

401

7-28-60

NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL MAY BE
PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW

Briefing Note for the
PB Meeting of July 29, 1960

(TITLE 17 U.S. CODE)

G/11w
7-28-60

U.S. FORCE COMMITMENTS TO NATO
(Memo for NSC, July 27, 1960)

On November 16, 1959, the President requested that no NATO commitments for any future year (including the NATO Annual Review of Requirements) be made without prior consideration by the National Security Council. By a memo dated November 20, 1959, this request was transmitted to the NSC. Accordingly, these levels of forces proposed for reporting in the U.S. Reply to the 1960 NATO Annual Review Questionnaire are submitted by Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin to the Council for its consideration.

Mr. Irwin says that the Army forces projected "basically meet" MC 70 requirements, even though there are overages and shortfalls. Presumably these balance out qualitatively. For the Navy there are shortfalls "in all categories" of forces in the three years. For the Air Force, the projected shortfalls are offset (presumably this means fully offset) by better and/or different equipment, except that some of the strike and attack aircraft would be readily available in the United States instead of being in Europe.

The firm commitment that would be made by this reply covers CY 1961, and should be compared to the commitment already made (and presumably met) for CY 1960. For the Army 3 LACROSSE battalions would be added (2 to 5); 2 CORPORAL/SERGEANT battalions would be withdrawn; and 4 NIKE/HAWK battalions would be added. For the Navy, 4 ASW carriers would be added; 1 submarine would be withdrawn; 3 maritime patrol aircraft would be withdrawn; and 6 AEW aircraft would be withdrawn. For the Air Force, 3 squadrons of AWX (all-weather fighter) aircraft, involving 75 aircraft, would be withdrawn; 2 squadrons of transports, involving 32 planes, would be withdrawn; and one MACE unit, presumably a squadron, would be added.

*Change was
of requirements*

There seems to be an error in addition on page 5. In the last three columns, the number of aircraft add to 904, not the 931 shown. Defense should be asked at the PB about this, and, if it is an error, a correction should be made. (I have alerted Page Smith.)

MC 70 was approved for planning purposes by the NATO Council on May 9, 1958. It is a phased build-up for NATO through CY 1963. The memo at hand says that NATO military authorities are currently reviewing the requirements for 1962 and 1963 in connection with their development of new requirements for 1962-66.

On July 1 the PB was told that this reply to the Annual Review Questionnaire should be submitted to NATO in August. If that schedule must be adhered to, the President will have to consider this reply without having the benefit of the "contributions" study which he requested last fall. (Last November, the President, by Action 2149-b, asked for recommendations by State and Defense on the future roles and contributions of the U.S. and other NATO nations with respect to the collective defense posture. The PB was told last Friday that this study would not be forthcoming

DDC 1987/401 + 405

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

until September.) Also, we have coming up, also in September, the very important Discussion Paper on "The Future of NATO", to be done by State and Defense. Also, there is a National Intelligence Estimate on "Trends Affecting the North Atlantic Alliance" now scheduled for completion in September. The desirability of considering all of these studies before the annual reply is submitted to NATO was raised by the Budget Director in June (see Memo for PB, July 5, 1960), and discussed, apparently favorably, by the PB on July 1. } ✓



~~TOP SECRET~~

3. Substantive. The State-Defense paper has some of the flavor of the Bowie report. /Incidentally, if you have not had an opportunity to do so, you may wish to glance at the Summary section of the Bowie report, especially pages 5-10 and 16-18./ However, the new paper is broader in some ways and more specific in others; broader in overall coverage and more specific in particular policy suggestions. It is divided into five Sections: I. An Introduction that gives something of the background of NATO and the new challenges that face NATO as it enters its second decade; that sets basic goals and major tasks and discusses briefly problems posed by the Soviet bloc and less developed nations; that indicates that the Atlantic nations have the human and material resources to meet the Bloc challenge but points out that the obstacles to be overcome are considerable; and that concludes that the U.S. is faced with two broad alternatives for NATO, the first said to present an unacceptable risk:

- a. To let NATO continue its present course, without attempting to revise U.S. policies toward NATO, on the assumption that we are doing the best we can; or,
- b. To endeavor to devise policies which would seek to deal effectively with the major problems of NATO: constructing a NATO posture to meet the political - military situation of the 1960's; finding effective means of coordinating policies in all aspects -- political, economic, psychological, and cultural -- of direct relations between the NATO countries and the Bloc itself; and finally ensuring that the members of the Alliance, particularly the European members, develop the will and determination to allocate their share of available resources to strengthening the overall power position of the Alliance.

Section II. A section that analyzes non-military tasks of the Atlantic Community in the political and economic fields and suggests a number of methods of furthering the discharge of these tasks.

Section III. A section that treats similarly of science and technology.

Section IV. A section that deals with the problems facing NATO in the military field and the roles and contributions of the NATO nations, including the U.S., in the collective defense posture.

Section V. A section that discusses problems of nuclear sharing for military purposes in the NATO area.

It is in Sections IV and V that the principal policy issues appear: a. What constitutes a proper NATO strategic concept and; b. what to do about nuclear sharing. These two Sections also contain Conclusions and Recommendations (p. 42 et seq. and 58 et seq.)

4. As I have indicated earlier, Defense and State will, I am sure, be able to bring out certain issues that they consider worthy of Council discussion. Set forth below are a few points that you may wish to raise during the course of the first Planning Board session.

5. First and foremost I direct your attention to the "Conclusions and Recommendations" concerning Nuclear Capabilities beginning with para. 83, p. 58. A marked shift is apparent, even in State's position.

a. (In August, you recall -- see p. 3, 8/23/60 memo to ESC -- State wished only to "study" and be prepared to consider on European initiative any multilateral arrangements.) Now they suggest a U.S. "proposal" along the lines of the KREM proposal of October 3, 1960. The split, see p. 59, is not abundantly clear but presumably reflects State's view that this further compromise is in line with the President's "decision" of October 3 and adds weight to State's contention, still not shared by Defense.

b.

6.

7. If you will now turn to the conclusions regarding future roles of NATO nations in collective defense (para. c. (1), p. 42) you will find agreement, if not novelty.

8. If you will now turn back to the less controversial part of the paper, beginning at para. 21, p. 10, you may wish to ask:

a. State to elaborate on the functions of the "Atlantic Policy Advisory Group" (subpara. a., p. 10) and U.S. obligations as a participant;

b. State to explain the concept of converting the NATO Parliamentarians conference into an official Atlantic Assembly (para. 22-a, p. 10).


c. State to explain extent of U.S. obligations in ensuring that "sufficient resources are allocated to meet the Soviet threat" (para. 23-c, p. 11);

d. State to elaborate the Alliance's role in arms control proposals (para. 27, page 13). Is the U.S. to negotiate only on the basis of NATO-agreed positions?

e. State to define (see para. 34, p. 14) the role of the Atlantic nations as providers of financial aid. Is this to be a multilateral aid program?

f. State to indicate any financial aspects of the programs set forth in para. 42-a(2), p. 19.

g. Defense if subpara. (5), p. 22 -- re exchange of military scientific information -- is feasible.



7/26/67
7/19

TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

(Tuesday, 19 July 1960 at Newport, R.I. at approx. 5:30 pm)

July 19

1. I first took up with the President the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of July 15. I reported to him the subjects briefed by the DCI and the comments by the Secretary of State regarding the Somali situation.

I informed him of the discussion on Cuba and particularly the report of the DCI that large packages had been received in Cuba whose contents were unidentified and that one military base had been declared off limits. I said that the Intelligence Community was puzzled as to the meaning of the combination of these things. I also reported to him the discussion of Secretary Anderson following the Joint Canadian-US cabinet officers meeting which reflected a disinterest on the part of the Canadians in what we were trying to do with respect to Cuba and indeed their flat position that we should do nothing. Also, I reported the negative view of the Canadians with respect to the Soviet Bloc-Free World struggle generally. The President was somewhat surprised, and said the Canadians had recently agreed to cooperate in Operation SKY HAWK. However, I reported that even more recently and within the last 24 hours the Canadians had taken a public view opposing U. S. nuclear testing for seismic research. The President was not aware of these difficulties with respect to Canada nor of the dissatisfaction of Mr. Deifenbaker with his recent visit to this country.

I informed the President of the discussion on the Congo.

I reported that there had been some discussion of the RB-47 incident in the Barents Sea and that I particularly wanted to reflect the strong statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military necessity for continuing such flights. The President indicated that he felt that he was in agreement with the view of the Chairman.

I then reported to the President the Council recommendations with respect to U.S. Policy Towards the Near East and briefed him generally



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-204

TOP SECRET

MR 80-77 #16

By DJH Date 12/11/81

OSAMA/Spec Assts 5/Pres 5.5/5/1960 -
@MAGS w the Pres - Vol 2 (a)
apt, 7, 4 only

~~TOP SECRET~~

along the lines of the attached briefing note but with particular emphasis on the change in the priority of the objectives and in the language of the paragraphs with respect to oil. I said that the Council, as had the Planning Board, unanimously agreed with respect to the amendments to the paper. However, I felt constrained to point out that whereas Secretary Anderson did not wish to recommend a change in the paper as presented to the Council, he did feel that it should be understood that because of the Western Security Alliance and because of the absolute need for oil by Western European countries, we should not understand this statement of policy should restrain a President from using force to act alone with respect to oil. I said that the Secretary of State had pointed out that any such eventuality would probably occur in the Persian Gulf and it was inconceivable that the U.K. would not act if necessary. The President felt that while he understood the point of view of the Secretary of the Treasury no change in the language was indicated.

I then reported briefly on the Technical Surveillance Counter-measures action.

I reported that the Council had acted upon the matter concerning anti-trust laws affecting U.S. foreign commerce in the way that he had approved in my meeting with him on July 12.

2. I then discussed with the President future NSC meetings. I reported to him that Mr. Dillon was extremely eager to have a meeting of the NSC during the week of July 25 for decisions relating to NSC Action 2158 (the Mutual Security Program) although I had ascertained that it was possible to accomplish Mr. Dillon's purposes by a meeting some time the following week. The President said that after his visit to Chicago on the 26th, he would go to Denver for a couple of days and not return to Newport until very late in the week. He therefore thought that a meeting on Monday the 25th at Newport would be desirable.

I then asked the President whether upon his return to Washington from Newport we should count upon his more or less regular participation in Council meetings in view of my problem of scheduling agenda items. The President said that he had hoped that the Council might in these months concern itself largely with updating, and with discussing major issues but that he recognized that the many problems around the world would probably require regular NSC meetings and that he would expect to be available.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. I then briefed the President with respect to the Fifth Report by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated December 11, 1959 (Recommendation regarding "Fusion of COMINT-ELINT Activities") along the lines of the attached briefing note. The President approved the recommendation contained in the memorandum.


4. I then discussed the matter of response doctrine with the President. I reminded him that the Planning Board was working on a revision of the Continental Defense policy paper and said that in the course of this work had considered a discussion paper on Continental Defense which had been prepared by a task force under the chairmanship of the Defense Department. The task force report is a very good one and will come before the Council for discussion. I pointed out to the President that the task force report called for two other studies one of which was underway by the Defense Department and the results of which would be incorporated in the Annual Status Report. However, the second was referred to in the following words in the task force study:

"In sum, there is need for a thorough study of capabilities, plans and programs to ensure the survival of the decision-making machinery and of reliable means of communication of the decision to the surviving retaliatory forces on land, at sea, and in the air, within the time dimensions of a surprise ballistic missile attack. As an essential part of this study, attention should be given to the preparation of a response doctrine that is not dependent on the survival of the seat of government and other vital links of the planned system for command and control."

I indicated to the President that when the discussion paper came before the Council it would be important for the Record of Actions to indicate what disposition had been made of the recommendations. I wanted therefore his guidance as to how to set up the study with respect to response doctrine. I said he could assign it to me as he had done the question of relocation planning for the NSC, in which event I could use some outside consultants, such as General Alfred Gruenther. On the other hand he might wish to make it entirely a Defense Department matter. The difficulty with the latter course would be that there are other agencies who are concerned, particularly OCDM, and the considerations involved would go beyond the purview of the Defense Department.

~~TOP SECRET~~

July
19



~~TOP SECRET~~

I pointed out to the President that there were security considerations which precluded putting the matter in the NSC machinery and allowing the Planning Board to make the study. The President agreed that it should be closely held.

The President indicated that he wished me to discuss this matter with the Secretary of Defense to insure that he was directly involved in any study made and that I should be responsible for incorporating elements of the study which went beyond Defense.

5. I then discussed two 5412 matters which are the subject of a separate memorandum.

6. I then reminded the President that at the time of Assistant Secretary McGuire's presentation on the new mobilization base planning the President asked some questions about tanks in Korea and I had in my possession a memorandum from Mr. McGuire containing the answers to the question. The President indicated that he had independently received this information from General Goodpaster.



A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Gordon Gray".

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

cc: Mr. Lay

~~TOP SECRET~~

July
19

7/19/60

~~SECRET~~

Σ

July 21, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 19, 1960, 3:15 PM Newport (Goodpaster)

Others present: Secretary Herter, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster

Secretary Herter first took up the matters before the United Nations. He said the United Nations Security Council had acted to refer the Cuban complaint to the Organization of American States. The determination of the place to hold the meeting of the OAS has developed into a problem. We are still hoping that it can be arranged for Costa Rica. The President said he thought that anywhere in Central or South America would be preferable to having it in the United States.



Mr. Herter next reported on the status of the Nicaro plant. It is evident that we will probably have to close this plant. However, we are making a final attempt to negotiate its sale to the Cubans. The President asked what recourse we have if the Cubans force us to close it. He commented that our case regarding this plant should be stronger than with regard to private enterprises since its operation is based upon an intergovernmental agreement. Mr. Herter said we will simply do the best we can. The President went on to ask what we would do in case the Cubans try to take the Guantanamo Base over. He was not talking of the water supply, since we can meet minimum needs with water brought in by tanker. Mr. Herter said that as regards the base itself, we have a valid treaty not limited in duration, and subject to change only upon agreement by both parties. The President said what he wants to see is what we do if they attack and how we plan to do it.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 1.1

FOR THE PRESIDENT
E.O. 11652 (S) (1) (2) (3)
Date 11/9/77 CIA #63477-132 01/14/78
NLE L 12/18/78

MR 76-56,466

4W 12-3-73

Staff Secy (Sub) / 003 / 4 / State Dept - 1960 (June-July) (4)

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

morning of Wednesday, July 20.)

Mr. Herter said he had some information that an American aircraft, which he thought was of C-47 type, had earlier on July 19th, through navigation error, flown directly over the Kuriles. The Soviets had apparently tried to bring it down but were unable to locate it in the fog and clouds.

Mr. Herter next took up the letter sent to the President from Mr. Macmillan enclosing the British reply to the Soviets on the RB-47 case, together with a personal letter from Macmillan to Khrushchev. He commented that Macmillan has taken a very stout stand. The President read the letter (which I carried up to him) and said that he was glad to see it, |

Mr. Herter then said that the question should be considered why the Soviets are taking the line that they have been taking. Their action gives real grounds for concern, since they are deliberately engaging in saber-rattling. He said that he and his associates, particularly Mr. Bohlen, have been giving some thought as to how best to handle this situation. One action that they have thought of is to work for something of major psychological effect through bring^{ing} our defense forces to a greater state of readiness. He asked Mr. Bohlen to outline this line of thought. Mr. Bohlen said the Soviet actions were now going beyond their usual ugly, angry reaction to every event they dislike. There has been a considerable shift in the Soviet behavior, evidenced by widespread campaign of inciting violence and disorder all around the world. He said that the threat to use force is something new in the Soviet tactics. This has now become something more than just words and needs to be met with more than words, since polemics and arguments are something they love for creating tension and disturbing world affairs. He said he had been casting about for some action that might quiet them down and show the world that the Soviets are not in position to rule the roost.



FOR YOUR INFORMATION

E.O. 13526, Sec. 1 (b) (1) (2)(3)

State-11/9/77, CIA-5/13/77, NSC-11/17/78

NLE Date 12/18/78

At this point the President asked in what specific military fields this could be done which would have real significance. He commented that everyone knows that if we added to our ICBM program it would be three years before the additional items were actually off the line. Mr. Bohlen said another possibility is to put SAC on airborne alert. The President said the Air Force itself is opposed to this, adding that SAC did not want it. I commented that the Air Force staff, including General White and General LeMay, have not wanted to do this but that General Power has been pressing for it. The President said he gave no weight to Power's views. Mr. Bohlen said that even if the use of the funds is not spelled out, just requesting them would show that we are not being frightened or cowed. He thought we might consider adding to our airlift. The President said he thought that additional airlift is perhaps the least significant need. What he thought he could do was ask authorization from the Congress to start spending available funds more rapidly because of the RB-47 incident, the Congo, Cuba, etc. Perhaps he could put more Atlases in production, and put more of the Air Force on air alert. Mr. Herter asked whether he might talk to Defense about this. The President went on to say that he did not like too much the idea of adding Atlases because it is practically an obsolete weapon. He would be more interested in the Minuteman, but again it is several years until the first of these will appear. Mr. Bohlen suggested he might simply ask the Congress for added money for defense and economic aid. The President said the crux of the matter is to decide what would carry sufficient credibility to create the psychological effect desired. Mr. Bohlen said he thought the Soviets are well aware the military balance is definitely against them. It is just possible, however, that they think our hands are tied during the pre-election period.

The President said he might ask for up to 100 additional ICBMs or perhaps \$500 million for speed-up of weapons systems already proven and for increasing the degree of alertness. In response to the Secretary's question, he asked that the Secretary meet with the Secretary of Defense, Gordon Gray, Mr. Harr and myself. He commented that he could state his intention even prior to the reconvening of the Congress, and bring out that, because of Soviet truculence and arrogance, he proposes to put a certain increase



of funds into defense. These funds would be used to get things we want more quickly or additional things that are useful, and would not go into waste. Mr. Bohlen thought this could be done in a sober and deliberate way without kicking off a war scare. There was question as to whether anything could be done in the field of IRBMs. Mr. Kohler said that the MRBM has some possibility, although we are far from having worked out political arrangements. The President said that the meeting he spoke of should be held soon and asked that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense not go down in their organization below an echelon they could trust since we do not want this getting to the press in a distorted way.

In further discussion Mr. Bohlen said there are two hypotheses with regard to this change of Soviet line. The first, which he does not believe, is that they might have decided this is the best year for a show-down -- that the correlation of forces is in their favor, and that the U. S. is paralyzed because of the forthcoming election. The second, which he is inclined to favor, is that they are having a good deal of trouble with Peiping and are adopting a militant line in order to cut out the Chinese. There was a suggestion that the President make a public statement on this matter, whether by live address or by "tape" within the next few days. I suggested that this should preferably come after the convention, rather than before as some seem to be contemplating, on the ground that the President should not be doing two dissimilar things before the American people at the same time. If he were to speak now he would have to change his approach at the Convention and then revert to this, and this would be confusing. After discussion the President thought that there could be a mention by Mr. Herter of concern over this problem before he left Newport later the same afternoon, that the President might mention it briefly but clearly at the Convention, and then make his speech on it later. The President asked whether it might be a good move to take the U. S. dependents out of Berlin. Mr. Kohler thought that this action would frighten the Berliners and that panic might result which would damage and erode our position. He said that Mr. Merchant has been conducting a study of counter-measures, possible alert steps, and contingency planning. The

~~SECRET~~

President confirmed that Mr. Herter should say we are taking a serious look at the Soviet line of action.

The President then commented, with respect to the issue that has arisen over whether the Bundestag should meet in Berlin, that there was no special reason from our standpoint for the Bundestag to meet there but that, when the Soviets begin to make these threats, we are obliged to come to the support of our German friends.

Mr. Kohler then raised one point with regard to flights such as the RB-47. The British have apparently stopped theirs for the present and have suggested that we suspend our flights. We have held up certain of them but if we were to stop them for very long, it would be difficult and dangerous to start them up again. The President recalled his question (which Colonel Eisenhower had conveyed to General Twining) as to why the British could not take on the sector of northwest Europe for such operations. He agreed that if we suspend the flights for very long it would be very hard to start them up. The President thought that on the next such flight we ought to give consideration to announcing the route in advance.



Mr. Herter next referred to a letter addressed to the President by Mr. McCone having to do with certain nuclear experimentation. After discussion the President gave this his approval subject to remarks that he entered on the letter.

Mr. Herter then spoke of the answer he proposed to give to the recent letter from Congressman Bowles concerning the Formosa Straits situation. The explanation is lengthy, and there is one point about which he had a question. This suggests that Mr. Bowles come in to the State Department for an oral supplement and discussion of the policy. I reported to the President the advice from staff members and other senior officials that oral discussion with the Democratic candidates or their associates on matters of foreign policy should be avoided. The President agreed with this, but after discussion said that Mr. Herter might offer to talk to Mr. Bowles in his capacity as a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. Herter next said that, from a report given to him by Secretary Anderson after the Latters Meeting with the President on Sunday, he had the impression that the President had agreed not to ask for any

~~SECRET~~

2751

EUR/RA: B. Rosenblum

SECRET
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S & U - 8/12/60 Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 2, 1960

SUBJECT: Nuclear Sharing

PARTICIPANTS: Department of State

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Evan B. White, EUR
Mr. Gerard Smith, S/P
Mr. Philip Farley, S/AE
Mr. Robert Bowie, S
Mr. Jack Bell, U/SEC
Mr. Enscell Fousenden,
EUR/RA

SHAPE

General Kertland, SA/SEC
Mr. May L. Thurston, Political
Advisor to SA/SEC

Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Twining, Chairman

Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. McCone, Chairman

Department of Defense
Deputy Secretary of
Defense Douglas
Assistant Secretary of
Defense Irwin (OSD/ISA)
General Miller, OSD/ISA
Colonel Billingslea, OSD/ISA

COPIES TO: S/S, G, S/P, DIR, EUR, RA, C, WE, GER, S/AE, Defense/ISA, UNRO Paris,
Ambassy Paris, Ambassy Bonn, AEC, SHAPE/L - Mr. Thurston

The Secretary asked General Worstad for his views on the question of nuclear sharing. General Worstad began by saying that he felt there was absolutely no military necessity for sharing nuclear weapons with our Allies. The present NATO stockpile arrangements are completely satisfactory as far as the military requirements are concerned. General Worstad said that he would testify to that effect in any Congressional hearings on the subject. He mentioned the deep moral responsibility which the United States has to the whole world in this matter and to the kind of responsibility which would attach to deliberate U.S. action tending to speed up the establishment of independent national nuclear weapons capabilities. He expressed the thought that to hasten this process by even a few years was a responsibility not lightly to be undertaken, particularly since those years could be devoted to attempts to arrive at satisfactory nuclear controls with the other side.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 89-46#12
By [Signature] NLE Date 5/24/89

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

INFORMATION COPY

General

1989/2751 E. Worstad / p. Admin - Mrs. Pol. '60 (2) / Pulley Abe Lewis

Notes etc. Policy 942/1
Shapiro/Thurston
Johnston
R

89-46
12

General Morstad said that sharing nuclear weapons information with the French will not "buy" any better French cooperation in NATO. Prestige is the real French motive for desiring an independent nuclear capability. There is nothing to be gained from the U.S. point of view in helping them attain an independent capability more quickly than they will by their own efforts.

General Swining, in response to a question, indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree with this position. The JCS felt that France is going to have its own nuclear capability inevitably, and that it is a waste of time and money for the French to do this entirely alone. We should therefore aid them by sharing nuclear weapons information.

General Morstad raised the German problem. Under Adenauer, we are confident of the German position, but we must also think of the time beyond Adenauer when no one can be certain as to the position of Germany. The Germans themselves are concerned about this. If the U.S. creates another nuclear power, it will make it much more difficult for the future Germany to resist getting into the field also. It is also difficult to justify a special status for France. Germany is as much a "great power" as France in terms of population and gross national product. It is also very difficult to explain to Italy that France should have a special status.

Mr. McCone, in response to a question as to his views, said that he agreed with General Morstad about the inadvisability of supplying nuclear weapons or information about them. He had felt at one time that the U.S. could assist by supplying enriched U-235 for weapons purposes. The Atomic Energy Commission estimates that we could quickly supply all the U-235 the French could produce over the next fifteen years and save the French a large amount of money.

Mr. Smith noted that our willingness to supply the U-235 would be likely to make the problem more acute, rather than less. If we were to supply the material for weapons, it would be all the more difficult to resist requests for weapons themselves or information about them. It is best to hold the line firmly on all aspects of weapons assistance.

Mr. McCone observed that the question was more or less academic and that the U-235 question should be considered in the context of our over-all policy on nuclear sharing, about which he was in full agreement with General Morstad.

1900 AUG 18 PM 2 19

OUT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

1978/451D

articles own policy - (p2)
on RUC. Shamn g

258-7,1/60
8/3/60

CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
11:45 AM - 12:30 PM

General Norstad
General Goodpastor

The President recalled that he had last seen the President
of the United States in the White House. When
the President visited the Chancellery after the latter's visit to the
United States, the idea of a home in which to test schemes for the
management, Admitter said the President had never
before. In any event, Gen. Norstad inquired, was
the Chancellery not elsewhere. The Chancellery was back
in the White House. The President recalled that he had last
seen the President in the Chancellery and, because of
the Chancellery being on the same side after lunch and

Admitter said that he had visited Turkey on Monday
of last week. Gen. Goodpastor asked if
the trip was to be a study, honorary, diplomatic, or
official. He also met with the Turkish
government, which had turned over the government to
Gen. Norstad said that he had met
before seeing the President
the junta would

Admitter said that he had visited Turkey on Monday
of last week. Gen. Goodpastor asked if
the trip was to be a study, honorary, diplomatic, or
official. He also met with the Turkish
government, which had turned over the government to
Gen. Norstad said that he had met
before seeing the President
the junta would

Walker, who is to be Mattingly's replacement at Walter Reed, and is a truly outstanding and fine man. Gen. Norstad next raised the question of succession for himself. He said he is not asking for relief, but can carry on for a reasonable time, such as a year, for example. The President said that he thought it would be a good thing for Norstad to say for another year. He asked whether Gen. Norstad knows of any foreign government which does not want him to stay on. Gen. Norstad said he was aware of none. The President said Sec. Gates had spoken to him a time or two as to the possibility of assigning Gen. Lemnitzer as SACEUR. The President

thinks it is time to give the Chairmanship to Gen. Lemnitzer. The President said there is need for stability in the top echelons of our armed services, and said he will tell Mr. Gates that he does not contemplate a change in Europe until Gen. Norstad wants to be relieved, or his health requires relief. Gen. Norstad said that he had put his personal views before the Joint Chiefs earlier in the day, and that none of them held a contrary view.

The President then went on to say that it is not possible to bring Gen. Lemnitzer to the position of SACEUR with prospect of success -- that there must be a period in which he and the Europeans get to know each other. Gen. Norstad reverted to the point that he has now served about four years as SACEUR, and thinks this is generally about the correct length of tour. He added that if the Government has a better solution, that at any time he is quite ready to turn over the job. The President reiterated that he thought it would be best for Norstad to say on for a year or so.

The President next raised the point that he has become very disappointed regarding our relationships with our allies in the matter of atomic weapons and missiles. The US Government seems to be taking the attitude that we will call the tune, and that they have inferior status in the alliance. He said he recognizes dangers in this attitude to bilateral, or selective arrangements, with only a few of the countries.

up
OK - see 2/10/60

He stressed that we must not treat our allies as secondary in their role, but should solve the problems of the alliance functionally.

We must devise arrangements that will prevent untoward developments or misuse. This will, of course, not be easy. He thought Italy, Germany, France and Britain would all want such weapons. They should be handled as NATO weapons, to be utilized in "over-all" or strategic purposes. He thought we should be as generous with our allies in this matter as we think they should be in other questions involving the alliance. He said he had considerable sympathy for the point of view of de Gaulle in this question. He is trying to build up his country, and we persist in treating them as second-rate. The President said this is why he wants the study to be made. He will make his recommendation and then leave the matter to his successor. Gen. Norstad said he strongly favored a multi-lateral solution, in which the weapons are turned over to NATO as an entity. He thinks bilateral solution would be destructive, and would involve discrimination against the Italians, Belgians, etc., which he thinks it very important to avoid. The President thought this might be accomplished by holding the control of the weapons to be above a certain echelon of NATO command. Gen. Norstad said he thought the problem could be solved on a NATO basis. There would be certain requirements for weapons. The US would make them available to the alliance during its life in its present form. The US could maintain custody, or joint custody, but NATO would exercise the essential control. Specifically, NATO would have the power of decision as to their use. The President asked whether Gen. Norstad thought Gen. de Gaulle would accept this arrangement. Gen. Norstad said he might not, but this offer would take away every legitimate complaint that de Gaulle now has.

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

The President continued that the Atomic Energy Act is a very defective and "flexible" law, which has done great harm to the conduct of our relations with our allies. Gen. Norstad commented that the submarine raises an entirely different question with regard to the moral issue. He assumed we are not talking about a Polaris submarine with atomic missiles, and the President agreed. The President thought the allies would be wise to let the US carry the moral responsibility. At this point the President asked me to check the status of Gen. Norstad's multilateral proposal of last year, and make sure that the three agencies studying the question give due consideration to this proposal. He said the study should also include submarines.

Gen. Norstad asked that I have the Departments involved let Gen. Norstad know what they are doing in the matter.

Gen. Norstad said it would be useful to him if he could see copies of the President's letters to Gen. de Gaulle. He realized

CONFIDENTIAL

These are very tightly handled. The President commented that it could be embarrassing to him if this very private correspondence were to be circulated. He agreed, however, that Gen. Norstad might receive a memo giving the gist of the questions when a matter affecting SACEUR's responsibility is involved. General Norstad said that Gen. de Gaulle is invariably extremely friendly in his manner toward him, and in his references to the President. The President said he would like to make some sort of a friendly gesture toward de Gaulle, particularly in light of recent reports that de Gaulle feels US policy is in the doldrums until a new administration comes in. Gen. Norstad confirmed that this is de Gaulle's view.

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

66D 204
177

F58

819/60
Euk

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

48
Action
S/S
Info

SECRET
Classification Control:
Rec'd: 5717

740.5
8-960
AUGUST 9, 1960
6:47 PM

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 545, AUGUST 9, 9 PM

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE / WDC/HR

PRIORITY

REVIEWED by: HA
 RELEASE DECLASSIFY
 EXCISE DECLASSIFY in PART
 DENY Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

REFERENCE: DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 482

Authority to:
CLASSIFY as _____ OADR
DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF LETTER AUG 9 TO
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER FROM PRESIDENT DE GAULLE WHICH WAS
HANDED BY BROUILLET, PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S DIRECTEUR
DU CABINET, TO LYON AT 7 P.M. PARIS TIME.

