCLINATION
AMONG GERMAN LEADERS MOVE TOWARD NUCLEAR INDEPENDENCE.
GERMAN INDUSTRY IS ENJOYING BOOM AND NO GREAT PRESSURES
ARE FELT THIS SECTOR TO UNDERTAKE ALONE COSTLY RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT NECESSARY FOR NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION.
GERMANS IN GENERAL AGREE WEU RESTRICTIONS ON ABC WEAPONS
ARE WISE BOTH FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS.
MEMBERS FONOFF AND MOD AWARE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTY INVOLVED IN
REVERSING POSITION REPEATEDLY TAKEN IN PUBLIC RE GERMAN
PRODUCTION OF, OR EQUIPMENT BUNDESWEHR WITH STRATEGIC

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
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
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN CASE OF MRBM PROGRAM, HOPE OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IS THAT ADEQUATE EXPLANATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN TERMS NATO FRAMEWORK IN WHICH PROGRAM WOULD OPERATE. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT IS FEELING DEEPLY ROOTED IN PUBLIC THAT MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF FEDREP AND US MUST BE PROMOTED BY ALL MEANS, BECAUSE US POLICY IN EUROPE NOT ONLY PROVIDES SECURITY FROM EAST BUT ESPOUSES OTHER POLITICAL GOALS TO WHICH GERMANS ARE DEDICATED.

THERE COULD OF COURSE BE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE THIS PICTURE, SHOULD US POLICY RE GERMAN PROBLEMS BE MODIFIED OR SHOULD THERE BE WEAKENING OF US LEADERSHIP IN EUROPE TO DEGREE THAT GERMANS FELT US COULD NOT ENSURE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE NOR INFLUENCE POLITICAL POLICY OF NATO COUNTRIES. OVER PAST YEAR WHEN THERE HAS BEEN SOME DOUBT OF WEST'S UNITY AND RESOLUTENESS AGAINST SOVIET THREATS TO BERLIN, SOME YOUNGER CDU/CSU LEADERS (E.G. GUTENBERG AND MAJONICA) HAVE ADVOCATED DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE TO STRENGTHEN CREDIBILITY WESTERN DETERRENT, AS CAPABILITY SOVIET STRIKING POWER AGAINST NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT INCREASES. ALTHOUGH THESE IDEAS ARE YET LIMITED TO SMALL CIRCLE, EMBASSY HAS NOTED GROWING TENDENCY ON PART OF OFFICIALS IN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO SUPPORT IDEA OF CONTINENTAL DETERRENT AND TO EMPHASIZE NEED FOR FEDREP VOICE IN ITS CONTROL.

THERE WAS NO QUESTION BUT THAT TWO YEARS AGO STRAUSS TOYED WITH IDEA COOPERATION WITH FRANCE AND ITALY (FIG) RE ATOMIC RESEARCH. STRAUSS' EFFORTS WERE FRUSTRATED THEN, AND HE HAS CONCLUDED AFTER VISITS TO NORTH AMERICA THAT GOING IT ALONE WITHOUT HELP OF US KNOW-HOW WOULD BE TOO COSTLY FOR CONTINENTAL POWERS. GERMANS, HOWEVER, NOW HAVE CONSIDERABLY EXPERIENCE IN ATOMIC RESEARCH WHICH COULD BE TRANSLATED RELATIVELY QUICKLY INTO PRODUCTION PROGRAM IF WEU RESTRAINTS REMOVED AND POLITICAL REACTIONS OF NATO ALLIES NOT NEGATIVE. FEDREP HAS, IN ADDITION, ECONOMIC RESOURCES AS CAPABLE AS ANY CONTINENTAL POWER TO SUPPORT ATOMIC PRODUCTION PROGRAM.

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-3- 2336, JUNE 11, 3 PM FROM BONN

FORMULA AS SET FORTH IN PARIS REFTEL TO CONTROL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY BY COUNTRIES OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE IS PERHAPS MORE RELEVANT TO EXISTING PROBLEMS IN FRANCE THAN TO POTENTIAL PROBLEM OF FEDREP. IT DOUBTFUL, HOWEVER, WHETHER TRIPARTITE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR DETERRENT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO FEDREP ANY MORE THAN IT WOULD ACCOMMODATE REAL PRE-OCCUPATION OF FRENCH. GERMANS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY SENSITIVE TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE DISCRIMINATORY FACTORS WHICH RELEGATE THEM TO SECOND CLASS STATUS, AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR CHANCELLOR TO MAKE ACCEPTABLE ANY PROPOSAL WHICH MIGHT INDICATE US HAS ADOPTED DE GAULLE'S TRIPARTITE DIRECTORATE CONCEPT. IT POSSIBLE CHANCELLOR MIGHT LOOK UPON RIGHT OF THREE CONTRIBUTING NATIONS TO MAINTAIN STRATEGIC FORCES ON INDEPENDENT NATIONAL BASIS AS THREAT OVER HEAD OF US TO MAINTAIN ITS INTEREST IN EUROPE AND SUPPORT AND LEADERSHIP OF WEST. IT DOUBTFUL, HOWEVER, HE WOULD BE ABLE EFFECTIVELY TO USE SUCH ARGUMENTS PUBLICLY.

NATURE FEDREP RELATIONS WITH FRANCE ARE SUCH THAT FEDGOVT PROBABLY SEES FAR MORE ADVANTAGES IN PROCEEDING IN COOPERATION WITH FRANCE AND WHATEVER EUROPEAN POLITICAL ENTITY WHICH MIGHT COME ABOUT, THAN CONDUCTING SOLO ADVENTURE IN NUCLEAR FIELD. PRESTIGE IS NOT PREOCCUPATION WITH FEDGOVT AND, AS LONG AS FRANCE COMMITTED TO FIRM POLICY ON BERLIN AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, THE CHANCELLOR APPEARS WILLING TO FOLLOW FRANCE'S LEAD.

IN SUMMARY, EMBASSY BELIEVES REAL PROBLEMS TO BE CONSIDERED ARE THOSE OF (1) NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF FRANCE, (2) PLACE OF FEDREP IN NATO MRBM PROGRAM, AND (3) STEPS THAT MAY BE TAKEN IN FUTURE TO PROVIDE CONTINENTAL EUROPEANS, INCLUDING GERMANS WITH SOME SHARE IN CONTROL NUCLEAR DETERRENT UNDER NATO OR OTHER AEGIS, WHEN WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE IS AT ISSUE. AS LONG AS US LEADERSHIP IS EFFECTIVELY EXERTED, IMPETUS TOWARD INDEPENDENT FEDREP CAPABILITY CAN PROBABLY BE CONTROLLED FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

SGC

DOWLING

SECRET

8/2/60

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By CEP NARA Date 3/12/97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Approved in S & U -
8/12/60

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 2, 1960

SUBJECT: Nuclear Sharing

SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE SECRETARY
S/AE
AUG 18 1960
AM 7,8,9,10,11,12,1,2,3,4,5,6 PM

ASF
EAS
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PR

PARTICIPANTS: Department of State

SHAPE

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Ivan B. White, EUR
Mr. Gerard Smith, S/P
Mr. Philip Farley, S/AE
Mr. Robert Bowie, S
Mr. Jack Bell, U/MS
Mr. Russell Fessenden,
EUR/RA

General Norstad, SACEUR
Mr. Ray L. Thurston, Political
Adviser to SACEUR

Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Twining, Chairman

Atomic Energy Commission

Department of Defense

Mr. McCone, Chairman

Deputy Secretary of
Defense Douglas
Assistant Secretary of
Defense Irwin (OSD/ISA)
General Miller, OSD/ISA
Colonel Billingslea, OSD/ISA

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
The Secretary asked General Norstad for his views on the question of nuclear sharing. General Norstad began by saying that he felt there was absolutely no military necessity for sharing nuclear weapons with our Allies. The present NATO stockpile arrangements are completely satisfactory as far as the military requirements are concerned. General Norstad said that he would testify to that effect in any Congressional hearings on the subject. He mentioned the deep moral responsibility which the United States has to the whole world in this matter and to the kind of responsibility which would attach to deliberate U.S. action tending to speed up the establishment of independent national nuclear weapons capabilities. He expressed the thought that to hasten this process by even a few years was a responsibility not lightly to be undertaken, particularly since those years could be devoted to attempts to arrive at satisfactory nuclear controls with the other side.

General

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- 2 -

General Norstad said that sharing nuclear weapons information with the French will not "buy" any better French cooperation in NATO. Prestige is the real French motive for desiring an independent nuclear capability. There is nothing to be gained from the U.S. point of view in helping them attain an independent capability more quickly than they will by their own efforts.

General Twining, in response to a question, indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree with this position. The JCS felt that France is going to have its own nuclear capability inevitably, and that it is a waste of time and money for the French to do this entirely alone. We should therefore aid them by sharing nuclear weapons information.

General Norstad raised the German problem. Under Adenauer, we are confident of the German position, but we must also think of the time beyond Adenauer when no one can be certain as to the position of Germany. The Germans themselves are concerned about this. If the U.S. creates another nuclear power, it will make it much more difficult for the future Germany to resist getting into the field also. It is also difficult to justify a special status for France. Germany is as much a "great power" as France in terms of population and gross national product. It is also very difficult to explain to Italy that France should have a special status.

Mr. McCone, in response to a question as to his views, said that he agreed with General Norstad about the inadvisability of supplying nuclear weapons or information about them. He had felt at one time that the U.S. could assist by supplying enriched U-235 for weapons purposes. The Atomic Energy Commission estimates that we could quickly supply all the U-235 the French could produce over the next fifteen years and save the French a large amount of money.

Mr. Smith noted that our willingness to supply the U-235 would be likely to make the problem more acute, rather than less. If we were to supply the material for weapons, it would be all the more difficult to resist requests for weapons themselves or information about them. It is best to hold the line firmly on all aspects of weapons assistance.

Mr. McCone observed that the question was more or less academic and that the U-235 question should be considered in the context of our over-all policy on nuclear sharing, about which he was in full agreement with General Norstad.

1960 AUG 18 PM 2 19

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5 August 1960

Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a Report by the J-5, for the Operations Deputies Meeting, Tuesday, 9 August 1960, Agenda Item No. 8

J.C.S. 1907/274

Subject: Military and Non-military Countermeasures in the Berlin Crisis (Checklist) (U)

Background - As a result of the 23 April 59 NSC Meeting, the President approved in principle studies related to further Berlin Contingency Planning. The President specifically charged the U.S. Coordinating Group for Berlin Contingency Planning with the responsibility for the development of general political, economic and military measures as outlined in the studies, with particular reference to selection and timing, with major decisions being referred to the President for approval as necessary.

- At the 23 May 60 Meeting of the U.S. Coordinating Group for Berlin Contingency Planning, the JCS representative recommended that a Working Group be established to develop a coordinated checklist of military and non-military measures for Berlin contingencies in accordance with the above. The purpose of the checklist would be to facilitate the action of the Coordinating Group in making its recommendations to the President regarding the selection and timing of any measures recommended. It was decided that such a Working Group would be established under the Chairmanship of Mr. Hillenbrand, Department of State, with representatives from JCS, OSD(ISA) and CIA to prepare such a checklist of possible military and non-military countermeasures.

- On 10 June 60 the SecDef also requested the JCS to furnish him with a list of those military measures with respect to the Berlin Crisis that will require his attention and decision, including where appropriate the estimated lead time from decision to achievement of capability.

Current Paper:

a. Contains, for notation by the JCS, a checklist of military and non-military measures that could be taken under various contingencies with regard to the Berlin situation. This list has been prepared in collaboration with representatives of OSD(ISA), State and CIA, and is responsive to the requirements established by the President.

b. Incorporates a memorandum for SecDef which incloses this same checklist for his information and informs him that the JCS would apprise him on a case-by-case basis of items therein which might require his personal attention and decision.

Service Comments - It is expected that the Services will support the paper as written.

Comments and Recommendations - International Policy Branch, J-5, recommends that the Chairman, JCS, support the paper as written.

Opinion as to Recommendations:

Director, J-5 _____ (Concur) (Non-concur)

Director, Joint Staff

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By <u>DOD</u>	Date <u>5/2001</u>
By <u>RWD</u>	NARS Date <u>2/17/88</u>

MESSAGE

STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE

TO: CJCS WASH DC

NR: ECJCBT 9-10679

241353Z AUG 60

Subject: Federal Republic of Germany Participation
in LIVE OAK Planning (S)

This message forwards below a LIVE OAK letter,
subject: "Federal Republic of Germany Participation in LIVE
OAK Planning (S)" signed by General Lauris Norstad to Chair-
man, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Staff,
National Defense General Staff, France and Chief of the
Defense Staff, United Kingdom, dated 22 August 1960. Gene-
ral Norstad's letter is quoted as follows:

Headquarters
United States European Command
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

ECLO 600/63

APD 128
New York, N. Y.
22 Aug 1960

Subject: Federal Republic of Germany Participation in LIVE
OAK Planning (S)

To: Chairman, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, National Defense General Staff, France
Chief of the Defence Staff, United Kingdom

1. It has become apparent to me that implementation of
any LIVE OAK Berlin contingency plans will most certainly
require some coordination and liaison on the part of the
Federal Republic of Germany.

2. Now that the principal LIVE OAK plans are in
existence, I think it is an opportune time for the Federal
Republic to be brought up to date on these plans. With
your approval, I propose to approach the German Minister of
Defense with the suggestion that he assign a liaison officer
to the LIVE OAK group. This officer would have access to all
planning and would serve as an advisor to the LIVE OAK staff;
he would not, however, be a fully participating member.

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(24 Aug 60)

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STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

NR: ECJCBT 9-10679

PAGE 2

3. Because of the progress of the planning, it may now be advisable that selected members of the Ministry of Defense, Federal Republic of Germany, be briefed on LIVE OAK's work to date.

4. I would appreciate your views on this subject.


/s/ Lauris Norstad
General USAF

ACTION: CJCS

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(24 Aug 60)

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Norstad, L

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September 12, 1960

FILEMEMORANDUM

TO: M - Mr. Merchant

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: S/AE - Philip J. Farley

SUBJECT: Your Discussion of Nuclear Weapons Custodial Arrangements with General Norstad

I understand you may have an opportunity to discuss with General Norstad custodial arrangements for nuclear weapons in the NATO stockpile. In this connection you will recall Mr. Thurston's letter to you of June 9 (Tab B) raising objections to the projected June visit of Mr. Miller of RA to certain NATO stockpile installations. If General Norstad does not raise the subject, I suggest that you do so with a view to removing his possible misunderstanding of the Department's position in this field and also to obtaining his consent in principle for Department officers to accompany DOD officers from General Loper's office on visits to NATO stockpile sites. For such a discussion you may find useful the talking paper attached at Tab A as well as the following background material.

BACKGROUND

As a result of the Department's responsibilities in the field of foreign affairs and national security policy, it has from the start followed nuclear weapons developments closely. Although atomic legislation does not assign definite responsibilities to the Department, it obviously has a responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, for the negotiation of international agreements in the atomic field. Furthermore, Executive Order No. 10560 of September 9, 1954 (Tab C) recognizes the Department's central responsibility in conducting negotiations pursuant to specific legislation. Quite apart from its statutory responsibilities, the Department attaches great importance to the carrying out of the national policy of discouraging the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities and protecting U.S. military assets. In pursuit of these policy objectives the Department pays particular attention to the effective implementation of the provisions for the retention of U.S. custody and control of nuclear weapons deployed abroad for the use of allies in an emergency which are the key features of our stockpile agreements negotiated and implemented under the NATO stockpile concept of 1957.

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S/AE: F Farley: br

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Authority VND 949520By DAW NARA Date 4/10/87

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Until 1959 the Department had no need to play an active role in the determination of policy on custodial arrangements or its implementation. It accepted the decision of the Department of Defense and the services that they would establish and maintain appropriate safeguards to ensure that U.S. custodial personnel would be in the position to prevent unauthorized access to or use of nuclear weapons by foreign personnel under all reasonable contingencies. Our understanding was that the application of that principle was a relatively simple matter because (1) the weapons or nuclear capsules were stored in igloos under exclusive U.S. custody and (2) they were not removed until the outbreak of hostilities. There was, therefore, *no* concern that U.S. physical possession of the weapons would be endangered except as a result of serious disturbances in the country where the weapons were deployed or the coming into power of a government determined to take possession of the weapons.

This situation changed with the development of new nuclear weapons, especially tactical weapons. The problem has thus arisen that to retain the operational efficiency of these weapons there must necessarily be a shift from the so-called "igloo" type of custodial arrangements. This transition is especially evident in cases such as the Genie air-to-air weapon, the Lulu anti-submarine weapons, the Davy Crockett, some of the shorter range surface-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, and probably mobile MRBM's. Obviously to achieve wide dispersal, fast reaction times in the use of the weapons and satisfactory maintenance procedures, it is necessary in a number of cases to affix weapons on foreign aircraft kept on an alert status or to incorporate (i.e. "to mate") weapons into missile delivery systems at the launch sites. This process necessarily involves the presence of foreign personnel in the near vicinity of armed aircraft or "mated" missiles with the result that the establishment of adequate custodial arrangements has become more difficult. In the case of the Genie or the Lulu weapons another complication is that if the interceptor or marine patrol aircraft are to function properly, they must be able to leave the ground (*viz.* the weapons are removed from U.S. custody) when hostilities are imminent. (e.g. a state of Maximum Readiness). Notwithstanding these changed circumstances, which are largely to be implemented in the future, we anticipate that arrangements can be made which are not in conflict with the law and are consistent with the Department's policy. But to insure that this situation will be the case, the Department must know what arrangements are contemplated by Defense and/or General Norstad before negotiations take place which will permit the deployment of new weapons. It is also necessary for the Department to review existing arrangements about which we know very little (i.e. the V-bomber and Canberra arrangements with the U.K.) as well as to review new arrangements which may be established under the authority of agreements already in effect. It was this situation which led you to write Mr. Douglas on June 3 (Tab D) stressing our

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
need for additional information and to approve Mr. Miller's projected trip to stockpile installations which General Norstad opposed.