QUOTE

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Kuto

YOUR LETTER OF AUG 2 BRINGS ME INDICATIONS CONCERNING
THE MANNER IN WHICH YOU ENVISAGE THE TRIPARTITE COOPERA-
TION WHICH I PROPOSED TO YOU AND TO MR. MACMILLAN ON
SEVERAL OCCASIONS . I NOTE THAT YOU PLAN A MEETING OF OUR
FOREIGN MINISTERS WHEN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY TAKES PLACE, A MEETING WHICH I THINK CAN REALLY
BE USEFUL AND WHICH, FURTHERMORE, SHOULD IN ANY EVENT
TAKE PLACE. I NOTE ALSO THAT YOU MAKE ALLUSION TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE THREE OF US, WITHOUT
HOWEVER MENTIONING EITHER A DATE OR SUBJECTS. ALLOW
ME TO TELL YOU, HOWEVER, IN ALL FRIENDSHIP, THAT YOUR
CONCEPTION SEEMS TO ME TO BE TOO RESTRICTED TO ATTAIN
THE COMMON ACTION OF OUR WEST AND TO MAKE OUR ALLIANCE
REALLY MORE EFFICIENT.

AT THE

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

SECRET

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R-central files with notation of action taken.

N 910 - DUS FOIA

#610

3

SECRET

-2- 544, AUGUST 9, 9 PM, FROM PARIS

AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE CRISIS IN THE CONGO BRINGS OUT OUR DISAGREEMENT. WHILE PROBABLY THE AGREEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE MIGHT HAVE SUFFICED TO BRING THIS VERY YOUNG STATE TO TAKE A REASONABLE COURSE, THE DIVERGENCES OF OUR WEST ARE, ON THE CONTRARY, IN LARGE MEASURE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FACT THAT THIS NEW INDEPENDENCE FELL, AT ITS VERY FIRST STEPS, INTO DISORDER AND ANARCHY. MOREOVER, WE FIND OURSELVES OUT OF STEP WITH ONE ANOTHER BEFORE THE SCHEMING AND THE POSSIBLE INTERVENTION OF THE SOVIETS IN THE HEART OF AFRICA. IN THIS AFFAIR, EVERYTHING IS HAPPENING AS THOUGH THE WEST, WHICH IS THE SEAT OF GOOD SENSE AND LIBERTY, WERE REACHING THE POINT OF VOLUNTARILY SUBMERGING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE COMPOSITE MIXTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

I MUST SAY TO YOU THAT FRANCE, IN CALLING TO MIND ONCE MORE ON THIS OCCASION THE PROSPECT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, FEELS MORE STRONGLY THAN EVER THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE SERIOUSLY DEFECTIVE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF OUR ALLIANCE. IN THE EVENTS WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE FROM ONE END OF THE WORLD TO THE OTHER, MY COUNTRY NOTES AT EVERY INSTANT THAT THOSE WHOM SHE CONSIDERS HER ALLIES ACT AS THOUGH THEY WERE NOT. BUT HOW COULD STATES CONSIDER THEMSELVES BOUND TOGETHER WHEN THERE IS NO POLITICAL SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THEM IN THE PRESENCE OF WHAT TAKES PLACE IN NINE-TENTHS OF THE WORLD? THE FACT THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, SUCH AS IT IS, COVERS ONLY THE NARROW SECTOR OF WESTERN EUROPE, WHEREAS CONTINENTAL ASIA, SOUTH-EAST ASIA, ASIA MINOR, NORTH AFRICA, BLACK AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTH AMERICA ARE FULL OF PROBLEMS AND OF SEETHING DANGERS AND WOULD EVENTUALLY BECOME THE THEATER OF WAR OPERATIONS, APPEARS TO FRANCE UNREALISTIC AND INCOMPATIBLE WITH HER WORLD-WIDE RESPONSIBILITIES.

FUTHERMORE,

SECRET

SECRET

-3- 544, AUGUST 9, 9 PM, FROM PARIS

FURTHERMORE, THE SYSTEM OF MILITARY INTEGRATION APPLIED TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND WHICH ATTRIBUTES IN FACT TO THE UNITED STATES THE EVENTUAL CONDUCT OF A WAR IN EUROPE, THE USE OF THE FORCES WHICH WOULD PARTICIPATE THEREIN, THE ENTIRE DISPOSITION OF THE ATOMIC ARMS WHICH WOULD BE ITS ESSENTIAL MEANS, TAKES AWAY FROM FRANCE, HER PEOPLE, HER GOVERNMENT, HER COMMAND, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HER OWN DEFENSE. CONSIDERING THE ELEMENTS OF THE CASE AS THEY EXISTED WHEN NATO WAS INSTITUTED, THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS COULD IN THE PAST BE EXPLAINED IN A CERTAIN MEASURE. YOU UNDERSTAND, I AM SURE, WHY IT HAS BECOME UNACCEPTABLE TODAY FOR MY COUNTRY.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT, MY DEAR FRIEND, I FEEL THAT YOU, MR. MACMILLAN AND I HAVE THE POSSIBILITY, WHICH IS AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME DEFINITE AND TRANSITORY, TO ORGANIZE A REAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC COOPERATION OF OUR WEST IN THE PRESENCE OF THE MULTIPLE AND DANGEROUS THREATS WHICH BESET US. WE CAN DO IT ALL THE BETTER SINCE ON THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PROBLEMS OUR VIEWS AND INTENTIONS ARE WITHOUT DOUBT QUITE CLOSE. IF, ALL THREE TOGETHER, WE CAME TO GRIPS WITH THIS AFFAIR, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE COULD ARRIVE AT A COMMON PLAN TO ESTABLISH OUR HARMONY VIS-A-VIS WORLD PROBLEMS AND THE REFORM OF THE ALLIANCE. I ADD THAT OUR AGREEMENT WOULD PRODUCE A SALUTARY IMPRESSION IN THE WORLD.

IF YOU WOULD BE WILLING TO PROCEED IN THIS MANNER, I PROPOSE AND AT THE SAME TIME SUGGEST TO MR. MACMILLAN THAT WE MEET DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER AT A PLACE AND ON A DATE CONVENIENT TO YOU.

PLEASE ACCEPT, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY VERY HIGH AND VERY CORDIAL CONSIDERATION.

CHARLES DE GAULLE

UNQUOTE

BROUILLET STATES

SECRET

#610

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

-4- 544, AUGUST 9, 9 PM, FROM PARIS

BROUILLET STATES ORIGINAL OF ABOVE BEING FORWARDED BY
POUCH TO FRENCH EMBASSY WASHINGTON FOR TRANSMISSION.
FRENCH ALSO TRANSMITTING COPY TO PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN.

HOUGHTON

AM/22

#610

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

8/14/60
= 8/16

State
1/6/61 PC

August 19, 1960

Z

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
August 16, 1960

Others present: Mr. Robert Bowie, Gen. Goodpaster

Mr. Bowie said he wanted to give a brief oral report on the ten-year study on NATO that he has been making. On the military side, he said he sees an urgent need for a new look at the strategy of NATO in light of the Soviet nuclear development. Action is needed respecting, first, a strategic strike capability in the European area, and, second, the "shield" forces.

As to the strategic capability, the Europeans want to have some nuclear weapons under their own control. Mr. Bowie said that the national programs now being carried forward are very bad and are having a divisive effect. He suggests instead a multilateral program. As the first stage of such a program, the United States would assign some Polaris submarines with missiles to NATO. The assignment should be irrevocable, with a commitment that we will not pull them out.



As the second stage, we would help the Europeans develop indigenous strike forces of a multilateral, multinational character (even including mixed crews in all probability). We would have to agree on the method of use of such a collective force. It might be that we would keep the warheads in our possession,

7/1/61
RW
semi-annual

Full version: DD RS 1997/889

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
BY LKO DATE 11/6/86

MR 85-22945

PORTIONS OF
ED. 1175.3 (10/16)
a(1)(5)
NSC letter 7/30/86
FILE DATE 11/6/86

Staff Secy / subj / 005 / 4 / "State Dept 1960
(Aug-Sept) (1) = 1980/1139

TOP SECRET

Mr. Bowie said he saw a number of merits for these schemes over the national force approach. Also, he thought the use of the Polaris was much better than proposals for land-based weapons,

With regard to the chield forces, Mr. Bowie thought that the non-nuclear elements should be enhanced and brought up to something like the 28-30 divisions contemplated in SHAPE plans. These should be equipped for, and capable of, non-nuclear fighting. The Europeans are not drawn with enthusiasm to the prospect of tactical nuclear war on their own homelands. He did not think that there could be a stage of conflict between the non-nuclear and the all-out strategic attack -- in other words, there can be no war limited to tactical nuclear war in Europe. Accordingly, he felt we should take a very hard look at our MRBM proposals and our tactical nuclear planning. He thought we should have enough tactical nuclear weapons of up to several hundred mile range to prevent an enemy from being able to mass forces against us. He did not see reason or need to go to a 1,200 mile missile.



At this point the President commented on Mr. Bowie's remarks. He said he was in accord with the first part of Bowie's thesis -- about the unsatisfactory state of the alliance insofar as atomic cooperation is concerned. The difficulty in his judgment is not with the Europeans but with our own Congress, which strives to keep in its own hands details of military foreign policy and similar operations. He said the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is unconstitutional in its functions. The President said he agreed that we are not going to have a tactical nuclear war in Western Europe. In fact, he said he cannot see any chance of keeping any war in Europe from becoming a general war. For this reason he thought we must be ready to throw the book at the Russians should they jump us. He did not see how there could be such a thing as a limited war in Europe, and thought we would be fooling ourselves and our European friends if we said we could fight such a war without recourse to nuclear weapons. If massive land war operations such as the Ludendorff offensive in early 1918 in World War I were to occur, he was sure that nations would use every weapon available to them. Mr. Bowie said that he did not see the Soviets

- 3 - TOP SECRET

attempting to mount a massive land attack in Europe. The point is psychological and political more than military. If the Europeans think that they are in a situation where they cannot resist at all if they do not use all-out nuclear attack, the probability becomes great that they would not resist and accordingly could not prevent Soviet encroachment. What he is suggesting is that we should be careful that we would not end up deterring ourselves.

The President said he thinks it is of the greatest importance to have this kind of thinking. He assured Mr. Bowie he would read his report, when it is available, most carefully. He noted that the Bowie proposal is the antithesis of de Gaulle's line of thought. De Gaulle apparently wants the atomic weapons completely in his own hands. Only when he has these things himself will he talk about "collective forces". He thinks de Gaulle gives only lip service to the basic idea of NATO. Mr. Bowie acknowledged that these proposals will probably not be acceptable to de Gaulle. However, one of their merits is that they permit us to go ahead with the first step. He also noted that officials in the French Government below de Gaulle do not agree with his approach and philosophy. The President commented that the ability to carry out the first step seems to be dependent upon the Congress. Mr. Bowie said this matter is not completely clear, since the weapons will in fact be retained in our hands, and the President will say that he will consider SACEUR's decision as his own. The President commented that if the Europeans are not willing to accept the idea of collective defense by multiple rather than national forces, the whole NATO concept will fall apart. Mr. Bowie agreed with the qualification that if the four or five big industrial powers will not work intimately together in the next ten years, we are in trouble.



The President said he has very much on his mind the question as to how NATO can act in harmony on a world-wide scale. Perhaps a geographical division of effort would be possible, with the French concentrating on their community, the British on the Commonwealth, the Germans perhaps on the Mid-East, and ourselves elsewhere. This did not really look like a feasible scheme to him; however. Mr. Bowie said that the present may be a critical point in time in one respect. The British, in his judgment, should throw their lot in with the continent. This is

TOP SECRET

- 4 - TOP SECRET

an historical opportunity for them, and perhaps for us to influence them. He suggested that we put our weight behind this. The President commented that Adenauer seems to be pulling back somewhat from the European concept. He added he thought it would be good to see Britain in this grouping. Mr. Bowie agreed that Britain is the key element to the success of this idea. The President thought it could be presented to them in terms that they would be going back to the balance of power, contributing their wisdom, experience and sturdiness to European affairs. Mr. Bowie thought we should tell them that they have to get into the European grouping in order to make these qualities effective.

The President recalled that he had told Churchill years ago that Britain is faced with three choices and will soon have to adopt one of them: to make the Commonwealth a single nation (which seems impractical); to join up with the continent; or to join the U. S. as several additional states. Mr. Churchill did not welcome the suggestion. Mr. Bowie repeated that the next few months in his opinion are a critical turning point. He thought Adenauer has lost his nerve over the European approach, and that the British are capitalizing on this to try to water down the European Community. He thought it should not be watered down, but should be developed as a strong political grouping.



It will be more difficult, and possibly impossible, to get around the problem of Commonwealth preference. Mr. Bowie observed that Commonwealth preferences are a wasting asset, both for the British and for the other Commonwealth members. The President commented that the Canadians, for example are at the moment very Commonwealth-conscious, trying to orient their trade to Britain.

Royal Family

The President said he thought he agreed with all of Mr. Bowie's remarks except the possibility of having a land struggle in Europe. Mr. Bowie said his proposal is that, if we have the capability to conduct some operations of this kind, we will probably not need it. The President said he felt sure we would

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

never see another grinding type of conflict along the lines of World War I. He recognized that perhaps there has been a gap in his own thinking regarding this question. Since the costs of developing and maintaining such a force would be quite large we come to a matter of priorities. Our gold outflow has been such that we cannot take on too much of a burden of supporting the development of conventional forces. Mr. Bowie thought that we should aim at strategic forces up to a couple of hundred missiles. We could cut on tactical nuclear forces and put the savings into the shield. The President agreed that if we have Polaris submarines there should not be a need for so many tactical missiles. He asked me to arrange to have General Norstad come in the next time he is in the States, preferably with Mr. Bowie. I commented that he will be here in mid-September.

The President said the overall question is to face up to the dilemma of how we make ourselves secure in our alliance without destroying the alliance. This is the real problem that de Gaulle has raised. He asked me to set up a "couple of hours" for the discussion he mentioned. He said if the scheme looks reasonable, he would be ready to battle with de Gaulle about it.



A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

TOP SECRET

1197/889

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 19, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
August 16, 1960

Others present: Mr. Robert Bowie, Gen. Goodpaster

Mr. Bowie said he wanted to give a brief oral report on the ten-year study on NATO that he has been making. On the military side, he said he sees an urgent need for a new look at the strategy of NATO in light of the Soviet nuclear development. Action is needed respecting, first, a strategic strike capability in the European area, and, second, the "shield" forces.

As to the strategic capability, the Europeans want to have some nuclear weapons under their own control. Mr. Bowie said that the national programs now being carried forward are very bad and are having a divisive effect. He suggests instead a multilateral program. As the first stage of such a program, the United States would assign some Polaris submarines with missiles to NATO. The assignment should be irrevocable, with a commitment that we will not pull them out. They could be employed on three types of orders: 1) SACEUR could order their employment in the event a massive attack were sustained on the territory of Western Europe, and we could not veto such an order; 2) the North Atlantic Council could order their employment and we could not veto this; 3) we would not give up the right to order their employment unilaterally. As the second state, we would help the Europeans develop indigenous strike forces of a multilateral, multinational character (even including mixed crews in all probability). We would have to agree on the method of use of such a collective force. It might be that we would keep the warheads in our possession, but without a veto as to their use.



DECLASSIFIED 3/31/06
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.4(b)
MIA 9-5122

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

Mr. Bowie said he saw a number of merits for these schemes over the national force approach. Also, he thought the use of the Polaris was much better than proposals for land-based weapons, since such proposals give a veto to the country on whose territory they are supposed to be based.

With regard to the chield forces, Mr. Bowie thought that the non-nuclear elements should be enhanced and brought up to something like the 28-30 divisions contemplated in SHAPE plans. These should be equipped for, and capable of, non-nuclear fighting. The Europeans are not drawn with enthusiasrn to the prospect of tactical nuclear war on their own homelands. He did not think that there could be a stage of conflict between the non-nuclear and the all-out strategic attack -- in other words, there can be no war limited to tactical nuclear war in Europe. Accordingly, he felt we should take a very hard look at our MRBM proposals and our tactical nuclear planning. He thought we should have enough tactical nuclear weapons of up to several hundred mile range to prevent an enemy from being able to mass forces against us. He did not see reason or need to go to a 1,200 mile missile.



At this point the President commented on Mr. Bowie's remarks. He said he was in accord with the first part of Bowie's thesis -- about the unsatisfactory state of the alliance insofar as atomic cooperation is concerned. The difficulty in his judgment is not with the Europeans but with our own Congress, which strives to keep in its own hands details of military foreign policy and similar operations. He said the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is unconstitutional in its functions. The President said he agreed that we are not going to have a tactical nuclear war in Western Europe. In fact, he said he cannot see any chance of keeping any war in Europe from becoming a general war. For this reason he thought we must be ready to throw the book at the Russians should they jump us. He did not see how there could be such a thing as a limited war in Europe, and thought we would be fooling ourselves and our European friends if we said we could fight such a war without recourse to nuclear weapons. If massive land war operations such as the Ludendorff offensive in early 1918 in World War I were to occur, he was sure that nations would use every weapon available to them. Mr. Bowie said that he did not see the Soviets

~~TOP SECRET~~



The Pros and Cons of Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies
(Including Possible Changes in Legislation)

Background.

1. This paper, as presently entitled, was initiated by the Planning Board and was to be drafted by an Ad Hoc Planning Board Committee composed of State (Chairman), Defense, and AEC. You will recall that the Planning Board, on March 10, 1960, discussed a similar discussion paper prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee and referred the paper back to the Committee for revision in the light of the discussion, with the understanding that the revised paper should be deferred until after submission of the two related reports called for by para. 24-c of NSC 5906/1 (Basic) and para. 42-a of NSC 5910/1 (France).

2. In discussions beginning July 22, the Planning Board concluded that the Ad Hoc Committee report should be broadened so as to develop in one report all of the elements called for in the three reports mentioned in para. 1 above (Study of Multilateral European Nuclear Authority; Possible Nuclear Assistance to France; Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies (including possible changes in legislation)). At its Aug. 5 meeting, the Planning Board noted a report by State that the latest comprehensive State draft had been presented to the Defense and AEC members of the Ad Hoc Committee. At its Aug. 9 meeting, the Planning Board agreed to attempt to discuss the new Ad Hoc draft on Tuesday, Aug. 16, aiming for possible Council consideration on Aug. 18. The Planning Board recognized, however, that the schedule might not be feasible. It also noted your request that Planning Board members study the State draft (circulated by Planning Board memorandum of Aug. 9) in anticipation of discussion of the expected Ad Hoc Committee report.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee report has not yet been circulated to the Planning Board. In fact, as of this writing, a State draft has not yet been considered by the Ad Hoc Committee, meeting as such. I have been informed that Defense has a new draft report. I do not believe, however, that other members of the Committee have yet seen it.

4. The State Draft -- General. You will note from the cover sheet:
(a) that the State draft has not been cleared by the State Department;
(b) that the organization of the State draft is the same as that of the March 3 draft of the Ad Hoc Committee. (The subheadings of the papers are virtually identical, except for a section entitled "Sharing with Neutrals" that appears on page 15 of the new draft). It is fair to say, I think, that the new paper differs little in major respects from the March 3 draft. Changes largely reflect: an up-dating of the earlier draft -- revised in the light of the Planning Board discussion of March 10; the Loper presentation of

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 87-324 #6
BY DJH DATE 1/7/92

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET

OSANGA / NSC Briefing Note / 1/4 / New Sharing w Allies



UNCLASSIFIED SECRET

April 26; the requirement to give further emphasis to France and to multilateral arrangements; and sharper and clearer conclusions and recommendations.

5. Suggestions for Planning Board discussion.

(a) Since the State draft follows so closely the Ad Hoc Committee report of March 3, one must assume that the new Defense draft implies disagreement with the conclusions and recommendations rather than with the organization of the paper. I suggest therefore, that the Planning Board turn first to the CONCLUSIONS of the State draft (p. 24) and seek to ascertain which of the conclusions are in dispute. (I understand that AEC is in general agreement with the State Draft). Since the RECOMMENDATIONS presumably flow from the CONCLUSIONS, I suggest next that the RECOMMENDATIONS be similarly treated.

(b) I would guess that State would prefer to use its draft in developing any splits that may exist. The fact of a new Defense draft suggests that Defense opposes the use of the State draft. The Planning Board should be asked to provide guidance to the Ad Hoc Committee on this procedural point.

(c) The State draft, as you have observed, has taken a negative position on all three aspects of the Nuclear Sharing Problem. Presumably for that reason it has not addressed itself specifically to recommendations as to the nature and timing of requisite legislature. Nonetheless, such recommendations are called for by NSC Action No. 2274-d, in the report that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the AEC are to make to the Council. Perhaps some Planning Board discussion on this problem is in order.

6. Specific Points that you may wish to note.

Para. 11, (p. 4,) line 3: clarifies an earlier question regarding requirements for Congressional "concurrence" and also points out that two Presidential determinations are required.

Para. 16, (p. 6,): note first sentence. The earlier draft indicated that "these arrangements appear to make it possible to meet some requirements".

Para. 18, (p. 7), last sentence: the Congressional and Executive "doubt" mentioned here was not, I believe, in the earlier paper.

Para. 21, (p. 8), last sentence: seems to reverse the point in the old paper that "the present custodial and control arrangements may not permit such weapons to be sufficiently ready and positioned for effective use." Note, however, that the distinction may lie in the fact that the old language included "control".

Para. 32, (p. 12): an important point in State's argument--no real pressure for sharing. Incidentally, you may wish to inquire if the studies mentioned in the last sentence of the para. are soon to be ready.

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET

Paras. 34, 35 (p. 13); 36, 37 (p. 14): French problem; recommend reading.

Para. 39, (p. 16): first sentence, top of page: seems somewhat unrealistic.

Soviet bloc reaction, (page 17): you may wish to ask if CIA agrees.

Para. 46, (p. 18): Suggests that U.S. sales to Allies would not be helpful.

Para. 49, (p. 19), last sentence: suggests that sharing would be expensive to the U.S. financially.

Para. 51, (p. 20): omits the thought in the old paper that broader sharing now might produce some means of exerting U.S. control over developments which might otherwise be lost.

Para. 56, (p. 22): This, I believe, was one of Dr. Loper's suggestions. But this too (see para. 58, p. 23) seems to be rejected.

8/24/60

1947/1949

Secretary Gates
Department of State
Acting Secretary Dillon
Mr. Smith

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Admiral Starbird

COPIES TO:

The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
S/P - Mr. Smith

S/AE - Mr. Farley
EUR - Mr. Kohler
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Retain class. Change class to _____
 With concurrence of _____
 Destroy in part and _____ as shown
EO 12858, Sec. 1.3 (a)

EXEMPTED BY 511 8128143

1348

Secretary Gates said that the Joint Chiefs had some weeks ago sent him a paper taking a firm line that we should change present US policy against nuclear weapons sharing with selected allies. Thereupon, Secretary Gates had instructed his people to prepare a paper proposing a reversal of policy for the purpose of getting a clear focus on the issue.

He mentioned the recent visit of General Beaufre who had indicated that General de Gaulle would offer full cooperation to NATO if the United States would supply France with some POLARIS missiles without warheads. General Beaufre's thesis was that all General de Gaulle wanted was to be in a position whereby he could offer his missiles to NATO.

Secretary Gates then spoke of the intense feeling that General Morstad had in opposition to nuclear sharing with the French. Secretary Gates said that General Morstad's conversation with him shock him and thereafter he had asked his people

to prepare

NLE MR Case No. 93-49

Document No. 1

Please review the bracketed portions.
The remainder of the document was
previously declassified under
NLE 89-46-211

State Hr. 5/18/89

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 93-49 H
By JMS NLE Date 4/9/86

Excluded from destruction made
by the Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes.

McCone / [unclear]

①
93-MR-0392

SECRET

- 2 -

to prepare the paper in a way that would show no sharp splits with the Department of State position. He did not want to have a row with State.

Secretary Gates feels that the present paper reflects little or no difference between State and Defense. Mr. McCone and Mr. Lillon pointed out that there seemed to be a flat difference in that the Defense language states that there is a need for the President to have authority to transfer nuclear weapons to selected allies. The State and AEC language says there is no need.

Secretary Gates then talked about the possibility of interpreting the present law by making a finding that the French had made substantial progress and thus permitting nuclear sharing without legislation. Mr. Lillon asked Secretary Gates if he had in mind actually transferring nuclear warheads to the French. Secretary Gates said he did not know whether the two-key arrangement for the missiles would be enough.

There was then some discussion of General Beaufre's visit. He said that he would return shortly after Labor Day, after having taken up the matter with General de Gaulle. Mr. Smith pointed out that all the evidence we have was contrary to the General Beaufre theory that General de Gaulle would offer full cooperation to NATO in return for such a small consideration. Secretary Gates said that General Beaufre had told him that the French would be willing to let the US keep custody of the warheads. Mr. Lillon pointed out his belief that the French in any event would want to keep national control over some ballistic missiles if we made them available.

Secretary Gates pointed out General Norstad's idea of having a recapture clause in a possible program for making submarines available to NATO countries. Under this, if the subs were no longer allocated to SACROH, the US could recapture them.

There was some discussion about the possibility of stepping up the POLARIS submarine rate so that General Norstad's initial MRB requirement could be met in this way. Mr. McCone said that Admirals Rickover and Rayburn had gotten together and it was Mr. McCone's belief that we could get five more subs by 1963 if we wanted to.

Mr. Smith

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Smith pointed out that Mr. Bowie's study was going to propose a multilateral water-borne missile force and that General Norstad and Mr. Bowie were going to meet with the President early in September. Secretary Gates asked if he could have a copy of the Bowie report. Mr. Dillon said it had not yet been received.

Mr. McCone pointed out that sharing weapons with the French had profound implications since it would raise the pressures from the Germans. The Chinese would press the Russians, as would the East Germans. If nuclear sharing is necessary, he inclines toward a multilateral rather than a bilateral arrangement.

Mr. Dillon said that he had been struck by General Norstad's argument that it would be bad policy to reward General de Gaulle by nuclear sharing with him after his continuous non-cooperation with NATO. Mr. Dillon went on to say that the circumstances would be different if General de Gaulle made a proposition to the United States.

It was noted that General Norstad was urging the US Government to bring pressure on the North Atlantic Council to take up the MRBM matter in September.

Mr. Dillon stated that he preferred the Defense language to that of the AEC/State for paragraph B of the committee report of August 23. Mr. McCone concurred.

In regard to submarine cooperation, Mr. Dillon pointed out that he did not think there was any issue of substance between the agencies, but he wanted to avoid any language that would suggest we would start the negotiations with the Dutch and then give the Joint Committee some opportunity to hold up the negotiations until they had a further chance to intervene. It was the consensus that we should establish with the Dutch at the start whether or not they agreed to the two-year delay clause. Mr. Dillon felt that the AEC formulation would permit the Joint Committee to hold up the negotiations until January.

Mr. McCone said he felt that the two-year delay would not suit the Dutch. They want to get as much information as soon as possible for use in their own peaceful uses programs and for component manufacture in Holland.

Mr. McCone

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. McCone felt that it was unwise for us to offer this cooperation to the Dutch. Their military expenditures for NATO are very much below A-70 requirements. This was not a sensible use of their resources. Mr. Smith pointed out that the President had made a commitment in NATO and that we had little choice except to cooperate or waltz. There was some discussion as to the Soviet capability in the ballistic missile submarine field. Secretary Gates said that the intelligence he had indicated that the Soviets will in a relatively short while have a capability to produce ten submarines.

Mr. McCone pointed out the unique reactor technology in the Nautilus-type submarine. Nothing that we have learned indicated the Soviets have it.

The conversation then returned to the nuclear weapons matter and Secretary Gates listed the arguments of the Joint Chiefs (all of which appeared to be political).

It was concluded that no decision would be reached at the Council meeting on August 25. Mr. Dillon said he felt that we ought to take a position that the policy certainly should be restudied and we should either reaffirm it, modify it, or abolish it. Secretary Gates said he felt that there was a need for a decision on this matter before the end of the Administration.

General Starbird pointed out that experience with the UK showed that limited cooperation is difficult. One may intend at the start to cooperate on relatively unadvanced weapons design but one soon gets into the latest techniques.

Mr. Smith pointed out the danger of leaks, indicating that there was already some public knowledge that this matter was under consideration and that State and Defense were split on the issue. Mr. Smith pointed out that if the French became aware that there was some prospect of change in US policy, there was little prospect of cooperation from them along the lines we are presently pushing.

~~SECRET~~

5124/60

August 24, 1960

Handwritten: CS, CD, 8/24/60

PARTICIPANTS: Department of Defense
 Secretary Gates
Atomic Energy Commission
 Mr. Malone
 Admiral Starbird

Department of State
 Acting Secretary Dillon
 Mr. Smith

COPIES TO:

The Secretary
 Mr. Merchant
 S/P - Mr. Smith

S/AE - Mr. Farley
 EUR - Mr. Kohler

Secretary Gates said that the Joint Chiefs had some weeks ago sent him a paper taking a firm line that we should change present US policy against nuclear weapons sharing with selected allies. Thereupon, Secretary Gates had instructed his people to prepare a paper proposing a reversal of policy for the purpose of getting a clear focus on the issue.

He mentioned the recent visit of General Beaufre

Secretary Gates then spoke of the intense feeling that General Morstad had in opposition to nuclear sharing with the French. Secretary Gates said that General Morstad's conversation with him shook him and thereafter he had asked his people

to prepare

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
 Agency Case State 8804678
 NLE Case 89-46-11
 By SK NLE Date 5/24/89

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Handwritten: Morstad 8/24/60 / Atomic Nuclear Policy 1960 (3)

~~SECRET~~

-2-

to prepare the paper in a way that would show no sharp splits with the Department of State position. He did not want to have a row with State.

Secretary Gates feels that the present paper reflects little or no difference between State and Defense. Mr. McCone and Mr. Dillon pointed out that there seemed to be a flat difference in that the Defense language states that there is a need for the President to have authority to transfer nuclear weapons to selected allies. The State and AEC language says there is no need.

Secretary Gates then talked about the possibility of interpreting the present law by making a finding that the French had made substantial progress and thus permitting nuclear sharing without legislation.

There was then some discussion of General Beaufre's visit. He said that he would return shortly after Labor Day, after having taken up the matter with General de Gaulle.

Secretary Gates pointed out General Norstad's idea of having a recapture clause in a possible program for making submarines available to NATO countries. Under this, if the subs were no longer allocated to SACROH, the US could recapture them.

There was some discussion about the possibility of stepping up the POLARIS submarine rate so that General Norstad's initial MRBd requirement could be met in this way. Mr. McCone said that Admirals Rickover and Rayburn had gotten together and it was Mr. McCone's belief that we could get five more subs by 1963 if we wanted to.

Mr. Smith

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

Mr. Smith pointed out that Mr. Bowie's study was going to propose a multilateral water-borne missile force and that General Horstad and Mr. Bowie were going to meet with the President early in September. Secretary Gates asked if he could have a copy of the Bowie report. Mr. Dillon said it had not yet been received.

Mr. McCone pointed out that sharing weapons with the French had profound implications since it would raise the pressures from the Germans. The Chinese would press the Russians, as would the East Germans. If nuclear sharing is necessary, he inclines toward a multilateral rather than a bilateral arrangement.

Mr. Dillon said that he had been struck by General Horstad's argument that it would be bad policy to reward General de Gaulle by nuclear sharing with him after his continuous non-cooperation with NATO. Mr. Dillon went on to say that the circumstances would be different if General de Gaulle made a proposition to the United States.

It was noted that General Horstad was urging the US Government to bring pressure on the North Atlantic Council to take up the MRBM matter in September.

Mr. Dillon stated that he preferred the Defense language to that of the AEC/State for paragraph B of the committee report of August 23. Mr. McCone concurred.

In regard to submarine cooperation, Mr. Dillon pointed out that he did not think there was any issue of substance between the agencies, but he wanted to avoid any language that would suggest we would start the negotiations with the Dutch and then give the Joint Committee some opportunity to hold up the negotiations until they had a further chance to intervene. It was the consensus that we should establish with the Dutch at the start whether or not they agreed to the two-year delay clause. Mr. Dillon felt that the AEC formulation would permit the Joint Committee to hold up the negotiations until January.

Mr. McCone said he felt that the two-year delay would not suit the Dutch. They want to get as much information as soon as possible for use in their own peaceful uses programs and for component manufacture in Holland.

Mr. McCone

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

Mr. McCone felt that it was unwise for us to offer this cooperation to the Dutch. Their military expenditures for NATO are very much below M-70 requirements. This was not a sensible use of their resources. Mr. Smith pointed out that the President had made a commitment in NATO and that we had little choice except to cooperate or welsh. There was some discussion as to the Soviet capability in the ballistic missile submarine field. Secretary Gates said that the intelligence he had indicated that the Soviets will in a relatively short while have a capability to produce ten submarines.

Mr. McCone pointed out the unique reactor technology in the Nautilus-type submarine. Nothing that we have learned indicated the Soviets have it.

The conversation then returned to the nuclear weapons matter and Secretary Gates listed the arguments of the Joint Chiefs (all of which appeared to be political).

It was concluded that no decision would be reached at the Council meeting on August 26. Mr. Dillon said he felt that we ought to take a position that the policy certainly should be restudied and we should either reaffirm it, modify it, or abolish it. Secretary Gates said he felt that there was a need for a decision on this matter before the end of the Administration.



Mr. Smith pointed out the danger of leaks, indicating that there was already some public knowledge that this matter was under consideration and that State and Defense were split on the issue. Mr. Smith pointed out that if the French became aware that there was some prospect of change in US policy, there was little prospect of cooperation from them along the lines we are presently pushing.

UNCLASSIFIED

8124760 (-)



UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

INCREASED NUCLEAR SHARING WITH ALLIES

1. The first item on today's agenda is a report on the subject of Increased Nuclear Sharing with our Allies. You will recall that the question of Increased Sharing has been before the Council on several earlier occasions.

Para. 24-c of Basic Policy (NSC 5906/1) dated August 5, 1959, called upon the Executive Branch to urgently consider, within the Executive Branch, plans for the development of NATO arrangements for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons. The question arose again in connection with U.S. Policy Toward France, (NSC 5910/1) dated November 4, 1959. Para. 42-a of that paper called upon the U.S. Government urgently to proceed with the above mentioned multilateral study and at an appropriate time seek French support of and participation in some form of multilateral European nuclear authority. The French paper also directed urgent study of whether and under what circumstances it might be in the U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France through the exchange with it or the provision to it as appropriate of (1) information; (2) materials; (3) nuclear weapons; under control arrangements to be determined. Shortly thereafter, on December 16, 1959, the Council agreed that the Planning Board should undertake the immediate preparation of a discussion paper on the "Implications of Sharing of Nuclear Weapons with Allies" (NSC Action No. 2166-b-(9)).

2. On August 1, 1960, (NSC Action 2274-d), the President directed that the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, jointly report to the President on the advantages and disadvantages of arrange-

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12333, SEC. 3.4 (b)

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

MR 87-324 #5
BY DVF DATE 1/7/91

OSANSA/NSC/Briefing Notes/14/1/1960/James Francis W. Office



~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ TOP SECRET

ments which would permit the President, whenever he determines it to be in the U.S. security interest to do so:

(1) Either to sell or otherwise make available nuclear weapons to selected allies; or

(2) to seek creation of multilateral arrangements to assure nuclear efficiency in NATO. Such report should also contain requirements as to the nature and timing of requisite legislation.

3. It will be recalled that the President on August 1 felt that some consideration should be given to the possibility of introducing legislation in this August session of Congress for the purpose of staking out administration views, realizing that no action would probably be taken. It appears that notwithstanding the divergencies of views among the agencies concerned with respect to other matters, they appear unanimously to recommend against any legislation at this August session. It seems to me, therefore, that unless you feel otherwise, Mr. President, this discussion should be concerned with what, if any, legislation should be considered for the new Congress in January. I suggest that you may not wish to reach any firm decisions with respect to ^{the} ~~the~~ other issues presented, _{A #} but instead simply discuss them today.

Transcribe paper
4. The paper before the Council this morning is a report prepared by a State-Defense-AEC Working Group in response to NSC Action 2274-d. It is based in large part on studies in preparation by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Planning Board charged with developing the studies called for by ~~the~~ earlier NSC Actions. *I have referred to* ~~that I have mentioned~~. The present paper, however, discusses all major aspects of the sharing problem, including recommendations as to the nature and timing of requisite legislation, and a report on the subject of Nuclear Submarine cooperation.

5. I suggest that we proceed by turning to the conclusions and recommendations, which you will find at page 2. At para. A -- Arrangements to permit the President

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

to sell or otherwise to make available nuclear weapons to selected allies -- occurs the first and, I believe, the most serious disagreement amongst the agencies. State and AEC argue that there is no present need for such arrangements. Defense urges that it would be desirable to have ready arrangements whereby the President would have the flexibility to act promptly and that necessary legislation should therefore be prepared for submission at the next session of Congress.

Perhaps the Secretary of Defense would care to be the first to address this question.

(CALL ON SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

May I now ask the Acting Secretary of State to speak to the State position.

(CALL ON ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE)

Will the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission also speak to the State-AEC position?

(CALL ON THE CHAIRMAN, AEC)

6. The second major point of the paper concerns arrangements to permit the President to seek the creation of multilateral arrangements to assure nuclear efficiency in NATO. The conclusions, as you see at para. B, p. 3, are again split. STATE and AEC agree that we should be prepared to consider proposals initiated by European members of NATO, but they conclude that we should not, at this time, initiate proposals ourselves. Nor should we now seek legislative assistance to this end. The argument, as I understand it, is that the majority of NATO members, aside from France, are satisfied with the NATO stockpile arrangements; the U.S. should, therefore, not take actions to change these arrangements and thus possibly create new and

additional problems. DEFENSE appears to see more urgency in the situation and recommends therefore that we accept the fact that we must, and possibly soon, be prepared to initiate proposals ourselves.

Perhaps the Acting Secretary of State would like to elaborate on the State-AEC recommendation.

(CALL ON THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE)

Would the Secretary of Defense care to comment on the Defense side of this issue?

(CALL ON SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

Does the Chairman of the AEC wish to speak further to the State-AEC position?

(CALL ON THE CHAIRMAN, AEC)

7. The third major point of the paper, at para. C, p. 3 concerns nuclear submarine cooperation. Again we find the agencies in disagreement. The AEC prefers not to negotiate with the Netherland's Government until after the completion of a favorable investigation of the feasibility of an arrangement with that Government which would protect Restricted Data for a two year period. State and Defense urge that we immediately inform the Netherland's Government that we are prepared to negotiate a nuclear submarine cooperation agreement. State and Defense presumably believe that the Restricted Data problem has been sufficiently determined. The AEC evidently considers that it has not. A further split, see p. 4, concerns the French issue. Defense urges that the broader issue of nuclear sharing with France be a part of any decision regarding cooperation

The Cast of characters has changed

TOP SECRET

with France on nuclear submarines. There seems to be general agreement that we should not now take any further action with respect to Italy and Germany.

Perhaps the Chairman of the AEC would speak first to the AEC position regarding the Netherlands.

(CALL ON CHAIRMAN, AEC)

Would the Acting Secretary of State care to comment, particularly on the political and economic aspects of the problem.

(CALL ON THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE)

Perhaps the Secretary of Defense would give his views regarding both the Netherlands and France.

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

8. The several splits that we have discussed are further reflected in the "DISCUSSION" section that begins at p. 5. Perhaps we should turn to them briefly. The first three of these splits appear under the "arguments for Increased Sharing" and each, I think it fair to say, stems from the differing views of Defense, on the one hand, and State-AEC, on the other, regarding the urgency of the situation. May I direct your attention to p. 5.

Would the various agencies care to comment further?

(CALL ON SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

(CALL ON ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE)

(CALL ON CHAIRMAN, AEC)

If you would now turn to page 6.

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



Again is their further comment?

(CALL ON SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

And now, p. 6., an interesting point that merits further discussion. Would the Secretary of Defense care to elaborate?

(CALL ON SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

Perhaps the Chairman of the AEC should respond.

(CALL ON CHAIRMAN, AEC)

9. The next splits in the Discussion relate to nuclear weapons assistance to France. Again, if you will turn to p. 14 and then to p. 15, you will see reflected the Defense view that the arguments against sharing are not as compelling as those in favor of some form of sharing.

Would the Secretary of Defense like to present the Defense view more fully?

(CALL ON SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

Would the Acting Secretary of State care to comment?

(CALL ON ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE)

10. The final disagreement, at p. 20, is a Defense proposal supporting its split regarding nuclear submarine sharing with France (see p. 4). Since we have already discussed the point, I simply call it to your attention, without suggesting further discussion.]

August 25, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 457th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, August 25, 1960

Present at the 457th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Item 1); and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, CIA; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. INCREASED NUCLEAR SHARING WITH ALLIES


(NSC 5906/1, paragraph 24-c; NSC 5910/1, paragraph 42-a; NSC Actions Nos. 2140-b, 2166-b-(9), 2204 and 2274-d and -e; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 23, 1960).

Mr. Gray began his briefing on the subject by reading the first two sentences of Paragraph 1, all of Paragraph 2, and all of Paragraph 3 of his Briefing Note. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).


DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS	
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC 585-1073
NLE Case	78-89-30
By	JW NLE D (1239)

TOP SECRET

W-4 P/NSC /13





Mr. Dillon reported that Mr. Bowie is preparing a written report which should be available by the end of the week.



Mr. Gray remarked that he had exerted a certain amount of pressure in order to have the subject of nuclear sharing discussed at this Council meeting. Some of the agencies concerned were not fully ready for the discussion but ^{he} had felt it was desirable to bring the matter up in order that a decision might


be made on whether to seek legislation at the present session of Congress. The President remarked that when he had referred to the possibility of seeking legislation on nuclear sharing at this session of Congress (at the August 1 NSC Meeting in Newport), he had not known what the current session of Congress would be like. It was clear by now that the present session of Congress would engage primarily in politics and that no legislation on nuclear sharing could be passed.





Secretary Gates thought the subject of nuclear sharing had been scheduled on the Council agenda without any intent to arrive at firm decisions at this meeting. He felt some very critical questions were involved, including our attitude toward France, that is, whether we would or would not assist France to achieve a nuclear capability. He believed a decision on this question

Pages 5-7 denied in full.



Secretary Anderson noted that the Council had discussed the question of whether MC-70 is still a valid planning document. He pointed out that if any changes were to be made in the MC-70 concept, such changes might have considerable effect on the U.S. budget. Since December would be budget time, he wondered whether State and Defense could accelerate their consideration of the MC-70 requirements.

Secretary Gates did not believe that MC-70 requirements could be changed in time to have any effect on the FY 1962 budget. MC-70 was a plan for the years 1958-1963. However, it would be possible to take a close look at the 1963 MC-70 figures. Mr. McCone asked when the review of MC-70 requirements would come up. Secretary Gates said that the review was now going on. Secretary Dillon said the fundamental review for 1963 would take place next year. Mr. Irwin pointed out that General Norstad was engaged in an extensive review of MC-70 as it concerned the last two years of the 1958-1963 period. He did not know whether the Norstad review was directed toward a

fundamental change in MC-70 or whether it was focussed on extending the MC-70 plan beyond 1963. In any case, the Norstad study which was due to be completed in about two months, would provide a framework for a review of MC-70 within this government. Secretary Gates remarked that thus far General Norstad had been unwilling to reduce any MC-70 requirements.


Secretary Dillon believed that if the U.S. desired a change in MC-70, it should inform the NATO Council that a review is necessary. The U.S. should then suggest that the NATO Council examine the political directive under which MC-70 was prepared and ask the NATO military commanders for a new plan. The earliest time at which we could begin this process would be the NATO Council meeting in December. However, he would not want to suggest to the NATO Council a review of MC-70 unless there was agreement in this government as to the military direction we wished to take in NATO. Mr. McCone felt the development of POLARIS since the formulation of MC-70 was a good reason for a review of the MC-70 concept. Secretary Dillon agreed but repeated that he would be reluctant to suggest a complete review of MC-70 before our own military objectives were clarified. Mr. Stans pointed out that both the U.S. and its allies had failed to fulfill MC-70 requirements. Secretary Gates believed that General Norstad would argue that POLARIS would only be a substitute for the fighter bombers that he has been losing. General Norstad would probably oppose any fundamental change in the policy reflected in MC-70. Mr. Stans asked whether Mr. Dulles' report on reductions in Soviet forces had any bearing on a review of MC-70. Secretary Dillon believed the key factor was whether we could develop a new concept as to the ground forces needed on the front line in Europe. If it was determined that thirty divisions were still needed, a reshuffle of forces rather than a fundamental review of MC-70 was indicated. Secretary Anderson felt that an equally important question was whose divisions are needed on the front line. Secretary Dillon believed that if we did not have some of our own divisions there, we would have to provide military assistance to nations whose divisions were there as long as a level of thirty divisions was considered necessary.

The President felt it was difficult to understand why the European countries could not provide more divisions. He pointed out that France and other European countries had maintained very large armies until 1914. Secretary Dillon said these armies were largely conscripted armies. The President agreed. However, these conscripted armies did not have the wealth of equipment present day armies possess. The President repeated his view that Europe should provide the ground force if the U.S. is to be expected to provide SAC, a navy, and nuclear capability. Secretary Dillon felt the Germans could certainly provide a few more divisions. The President believed the Germans were dragging their feet.

Mr. Gray remarked that the discussion had been a long one in view of the fact that the President had asked for no discussion. He then asked whether or not the JCS should consider the desirability, from a military point of view, of recommending changes in MC-70 in preparation for possible U.S. proposals to the NATO Council in December. Mr. Gray also hoped that the President would set the deadline for resubmission of the report on nuclear sharing to the Council. He wondered whether the President wanted the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC to prepare a revised report or whether this was a task for the Planning Board.

*para 761
p619*

The President said we would be studying this question in a vacuum until we knew what we could get Congress to do. He felt careful consideration should be given to the problem of consultation with Congress. Mr. McCone said it was clear from the law and from legislative history that not even France at the present time qualified for receipt of U.S. nuclear information or material. We could, of course, endeavor to change the law or reinterpret the legislative history. Secretary Dillon asked when France would qualify. Mr. McCone said that this was a difficult question to answer. From legislative history it was clear that conducting a few nuclear tests did not qualify a country to receive U.S. nuclear information or material under the law.



Secretary Gates believed the legislative question should be studied carefully and that the Administration should seek to diminish the influence of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on these matters. The Attorney General felt the law could be reinterpreted if such reinterpretation were believed desirable. He believed such a reinterpretation would be acceptable if we could show Congress that it was in our security interests.

The President did not favor an attempt to reinterpret the law. He believed we should place our case on nuclear sharing before the military committees of Congress and ask them to secure Congressional endorsement of our program. The defense of the Western world was involved in this question and the President did not want to take up such a question with the Joint Committee. Secretary Gates agreed. The President said Senator Russell and Representative Vinson would give serious attention to Administration proposals. Secretary Gates said we should at least consult the military committees of Congress at the same time we consult the Joint Committee. The President preferred to put the problem where it belonged, that is, with the military

committees of Congress. We need not apologize for talking to the military committees about this problem. We might even want to talk to the foreign relations committees. Consulting with the Joint Committee only amounted to letting politicians tell us how to carry out our defense policy. Mr. McCone agreed with the President's remarks.

Mr. Gray suggested that the President ask the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, taking into account General Norstad's views and Mr. Bowie's recommendations, to prepare a revised report on nuclear sharing. The President believed that the Secretary of Defense together with the Chairman, JCS should consult with the military committees of Congress. The committees should be made aware of our problem; they should be told that the present pattern is not necessarily the best for purposes of defense and that we could do better in the nuclear field for less money under new arrangements. Secretary Gates agreed that such a procedure would at least dilute the present influence of the Joint Committee.

Secretary Gates then suggested that Mr. Gray should set the deadline for resubmission of the nuclear sharing report to the Council and should make the arrangements for preparation of the report. Mr. Gray said he hoped the President would assign the responsibility to some official or officials. The President said that in talking to the chairmen of the military committees of the Congress, Senator Russell and Representative Vinson, we should present our whole case. Mr. Gray said the difficulty was that we did not yet know what our case is. He hoped the President would issue a directive concerning future Council consideration of the problem. The President said that Mr. Gray should arrange for preparation and early submission to the Council of a revised report on future nuclear capabilities in the NATO area, including recommendations regarding France.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the subject in the light of the draft report, prepared by an Interdepartmental Working Group consisting of officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, as a response to NSC Action No. 2274-d and -e, and transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 23, 1960.
- b. Noted the President's directive that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs arrange for the preparation, not later than October 15, 1960, of a report on U.S. policy regarding future nuclear weapons capabilities in the NATO area, including recommendations as to whether or under what circumstances it might be in U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France. This report should contain suggestions regarding appropriate legislative action, if necessary, to carry out policy recommendations.

This report should take into account two studies on NATO, one by Mr. Robert Bowie for the Department of State and the other by the Department of Defense which is being prepared in connection with the joint State-Defense report to the Planning Board and the Council on "The Future of NATO", as called for by NSC Action No. 2219-b, and the forthcoming consultations with General Norstad.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles reported that there was another mix-up in Africa with the Mali Federation, part of the French Community, apparently breaking up. Senegal was attempting to secede from the Federation. Mr. Dulles then pointed out important areas of the Mali Federation on a large display map. He said the only grave danger to U.S. interests in the break-up of the Mali Federation was the possibility that Soudan might join Guinea if Senegal remained independent. The tendency of Soudan toward close relations with Guinea was most unfortunate in view of the Communist tendencies of Guinea. Secretary Dillon said that if Soudan joined Guinea, then we would probably have difficulty with Russian activities in Soudan. The President remarked that the Sengalese were the best fighters in the whole French Army. The Attorney General asked whether there was any possibility that Soudan would attempt to form a tie with the Ivory Coast. Mr. Dulles doubted that such a development would take place.

Mr. Dulles reported that Lumumba had receded from his extremist position as a result of the UN Security Council meeting on the Congo. It is possible that Lumumba is only beating a tactical retreat, however; he may resume the offensive at any time. The next issue to arise in the Congo may concern the Belgian insistence that a complete relinquishment of the Belgian air bases must await negotiations. Belgium is planning a "presence" in Katange in the form of technicians even though Belgian troops are scheduled to be withdrawn by August 30. Training a Congo armed force will prove to be a difficult task in view of the disintegration of the Force Publique which has already taken place. It is unlikely that a large force of trained Congo troops can be assembled in the near future. Mr. Dulles displayed a map of the Congo and pointed out the Kasai province to which Lumumba was attempting to airlift troops in order to prevent another attempted secession. Mr. Dulles explained that the southern part of Kasai was threatening to join the Katanga secessionist movement. To provide for his airlift, Lumumba seized part of the Sabena airlines although some of these planes still bore UN markings.

On August 22 a Soviet vessel with a number of Soviet technicians and one hundred trucks arrived in the Congo. Czech teachers for the Congo secondary schools are reported to be on the way. Several prominent Belgian Communists have arrived in the Congo to lay the foundations for a Congolese Communist Party. Finally, Mr. Dulles reported that as an aftermath of the break-up of the Mali Federation, it appeared that the 566-man Mali contingent of UN forces in the Congo was also splitting along Sengalese-Soudanese lines.

Mr. Dulles believed that favorable developments had occurred in Laos during the past week. Phoumi had strengthened his hand in negotiations with Souvanna Phouma and General Ouane, both of whom conferred with Phoumi at Savannakhet. Souvanna Phouma subsequently announced that he had reached an agreement with Phoumi. Mr. Dulles thought this announcement should be taken with a grain of salt. However, he believed it was possible that the present crisis in Laos would be resolved in typical Laotian fashion, that is, with a great deal of talk and very little bloodshed. One of the difficult questions in Laos is who pays the army, Ouane or Souvanna Phouma? Mr. Dulles thought the most dangerous aspect of the present situation was the continuance of pockets of Pathet Lao troops in the vicinity of the Laotian capital.

Mr. Dulles expressed concern over the "rigging" of the parliamentary elections in Iran. He said events in Korea and Turkey had indicated that fixed elections can produce dangerous repercussions. The aftermath of the Iranian elections has produced an undercurrent of opposition to the Shah. The opponents of the Shah may take advantage of his forthcoming absence from the country for a trip to Europe to stage a coup d'etat.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to recent Soviet space achievements; the apparent break-up of the Mali Federation; and recent developments regarding the Congo, Laos, and Iran.

Marion W. Boggs
MARION W. BOGGS

1628

Department of State

DATE 6/1/87

RDS EXT. DATE
 TS AUTH REASON(S) **Classification**
 ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS
 DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE
 FROM: MOSCOW
 PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS
 TO: Secretary of State

Control: 5034
 Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 8, 1960
 4:26 P.M.

Eyes Only
 EXCISE REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed,
 transferred to O/FADRC
 Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
 with additional access
 controlled by S/S
 Cat. C - Caption and custody,
 retained by S/S
 Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.
 Date: 5/22/87 19

NO: 698, SEPTEMBER 8, 5:00 P.M.

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

FOLLOWING IS THAT PART OF MY CONVERSATION WITH KHRUSHCHEV WHICH HE DID NOT WANT ME TO REPORT. HE SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING OUR PROBLEMS DURING REST OF CURRENT ADMINISTRATION. HE HAD BEEN MUCH ATTRACTED TO PRESIDENT WHO PERHAPS SUFFERED FROM FACT HE WAS TOO KIND AS PERSON AND WAS BASICALLY MILITARY MAN WHO DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND POLITICS. HE WAS QUITE SURE IF PRESIDENT HAD BEEN ASKED TO AUTHORIZE U-2 FLIGHT ON MAY 1 HE WOULD NOT HAVE DONE SO EVEN THOUGH HE DOUBTLESS KNEW IN GENERAL OF THESE FLIGHTS. HE SAID HE HAD TRIED TO LEAVE WAY OUT FOR PRESIDENT TO DISAVOW U-2 FLIGHT BUT HE DID NOT DO SO. HE SAID OF COURSE HE REALIZED PRESIDENT HAD GOTTEN INTO ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE POSITION SINCE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO GO BEFORE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND ADMIT HE HAD NOT KNOWN WHAT WAS GOING ON. THEY WOULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER OUR ELECTIONS TO MAKE NEW EFFORT TO REACH UNDERSTANDING. HE FRANKLY HAD NOT BEEN CHARMED BY NIXON WHO HE THOUGHT WAS A CAREERIST BUT THEY HAD NO DESIRE INTERFERE WITH OUR ELECTIONS AND WOULD STAY OUT OF THEM. HE MENTIONED NIXON'S SPEECH IN NEW YORK BEFORE DENTISTS' CONVENTION AND SAID THAT HAD BEEN STUPID THING TO DO JUST BEFORE HE, KHRUSHCHEV, WAS TO VISIT US. HOWEVER THEY WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH NIXON IF HE WERE ELECTED BY AMERICAN PEOPLE. HE KNEW LITTLE OF KENNEDY WHOM HE HAD ONLY MET WHEN HE VISITED FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND EXCHANGED FEW WORDS WITH HIM BUT HE INDICATED BOTH OUR PARTIES REPRESENTED OUR SYSTEM INCLUDING OUR MONOPOLIES. THIS HOWEVER NEED NOT PREVENT AGREEMENT ON SUBJECTS RELATING TO PEACE.

/1 REPLIED

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: MR 87-194 #5
 Date: 11/1/87

SECRET
 Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
 COPY IS PROHIBITED
 UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

1628

87-194

SECRET

-2- 698, SEPTEMBER 8, 5:00 P.M. FROM MOSCOW.

I REPLIED TO EFFECT HE MISJUDGED PRESIDENT. I SAID I WOULD ADMIT, ALTHOUGH I DID NOT HAVE FACTS AND IT WAS PROBABLY INDISCREET TO SAY SO, THAT IN MY OPINION PRESIDENT HAD PROBABLY NOT SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED U-2 FLIGHT. (KHRUSHCHEV INTERRUPTED TO SAY "I WILL NEVER EXPLOIT THAT REMARK AGAINST YOU.") I POINTED OUT HOWEVER THAT HE HIMSELF HAD JUST MADE CLEAR THAT HE HAD NOT REALLY LEFT WAY OUT FOR PRESIDENT. I SAID MOREOVER THAT AT PARIS HE HAD IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL GIVEN FRENCH WRITTEN MEMO WHICH HE KNEW WOULD EVENTUALLY BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND THAT THIS ACTION HAD BEEN INTERPRETED BY US TO MEAN HE DID NOT REALLY WISH TO SETTLE U-2 AFFAIR. I SAID THIS WAS OF COURSE PAINFUL AFFAIR FOR ME TO HAVE TO DISCUSS AND THERE WAS NO QUESTION BUT THAT PLANE HAD VIOLATED SOVIET FRONTIER. HOWEVER, IT SEEMED TO US THEY HAD GONE VERY FAR IN OVER-EXPLOITING IT AND THIS CAST DOUBT ON THEIR INTENTIONS.

WITH RESPECT TO VP I WANTED TO MAKE TWO REMARKS. IN FIRST PLACE HE HAD REFERRED TO VP'S SPEECH BEFORE DENTISTS. WHILE NEITHER VP NOR ANYONE ELSE HAD EVER MENTIONED THIS TO ME, IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT SHORTLY BEFORE THIS THE VP HAD APPEARED BEFORE AMERICAN VETERANS' ORGANIZATION AND PERSUADED THEM NOT TO PASS RESOLUTION CALLING FOR DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV DURING HIS VISIT TO US. THIS HAD CAUSED MANY PEOPLE TO ATTACK VP ON GROUND HE WAS PRO-COMMUNIST. VP WAS POLITICIAN AND I PERSONALLY THOUGHT HIS DENTISTS' SPEECH SHOULD BE REGARDED IN LIGHT THIS BACKGROUND.

MY SECOND REMARK WAS THAT VP WAS AS STAUNCH AN OPPONENT OF COMMUNIST SYSTEM AS KHRUSHCHEV WAS OF CAPITALIST, BUT I THOUGHT THEY WOULD MAKE MISTAKE IF THEY CONCLUDED FROM THIS THAT VP DID NOT WISH TO REACH AGREEMENTS WITH SOVIET UNION IN MATTERS WHERE IT WAS TO OUR MUTUAL INTEREST. I SAID I MADE THESE REMARKS NOT IN ANY PARTISAN MANNER AS I KNEW BOTH CANDIDATES AND REGARDED THEM HIGHLY. I WAS EQUALLY SURE THAT KENNEDY WOULD BE PREPARED ENDEAVOR REACH MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY

/AGREEMENTS. IT

SECRET

SECRET



3-698, SEPTEMBER 8, 5:00 P.M. FROM MOSCOW.

AGREEMENTS. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT I REFERRED TO IMPORTANCE OF SOVIETS NOT PUSHING EITHER CANDIDATE INTO POSITION WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID WE ALREADY HAD NUMBER OF ACUTE PROBLEMS AND MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY CONGO AND CUBA. KHRUSHCHEV SAID THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF INCREASING TENSIONS BUT IT WAS OBVIOUS FROM WHOLE CONVERSATION THEY WILL MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT LINE AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER OUR ELECTIONS.

IN DISCUSSING ECONOMIC MATTERS KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO CONVERSATIONS AND ARGUMENTS HE HAD HAD WITH HARRIMAN AND HUMPHREY, BOTH OF WHOM HE CHARACTERIZED AS INTELLIGENT MEN THOUGH HE INDICATED HE HAD NOT BEEN PLEASED WITH THE WAY HUMPHREY HAD HANDLED MATTER OF THEIR CONVERSATION UPON HIS RETURN.

HE REFERRED TO DISSENSIONS WITHIN US AND IN WEST AND BOASTED THEIRS WAS MONOLITHIC SYSTEM. (HE DID NOT MENTION CHINA.) HE SAID HE HAD HEARD OF DISCUSSIONS IN WEST ABOUT DISSENSIONS WITHIN SOVIET REGIME BUT SAID THEY WERE UNITED NOT ONLY IN PARTY BUT ALSO IN GOVERNMENT, AND POINTED OUT HE WAS HEAD OF BOTH PARTY AND GOVERNMENT. HE SAID REPORTS OF HIS DISPUTES WITH SUSLOV AND OTHERS WERE COMPLETELY UNTRUE AND THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT NOT ONLY WITH HIM BUT WITH MIKOYAN AND KOZLOV AND OTHERS. HE SAID EVEN WITH MOLOTOV THERE HAD NOT BEEN BASIC DISAGREEMENT OVER HIS POLICIES, PARTICULARLY COEXISTENCE, BUT SAID MOLOTOV CARRIED BURDEN OF HIS AGE AND BACKGROUND IN HIS THINKING. HE SAID COEXISTENCE WAS LENINIST POLICY AND EVEN STALIN HAD AGREED WITH IT.

THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION AND TO SOME EXTENT LAST NIGHT KHRUSHCHEV EMPHASIZED GREAT IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO FACT THAT U-2 FLIGHTS WERE MADE AFTER HIS VISIT TO US AND ESPECIALLY HIS FRIENDLY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT. HE HAS THUS INDICATED THAT NOT ONLY WAS SOVIET MILITARY PRESTIGE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR BUT ALSO HIS OWN PERSONAL PRESTIGE IN VIEW OF FAVORABLE REMARKS HE MADE ABOUT PRESIDENT AFTER HIS RETURN TO SOVIET UNION.

HZK-21

SECRET

THOMPSON

4

19/9/60-

9/9/60

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT
EUROPEAN REGION, ISA
9 Sept. 1960

Authority DMB 77-161 #1

By W NLE Date 10/20/77

NATO IN THE 1960'S: U.S. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION


be

1. Origin of NATO Planning for the 1960's

As a result of Secretary Herter's proposal in the NATO Ministerial Meeting of 15 December 1959, NATO has agreed that the North Atlantic Council, with the assistance of the International Staff, should carry out long-range planning for NATO, to cover the decade of the 1960's.

2. Purpose of this Defense Study

The purpose of this study is to furnish a basis for Department of Defense participation in development by the United States of its long-range attitude toward NATO and its objectives for NATO during the 1960's.



3. Approach used in this Study

a. Although the United States is in fact heavily committed politically to the NATO concept, the study does not view NATO as an end in itself. Rather, it examines NATO's relation to U.S. security against the background of expected trends and problems, and the possible need for changes in NATO purposes or organization.

b. This study is intended as a basis for long-range planning. It focuses on objectives at the end of the 1960's rather than solutions for current problems. However, it considers those persistent problems for which solutions must be sought.

c. Inasmuch as all fifteen NATO nations are expected to take part in NATO long-range planning, this study and the subsequent U.S. position should seek to determine general U.S. objectives rather than a blueprint for action.

~~SECRET~~

4/27/60 / Ad TAM/S / NATO (5) [1959-1960]
pp 1, 22-23 only

SECRET

balanced collective forces, standardization of weapons and equipment, integrated logistics systems for land and air forces in Europe and multilateral financing of NATO programs.

e. Need for Agreement on Procedures for Supply and Control of Nuclear Weapons for NATO forces.

(1) The NATO Special Ammunition Storage System under which U.S. nuclear weapon warheads are held in U.S. custody for release to NATO forces after approval by the President is currently meeting NATO needs. However, there is some concern over whether the United States would in fact make the nuclear warheads available in a timely manner. It may become necessary, if this concern is raised on an official level, to consider what satisfactory modification of current arrangements could be made. One approach, which would not require any change in U.S. law, would be a statement by the President that the nuclear warheads under U.S. custody in the NATO Special Ammunition Storage System would be made available upon the request of the NATO Supreme Commander concerned (SACEUR or SACLANM); this would constitute a relinquishment of any U.S. veto on availability of warheads.

(2) There has been informal agreement among NATO Council members that it appears undesirable to attempt to set up formal procedures for a NATO Council approval of the institution of nuclear warfare. As NATO moves through the period of the 1960s, and particularly if NATO Shield conventional capabilities are increased, there will probably be growing official support substantial for putting the initiation of nuclear warfare by NATO forces under NATO Council control. It is highly likely that the question will be discussed in the Council to a greater extent

SECRET

than in the past. Council discussion would not necessarily lead to the Council's retaining exclusive control for initiating nuclear warfare; the Council might approve procedures whereby NATO Commanders or the Council would make the decision depending on the circumstances.



SECRET

9/10/60



FILE US SUPORT NATO
✓ XREF: ATOMIC - NUCL POL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Strategic Studies
KCS
WH
File
Sep 10, 1960

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

In reply refer to I-15666/60
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

✓ FRANCE (ATOMIC)
✓ MRBM

Dear General Norstad:

At the request of the National Security Council, a State-Defense-AEC ad hoc group prepared the enclosed report on the subject of increased nuclear sharing including nuclear assistance to France and possible NATO arrangements for holding custody of and controlling the use of nuclear weapons. The splits shown in the report were incorporated in an effort to sharpen the issues rather than as final statements of approved Departmental positions.

After a brief discussion of the subject at the NSC on August 25th, the President directed that a full report be developed on U. S. policy regarding future nuclear capabilities in the NATO area, the report to include consideration of the Bowle NATO study and to give particular attention to those circumstances in which it might be in the security interests of the U. S. to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France. It is anticipated that the NSC will discuss this report in mid-October.

Although we are generally familiar with your views on this subject, it would be helpful in connection with the forthcoming NSC discussion to have your written comments and recommendations on the following questions:

- a. Is the present policy of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by (1) discouraging the development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons production capabilities, and (2) the acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons components by nations which do not now possess them (para 24-g, NSC 5906/1) still valid?
- b. Would it be desirable to exempt France at the present time from any such over-all policy in the light of the announced intention of France to acquire a nuclear capability and the progress made to date in this direction by France? What are the views of the other NATO nations on this subject?

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: MIL 92-20943
By: JN
Date: 8/6/93
NLE Date

SECRET, 10, 0201

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

c. Would it be desirable and feasible to establish in lieu of the present NATO Atomic Stockpile concept NATO multilateral arrangements to determine requirements for, hold custody of, and control the use of nuclear weapons, (including MRBMs)?


d. Would it be desirable to assist our NATO allies to obtain nuclear-powered submarines?

e. What is the relationship between our nuclear sharing policy, NATO MRBM requirements and a possible NATO POLARIS submarine capability?

We recognize that each of these questions contains both military and political implications. We would appreciate having your views separately on both aspects insofar as they can be treated separately, as well as your comments on any other issues which you consider pertinent to the over-all problem.

In view of the work which will have to be done on this problem here in Washington, it would be appreciated if we could hear from you by 26 September 1960.

Sincerely,



1 Enclosure
Copy of draft study

General Lauris Norstad
Supreme Commander
Allied Powers Europe

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

1880

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES EN EUROPE

PARIS, FRANCE

9/2/60 (6)

2 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Previous Conflict on JCS-SACEUR Relationships

1. During the Spring of 1952 General Eisenhower, as SACEUR, encountered a situation similar to that now prevailing as a result of the JCS directive on the NSTL/SIOP. The JCS notified General Eisenhower that they would do his atomic planning. He, in turn, notified the JCS that such an arrangement was unacceptable to him and that he would do his own atomic planning. When the JCS refused to accept this procedure it is understood that General Eisenhower returned to the U. S. for a meeting with President Truman and the JCS. The issue was settled in SACEUR's favor and thereafter the expression "because the controlling policy statement for the JCS."

2. In order to clarify the role of SACEUR/USCINCEUR as an instrument of U. S. policy, it may be desirable to reiterate the position taken at the outset of NATO by General Eisenhower and President Truman and to reassert unequivocally, the independent but coordinate status of SACEUR with other military instruments of national policy and to stress his unique position with the President and Congress. In this regard, the concept of "committed NATO" forces must be understood to include other national forces such as SAC, UKEC, etc., even though they remain under national command.

3. The US NSR does not have the documents referred to in the first paragraph and he believes they were sent to the U. S. upon the return of General Eisenhower. It might be profitable to have Colonel Downey get in touch with General Goodpaster to determine if these documents could be made available to General Norstad for review during his forthcoming visit to Washington.

4. I have related the above with the knowledge that General Norstad was not at SHAPE at the time and consequently might be unaware of this incident. In view of his impending visit to the U. S. it seems a most opportune moment to clear the atmosphere completely with General Twining and the President.

RC
 RICHARD T. COLNER, JR.
 Major General, USAF
 Assistant Chief of Staff
 Air and Special Operations

Special Handling Required
 Not releasable to Foreign Nationals

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
 Agency Case 050 84-mpr-255
 NLE Case 89-1663
 By *ATG* MED 11/16/90

1880/0937

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
SECRET

Character State

Classification

Control: 471

Date: Sept 10, 60
8:08 PM

P R I O R I T Y

THURSTON 2 SEPT: SECSTATE WASHINGTON PRITY 1024

AMB RPTD INFO: BONN PRITY 45 LONDON PRITY 176

MIN NOFORN FROM THURSTON
ADMIN LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

NINECON SHAFEL 1
EUCONL 1 General Norstad gave me following account his lunch yesterday
CINCEUR 7 in Italy with Adenauer,

POL 5
ULMER Lunch and discussion afterward lasted four hours. Chancellor
EF was in fine form, and he set sharp, vigorous tone for exchange
PF 3 of views.

OES 4
POL 4
DEF 4

23

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
UNCLASSIFIED

EXEMPTION FROM THIS GPT IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS	
Agency Case	<i>State 9202075</i>
NLE Case	<i>92-20751</i>
By	<i>AK</i>
NLE Date	<i>11/19/92</i>

Norstad 11/19/90 / NATO General (4)

MEMORANDUM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

Case No: _____
Classification: ~~SECRET~~ _____
Contract: 471
Date: _____

Page 2

Norstad intervened to correct record at this stage going back over Sixth Fleet question, US efforts to consult with France on African problems in past two years, and fact that integration did not violate national units. He said it was the delicate point of atomic control that underlay withdrawal of US strike squadrons from France. Spaak complained that NAC never really told whole story on this.

Norstad expressed belief that US people are not going to turn over atomic weapons to any country for independent use and added that he personally shared this popular sentiment. He said that US could not base its policy on this important question on the national prestige of this or that country.

At this point Norstad alluded his Pasadena speech of last December and to thinking that lay behind it, that is, idea of NATO as the fourth atomic power.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

Control:

471

Page 3

Date:

Norstad touched on integration theme at end and while making clear that 300,000 US troops would not move out of Europe merely because de Gaulle says he is against principle of integration, nevertheless US military presence in Europe was firmly based on this principle as embodied in NATO military system.

Berlin touched on only briefly by Chancellor who described current East German measures as most serious challenge to date.

Norstad's over-all impression was that Adenauer remains essentially sound in his outlook on NATO and European problems and that in his relationship with de Gaulle his tactics are carefully designed to preserve the over-all benefits of the post-war Franco-German rapprochement without selling the Alliance or the United States down the river.

HOUGHTON

Typed in Communications

Smt 9/10/60

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

Drafted By: RLHurston/

9/10/60

Shane Jr

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

39-M
Action
EUR
Info
SS
G
SP
C
H
SAE
INR
RMR

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 6778
Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 10, 1960
11:01 PM

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1024, SEPTEMBER 10, 8 PM

*12 Sept 60
Reported orally to
President by
Norstad B.*

PRIORITY
SENT DEPARTMENT 1024, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY BONN 45,
LONDON 176

NOFORN FROM THURSTON
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

GENERAL NORSTAD GAVE ME FOLLOWING ACCOUNT HIS LUNCH YESTERDAY
IN ITALY WITH ADENAUER, SPAAK, STIKKER, DE STAERCHE AND
BLANKENHORN:

LUNCH AND DISCUSSION AFTERWARD LASTED FOUR HOURS... CHANCELLOR
WAS IN FINE FORM, AND HE SET SHARP, VIGOROUS TONE FOR EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS. HE OPENED WITH DETAILED ACCOUNT HIS RECENT TALKS
WITH DE GAULLE AT RAMBOUILLET AND CONFIRMED PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS
ABOUT HIS OWN IRRITATION OVER DEBRE'S EARLIER ALLUSION TO
"SATELLITES." HE SAID THAT DE GAULLE EMPHASIZED THE LACK OF
POSITIVE WESTERN ACTION AND OF CONSULTATION WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE CONGO. CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE CHALLENGED
DE GAULLE REGARDING TRIPARTITE DIRECTORATE. REPLY WAS THAT
IT WOULD OPERATE ONLY OUTSIDE THE SCOPE AND FUNCTIONS OF NATO.
(NORSTAD OBSERVED THAT THIS WAS MORE LIMITED THAN SEPTEMBER
1958 MEMORANDUM AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT). ADENAUER STRESSED
THAT NATO WAS ESSENTIAL AND MUST GET PRIORITY SUPPORT, AND
DE GAULLE AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT, THOUGH MENTIONING US
WEAKNESS IN SAME BREATH. ADENAUER SAID THAT HE BELIEVED IN
NATO PLUS CLOSER RELATIONS WITH US, AND DE GAULLE REACTED
AFFIRMATIVELY.

ALLUDING
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED,
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Authority MR 77-72#4

By [Signature] NLE Date 8/18/78

CP 236 w/49
Staff serg / Dist to M/5 / NATO (4) [1959-1960]

Electrostatic reproduction made
for preservation purposes by the
Eisenhower Library for replacement
of a deteriorating manuscript item

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1024, SEPTEMBER 10, 8 PM, FROM PARIS

ALLUDING TO DE GAULLE'S POSITION ABOUT INTEGRATION, CHANCELLOR SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND HIS ASSERTION THAT FRENCH SOLDIER MUST BELIEVE HE IS FIGHTING FOR DEFENSE OF HIS COUNTRY. AS TO FRENCH FLEET, DE GAULLE HAD PROPOUNDED INTERESTING THOUGH UNFOUNDED CONCEPT THAT NORTHERN LITTORAL OF MEDITERRANEAN WAS NATO RESPONSIBILITY WHEREAS SOUTHERN SHORE WAS FRENCH NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. DE GAULLE SAID HE WOULD LIKE HIS FLEET TO HAVE SAME STATUS AS US SIXTH FLEET (NORSTAD TOLD CHANCELLOR THAT DE GAULLE DID NOT CORRECTLY STATE THIS SITUATION SINCE SIXTH FLEET WAS COMMITTED TO NATO).

REGARDING EUROPE DE GAULLE SAID THAT AT TIME OF US WEAKNESS EUROPE HAD TO BE STRONG, EVEN BEYOND ELECTIONS. EUROPE MUST LOOK TO ITS OWN ORGANIZATION. HALLSTEIN HAD EXTENDED HIS TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THIS TENDENCY HAD TO BE COUNTERED. ADENAUER APPEARED TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE ANTI-HALLSTEIN SENTIMENTS.

WHEN ADENAUER REFERRED TO DE GAULLE'S UNHAPPINESS OVER US ATOMIC AND MISSILE POLICY--WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS CRUX OF PROBLEM--; SPAAK TOLD STORY OF HIS EFFORTS REGARDING POLARIS MRBM PROGRAM AND SAID HE WAS SAD AT OUTCOME, THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE TO APPEASE DE GAULLE, ETC. HE THOUGHT DE GAULLE'S LAST PRESS CONFERENCE WAS MOST UNEFORTUNATE.

NORSTAD INTERVENED TO CORRECT RECORD AT THIS STAGE GOING BACK OVER SIXTH FLEET QUESTION, US EFFORTS TO CONSULT WITH FRANCE ON AFRICAN PROBLEMS IN PAST TWO YEARS, AND FACT THAT INTEGRATION DID NOT VITIATE NATIONAL UNITS. HE SAID IT WAS THE DELICATE POINT OF ATOMIC CONTROL THAT UNDERLAY WITHDRAWAL OF US STRIKE SQUADRONS FROM FRANCE. SPAAK COMPLAINED THAT NAC NEVER REALLY TOLD WHOLE STORY OF THIS.

ADENAUER THEN VERY SERIOUSLY DECLARED THAT "EUROPE MUST HAVE SOMETHING" IN THE ATOMIC FIELD. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CHARACTER OF US LEADERSHIP SHOULD CHANGE? NORSTAD EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT US PEOPLE ARE NOT GOING TO TURN OVER ATOMIC WEAPONS TO ANY COUNTRY FOR INDEPENDENT USE AND ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 1024, SEPTEMBER 10, 8 PM, FROM PARIS...

PERSONALLY SHARED THIS POPULAR SENTIMENT. HE SAID THAT US COULD NOT BASE ITS POLICY ON THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION ON THE NATIONAL PRESTIGE OF THIS OR THAT COUNTRY. CHANCELLOR ASKED HOW THE EUROPEANS CAN ORGANIZE THEIR DEFENSE AROUND ATOMIC WEAPONS WHEN US HAD MONOPOLY OVER THEM AND CAN TAKE THEM AWAY IF IT WISHED?

AT THIS POINT NORSTAD ALLUDED HIS PASADENA SPEECH OF LAST DECEMBER AND TO THINKING THAT LAY BEHIND IT, THAT IS, IDEA OF NATO AS THE FOURTH ATOMIC POWER. ADENAUER SAID EUROPE WOULD APPROVE AND APPLAUD A MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION. WHEN SPAAK RAISED QUESTION OF "WHO IN NATO" WOULD CONTROL THESE TRANSFERRED WEAPONS, CHANCELLOR WAS RATHER IMPATIENT WITH HIM AND CONTINUED DEMONSTRATE GREAT ENTHUSIASM FOR SCHEME. NORSTAD POINTED OUT NATO HAD MADE MUCH PROGRESS WITHOUT ANSWERING UNANSWERABLE QUESTION OF EXACTLY HOW ALLIANCE GOES TO WAR AND THOUGHT STILL FURTHER PROGRESS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT DOING SO.

IT WAS OF INTEREST THAT ADENAUER THOUGHT DE GAULLE'S POWER POSITION (PRESUMABLY BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD) HAD SLIPPED ABOUT 50 PERCENT IN THE PAST TWO YEARS AND THAT HE (DE GAULLE) WAS AWARE OF THIS. HE SAID DE GAULLE HAD SHOWN HIM A PAPER AT THEIR RAMBOUILLET TALKS AND THAT HE HAD ADVISED DE GAULLE NOT TO SHOW IT TO NATO ALLIES. IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BASIS, HOWEVER, FOR HIS RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE.

ADENAUER SPOKE OF REFORMING NATO PRIMARILY BY STRENGTHENING NAC WHERE HE THOUGHT US VOICE PARTICULARLY SHOULD ALWAYS BE CLEAR AND FIRM. LUNCHEON GROUP TENDED TO AGREE THAT POLICY OF "LEADERSHIP BY GENEROSITY" HAD FAILED. NORSTAD TOUCHED ON INTEGRATION THEME AT END AND WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT 300,000 US TROOPS WOULD NOT MOVE OUT OF EUROPE MERELY BECAUSE DE GAULLE SAYS HE IS AGAINST PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRATION, NEVERTHELESS US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE WAS FIRMLY BASED ON THIS PRINCIPLE AS EMBODIED IN NATO MILITARY SYSTEM.

BERL IN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4- 1024, SEPTEMBER 10, 8 PM, FROM PARIS

BERLIN TOUCHED ON ONLY BRIEFLY BY CHANCELLOR WHO DESCRIBED CURRENT EAST GERMAN MEASURES AS MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO DATE.

NORSTAD'S OVER-ALL IMPRESSION WAS THAT ADENAUER REMAINS ESSENTIALLY SOUND IN HIS OUTLOOK ON NATO AND EUROPEAN PROBLEMS AND THAT IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH DE GAULLE HIS TACTICS ARE CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO PRESERVE THE OVER-ALL BENEFITS OF THE POST-WAR FRANCE-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT WITHOUT SELLING THE ALLIANCE OR THE UNITED STATES DOWN THE RIVER.

HOUGHTON

PLH

NOTE: Mr. Smith (EUR) notified 9/11/2:45 p.m., CWO-M

~~SECRET~~

Electrostatic reproduction made for preservation purposes by the Eisenhower Library for replacement of a deteriorating manuscript item.

9/14/60

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

ussr

SEP 14 1960

E

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT



Subject: Disposition of Certain Lend-Lease Vessels Held by the U.S.S.R.

In a note dated July 15, 1960, the Soviet Government informed our Embassy at Moscow that it intends "in the near future to sink ten naval vessels received under lend-lease in view of their dilapidated condition and difficulties of further maintenance, and to transmit corresponding reports to the American side". The ships are identified as five submarine chasers of the type "SC", three tankers, and three water tankers all of which were reported as being in the "Far Eastern Theater".

With the possible exception of one of the tankers, all of the vessels were transferred from Army or Navy sources. In coordination with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy has indicated that, as in the case of previous sinkings of this nature, the vessels are old and undoubtedly in dilapidated condition, making them of no current value to the Soviet Government or to the United States, and that nothing is to be gained from asking for their return. The Department of the Navy has accordingly concluded that it has no objection to the sinkings of the vessels. Similarly, in the eventuality that one of the tankers should turn out to be in the merchant ship category, the Maritime Administration has indicated that it would have no objection to its being sunk.

On October 22, 1955 and on May 9, 1956 you approved a Soviet proposal to sink groups of 59 and 20 lend-lease naval craft, respectively, in the custody of the Soviet Government at that time.

As in these previous cases, it is recommended that you determine, pursuant to Article V of the Soviet Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, that the ten vessels referred to herein will not be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or be otherwise of use to the United States, and that you concur in the Soviet proposal to sink the subject vessels.

/S/ CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
Christian A. Herter

DE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MIL 90-2774
By JAC
Date 12/11/90
NLE Date

photo sent to

CONFIDENTIAL
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

stop Sem / part / state 9/15/60 - ab
15 / 03510 - not # 02 # (5)

9/15/60

SECRET

CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

Log No. 60-4295
Cy 2 of 20 Cys

Briefing given to the NSC by
Mr. John H. Rubel, Acting Director
Defense Research and Engineering
September 15, 1960

Mr. President, the purpose of this briefing is depicted on the first chart. It is to review the manner in which the United States continental defense objectives and programs are affected by changes in the threat -- especially the ballistic missile threat -- and to discuss the technological factors which govern planning for continental defense. (First Chart)

The presentation is outlined here (Second Chart). First I will talk about major trends. This section of the presentation will establish a background and a framework for the balance of my remarks. Next, about our current posture with emphasis on planning and how planning has affected and will affect our posture for continental defense. The third section concerns technological planning -- how we are getting ready to accomplish continental defense in the future. And finally a discussion in summary in which I will chiefly address myself to three questions which were contained in the discussion paper.

I will now begin discussing major trends. For that purpose, I have here a chart which begins in 1950, goes through 1960 and out to 1970. (Third Chart) Depicted in this portion is a qualitative exposition of the manner in which the threat has evolved during that period and then the principal elements of our continental defense: the early warning part, the control part and the weapons part. I would like to begin by discussing first the major trends in the evolution of the threat. In the early part of the 1950's, this threat consisted exclusively of a bomber threat. The bomber threat still exists, but as we look into the future, we see that the principal danger from a first strike is a ballistic missile threat. It isn't only an ICBM threat, but also a submarine-based missile threat. And it isn't only ballistic missiles, but aerodynamic missiles. These aerodynamic missiles could be launched, not only from ships, but also from aircraft.

We can see that, qualitatively, the threat has become much more difficult to cope with and involves many more elements than it did during the bomber period. We have been responsive to this threat. All the tasks that we have done in the area of continental defense, we have done because of the threat. It is technology that has made the evolution of this threat possible to the enemy -- it is technology which has made it possible for us to do things about the threat -- and it is technology which limits our response to the threat. It turns out that in spite of all the efforts which we have put forth in the area of continental defense, the problems which we are confronted with today are more difficult than the problems we were confronted with a decade ago and we look forward to problems which appear technologically even more difficult than the problems we are confronted with today. We have tried to plug gaps. In some areas, we have

DECLASSIFIED

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

Authority DR 83-585 #1

E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (a)(1)(2)
DOD Lett. 2/3/84

SECRET

NLE Date 2/14/84

NLE DATE 2/14/84

(2-1005)

30011 Ser 1/26/1/ ATION-16/ NSC [vol II] (6)

SECRET

succeeded -- in some others we have not. I would now like to outline this evolution in somewhat more detail.

For convenience in doing that, I would like to divide this chart into three sections. Vertical line drawn down through 59 and another through 62. I would like to call this section "the past" [i.e., left of left line], and I would like to draw a line at a point here and call this area "the future" [i.e., right of right line].

Note: In this section grease pencil is used to make an "overlay" on the third chart. Brackets in the text contain added comments to indicate the overlay notations that accompanied the text.



I realize that the future actually begins this afternoon or the next minute, but for convenience, I have placed it out here a couple of years ahead of us so that I could call the period through which we are passing now a transition period -- a period in which the principal elements of the threat are mixed, consisting of a bomber threat, but also a growing ballistic missile threat, while in the future period, the ballistic missile and other threats comprise the primary elements of a first-strike enemy threat.

What are some of the characteristics of this past period? The bombers of this early period were sub-sonic. In the later part of this past period, the enemy developed jet bombers. He developed refuelling capability. He developed an all-weather capability. All of these things required an evolution, on our part, of warning, of control and of weapons to cope with an ever-more complex and difficult threat. A nuclear capability was accomplished early in this period by the enemy. A thermonuclear capability added to the magnitude and danger of this threat.

What could we expect to accomplish by way of continental measures in this past period? For one thing, we could expect to accomplish attrition -- a high probability of being able to knock down enemy bombers with our active defenses and we could expect to do that economically. We were more than willing, in this early period, to trade anti-aircraft armament or to trade day fighters or even to trade missiles or interceptors for enemy bombers. It was an economical thing to do. And we could create in the enemy's mind considerable uncertainty concerning the potential success of even a mass bomber raid. The combination of these measures would significantly contribute, we thought, to the deterrence of an enemy. And finally, we could expect, to a degree at least, to protect populations by means of active defense measures.

If we look forward to the future period and ask ourselves, "can we do these things in the future?" the answer for the most part is "no." I should

SECRET

emphasize that this is an answer which is based upon today's knowledge. It is an answer which is based upon today's forward look. We could be wrong, but based upon that knowledge, and based upon that forward look, we believe that economical attrition of enemy ballistic attack is something that we cannot expect to be able to do. We do not believe, therefore, that active defenses will contribute very much to deterring a determined enemy from mounting a ballistic missile attack on the United States. And finally, we do not believe that we could protect populations in the United States by active means because even a perfect air defense surrounding major United States cities would not protect our population from the effects of fall-out of enemy bombs which landed in other places.

Now, during this transition period -- the period lying between the past and the future -- we find ourselves confronted with the necessity to maintain many of the elements of continental defense that were created to cope with the bomber threat of the past, and at the same time to prepare ourselves for the missile threat of the future. During this period, increased emphasis is being placed upon the evolution of early warning. I would like to discuss that.

In the early part of the past period, we depended entirely for early warning upon surveillance radars which were based upon the continental United States. It was our belief at that time that the bomber threat which the enemy could mount against us was sufficiently slow and sufficiently predictable so that we could get adequate warning to deploy our weapons against the enemy based upon this kind of a warning network. But during this period, we evolved adjuncts and we augmented that early warning system. We created off-shore warning devices, radars on picket ships, radars in AEW aircraft, We built the DEW line across the northern part of the North American continent; we built the mid-Canada line; we built the Pinetree line; and many other things which gave us added time through early warning. These measures are comparatively effective. Bombers coming across the DEW Line will give us several hours of warning of their approach. In this transition period, we are creating and deploying the ballistic missile early warning system, the BMEWS. This system will cost between one and two billion dollars and it will give us between five and fifteen minutes of early warning against certain kinds of ballistic missile attack. Because it can be under-flown, or over-flown by going around the other way, we are working on the development of the satellite-borne MIDAS system. This also will cost, if it can be made practical, additional billions of dollars and it will buy for us another fifteen minutes of warning. The warning problem has become, economically and technically, increasingly difficult throughout this entire period of time.

Similar remarks can be made with respect to the evolution of wapons. During this passage, notes are added to third chart on weapon types s/. In the

SECRET

I would like to turn now to technological planning for the future. Listed here are some of the principal elements of technological planning for the future. The list could be made considerably longer -- these are the highlights.

First, to press forward the development and testing of the NIKE-ZEUS. Now I have emphasized up until now what the NIKE-ZEUS will not do. It will not save populations. Even a perfect NIKE-ZEUS will not save populations. If we were to ring every city in the United States with NIKE-ZEUS and if NIKE-ZEUS were perfect, and if no ballistic missiles could fall on any of these cities in the entire United States, without an adequate shelter program all of those people could be destroyed by fall-out from bombs fired into other areas. ZEUS will not, according to our present view, according to our present extrapolations, furnish economical attrition. You cannot save the White House, you cannot save the Pentagon, economically -- and perhaps not at all -- with NIKE-ZEUS. Suppose, for example, that the enemy decides that he wishes to destroy these places, and decides further that it will take him two ballistic missiles to give him 95 percent confidence that he will destroy the White House or that he will destroy the Pentagon if they are undefended. We can deploy NIKE-ZEUS to the point where it will require him 50 missiles to do the same job, that is, still have 95 percent confidence that he will destroy these places, by firing 50 missiles.

We have other options. We could deploy still more NIKE-ZEUS and force him to fire, say, 100 missiles to achieve the same confidence of destroying the White House or the Pentagon. The point is, however, that it is always cheaper for him to deploy his missiles than it is for us to deploy our defense system. We can make it more costly for him, but at much more cost for us. It is possible, (and this is a technological fact which is not yet fully assessed) that he would not have to deploy more missiles at all, but that with a clever decoy program, he could accomplish the same thing so that the total cost to him would be very slight in order to make the total cost to us very, very great indeed.

Now, we are spending this year, for the development and testing of NIKE-ZEUS, a total of approximately \$300 million. One may ask, "why?" in view of the remarks I have just made, "are we willing to invest or do we regard it as sound judgement to invest that kind of money in that kind of program?" There are several reasons. For one thing, the NIKE-ZEUS is the only system that anybody has conceived of yet that has any promise of accomplishing the active air defense mission of the future. Other schemes are being considered. Many other ideas have been brought forth. None of them have enough promise so that anybody is willing to make the decision to go forward with these even in the development stage. It is true that, based upon present technology, NIKE-ZEUS is somewhat of a brute-force effort.

SECRET

It uses today's technology. Today's technology does not enable us to solve tomorrow's problems to our full satisfaction. But for the time being, we have to pursue this line because we do not know what tomorrow's technology, related to this problem, is likely to be. We cannot be sure that new inventions and that new techniques and that new ways of doing the technical job will not come forward and that NIKE-ZEUS in the years to come will not look much, much more attractive from an economic point of view than it does today. For these reasons, we believe it is not only desirable, but vital to press forward with the development and with the testing of the new system. A production decision has not been made. It is our judgement that it should not be made for the reasons indicated.

We are pursuing the development of the MIDAS system with high priority. We will spend this fiscal year approximately \$110 million on the development of MIDAS. We do not know how soon, if ever, a system like MIDAS will be, operationally, an economical thing to do. We do not know, in fact, how practical technically it will turn out to be to accomplish early warning using a MIDAS-type system. We are pressing forward as rapidly as seems appropriate, to develop this capability if indeed it can be developed.

Project DEFENDER is a program on which this year we will spend also approximately \$110 million. It consists, actually, of a very large number of small projects -- perhaps 60 or more. I have divided these into three principal categories. We have a number of programs which are concerned with re-entry phenomena. Now what is it that happens from a physics point of view when a body such as a warhead re-enters the atmosphere? What kind of electrical disturbances occur? What kind of optical disturbances occur? What can we find out about these things that might enable us to devise a way of coping with them better than we can now?