In specific terms the projected Genie arrangements has brought about a change in the Department's role in this field. In June, 1959 Secretary Gates asked the Secretary to join him in seeking the President's authorization for the Genie rocket proposal. You will recall our prolonged examination of this request which led to the President's approval in October, 1959 and to the appearance of you and Mr. Hager before the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on February 2 when certain members objected to the proposal on the grounds that it might be in conflict with the Atomic Energy Act and an unwarranted extension of the President's powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. In this connection one point is noteworthy. Certain Committee members took the view that State and Defense had a joint responsibility for the custody and control of U.S. atomic weapons deployed abroad for the use of allies. They did not differentiate between Defense's responsibilities for the formulation and implementation of detailed custodial arrangements and the Department's finding that these were consistent with law and policy.

At the February 2 hearing members of the Joint Committee not only objected to the Genie proposal but also expressed concern about other custodial arrangements especially the IREM's. This concern was reiterated in Senator Anderson's May 16 letter to the Secretary (with a copy to Secretary Gates) (Tab B) in which he referred to "fictions" in existing and contemplated arrangements. Again, at the June 24 hearing members of the Joint Committee expressed the view that there was a joint State-Defense responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of custodial arrangements which were satisfactory to the Committee.

Subsequently, this subject was discussed at your meeting with Secretary Gates and Mr. McCone on July 22 when it was agreed that the three agencies should review the custodial situation with particular reference to the Genie proposal. The results of this review is the draft letter to Senator Anderson attached at Tab F which has four purposes: (1) to notify the Committee of our decision to proceed with the Genie proposal, (2) indirectly to answer Senator Anderson's letter of May 16, (3) to indicate the Department's support of the Defense position that the draft custodial legislation prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee and given to State-Defense representatives at the June 24 hearing is not acceptable, and (4) to clarify for the Committee the Department's policy and role in this field.

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As indicated above, the Department must have more detailed information on existing and contemplated custodial arrangements if it is to discharge its responsibilities in this field. In view of the Joint Committee's questions to the Department on custody-control matters and in view of past and projected visits by Committee members to NATO stockpile installations, it is essential that we have a better understanding of this complicated field. At present we rely on three principal sources: (1) General Loper's statements on custody to the Planning Board on April 26 (Tab G), (2) his statement to the Joint Committee on June 24 on the same subject (Tab H), and (3) the USCINCEUR Plan for Support of the NATO Special Ammo Storage Program (Tab I). These sources are informative, but we still need to know more about certain existing arrangements and to know the status of Defense thinking on arrangements for new weapons systems.

We hope you will be able to assure General Norstad that the Department's interest in this field in no way reflects any doubt about his competence and sincerity in affording proper protection for U.S. nuclear weapons. We believe that it would be to his advantage as well as the Department of Defense for us to have a better understanding of custodial-custody procedures in his command.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you use the talking paper attached at Tab A to explain to General Norstad the basis for our interest in custodial arrangements and the reasons for our need to know in considerable detail existing and contemplated custodial-control arrangements under the NATO stockpile concept.

2. That you inquire of General Norstad whether, in view of the above circumstances, he would agree to Department officers accompanying Defense officers on a visit to SHAPE for a discussion of this field and for a subsequent tour of NATO stockpile installations illustrating the several weapons systems now deployed in NATO.

CLEARANCES

L/SFP - Mr. Pender (in draft)

NA - Mr. Vessenden (in draft)

S/AE:Prutter;br
 September 12, 1960

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Authority VND 949520By DAW NARA Date 4/10/97SECRETTALKING PAPER

1. Our nuclear weapons policy, including the NATO atomic stockpile aspect, is such an integral part of our foreign policy that the Department, as well as Defense, must be fully conversant with its implementation.

2. So long as the weapons were being stored in so-called "igloos" it was relatively easy to understand and explain our position that the weapons remained under our custody and control.

3. The new arrangements, generated by military requirements, however, have complicated our task of defending the arrangements.

4. Particularly since the Department's detailed defense of the Conie proposal, the Joint Committee has been pressing the Department, as well as Defense, to speak with authority and knowledge on the particulars of these matters. Since intergovernmental agreements and a particularly delicate area of foreign policy are involved, the Department cannot properly profess ignorance of these particulars.

5. The Department certainly agrees with Defense that the precise security arrangements at each site are generally matters for the responsible military commander to resolve.

6. Yet, if the Department is to defend our position that we still maintain effective custody and control despite the newer deployment techniques, we must be able to speak with knowledge. And in view of the complicated nature of these newer arrangements, we doubt that we can fulfill our responsibilities solely on the basis of the materials furnished to date. Indeed these materials have suggested the importance of being able to speak from first-hand knowledge about the situations at typical systems sites.

7. This approach should help us minimize any domestic or international political repercussions since the Department would be able to add its assurance in domestic and international forums that the United States is still in fact effectively maintaining custody and control of the weapons.

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By DOD Date 2/17/88
NARS, Date 2/17/88

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

AF IN : 56214 (17 Sep 60) N/g

ACTION: JCS-28

INFO : ARMY-30, NAVY-50, CMC-6, XPD-4, XDC-1, ODC-1, CIN-1, OOP-1

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FM JCSLG OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO JCS WASH D C
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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 21 Jan 1981

SECRET 60-2 FROM JCSLG.
FOR THE DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF, SIGNED SPIVY. THIS IS THE SECOND
WEEKLY JCSLG ACTIVITY REPORT. THIS MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS.
PART I. JSTPA ACTIVITY: (A). DURING THE PERIOD 15, 16,
17 SEP 60, THE JSTPA CONDUCTED AN EDUCATION PROGRAM FOR
PLANNING. INCLUDED WERE BRIAFINGS BY SAC ON EMERGENCY WAR
ORDERU ANDRONTINGENCY PLANS AND BY PAC, LANT, AND EUR ON
THEIR WAR PLANS AND PECULIAR SITUATIONS. COPIES OF THE
AGENDA ARE BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY. (B). JSTPA POLICY
NUMBER ONE, DATED 13 SEPT 60, ESTABLISHES POLICY REGARDING
THE PROCEDURES FOR THE HANDLING OF DIFFERENCES OF
OPINIONS AND DISSENTS. COPIES OF THIS POLICY MEMORANDUM
ARE BEING FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER. (C). THE
INITIAL MEETING OF THE JSTPA POLICY COMMITTEE WAS
CONDUCTED ON 13 SEPT 60. MINUTES OF THIS MEETING ARE
BEING FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER. PART II. JCSLG
LIAISON ACTIVITY: (A). IN A DISCUSSION WITH THE

EXCLUDED FROM GDS.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

AF IN: 56214 (17 Sep 60)

DIRECTOR JSTPA ON 13 SEPT 60, GENERAL POWER REAFFIRMED THAT HE FEELS VERY STRONGLY THAT SOME MEANS MUST BE FOUND TO IMPLEMENT INTEGRATION OF THE SACEUR ATOMIC STRIKE PLAN WITH THE SIOP EVEN IF IT MEANS DISCLOSING TO CERTAIN ALLIED ATOMIC PLANNING STAFFS THAT PORTION OF OUR STRIKE PLAN THAT PERTAINS TO THEIR AREA. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD RATHER TAKE THE CHANGE OF SECURITY COMPROMISE THAN TO HAVE UNCOORDINATED PLANS. GENERAL POWER RECOGNIZES THE COMPLICATIONS OF THE INTER-

GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT AND THE FACT THAT GENERAL NORSTAD MIGHT NOT BE GIVEN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALLIED FORCES IN TIME FOR THEM TO BE EFFECTIVE.

HOWEVER, HE FEELS THAT CINCEUR CAN COMMIT US FORCES IN NATO TO THE SIOP IN APPROXIMATELY THE SAME MANNER AS THE OTHER CINC'S. GENERAL POWER WILL CONTINUE HIS PRESENT PLANNING EFFORT ON THE TERMS STATED BY THE SACEUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE INITIAL MEETING HERE IN AUGUST. RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESENT SACEUR REPRESENTATIVES (SENIOR REP IS COLONEL P. J. LONG, USAF) INDICATE THAT THEY HAVE CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY IN PLANNING ADJUSTMENT. FURTHER, INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
 STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
 INCOMING MESSAGE

AF IN : 57353 (19 Sep 60) P/wg

ACTION: JCS-28, XPD-4

INFO : ARMY-20, NAVY-25, CMC-6, XDC-1, ODC-1, CIN-1, OOP-1 (88)

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FM SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
 TO RJEZHQGXJCS WASH D C
 RJEZHQ/C OFS USAF WASH D C
 BT

JCS MESSAGE

SECRET 1965. FOR DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF.
 SUBJ: (U) MID-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE REQUIREMENTS.

FOLLOWING ARE CINCSAC COMMENTS IN REPLY TO YOUR JCS
 980925 DATED 3 AUG 60, ON THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS STUDY
 FOR MID-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (MRBM'S). THIS MESSAGE

IN 2 PARTS. PART I: THIS COMMAND REGARDS THE MRBM AS A
 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEM THAT WILL PRIMARILY BE
 UTILIZED FOR EMPLOYMENT AGAINST SINO-SOVIET TARGETS
 CATEGORIZED AS STRATEGIC. FURTHER, IT RECOGNIZES THERE
 ARE IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN MAKING
 AVAILABLE TO OUR ALLIES MRBM'S AND THAT SUCH AN ACTION IS

REGARDED AS BEING IN FURTHERANCE OF U.S. SECURITY
 INTERESTS. HOWEVER, ANY DELIBERATIONS RELATED TO MRBM
 REQUIREMENTS SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE
 FOLLOWING FACTORS: A. THE MAJOR OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
 ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMPLEXITY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

DATE

20 Oct 81

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20 Oct 81

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 NARS, Date 8/17/88

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
 STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
 INCOMING MESSAGE

AF IN: 57353 (19 Sep 60)

ARRANGEMENTS OF DEPLOYED MRBM'S. B. THE POLITICAL
 INSTABILITY OF AFFECTED COUNTRIES AND THE UNCERTAIN
 RESPONSE OF THESE COUNTRIES IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL WAR.
 D. THE VULNERABILITY OF DEPLOYED MRBM'S AS RELATED TO
 AVAILABLE WARNING. E. THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF ZI
 BASED ICBM'S (MINUTEMAN) CONSIDERING COST FACTORS,
 VERSATILITY AND CAPABILITY OF COVERING A FAR GREATER
 SPECTRUM OF TARGETS THAN A MID-RANGE MISSILE.

PART II: RECOGNIZING THAT WHILE LIMITED NUMBERS OF
 MRBM'S AND IRBM'S DO SERVE TO SUPPLEMENT AND COMPLEMENT
 THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IT APPEARS THAT THE GREATEST
 CONTRIBUTION ALLIED MRBM'S MAKE IS IN SATISFYING CERTAIN
 POLITICAL OBJECTIVES; ICMC., ENHANCING NATIONAL PRESTIGE,
 STRENGTHENING ALLIANCES, ETC. IN VIEW OF THIS, IT IS
 RECOMMENDED THAT THE NUMBER OF MRBM'S MADE AVAILABLE TO
 OUR ALLIES BE LIMITED TO THE MINIMUM NUMBER NECESSARY
 TO ACHIEVE THIS PURPOSE AND IN THE INTEREST OF CON-
 SERVING NATIONAL RESOURCES THOSE MISSILES SUPPLIED BE
 PROVIDED FOR FROM INDIGENOUS FUNDS RATHER THAN U.S. MAP.

BT

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JCS 1620/300

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(Page revised by Corrigendum - 8 September 1960)

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REF ID: A610

Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a Report by the J-5, for the JCS Meeting Friday, 7 October 1960, Agenda Item No. 5.

J.C.S. 2305/239

Subject: Department of Defense Position on Nuclear Sharing with Allies (U)

Background - NSC action of 25 Aug 60 calls for a report to the President, no later than 15 Oct 60, on "U.S. Policy Regarding Future Nuclear Weapons Capabilities in the NATO Area, including recommendations as to whether or under what circumstances it might be in U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France. This report should contain suggestions regarding appropriate legislative action, if necessary, to carry out policy recommendations. This report should take into account two studies on NATO, one by Mr. Robert Bowie for the Department of State and the other by the DOD which is being prepared in connection with the joint State-Defense report to the Planning Board and the Council on 'The Future of NATO', as called for by NSC Action No. 2219-b, and the forthcoming consultations with General Norstad."

- By memo dated 26 Jan 60, the JCS provided to SECDEF their views regarding NATO arrangements for nuclear weapons custody and control. (Para 9, JCS 2278/16)

- By memo dated 4 Aug 60, the JCS informed SECDEF that although they recognize that such action will entail complications, they consider it to be in the U.S. security interests to assist France in her efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.

- By memo dated 9 Sep 60, the Chairman JCS forwarded to SECDEF views of the JCS on subject of U.S. Policy Relative to Enhancing Nuclear Weapons Capability of France which:

a. Clarified and amplified previously expressed views.

b. Reaffirmed previously expressed views on NATO arrangements (26 Jan 60 memo).

- On same date, 9 Sep 60, ASD/ISA forwarded memo to the Chairman, JCS requesting, by 26 Sep 60:

a. Views of the JCS on a State-Defense-AEC Ad Hoc Working Group Study on the pros and cons of nuclear sharing.

b. Advice of the JCS on four specific questions regarding NATO and France.

c. Any other pertinent comments in connection with nuclear sharing.

- By memo dated 15 Sep 60, ASD/ISA requested that JCS include, in their reply to his 9 Sep memo, their views on the proposal on nuclear sharing, sponsored by Gen Norstad, contained in an American Embassy message dated 21 Aug 59.

- By memo dated 23 Sep 60, the JCS in responding to the memoranda from ASD/ISA cited above, stated that they were considering the nuclear sharing aspects of the Bowie study so that the DOD position may reflect the desire of the President that this study be considered in the preparation of the full report cited in the first background paragraph above.

- At the request of ASD/ISA, the Joint Staff is currently preparing, as a separate action, JCS comments on the DOD study which is similar in scope to the Bowie study. Although related in some aspects to the report cited in the first background paragraph above, both of these studies were prepared in response to a separate NSC requirement for a report on "The Future of NATO".

JCS 1960 CS 4610 (29 Aug 60) sec 2

(A) 4m
C/A

- On 28 Sep 60, the JCS approved talking paper for the purpose of providing guidance to the SECDEF on the subject of MREB's for NATO. This constitutes JCS views relative to certain aspects of the Bowie Study as well as views with respect to arrangement, within NATO, for employment control of NATO MREB's.

Current Paper - Contains a memo to SECDEF, in accordance with the 23 Sep 60 memo from the JCS to SECDEF (cited above), which states that:

a. The 15 Oct report to the NSC should encompass:

(1) U.S. assistance to the nuclear effort of selected NATO Allies, on a bilateral basis, and

(2) Arrangements, within NATO, for the custody and employment control of NATO committed nuclear weapons.

b. Any review of NATO strategy, etc., should be undertaken in connection with the report to the NSC on "The Future of NATO".

c. JCS non-concurs with the Bowie view that the problem of nuclear sharing can be dealt with and resolved exclusively by establishing multinational arrangements within NATO for custody and control of nuclear weapons. Refers to and reaffirms JCS views recently forwarded to SECDEF.

d. From a military standpoint, arrangements under NATO Atomic Stockpile Program, as supplemented by recommendations for NATO arrangements previously submitted by JCS, are satisfactory.

e. In view of the possibility that political pressures may necessitate establishment of further multinational arrangements for custody and control, NATO arrangements which are militarily acceptable are identified. In formulating these views, pertinent aspects of the Bowie study, as well as the known views of Gen Norstad, were considered. For the purpose of identifying NATO arrangements, the requirement presented in the Bowie study for multinational manning and common ownership is manifestly impractical from a military standpoint.

Service Comments - The Army and Air Force are expected to support the paper as written. The Marine Corps has expressed NDC. The Navy has submitted a non-concurrence which:

a. Dissents with the judgment that multinational manning and common ownership is manifestly impractical.

b. Introduces the additional issue of the NATO MREB program.

Comments and Recommendations - In view of the 15 Oct 60 deadline for the NSC report, it is urgent that the inputs thereto, as provided in subject paper, be forwarded to SECDEF as soon as possible. The views expressed in the non-concurrence of the Navy cannot be supported by the Joint Staff. The Policy Division, J-5, recommends that the Chairman, JCS, support the paper as written.

Opinion as to Recommendations:

Director, J-5 F (Concurs) (~~Non-concurs~~)

Director, Joint Staff _____ (Concurs) (Non-concurs)

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Col R. F. Shaefer, USAF
 R & D Branch, J-5,
 Extension 71688

Capt R. E. Sinnott, USN
 International Policy Branch, J-5
 Extension 71477

DECLASSIFIED	DDO DA 52001	BY [initials]
	NARS Date	88/17/8

Talking Paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for use in discussion with the Secretary of Defense on 31 October 1960

Subject: Third Generation MRBM's (U)

Reason for Discussion - Mr. Gates has requested the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to brief him on the status of third-generation MRBM requirements and development prospects. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) have been invited to attend.

Background - In response to a Secretary of Defense request to study MRBM requirements, dated 1 August 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by memorandum dated 29 September 1960, informed the Secretary of Defense that they considered that there is a valid requirement for a third-generation MRBM and recommended the initiation of the development of a new system with a maximum range of at least 1200 nautical miles which would be adaptable to land mobile, hard fixed, and water-borne configurations.

- Initiation of the development of a third-generation MRBM will have an impact upon the FY 1962 DOD budget. It is understood that this facet of the problem motivated Mr. Gates' request for a presentation. The briefing is now expected to take the form of a short introduction followed by key questions, and the answers thereto, covering major political, military, economic, and technical aspects. ISA and Joint Staff representatives have assisted the DDR&E in formulating these questions and answers.

Discussion - The anticipated questions and DDR&E answers, together with Joint Staff comments thereon, ~~at~~ attached.

Prepared by: T.J.B. SHANLEY
Colonel, USA
AE&GM Branch, J-5
Extension 53838

4920 (1 Aug 60)

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCE DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 20 Oct 81

5/17 m C/F

" on MRBM's: AF218 (1961) 9051/4610 (24 Mar 61) "Mil. Aspects of
Control of - 1 - MRBM's & other TMB (in ACE"
(most docs w/d, 7/85, but a few docs with hints)

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By 1200
Date 2/17/88
NARS Date 2/17/88

AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

QUESTION 12: What is the Position of the State Department on NATO MRBM's?

ANSWER: It is anticipated that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) will provide the answer to this question. The principal aspects of the State Department views are as follows:

- (1) State desires to defer consideration of third generation MRBM's until current negotiations on second generation systems for NATO are complete.
- (2) State is in favor of exclusively water-borne deployment of MRBM's

DISCUSSION:

a. The most important State Department position with respect to the question of third generation NATO MRBM's was expressed by Secretary Herter in his meeting with Mr. Gates on 14 September 1960 when he deferred consideration of a third generation MRBM phase in the NATO MRBM program. He considered it more important to get on with the phase wherein second generation MRBM's will become available to NATO.

b. Another important aspect of the State Department's position with respect to NATO MRBM's is the firm conviction held by influential people in the Department, including Secretary Herter himself, that there is no political advantage to be gained by basing MRBM's ashore. They point up the "host country" problems which could result in veto on the use of land-based MRBM forces, the fears and controversies which would result from their movement over European roads with the possibilities of nuclear accidents and particularly the magnet effect or damage to a nation that would result from the enemy's attacks on MRBM forces on its soil. State, however, strongly supports the concept of providing NATO with a sea-borne MRBM capability.

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Authority NND 95295By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

11/9/60

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Number 3 of 11 copies, Series A.

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November 9, 1960

RETURN TO S/S-CC
ROOM 7512D NS/E

To: The Secretary

Through: S/S

From: EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Subject: Nuclear Weapons for NATO

There has been so much suggestion and counter suggestion, proposal and counter proposal and so many political and legal obstacles indicated, that the bold new proposals we started with several months ago for a NATO deterrent are in danger of becoming something which will be regarded as just another uninspired, unsubstantial "American gimmick."

I fear that our original purposes are being largely lost sight of and that it might be well to refresh our minds as to what they were (and should remain):

(1) To meet the loss of faith in the reliability of the US deterrent as we move, in the 1960s, toward an ICBM stalemate and a direct threat to the United States, we sought an arrangement under which the Europeans would feel they could trigger their own deterrent without an American veto.

As a corollary we calculated that this would enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the total free world deterrent as viewed from Moscow.

Moreover, we considered that a U. S. offer to participate in this deterrent with a dramatic contribution of its own would provide convincing reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe.

(2) In view of the erosion of the original spirit behind NATO resulting at least in part from dependence almost

exclusively

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State Dept Partic. in NSC (66D95) / 107 / NSC 6017
Memorandum

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Authority NND 95295By SL NARA Date 3/11/97SECRET

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exclusively on the United States for nuclear deterrence, we sought a new proposal in the security field which by virtue of its truly multilateral character would distribute real responsibility more widely in the Alliance and provide a basis for future political cohesion.

(3) To prevent the divisive influence of mounting demands for independent national nuclear capabilities we sought a means to meet the objectives asserted in support of these demands on a truly multinational basis. As a corollary we sought a method which would have an optimum appeal to France, if not today, then tomorrow. In longer range terms we were seeking particularly to head off German ambitions in the nuclear field.

I fear that the various watered-down compromise proposals we have recently been discussing would not fulfill these purposes. In fact it now seems clear that no proposal can do so without a modification of US legislation, either for an MRBM proposal or for the NATO-ization of the stockpile. I think we should simply face up to this fact.

Consequently I would recommend that instead of pushing for some inadequate compromise proposals for presentation in NATO in December we should go ahead deliberately with consultations with the new Administration and with preparations to present and secure the necessary Congressional action in the new session. If these consultations permitted some outline of the proposals to be put forward at the December meeting in Paris, so much the better. If not, we would do no more at that session than make a general explanatory statement of the US Government's exploration of arrangements in this field and defer presentation of any firm proposals until some time next year. I believe that our NATO allies would understand the exigencies of the impending change in the U. S. Administration.

If this approach is followed it would be all the more important to hold the line against changes that Defense is suggesting in the language concerning use and multilateral features contained in the proposal approved by the President

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on October 3. The proposal about which we consult the incoming Administration should be one we believe is substantively sound and designed to fulfill our purposes. It should not be watered down in advance in anticipation of Congressional concerns which we will have ample time to explore fully under the more deliberate schedule suggested above.

Moreover if this approach is adopted there is not the same rush about seeing President Eisenhower to iron out the differences between State and Defense and getting General Nerstad over to participate in such a meeting early next week.

I attach for convenient reference (A) the NATO MRBM proposal of October 3, (B) a proposal on the NATO stockpile arrangements, and (C) an analysis of State-Defense differences.

cc: S/P - Mr. Smith
C - Mr. Achilles
S/AE - Mr. Farley
S/B - Mr. Bohlen
L - Mr. Hager
H - Mr. Macomber

EUR:FDKohler:mt

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 11 February 1961, subject as above.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that NATO strategy is stated in sufficiently broad terms to permit the necessary planning flexibility. They reaffirm their confidence in the existing strategic concept and implementing measures as interpreted in the principles recently enunciated by SACEUR.

3. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this strategy, together with SACEUR's interpretation, adequately contemplates a flexible response to the various forms of aggression which might take place in the NATO area. There should be no over-all change in the NATO basic directives as now published. They should remain subject to broad and flexible interpretation. Definitive changes therein, particularly with respect to the threshold of nuclear employment, would undoubtedly serve to alert the Soviets as to specific Alliance intent and thereby facilitate Soviet planning.

4. It is considered that implicit in the planning flexibility permitted SACEUR by the strategic concept and implementing measures there is at present adequate latitude to permit a "pause" in certain contexts of aggression. Hence, no desirable purpose would be served by formal NATO adoption of a "pause strategy".

5. With respect to the role and capability of shield forces, they are designed to counter and halt aggressions short of general war and in general war, to contribute with both nuclear and conventional capabilities to the achievement of victory. Given the necessary improvement in weapons and survivability, the programmed forces are minimally adequate; these force goals should be attained as a matter of urgency. Force goals for later periods will be addressed separately.

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BY JCS ON 11/1/62
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regardless of the nature of the Soviet attack. Prompt and
effective response by NATO with all necessary force to restore
the status quo will prove to the Soviets that the Allies value
NATO territory too highly to accept its loss under any conditions.

(b)(1) OSD

A. Present NATO strategy, together with SACEUR's interpretation,
is sufficiently flexible to permit the discriminate use of nuclear
weapons against Soviet aggression as required. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff have indorsed General Norstad's view that the selective
use of limited atomic fire power will not necessarily result in
total war, although it may heighten the risk. Hence the idea of
imposing a "pause" on Soviet aggression against NATO territory
depends not on the size and intensity of force committed
but on the local nature of the hostile action. In the absence

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Appendix

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of hostile action elsewhere and any indication of enemy intent to engage NATO forces across the front or to launch a massive nuclear exchange, the imposition of a "pause" may be possible.

¶ In this context NATO response to this minimal level of Soviet aggression must be swift and effective, employing forces and weapons appropriate to the situation, with the objective of demonstrating unmistakably to the USSR the determination of the Alliance:

a. To suffer no territorial loss as a result of the action, and

b. To bring the hostilities to a halt.

¶ It is conceivable that aggression could occur against NATO by satellite forces without identifiable Soviet involvement.

¶ Such aggression could be on a scale larger than an incursion, and for the purpose of attaining limited territorial objectives. Necessarily, this kind of action would have to be regarded also as a test of the will of the Alliance. In such an event, the NATO response -- under the existing concept -- would be the taking of all appropriate military measures with the objective of:

a. Limiting the geographic scope of the conflict, and

b. Bringing it to rapid and favorable conclusion.

These military measures should be immediate and decisive, entailing the use of whatever degree of force may be necessary to attain local superiority and halt the aggression; this would not necessarily involve the employment of nuclear weapons, but selective and discriminate use of these weapons might be found to be appropriate in attaining superiority.

Subsequent to halting the aggression and prior to turning it back by military force, it is possible that NATO interests would dictate political representations to Allies of the aggressor and neutrals with the aim of inducing withdrawal.

The aim of the Alliance throughout, in countering both minimal aggression and that on a larger scale, would be to retain the territorial integrity of NATO and demonstrate determination to achieve victory on whatever level engaged.

- Q. 11. (b)(1) OSD 1
2
- A. NATO should plan to use whatever force is required to 3
defend NATO territory but should not plan to use more force 4
than is necessary. This principle is especially important 5
within NATO territory and against the territory of European 6
Satellites. The selective use of limited nuclear weapons will 8
not necessarily result in total war, although it may heighten 9
the degree of risk. Shield forces should have a dual capability 10
of employing either conventional or nuclear weapons. Care 11
should be exercised in order to avoid self-imposed inhibitions 12
concerning the use of nuclear weapons when they are required 13
to defeat the enemy. 14
- Q. 11. (b)(1) OSD 15
16
17
18
19
20
- A. As indicated in answer to 11 (a), shield forces should 21
be equipped with nuclear weapons. In order to provide a 22
capability for selective use and an ability to live on the 23
battlefield, these weapons should: 24
- a. Be in a yield range from a fractional kiloton to 25
many kilotons. 26
 - b. Except for large yield weapons and consistent with 27
technical feasibility, delivery vehicles should have a dual 28
capability of delivering either nuclear or conventional 29
weapons. 30
 - c. No substantial change in the system of control is 31
recommended. SACEUR's recent evaluation is considered to 32
be the most workable compromise between military necessity 33
and political expediency. This evaluation is quoted as 34
follows: 35

7/13/61
CW Adenauer
Adenauer
07 2/17

March 10, 1961



Dear Chancellor:

Thank you very much indeed for your most interesting and informative letter which Herr von Brentano brought to me. The request which the President made to me was not quite as extensive as your letter suggests. It was rather to review developments in NATO since the time I was officially concerned with it and consider the future courses which will do most to further the political coherence of the alliance and strengthen its military defenses.

You do me great honor in writing to me so personally and with the frankness of a warm and tried friendship. Since I fully reciprocate this trust and friendship what you tell me will be treated as your personal views and I shall write you in the same way.

You stress wisely and rightly the need for real political consultation within NATO as a means to more unity among the allies. Your letter confirms what I had heard from others that General de Gaulle was deeply offended by the abstention of the United States from the vote last year in the United Nations on the motion against France regarding Algeria. I thought at the time, and think now, that the abstention was a mistake. I am convinced, as I know you are, that the best hope of a solution in Algeria lies in General de Gaulle's program and in his leadership. That hope would be greatly strengthened if our Government would support him loyally and unequivocally all the way. Whatever powers of persuasion I have will be used to this end, if, indeed, they are needed at all.

Full and candid discussion in NATO—even if informally conducted, at first—can help to bring mutual understanding

among

His Excellency
Dr. Konrad Adenauer,
Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany,
Bonn.

- 2 -



among the allies on critical issues of this sort. It is much safer than reliance upon unilateral versions of private discussions between heads of governments, especially when they speak through an interpreter and are anxious to please, as I assume was the case with General de Gaulle and General Eisenhower. I remember one "agreement" between Mr. Truman and Mr. Atlee, supposedly using the same language, which was reasonably understood by each in a different way, and which as understood by Mr. Atlee was quite beyond Mr. Truman's legal authority. It took us a day, after discovering the "agreement", to straighten it out.

Heads of government alone can give the desired goal and extent of joint efforts, but the careful planning of methods, means and time can most surely and safely be done in consultations, leading up to and including the common council of the allies in NATO. These meetings should be restricted to narrowest limits as you point out.

A new start in consultation can, I hope, be made with a new Administration, and the sort of consultation you and I understand, based upon open dealing, good faith and mutual confidence. Allies who hang back, as we and others have done, asserting the outmoded claim that matters which obviously affect the strength of the alliance lie solely within the domestic concern of one member doom any useful consultation. Today no nation is an island entire to itself. Before our propaganda can be firmly knit, our minds must be. On this I know that we are in agreement.

What you tell me of General de Gaulle's attitude toward the evolution of the Six as shown in your last meeting is most encouraging. I would venture the belief that in no small part the development of the General's attitude comes from your own efforts.

I quite agree that the equipment of NATO with nuclear arms is necessary. NATO-committed forces are already, as you know, equipped with these arms to a considerable extent. So the questions raised are rather how to balance non-nuclear and nuclear capabilities in view of possible eventualities, and what sort of nuclear arms are most suitable for what

purpose

- 3 -

purpose and how to control and command these weapons. I have considered some of these questions with General Norstad. It is hard to discuss them in private correspondence. They require the assured confidence of personal talk. I am to argue a case at The Hague Court on April 10th for perhaps a week, and had hoped to stay on for a conference at Bologna on April 22 and 23. The President has announced your visit here for April 12th and 13th. Perhaps you will be in Europe after that and might be moved to take a rest at our mutually loved Como, or I might visit you at Bonn as ambassador Dowling has suggested. In some way or other, either in Como or Bonn, I hope that it may be possible for us to exchange ideas in person.



I commend our new President to you. He has the qualities that you like, frankness, decisiveness and command. I greatly hope that you and he will establish a mutual confidence. The new Secretary of State is also a man upon whom you may wholly rely. He is, as you know, an old friend and colleague of mine. He can also ease your less official discussions by using your own language.

With best wishes for your journey and cordial greetings,

As ever yours,

Dean Acheson

DA:gm

(Translation)

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
THE CHANCELLOR

Bonn, February 13, 1961

Dear Mr. Acheson:
Dear Friend:



It was a great joy and satisfaction to me to learn some time ago of your appointment as adviser to President Kennedy for Special Projects. A confirmation of my satisfaction and joy is provided by the order you have received to submit proposals for a reorganization of the NATO.

This question is of such extraordinary importance to all that I should like to take this opportunity to give you some of my thoughts in connection therewith. Please do not consider this letter as an official document but as solely a personal expression of opinion. Our long-standing friendly relations, I believe, permit me to write to you in such a personal nature. In situations as difficult as now exist in the world, unconditional frankness among friends is twice as necessary.

His Excellency
Dean Acheson,
Washington.

NATO

- 2 -



NATO has been a matter of concern to me during the last year. Since its foundation, it has not experienced a systematic expansion, although conditions have undergone a considerable change since that time. I believe that both of us agree that the work of NATO needs to be enlarged. It must concentrate a great deal more intensively on the political area and on the field of propaganda. It is sad to observe the way the Communist World uses a firmly-knit and unified propaganda to serve its purposes and, on the other hand, to see the result of the scattered propaganda carried out by the NATO countries.

As regards activities in the political field, I wish to comment as follows on the attitude of France, so injurious to the interests of NATO for a considerable length of time: I have closely followed the attitude of General de Gaulle in connection with NATO questions. Repeatedly, I have discussed these questions with him. In my opinion, the whole discord is caused, as he sees it, by the stand taken by the United States in the UNO on motions of censor against France because of its acts in Algeria.

Recently, I have gained the impression that de Gaulle is slowly moving away from his opposition towards any integration. In my opinion, the development of the Algerian question, on the whole, has exercised some favorable influence.

As you know,

- 3 -



As you know, a few days ago we had a meeting of the six Heads of Government in Paris. Because of the somewhat incomprehensible attitude of the Foreign Minister of The Netherlands, no definite resolution was achieved. Such a resolution will be achieved at a conference scheduled in Bonn in May. The proposals and statements made by de Gaulle, as well as the statements made by him to me alone, evidence that he has made a great step toward Europe. Furthermore, I see in his statement that no further nuclear tests would be conducted in the Sahara a cautious turning away from his previous attitude concerning the question of nuclear armament. If now, in connection with the arming of NATO, the question of furnishing NATO with nuclear weapons could be solved satisfactorily, I believe that the attitude of France toward NATO would undergo a change. It is necessary for us to exercise perseverance and patience. I deem this decision by de Gaulle as a politically important step. In my opinion, one has to see jointly the present trend toward Europe and the abandonment of further tests in the Sahara. In my personal talks with de Gaulle, I found the latter more in sympathy with my thoughts than has been the case for a long time. The difficulties, which had arisen between France and us since my visit to Rambouillet in summer 1960, have been removed since our meeting in Paris of last week.

For

- 4 -

For military and political reasons, I deem it absolutely necessary to equip NATO, as soon as possible, with nuclear weapons—approximately in the form proposed by General Norstad. Decisive for the success of NATO will be the assumption of leadership by the United States in the NATO Council, which leadership, in my opinion, it must take as the strongest free power. There has been often a lack of this in past years. With its particular construction, the NATO Council is in need of strong leadership which can be furnished only by the United States.

I should like to mention one more matter. As I understand, over 100 persons are present at each session of the NATO Council. I do not know why so many persons need be present. Of course, if so many persons are present, secrecy cannot be preserved. Thus the discussions tend to lose their value.

Most probably, you will visit the NATO Council in Paris. May I extend a cordial invitation on such an occasion to visit me in Bonn.

With cordial regards,

as ever,

Yours,

/s/ Adenauer

/t/ (Adenauer)



7/31/62

7/31/62

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By <u>DoD</u>	Date <u>2/8/88</u>
NARS, Date <u>2/8/88</u>	

ENCLOSURE (to JCS 1907/526)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
International Security Affairs

In Reply Refer
to: I-18886/62

31 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Buildup Planning for Berlin Crisis

1. The President, in NSAM 109,* described the four phases into which he expected progressive US and Allied military action would fall in the process of meeting and countering Soviet/GDR measures to force the Western powers out of Berlin. The timing of Phase I cannot now be determined with any accuracy, but it appears more likely than not that Phase II will develop at least to some extent before satisfactory solutions can be arrived at, with always the very real possibility that Phase III and even Phase IV could follow.