A second major element of Project DEFENDER is the development of techniques and components which we presently believe will be of future value. Examples are the development of very high-powered broadcasting tubes at frequencies of interest for the anti-missile and the missile detection problems. These we are virtually certain will be needed and will be useful.

And finally, we are sponsoring the development of novel weapons concepts, even bizarre weapons concepts. We are allowing ourselves -- we are encouraging our contractors -- to think freely, to come forth with notions the majority of which may not be any good, but out of which, hopefully, at least one will arise which is better than anything we have thought of before.

SECRET

efforts the enemy would have to expend to counter our hardening investment. The first fully buried installations for ATLAS and TITAN are still under construction. We expect to learn a lot from the technical and operational side about hardening in the months ahead.

It is not surprising, therefore, particularly in view of the rapid pace of technological change, that the communication, command and control systems which link together our strategic and other forces are more vulnerable to ballistic missile attack in several places than we would like them to be. The basic parts of these systems and installations were started long ago and were in existence long before the development of ICBMs was started. Paradoxically, many of them play an increasingly important military role, both in peace and in war, than ever before. Examples include The White House; the Pentagon; SAC Headquarters and alternate headquarters; Norfolk and Pearl Harbor naval bases; communication stations at Cutter Maine Annapolis, Maryland, and Jim Creek, Washington; and others. Most of these are soft. Lines of communication from these installations are generally soft too, and nearly all land-line communications pass through soft transfer points that are co-located with likely targets for enemy attack.

A substantial portion of the discussion paper is addressed to questions concerning the survivability of the decision-making machinery and of the means for communicating decisions to our strike and defense forces during and after the onset of surprise ballistic missile attack. The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have these matters under constant study. Their importance is acknowledged. The great difficulty, and the great importance, of closing gaps in our posture which tend to develop because of the rapid forward march of technology in the ballistic missile and space era is thoroughly understood.

If, Mr. President, you approve the DRAFT RECORD OF NSC ACTION for this meeting, these on-going study efforts will be augmented in accordance with paragraph "d" which provides:

"Noted that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs would confer with the President and the Secretary of Defense with regard to the proposal for a study of the capabilities, plans and programs to ensure the survival of the decision-making machinery and of reliable means of communication with the surviving retaliatory forces on land, at sea, and in the air, within the time dimensions of a surprise ballistic missile attack. As an essential part of this study, attention should be given to the preparation of a response doctrine that is not dependent upon the survival of the seat of government and other vital links of the planned system for command and control."

9/16/60

US

UNCLASSIFIED

COPY NO. 5

16 September 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting between Secretary of Defense, United States, and General Norstad

TIME & PLACE: Office of Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.
13 September 1960, 0930-1030 hours

PRESENT

Honorable Thomas S. Gates Jr
 Honorable James M. Douglas
 Honorable John N. Irwin, II
 Mr. Hayden Williams
 General N. F. Twining
 General L. L. Lemnitzer
 General I. D. White
 Admiral Arleigh Burke
 General D. M. Shoup
 General Lauris Norstad

Maj Gen Frederic H. Miller
 Brig Gen George S. Brown
 Brig Gen H. A. Twitchell
 Colonel Chas. Billingslea
 Colonel S. K. Eaton
 Captain Means Johnston
 Colonel S. W. Downey

Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Asst SecDef (ISA)
Dep Asst Sec for NSC& Plans
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, Army
Chief of Staff, Air Force
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant, Marine Corps
Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe
 Reg Dir Europe (OSD/ISA)
 Military Asst to SecDef
 Office Chief of Staff, Army
 OSD/ISA
 OSD
 Military Asst to SecDef
 Executive to SACEUR, SHAPE

1. General Norstad opened the discussion by noting that the President had been favorably impressed with the Bowie Report. The report involves three principal problems.

a. The Level of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Shield Forces.

Mr. Bowie's proposal is to rely basically on conventionally equipped shield forces, although he would accept a few dual-purpose weapons systems for the purpose of deterring Soviet forces from initiating tactical nuclear warfare. General Norstad agrees that conventional capabilities should

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MK92-216-4/1
 By FNO NLE Date 7/17/95

UNCLASSIFIED

NP / Poling Rho Hall US NOT RECLASSIFIED BY 7858/60 (2)

UNCLASSIFIED

NO SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED.
NOT RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

be improved but tactical nuclear weapons are also necessary to bridge the gap between this conventional capability and an all-out general war. The key problem is to determine the proper balance between nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, particularly the type and level of tactical nuclear weapons systems in the shield forces. This problem should be referred to the Department of Defense for a military determination. General Norstad would appreciate the opportunity to comment on the DOD study prior to final approval.

b. MRBMs.

Mr. Bowie believes that MRBMs should be limited to a relatively small force (perhaps 200 missiles), located off the continent in water-based configurations but under the full control of SACEUR in peace and war. General Norstad agrees that the first 80 to 150 MRBMs should be water-based Polaris missiles; but highly mobile land-based missiles, specifically designed for Allied Command Europe, are also necessary. All missiles could be assigned to SACEUR in peace and war. The President had seemed to agree that broad NATO participation is desirable and that some land-based missiles are necessary.

c. Control of Nuclear Warheads.

General Norstad stated that there appear to be three schools of thought with respect to the control of nuclear warheads. These are:

- (1) Maintain the status quo;
- (2) Develop bilateral arrangements with individual countries, particularly France;
- (3) Provide a system for multi-lateral control.

Although militarily desirable, continuation of the status quo is no longer politically acceptable and General Norstad is strongly opposed to bilateral arrangements from the military, political, psychological, moral or any other point of view. On the other hand, a strong case can be made for a multi-lateral system of control. Such a system was recommended by General Norstad in POLTO 330 dated 21 August 1959, and the same idea in slightly different form is included in the Bowie Report.

UNCLASSIFIED

2

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chancellor Adenauer was also impressed with the desirability of developing a system of multi-lateral control such as outlined in POLTO 330 and he thought that a proposal by the United States along these lines would have a very favorable effect in NATO. Such a proposal should first be presented by the President to General de Gaulle (with prior support from Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer), after which it could be taken up in the NATO Council. Probably General de Gaulle would turn it down, but this is not a certainty. If President de Gaulle would not accept the proposal, NATO should proceed on an "empty chair" basis. As outlined in POLTO 330 and as suggested by Mr. Bowie, a steering group might be organized with special responsibilities in the nuclear field. In this connection, General Norstad felt that the President was now convinced that the multi-lateral approach to this problem was the proper solution. In response to a question by Secretary Douglas, General Norstad stated that, contrary to Mr. Bowie's view, his concept did not involve giving up the right of a US veto on the use of atomic weapons.

2. General Norstad continued his briefing by emphasizing Chancellor Adenauer's view, shared by the other European nations, that the United States was not adequately fulfilling its role of leadership in the Alliance. General Twining said that the US did attempt to exercise proper leadership by recommending appropriate courses of action, but there was no way to force the European nations to carry out these recommendations.

3. In response to a question by Secretary Gates, General Norstad elaborated on the concept of multi-lateral control by stating that the weapons should be turned over to NATO for as long as NATO continues in its present form. They would, in fact, belong to NATO and be under NATO control. It is this firm commitment, combined with NATO control, which distinguishes this concept from present arrangements. US custody would be maintained in any event. Admiral Burke noted that this principle of multilateral control could also apply to the MRBMs, and General Norstad agreed.

4. Secretary Douglas then raised the question of how NATO would exercise this control; i. e., how would NATO go to war. General Norstad stated that the answer to this question could never be very clear. Article Five of the Treaty provides for both individual and collective action by the NATO nations. As a practical matter, it should be possible to proceed under multi-lateral control with about the same flexibility as can be obtained under existing arrangements. In response to another question from Secretary Douglas, General Norstad indicated that we should not be concerned with whether this meets French prestige requirements. He also stated that he had discussed the legal aspects of multi-lateral control with Chairman McCone who felt that some modification of the present law would probably be necessary. However, both he and Chairman McCone felt that this

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED

~~TOP SECRET~~

could be accomplished without too much difficulty. In response to another question from Secretary Douglas, General Norstad stated that a US proposal for NATO control of nuclear weapons would have a very favorable psychological impact on the Alliance.

5. Secretary Gates then suggested that perhaps it is necessary to resolve the fundamental problem of the mission of the shield forces within the overall strategic concept before establishing a firm position on NATO control of nuclear weapons. General Norstad responded that the functions and missions of the shield forces would not change in the future, except that they would become even more important. It is necessary to raise the level of conventional response, and a tactical nuclear capability is also essential. However, we should be very careful not to go overboard in our reliance on the use of nuclear weapons. The point is that nuclear weapons should not be considered as the normal immediate response. Rather, they should be used only after a conscious decision at a responsible level of command.

6. Secretary Douglas noted that, contrary to General Norstad's view, Mr. Bowie considered the MRBMs as a contribution to the so-called strategic retaliatory forces. General Norstad said that the principal point is that Europe would have a significant MRBM capability, and that duplication of targets would be prevented through close coordination with the other nuclear delivery forces.

7. General Twining then noted that the purpose of the Bowie Report was to provide a basis for greater European participation in NATO, thus permitting the withdrawal of some US forces. Secretary Gates added that the President had said repeatedly that he thought Europe should provide more divisions, and this had been a factor in the initial US concept for a 10-year NATO plan. General Lemnitzer noted that no one should have expected the Bowie Report to recommend reduced forces since it was clear that the threat had increased.

8. Secretary Irwin raised the question of targets for MRBMs by pointing out that he thought Mr. Bowie visualized these weapons in a retaliatory role against Russia. General Norstad responded by saying that he favored assigning these weapons systems to so-called tactical targets as a basic mission but that they could be used in either role.

9. Secretary Gates said that he was very much impressed with the Bowie Report and that it represented the first reasonable approach he had seen to the problem of reduced confidence in the concept of massive retaliation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

10. General White said that he felt that requirements for nuclear delivery systems should be determined for the Alliance as a whole and that Europe should participate in meeting these requirements. An increased conventional response was desirable, but this should not be achieved at the expense of nuclear capabilities. Both are necessary. Control of nuclear weapons is a key problem, but once nuclear weapons are used they must be used massively. General Norstad commented that we should be very careful not to organize ourselves into a position where we must respond at once with nuclear weapons. In this connection, MC 70 force goals for nuclear delivery systems are probably already too high. However, this does not constitute a practical problem since we will not actually meet all of these goals anyway. General White said that he believed we must concentrate on achieving maximum nuclear capabilities but at the same time improve conventional capabilities. Secretary Gates referred specifically to the Army Pentomic organization and noted that we may already have gone too far in concentrating on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional capabilities.

11. General Norstad closed by again emphasizing his view that we must raise the level of conventional response so as to make it abnormal to use nuclear weapons at once. The basic Army units should be generally organized and equipped with non-nuclear or dual-purpose weapons systems with the primary nuclear support weapons controlled in a manner similar to the division or corps artillery of World War II.

S. W. DOWNEY
Colonel, U.S. Army
Executive to SACEUR

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
By: R.D. NARS, Date: 2/17/88

9/17/60

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

AF IN : 56214 (17 Sep 60) N/E

ACTION: JCS

REF: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

DE RJWXBR 189
P 171 645Z
FM JC SLG OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO JCS WASH D C
BT

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 21 Jan 1981

SECRET 60-2 FROM JC SLG.
FOR THE DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF, SIGNED SPIVY. THIS IS THE SECOND
WEEKLY JC SLG ACTIVITY REPORT. THIS MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS.
PART I. JSTPA ACTIVITY: (A). DURING THE PERIOD 15, 16,
17 SEP 60, THE JSTPA CONDUCTED AN EDUCATION PROGRAM FOR
PLANNING. INCLUDED WERA BRIAFINGS BY SAC ON EMERGENCY WAR
ORDERU ANDRONTINGENCY PLANS AND BY PAC, LANT, AND EUR ON
THEIR WAR PLANS AND PECULIAR SITUATIONS. COPIES OF THE
AGENDA ARE BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY. (B). JSTPA POLICY
NUMBER ONE, DATED 13 SEPT 60, ESTABLISHES POLICY REGARDING
THE PROCEDURES FOR THE HANDLING OF DIFFERENCES OF
OPINIONS AND DISSENTS. COPIES OF THIS POLICY MEMORANDUM
ARE BEING FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER. (C). THE
INITIAL MEETING OF THE JSTPA POLICY COMMITTEE WAS
CONDUCTED ON 13 SEPT 60. MINUTES OF THIS MEETING ARE
BEING FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER. PART II. JC SLG
LIAISON ACTIVITY: (A). IN A DISCUSSION WITH THE

EXCLUDED FROM GDF.

(Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.)

AFHQ FORM MAY 59 0-309b
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO.

at
x: LIA

UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT ATTACHMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

AF IN: 56214 (17 Sep 60)

DIRECTOR JSTPA ON 13 SEPT 60, GENERAL POWER REAFFIRMED THAT HE FEELS VERY STRONGLY THAT SOME MEANS MUST BE FOUND TO IMPLEMENT INTEGRATION OF THE SACEUR ATOMIC STRIKE PLAN WITH THE SIOP EVEN IF IT MEANS DISCLOSING TO CERTAIN ALLIED ATOMIC PLANNING STAFFS THAT PORTION OF OUR STRIKE PLAN THAT PERTAINS TO THEIR AREA. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD RATHER TAKE THE CHANGE OF SECURITY COMPROMISE THAN TO HAVE UNCOORDINATED PLANS. GENERAL POWER RECONGNIZES THE COMPLICATIONS OF THE INTER-

GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT AND THE FACT THAT GENERAL NORSTAD MIGHT NOT BE GIVEN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALLIED FORCES IN TIME FOR THEM TO BE EFFECTIVE.

HOWEVER, HE FEELS THAT CINCEUR CAN COMMIT US FORCES IN NATO TO THE SIOP IN APPROXIMATELY THE SAME MANNER AS THE OTHER CINC'S. GENERAL POWER WILL CONTINUE HIS PRESENT PLANNING EFFORT ON THE TERMS STATED BY THE SACEUR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE INITIAL MEETING HERE IN AUGUST. RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESENT SACEUR REPRESENTATIVES (SENIOR REP IS COLONEL P. J. LONG, USAF) INDICATE THAT THEY HAVE CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY IN PLANNING ADJUSTMENT. FURTHER, INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS

2 of 5 (Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.)

AFHQ FORM
MAY 59 0-309b
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

SECRET

COPY NO.

9/18/60
US-Support

COPY NO. 5

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN N.

~~TOP SECRET~~

16 September 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting between the Honorable Livingston T. Merchant
and General Norstad

TIME & PLACE: Office of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
Washington, D. C., 13 September 1960, 1115-1210 hours

PRESENT:

Honorable Livingston T. Merchant	Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Honorable Gerard C. Smith	Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
Honorable I. B. White	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
General Lauris Norstad	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Mr. Philip J. Farley	Special Assistant for Disarm- ament and Atomic Energy Affairs
Mr. Robert Bowie	Harvard University
Mr. Russell Fessenden	Director of Office of European Regional Affairs
Colonel S. W. Downey	Executive to SACEUR, SHAPE

1. General Norstad opened the discussion by outlining briefly his conversations with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Meeting between Secretary of Defense, United States, and General Norstad held in Office of Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C. 13 September 1960, 0930-1055 hours). He then turned to the question of multi-lateral control of nuclear weapons. He said that he felt the President was ready to make a decision on this matter and that Secretary Herter might well take the lead in presenting a specific proposal.

2. Mr. Bowie said that in his view the U. S. should first negotiate an appropriate agreement and then present the agreement to Congress. Regardless of the procedure adopted, the President could state his position prior to congressional action.

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
 Agency Case State 9202350
 NLE Case 92-21141
 By JHO NLE Date 12/9/96

~~TOP SECRET~~

WP/21/ US support of NATO (1958-60) (3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. General Norstad said he did not wish to get into the mechanics of the problem but he did wish to emphasize that the U.S. must act expeditiously.

and it is essential that the U.S. do something now on the control of nuclear weapons. A dramatic impact is vital and time is short.

Based on discussions with Chairman McCone and a previous appearance before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, he felt sure that favorable action could be obtained to provide necessary changes in the law.

4. Mr. Bowie raised the question of tactical nuclear weapons and stated.

[REDACTED]

5. Secretary Merchant noted that the Cates proposal was purely for the provision of missiles and had nothing to do with nuclear warheads which would remain under U.S. custody in accordance with current procedures.

6. General Norstad emphasized that the priority task is to achieve multi-lateral control of the warheads and that this can be done independently since some warheads are obviously necessary in any case.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~
2

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~TOP SECRET~~

7. It appeared that, with the exception of Mr. Bowie, the participants felt we should move ahead on multi-lateral control as an independent problem. Mr. Smith was assigned the responsibility of preparing a short paper on this subject for presentation to the Secretary.

8. General Norstad then outlined his discussions with the Secretary of Defense and JCS on the need for improving conventional capabilities in the shield forces. Turning to the MRBM question, he said that the first MRBMs should be water-borne Polaris missiles followed as soon as possible by light, highly mobile missiles designed specifically for ACE purposes.

9. General Norstad stated that he had already informed Mr. Spaak that, in his view, the NATO Council must sooner or later face up to the MRBM problem. It is important that the National Representatives at least express the views of their Governments in a closed session. Perhaps a decision would not be reached immediately but, at least, some useful guidance might emerge.

S. W. DOWNEY
Colonel, U. S. Army
Executive to SACEUR

~~TOP SECRET~~

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT

DECLASSIFIED
BY: DOD
DATE: 5/20/88
88/1/17

9/19/60

9/19/60

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

AF IN : 57353 (19 Sep 60) P/wg
ACTION: JCS-28, XPD-4
INFO : ARMY-20, NAVY-25, CMC-6, XDC-1, ODC-1, CIN-1, OOP-1 (88)

JCS (96) 520 (Aug 60) sec 1
0921520

PERAAX 228X
FM SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
TO RJEZHQ XJCS WASH D C
RJEZHQ/C OFS USAF WASH D C

JCS MESSAGE

BT
SECRET 1965. FOR DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF.
SUBJ: (U) MID-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE REQUIREMENTS.

FOLLOWING ARE CINCSAC COMMENTS IN REPLY TO YOUR JCS
98025 DATED 3 AUG 60, ON THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS STUDY
FOR MID-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (MRBM'S). THIS MESSAGE

IN 2 PARTS. PART I: THIS COMMAND REGARDS THE MRBM AS A
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEM THAT WILL PRIMARILY BE
UTILIZED FOR EMPLOHMENT AGAINST SINO-SOVIET TARGETS
CATEGORIZED AS STRATEGIC. FURTHER, IT RECOGNIZES THERE
ARE IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVE) IN MAKING
AVAILABLE TO OUR ALLIES MRBM'S AND THAT SUCH AN ECTION IS

REGARDED AS BEING IN FURTHERANCE OF U.S. SECURITY
INTERESTS. HOWEVER, ANY DELIBERATIONS RELATED TO MRBM
REQUIREMENTS SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE
FOLLOWING FACTORS: A. THE MAJOR OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMPLEMITY OF COMMND AND CONTROL

DATE: 20 Oct 81

(Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.)

AFHQ FORM 0-309b
MAY 59
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
THIS FORM MAY BE USED.



COPY NO.

DATE: 20 Oct 81

X: (1/A)

DECLASSIFIED
BY 001
DATE 2/17/88

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

AF IN: 57353 (19 Sep 60)

ARRANGEMENTS OF DEPLOYED MRBM'S. B. THE POLITICAL
INSTABILITY OF AFFECTED COUNTRIES AND THE UNCERTAIN
RESPONSE OF THESE COUNTRIES IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL WAR.
D. THE VULNERABILITY OF DEPLOYED MRBM'S AS RELATED TO
AVAILABLE WARNING. E. THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF ZI
BASED ICBM'S (MINUTEMAN) CONSIDERING COST FACTORS,
VERSATILITY AND CAPABILITY OF COVERING A FAR GREATER
SPECTRUM OF TARGETS THAN A MID-RANGE MISSILE.

PART II: RECOGNIZING THAT WHILE LIMITED NUMBERS OF
MRBM'S AND IRBM'S DO SERVE TO SUPPLEMENT AND COMPLEMENT
THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE IT APPEARS THAT THE GREATEST
CONTRIBUTION ALLIED MRBM'S MAKE IS IN SATISFYING CERTAIN
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES; ICM., ENHANCING NATIONAL PRESTIGE,
STRENGTHENING ALLIANCES, ETC. IN VIEW OF THIS, IT IS
RECOMMENDED THAT THE NUMBER OF MRBM'S MADE AVAILABLE TO
OUR ALLIES BE LIMITED TO THE MINIMUM NUMBER NECESSARY
TO ACHIEVE THIS PURPOSE AND IN THE INTEREST OF CON-
SERVING NATIONAL RESOURCES THOSE MISSILES SUPPLIED BE
PROVIDED FOR FROM INDIGENOUS FUNDS RATHER THAN U.S. MAP.
BT

NOTE: Advance copy delivered to JCS

(Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of THE OFFICE OF PRIMARY INTEREST.)

AFHQ FORM
MAY 59 0-309b
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
THIS FORM MAY BE USED.



COPY NO.

DATE 20 Oct 81

JCS 1620/300

September 21, 1960

NSC-13

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 460th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Wednesday, September 21, 1960


Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Commerce (Items 1, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Bennett) (Items 1 and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for the President, Export-Import Bank of Washington (Items 1 and 2); and the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Robert Packard for the Department of State; [.....] Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM
(NSC Action No. 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1960; NSC 6011; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August 9 and 29, and September 19, 1960)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's presentation, the President said he had received the most glowing reports on the prospects for petroleum production in Libya. He had been told that the Libyan reserves exceeded even the Sahara reserves. He asked



TOP SECRET

1. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

that MAAG should take over responsibility for the Civil Guard. Secretary Dillon believed that the Civil Guard could now be converted into an effective anti-guerrilla organization in about three months.

Mr. Dulles reported that the Syrian army had declared a war alert as a result of Jordan's action in moving forces toward the Syrian frontier. [.....]

Mr. Dulles said he would next report on the situation with respect to Berlin. In his desire to focus world attention on Berlin, Khrushchev was permitting the East Germans to undertake a new campaign designed to increase tensions over Berlin. The East Germans had imposed restrictions on the travel of West Germans to East Berlin. However, these restrictions had not affected commuters living in one part of Berlin and working in another. The East German restrictions appeared to be a step in the direction of incorporating East Berlin into East Germany by asserting that East German laws are applicable to East Berlin and by giving the East Berlin boundary the character of a frontier. One element in the situation is the desire of the Ulbricht regime to demonstrate the "sovereignty" of East Germany. By concentrating measures against the West Germans, the Communist probably consider themselves on safer grounds than they would occupy if they applied their restrictions to the allies. The East Germans may also attempt to impose restriction on the travel of West Germans to West Berlin. The Soviet commander has supported the East German position and has warned the Western Powers. Mr. Dulles said the USSR may be considering steps to bring the East Germans into flight clearance procedures applying to planes flying the corridors to Berlin, so that civil airlines would be compelled to operate without Soviet flight safety guarantees or else cease flights into Berlin. The USSR is taking the position that the corridors to Berlin have been established solely for the purpose of permitting the Western Allies to resupply their forces in Berlin. Civil planes flying in the corridors have recently been buzzed by Soviet jet fighters, one of which scored a near miss on a U.K. plane. Apparently, the Communists are trying to make the route too dangerous for civilian pilots to fly. Bonn is considering countermeasures but Adenauer is anxious to avoid any rash measures and is attempting to quiet Willy Brandt.

F D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY

The President said he had many times discussed with Adenauer the question of what should be done in the event the East Germans, supported by the USSR, undertook to impose every kind of impediment on our movement to and from Berlin. He had been unable to secure a satisfactory answer from Adenauer. Adenauer and De Gaulle also had said we must maintain our "juridical position" in Berlin. Neither De Gaulle nor Adenauer will face up to the question of what we should do in the face of possible East German impediments. In fact, the President was not sure that the U.S. Government had completely faced up to the situation.

Mr. Dulles said that if shipments into Berlin were delayed, Berlin's economy would be rendered completely untenable. The President said that the Soviets could seriously embarrass us by taking various measures which did not violate the Potsdam Agreement.

Mr. Gray said he understood inter-Allied talks in a low key on the subject of trade retaliation were in progress and that these talks had revealed a reluctance on the part of the West Germans to take any action. Mr. Dillon said that until recently the West Germans were unwilling to take action. They had taken the position that the Allies could act without them. We had taken the position that the key to the situation lay in action by West Germany, which had now agreed to go along in any action the NATO powers might take in the economic field. Secretary Dillon felt joint action by the NATO powers and West Germans made good sense. The West Germans believe that the greatest damage to East Germany can be done by concentrating on commodities which are in short supply in East Germany. A technical group in Bonn is now starting a study of these items. In the first meeting of the group, it was apparent that the West Germans had done considerable advance work on this subject and had developed concrete ideas. In any case the ground for action was now being prepared. It was not known how far the U.K. and France would be willing to go but Mr. Dillon felt these countries were prepared to collaborate.

The President said the weakness of our position with respect to Berlin was a geographical one. The East German hinterland supported the East German position in Berlin but our support was still 100 miles away down a narrow corridor. Secretary Dillon said the West German economic actions would be taken against the whole of East Germany. Mr. Dulles reported that West German shipments to East Germany are less than two per cent of West Germany's total exports. These shipments, however

MsETLong:eb

91-6948 (State 10) 20191

SECRET - EYES ONLY

96-18 9/29/60
1 2007/25588

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EI

APPROVED BY S 10/5/60
APPROVED BY H 9/29/60

Memorandum of Conversation

Place: Tripartite Meeting-N.Y.

SecDel MC/76
DATE: September 23, 1960

SUBJECT: Discussion at Dinner Meeting of the Three Foreign Ministers - NATO

PARTICIPANTS:	US	UK
	The Secretary	Lord Home
	Mr. Livingston T. Merchant	Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
	Mr. Foy D. Kohler	Sir Harold Caccia
	Mr. Theodore C. Achilles	Mr. Peter Ramsbotham
	Mr. Edward T. Long	

COPIES TO:	S/S	Am. Burgess	France:
	G		M. Couve de Murville
	C	White House-	M. Charles Lucet
	EUR - Mr. Kohler	Gen. Goodpastor	Ambassador Alphand
	S/P - Mr. Smith		M. Pierre De Leusse
	A.B. Houghton		
	A. Whitney		

The SECRETARY said that there was quite a bit of confusion in our minds concerning the French attitude toward NATO. We had seen and read with care General De Gaulle's press statement earlier this month and we frankly didn't know what he was driving at. Does France want to modify the treaty? Does it want armies to go back to becoming national entities? This in effect would mean that the U.S. would have to leave Europe. Does this kind of talk on De Gaulle's part strengthen or weaken NATO? Last May General De Gaulle promised us a memorandum outlining his thoughts on NATO's future. We have been waiting since that time but have not received these views.



The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER observed that maybe De Gaulle's press conference was not well understood in the U.S. He expressed nothing new. His views were consistent with those expressed by him in December 1958. De Gaulle is after two things. First, he wants tripartite cooperation on global matters. As a matter of fact, this meeting goes a long way to fulfilling that idea of De Gaulle's. The other thing is the NATO question, that of integration of military forces. After all, integration is not linked to or in the North Atlantic Treaty. France seeks no change in the Treaty itself. De Gaulle is referring to the military organization of NATO which he believes is not up to date, not responsive to modern needs.

The SECRETARY asked the French Foreign Minister for clarification, "What does he mean?"

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MR 96-1841
 By JLB
 NLE Date 12/10/56

SECRET - EYES ONLY

STATE DEPT. CONTROL BOARD REVIEW
 Approved
 Disapproved
 EO 12958
 FPO/HR
 Withdrawal No.

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said this was in accord with the present situation. It is rather awkward to say it here but we have a different situation from that of the U.S. and the United Kingdom, making a possible reservation for Germany in the future. France is the only country, apart from the U.S. and UK, which normally makes an important contribution to its own defense. At the present time France is in a situation where it cannot provide for its own defense. The US and UK are different. The U.S. has a massive global defense establishment. The territory of the United Kingdom is not within the NATO command and the bulk of its forces are outside the NATO command. France is on the Continent. All of its own defense is linked with NATO. France believes there has been a great change in the last ten years. Europe has recovered economically. France needs something of its own in the defense area. If nothing is done, the result will be the status quo where France and the other European nations are not interested in defense, where they will continue to rely on the U.S. France and the other European nations spend less on defense. They contribute less to defense. There is nothing in France's mind that would contribute to the consequences of weakening the defense of the West but on the contrary what France wants is a way to improve its contribution to this concept. One can always have a scholastic discussion of military integration vs. coalition of armies but there is nothing in this concept which should cause the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Continent.

The SECRETARY said that the concept of coalition would mean no U.S. troops on the Continent.



The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER replied, "I don't understand integration vs. coalition. This doesn't mean in the least that the allied command should be suppressed in time of war". France placed its troops under a unified command during the last war. France has nothing against the concept of integrated command structure in wartime. What France would like concerns its own defense. "How this is done, I can't say."

The SECRETARY observed that France was criticizing without coming up with a concrete proposal.

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said there was no hurry in this regard. He said that France would present its proposals for quiet and secret discussions in time. Now that we are in a crisis, now that the cold war is with us again there is no hurry to discuss these changes.

The BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER said the difficulty was why had General De Gaulle made such a public issue of his desire to change the command structure of NATO. The British understood the necessity for preserving the national identity of armies but in fact NATO integration is at a higher level in the command structure. National entity is preserved in the armies; France was able to withdraw its units unimpaired for service in Algeria.

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said he couldn't quite agree with Lord Home's observation. It was difficult on the Continent to observe that armies had a national entity.

The SECRETARY said that the national forces on the Continent were part of the structure of NATO, granted, but the U.S. had no difficulty in taking a division out for the Lebanon crisis.

The BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER asked why do the French feel that the integration of forces is against French national interest?

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said that France had no objection to certain kinds of integration, for example, the unified air defense problem had been settled by France recently. But one mustn't forget that the Treaty itself made no provision for integration of forces. In addition, NATO had accepted the withdrawal of French forces without too much difficulty.

The SECRETARY said this was true largely on the basis of NATO saying it could get along for a time without French forces.

MR. HOYER MILLAR observed that the problem of the unified air defense command structure had been settled.

The SECRETARY said that the atomic stockpile problem was involved in all this and that as a result of France's attitude on the stockpile we had been forced at great expense to move our squadrons out of France.

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said that another related problem on France's mind was that very one, that of atomic weapons.

The BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER repeated his observation that the most difficult thing for the British to understand was why had the French advertised their opinion on the NATO subject. "Let's get on quietly with our discussion of NATO".



The SECRETARY said that we have our own plans about the future of NATO. We hope in two weeks or so to have ready for presentation a long range plan. Obviously, in this time of tension, the military problem of NATO is of great concern.

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said that after ten years there obviously should be some change.

The SECRETARY said this was true but that the U.S. proposal would be calling for greater integration of NATO forces rather than less. It would call for more European participation. He said he was sorry he couldn't at this point go into more detail but that we would certainly be discussing these proposals informally with the British and French. The point was, however, that De Gaulle's attitude had caused us to be psychologically worried.

The BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER said that the greatest problem was that of the German army, to which the SECRETARY replied, "Definitely, this is much more difficult because of De Gaulle's public statements".

[The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said that Germany would be causing the same problem as the years went on.]

The SECRETARY said that this was not inevitable, that one of the most important parts of the whole NATO exercise was to hold together in that context the German military establishment.]

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER failed to see that France's attitude was a contradiction because after all there would be wartime integration.

[The SECRETARY observed that at the present time every bit of the German military establishment was integrated into NATO operation.]

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said he hoped that the German forces would remain so.

The BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER stated that whether we can or not depends primarily on our agreeing to integration.]

The SECRETARY said that what we want is an integrated command, not necessarily under U.S. direction.

The BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER asked the French Foreign Minister whether he wanted NATO to retain the integration aspect but with special arrangements for France.

The SECRETARY observed that the problem couldn't be settled at this meeting but he certainly wanted everyone to think about it seriously. NATO was getting jumpier as the months went on without knowing exactly what the French wanted. He pointed out that the U.S. was coming up in good faith with a new plan for NATO. We are not infallible. We want NATO maintained. And we don't want something to break up NATO.

The BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER wondered whether the U.S. was worried about the NATO military command structure being too top-heavy.

The SECRETARY said no. He then stated that of course the military situation had changed since NATO had been set up, that the next war would be a split-second one, demanding immediate and effective reaction.

MR. HOYER MILLAR [reverted to a "subsidiary" point - Germany. He] recalled that in this same building, i.e., the Waldorf Towers, the concept of SHAPE had been established and what convinced the British on its desirability was the fact that Dwight Eisenhower had been named as the Supreme Commander. [Mr. Hoyer Millar continued that an independent French army would inevitably result in an independent German army.]

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said the problem is to have a national army and this is something France doesn't have. He pointed to the difference in the fact that the UK had an expeditionary force in Germany but had its own national army at home. "This is fine."

The SECRETARY apologized for not being able to go into more detail on the U.S. long range proposal but expressed the hope that the U.S. could have private discussions on this with the French and British.

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER observed that "in the meantime we haven't changed anything".

The SECRETARY said, "Very honestly, after De Gaulle's public statement we feel we have a right to know what he is driving at".

The BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER observed that since the French appeared to agree with the fact of some integration of military forces it would be helpful to know how much integration France would agree to.

The SECRETARY observed that the U.S. philosophy called for more rather than less integration.

MR. MERCHANT stated that there was one very real element of concern to the U.S. on the problem of NATO caused by the French attitude, that being the terms on which U.S. public opinion would permit the stationing of U.S. troops abroad. "We have to look not only at the difficulties NATO causes for the French but also the difficulties for us. Our whole policy in Europe is based on the concept of integration."

The SECRETARY observed that the American public, if it knew U.S. troops were not wanted in Europe, would move immediately for their return to the continental limits.

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said he failed to see the relation between integration and the problem of the American presence in Europe, the U.S. being the largest and most powerful member of the alliance.

The SECRETARY said that without an integrated command structure the U.S. could not send troops to Europe.

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said, "I never said a non-allied command structure. No one has asked for American troops to withdraw from Europe nor has there been any talk that there would not be an allied integrated command in wartime."

The SECRETARY said, "Couve, let's be frank. The implication is that you want to wait on making changes in NATO until your troops are back from Algeria. When they are back then you want the change."

The BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER said that we have to talk this out tripartitely in private.

The SECRETARY observed that in modern war the concepts were different from the past.

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY



~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

- 6 -

The FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER said that what he was discussing had nothing to do with atomic warfare concepts.

The SECRETARY hoped that soon these problems could be talked out seriously and privately.



~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

9/28/60

September 28, 1960

1497/
1698

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
September 27, 1960

Others present: Prime Minister Macmillan
Secretary Herter, Lord Home,
Mr. de Zulueta, General Goodpaster

At 9 AM, after the President and Prime Minister Macmillan had had breakfast alone, the others joined for an hour's discussion. As we came in, the President was telling the Prime Minister that he has had in his mind the possibility of making a quick visit late in November to Great Britain for three or four days. He would plan to pay his respects to the Queen but would hope to have no social program. He would like for Mrs. Eisenhower to accompany him, although the state of health of her mother may prevent this. He would hope some basis might be found for de Gaulle to join for discussions, but is troubled to try to figure out any subjects that he and Macmillan could discuss with General de Gaulle. This would be two or three weeks after the election, and the President thought he could usefully consult with the others on the prospects for continued collaboration under the new administration.



Regarding our questions with the French, Mr. Herter said that his tripartite talks with Lord Home and Couve de Murville had gone quite well. He had been rather tough on Couve, who took this very well. Particularly on specific matters such as Laos, Berlin and similar problems their discussions had been useful.

The Prime Minister told the President that the British and ourselves have now reached agreement on the text of a public statement the Prime Minister might make concerning the basing of Polaris submarines in the United Kingdom. The President agreed with the statement, but suggested that it be modified to say that this is

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)
Agency Case NSC F94-1727
NLE Case 91-25 PM
By 210 NLE Date 8/17/76

Ev. SA GVA

~~SECRET~~


a continuation and extension of existing procedures for consultation.

The Prime Minister next raised the question of reconnaissance flights that we both conduct of the periphery of the Soviet Union for intelligence purposes. He reported that agreement has been reached on procedures for consultation that have been under discussion, but the real question which remains is just what should we do in this program, what places should we go to, and what operations should we conduct there. On the one hand, we do not want to permit the Soviets to drive us away from free use of international waters and international air space, but on the other we must recognize that we are in a weak position when they can shoot our planes down over international waters and there is apparently nothing we can do about it. He suggested that the intelligence people of the two countries should get together on this. The President referred to certain rules he had put into effect after difficulties in the Far East, prescribing that the aircraft should keep a certain distance away from hostile shores at all times, and avoid direct headings toward critical areas within the Soviet bloc such as major cities, naval bases, etc. He said that his discussion of the matter with our people has disclosed that the information gathered is of great importance to our bomber planning. The Prime Minister asked that arrangements be made for Patrick Deane to meet with our people. He said there is also the question of what cover story we should use. He thinks it is foolish to say that we are conducting the flights for electro-magnetic research and thought it better to say frankly that they are for reconnaissance purposes. The President agreed, stating that when we tell what we are doing, we should simply say that we are flying over the open ocean to see what the Soviets are doing that might have a bearing on military preparations -- just as they do with their trawlers. The Prime Minister noted that the difference is that they can shoot our planes down and conceal the facts as to location, etc., whereas if we were to do anything, our people talk so much that no details could be kept secret. (The President commented that the only regret he had regarding the U-2 is that the cover statement which was used did not fit the facts as they developed -- on the assumption that the plane would be destroyed and the pilot probably lost.) The Prime Minister said he does not plan to make a public



statement regarding the reconnaissance flights. If he is asked a question in Parliament -- and he hopes he will be asked a question, preferably by some Communist-leaning member -- he will simply say that he talked to the President about this matter, as he told the House he would, and what has been agreed upon has been satisfactory from a British standpoint.

The President reverted to discussion about de Gaulle. He said de Gaulle has him baffled to know what we could offer that would improve our relations. When he has raised the subjects of Algeria, tripartite organization, and atomic weapons, de Gaulle simply clams up. He has had no answer from de Gaulle to his last long letter, and still is not clear just what de Gaulle wants. Mr. Herter said he thinks de Gaulle's advisors are counseling him not to put his thoughts down on paper. Their reason is that this would make the situation irretrievable since de Gaulle would find it hard to back down. The Prime Minister suggested that perhaps de Gaulle does not have anything specific in mind -- that he just wants to have the form of tripartite Head of Government meetings.



Lord Home said that Couve had stressed that France does not want to break up NATO. Their question is simply how far the question of integration should be carried. The Prime Minister picked this up and said that one problem is that words are given a different significance in French than in English. Integration troubles de Gaulle in this way: there are only two forces in France that can stand up to and defeat Communism -- the Church and the Army. He does not feel that the answer is the Church. Therefore he feels he must keep the French Army as an integral unit which could be used against the Communists. It should not be broken up into separate divisions serving in multi-national corps. In other words, integration should take place only at the top. He noted that this is in fact the procedure that is used, and suggested that de Gaulle just does not understand the present system. He said that there is an analogy of this in Britain, not with regard to the Army, about which people care very little, but with regard to the Navy. The resistance to putting the British

~~SECRET~~
44

fleet under the command of someone from another country was deep-seated and emotional.

The President said that, in an effort to think of some way of improving the situation, he has talked to some of our people about saying we are ready to let a European take over the command of NATO in Europe. This would have to be a nation with major ground forces, and that requirement reduces the choice to France or Germany. The latter is obviously unthinkable at this time, and the French do not have men of the qualification of Gruenther and Norstad. The Prime Minister said he thought that de Gaulle probably would not want to have the top command because that would denationalize his commander. What he wants is to keep the French Army as a unified structure with a strong general in command, so it could be used against the Communists in France in case of necessity. The President observed that he had recently seen a report that the French have agreed on an air defense command, following the same terms as the British have adopted.

The President said that the great problem regarding France is Algeria. This is "a running sore." His personal idea is that if France would give the Algerians independence, with a good treaty establishing economic relationships, this would constitute the best available solution. He said in his judgment it is no longer possible for any free nation to keep other people in a state of domination. The costs and difficulties are simply too great. The problem in Algeria of course is that there are a million French colons intermingled with Arab population. Lord Home said that the same problem must be foreseen in Rhodesia within a few short years. The Prime Minister added that, although the South Africans have been foolish in their conduct of political affairs, they have the same problem -- that for three hundred years the nation has been colonized and developed by European immigrants, to which it is now home. Lord Home said that he thought it is barely possible the French might be able to move forward on Algeria if they could achieve a truce -- not demanding that the rebels lay down their arms. The Prime Minister noted that the British had not waited for a truce to negotiate in Cyprus, but had started the negotiations, calling for a truce at the same time. The President said de Gaulle had stressed to

—

9/28/60

FILE NO. Case No. 97-251
Document No. 1

DECLASSIFIED BY THE INTERAGENCY
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL
DATE _____ INITIALS SH

September 28, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
September 27, 1960

Others present: Prime Minister Macmillan
Secretary Herter, Lord Home,
Mr. de Zulueta, General Goodpaster

At 9 AM, after the President and Prime Minister Macmillan had had breakfast alone, the others joined for an hour's discussion. As we came in, the President was telling the Prime Minister that he has had in his mind the possibility of making a quick visit late in November to Great Britain for three or four days. He would plan to pay his respects to the Queen but would hope to have no social program. He would like for Mrs. Eisenhower to accompany him, although the state of health of her mother may prevent this. He would hope some basis might be found for de Gaulle to join for discussions, but is troubled to try to figure out any subjects that he and Macmillan could discuss with General de Gaulle. This would be two or three weeks after the election, and the President thought he could usefully consult with the others on the prospects for continued collaboration under the new administration.



Regarding our questions with the French, Mr. Herter said that his tripartite talks with Lord Home and Couve de Murville had gone quite well. He had been rather tough on Couve, who took this very well. Particularly on specific matters such as Laos, Berlin and similar problems their discussions had been useful.

The Prime Minister told the President that the British and ourselves have now reached agreement on the text of a public statement the Prime Minister might make concerning the basing of Polaris submarines in the United Kingdom. The President agreed with the statement, but suggested that it be modified to say that this is

DECLASSIFIED BY THE INTERAGENCY
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL
DATE _____ INITIALS SH

a continuation and extension of existing procedures for consultation.

The Prime Minister next raised the question of reconnaissance flights that we both conduct of the periphery of the Soviet Union for intelligence purposes. He reported that agreement has been reached on procedures for consultation that have been under discussion, but the real question which remains is just what should we do in this program, what places should we go to, and what operations should we conduct there. On the one hand, we not want to permit the Soviets to drive us away from free use of international waters and international air space, but on the other we must recognize that we are in a weak position when they can shoot our planes down over international waters and there is apparently nothing we can do about it. He suggested that the intelligence people of the two countries should get together on this. The President referred to certain rules he had put into effect after difficulties in the Far East, prescribing that the aircraft should keep a certain distance away from hostile shores at all times, and avoid direct headings toward critical areas within the Soviet bloc such as major cities, naval bases, etc. He said that his discussion of the matter with our people has disclosed that the information gathered is of great importance to our bomber planning. The Prime Minister asked that arrangements be made for Patrick Deane to meet with our people. He said there is also the question of what cover story we should use. He thinks it is foolish to say that we are conducting the flights for electro-magnetic research and thought it better to say frankly that they are for reconnaissance purposes. The President agreed, stating that when we tell what we are doing, we should simply say that we are flying over the open ocean to see what the Soviets are doing that might have a bearing on military preparations -- just as they do with their trawlers. The Prime Minister noted that the difference is that they can shoot our planes down and conceal the facts as to location, etc., whereas if we were to do anything, our people talk so much that no details could be kept secret. (The President commented that the only regret he had regarding the U-2 is that the cover statement which was used did not fit the facts as they developed -- on the assumption that the plane would be destroyed and the pilot probably lost.) The Prime Minister said he does not plan to make a public



statement regarding the reconnaissance flights. If he is asked a question in Parliament -- and he hopes he will be asked a question, preferably by some Communist-leaning member -- he will simply say that he talked to the President about this matter, as he told the House he would, and what has been agreed upon has been satisfactory from a British standpoint.

The President reverted to discussion about de Gaulle. He said de Gaulle has him baffled to know what we could offer that would improve our relations. When he has raised the subjects of Algeria, tripartite organization, and atomic weapons, de Gaulle simply clams up. He has had no answer from de Gaulle to his last long letter, and still is not clear just what de Gaulle wants. Mr. Herter said he thinks de Gaulle's advisors are counseling him not to put his thoughts down on paper. Their reason is that this would make the situation irretrievable since de Gaulle would find it hard to back down. The Prime Minister suggested that perhaps de Gaulle does not have anything specific in mind -- that he just wants to have the form of tripartite Head of Government meetings. The Prime Minister added, as we look into the future, we can see the question of a balance between France and Germany on the Continent reappearing. As between the two, he thinks we should work to keep France the stronger as long as we can possibly do this, and that this should be possible as long as de Gaulle lives. Thereafter, Germany may become the stronger, and this carries with it a host of difficult problems.



x 6
Declassify on:
1/1/2000

Lord Home said that Couve had stressed that France does not want to break up NATO. Their question is simply how far the question of integration should be carried. The Prime Minister picked this up and said that one problem is that words are given a different significance in French than in English. Integration troubles de Gaulle in this way: there are only two forces in France that can stand up to and defeat Communism -- the Church and the Army. He does not feel that the answer is the Church. Therefore he feels he must keep the French Army as an integral unit which could be used against the Communists. It should not be broken up into separate divisions serving in multi-national corps. In other words, integration should take place only at the top. He noted that this is in fact the procedure that is used, and suggested that de Gaulle just does not understand the present system. He said that there is an analogy of this in Britain, not with regard to the Army, about which people care very little, but with regard to the Navy. The resistance to putting the British

fleet under the command of someone from another country was deep-seated and emotional.]

The President said that, in an effort to think of some way of improving the situation, he has talked to some of our people about saying we are ready to let a European take over the command of NATO in Europe. This would have to be a nation with major ground forces, and that requirement reduces the choice to France or Germany. The latter is obviously unthinkable at this time, and the French do not have men of the qualification of Gruenther and Norstad. The Prime Minister said he thought that de Gaulle probably would not want to have the top command because that would denationalize his commander. What he wants is to keep the French Army as a unified structure with a strong general in command, so it could be used against the Communists in France in case of necessity. The President observed that he had recently seen a report that the French have agreed on an air defense command, following the same terms as the British have adopted.



The President said that the great problem regarding France is Algeria. This is "a running sore." His personal idea is that if France would give the Algerians independence, with a good treaty establishing economic relationships, this would constitute the best available solution. He said in his judgment it is no longer possible for any free nation to keep other people in a state of domination. The costs and difficulties are simply too great. The problem in Algeria of course is that there are a million French colons intermingled with Arab population. Lord Home said that the same problem must be foreseen in Rhodesia within a few short years. The Prime Minister added that, although the South Africans have been foolish in their conduct of political affairs, they have the same problem -- that for three hundred years the nation has been colonized and developed by European immigrants, to which it is now home. Lord Home said that he thought it is barely possible the French might be able to move forward on Algeria if they could achieve a truce -- not demanding that the rebels lay down their arms. The Prime Minister noted that the British had not waited for a truce to negotiate in Cyprus, but had started the negotiations, calling for a truce at the same time.] The President said de Gaulle had stressed to

him that it is not possible to conduct free elections while fighting is going on and that he had agreed with de Gaulle on this. Lord Home said that if a truce could be achieved, it might then be possible to have the election internationally observed. In fact, de Gaulle might conceivably be induced to come to the United Nations and ask the United Nations to provide observers for this purpose. Mr. Herter said he had been informed by the Tunisians that Bourguiba had offered to give Bizerte to NATO and associate Tunisia with the French community if the French would give Algeria the same status as Tunisia. He said he understands the French have rejected this.

The Prime Minister then returned to the subject of the UN General Assembly. He said that the mood seems to be changing. There is a feeling that Khrushchev has again overplayed his hand. The President interjected that the luncheon given by Cyrus Eaton for Khrushchev was about as despicable a thing as he knew of. Mr. Herter said that Hammarskjold has told him that it begins to look as though the United Nations had imported from the Congo some of the political chaos that now exists there. The President observed that after Khrushchev, Castro and their associates go home, the United Nations discussions may take a better turn. He said that Nasser had told him he did not want to destroy the UN. He is very insistent, however, that the UN should enforce its 1948 resolution on Palestine, and refuses to honor the resolution on opening the Suez until the 1948 resolution is enforced upon Israel. To a question by the President, the Prime Minister said he thought that some 60,000 to 100,000 of the Arab refugees might be sent back into Israel. Nasser insists that the full one million be sent back. The Prime Minister saw some possibility of perhaps working out a deal with both sides on the basis of return of 200,000, if enough money were provided to satisfy both sides.



Lord Home said that he sees some signs that the neutral or uncommitted countries are beginning to get rather touchy about the course of the General Assembly debate. They are being treated like pawns. The Soviets want to take them into the Communist camp and the West of course is trying to urge them to be free and democratic. There is growing resentment of both of these approaches but at the same time we cannot just

say that we will leave them to find their own salvation. The President said one reason for his suggestion for a regional grouping in Africa was to keep out big-power intervention and to discourage the building up of large armaments on the part of these countries. Such a grouping and limitation of arms would mean there would be neutrality among these countries, and between this grouping and the major powers. He said these leaders have stressed to him that they want "no Communist domination" but think that they will be skillful enough to accept Communist aid and still avoid this. He commented that the African who has impressed him the most so far is President Olympio of Togo -- a modest, quiet-spoken, intelligent man.

The Prime Minister asked how the President found Nehru, commenting that Nehru seemed somewhat "down" and dejected to him. The President said he tried everything with Nehru, but Nehru tended to lapse into long silences. (The President said he was accustomed to his from his meeting with Nehru at Camp David, and was not troubled by it.) Nehru stressed how bad Indian relations with China are becoming over the territorial dispute in the northeastern area. Nehru put little importance on the western disputed area, which is remote and mountainous. Mr. Herter observed that Nehru seemed somewhat confused as to what his own role might best be in the circumstances of this General Assembly. The President said that Nehru had expressed strong support for the UN. Nasser had done the same. Nkrumah had also done this but had gone out forty-five minutes later and made a speech at the UN supporting Khrushchev.



The Prime Minister said that all these countries support the UN as do we. All of us favor peace. The question is how to get peace with justice, when many of these countries are violating the rights of others.

Lord Home raised the question why we are not getting rid of Lumumba at the present time. If he were to come back to power, there would be immediate stress on the Katanga issue, which would get us into all sorts of legalistic difficulties. He stressed that now is the time to get rid of Lumumba. Mr. Herter said that

E **F**

2526
Declassify on: 1/14/2000

Hammaraskjold had told him that the United Nations would interpose no objection to the arrest of Lumumba if it were done by legal means. Mr. Herter recalled that Nasser had been very critical of Hammaraskjold's action in closing the airports and radio stations in the Congo. Problems like this are going to keep coming up in the present circumstances. Hammaraskjold is not undertaking to govern the Congo but has the idea that if he provides law and order, a government can develop. The President said he understands it is very important for another regiment to come into Leopoldville and replace the Ghana troops now there, which are not following the UN loyally. He said that Nehru had said in a very emotional way that Belgium was quite wicked to have left the Congo without having made provision for its government. Mr. Macmillan and Lord Home said Nehru had shown the same feeling to them, displaying great emotion. Lord Home said that, if the Belgians pull out of Ruanda-Urundi, the situation will be even worse.

The President said that Nigeria shows some signs of the possibility of exercising leadership in Africa. It is more populous and more advanced than the other countries.

As the meeting broke up, Lord Home said the First Secretary of the Nigerian delegation had come to him to say that he is finding it impossible to get a place to live in New York because of his color. Mr. Herter said this problem is a terribly difficult one. The President said it should be taken up with Mayor Wagner and Police Commissioner Kennedy at once.



A. J. Goodpaster
 A. J. Goodpaster
 Brigadier General, USA

SECRET

166586

9/30/60
(Handwritten initials)

**THE NAVY AND
SUB-LIMITED CONFLICTS
(U)**

3278228

FINAL REPORT

BSR 1407

RESEARCH SPONSORED BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH
UNDER CONTRACT: NONR 4601(00)
ONR CONTRACT AUTHORITY #274-057/3-8-65

30 SEPTEMBER 1966

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP-3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS**
The information contained in this document will not be disclosed to foreign nations or their representatives.

DDC
JAN 4 1967
E

DDC AVAILABILITY NOTICE
In addition to security requirements, which apply to this document and must be met, each transmittal outside the Department of Defense must have prior approval of the Office of Naval Research (Code 462)

Office of National Security Studies

THE *Bendix* CORPORATION
BENDIX SYSTEMS DIVISION

DECLASSIFIED BY:
DIRECTOR, STRATEGY, PLANS
AND POLICY DIV
(OP-60)

**DDC CONTROL
NO. 70018**

SECRET

SECRET

A. 2. 3

Show of Force Operations

During the past decade the U.S. Navy has been involved in over forty incidents which may be classified as a show of force. Of these, ten cases as well as one involving only the United Kingdom Navy have been selected for analysis:

Jordan, 1957
Laos, 1959
Panama, 1959
Guatemala/Nicaragua, 1960
Kuwait, 1961
Dominican Republic, 1961
Berlin, 1961
Thailand, 1962
Laos, 1963
Haiti, 1963
Cyprus, 1964

In five of these incidents, including the Kuwait operations of the United Kingdom, Naval forces were deployed in response to requests for assistance. In the remaining six, the United States acted unilaterally. It is noted that half of the unilateral operations took place in the Caribbean and that while the primary objective of the deployment in each case was stabilization of the area the naval forces were also responsible for the protection, and if necessary, evacuation of United States and other foreign nationals.

Ten of the incidents were either Communist-inspired or included the participation of Communist-inspired parties or Communist agitators and agents to promote continuing unrest. Only one case clearly involved internal conflict without involvement of outside parties. In all cases the size of the force employed (see Table A-3) appeared to be related to the availability of forces in the area and the seriousness of the perceived situation rather than the original cause of the incident.

A-28

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

SECRET

A. 2. 3. 7

Berlin, 1961

Conflict Origins. The Berlin question dates back to the post war arrangements for four-power control of Berlin and the divided status of Germany. The exposed position of West Berlin inside East Germany and the limited access to this city from West Germany have provided the Soviets with a convenient point to apply pressure on the West. In 1948 the land access routes were closed in an attempt to force a change in status of Berlin. The Western powers maintained their control over West Berlin by keeping access to the city open with a massive airlift effort. In 1958-59 the Soviets again attempted to force a change in the status of Berlin, but the Western resolve and apparent readiness to fight over Berlin led to repeated qualification and eventual disregard of the original Soviet ultimatums. This crisis reached a peak of U.S. Navy involvement in May of 1959 when Sixth Fleet units were alerted and redeployed to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with portions of the strike force aircraft on deck ready for launching in case of war over Berlin.¹⁹

Crisis Development. The Soviet Union repeated the pressure on Berlin in early 1961 with threats to make a separate peace treaty with East Germany. This was coupled to a gradual transfer of control over access to Berlin from the Soviets to the East Germans in order to force Western recognition of East Germany. The Soviets threatened nuclear war if the West should attempt to use force or violate East German territory in their efforts to counter the restrictions imposed. Soviet Premier Khrushchev stated that any attempt at repeating a Berlin airlift would be shot down. Amid the growing tension and nuclear threats, the refugee flow from East Germany into West Berlin increased from 2,600 per week in February to 3,000 per day in August.²⁰ This loss of trained man power aggravated an East German labor crisis and to halt this loss on 12 August 107 of 120 Berlin border crossing points were closed and strict controls exercised by the East Germans at those remaining open. Barbed wire barricades were erected and construction of the Berlin Wall" was begun a few days later. On 15 August three East

¹⁹ Commander in Chief, Northeast Atlantic and Mediterranean, Report of Operations and Conditions of Command, 1 January 1959 to 31 December 1959 (U), 24 February 1960, (SECRET)

²⁰ Commander United States European Command, Annual Historical Report, 1961, (U) (TOP SECRET)

SECRET

SECRET

German Divisions deployed around Berlin. Following these Soviet-East German actions and a message from Berlin Mayor Brandt to President Kennedy stating that he would welcome a demonstrative strengthening of the U.S. garrison in Berlin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an order on 18 August for a reinforced battle group to move into Berlin by 20 August. In the weeks that followed various probes of Soviet reactions were carried out in Berlin to assert Western rights. These probes and counteractions included confrontations of Soviet and United States tanks, harassment of United States aircraft in the air corridors, and street demonstrations by the West Berliners. The incidents continued at a gradually decreasing level throughout the remainder of 1961 and much of 1962. By May 1962 the situation had stabilized sufficiently for the personal representative of President Kennedy, General Lucius Clay, to leave Berlin for the United States.

U. S. Naval Operations. Along with the call up of reservists by President Kennedy, the Navy activated 13 Naval Reserve Training ASW vessels, 6 ASW carrier aircraft squadrons, and 1 land based patrol squadron until 1 August 1962. In November 1961, an anti-submarine task group was deployed to the North-east Atlantic for possible employment in the harassing of Soviet naval operations as a counter to Soviet harassment in Berlin.²¹ This group was relieved in February 1962 by a second group that remained in the area until May 1962. Some operations were carried out in the Baltic Sea with West German Navy units, however, there is no evidence that these operations were directly related to or had any influence on the Berlin crisis. Fleet exercise CHECKMATE carried out by the Sixth Fleet coincided with the Berlin crisis allowing the desired degree of readiness to be achieved without changes in deployment.

Outcome. Berlin continues to be an issue in Soviet-United States relations. Although the threatened separate Soviet-East German peace treaty has not yet become a reality, the continued special status of Berlin and the divided Germany remain as the primary impediments to the achievement of Soviet-United States accord in Europe.

²¹ Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Forces, Europe, Annual Historical Report, Fiscal Year 1962 (U), 13 August 1962, (SECRET)

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FDK

Memorandum of Conversation

The White House
DATE: October 3, 1960
11:45 a.m. - 1:15

SUBJECT: NATO MRBM Force

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
General Goodpaster

Mr. Merchant,
Under Secretary for
Political Affairs
Mr. Kohler, Asst Secy

Mr. Gates, Secy of Defense
Mr. Douglas, Deputy Secy
Mr. Irwin, Assistant Secy

COPIES TO:

S/S
EUR - Mr. Kohler
S/P - Mr. Smith
RA - Mr. Fessenden
H - Mr. Macomber
G - Mr. Hare

U/MSC - Mr. Bell
Defense - Secretary Gates
Mr. Irwin
White House - General Goodpaster
USRO - Ambassador Burgess



By agreement with Mr. Merchant, Mr. Gates opened the presentation to the President of the proposals for the establishment of a NATO MRBM Force. He pointed out that it was basically a weapons modernization proposal. The project did not involve a revision of existing NATO strategic doctrine though this was also being considered apart from the proposal. A fundamental question was raised by the proposal with respect to the US contribution of five Polaris submarines, specifically, whether these should be new submarines beyond the existing procurement program or just considered as being on loan from the US program with some expectation of withdrawal.

The President commented that the proposal, as respects the US contribution, in a sense would not be fundamentally different than the existing situation as respects US contributions of troops to Europe and other national contributions. Basically the Polaris subs were mobile missile bases.

Mr. Merchant then presented the multinational features embodied in the plan and explained their purposes as being three-fold: first, to provide reassurance to our European allies who were beginning to have doubts, in the era of ICBM's, as to the dependability from their point

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Authority MR 77-161 #3

By bc NLE Date 12/15/78

Staff Secy / Det TAM/S / NATO (6) [1959-1960]

point of view of a purely US controlled deterrent; second, to prevent the development of independent national nuclear capabilities; and, third, to provide a framework within which we might eventually consider the question of nuclear sharing. He pointed out that the plan would have two phases: first, the initial US contribution and, secondly, the NATO contribution, presumably by the procurement of US Polaris missiles. Mr. Merchant then presented to the President the coordinated paper developed by State and Defense.

The President read the proposal through. He commented that it was difficult to see how SACEUR was so interested in targeting so far back from the front lines. Mr. Gates said that basically General Norstad was seeking replacement for his existing air strike force. Norstad needed a missile with a range of 300-1500 miles and had established a requirement for 300 such missiles by 1965 with an initial increment of 80 in 1963. He noted that Polaris is really not suitable for mobile land-based launchers but is the only MRBM available in the time-frame. Mr. Irwin pointed out that on the Soviet side their short range missiles could take out the bases now used by the strike aircraft.