2. A considerable volume of planning has been accomplished, by the US, the tripartite and quadripartite powers, and NATO, in anticipation of such a situation. SACEUR has stated, however, in paragraph 3 of his letter** of 24 March 1962 to the Chairman of the Standing Group on the subject of Berlin Contingency Planning, that the foundation offered by our present force posture is not strong enough to support satisfactorily the BERCON operations. In addition, the timing of preparatory measures required for these and for LIVE OAK plans has not been determined.

3. Your recommendations, therefore, are urgently requested on the timing and extent of US and Allied buildup in Phase II. Specifically, your best judgment is requested on the questions listed below.

a. Disregarding political implications, but from the view-point of military readiness,

* Attachment to JCS 1907/440

** SHAPE 70-62; on file in Joint Secretariat.

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DOB 20-5200-1

By KUD NARS, Date 2/8/88

(1) What degree and nature of US mobilization do you contemplate?

(2) When should it be ordered into execution?

b. What reinforcements should be ordered to Europe, and when should these forces be moved?

c. At what point, based on military considerations, should dependents be returned to the US?

d. What is your judgment on the contributions which are realistically feasible for and required from the NATO Allies, and your best estimate on the times at which these should be made?

e. From a practical and realistic viewpoint, what is the status readiness to execute the plans now in being?

f. Are there additional planning or preparatory measures which you believe should be taken? If so, what are they and what should their timing be?

g. In which phases of NSAM 109 do you consider that the specific LIVE OAK and BERCON/MARCON plans should most appropriately be executed?

4. At least a preliminary estimate is required for inclusion in a briefing now being prepared by the Department of State for presentation to the President, which is intended to describe for him the political, military, and economic planning which has been accomplished in the Berlin contingency, as well as to point out what work remains to be done in this area, and what decisions are, or may be, required. The exact time of this briefing has not yet been determined, but it is anticipated that it will be presented within the next week or ten days. For this purpose, therefore, the preliminary estimate is needed by the close of business Friday, 3 August.

/s/ Paul H. Nitze

SECRET

December 17, 1962

TO: The President
FROM: W. W. Rostow
SUBJECT: A Word On Nassau.

I understand that you have heard all the argument you wish to hear about the possible Polaris arrangement with Britain; but let me leave these thoughts with you for the plane, for I have rarely seen so dangerous a gap between a high level decision and the judgment of junior subordinates, in both Defense and State, and on both sides of the ocean. We could be wrong, but these thoughts may be useful if the picture in Nassau proves somewhat different from that in Washington.

1. The Polaris deal may upset the Brussels negotiation. The critical political issue for Macmillan, as well as for us, is getting into the Common Market. The Polaris deal, as presently conceived, will make this harder, not easier. It will appear to take the US-UK special tie over the watershed of aircraft into missiles as a fait accompli, with multilateralism a vague hope for the future. De Gaulle's case on the continent will be vastly strengthened.

2. It may be unnecessary. You will judge this on the spot, but the evidence is that, after the first shock of the SKYBOLT leak and the McNamara-Thornycroft confrontation, British public opinion has settled down quite a lot and is prepared to be much more rational than some of our people think as of this moment. They are falling away from a national nuclear deterrent, but Macmillan may not be prepared to commit himself to a multilateral force.

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3. It provides no clear operating track for de Gaulle and Adenauer. The critical problem that we and the British face and which justifies truly candid talk, is the spirit of a "special relation," i.e. in the short run, de Gaulle; and in the longer run, Germany. Our common task is to play de Gaulle and the French in ways which permit the Common Market negotiation to be completed; and in the long run to avoid Germany either turning away from the West or acquiring a national nuclear capability.

4. An alternative: The attached suggestion for a Nassau Track would solve the short run British political problem by something less drastic than a Polaris sale; would provide a line of negotiation with de Gaulle and of continuity with Adenauer. Specifically, you may wish to consider this alternative if you find Adenauer unwilling to sign on firmly now to a multilateral deal. Rather than soften that commitment, I would consider drawing back from the Polaris and going together with the British, as true partners, into the set of transitional moves with the Continent this memo sketches out.

5. After all, our common problem with Britain is to manage our affairs with the Continent in this generation better than our inter-war parents and pre-1914 grandparents. This is what should bind us at Nassau.

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
ITEM #	THE DOCUMENTS IN THIS FOLDER ARE NUMBERED FROM 1 TO 2.		
1a	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 4/97 6pp S Defense "Preface"/..../..	A
1b	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 4/97 1p S Defense "Conclusions"/..../..	A
1c	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 4/97 4pp S Defense "Introduction to NSAM 239 Review"/..../..	A
1d	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 4/97 6pp S Defense Memo for the President: "Subject: The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement"	6/12/63	A
1e	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 4/97 1p S Defense Table One/..../..	A
1f	DECLASSIFIED NLK-76-115 7pp S Defense "Possible Soviet Outlook"	6/12/63	A
1g	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 + NLK-88-34, 2/88; NLK-91-87, 6/91 SANITIZED NLK-94-76, 12/96 9pp S Defense Chinese analysis DECLASSIFIED NLK-94-76, 11/98	6/12/63	A
1h	EXEMPT NLK-76-115, 5/76 DECLASSIFIED NLK-91-99, 4/97 11pp S Defense European analysis/..../..	A
1i	EXEMPT NLK-76-115 & NLK-91-99, 5/90 20pp S Defense Diffusion in other areas Gordon, NLK-99-87 1103/..../..	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF:Departments and Agencies:ACDA, Disarmament, Nuclear Test Ban, Harriman Trip to Moscow, Briefing Book, Vol. I, "On U.S.-Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement", 6/63
Box 265. Page 1 of 2

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA FORM 1429 (8-85)

more on the previous subject
China in Vol II, as per ALP

Vol II date 20 June 1967
(see entries page 101)

Vol I + II (plus Vol II, which is
in NSF/376 (Kaysan 4/91)

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BRIEFING BOOK
ON
US - SOVIET NON-DIFFUSION AGREEMENT
FOR
DISCUSSION AT THE MOSCOW MEETING

COPY 4

Arthur Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary

(W/D)

BRIEFING BOOK
ON
US - SOVIET NON-DIFFUSION AGREEMENT
FOR
DISCUSSION AT THE MOSCOW MEETING

I N D E X

TAB A ... Preface

TAB B ... Can the Genie be Put Back in the Bottle?

TAB C ... Diffusion With and Without a Test Ban

TAB D ... Soviet Analysis

TAB E ... Chinese Analysis

TAB F ... European Analysis

TAB G ... Diffusion in Other Areas

TAB H ... JCS Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability

ANNEX ... Comments of Lord Home on East - West Relations

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Introduction to NSAM 239 Review


Subject: Can the Genie Be Put Back in the Bottle?

The smooth road down versus the rough road up.

In NSAM 239, the President wrote to the Committee of Principals and the Director of ACDA calling for "an urgent reexamination of the possibilities of new approaches to significant measures short of general and complete disarmament." In doing so, he said: "The events of the last two years have increased my concern for the consequences of an unchecked continuation of the arms race between ourselves and the Soviet Bloc."

The first problem of such a policy review must be the identification and formulation of U. S. national interests. To date, U. S. nuclear policy for armament and disarmament has been based primarily on a bilateral analysis of U. S. and Soviet military capabilities. Accordingly, we find within the government a debate among those who argue for strategic superiority vis-a-vis the Russian's to advance national security and others who argue that we should negotiate reduction of strategic forces by 50 to 75% to increase our national security. Actually both may be profoundly wrong.

A bilateral analysis is not a sound basis for formulating U. S. thermonuclear policy. The world is no longer bilateral. Indeed, the most significant and potentially most dangerous fact of the nuclear world is that it is on the verge of forever losing its essentially bilateral character. The acquisition of even a small number of atomic weapons by China, Israel, or the UAR decreases the power, influence and security of both the U. S. and



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the Soviet Union. Chinese development of 5 fifty kiloton weapons decreases the security of the U. S. more than the addition of 5 one megaton weapons to the current Soviet inventory. The enforced limitation on the diffusion of atomic and thermonuclear weapons is therefore the prime question of U. S. national strategy and consequently a major portion of the NSAM 239 review should be focused on this problem. Clearly, if the U. S. can take steps to insure that other nations do not build atomic weapons, it would be in our interests to do so and we should be prepared to pay a significant price to achieve this objective. The overriding question is whether or not the U. S. government can stop diffusion. The honest answer is that we don't know. It is equally clear that it would be irresponsible not to try.

Such an agreement, to be meaningful to the U. S. and of interest to the USSR, should consist of three parts:

- a. The nuclear powers should agree not to assist any non-nuclear power in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. (The acceptance by the USSR of France as a nuclear power is a mandatory requirement and is considered feasible provided the FRG is clearly estopped by the terms of the agreement from acquiring such weapons.
- b. The nations not currently possessing nuclear weapons would have to agree not to acquire such weapons.
- c. Initially on the basis of a private understanding between U. S. and USSR (to which we should make our principal NATO allies privy) and later through agreement by all states which have acceded to the treaty, there should be application of constraints adequate to insure that non-signatory states would not only sign but abide by the terms of the treaty. The non-signatory

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states would be induced by a combination of political and economic rewards and pressures to sign. The primary problem would, of course, be Communist China. In this case, it would probably be necessary to work out an arrangement with the USSR in which that country sought first to win Communist China's accession, but with the understanding that, should she fail, both super-powers would endeavor to apply trade restrictions including POL, chemical fertilizers, food stuffs, etc. Later, if necessary, military attacks could be carried out against nuclear production plants with the tacit consent of the USSR. In the case of the smaller nations such as Israel and the UAR, there would probably have to be a joint super-power guarantee of their borders or other satisfactory arrangements coupled with a clear signalling of intent by the super powers that these states must accede.

To date, there has been relatively little analysis of the possibilities of an enforced international agreement against the diffusion, testing, or production of nuclear weapons. Current strategy appears to be based on the assumption that modest steps such as the test ban are the best means to stop diffusion. There is little evidence to support this assumption and considerable evidence that it is not true. A broad U. S. - USSR agreement on an enforced diffusion treaty may be easier to achieve than the piecemeal approach which we are currently pursuing.

It is clear that the Soviet Union would not agree to enforcing a non-proliferation agreement without agreement on at least some of the other major issues. Therefore, it is the view of the Department of Defense that Presidential interest and the pace of events require a new initiative consisting of a four part inter-related proposal which should be communicated to the

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Soviet Union at a high level at the appropriate time and place.

This package should consist of:

- a. A non-proliferation agreement including appropriate sanctions to win accession from recalcitrant states.
- b. An agreement to limit strategic vehicles to agreed force levels.
- c. An agreement on force levels in Europe combined with a European Non-Aggression Pact.
- d. A nuclear test ban.

In subsequent papers we propose to analyze such a set of proposals.

We recognize that it is easier to ignore these questions than to face the difficult issues they raise. Nevertheless, we would do well to remember the words of Winston Churchill shortly before World War II:

"Still, if you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory can be assured and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance to survive. There may be even a worse case; you may have to fight when there is no hope of victory and it will be better to perish than to live in slavery."

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ON NUCLEAR DIFFUSION

VOLUME II

20 JUNE 1963

Prepared by
Arthur Barber
Deputy Assistant Secretary

I N D E X

TAB A ... PREFACE

TAB B ... A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

1. Soviet Union
2. France
3. Germany
4. Cuba

TAB C ... TACTICS AND TIMING

TAB D ... MILITARY AND OTHER SANCTIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA

TAB E ... ECONOMIC EMBARGO AGAINST COMMUNIST CHINA

TAB F ... EFFECTS OF AN EMBARGO ON THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF
COMMUNIST CHINA

TAB G ... CONTROLS ON NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR WEAPONS

APPENDICES

- I. International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards
and a Non-Proliferation Agreement
- II. Inspection for a Production Cutoff
- III. The Threat of Diffusion: The New Phase in
Soviet-American Relations

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(c) and 5(d) of (F)

By MEC NARS, Date 5/7/76

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7. The EUR paper at Tab B sets forth one approach which might be made to the French. A further exploration of alternative approaches, in somewhat greater detail, and specifically should be the task of Sub-Group III.

8. There remains the question of the Germans, Italians and the rest of NATO. Here I must record my feelings that there does not appear to be a clear enough appreciation on the part of the President as to how difficult the German problem is and can become. The Germans cannot be relegated indefinitely to an inferior nuclear status. Over the long run, if the British and French are successful in maintaining their independent nuclear forces it may be impossible to resist the German desire to secure an equal position. And, it should be made crystal clear that this is not a development which we can ourselves completely control. For this reason it is vital that the Germans have open to them an immediate alternative which if not just as good (in a political sense) as an independent nuclear capability, nevertheless, presents an acceptable role and indeed one which has some real attraction. So far as we are aware, the only alternative which fills this requirement, while at the same time avoiding the dangers to the Alliance which independent German nuclear capability would present, is the development of a multilateral force in which the Germans can participate. The exploration of the exact nature of this force is the task of Sub-Group IV. Here I think we can report to the President that we would hope to have specific recommendations for his approval in the reasonably near future. Until that Group has completed its study and provided recommendations for review by the Secretaries of State and Defense, it is difficult to anticipate the detailed characteristics of the multilateral force which would be proposed. One thing, however, is certain, namely that the development of this force should go forward at a rapid pace and that it is quite feasible for this to be accomplished without having every detail of the nature of the force agreed to. For example, if we are to propose an accelerated training program for the British and the French, there is absolutely no reason why the Germans, Italians, Belgians, and others, who might participate in the multilateral force cannot be similarly invited to participate at once. In any event, I do think it highly important to attempt to impress upon the President and Mr. McNamara that we should not accord a priority to the development of the British and French national forces which is well above that accorded to the multilateral force.

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W. H. St. John
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January 11, 1963

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MEMORANDUM

TO: S - The Secretary
FROM: Jeffrey C. Kitchen
SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Nassau Follow-Up

1. From our discussions with White House staff we gather that at your meeting with the President on Saturday morning he will be interested in (a) a review of the status of the various follow-up actions which are under way and (b) exchanging views on the substantive question of how we proceed with the implementation of the policy intent embodied in the Nassau agreements.

2. At Tab A I have attached a summary status report of all of the major follow-up activities.

3. As to the question of how we proceed to implement the policy intent embodied in the Nassau agreements, my judgment is that this issue is likely to center around the question of how we proceed with the French, although there are other important, even if subsidiary, questions which should also be explored. In connection with the French problem, EUR has produced a separate memorandum which has been forwarded to you by Bill Tyler. My suggestions as to how we should describe to the President the manner in which we believe the Nassau agreements should be implemented, are set forth in the paragraphs which follow.

4. Presumably Nassau was intended as a new departure in our policy toward the Alliance as a whole, and the French in particular, which in no way represented an abandonment of our ultimate objective of a politically, economically and militarily integrated Europe in the closest possible association with the US in a broad Atlantic Community. However, Nassau did imply, or so I interpret it, that we are now prepared to pursue a new path toward attainment of that ultimate objective. This path accepts as a fact with which we will have to live that the British are not yet ready to abandon their independent nuclear capability and that the French, at least for the immediate foreseeable future, will persist in developing such a capability. It is, therefore, assumed by the Nassau approach that the ability of the US to influence the policy of these two principal Allies

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will be directly related to the extent to which we accept their nuclear pretensions, at least over the short run, and indeed assist them in developing their capabilities. But, at the same time the Nassau agreement clearly contemplates that our ultimate objective in the nuclear field is a multilateral European effort, by which I understand an integrated European effort. Thus, the principal questions which must be answered are these:

a. At what pace do we wish to move in providing assistance to our principal Allies consistent with the above assumptions?

b. What are the minimum assurances which we require from them which will satisfy us that they are prepared to work with us toward the ultimate objective of nuclear multilateralism and, finally,

c. How, in pursuing the paths described in a. and b. above, do we carve out a logical and persuasive policy which meets the political aspirations of the remainder of the Alliance, but particularly of the Germans and secondarily the Italians.

It is the exploration of these three questions which I think the discussion with the President should center upon.

5. It is entirely likely that we may encounter a position on the part of Mr. McNamara which suggests that we should "go all out" to expedite the arrangements reached at Nassau which provide for assistance to the British and to the French. He may equate this with cutting corners in order to (a) make the financial arrangements as reasonable and palatable as possible, (b) press hard on establishing training arrangements, (c) move rapidly forward on exchanges of information, etc. All of this ~~activity~~ directed toward assisting the British and the French.

6. My own view is that expediting the arrangements with the British and the French represent only one part, although, admittedly, a very important part, of the objectives which we should continue to seek in implementing the Nassau agreements. Essentially what this DOD approach ignores is: (a) how fast and how far the British, and much more importantly the French, are willing to come in the direction of supporting our ultimate objectives and (b) how rapidly we can and must move in facilitating the establishment of the multilateral force.

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In connection with the former point, we are not yet in a position where we can reach a final judgment on how far our Allies are willing to go to support our ultimate policy objectives. The British so far seem to be coming along, if slowly. They supported the US position as set forth by Mr. Ball to the NAC and have, so far as we are aware, shown no positive signs of backing away from the agreement reached at Nassau. On the other hand, as one would expect, the British are not anxious to push the pace of their commitment to support the multilateral force while they are anxious, on the other hand, to expedite development of their national capabilities. My conclusion would be that with regard to the British our problem, for the time being, is manageable. So long as we continue to work earnestly with them on arrangements for providing them with the necessary assistance for the development of their national capabilities, I believe they will be prepared to support our initiatives to move forward on the multilateral force. The discussions with Solly Zukerman and the work of Sub-Group I suggest we are moving forward about as rapidly as practical with the British.