The President then referred to his conversation with Mr. Robert Bowie. He had listened for a long time to Mr. Bowie and had been thinking a great deal about the problem. He agreed with the proposal, and with Mr. Gates' remarks about Polaris being too big really to be an acceptable mobile land-based missile. He really believed that if Polaris and ICBM missiles were properly coordinated no change would be required in NATO. There ensued some discussion about targeting, and about the attitudes and apprehensions of the European members of NATO. The President commented that the obligation for the US to act under the NATO provisions specifying that an attack on one was an attack on all was clear and that there was no doubt it would be observed by the US. However he recognized that there was a psychological benefit to more specifically reassuring arrangements. He realized and agreed that the five Polaris submarines should be separate from our own established program for Polaris procurement. Secretary Gates then cited the size of the present US program, with nineteen submarines now on order and plans that in fiscal year 1962 five more should be programmed plus five authorizations for lead items. The President said he had understood the whole program was contemplated for about 40 submarines and he thought we should go ahead now with authorizations for up to 40. Secretary Douglas said there was no agreement as yet among the services as between the figures of 25 and 45, with the relation of the Polaris program and other

other missiles such as the Pershing still to be decided. Secretary Gates stressed that the immediate problem was that of the financing in the FY 1962 budget which was now being developed. In this connection he said he feared there would be a lot of criticism from Congress about turning over control of these submarines to NATO. The President agreed there might be some difficulties and cited the possibility that there would be some Congressional demand for a stipulation that SACEUR must continue to be an American.

After reflecting for a bit, the President said that he thought by and large the proposal was a good idea. It might help to bridge the differences with de Gaulle if properly handled. Perhaps it would also have a good effect on the Dutch whom the President had always favored as being, along with the British, our staunchest allies. Parenthetically he commented he was also beginning to think that we ought to give the Dutch landing rights on the West Coast for KLM as he would like to help the Dutch. Commenting on this remark, Mr. Merchant pointed out that the submarine in question for the Dutch was not a Polaris sub but one of the Nautilus type, the same in fact in which the French were also interested as well as the Italians. He added that in any event there would be danger in national ownership of Polaris submarines under this program. Mr. Irwin explained further that the contemplated European contribution to the program would not necessarily be in the form of missiles in Polaris submarines but that their contribution might well be placed on coastal vessels instead -- a much cheaper method -- or other seaborne craft. The five US Polaris submarines would provide a strong base of greater relative invulnerability. This led the President to ask how vulnerable surface vessels would be, to which Secretary Gates replied that they would be vulnerable to air and submarine attack but because of their mobility not to missile attack. He explained further that the European missiles could be placed on coastal ships for a cost of approximately \$225 million as against a cost of about \$750 million in Polaris submarines.

The President then repeated that he favored the theory of the proposal. He favored the establishment of a multilateral force. He felt it would help pull NATO together and raise the morale of the NATO members. He foresaw that there would be considerable difficulties involving the question of the joint Atomic Energy Committee and the question of financing. In this latter connection he said he assumed that the European missiles would be bought from the United States and, after Secretary Gates had confirmed this, commented that this would please the Treasury in connection with the balance of payments problem.

At

At this point Secretary Gates pointed out that the most immediate problems were the need to be able to talk about the proposal with Spaak, who had already arrived here, and to make decisions in the near future as to the FY 1962 Defense budget.

Mr. Merchant then brought up the specific issue disagreed between Defense and State as respects the proposed requirement of mixed manning, summarizing the opposing positions. The President commented that he thought SACEUR would have to establish a multinational school in this connection to train the crews and commented this would be quite a problem. Mr. Merchant replied that the State Department did not think it would be too difficult. He explained that our concept would not be of multinational crews each representing all countries of NATO but rather of selected mixing of crews. The President said this would raise the problem of leadership and discipline. At present this had to be done by the separate laws and regulations by sovereign governments. At sea the captain must really be in charge and have the loyalty and obedience of the crew. He thought we might need a treaty between the member governments if we wanted to establish a NATO discipline.

Secretary Gates then set forth the Defense views, expressing strong opposition to the requirement for multinational manning. This was a very complicated and intricate problem involving questions of national psychology, religious differences and the like. Of course it would be possible to have a few riders of various nationalities on the submarines. On the whole, the Pentagon thought that NATO command and control was sufficient to establish the multilateral nature of the operation, though he said it was true that even the US Polaris subs were overloaded by about 20% for training purposes and that this might be possible with other nationalities.

The President wondered whether if the law were amended to permit the assignment of these submarines to SACEUR it might not in practice be necessary that each submarine have a national crew, so that while they operated under common command one unit, for example, would be Dutch, another German, etc.

Mr. Merchant again repeated that the State Department view did not foresee that each ship be a complete cross section of NATO but rather the selected mixing of relatively compatible nationalities in each crew. In any event he said we should not foreclose the possibility of such mixed manning.

The President

The President turned to the question of ownership. He said that he understood that the title of the five initial submarines would stay vested in the United States. Mr. Gates confirmed this understanding.

Mr. Merchant then returned to the subject of manning and said that the State Department was willing to accept the formulation of Defense to the effect that this manning should be mixed to the extent considered feasible by SACEUR.

The President then repeated that he was in favor of the plan. He commented that we must get it understood in the Congress that we must have faith and confidence between allies if we wished our alliances to work. He said that he would like to see the necessary studies go ahead to implement the project. He referred to his meeting with Spaak the next morning (i.e. breakfast on October 4) but thought he would not discuss this MRBM proposal at this stage. Both Mr. Gates and Mr. Merchant cited the conversations Spaak had already had with Norstad on this general subject and the importance of being able to say something to him during his current visit. The President then agreed that the MRBM proposal could be discussed on a confidential basis with Spaak.

Secretaries Gates and Douglas then turned to the question of the Defense budgetary problems connected with the project and considerable discussion then ensued between them and the President as to whether all five submarines should be added to the FY 1962 budget or whether authorization should simply be sought, whether the procurement was funded in full and related matters. General Goodpaster pointed out in this connection that while authority for the full funding of the Polaris programs had been sought in the past, expenditure actually was stretched out. Summarizing this phase of the discussion the President said that we should go to Congress and show what the full plan involves. It was not sufficient to talk only in terms of the initial US contribution but we must disclose the eventual program including the NATO multilateral concept. We must be completely honest on the subject. He thought we should seek authorizing legislation probably as a separate package.

Mr. Merchant then returned to the matter of State-Defense differences and read the revised formula relating to multilateral ownership, financing, control and manning. Indicating his assent, the President commented that we must explain what is involved in the question of ownership including the matter of who gets the ships

at

SECRET

-6-

at the end of the treaty period. Mr. Merchant agreed that this question should be spelled out clearly. Some inconclusive discussion then ensued as respects the difference between the concepts embodied in the word ownership and those embodied in the word financing. In this connection Mr. Merchant emphasized that multilateral ownership was essential to the concept of a really integrated NATO force as distinct from national ownership.

In conclusion the President directed that the planning should go ahead in connection with the project on an urgent basis. It was important that the case be got ready for the Congress and presented. In the second stage at least he felt we were bound to have to have an amendment of the law. As to financing, he suggested that Defense could perhaps budget for two additional Polaris submarines in FY 1962.

* * * * *

Following the meeting Messrs. Gates, Irwin, Goodpaster, Merchant and Kohler met in General Goodpaster's office to iron out remaining differences in the wording of the paper. (See Mr. Merchant's letter to Mr. Irwin for final text.)

SECRET

File w 10/3/60

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 79-107 #6

~~SECRET~~

By bc NLE Date 12/3/79

NATO MRBM'S

1. The U. S. suggests formation of a NATO MRBM Force under SACEUR. The targeting should be planned by SACEUR in coordination with the other retaliatory forces of the Alliance in order to attain the greatest deterrence for the Alliance as a whole.

2. As a modification of the proposal made by the U. S. on April 1st, the U. S. offers to commit to SACEUR, as an interim NATO MRBM Force, five POLARIS submarines to be deployed prior to the end of calendar year 1963. The U. S. would consider the five POLARIS submarines as a permanent contribution to the NATO MRBM Force described in paragraph 4 below and, in the event of its establishment, would undertake not to withdraw them from NATO assignment without NAC consent during the life of the Treaty.



- 3. This interim MRBM Force would be available for use:
 - a. By order of SACEUR in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on the NATO area; or
 - b. In other contingencies, in accordance with existing procedures or any other procedure approved by NAC; or
 - c. By order of the U. S. in self-defense.*

The U. S. would undertake to provide such advance authority as may be needed to use the missiles in conformity with a or b above.

4.

* Defense would delete

SECRET

Start Sec 1, 1 line 7 & M / 5 / NATO (6) [1959-1960]

~~SECRET~~

-2-

4. In making this offer, the U. S. expects that other NATO governments will want to join in the creation of a NATO MRBM Force and that they will therefore contribute approximately 100 additional MRBM's in order to help meet SACEUR's MRBM requirements through 1964. To this end, the U. S. offers to facilitate development by NATO of a permanent multilateral MRBM Force if other NATO governments, in conjunction with SACEUR, adopt a plan meeting the following conditions:

a) [that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral ownership and control, and with a feasible system of mixed manning designed to guard against the possibility of the force being broken down or diverted into national forces.]*

[that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral financing and control, and with mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.]**

b) that a suitable formula to govern decisions on use be developed which would maximize its effectiveness [as a deterrent]*** and establish its multilateral character. The most appropriate provision for decision on use of such a multilateral force would appear to be:

- (1) by order of SACEUR in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on the NATO area; or

* State prefers
** Defense prefers
*** Defense would delete

(11)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-3-

(ii) in other contingencies, [by decision of the NAC]* [in accordance with existing procedures]** or any other procedure approved by the NAC.

e) that means be worked out to safeguard the security of the classified design data for the weapons and delivery systems.

5. If a plan as indicated under paragraph 4 above is developed which is acceptable to the NAC, the U. S. would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement of POLARIS missiles together with the required equipment and vehicles for deployment. In the U. S. view, it would seem desirable, in terms of maximum deployment security, that these initial POLARIS missiles be deployed at sea.

6. Decisions on the question of additional requirements for the NATO MRBM Force and how such requirements should be met should be considered subsequently, taking into account the prospect for new weapons and conclusions reached in the process of NATO long-term planning.

7. The U. S. believes that NATO should undertake to parallel these advances with additional vigorous measures to strengthen its other forces which are equally essential for

* State prefers

** Defense prefers

deterrence

SECRET

SECRET

-4 -

deterrence in accordance with NATO military plans. [It is of great importance for NATO to maintain a flexibility of response. Progress in the MRBM system should not be permitted at the sacrifice of progress in building NATO's other forces.]*

8. The U. S. Executive Branch undertakes to attempt to obtain legislation if necessary to implement the above proposal.



* Defense would delete

SECRET

EUR:FDKohler:mt

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

01/14/60
21061

2101

Memorandum of Conversation

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
Approved in U 10/7/60
Approved in U 10/8/60
Approved in White House 10/17/60

DATE: October 4, 1960
8:00 - 9:15 a.m.



SUBJECT: NATO Atomic Force

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Paul Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO
Mr. Dillon, Acting Secretary
Mr. Marchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
COPIES TO: Mr. Burgess, Ambassador, USRO
Mr. Glenn, Interpreter

S/P - Mr. Smith
S/P - Mr. Laro
EUR - Mr. Kohler
USRO - Ambassador Burgess
H - Mr. Danaher
Department of Defense - Secretary also Mr. Irwin
White House - Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster

After some general discussion during the breakfast, which touched upon NATO affairs and the current Communist harassment of West Berlin, Mr. Dillon raised the subject of the proposed NATO MRBM Force by reporting on the discussion of the subject which he had had with Mr. Spaak yesterday afternoon.

The President said he had been mulling this question over at length. It was clear that the establishment of such a NATO force on the basis of national contributions in ships, men, and materiel would not be satisfactory. In fact he thought the best way would be through the establishment of a kind of a "Foreign Legion" under exclusive NATO control and financed by contributions of the member states. This was the only manner to do away with nationalism and to prevent the possibility of the withdrawal by any nation of its own units. Only a force loyal exclusively to NATO would be safe from such a danger. Of course certain difficulties existed before a full integration could be obtained, due among other things to the lengthy training necessary.

Ambassador Burgess added that the question of languages would also present a difficulty but that this did not appear insurmountable.

Mr. Spaak

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 3A (b)

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
INFORMATION COPY

MR 85-351 #1

NSC letter 11/28/60
a(3)(5)(7)

BY JAS DATE 4/22/87

NLE DATE 1/22/87

CP 289 416, 207053, st-11 Geny/STM/5/NATO (6)
(1459-7460)

10127 1891

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-2-

that if a proposal to create a NATO nuclear strike force were made, it could well take the form of the creation of a foreign legion type force. Difficulties might be expected, however, on the side of General de Gaulle. It was extremely important to arrive at the result desired and a means should be found to persuade General de Gaulle to participate in the project. If this could not be done, the big question would arise as to whether or not to proceed without France.

The President said that proceeding without France might well lead, step by step, to a withdrawal of France from the alliance.

reiterated that a procedure should be found to obtain French participation. Such participation seemed possible, because France would find herself completely alone if she did not participate in the proposal. One might wonder if the best way might not be a letter from the President to General de Gaulle. At the same time Chancellor Adenauer might be approached and asked to help convince General de Gaulle. The present moment might be opportune, because General de Gaulle had aroused great alarm by his hints that the United States could withdraw from Europe. A proposal to create an integrated nuclear strike force, made at this moment, would reassure the European partners of NATO and receive practically unanimous support.

The President agreed that such an approach should be made. However, it would also be necessary to consult the leaders of the five Congressional committees which would be involved.

The President explained at this point that this was necessary because Congress had reserved for itself, as far back as 1947, certain prerogatives which should belong in the executive branch. While the President thinks that this is not constitutional, the position has not really been challenged because of concern about appropriations. Congressional concurrence in the idea would therefore be necessary.

Mr. Dillon suggested that Congressional leaders should be contacted before any approach is made abroad. Otherwise there is a danger of leaks and rumors reaching Congress creating misunderstandings and opposition due to an inadequate presentation of the question. The President agreed with this point of view.

Mr. Merchant

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

INFORMATION COPY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

-3-

Mr. Merchant reverted to the President's remark that France might withdraw from NATO. While he agreed that France might not accept the MRBM proposal, at least initially, he doubted that de Gaulle would actually withdraw from the Alliance. He cited, in this connection, the modest progress made recently as respects French cooperation in the fields of air defense and atomic stockpile arrangements in Germany and the awkwardness of the French position if they isolated themselves completely from their Western European neighbors.

..... another difficulty existed. If the United States turned nuclear weapons over to NATO, who would have the authority to decide on their use?



..... there were two types of circumstances under which NATO might want to use its atomic strike forces.

The President said that at the present moment the two opponents are providing their forces with such a variety of atomic weapons that any conflict in Europe which would not involve their use is hardly conceivable, the more so in that European countries are rather small in size and therefore any penetration into their territories would be sufficiently serious to mean an all-out war.

..... Thus there seems to be no possibility whatsoever of any non-atomic conflict in Europe, though the possibility of a more limited type of conflict could be considered in Middle East countries, such as Greece, Turkey, or Iran.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET
INFORMATION COPY

Ambassador

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Ambassador Burgess noted that Iran is not within NATO even though connections between NATO and CENTO do exist. He thought also that the Soviet Union understands that an attack on Turkey would be as serious an undertaking as an attack in Europe.

The President noted that in any case a non-nuclear war in Europe is so improbable as to make the question of who is to decide the use of nuclear weapons somewhat academic. At the present moment the Supreme Commander in Europe is an American and a decision, therefore, could be made under the present law. general agreement regarding the improbability of large scale non-nuclear war in Europe.

Ambassador Burgess commented that even now SACEUR is organized somewhat along the lines of a foreign legion because of the presence on the staff of officers of many nationalities. It is entirely possible that the need for decision might arise at a time when the Supreme Commander would be unable to act, in which event the responsibility would fall on his deputy, a non-American.

Discussing the possibility that Congress might seek to stipulate that the post of Supreme Allied Commander be reserved to an American as a condition for providing nuclear weapons, the President said such a condition could not be justified and should not be contemplated.

..... on the enormous political and psychological importance of the proposal under discussion, which would signify closer and more binding ties between the United States and Europe than ever before.


The President spoke of his desire that a start be made promptly, commenting on the many problems which would have to be solved and the difficulties which would have to be surmounted. He agreed with

..... the chances of convincing the French appear to be enhanced by the fact that General de Gaulle's plan to create a French nuclear strike force is meeting considerable opposition in the French parliament. A proposal such as the one under discussion would undoubtedly receive strong support from the French public opinion and increase the opposition in France against an independent nuclear force and thus pressure on de Gaulle.

The President

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED



..... the question of the attitude of the standing group and suggested that the American representative in the group be instructed to support the Polaris system without too many mentions of competing weapons.

The President mentioned that Polaris was unquestionably the choice for a submarine based weapon, but that cheaper and equally powerful weapons such as the Pershing were preferable for land use, the difference residing in the complexity of the guidance system needed for a weapon fired from a mobile launcher away from all landmarks, as against a launcher with known coordinates.

* * * * *

~~SECRET~~
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

INFORMATION COPY

Xp3: Dke says SAECVA will decide

EUR:FDKohler:mt

(Drafting Office and Officer)

FDK

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 4, 1960
8:00 - 9:15 a.m.

SUBJECT: NATO Atomic Force

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Paul Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO
Mr. Dillon, Acting Secretary
Mr. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
COPIES TO: Mr. Burgess, Ambassador, USRO
Mr. Glenn, Interpreter

S/S
S/P - Mr. Smith
G - Mr. Hare
EUR - Mr. Kohler
USRO - Ambassador Burgess
H - Mr. Macomber
Department of Defense - Secretary Gates
Mr. Irwin
White House - Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster

After some general discussion during the breakfast, which touched upon NATO affairs and the current Communist harassment of West Berlin, Mr. Dillon raised the subject of the proposed NATO MRBM Force by reporting on the discussion of the subject which he had had with Mr. Spaak yesterday afternoon.

The President said he had been mulling this question over at length. It was clear that the establishment of such a NATO force on the basis of national contributions in ships, men, and materiel would not be satisfactory. In fact he thought the best way would be through the establishment of a kind of a "Foreign Legion" under exclusive NATO control and financed by contributions of the member states. This was the only manner to do away with nationalism and to prevent the possibility of the withdrawal by any nation of its own units. Only a force loyal exclusively to NATO would be safe from such a danger. Of course certain difficulties existed before a full integration could be obtained, due among other things to the lengthy training necessary.

Ambassador Burgess added that the question of languages would also present a difficulty but that this did not appear insurmountable.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Mr. Spaak

Authority MR 79-107 #5

By SK NLS Date 12/3/79

Staff Secy (Int T+M/S/NATO (6) E(1959-1960)
pp 1, 3, 4 only

Mr. Merchant reverted to the President's remark that France might withdraw from NATO. While he agreed that France might not accept the MRBM proposal, at least initially, he doubted that de Gaulle would actually withdraw from the Alliance. He cited, in this connection, the modest progress made recently as respects French cooperation in the fields of air defense and atomic stockpile arrangements in Germany and the awkwardness of the French position if they isolated themselves completely from their Western European neighbors.

Mr. Spaak then mentioned that another difficulty existed. If the United States turned nuclear weapons over to NATO, who would have the authority to decide on their use?

*g w
p r s*
The President said that such authority should be vested in NATO and in particular in the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. If we were to be attacked with nuclear weapons a counter attack would be automatic. The great advantage of a Polaris system over land-based means of delivery, he pointed out, is the fact that submarines are more or less invulnerable to surprise attack, and therefore there is no necessity of getting the counter attacking missiles up into the air immediately. A certain amount of time is thus gained for consultation and reflection.

Mr. Spaak said that there were two types of circumstances under which NATO might want to use its atomic strike forces.

g
The first one is a nuclear attack against NATO; in this case a reply would be automatic and the question of authority to launch would hardly arise. The second one would be that of a non-nuclear attack against NATO by the conventional forces of the enemy. Who would decide whether or not nuclear weapons are to be used in such a case?

g
The President said that at the present moment the two opponents are providing their forces with such a variety of atomic weapons that any conflict in Europe which would not involve their use is hardly conceivable, the more so in that European countries are rather small in size and therefore any penetration into their territories would be sufficiently serious to mean an all-out war. (The only exception would perhaps be some sort of an infiltration into Berlin.) Thus there seems to be no possibility whatsoever of any non-atomic conflict in Europe, though the possibility of a more limited type of conflict could be considered in Middle East countries, such as Greece, Turkey, or Iran.

SECRET

-4-

Ambassador Burgess noted that Iran is not within NATO even though connections between NATO and CENTO do exist. He thought also that the Soviet Union understands that an attack on Turkey would be as serious an undertaking as an attack in Europe.

The President noted that in any case a non-nuclear war in Europe is so improbable as to make the question of who is to decide the use of nuclear weapons somewhat academic. At the present moment the Supreme Commander in Europe is an American and a decision, therefore, could be made under the present law. Mr. Spaak indicated general agreement regarding the improbability of large scale non-nuclear war in Europe.

Ambassador Burgess commented that even now SACEUR is organized somewhat along the lines of a foreign legion because of the presence on the staff of officers of many nationalities. It is entirely possible that the need for decision might arise at a time when the Supreme Commander would be unable to act, in which event the responsibility would fall on his deputy, a non-American.

Discussing the possibility that Congress might seek to stipulate that the post of Supreme Allied Commander be reserved to an American as a condition for providing nuclear weapons, the President said such a condition could not be justified and should not be contemplated.

Mr. Spaak insisted on the enormous political and psychological importance of the proposal under discussion, which would signify closer and more binding ties between the United States and Europe than ever before.

The President spoke of his desire that a start be made promptly, commenting on the many problems which would have to be solved and the difficulties which would have to be surmounted. (He agreed with Mr. Spaak's suggestion as to the desirability of asking Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer to use their influence on General de Gaulle.)

Mr. Spaak said that the chances of convincing the French appear to be enhanced by the fact that General de Gaulle's plan to create a French nuclear strike force is meeting considerable opposition in the French parliament. A proposal such as the one under discussion would undoubtedly receive strong support from the French public opinion and increase the opposition in France against an independent nuclear force and thus pressure on de Gaulle.

The President

SECRET

EUR:FDKohler:mt

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10/17/60
21061

2101

Memorandum of Conversation

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
Approved in U 10/7/60
Approved in U 10/8/60
Approved in White House 10/12/60

DATE: October 4, 1960
8:00 - 9:15 a.m.



SUBJECT: NATO Atomic Force

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Paul Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO
Mr. Dillon, Acting Secretary
Mr. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
COPIES TO: Mr. Burgess, Ambassador, USRO
Mr. Glenn, Interpreter

Mr. Harbo
Department of Defense - Secretary
Mr. Irwin
Mr. House - Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster
USRO - Ambassador Burgess

After some general discussion during the breakfast, which touched upon NATO affairs and the current Communist harassment of West Berlin, Mr. Dillon raised the subject of the proposed NATO MRBM Force by reporting on the discussion of the subject which he had had with Mr. Spaak yesterday afternoon.

The President said he had been mulling this question over at length. It was clear that the establishment of such a NATO force on the basis of national contributions in ships, men, and materiel would not be satisfactory. In fact he thought the best way would be through the establishment of a kind of a "Foreign Legion" under exclusive NATO control and financed by contributions of the member states. This was the only manner to do away with nationalism and to prevent the possibility of the withdrawal by any nation of its own units. Only a force loyal exclusively to NATO would be safe from such a danger. Of course certain difficulties existed before a full integration could be obtained, due among other things to the lengthy training necessary.

Ambassador Burgess added that the question of languages would also present a difficulty but that this did not appear insurmountable.

Mr. Spaak

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 34 (b)

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
INFORMATION COPY

MR 85-351 #1

NSC letter a(3)(5)(7) 11/28/82

BY JKO DATE 1/22/87

FILE DATE 1/22/87

attn Genm/STM/5/NATO(6) [1459-1460]

10012101 = Venw - FRNS 58-60, 7(1): 698 A (1983) 1 (693)

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

that if a proposal to create a NATO nuclear strike force were made, it could well take the form of the creation of a foreign legion type force. Difficulties might be expected, however, on the side of General de Gaulle. It was extremely important to arrive at the result desired and a means should be found to persuade General de Gaulle to participate in the project. If this could not be done, the big question would arise as to whether or not to proceed without France.

The President said that proceeding without France might well lead, step by step, to a withdrawal of France from the alliance.

reiterated that a procedure should be found to obtain French participation. Such participation seemed possible, because France would find herself completely alone if she did not participate in the proposal. One might wonder if the best way might not be a letter from the President to General de Gaulle. At the same time Chancellor Adenauer might be approached and asked to help convince General de Gaulle. The present moment might be opportune, because General de Gaulle had aroused great alarm by his hints that the United States could withdraw from Europe. A proposal to create an integrated nuclear strike force, made at this moment, would reassure the European partners of NATO and receive practically unanimous support.

The President agreed that such an approach should be made. However, it would also be necessary to consult the leaders of the five Congressional committees which would be involved.

The President explained at this point that this was necessary because Congress had reserved for itself, as far back as 1947, certain prerogatives which should belong in the executive branch. While the President thinks that this is not constitutional, the position has not really been challenged because of concern about appropriations. Congressional concurrence in the idea would therefore be necessary.

Mr. Dillon suggested that Congressional leaders should be contacted before any approach is made abroad. Otherwise there is a danger of leaks and rumors reaching Congress creating misunderstandings and opposition due to an inadequate presentation of the question. The President agreed with this point of view.

Mr. Merchant

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

INFORMATION COPY

Mr. Merchant reverted to the President's remark that France might withdraw from NATO. While he agreed that France might not accept the MRBM proposal, at least initially, he doubted that de Gaulle would actually withdraw from the Alliance. He cited, in this connection, the modest progress made recently as respects French cooperation in the fields of air defense and atomic stockpile arrangements in Germany and the awkwardness of the French position if they isolated themselves completely from their Western European neighbors.

..... another difficulty existed. If the United States turned nuclear weapons over to NATO, who would have the authority to decide on their use?



..... there were two types of circumstances under which NATO might want to use its atomic strike forces.

The President said that at the present moment the two opponents are providing their forces with such a variety of atomic weapons that any conflict in Europe which would not involve their use is hardly conceivable, the more so in that European countries are rather small in size and therefore any penetration into their territories would be sufficiently serious to mean an all-out war. Thus there seems to be no possibility whatsoever of any non-atomic conflict in Europe, though the possibility of a more limited type of conflict could be considered in Middle East countries, such as Greece, Turkey, or Iran.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

Ambassador Burgess noted that Iran is not within NATO even though connections between NATO and CENTO do exist. He thought also that the Soviet Union understands that an attack on Turkey would be as serious an undertaking as an attack in Europe.

The President noted that in any case a non-nuclear war in Europe is so improbable as to make the question of who is to decide the use of nuclear weapons somewhat academic. At the present moment the Supreme Commander in Europe is an American and a decision, therefore, could be made under the present law. general agreement regarding the improbability of large scale non-nuclear war in Europe.

Ambassador Burgess commented that even now SACEUR is organized somewhat along the lines of a foreign legion because of the presence on the staff of officers of many nationalities. It is entirely possible that the need for decision might arise at a time when the Supreme Commander would be unable to act, in which event the responsibility would fall on his deputy, a non-American.

Discussing the possibility that Congress might seek to stipulate that the post of Supreme Allied Commander be reserved to an American as a condition for providing nuclear weapons, the President said such a condition could not be justified and should not be contemplated.


..... on the enormous political and psychological importance of the proposal under discussion, which would signify closer and more binding ties between the United States and Europe than ever before.

The President spoke of his desire that a start be made promptly, commenting on the many problems which would have to be solved and the difficulties which would have to be surmounted. He agreed with

..... the chances of convincing the French appear to be enhanced by the fact that General de Gaulle's plan to create a French nuclear strike force is meeting considerable opposition in the French parliament. A proposal such as the one under discussion would undoubtedly receive strong support from the French public opinion and increase the opposition in France against an independent nuclear force and thus pressure on de Gaulle.

The President

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



..... the question of the attitude of the standing group and suggested that the American representative in the group be instructed to support the Polaris system without too many mentions of competing weapons.

The President mentioned that Polaris was unquestionably the choice for a submarine based weapon, but that cheaper and equally powerful weapons such as the Pershing were preferable for land use, the difference residing in the complexity of the guidance system needed for a weapon fired from a mobile launcher away from all landmarks, as against a launcher with known coordinates.

* * * * *

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 4, 1960
8:00 - 9:15 a.m.

SUBJECT: NATO Atomic Force

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Paul Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO
Mr. Dillon, Acting Secretary
Mr. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO: Mr. Burgess, Ambassador, USRO
Mr. Glenn, Interpreter

S/S	H - Mr. Macomber
S/P - Mr. Smith	Department of Defense - Secretary Gates
G - Mr. Hare	Mr. Irwin
EUR - Mr. Kohler	White House - Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster
USRO - Ambassador Burgess	

After some general discussion during the breakfast, which touched upon NATO affairs and the current Communist harassment of West Berlin, Mr. Dillon raised the subject of the proposed NATO MRBM Force by reporting on the discussion of the subject which he had had with Mr. Spaak yesterday afternoon.

The President said he had been mulling this question over at length. It was clear that the establishment of such a NATO force on the basis of national contributions in ships, men, and materiel would not be satisfactory. In fact he thought the best way would be through the establishment of a kind of a "Foreign Legion" under exclusive NATO control and financed by contributions of the member states. This was the only manner to do away with nationalism and to prevent the possibility of the withdrawal by any nation of its own units. Only a force loyal exclusively to NATO would be safe from such a danger. Of course certain difficulties existed before a full integration could be obtained, due among other things to the lengthy training necessary.

Ambassador Burgess added that the question of languages would also present a difficulty but that this did not appear insurmountable.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Mr. Spaak

Authority MR 79-107 #5

By bc NLS Date 12/3/79

Staff Secy (Int 7 + M/S / NATO (6) [1959-1960])
pp 1, 3, 4 only

Mr. Merchant reverted to the President's remark that France might withdraw from NATO. While he agreed that France might not accept the MRBM proposal, at least initially, he doubted that de Gaulle would actually withdraw from the Alliance. He cited, in this connection, the modest progress made recently as respects French cooperation in the fields of air defense and atomic stockpile arrangements in Germany and the awkwardness of the French position if they isolated themselves completely from their Western European neighbors.

Mr. Spaak then mentioned that another difficulty existed. If the United States turned nuclear weapons over to NATO, who would have the authority to decide on their use?

The President said that such authority should be vested in NATO and in particular in the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. If we were to be attacked with nuclear weapons a counter attack would be automatic. The great advantage of a Polaris system over land-based means of delivery, he pointed out, is the fact that submarines are more or less invulnerable to surprise attack, and therefore there is no necessity of getting the counter attacking missiles up into the air immediately. A certain amount of time is thus gained for consultation and reflection.