The problem with the French is both more difficult and more uncertain. We have so far had no real indication that President DeGaulle is prepared to accept any of our objectives as a valid basis for ultimate Alliance planning. For example, in his initial discussions with Ambassador Bohlen he reminded the Ambassador again of his great skepticism about the feasibility of a multilateral nuclear force. On the other hand, it is not insignificant that President DeGaulle did not foreclose further discussion and in fact seemed to leave the initiative in our hands. My conclusion, therefore, is that the issue is yet to be joined with the French. There is little likelihood of DeGaulle going very far at this time toward committing himself to an integrated Europe of the sort which we hold important. On the other hand, if our offers of assistance for the development of French nuclear forces are sufficiently attractive this may well pose a difficult dilemma for DeGaulle. In essence this is what I believe our policy toward the French should attempt to achieve, that is, the development of a proposal for providing assistance, in furtherance of the "similar terms" to be offered the French, which will be so attractive that DeGaulle will find it difficult to turn it down even though this involves his accepting an ultimate commitment to European multilateralism.

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The documents in this folder are numbered 1 - 4.

11/11/63

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FILES

Box 127a

COUNTRIES

UNITED KINGDOM

United Kingdom - Transcripts of Kennedy-Macmillan Phone Calls,
1/19/63 and 4/11/63

- 1/.../.. WH TS(...) ...
Magnetic audio tape (7" reel) of JFK telephone conversations with Macmillan, 01/19/63 and 04/11/63
- 2 07/24/63 WH U 4p
~~M. Zayac memo to E. Lincoln forwarding above tape and attached transcripts~~
- 3 01/19/63 WH TS(...) 4pp DECLASSIFIED NLK-98-42, 6/99
~~Transcript of JFK phone conversation with Macmillan~~
4. 04/../63 WH TS(...) 6pp DECLASSIFIED, 6/98
~~Transcript of JFK phone conversation with Macmillan~~

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Jan. 19, 1963

(transcript of telephone conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan)

Prime Minister: Hello.

President: Hello.

PM: Hello.

Pres. Prime Minister?

PM: Yes.

Pres: How are you doing over there?

PM: Very well.

Pres: Oh splendid, good. Listen, I appreciated your cable, and you got a copy, I think, of the letter we sent to Chancellor Adenauer?

PM: I've just got it -- it's splendid.

Pres: Oh fine, well, we were going to get the German Ambassador in this afternoon -- the Secretary of State was -- and say this in strong terms. And I just wondered if there was anything else you might suggest.

PM: No, I think it's absolutely fine. I think you've got to work on this man with a bit of flattery, you know.

Pres: Yes, Yes, Yes.

PM: Because he likes to think he's doing a fine job.

Pres: Right. Right.

PM: We all do, I suppose.

Pres: Yes, I know -- whether we are nor not!

PM: I say, did you enjoy Nassau? I loved it, didn't you?

Pres: Which, the...

PM: I thought it was awfully good.

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By <u>mmk</u> NARA Date <u>6/1/99</u>

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Pres: Which was that?

PM: The Nassau meeting.

Pres: Oh yes, very good, very good.

PM: And look, our thing here, which started rather badly, is all quieting down. I'm quite confident about it.

Pres: Oh, fine, good.

PM: It's all coming right. People are being sensible now.

Pres: Well, now I understood there was some matter at issue between Peter Thorneycroft and Bob McNamara. If there's any question on that, you can let me know.

PM: Yes, I'll let you know. I think they're hammering it out here.

Pres: Oh, I see, fine.

PM: And I won't worry you unless we have to.

Pres: Good, well, Prime Minister...

PM: And I'm very pleased because I thought you were perhaps a little worried. Both you and I thought we'd done a fine job -- when we got home we were told we'd made an absolute mess(?) of it.

Pres: Well, perhaps we did.

PM: ...I'll leave it alone. It is all quietly done. I think when we get to debate in about a fortnight I can put the whole thing in the proper perspective and I think we shall get it right.

Pres: What is your judgment about the course of events in the next few days on the Common Market?

PM: Well, I think it's a very bad situation. I think this man's gone crazy.

Pres: Yes, yes.

PM: Absolutely crazy.

Pres: Well, what do you think it is that's made him crazy?

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PM: He's simply inventing any means whatever to knock us out. It's a real simple thing -- you see, he wants to be the cock on a small dunghill instead of having two cocks on a larger one.

Pres: Yes, yes, yes.

PM: What"

Pres: Well, that's very sound, I suppose, from his point of view.

PM: Yes, but I mean it's very dangerous because all things we've worked for, he may break it up. On the other hand, the five have stood stronger than they've ever been before.

Pres: Right. Well, I think the important thing is to try to get him as isolated and make him appear to be really taking us all back 20 years, and...

PM: I think what we've got to do... our people have done quite well... if he wants to blackball us, then he must do it.

Pres: Yes.

PM: We mustn't let him get out on this small or that small issue.

Pres. Right. Right.

PM: Make it a big issue.

Pres: That's right.

PM: And put the whole burden on to him before the world.

Pres: That's right, because then in time it would have to change.

PM: Of course, a lot depends on this old gentleman he'll get a hold of tomorrow or the next day.

Pres: Well, he'll...

PM: He'll fascinate him, you know?

Pres: Yes.

PM: And bully him.

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Pres: Well, then he'll tell him that we made an accord. Isn't that what they're saying, that we have made an accord to sell out Berlin? Then he's also telling him that we're taking all our atomic weapons out of Europe, and various other stories.

PM: Well, I know. But on the other hand the German parties(?) seem to have done better. Adenauer may be frightened to go back.

Pres: Well, we'll get the German Ambassador in and say it again. Dean Acheson, who is an old friend of the Chancellor, sent him a very sharp message.

PM: I think a little bit of fear in his mind wouldn't be a bad thing.

Pres: No, that what I thought. That's what I thought.

PM: I quite agree with you.

Pres: So we'll try to do that this afternoon.

PM: I'll give you a ring as things develop, shall I?

Pres: Good, fine, Prime Minister.

PM: Right. Good night. Thanks a lot.

Pres: Thank you.

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January 26, 1963

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION (UNCLEARED)

SUBJECT: State-Defense Meeting on Group I, II and IV Papers

Participants

Defense: Secretary McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. Nitze
Mr. McNaughton
Admiral Lee

State: Secretary Rusk
Mr. Ball
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Schaetzel
Mr. Kitchen
Mr. Smith
Mr. Owen
Mr. Burdett
Mr. Popper
Mr. Weiss

White House: Mr. Bundy

AEC: Mr. Palfrey
Mr. Ramey

1. In the absence of Secretary Rusk who was meeting privately with Secretary McNamara, Mr. Ball opened the meeting. He referred to the overall agreement expressing the view that such an agreement could help to clarify the ambiguities in the Nassau terminology. In this connection, he referred to his NATO statement in which he attempted to differentiate between the NATO Nuclear Force, the multilateral component, the national components, etc. Mr. Gilpatric stated that he hoped that we could return to this subject when Secretary McNamara joined the meeting since he knew that Mr. McNamara felt strongly that negotiating an overall agreement would be counterproductive. In this connection, he referred to the recently received letter from Thorneycroft in which the British resistance to such a proposal was reiterated. He also pointed out that Mr. Ball's approach to clarification of the terminology through his statement to the NAC was consistent with the DOD thinking as to how the objectives sought within the overall agreement might be accomplished in a manner other than through negotiation of a formal document.

2. Mr. Ball offered the view that perhaps we need not formally table the agreement but could hand it to the British as a statement of US views. Mr. Gilpatric said that they did not feel that it would be profitable to try to reach a formal accord with the British, but had no objection to attempting to reach general agreement on concepts. Mr. Nitze stated that Mr. McNamara felt it would be a waste of time to attempt to negotiate an agreement. However, if we could put forth the

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document which we thought might be helpful, he was sure Mr. McNamara would have no serious objections to such an approach. Mr. Ball stated that there was some value in the British understanding quite clearly what the US has in mind. Mr. McNaughton indicated that presumably the paper given to the British would not be entitled Memorandum of Agreement. Mr. Ball said this was a matter which would be left open for the moment. Mr. Kitchen referred to the Secretary's feeling that there should be an "umbilical cord" between the overall philosophy of the Nassau Agreement and the specific sales arrangement on the Polaris.

3. Mr. Gilpatric suggested it would be useful to go through the document in order to discuss specific items, quite aside from how the document would be handled with the British. Mr. Ball indicated that a number of changes had been made in the State discussions this morning, and referred as an example to the handling of the British conventional military effort. Mr. Nitze stated that this is precisely the item which would cause considerable trouble, referring to the difficult negotiating over the matter at Nassau. He stated that the British would reject the notion they had agreed at Nassau to meet NATO force requirements. Mr. Ball pointed out that Mr. McNamara had been preoccupied with the problem of securing an additional NATO conventional buildup. Mr. Nitze agreed but stated that Defense did not believe that we could get the British to agree to the language in question.

4. Mr. Ball suggested that this subject might be left for a moment and proposed that the discussion move to the question of tactical nuclear weapons. He indicated that State had added some language back into the draft proposal which DOD had before it, in view of our feeling that we could not entirely avoid reference to this matter in the overall agreement given its explicit inclusion in the published Nassau Agreements. General Taylor indicated his agreement with this and suggested that some clarification was required with regard to our attitude toward consultation with our Allies on this subject. He pointed out that we could not after all decline to talk to them should they wish to raise the tactical nuclear weapons issue. Mr. Nitze suggested that we might indicate to the British our willingness to discuss this problem with our Allies and to include language which would convey this. This was agreed.

5. Discussions then moved to paragraph 3 in the overall agreement dealing with the multilateral force. Mr. Nitze noted the possibility that the British may indicate their willingness to participate, through a contribution of manpower but not

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By <u>CH</u> NARA Date <u>12/12/08</u>

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financially. Mr. Ball stated that we would in that event have to decide whether such participation was acceptable to us. The discussion then turned to the question of whether the language in paragraph 3 implied a joint US-UK approach to NATO, and it was suggested that the words "engage in" be substituted for "undertake" in order to avoid any implication of a requirement for a joint approach.

6. Mr. Ball indicated that a further review of the paper from the point of view of the existing practice on notification to NAC was required.

7. General Taylor stated that in paragraph 2 the term assignment arose for the first time. He questioned whether the meaning of this term was clear. Mr. Ball thought it was, but General Taylor pointed out that there had been considerable confusion in the Sub-Group discussion of this matter. In this connection, reference was made to Nassau language which utilized other terminology such as "subscribing." However, Mr. Ball maintained that the word "assigned" was the operational word in the sentence in question.

(At this point the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense joined the meeting).

8. Mr. Ball referred to the previous conversation on the overall agreement. The Secretary stated that it was necessary to deal with the problem within the four corners of the Nassau Agreement. What we wish to avoid, is having the British accept our Polaris offer and then forget the remainder of the obligations imposed within the Nassau Agreements. He also noted that when we reported to the NAC we wished to avoid the impression that Nassau simply involved the sale of Polaris to the UK. For these reasons, it was necessary to have an overall agreement. At the same time, he stated that we should not press the British unduly if we find our proposal presents political problems from their point of view. We should not, as he had heard others refer to it, "renegotiate Nassau." He pointed out that State had made further amendments in the language this morning which would take into account our desire not to overreach with the British. At the same time, he thought it important that they be clear as to the US views. He indicated he was interested in making sure that Nassau language did not concentrate on concealing differences rather than reflecting agreements.

9. Mr. McNamara stated he agreed in general, but referred to the problem of the British conventional military effort as it was treated in the proposed overall agreement. He stated that he had had several conversations with Thorneycroft on

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this subject, and he believed that British understood and agreed with the necessity for increasing their efforts. He said they intended to budget about 7% of their GNP (actually about 7½%) and he personally felt this would be adequate, in fact he thought it would not be in our interest to seek a higher British effort. Thus, it was important that the British limit their effort on nuclear military expenditures and this was one reason for negotiating a Polaris deal which would permit the British to benefit from advanced US technology. In this way, it would make it easier for them to finance their nuclear requirements. Mr. McNamara stated he fully supported the Secretary's thesis on retaining an "umbilical cord" relationship, but he did believe that we should not renegotiate or advance broader interpretations of Nassau.

10. The Secretary cited the conventional force reference and indicated its importance. Mr. McNamara agreed, but stated that there was a danger in pushing too hard. He would not want to see a reduction in British force commitments elsewhere in the world in order to increase their NATO capabilities. He alluded to the importance of British contribution from "Aden to Hong Kong." He said he doubted that it was feasible for the British to increase their defense contribution above 7% of GNP. The Secretary stated that it was not feasible because the government had not taken the difficult political steps required to prepare the population for the greater sacrifice. Mr. McNamara said conscription might be reinstituted over a 3 to 5 year period, but doubted that much beyond this would be possible. The Secretary asked his colleagues how they felt about reverting back to the specific language of Nassau on this question.

11. In reply, Mr. Burdett offered the suggestion that we might start with the Nassau agreements, but attempt to persuade the British to go further on the grounds that this would have a good effect on others in NATO, a thought which might appeal to the British. Mr. McNamara said this approach was entirely acceptable. He stated that in his view our principal target should be the Germans, who were not contributing either enough men or enough money to the NATO conventional defense effort. He cited the Canadians and Belgians as also being in default. If the British could be induced to ^{accept} more forthcoming language on the grounds that this could be used as a lever on the Germans, this would be fine. The Secretary noted that particularly in light of the rumored reduction in the French conventional budget, the British might be persuaded that a more forthcoming attitude on their part would be well received on the continent.

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12. In moving to further matters, the Secretary referred to the reinsertion of wording covering the tactical nuclear contribution. Secretary McNamara stated that he believed that reinclusion of language covering this matter was wise, despite his substantive reservation as to the desirability of including tactical nuclears in the force.

13. The discussion then moved on to paragraph 3 dealing with the notification to NATO. The Secretary referred to his desire to avoid a French procedural veto. Mr. Gilpatric explained the modification of language which had been discussed prior to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk joining the meeting. The revised language was agreed to.

14. The discussion then moved to the relationship between the paragraph 8 and paragraph 6 forces particularly with regard to withdrawal. Mr. McNamara felt that Nassau was clear with regard to the former and less so with regard to the latter, but he did not believe we should try to settle this issue in the overall agreement with the British. The Secretary stated that we might clarify it elsewhere, but that clarification was important. Mr. McNamara agreed and suggested that the Group II negotiation could cover the point. Mr. Popper agreed this was possible.

15. General Taylor asked which negotiation would be conducted first. Mr. Burdett explained that our plan was to have an overall group with three negotiating teams, one on the overall agreement, one on the technical agreement and one on the Aide Memoire. The proposal was to provide the British with the three documents by next Wednesday (the 30th) requesting that the British team arrive by February 4 to undertake the negotiation. The three negotiations would be conducted simultaneously. The Secretary stated that at the time we give the British the documents, we should impart quite a bit of our thinking as to what lies behind them. If we fail to provide a sufficient rationale, the British would tend to freeze their thinking perhaps based on erroneous assumptions. Mr. Nitze stated that consistent with the foregoing, the reference to the handling of paragraph 6 forces on page 3 should be explained to the British. The Secretary suggested that we should know in short order whether the British would be willing to discuss an overall agreement and if we determine that they were reluctant to do so, we might revert to an extensive preamble to the technical agreement in order to maintain the "umbilical cord."

16. Mr. Gilpatric noted that paragraph 6 provided for notification to NATO rather than the President. There was some discussion as to the genesis of the word "temporary" relating to the withdrawal question. Mr. Ball pointed out that this

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reference was contained in MacMillan's minute. The Secretary pointed out that the British might resist making this or other portions from the minute, which is classified, public.

17. Secretary McNamara indicated that he saw problems in having three negotiations going on simultaneously. He expressed the hope that it would not result in holding up the Polaris sale negotiation until the other political agreements were completed. He believed it should be possible to preserve the "umbilical cord" without doing so, but feared that certain of the points in the other agreements might take weeks of negotiation. Mr. Ball stated he disagreed. He alluded to the events of the last 10 days which, in his view, underlined the vital political importance which should be attached to the manner in which we approach the negotiations with the British. He felt that the danger of proceeding with the Polaris Agreement well in advance of the other portions of the negotiation would be that this would be misinterpreted to the disadvantage of our broader European policy objectives. He pointed out that unless the British clearly understand what we intended by Nassau, this could aggravate our problems of relationships with Europe. The Secretary stated that unless we receive evidence of a British attempt to pull away from Nassau, there was no reason why we could not go ahead with the Polaris very rapidly. In fact he suspected that we could finish negotiating the political aspects before the technical agreements were concluded (in this connection, he alluded to the complicated R&D problem).

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18. Mr. Ball expressed the view that the language of Nassau was in certain respects rather ambiguous and that it was important that these ambiguities be corrected. Mr. Bundy agreed, but expressed the need for caution when we departed from clarification and get into matters of substantive interpretation. Mr. McNamara stated that so long as the conclusion of the Polaris agreement was not made conditional upon getting a final agreement on the political negotiations the proposed course of action was satisfactory to him. The Secretary indicated that it was also important at this time to capitalize upon the forthcoming British attitude on multilateralism. Mr. McNamara indicated that very great care would have to be exercised in handling the withdrawal issue since this was a matter of key importance to the British. Mr. Ball said it was his inclination not to change the Nassau language on withdrawal. He went on to point out that we had a period of difficult discussions with the Europeans to look forward to and that it was important that the British not undercut our position in Europe after the Polaris deal was signed. Mr. McNamara said he saw no signs of such a British attitude as yet. In summing up, the Secretary stated that it was possible that the British might resist the overall agreement when we first advance it. In which event he would suggest that our proposed discussion of the other two and on the basis of these discussions, if the British agreed with us that there would be the advantages which we foresaw to the signing of an overall agreement, we could then come back to our original proposal for such an agreement.

19. The discussion then moved to the Sub-Group II assignment of forces issue. The Secretary stated that he gathered the paragraph 5 command relationship represented the principal problem. Mr. McNamara confirmed this stating that he favored the Defense language. He said he could not at this time support the overall nuclear planning function envisioned in the State language. He was concerned that the conventional role of the strike aircraft would be prejudiced by such an arrangement. He also expressed doubts as to its necessity. The Secretary inquired as to how, below SACEUR, the responsibility for targeting and planning was carried out. General Taylor responded by indicating that any Commander could request coverage of a target of particular interest to him. He stated that SACEUR's Deputy for Air was actually responsible for the function. The Secretary asked the nationality of this officer and General Taylor replied that he was an American. Mr. McNamara injected that this officer had no forces specifically assigned to him and this his planning covered forces which had both a conventional and a nuclear capability. In this connection General Taylor stated that if, consistent with the State

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proposal, we wished to give the new Commander over-all responsibility for planning and targeting on the nuclear side, this would only make sense if he was also given similar responsibility for the conventional side as well.

20. The Secretary admitted that he was personally inclined to feel that we should be careful to avoid confusing command responsibilities. However, he referred to previous conversations within the Department and asked if his colleagues would care to comment on the point. Mr. Popper stated that the State view stemmed from a strongly felt need that the new Commander must be looked upon as having a position of considerable importance, if we are going to derive the desired political impact. General Taylor said that to the military people the new Commander will unquestionably look important because he controls the fire power which is what is important to a military man. Mr. McNamara agreed that the new Commander would look very important, pointing out that he would be the recognized authority in NATO on strategic nuclear warfare. It would no longer be necessary to send teams to provide the Europeans with data on nuclear problems since this new Commander would have access to all such information.

21. Mr. McNamara stated that the reference to verification and attainment of operating standards created problems. He indicated that the exact intent of the words was not clear and that he would, in any event, wish to discuss this with SACEUR first before taking any action. He expressed the view that this was a matter which could be worked out but that it would take a considerable period of time and, in any event, would not appear to be an essential part of the para. 5 language. The Secretary inquired as to why we could not get SACEUR's comments promptly. Mr. McNamara stated that it might take weeks to define exactly what was intended by the "verification and attainment of operational standards." For example, would this mean that non-US nationals would have access to all parts of our Polaris submarines in order to accomplish the necessary verification? He pointed out that our current legislation would probably preclude this. Mr. Bundy stated that we certainly wanted to move in this direction, but conceded there was a problem of timing. He stated that he assumed that we would not formalize the proposals contained in the Group II Paper before showing them to General Lemnitzer. Secretary McNamara agreed. The Secretary indicated to Mr. McNamara that he would call him later after having some further discussion with his colleagues.

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22. General Taylor pointed out that the reference to Polaris subs "not now committed" created a problem in connection with the Athens language in that the Secretary of Defense had indicated at Athens that in addition to the 5 subs explicitly committed at that time others would be following on which would also be committed.

Secretary McNamara said that in effect there were 3 classes of Polaris: those assigned to NATO, those earmarked or committed to NATO and those neither earmarked nor committed. He stated that the targeting of the subs should be at the direction of SACEUR. However, this could result in a very inefficient targeting. For example, to target Polaris on Soviet MRBMs would not make sense since the Polaris CEP was too high and as a result we would have to use too many Polaris to assure destruction of a given MRBM. This was quite wasteful. On the other hand, a Minuteman, perhaps located in Montana, might provide a much better weapon against an MRBM. This raises a question of negotiating with SACEUR as between the targets which the Polaris would strike and those hit through other means. He said he thought this was a matter which would be worked out. The Secretary asked whether it was not a problem of coordination of targeting. Mr. McNamara said that it was. General Taylor referred again to the specific language by which the US made its commitment of Polaris to NATO. Secretary McNamara said that we should clarify our position by indicating that the assignment of the 3 Polaris in question were in addition to the 5 which we had previously committed to NATO. ✓

23. General Taylor asked why the independent nuclear Commander was raised. Mr. Popper referred to Mr. Ball's statement to the NAC in which a separate nuclear Commander was identified as one possibility. Mr. Ball clarified what he had said in Paris pointing out that he had indicated that this was a matter which would have to be worked out. The Secretary stated that in light of the fact that we did not have a US position on this matter it was somewhat premature to raise it in the paper and suggested that the reference be dropped. It was agreed that a period should be placed after the word "SACEUR" and the next sentence deleted. (p. 3, para. 6 of Draft instruction).

24. General Taylor pointed out that the paragraph at the top of page 4 contemplated the possibility of a British Commander. He said he was not opposed to this idea but wondered whether it was necessary to raise the point at this time. He suggested that it might be wise to hold it back as

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a negotiating point. Mr. McNamara supported the idea of a British Commander. Mr. Bundy thought it would not be good negotiating tactics or good psychology to hold back on this point if it were to be offered at all. He asked what would be the European attitude to the appointment of a British Commander. Mr. McNamara thought that it would forward US objectives and that it would erode the view that the US intends to hold on to all of the nuclear commands. The Secretary stated that such a proposal would have an advantage in our relationship with the British who were feeling rather lonely at this time. Mr. Nitze noted that the Germans had strong feelings about the necessity for a German officer to be placed high in the command. Secretary McNamara pointed out that US officers probably could be expected to have reservations about non-US officers being placed in charge of a key command. However, he did not believe this would be a serious problem and that having a non-US national in charge would be politically useful. General Taylor stated that the British should be made to understand that our proposal for them to head the command should not be interpreted as giving the British a "lock" on it; that it was a temporary appointment. Mr. Nitze stated that the Germans already feel discouraged at the number of French and British senior officers currently in the NATO command. He recommended that we carefully consider where the Germans fit in this new command structure. Mr. McNamara stated that while we might indicate a US willingness to start with the UK Commanders, we could express our hope that the British might support us in the eventual rotation to German or other non-US national at a later date. In this connection he mentioned that while he personally saw no reason to keep the Polaris always under SACEUR he thought it was important that we start out this way. The Secretary agreed with the discussion on non-US nationals in the Command though he pointed out that the ticket for admission into the force for non-nuclear members of NATO must be through participation in the MLF.

25. The Secretary then suggested that the consideration move to the Group IV paper. Mr. McNamara in noting the reference to size of the force in paragraph 2 suggested that the words "at least" be substituted for the word "about" in referring to the lower limit of 200 missiles.

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General Taylor in referring to the discussion under targetting said that it was not clear to him as to what was intended. He pointed out that there was not a complete integration of US and NATO targetting at the moment. That it was not all in a single hopper. The Secretary replied that we should not permit a contest between US and NATO targetting. General Taylor agreed but he pointed out that, for example, if we were today forced to open up all of our planning to the Europeans, the US might be considerably embarrassed since the plans would disclose that the targets of primary interest to the US were covered with a much higher degree of destruct probably than were targets primarily directed against Western Europe. Mr. Bundy said he could well appreciate this problem but that he felt it was inevitable that we would have to move in the direction of a much fuller disclosure of just such information if we were going to protect ourselves against the DeGaulle charges that the entire US package of nuclear proposals really represented a political facade. He pointed out that in this connection the current US military planning which accords this higher destruct ratio to weapons of interest to the US might have to be changed through civilian guidance to the military Commanders. Mr. McNamara stated he fully agreed with Mr. Bundy's comments. ✓

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26. General Taylor questioned whether the proposed delegation to SACEUR was politically acceptable. Mr. Owen responded that it was consistent with the previous commitment made by the US. Mr. McNamara stated that this subject needed a tremendous amount of additional work. He stated that in his view our objective ought to be to participate in all decisions to fire. In response to a question he agreed that this amounted to no advance delegation. Mr. Smith pointed out that we had moved in the direction of advanced delegation at Athens and that we could not appear to be backing away from that position without serious political harm to our position. Mr. McNamara said that he would strongly oppose the delegation of authorization to SACEUR to fire. Mr. Owen pointed out that the language in question was taken from the paper approved by the President prior to the Athens commitment. Mr. McNamara stated that he was perfectly willing to discuss the matter at length but that offhand he could not see the wisdom of such a delegation. He said he would like to explain the basis for his views. Mr. McNamara went on to describe the possibilities which existed for an accidental launch of a missile against the USSR. He pointed out that we were spending millions of dollars to reduce this problem to a minimum, but that we could not assure ourselves completely against such a contingency. Moreover he suggested that it was unlikely that the Soviets were spending as much as we were in attempting to narrow the limits of possible accidental launch. He went on to describe crashes of US aircraft one in North Carolina and one in Texas, where, by the slightest margin of chance, literally the failure of two wires to cross, a nuclear explosion was averted. He concluded that despite our best efforts, the possibility of an accidental nuclear explosion still existed. Therefore, he did not believe that anyone other than the President should decide to launch in response to an apparent nuclear attack. He stated that it was his personal belief that we should not even recommend such action to the President until we know the details about a given detonation --whether or not it was Soviet launched, how large, where it occurred, etc. He said he realized that this view was not fully shared but that it accounted for his thinking that advance delegation to fire nuclear weapons was not in the US interest. General Taylor asked whether the rest of NATO forces would be tied to such an advance delegation to fire. Mr. Smith replied that it was his belief that other US weapons would have gone off before the SACEUR delegation could have been acted upon. He went on to state that unless there was some movement in the direction of delegation, in his view we

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The Secretary asked if it was not correct that some advance delegation has already been made to US Commanders. Secretary McNamara said that this was correct, but such delegation was very limited. General Taylor asked whether the rest of NATO forces would be tied by such an advance delegation to fire. Mr. Smith replied that it was his belief that other US weapons would have gone off before the SACEUR delegation could have been acted upon. He went on to state that unless there was some movement in the direction of delegation, in his view we

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may as well give up on the possibility of the MLF concept. He said we should not delude ourselves into believing that we could temporize on the issue of control, that the Germans, the Italians and others will want to know whether the force will be subject to a U.S. veto.

27. The Secretary stated that he shared Secretary McNamara's concern about an accidental firing and had himself been thinking about the need for a special procedure, such as an immediate appeal to the UN to all Nations to cease any military activity in the face of a nuclear detonation until a determination as to its exact nature had been made, to cover the possibility of accidental detonations. Moreover, he said that we must be sure that national governments cannot send messages directly to Commanders of their own nationality to permit them to utilize the authority of the advance delegation. He pointed out that, for example, at some point there might be a German Commander of the NATO Nuclear Force and we must avoid any possibility of his getting word to fire from the German Government, circumventing the established channels and procedures. General Taylor referred to the permissive link. The Secretary asked who would hold the control over the Permissive Link. General Taylor answered that this would be SACEUR and that if we cannot depend upon him then, of course, everything would be gone. Secretary McNamara stated that it was his view that only the President should decide that the conditions specified in the guidelines had been met. Mr. Bundy said that the heads of government would want to retain this decision for themselves and would not want to delegate the firing authority. Mr. McNamara agreed.

28. The Secretary pointed out that it would not be possible to proceed with our proposals without having a solid legislative base. He noted that we had previously stated that we would look at European proposals dealing with the control issue and he questioned whether we needed to go further at this time. Mr. Smith said that he would be happy to see us stand with what we had previously committed ourselves to. He said that Sub-Group IV only attempted to spell out in somewhat greater detail how the control problem might be handled because the Secretary and Mr. McNamara had wanted to see the issue set forth in greater detail. He said he would personally prefer to see the matter left rather general, but that on the other hand we cannot "walk the cat back" in terms of our previous commitments on the veto question for if we do the multilateral force will be a non-starter. Secretary McNamara said that there were two separate problems which needed to be considered. First, there was a question of greater participation by foreign governments in the

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
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control issue, the second had to do with advance delegation. He thought these two matters should be treated separately. Mr. Bundy said he thought that the President can reaffirm our willingness to act in Europe's defense but that on nuclear matters we cannot remove ourselves from participation "at the moment of truth." Mr. Smith said the question was can we go as far as we previously have? Mr. McNamara repeated that he was against advance delegation. Mr. Smith said that he wished to make it clear that he was too, except that there was no other way to get the hundreds of millions of dollars for a multilateral force which we were proposing. Mr. McNamara stated that he was not aware that the Europeans had made advance delegation as a condition of their participation in the force. Mr. Smith said that they had not. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the force must, of course, be creditable and we must assure the Europeans that it will go off under certain specified circumstances, including a wide scale attack on NATO. Mr. McNamara said that our representatives should do nothing to encourage the idea of advance delegation and that moreover in his opinion the heads of States will not wish to delegate this authority. It was agreed that a redraft of the paragraph on control would be required.

29. The Secretary then shifted the discussion to the problem of design data. /At this point General Taylor left for another appointment/. The Secretary pointed out that this might be only one of several issues which would require an amendment to existing legislation. Mr. Palfrey of the AEC said that Sub-Group IV had concluded that it would make no sense to try to get around the legislative problem through the use of gimmicks. Such an attempt would inevitably be seen through and any support which might otherwise be generated would be lost. Mr. McNamara said that there was a feeling of some on the Commission as well as in the Navy that the release of design data to the MLF would eventually result in its getting back to the Soviets. He said that even if the information did get back to the Soviets, and we presumably had to go on the assumption that this was likely, he did not believe that this would be a serious loss given the state of Soviet technology. ✓

30. The discussion then turned to the question of surface vessels vs. submarines. Mr. McNamara said that Admiral Anderson had stated categorically that it was his belief that the survivability of submarines far exceeded that of surface vessels. The Secretary stated that he would accept this judgment as a fact but that it was only one of several matters which bore on the issue of whether it was desirable to opt for surface vessels or submarines. Mr. McNamara agreed. Mr. Ball pointed out, in a

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light vein, that on the question of survivability of surface vessels we encountered great difficulty in finding and pinpointing Soviet ships during the Cuban engagement. Mr. McNamara stated that, nevertheless he believed that on the basis of cost per survivable missile the equation was in favor of the submarine as against surface vessels. He pointed out that though a Navy Study existed which suggested that the surface vessel could attain an acceptable level of survivability his proposal to the Navy that remaining unobligated funds for Polaris submarines (in the order of magnitude of \$3 billion) be shifted to missile carrying surface vessels received a quick and definite rejection. Mr. Smith asked Mr. McNamara what his judgment was on the survivability surface vessels vs. submarines as this related to Congressional approval. McNamara stated that he believed we can get Congressional approval on submarines although if this assumption was unwarranted this was a matter to be discussed right now. Mr. Bundy stated that in his judgment, the issue of Congressional approval on the surface vessels vs. submarine issue, although that issue might create considerable argumentation, would not basically affect any votes. Mr. Ramey expressed the opinion that it would be easier to get Congressional approval of the surface vessels. Mr. Bundy repeated his doubts. The Secretary, addressing Mr. McNamara, stated that he believed we had a working agreement on this subject and suggested that we move on to the issue on page 3, paragraph 9 b. dealing with the cost problem.

31. Mr. McNamara said he was willing to add a sentence to indicate an annual cost of \$5 million per missile per year over the life of the missile. Under these circumstances he was willing to leave in paragraph a. and b.

32. The Secretary referred to the discussion on page 4 dealing with the relationship between the NNF and conventional force requirements. Mr. McNamara stated that he fully appreciated why State did not want to see an organic linkage between the MLF and conventional force requirements. However, in his view, particularly regarding Germany, there must be an approach to the two problems simultaneously and through the same negotiating team. This would involve a five year budgetary projection which would cover both expenditures for the MLF and for conventional requirements. The Secretary asked Ambassador Merchant if he would address himself to the issue with specific reference as to whether we would not likely gain our objectives more adequately on the conventional effort through bilateral negotiations which were not explicitly related to the nuclear force. He said there must, of course be a relationship, but the MLF should not be made

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contingent upon satisfactory conventional performance. Mr. Merchant replied that he favored the bilateral approach as being most effective. He said that he frankly disagreed with Mr. McNamara's proposals that the same negotiation should encompass both the conventional and nuclear force budgetary discussions. He said that it would, of course, be possible to bring into the discussions the desirability of conventional increase but that we could not make one conditional upon the other without overloading the negotiating burden on the MLF which is the best answer we have been able to devise as a means for discouraging national proliferation of nuclear capabilities. He said that on the basis of his rather brief introduction to the problem he was not personally satisfied that the enthusiasm of the Germans and the others for the MLF was so high as had previously been assessed and that therefore there was danger of overloading this particular horse.

33. Mr. Bundy also referred to the German political scene at the present moment and particularly the German suspicion regarding US views on the conventional build-up. He stated that we should not give those who might be suspicious of US intentions a chance to say that the MLF was being marketed in what was virtually an unmarketable manner. He said that paradoxical as it may sound he believed that we could get the conventional contribution only if we first go after the MLF. The Secretary commented to Mr. McNamara on the relevance of the discussions of the preceding day after the NSC meeting. He said that it was important that the US not project its commitment to the MLF beyond the extent to which the Europeans demonstrated their own interest in this force. He stated that the issue created by DeGaulle requires that we rally the forces which exist in Europe in support of the MLF concept. Moreover, he stated that he rather gathered that we had not been as persuasive with our Allies as we might have been regarding the utility of a conventional strategy which in turn would support the need for a conventional build-up. He noted that apparently even some of the European military had reservations on this matter. He said personally he believed that this was a phony issue and that the problem lie primarily in the unwillingness of the Europeans to take the necessary political measures required. He indicated that he had nevertheless asked for an analysis on this issue of the strategic confrontation between our European Allies and ourselves. Thus, he said there were several elements in the picture which led him to the conclusion that we should discuss the problem of conventional requirements bilaterally. If the Germans were willing to lay out a conventional budget projection for five years that would be fine.

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He also stated that we should discuss this matter with the new German Defense Minister.

34. Mr. McNamara stated that he felt the pressures which existed on him would require him to have to recommend withdrawal of a substantial number of US forces from Europe before the end of the year if the Germans did not come up with more money and men. And, he added, by substantial he meant up to one-half. He pointed out that the combination of the gold drain on the one hand and the unwillingness of our Allies to accept our conventional strategic concepts on the other would force such a decision. Mr. Bundy asked whether the two budgetary questions could not be separated. Mr. McNamara said he did not see how since a commitment to a five year projection on the MFL side, which was required if a country's commitment was to be meaningful, automatically tended to foreclose certain flexibilities on the conventional side. Mr. Bundy said that when the problem was looked at from our point of view it seemed simple enough, but this was not the case when looked at from the German point of view in the present political context. He wondered whether it would not be possible to write instructions to our negotiators which directed them to deal with the conventional problem as they proceeded to negotiate the MFL issue. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Germans and particularly the German military, simply do not think like us on this matter of a conventional defense of Europe. Mr. Ball stated that they were still following the massive retaliation doctrine. Mr. McNamara said this might be so but questioned whether we should continue to continence this. If the Germans commit themselves to spend a given amount on the MLF and if we then subsequently ask them to improve their conventional posture they would simply not be in a position to do so.

35. The Secretary stated that his views were unquestionably affected by the recent position of DeGaulle. He said that if the Allies want a MLF and find that they cannot get it without a prior commitment to a conventional build-up then there is a distinct possibility that they will not undertake the MLF venture. Under these circumstances the Alliance could easily break up and then the difference between 24 and 30 divisions would become unimportant. Mr. Ball pointed out that also once the Alliance started down the nuclear path the likelihood of the Europeans being more responsive on the conventional side would increase. Once they are confident that they have a nuclear reliance this would be the case, whereas the more we press on the conventional side in advance of developing such a nuclear force the more they are likely to believe that we do not want to fight for Europe but rather over Europe.

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Authority	NUM 979037
By	CH NARA Date 12/12/08

TOP SECRET

- 18 -

36. Mr. McNamara said that we should be clear that what was being proposed was a major change of policy and he cited the President's letter. He said that if such a change in approach would be advantageous we should, of course, consider this but that he could not help but worry about the possible consequences of the removal of US forces from Europe. He pointed out that there were 80 thousand personnel in Europe being supported by the US just to supply our Allies with logistics back up. He said that this was intolerable and would have to stop and that in the absence of a change in the gold drain and in Europe's attitude toward conventional build-up we would have to remove about one-half of the forces from Europe before the end of the year. Mr. Bundy said that this time period should not be viewed as a fixed point any more than various of the other targets. He said that if we were talking about a two or three year period, Mr. McNamara's proposition would be more reasonable. The Secretary stated that the withdrawal of one-half of US forces before the end of this year would make the gold problem the least of our worries. He said he would not want to argue that the existing European attitude was consistent with our interests but that he would not think the problem could be solved in the short run. Mr. Bundy supported this view and reiterated that a two to three year time frame might be reasonable but that we cannot tie the Europeans down to make the necessary changes within the next six months. This he thought was asking too much. The Secretary stated that we must keep the people who are around the Chancellor looking toward the Atlantic Community for their first allegiance rather than having them veer off toward DeGaulle. He said he was not minimizing the problem of getting a more adequate conventional effort but he just did not believe that this could be made an explicit condition upon our willingness to participate in the MLF. He suggested that this was a matter which he and Secretary McNamara should talk to the President on.

37. Mr. Merchant asked whether as a matter of factual information the conventional increases went beyond Western Union or NATO force goals. Mr. McNamara answered that it did not. He pointed out that the Germans were committed to 12 divisions and 4 brigades which they were attempting to meet with a force of 400 thousand men. This he said simply could not be done and that it was clear that the Germans did not intend to support their forces in the field.

38. The Secretary indicated that a number of the principals had prior engagements and that the meeting would have to stand adjourned.

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TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>MM 979037</u>
By <u>CA</u> NARA Date <u>12/12/08</u>

3/16/63



Admiralty House
Whitehall, S.W. 1

TOP SECRET

March 16, 1963.

IMMEDIATE

Dear Friend —

I was very glad to get your message about the whole problem of the nuclear forces.

The more I think of it, the more constructive I believe our Nassau declaration was. In whatever form our plans ultimately emerge, the spirit in which they were launched has undoubtedly been more and more understood as the weeks have passed. I was very glad too to have a chance of seeing an old friend, Livvy Merchant, and to hear from him some account of his journeys. I left Alec Home to discuss some of the problems with him in detail.

With the signature of the technical agreement between our countries arising from Nassau, the foundation of one part of our work will be well and truly laid. Nor do I think it will ever be abandoned by any Government here. After long experience I have found that we are all of us apt to say things when we are not in authority which we do not feel either willing or able to carry out when we succeed to responsibility.

But thinking so much about all these matters has led me, and I expect you, to turn back to another part of this

By MTF
NVA
EO. 12858, Sec
NWC-91-46/NWD 9

POF/127a/05 family 1/63-4/63 JFC

tremendous new sense of hope. We could probably succeed in giving a new impetus to the Disarmament Conference and might also give a lead on other fronts.

It would be a great gain, of course, if Sweden, India, Israel and the rest would undertake not to test; but I have a feeling that if we get the test ban agreement, there would be another prize just as important to be secured. We ought to be able simultaneously to get a non-dissemination agreement; an undertaking, that is, from non-nuclear countries not to accept nuclear power at the gift of others, for their sole use, and from nuclear powers not to give nuclear weapons or knowledge to non-nuclear countries. To me this seems the real key to the German problem; one which gives a good deal of anxiety both to the Russians and to us, and, to be fair, to many Germans; who are genuinely anxious lest in due course they or their successors will be forced to become a nuclear power. It is quite true that Germany is bound by all kinds of agreements and undertakings. But these could easily be represented by a bad German in the future as the modern counterpart of Versailles. We know - only too well - what might follow from all that way of thinking. Indeed, speaking frankly, the most attractive part of clause 8 of the Nassau Agreement is that it may give the Germans a sense of participation without incurring these dangers. But I feel that a test agreement accompanied by a non-dissemination agreement would serve to underline clause 8 if we are able to bring clause 8 into operation, and anyway would be effective in itself. No German could then say that Germany had been forced

On the contrary the Germans could claim with pride that, with other great States, Germany had entered into this undertaking as a contribution to the solution of one of the gravest problems which confronts the world. At the same time, this is a prospect which must appeal equally to the Russians. The countries of the West have, thank God for it, decided to rebuild their bridges with Germany. We have tried to forget about the two wars and the Hitler persecutions and all the rest. This is true of your country and mine, and to be fair, of the French. All this is good. But then, without being cynical, we all have an interest, because the Germans are our Allies against the Communists. The Russians both hate and fear the Germans. They hate them, inspired by the cruel memories which we have decided to blot out; they fear them as an efficient, hard-working, brave and determined people. Nor can they fail to be conscious of the pressure which they put continually upon German patience by the obstinacy with which they enforce to the division of Germany. For all these reasons, then, I think the tests ban, followed by adherence of other countries not to test, accompanied by a non-dissemination agreement which was reasonably well supported, would have a profound effect in removing the present state of tension in the world.

Of course whatever agreement is made, the Russians might be able to evade it and we might not be able to catch them. From our point of view, if there are some twenty-five

~~SECRET~~

4/30/63

EMBASSY
OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 30, 1963

My dear Mr. President:

Chancellor Adenauer has asked me to transmit to you the following letter:


" Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident!

Ich möchte noch einmal auf die in Ihrem Schreiben vom 29. März erörterte Frage der Errichtung einer multilateralen Nuklear-Streitmacht zurückkommen.

Die Bundesregierung ist Ihnen dankbar, dass Sie entsprechend dem Vorschlag in meinem Schreiben vom 4. April eine Expertendelegation unter Leitung von Admiral Ricketts nach Bonn entsandt haben. Die aufschlussreichen Erläuterungen, die Admiral Ricketts zur Frage der Überlebensfähigkeit von Überwasserschiffen gegeben hat, haben unsere Bedenken gegen die anfängliche Ausstattung der MLF mit Überwasserschiffen weitgehend ausgeräumt. Die Bundesregierung ist daher mit Ihrem Vorschlag einverstanden, dass die MLF zunächst mit Überwasserschiffen als Trägermittel der Polaris A-3 ausgerüstet wird. Sie legt jedoch Wert darauf, dass eine spätere Prüfung der Ausstattung der MLF mit Unterseebooten, falls dies auf Grund der gewonnenen Erfahrungen zweckmässig erscheint, vorbehalten bleibt.

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~



POF/117/6er-Security

Die Bundesregierung hat ferner Ihre Vorschläge zur politischen Kontrolle der MLF geprüft. Sie ist damit einverstanden, dass zunächst eine Regelung vorgesehen wird, bei der für die Entscheidung zur Freigabe des Einsatzes der MLF die Zustimmung der Hauptteilnehmerstaaten erforderlich ist. Die Bundesregierung hält es jedoch für notwendig, dass auch diese Regelung auf Grund der Erfahrungen nach einigen Jahren geprüft wird, und dass ein Übergang zu einer anderen Regelung nicht ausgeschlossen wird.

Die Bundesregierung würde es begrüßen, wenn bereits während Ihres Besuchs in Europa im Juni dieses Jahres eine vorläufige Vereinbarung über die MLF mit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und anderen interessierten NATO-Staaten unterzeichnet werden könnte. Sie ist bereit, unverzüglich Gespräche über eine solche Vereinbarung aufzunehmen. Die Ihrem Schreiben vom 29. März beigefügte Liste von Punkten, die in einem vorläufigen Abkommen über die multilaterale Streitmacht zu behandeln sind, bildet eine gute Grundlage für diese Gespräche.

Dabei sollten die noch offenen technischen und finanziellen Fragen geklärt werden, die nach der Anlage zu Ihrem Brief bereits in der vorläufigen Vereinbarung behandelt werden sollen. Dazu gehört die Festlegung der Zahl der Schiffe und Raketen, mit denen die MLF ausgerüstet werden soll. Ferner ist der Anteil zu klären, den die Teilnehmerstaaten zu den Kosten der Streitmacht beitragen werden. Dies müsste auf Grund einer noch genaueren Aufstellung der Gesamtkosten geschehen.

Die Bundesregierung ist grundsätzlich bereit, einen wesentlichen Anteil an den Kosten der MLF zu übernehmen. Sie würde es

SECRET

- 3 -

vorziehen, wenn die Vereinigten Staaten als führende Macht der Allianz einen etwas grösseren finanziellen und personellen Beitrag zur MLF leisten als die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Sie glaubt, dass dies die Bereitschaft anderer NATO-Staaten, an der MLF teilzunehmen, fördern könnte.

Die bisherigen Gespräche haben bereits zu einer grundsätzlichen Einigung zwischen unseren beiden Regierungen geführt. Die Bundesregierung hält es für notwendig, dass nunmehr auch andere NATO-Staaten dafür gewonnen werden, ihre Teilnahme an der multilateralen Streitmacht verbindlich zuzusagen. Sie schlägt vor, dass die weiteren Gespräche, die zu einer vorläufigen Vereinbarung führen sollen, möglichst bald unter Beteiligung anderer interessierter NATO-Staaten geführt werden. Die Bundesregierung teilt Ihren Wunsch, nach Unterzeichnung der vorläufigen Vereinbarung in förmliche Vertragsverhandlungen einzutreten, die bis zum Herbst dieses Jahres abgeschlossen sein sollten.

Die Bundesregierung empfindet tiefe Befriedigung darüber, dass das Projekt der multilateralen Streitmacht, dem die Bundesrepublik grosse politische und militärische Bedeutung beimisst, nunmehr seiner Verwirklichung naheückt. Ich bin Ihnen dankbar für den Nachdruck, mit dem Ihre Regierung und Sie selbst sich für die MLF einsetzen. Ich bin überzeugt, dass die noch bestehenden Hindernisse auf dem Weg zur MLF überwunden werden können, und dass die MLF entscheidend zur militärischen Stärke und zum politischen Zusammenhalt der Allianz beitragen wird.

- 4 -

SECRET

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- 4 -

Ich freue mich auf Ihren Besuch im Juni.

Mit herzlichen Grüßen

Ihr

(signed:) Adenauer "

I am pleased to attach an unofficial translation of this letter the original of which will be forwarded to you as soon as I shall have received it.

Respectfully yours,

K. H. Knapstein

~~SECRET~~

EMBASSY
OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.

EYES ONLY

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"The Federal Government has also examined your proposals regarding the political control of the Multilateral Force. It agrees that in the beginning an arrangement should be provided for under which the decision to permit the use of the Multilateral Force would require the consent of the major participating countries. However, the Federal Government deems it necessary that this arrangement, too, should be re-examined after some years in the light of past experience and that a change to a different arrangement should not be excluded.

"The Federal Government would appreciate it if a provisional agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and other interested NATO states on the Multilateral Force could be signed already during your visit to Europe this coming June. The Federal Government is prepared to enter immediately into discussions concerning such an agreement. The list of points appended to your letter of March 29 which would have to be dealt with in a provisional agreement on the Multilateral Force offers a good basis for these discussions.

"These discussions should also settle the technical and financial questions which are still open and which according to the enclosure to your letter should be dealt with already in the provisional agreement. These questions include fixing the number of ships and missiles with which the Multilateral Force should be equipped. Moreover, the share which the participating states are to contribute toward the costs of the force has to be determined. This should be based on a more detailed tabulation of the overall cost.

"The Federal Government is prepared in principle to assume a substantial share of the cost of the Multilateral Force. It would prefer to see the United States, as the leading power of the alliance, make a

somewhat

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

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somewhat larger contribution to the Multilateral Force in money and personnel than the Federal Republic of Germany. It is of the opinion that this might spur the willingness of other NATO states to participate in the Multilateral Force.

"The discussions held thus far have already led to agreement in principle between our two governments. The Federal Government deems it necessary at this point to persuade other NATO states as well to give a formal pledge of their participation in the Multilateral Force. It proposes that future talks in preparation for a preliminary agreement be held as soon as possible, with other interested NATO countries participating. The Federal Government shares your wish that after a preliminary agreement has been signed, negotiations for a formal treaty be inaugurated and concluded by fall of this year.

"The Federal Government notes with deep satisfaction that the project of a Multilateral Force, to which the Federal Republic assigns great political and military importance, is now approaching realization. I am grateful to you for the forcefulness with which your Government and you in person are advocating the Multilateral Force. I am convinced that the remaining obstacles on the way toward the Multilateral Force can be overcome and that the Multilateral Force will contribute decisively to the military strength and the political unity of the alliance.

"I am looking forward to your visit in June.

"With kindest regards,

Yours,

(signed:) Adenauer"

I am pleased to attach an unofficial translation of this letter, the original of which will be forwarded to you as soon as I shall have received it.

Respectfully yours,

(signed:) Knapstein

EYES ONLY

SECRET

4/4/63 (3)
EMBASSY
OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 4th, 1963

My dear Mr. President:

Chancellor Adenauer has asked me to transmit to you the following letter:

" Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident!

Ich danke Ihnen für Ihr Schreiben vom 29. März, das mir Mr. Tyler am 2. April in Cadenabbia übergeben und erläutert hat. Ich begrüße die Gelegenheit, mit Ihnen in einen freimütigen Gedankenaustausch über die Frage der multilateralen MRBM-Streitmacht einzutreten, die auch nach der Überzeugung der Bundesregierung von besonders grosser Bedeutung für die Allianz ist und sobald wie möglich verwirklicht werden sollte.

Die Gespräche, die Mitglieder meiner Regierung und ich selbst mit Botschafter Merchant geführt haben, haben die Überzeugung der Bundesregierung gestärkt, dass die multilaterale Streitmacht eine grossartige Gelegenheit ist, den Zusammenhalt der NATO zu stärken und der Bedrohung Europas durch das wachsende nukleare Potential der Sowjetunion zu begegnen. Die Bundesregierung ist entschlossen, an der Verwirklichung dieses Projekts mitzuwirken und einen wesentlichen Teil der erheblichen, damit verbundenen Lasten zu übernehmen.

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 2.6
NLK-97-40
By MFP NARA, Date 11/14/01

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Ich begrüße Ihre Absicht, während Ihres bevorstehenden Besuchs in Europa im Juni dieses Jahres ein vorläufiges Abkommen der Regierungschefs derjenigen Staaten, die sich an der MLF beteiligen wollen, zu unterzeichnen. Die Bundesregierung wird alles in ihren Kräften Stehende unternehmen, um bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt eine Klärung der noch offenen Fragen herbeizuführen.

Ich teile Ihre Auffassung, dass nach den bisherigen Kontakten zwischen unseren beiden Regierungen im wesentlichen nur noch zwei wichtige Punkte einer Klärung bedürfen.

Der eine dieser Punkte ist die Ausrüstung der MLF mit Überwasser- oder Unterwasser-Schiffen. Bestimmte der Argumente, die von Botschafter Merchant für die militärische Zweckmässigkeit von Überwasserschiffen vorgebracht wurden, werden von meiner Regierung als berechtigt anerkannt. In einigen Punkten bestehen noch Zweifel, vor allem bei der Beurteilung der Überlebensfähigkeit von Überwasserschiffen und der Wirkungsmöglichkeiten der gegnerischen Unterseeboote. Diese Fragen bedürfen noch einer weiteren Diskussion durch Experten. Ich schlage daher vor, dass eine Gruppe von deutschen Experten hohen Ranges sobald wie möglich diese militärischen Aspekte der MLF eingehend mit amerikanischen Experten diskutiert. In diesen Gesprächen könnten auch die militärischen und finanziellen Implikationen Ihres Vorschlags untersucht werden, in einer Anfangsphase Überwasserschiffe vorzusehen und zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt Unterseeboote in die MLF einzufügen, falls dies aufgrund der gewonnenen Erfahrungen zweckmässig erscheint.

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SECRET

SECRET

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In der öffentlichen Meinung der Bundesrepublik und anderer europäischer Staaten bestehen Vorbehalte gegen die Ausrüstung der MLF mit Überwasserschiffen, weil diese als zweitklassig und als Notbehelf angesehen werden. Falls die von mir vorgeschlagenen Expertengespräche bei uns zu der Überzeugung führen, dass Überwasserschiffe die geeignetsten Träger für die MRBM der MLF sind, wird meine Regierung alles in ihren Kräften Stehende unternehmen, um die Zustimmung des Parlaments und der öffentlichen Meinung in der Bundesrepublik für diese Lösung durchzusetzen.

Der zweite von Ihnen behandelte offene Punkt, die Regelung der Einsatzentscheidung, hat in noch stärkerem Masse das Interesse der öffentlichen Meinung in der Bundesrepublik und in anderen europäischen Staaten gefunden. Die Bundesregierung erkennt die Berechtigung Ihres Arguments an, dass der Einsatz der MLF höchstwahrscheinlich die Unterstützung durch das strategische Potential der USA erfordert und dass daher eine Entscheidung über den Einsatz der MLF gegen den Wunsch der Vereinigten Staaten problematisch ist.

Andererseits ist es unsere Aufgabe, die MLF so zu gestalten, dass sie von der öffentlichen Meinung als eine echte Beteiligung der europäischen NATO-Partner an der nuklearen Verantwortung angesehen wird und dass sie einen Anreiz für andere NATO-Staaten bildet, sich später an der MLF zu beteiligen.

Ich glaube, dass die Unterschiede in den Auffassungen unserer beiden Regierungen nicht unüberbrückbar sind, und dass

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- 4 -


ein Kompromiss gefunden werden kann. Die Bundesregierung hat bereits vorgeschlagen, für eine Übergangsperiode das Einstimmigkeitsprinzip vorzusehen und erst nach einigen Jahren zu einem System der Mehrheitsentscheidung überzugehen. Andererseits hat Botschafter Merchant die Bereitschaft der amerikanischen Regierung erklärt, nach einigen Jahren aufgrund der gewonnenen Erfahrungen das System der einstimmigen Entscheidung zu überprüfen. Ich glaube, dass diese beiden Vorschläge miteinander in Einklang gebracht werden können, und schlage vor, dass diese Frage unverzüglich zwischen unseren beiden Regierungen diskutiert wird.

Die Ihrem Schreiben beigelegte Liste von Punkten, die in einem vorläufigen Abkommen über die multilaterale Streitmacht enthalten sein müssten, habe ich mit Interesse gelesen. Der Entwurf ist eine gute Grundlage für die weiteren Verhandlungen zwischen den interessierten NATO-Staaten in den nächsten Wochen. Er ist für uns vorbehaltlich einer Klärung der beiden Fragen der MRBM-Träger und der Einsatzentscheidung im Prinzip annehmbar.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen
(signed:) Adenauer "

I am pleased to attach an unofficial translation of this letter the original of which will be forwarded to you as soon as I shall have received it.

Respectfully yours,



~~SECRET~~

2016
(5)

EYES ONLY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 54699
R-12/R-16
German

My dear Mr. President:

Chancellor Adenauer has asked me to transmit to you the following letter:

"Dear Mr. President:

"I wish to thank you for your letter of March 29, which Mr. Tyler handed to me and explained on April 2 at Cadenabbia. I welcome the opportunity to enter into a frank exchange of views with you on the question of a multilateral medium-range ballistic-missile force, which in the opinion of the Federal Government, too, is of very great importance for the Alliance and should be brought into being as soon as possible.

"The talks which members of my Government and I myself have had with Ambassador Merchant have strengthened the conviction of the Federal Government that this multilateral force offers a splendid opportunity to strengthen the solidarity of NATO and counter the threat to Europe from the growing nuclear potential of the Soviet Union. The Federal Government is determined to cooperate in making this plan a reality and to assume a substantial part of the considerable costs connected therewith.

"I welcome your intention during your approaching visit to Europe this coming June to sign a provisional agreement with the heads of government of those countries that wish to participate in the

multilateral

The President

The White House

Washington, D. C.

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
MLK-97-40
NAVJ 912021
By MFP NARA, Dec 11/14/00

EYES ONLY

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multilateral force. The Federal Government will do everything in its power to clarify by then the questions that are still unsettled.

"I share your view that, judging from contacts between our two Governments thus far, there are essentially only two important points that still require clarification.

"One of these points is the equipment of the multilateral force with surface vessels or submarines. Some of the arguments advanced by Ambassador Merchant for the military feasibility of surface vessels are recognized by my Government as valid. On some points there is still doubt, especially with regard to the vulnerability of surface vessels and the potential effectiveness of enemy submarines. These questions require further discussion by experts. I therefore propose that a group of high-ranking German experts discuss these military aspects of the multilateral force in detail with American experts as soon as possible. These talks could also study the military and financial implications of your proposal to provide surface vessels in an initial phase and at a later period introduce submarines in the multilateral force, if this seems advisable in the light of the experience gained.

"Sentiment in the Federal Republic and other European countries harbors reservations about equipping the multilateral force with surface vessels, because such vessels are considered to be second-class and a stopgap. If the expert talks I am proposing lead to the conclusion here that surface vessels are the appropriate carriers for medium-range ballistic missiles of the multilateral force, my Government will do everything in its power to win the approval of parliament and public opinion for this solution.

"The

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

-3-

"The second still unresolved point which you discuss, namely a system for reaching a decision on commitment, has aroused greater public interest still in the Federal Republic and other European countries. The Federal Government recognizes the justice of your argument that employment of the multilateral force will in all probability require the support of the strategic potential of the United States and that consequently any decision to commit the multilateral force against the wishes of the United States would be impractical.

"On the other hand it is our task to give the multilateral force such a form that in the eyes of the public ^{it will be} a genuine sharing by the European NATO partners in nuclear responsibility and that it will serve as an incentive to other NATO countries to join the multilateral force later.

"I believe that the differences in the views of our two Governments are not irreconcilable and that a compromise can be found. The Federal Government has already proposed that the principle of unanimity be adopted for a transitional period and that a system of decision by a majority be introduced only after several years. On the other hand Ambassador Merchant has stated that the United States Government is prepared after a few years to review the system of unanimous decision on the basis of the experience gained. I believe that these two proposals can be reconciled with each other and I propose that this question be discussed at once between our two Governments.

"I have read with interest the list appended to your letter of the points that must be contained in a provisional agreement on the multilateral force. This draft is a good basis for further negotiations between the interested NATO countries in the next few weeks. It is acceptable to us in principle, subject to a clarification of the two

questions

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

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questions of the medium-range ballistic-missile carriers and of the decision regarding commitment.

With cordial greetings,

(signed) Adenauer"

I am pleased to attach an unofficial translation of this letter the original of which will be forwarded to you as soon as I shall have received it.

Respectfully yours,

(signed) Knappstein

EYES ONLY

8(63)

SUBJECTS

DISARMAMENT - NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS - 7/63 MEETING IN MOSCOW (PART II)

8	8/14/63	Defense U 8pp		
		Press release of 10 AM: "Statement of Position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Three-Environment Nuclear Test Ban Treaty"		
8a	EXEMPTED	8/ 8/63 WH S(2...) 2pp		
	NLK-75-2	3/75		
		Memo for Secretary Rusk from unidentified source on Rusk's forthcoming talks with Adenauer		
2b		8/ 6/63 WH U 1p		
		Covering memo from McG. Bundy to Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary, State, conveying the attached message		
8c	EXEMPTED	8/ 6/63 WH S(...) 1p		
	NLK-75-2	3/3/75		
		Instructions to Ambassador McChes for handling the following message		
8d	EXEMPTED/..../.. WH S(...) 4pp		
	NLK-75-2	3/3/75		
		Letter from the President to Chancellor Adenauer after McNamara-Adenauer conversations		
8e	DECLASSIFIED	8/42/63 Defense-US(2...) 8pp		
	10/18/74	NLK-75-2		
		Draft: "Summary of Position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Three-Environment Nuclear Test Ban Treaty"		

The Documents in this folder are numbered 1-11.

Box 100

page 1 of 1

~~SECRET~~

August 8, 1963

TO: American Embassy Bonn
EYES ONLY for Secretary Rusk

Hold for arrival

Unless Chancellor's answer to President's letter suggests tactical change, President hopes that in your talk with Chancellor you will strongly follow up line of his letter. In particular he would point out to Chancellor that constant references to the greater reliability and wisdom of earlier U. S. leaders like Dulles are not received with pleasure or approval in the U. S. Neither does the President think it useful for U. S. Cabinet officers to be subjected to a torrent of suspicion and complaint of the kind which Chancellor poured out on Bob McNamara last week.

The President would like you to call Adenauer's attention again to levels of U. S. defense effort in this Administration and to record of U. S. responsibility and effort all over the world for 15 years, in Korea, Laos, Vietnam, India, and always and above all in Europe and in Berlin. You should contrast this record with that of France, constantly failing in world-wide responsibilities and seeking persistently under de Gaulle to diminish NATO and to avoid real partnership. In the light of this contrast, you should express the President's inability to understand why the leadership of the United States is covered with criticism and expressions of suspicion by the Chancellor while a series of lame excuses is put forward for General de Gaulle.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

(page 1 of 2 pages)

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

Department of State By Guidelines

By MFV NARA, Date 5/03

~~SECRET~~

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8/8/63

FYI. The President strongly agrees with the estimate of the Chancellor's recent behavior which is to be found in Walter Lippmann's column of August 8. End FYI.

~~SECRET~~

(page 2 of 2 pages)

August 6, 1963

To: Mr. Benjamin Read
Executive Secretary
Department of State

From: McGeorge Bundy

Subject: SECRET-EYES ONLY message
for transmittal to Ambassador
in Bonn.

Attached message for transmittal. It should
have only such distribution within the Department
as the Acting Secretary directs.

August 6, 1963

SECRET

EYES ONLY for Ambassador McChes in Bonn

The following message from the President should be delivered to the Chancellor's office as soon as possible. Unless rumors about Chancellor's discussion with McNamara have spread, there should be no other distribution or discussion of this letter. If rumors about Chancellor's discussion with McNamara or of contents of this letter should begin to spread outside Chancellor's office, you should make recommendation and seek instruction.

(quote attached letter from the President to
Chancellor Adenauer)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
State guidelines / FRYS VII
By mfj NAPA, Date 5/03

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Secretary McNamara has just come back and reported to me his long conversation with you. He has suggested that it might be useful for me to send you a letter commenting on some of the things which you and he talked about, and I think his suggestion is a good one. As he reports the conversation, you talked about two major topics. The larger of them is the question of the basic policy of the West toward the Soviet Union, in which, as I understand it, your worry is that the U. S. may be too easily beguiled by the smiles and tricks of the Soviet Government.

I understand this concern, but I must tell you in all frankness that I do not think it is justified. It seems to me, in fact, as far from the mark as the kind of thing I sometimes hear from political groups in this country who say that it is wrong to trust the democratic commitment and the loyalty to the Alliance of the Federal Republic. The truth is, in my judgment, that one of the wisest things our two countries have done the last fifteen years is to trust each other, and I think the record of the United States Government as a whole, and of this Administration in particular, makes it pretty clear that we are not disposed to be taken in by Soviet duplicity.

I myself believe that it is much too soon to throw our hats in the air because of a single agreement on a single subject, the limited test ban -- important as that subject is. I believe that we have reached even this small understanding as much through our strength and resolution as through the process of negotiation, and I recognize, as you do, that we are dealing still with a government which has repeatedly posed threats to the freedom of West Berlin and which, as late as October of last year, undertook a peculiarly dangerous

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DECLASSIFIED
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REF. VII
REF # 360
DATE 4/03
BY MFP

and reckless act of duplicity in Cuba. So we are not under illusions about the Soviet Government, and you may be quite sure that Secretary McNamara, who has pressed so hard and so successfully for a strengthening of Western defenses in the last three years, is not a man who is likely to be lulled into forgetfulness or neglect of his duty by a single limited agreement. It is Secretary McNamara, after all, who has been my chief lieutenant in a process of reinforcement which has added nine billion dollars a year to our defense budget, and has increased the number of our battle-ready divisions by forty per cent. It was with Secretary McNamara that I called up 150,000 Reserves at the height of the Berlin crisis in 1961. And he and I feel, just as you do, that this is no time to let down our guard.

It may be, as you say, that there is some danger of relaxation in Europe, and you can count on us to work energetically against any such tendency. That is one reason why Secretary McNamara has pressed so hard in Bonn to find ways and means of meeting the overseas cost of the great forces which we have placed in Germany for the common defense.

Our own commitment and alertness, of course, have to be world-wide. If the Chinese should break out into new acts of aggression, it is only the United States among Western countries that will have the necessary means and determination for reply. We are the only Western power fully engaged in a two-front struggle in the cold war, and I think there is little reason for any feeling that we are blind to its dangers and demands.

Let me repeat that I do understand and respect your honest concern here, for I recognize also that in a large and varied country like this one there will always be people who can bring you reports that this or that individual or group is spreading dangerous opinions. But such rumors deserve to be set against the reality of what our Governments have done together for fifteen years.

As to the particular question of the limited test ban treaty, I am glad to see both in Secretary McNamara's and in William Tyler's reports that you do regard it as a success, although you have some specific questions about its possible impact on the status of the regime in East Germany. I too think it a success, for reasons which I stated at length last week and with which I will not bother you again now. I do not think it matters much where a treaty of this kind is signed or who claims the credit for it. The point about the treaty is that it makes sense for the world and that it does not jeopardize the essential security of either side. That is what makes it possible and useful.

The problem of the status of the East German regime is an important one, and I fully recognize your special concern with it. In our judgment, fully adequate precautions have been taken on this point. We do not think that either as a whole or in its separate parts does the treaty create any danger of increased recognition or international status for the East German regime. The use of the term "states," which goes back a year, and the reference to sovereign rights, which is a product of the more recent negotiations, are both of them standard phrases which do not confer any new standing upon any regime which adheres to the treaty, and this solid legal judgment is one which we are prepared to make clear as often as is necessary. Moreover, we believe that the new process of accession is distinctly advantageous to us from this point of view, in that the Federal Republic, which is recognized by all three depository governments, has an opportunity to deposit its accession without challenge from any of them, while the Pankow regime will obviously have to confine its accession to the USSR. Thus the process of adherence itself will make it clear which regime is recognized by all, and which is a puppet of one.

SECRET

June 20, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 11:30 Meeting Tomorrow on the Harriman Trip

1. At 11:30 tomorrow morning you will be meeting with a small group (list attached) from State, ACDA, Defense and AEC for a preliminary discussion on Averell Harriman's trip to Moscow on July 15.

2. The attached paper is Fisher's report on the line of thought that has evolved from several discussions among Harriman, Thompson, Foster, Fisher, Nitze, Haworth, Bundy and myself. The purpose of the meeting is to go over this material in an informal way so that you can be prepared for your conversations with Macmillan on this subject.

3. It is clear that one of your problems with him will be the number of inspections for a test ban treaty.

The British delegation will be headed by Hallahan, but we have no knowledge of his views.

4. We plan another more formal review for the purpose of discussing Harriman's instructions after your return from Europe. At that time we will convene something more like a regular NSC, with Max Taylor and John McCone, among others, present.

C. K.

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SANITIZED

NK-85-171

BY mm NARA DATE 2/88

NSF/265/ACDA-Dismant - Harriman Trip MRC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SCDA-921

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF
13 PAGES. COPY NO. 4
OF 15 COPIES. SERIES A.

~~TOP SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE COVERED IN PREPARATION OF FORTHCOMING
JULY 15 MISSION OF GOVERNOR HARRIMAN TO MOSCOW

In his discussions in Moscow, Governor Harriman will doubtless have to deal with the following four general subjects. There follows the suggested positions which should be taken:

I.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

The initial part of the discussion should deal with a comprehensive test ban treaty. As part of that discussion an attempt should be made to resolve the differences which exist between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as to the ability to detect and identify underground nuclear tests by seismic means alone. The difference relates to what is solely a scientific question -- the ability to make a distinction on the basis of seismic signals between underground nuclear tests and earthquakes, both of which produce seismic signals which often have similar characteristics.

In view of the U.S., events in the Soviet Union producing seismic signals in the range of 4.75 - 5.00 or below do not produce seismic signals which permit them to be identified as tests rather than as earthquakes. The seismic signals produced

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SANITIZED VERSION
(NLK-76-112)

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A possible combination would be to establish a quota of 12 underground tests a year of explosions which would produce a seismic event of not greater than 4.75 and which would not vent radioactivity beyond the borders of the country. A treaty of this kind would permit the U.S. to relax its insistence on compulsory on-site inspections, in view of the fact that the effects of a violation would be much less critical. Under such a treaty it would probably still be advisable to have a provision for exchange of data from strengthened national seismic stations, and to have the national stations supplemented by automatic recording stations. It would probably be necessary to have a provision entitling the parties to demand data concerning events which were suspicious and the right to abrogate the treaty if it were to determine that its requests for data were not being complied with in a satisfactory manner or if it concluded that there had been a violation.

III.

RELATIONSHIP OF A TEST BAN TO NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

One of the principal interests of the United States in a test ban agreement is an interest in it as one of a series of steps designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world. It is probable that the U.S.S.R.

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has a similar interest. It might be advisable to discuss this interest with the Soviet Union with relation to the interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in a test ban. In the first instance the U.S. should point out that the signing of a test ban treaty would mean that there would be no additional nuclear powers in our camp. We should point out that we would attempt to obtain adherence by the French and as a result a reduction of the intensity of the French nuclear development program. We could then point to the draft declaration on non-dissemination and point out that we would expect the French to sign not only the test ban treaty but the non-dissemination declaration as well.

The discussion of the non-dissemination will, of course, raise the question of the future of the NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force. We should point out that the multilateral nuclear force is a proposed substitute for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by individual NATO Countries. We should point out that in view of the continued Soviet nuclear threat to Europe, the MLF offered our European allies a substitute to the acquisition of their own nuclear capabilities and to that extent it was designed to prevent proliferation. ~~We should point out, however, that if we could work out an understanding that there would be no more nuclear~~

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threat to Europe, the MLF offered our European allies a substitute to the acquisition of their own nuclear capabilities and to that extent it was designed to prevent proliferation. We should point out, however, that if we could work out an understanding that there would be no more nuclear powers in either the Western camp or in the Socialist camp perhaps the Western powers would not feel the need for an MLF but could work out some other arrangements for European security.

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