Mr. Spaak said that there were two types of circumstances under which NATO might want to use its atomic strike forces.

The first one is a nuclear attack against NATO; in this case a reply would be automatic and the question of authority to launch would hardly arise. The second one would be that of a non-nuclear attack against NATO by the conventional forces of the enemy. Who would decide whether or not nuclear weapons are to be used in such a case?

The President said that at the present moment the two opponents are providing their forces with such a variety of atomic weapons that any conflict in Europe which would not involve their use is hardly conceivable, the more so in that European countries are rather small in size and therefore any penetration into their territories would be sufficiently serious to mean an all-out war. (The only exception would perhaps be some sort of an infiltration into Berlin.) Thus there seems to be no possibility whatsoever of any non-atomic conflict in Europe, though the possibility of a more limited type of conflict could be considered in Middle East countries, such as Greece, Turkey, or Iran.

SECRET

-4-

Ambassador Burgess noted that Iran is not within NATO even though connections between NATO and CENTO do exist. He thought also that the Soviet Union understands that an attack on Turkey would be as serious an undertaking as an attack in Europe.

The President noted that in any case a non-nuclear war in Europe is so improbable as to make the question of who is to decide the use of nuclear weapons somewhat academic. At the present moment the Supreme Commander in Europe is an American and a decision, therefore, could be made under the present law. Mr. Spaak indicated general agreement regarding the improbability of large scale non-nuclear war in Europe.

Ambassador Burgess commented that even now SACEUR is organized somewhat along the lines of a foreign legion because of the presence on the staff of officers of many nationalities. It is entirely possible that the need for decision might arise at a time when the Supreme Commander would be unable to act, in which event the responsibility would fall on his deputy, a non-American.

Discussing the possibility that Congress might seek to stipulate that the post of Supreme Allied Commander be reserved to an American as a condition for providing nuclear weapons, the President said such a condition could not be justified and should not be contemplated.

Mr. Spaak insisted on the enormous political and psychological importance of the proposal under discussion, which would signify closer and more binding ties between the United States and Europe than ever before.

The President spoke of his desire that a start be made promptly, commenting on the many problems which would have to be solved and the difficulties which would have to be surmounted. (He agreed with Mr. Spaak's suggestion as to the desirability of asking Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor Adenauer to use their influence on General de Gaulle.)

Mr. Spaak said that the chances of convincing the French appear to be enhanced by the fact that General de Gaulle's plan to create a French nuclear strike force is meeting considerable opposition in the French parliament. A proposal such as the one under discussion would undoubtedly receive strong support from the French public opinion and increase the opposition in France against an independent nuclear force and thus pressure on de Gaulle.

The President

SECRET

3086

DECLASSIFIED

86-63

10/4/62 (m)

4 October 1950



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Committee Study on:
"United States and Allied Capabilities
for Limited Military Operations to
1 July 1952"

Attached for your use is a copy of the
JCS views on the Limited War Study, as presented you at
the Planning Board this afternoon.

/s/ H. E. Wade

1 Incl
A/B

Declassified by: PDASD/ISA
Declassified on: 17 Feb 87
Authority for Declass: 83-MDR-164

CLASSIFIED BY: [Signature]

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

MR 86-63

By

[Signature]

NLE Date

5/6/87

EMR

Electronic reproduction
for preservation
Essential to the
National Archives

①

1990/7026

86-63

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Document No. 2

381



JCSM-324-60
27 Jul 60

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Interdepartmental Committee Study on: "United States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962" (C)

1. It is understood that the subject study will be presented to the National Security Council in the near future. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the study and prepared appropriate comments thereon.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, even though it stimulates and provokes thought and highlights already well-recognized problem areas, the study does not by itself constitute a valid basis for formulating programs or reaching decisions. As the situations envisaged probably will never occur exactly in the manner depicted in the study, decisions must be made in light of the actual conditions existing at the time. Advance planning and programming must take into account many factors, such as the Department of Defense budget, which the study does not consider. Therefore, the study must be recognized for what it is - namely, a study of hypothetical situations. However, the study will serve to present, for discussion purposes, possible courses of action to the hypothetical situations envisaged.

3. Detailed comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which point out both the weaknesses and the values of the study are as indicated in the Appendix hereto.

OASD(PA) DFOISR RS-2

DECLASSIFIED
MK 86-6342

CYP-2

DECLASSIFIED BY: ODC
DATE: 6 MAR 1987
LESS STATED ATTACH

Authority
BY: [Signature]
DATE: 5/6/89

Electrostatic reproduction made for preservation purposes by the Eisenhower Library for replacement of a deteriorating manuscript item

2 18050/60

UNCLASSIFIED

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that these views form the basis for your position on the study.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



ARLEIGH BURKE,
Chief of Naval Operations.

Attachment (13 pages)


Electrostatic reproduction made
for preservation purposes by the
Chapman Library and Placement
of documents in this series item

APPENDIX

COMMENTS BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE STUDY, ENTITLED: "UNITED STATES AND ALLIED CAPABILITIES FOR LIMITED MILITARY OPERATIONS TO 1 JULY 1962" (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the following aspects of the study which affect adversely the validity of the conclusions which may be derived therefrom:

a. The study is qualified by certain assumptions which may or may not be valid.



b. Although the study is based on realistic enemy and allied capabilities, it cannot be considered as a definite forecast of events in an actual situation. As noted in the study, judgments about enemy intentions were specifically designed to support the study, they should not be construed as intelligence estimates for application to actual situations. Therefore, the strategy outlined must be considered as illustrative only.

c. In assessing Free World reactions to the situations depicted, there is a tendency to degrade the perception and resolution of our Western Allies by postulating a reaction of alarm over United States actions to counter overt communist military aggression with the degree of force considered necessary. In this respect the study fails to give proper weight to the evidence, increasing since 1958, that Free World opinion recognizes the necessity for a firm, positive response to Communist Bloc threats and aggression.

Authority: MIL 86-63*3


TOP SECRET JCSM-324-60

DECLASSIFIED FILE DATE 5/6/87

PORTIONS EXEMPTED E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (1) OSD letter 3/20/87 FILE DATE 5/6/87

Appendix

Electrostatic reproduction made for preservation purposes by the Eisenhower Library for replacement of a deteriorating manuscript item.



1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

4. additional comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which pertain to specific areas studied are as indicated hereinafter: 12 13

a. Berlin. It is noted that: 14

(1) The study emits specific political, economic and psychological measures which the United States and her allies should take to prepare their civil populations to resist Soviet/German Democratic Republic (GDR) demands. Likewise, it emits significant political, economic and psychological pressures which the United States and her allies should apply against the Soviets/GDR simultaneously with military pressure to convince them of the benefits of our resolve to maintain our rights. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

(2) The study examines a progressively deteriorating situation as a means of assessing capabilities and limitations. The type of approach in this study inevitably reaches alternatives which cannot be satisfied through action by limited force. Whereas it is recognized that the study would have been prematurely 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

10/4/60

terminated if early attainment of United States and allied objectives had been attributed to military and political efforts, it must also be realized that such success might have been realized at any one of several points. Conceivably, it could have been reached at a point not considered by the study,



However, the method employed in the study required development of the situation by successive arbitrary steps, a procedure which, if actually carried out, might not be the most effective approach.


(3) The depicted Soviet reaction attributes to them a greater degree of willingness to risk general war than is estimated by national intelligence to exist. Similarly, the firmness of allied reaction was somewhat degraded from the optimum in order to support a plausible situation under which the Soviets could hold to their demands with respect to Berlin. In these areas, the assumed intelligence in the study departs from agreed intelligence.

(4) The size of allied forces employed and the manner in which it was committed should be considered as illustrative only.

*mis. intelligence
be agreed
intelligence
gives west
the upper
hand*

~~TOP SECRET~~

(5)




1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

All of this would complicate the Soviet problem enormously and prevent them from manipulating the actions without serious risk of becoming directly involved. This, in turn, would have placed added pressures on the Soviets to seek a solution to the problem before it gets completely out of hand.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

(6)



16
17
18
19
20
21
22

(7) As indicated above, the study does not clearly differentiate between GDR action, GDR action supported by the USSR, and unilateral Soviet actions. The study indicates correctly the probability that initial reaction to U.S. and allied actions would be solely by GDR forces and that the Soviets would have withdrawn their forces from the tactical situation although their troops might still be strategically located in East Germany. Since the Soviet military

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCSM-324-60

Electrostatic reproduction made for preservation purposes by the Eisenhower Library for replacement of a deteriorating manuscript item.

UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

forces are not initially engaged, little risk of general
 war is involved at the outset. It should be made clear
 to the Soviets that the responsibility for the con-
 sequences of the use of this force rests with the USSR
 and its ability to control the GDR and that in no
 situation will U.S. or allied forces be directed against
 Soviet forces except in retaliation.

(8) Paragraphs I 1 d page 30, I 2 d page 32 and F 1 g
 pages 39 - 40, tend to go beyond approved Basic
 National Security Policy and U.S. Policy in the Event
 of War. Such implications are unacceptable.

(9) [REDACTED] It is
 possible that the issue could be settled through
 negotiation prior to introduction of a combat force or
 at some point after the commitment of such force; how-
 ever, the study does not indicate the resoluteness
 required to resolve the issue favorably to the United
 States and its allies. The fact that the USSR controls
 the GDR makes it possible for them to create a series
 of volatile situations. However, it is unlikely the
 USSR would allow the situation to develop as far as
 indicated in the study, particularly in view of the
 action taken by the United States and her allies to
 achieve a fully prepared general war posture. This
 study leaves an erroneous impression in this regard.

(10) The primary value in the study lies in the clear
 indication of the necessity for staunch resolution in
 dealing with the Soviets on the Berlin issue. Addition-
 ally, it is considered extremely important that an

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

10/5/60
WH

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

OCT 5 PM 3 57

01538

L
Origin

SENT TO: Amembassy BONN 628

VERBATIM TEXT

NIACT ~~XXXXXXXX~~

S/S
Info

RPTD INFO: Amembassy PARIS 1463

PRIORITY
FOR THURSTON

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

~~XX~~



1

6492/152

Deliver following message to Chancellor at earliest opportunity/ before Debré visit. In delivering message, you should make point that this is of course personal communication between President and Chancellor and that the President knows that Chancellor will treat it accordingly in his talks with the French. FYI We wish avoid having Chancellor inform Debré that he has received special letter from President on subjects of visit. END FYI.
BEGIN TEXT

Dear Mr. Chancellor: General Norstad and Ambassador Dowling have reported to me on their recent conversations with you. I understand from them that you expect to have a full discussion this week with Debré and Couve de Murville on General de Gaulle's views on nuclear matters as well as on NATO and on European integration. I thought it might be useful for you to have some of my thoughts on these matters before your meeting with the French.

On nuclear matters, I have been much impressed with the strong feeling of various European leaders, including yourself and M. Spaak, that the European countries should have an increased role in the nuclear aspect of NATO's defenses. We are considering, under my personal direction, the possibility of a multilateral, NATO-wide means for dealing with the problem.

Drafted by:

EUR/RA:RFessenden:mck 10/5/60

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: S/S - Mr. Stoessel

Clearances:

~~XX~~
EUR - Mr. Kohler

The White House
(General Goodpastor)

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)

Agency Case Nsc.F90-499
NLE Case MR 90-19273

By DJT NLE Date 8/6/91

SECRET

-3- # 628 to Bonn



I am heartened by the feeling that your views and mine are very close on these NATO defense matters, and I was most interested to learn from Ambassador Dowling that you intend to speak very forthrightly to Debré and Couve on these questions.

With respect to the political functions of NATO, I have serious reservations about a proposal that suggests the U.S., the U.K. and France as a mechanism for preserving order in other areas of the world, because of the danger that any such structure might take on overtones of a "directorate". If that should come about, important interests of other NATO countries would be ignored and opposition in other areas of the world would surely occur.

Similarly dangerous to NATO, in my view, would be any Six Nation bloc within NATO, in which separate national states, not moving toward the goal of European unity, acted on political and military matters properly dealt with in NATO.

As a constructive step for improving the political cohesion of the West, I feel that NATO consultation, covering all areas of the world, should be further developed and strengthened. The U.S. has itself sought to make maximum use of the NATO Council for this purpose, and we certainly intend to continue this effort in view of the obvious need to achieve the maximum harmonization of Free World policies in the light of the world-wide Communist threat. It appears to us that the study of means for improving the Alliance is a subject best considered in the discussions of long-range planning in NATO. We ourselves expect to contribute some ideas, and it might be useful to suggest to the French that they also make use of this forum.

SECRET

SECRET

-4- # 628 to Bonn

Finally, I would like to comment on General de Gaulle's views on the future development of the Six Country movement. I know that in this field also your views and mine have long been very close indeed. We both regard the Six Country integration movement as of very basic importance to the future of our world. A Europe moving toward real unity will strengthen and reinforce the NATO Alliance as a whole. I think we would both be prepared to support any steps designed to further progress toward the concept of true integration embodied in the Rome treaties. Quite frankly, however, I am not aware of the exact nature of de Gaulle's proposals in this field. If his proposals clearly will contribute to achieving the goals of integration, then I believe they are deserving of the support of other members of the Six. If, on the other hand, they would be likely to weaken the integration concept, a serious question would arise. While the U.S. has a deep interest, it is not of course directly involved in the discussions of de Gaulle's proposals; this is primarily a matter which the other Five must work out with France. You yourself obviously are in a most influential position in respect to these developments. Perhaps if you and others of the Six were to put up to de Gaulle specific proposals which will unmistakably contribute to further progress toward genuine integration, de Gaulle's intentions in this field might well become clearer.

I mean for this letter to confine itself to those matters that may have ~~any direct bearing on your~~ a direct bearing on your subjects, talk with Debré and Couve de Murville. There are, of course, many other ~~subjects~~ especially affecting Berlin, which are much on my mind these days.

With warm personal regard,

Sincerely,

Observe PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING ~~SECRET~~ Dwight D. Eisenhower. END TEXT.

DILLON

SECRET
Classification

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
CN 141

Date Sent: October 6, 1960

FROM: Amembassy BONN

TO: SecState WASHINGTON

NO: G-331

G-90

PTD INFO: Amembassy Paris/for USRO, THURSTON, and FINN

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

R684

Records of
For. Sec. Pers.

Bonn Embd 1959-61

Box 21

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Herr Hopf, DefMin Staatssekretar, ^{September 30} ~~was~~ told Embassy officers Strauss currently much interested "reappraisal" by SHAPE planners of MC-70 requirements for manned aircraft. He indicated Strauss himself and many German military planners expect large reduction manned aircraft requirements (eventually over one half) and compensating increase missile requirements. Although German military would support such alteration requirements due to vulnerability long runways for F-104's, land shortages, etc., DefMin concerned about consequences for F-104 program. He implied "reappraisal" might require review production allocations for F-104 program since it would be impossible operate all four presently planned production lines economically if total requirement cut back. Comment: Usual German insistence that interested parties move ahead with F-104 program not on this occasion manifested by Hopf. Nor did he express disappointment concerning U.S. aid offer, as other FedRep officials have. Rather gave impression FedRep inclined re-study whole F-104 program in light what it considers inevitable shift requirements.

Embassy officer asked if recent indications German consideration Pershing pertinent this subject. Answering in affirmative Hopf pointed out this subject almost certainly had been raised by Strauss with Norstad. German military planners were particularly interested in 400 mile version, with perhaps later interest in longer range possibilities. In reply to question whether this development meant FRG no longer interested in Polaris program, Herr Hopf stated that German military interest in Polaris in no way diminished but that this particular missile now politically (both internally and externally) too hot to discuss. He alluded to reaction French and British press to German Generals' Memorandum, as well as SPD attacks, as evidence inadvisability even discussing Polaris at present. Recent emphasis on Pershing was merely tactical manoeuver and eventually longer range missile of Polaris type would, in judgement German military, become necessary armament for Bundeswehr. NATO requirements are quite clear on this, he asserted. He continued, however,

CN 141

SECRET
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DO NOT TYPE BELOW THIS LINE
OFFICIAL FILE COPY

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Authority NND 957126
By *[Signature]* NARA Date *5-22-88*
DECLASSIFIED

Bonn Hubert Z.

SECRET
Classification

by emphasizing that FedRep could not take initiative in asking for Polaris, but that NATO must determine requirements for its utilization by Bundeswehr, and that FRG could then "accept Polaris" on "insistence of NATO". Behind such NATO decision would have to be full support of U.S. Government at highest political level, which he intimated, not now case. He attributed recent violent British reaction on Polaris subject to fact that, as proposed in FedRep AR, missiles would be mounted on either submarine or surface vessels and Britian traditionally opposed to development strong continental fleet.

Comment: Embassy convinced German "switch" to Pershing will in no way deter German participation any future NATO MRBM program, either for production or deployment, if NATO takes initiative in requesting such participation. Otherwise, for cogent political reasons, FedRep will resort to "ohne Mich".

MORRIS

AUTH: ECON *[Signature]* A.A. Radius

Concurrence: DCM - Minister Morris (draft) *RWK*
 POL - Mr. Tyler "
 MAAG - General Steinbach " *RWK*

1960 OCT 5 17:57

Communications
Center
Bonn

Drafter: E/NAD - *RWK* RHKranich:dem:3130:10/5/60

CN 141

By *[Signature]* NARA Date *5-22-81*
 Authority *NND 957126*
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a Report by the J-5, for the JCS Meeting Friday, 7 October 1960, Agenda Item No. 5.

J.C.S. 2305/239

Subject: Department of Defense Position on Nuclear Sharing with Allies (U)

Background - NSC action of 25 Aug 60 calls for a report to the President, no later than 15 Oct 60, on "U.S. Policy Regarding Future Nuclear Weapons Capabilities in the NATO Area, including recommendations as to whether or under what circumstances it might be in U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France. This report should contain suggestions regarding appropriate legislative action, if necessary, to carry out policy recommendations. This report should take into account two studies on NATO, one by Mr. Robert Bowie for the Department of State and the other by the DOD which is being prepared in connection with the joint State-Defense report to the Planning Board and the Council on 'The Future of NATO', as called for by NSC Action No. 2219-b, and the forthcoming consultations with General Norstad."

- By memo dated 26 Jan 60, the JCS provided to SECDEF their views regarding NATO arrangements for nuclear weapons custody and control. (Para 9, JCS 2278/16)

- By memo dated 4 Aug 60, the JCS informed SECDEF that although they recognize that such action will entail complications, they consider it to be in the U.S. security interests to assist France in her efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.

- By memo dated 9 Sep 60, the Chairman JCS forwarded to SECDEF views of the JCS on subject of U.S. Policy Relative to Enhancing Nuclear Weapons Capability of France which:

a. Clarified and amplified previously expressed views.

b. Reaffirmed previously expressed views on NATO arrangements (26 Jan 60 memo).

- On same date, 9 Sep 60, ASD/ISA forwarded memo to the Chairman, JCS requesting, by 26 Sep 60:

a. Views of the JCS on a State-Defense-AEC Ad Hoc Working Group Study on the pros and cons of nuclear sharing.

b. Advice of the JCS on four specific questions regarding NATO and France.

c. Any other pertinent comments in connection with nuclear sharing.

- By memo dated 15 Sep 60, ASD/ISA requested that JCS include, in their reply to his 9 Sep memo, their views on the proposal on nuclear sharing, sponsored by Gen Norstad, contained in an American Embassy message dated 21 Aug 59.

- By memo dated 23 Sep 60, the JCS in responding to the memoranda from ASD/ISA cited above, stated that they were considering the nuclear sharing aspects of the Bowie study so that the DOD position may reflect the desire of the President that this study be considered in the preparation of the full report cited in the first background paragraph above.

- At the request of ASD/ISA, the Joint Staff is currently preparing, as a separate action, JCS comments on the DOD study which is similar in scope to the Bowie study. Although related in some aspects to the report cited in the first background paragraph above, both of these studies were prepared in response to a separate NSC requirement for a report on "The Future of NATO".

JCS 1960
CCS 4610
(23 Aug 60) see 2

X: 1/R

- On 28 Sep 60, the JCS approved a talking paper for the purpose of providing guidance to the SECDEF on the subject of MRBM's for NATO. This constitutes JCS views relative to certain aspects of the Bowie Study as well as views with respect to arrangement, within NATO, for employment control of NATO MRBM's.

Current Paper - Contains a memo to SECDEF, in accordance with the 23 Sep 60 memo from the JCS to SECDEF (cited above), which states that:

a. The 15 Oct report to the NSC should encompass:

(1) U.S. assistance to the nuclear effort of selected NATO Allies, on a bilateral basis, and

(2) Arrangements, within NATO, for the custody and employment control of NATO committed nuclear weapons.

b. Any review of NATO strategy, etc., should be undertaken in connection with the report to the NSC on "The Future of NATO".

c. JCS non-concurs with the Bowie view that the problem of nuclear sharing can be dealt with and resolved exclusively by establishing multinational arrangements within NATO for custody and control of nuclear weapons. Refers to and reaffirms JCS views recently forwarded to SECDEF.

d. From a military standpoint, arrangements under NATO Atomic Stockpile Program, as supplemented by recommendations for NATO arrangements previously submitted by JCS, are satisfactory.

e. In view of the possibility that political pressures may necessitate establishment of further multinational arrangements for custody and control, NATO arrangements which are militarily acceptable are identified. In formulating these views, pertinent aspects of the Bowie study, as well as the known views of Gen Norstad, were considered. For the purpose of identifying NATO arrangements, the requirement presented in the Bowie study for multinational manning and common ownership is manifestly impractical from a military standpoint.

Service Comments - The Army and Air Force are expected to support the paper as written. The Marine Corps has expressed NDC. The Navy has submitted a non-concurrence which:

a. Dissents with the judgment that multinational manning and common ownership is manifestly impractical.

b. Introduces the additional issue of the NATO MRBM program.

Comments and Recommendations - In view of the 15 Oct 60 deadline for the NSC report, it is urgent that the inputs thereto, as provided in subject paper, be forwarded to SECDEF as soon as possible. The views expressed in the non-concurrence of the Navy cannot be supported by the Joint Staff. The Policy Division, J-5, recommends that the Chairman, JCS, support the paper as written.

Opinion as to Recommendations:

Director, J-5 _____ F (Concurs) (~~Non-concurs~~)

Director, Joint Staff _____ (Concurs) (Non-concurs)

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Col R. F. Shaefer, USAF
R & D Branch, J-5,
Extension 71688

Capt R. E. Sinnott, USN
International Policy Branch, J-5
Extension 71477

~~SECRET~~

October 12, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
October 11, 1960

Others present: General Lemnitzer, General Goodpaster

General Lemnitzer thanked the President for his note and his telegram at the time General Lemnitzer assumed his new post. The President said he was delighted to send them, and simply wished he had been able to be present.

General Lemnitzer said the situation in Laos gives us great concern. Assistant Secretaries Parsons and Irwin have gone out to the area to see if the situation can be salvaged. It has been degenerating fast, with Souvanna Phouma consorting with the Pathet Lao. The man we have been supporting, Phoumi, is receiving no support from the government, or from the King who is being very chary about taking a position. The Joint Chiefs of Staff think the situation can still be salvaged. It is very confused and the reports that have been coming in are not too clear or valid. He thinks this visit should do much to give us a clearer picture. General Lemnitzer next reported on a step being taken in the JCS to achieve better control of peripheral reconnaissance flights. A Joint Reconnaissance Center is being established in the JCS area to clear every reconnaissance flight and its flight path. In addition, a technical evaluation of more advanced aircraft for this mission is being carried out. The B-58 and A3J are the most promising. The U-2 does not have the carrying capacity needed for this type of work.

General Lemntizer then reported that as the President had requested, the JCS are keeping very close to the new joint targeting organization in Omaha. The President said he wants the Joint Chiefs to keep right in the middle of this activity. He said that frankly he has considerable doubts as to General



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	MR 87-91 #2
By	DJH
NLE Date	8/5/91

OWF/DOE Diary (53 / Staff Notes Oct 1960 (1)

Power's capacity in this duty. General Lemnitzer said he had told Admiral Parker of the President's directive, and added that it is good to have General Power know that the activity will be closely observed. The Chiefs are appointing General Spivey as the JCS liaison to this activity, and he will be functioning within this week. General Power is coming in to the Pentagon next week to report to Secretary Gates and the Chiefs on the activity of the new organization. In addition, General Lemnitzer is sending General Wheeler and the planners out to visit Omaha. He himself has a "hot line" to General Power and Admiral Parker. The President said he liked the idea of personal visits, because the visitors are visible there. General Lemnitzer said that General Power expects to have his plan ready for submission to the JCS by the end of November. This would make it possible for him to consider it before going over to the NATO meeting.

Regarding the question of quarters for the Chairman of the JCS, General Lemnitzer said that, after study, he thinks that quarters No. 6 at Fort Myer would be the best. The President agreed that it should be quite suitable. General Lemnitzer said that the Senate Armed Services Committee has cleared the remodeling of the set for General White, and he thought the necessary agreement for quarters No. 6 could be obtained without any difficulty. He said he would take the designers over to quarters No. 1 to see the type of accommodations that should be provided. The President said the matter should be handled by the Army submitting a recommendation which would be approved by the JCS, the Secretary of Defense and the President. This would give as much stability as possible.

The President said he had something he wanted General Lemnitzer to think about. In his opinion, there is a problem of duplication in intelligence activities, particularly the intelligence activities of the military services. He said his thoughts are guided by his basic idea of putting more power in the JCS. He commented that he still hopes one day to see a single Chief of Staff, but in the meantime he would center more responsibility in the JCS as a group. In this respect he said he is convinced that each Chief

~~SECRET~~

of Staff ought to put in more time in the JCS than in his own service activities. The President said he thinks that the CIA -- which is itself probably too large and duplicative of other intelligence groups -- together with State should be the place for strategic intelligence work. In addition, each unified commander should have specific intelligence on his own area of command responsibility. Beyond this, he feels that a central intelligence group in the Joint Chiefs is probably the answer. In addition, he has frequently thought that we should have a unified intelligence training system. The President said he is aware of some studies that have been made of duplication, but wanted to be sure that the studies now being made go right to the heart of the problem. He commented that the hardest thing to destroy in this world is entrenched bureaucracy and that intelligence agencies are among the worst. General Lemnitzer said that the JCS will do what they can. The President added that he puts a lower rating on the parochial activities of the services than on joint activities.



General Lemnitzer commented that there is a tendency for other agencies to encroach into the fields of the JCS, and added that some of the civilian offices are offenders in this respect. The President said he has nothing against the JCS, but is against the separate Chiefs entering into some of these fields in which the civilian agencies act. He said he thought there is much better coordination in the intelligence community today than eight years ago, but felt there is still much work to be done in order to find duplication. He acknowledged that specialized intelligence will still require specialists, but thought the framework should be provided by the joint activity.

The President then said that he would like to see General Lemnitzer place increasing accent on service on the Joint Staff. General Lemnitzer said there had been progress in this direction. The President thought that one test of this is to be sure that the services send their best people. General Lemnitzer said that this word had been passed thoroughly through the Pentagon, and that the best officers on the basis of demonstrated

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ability are being sent into the Joint Staff. He said that selection procedures now call for satisfactory prior service on joint, allied and combined staffs for selection to General or Flag rank. The President thought there might be reason to narrow this requirement down now to service on the JCS. He asked whether this could be made a requirement for consideration for more rapid promotion in the lower grades. General Lemnitzer was not sure a fixed rule could be devised, but thought a policy could be stated that the officers picked for more rapid advancement should be considered prime candidates for assignment to the JCS organization.

In connection with the procedures for accelerating promotion of outstanding officers, the President said he is opposed to use of this technique for "double jumps" for any individual officer below the grade of Brigadier General. In general, he thought a man should not get more than three years ahead of his contemporaries prior to reaching General Officer grade.



A. J. Goodpastor
Brigadier General, USA


~~SECRET~~

10/13/60

October 13, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
October 12, 1960

Others present: Secretaries Douglas, Gates, Irwin,
Merchant, Mr. Foy Kohler; General
Goodpaster



Mr. Gates said the question the group wanted to discuss relates to the idea suggested by Mr. Bowie, that a force of NATO Polaris submarines be developed and deployed in European waters. He recalled that the United States had made a proposal to NATO last year regarding MRBMs. In this, NATO has not yet taken action. Also, he noted that the whole strategy of NATO is under review in connection with the "ten-year study" proposed by the United States last December. Pending the results of the broader studies of this kind, the present question is simply a weapons matter. The first question is whose submarines these were to be. For the interim force, the proposal is to turn five submarines, manned by American crews, over to SACEUR. This involves, first of all, a substantial issue of money and military policy. It also raises the question which submarines will be utilized. If we put this kind of string on those in our present program, we will limit their freedom of operation and hence their capability below that now planned. If we add five submarines to the program we are now contemplating, we are adding something like \$725 million in additional funds.

The President observed that we now have land and air forces under the control and command of SACEUR, even though naval forces have been withheld in peacetime. He said that these naval forces have a new mission -- not the control of the seas

Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as
Preserved at the United States
1950-01 (W. W. Williams File)

BX 53, Staff Notes October 1960(2)

15561981

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 1.1(b)

ML 85-352 #1

BY *[Signature]* DATE 2/11/86

26(x5)
Use letter 12/20/85
2/11/85

~~TOP SECRET~~

6. The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare is a special staff responsible directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army. As presently constituted it consists of three divisions: (SR 10-250-1 and AM 48).

~~TOP SECRET~~
2

but rather to serve as a mobile, seaborne, "bomber" force.

Mr. Merchant said the basic idea here is to provide a multi-lateral, Polaris-borne MRBM. This would have three favorable results. It would give a lift to NATO, through its having a striking force of its own.

There would be five submarines initially, with U. S. crews. Ultimately, a permanent force would be created, multi-national in character, of which this would be a part.

He recognizes that these must be carefully coordinated with SAC's forces. Mr. Gates said that he himself very much likes the idea of putting the force at sea. General Norstad, however, would be only for the first increment. Beyond that, he sees considerable value in a land-based mobile 1000-mile missile.

The President commented that if we get our own Polaris and ICBM forces properly coordinated, we could accomplish the tasks that need doing without necessitating a change in NATO weapons and concept.

~~TOP SECRET~~

policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort."

The members of the Board are the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

The President said that he thought these would have to be five additional submarines. He commented that we seem to be thinking of national Polaris forces of submarines. Mr. Gates agreed that there has been thought of a force of about this size. Mr. Douglas pointed out that there has been no agreement on the total size of our program, Mr. Gates said that the presently approved program is submarines, including those for which long lead time items have been authorized, and that this will be the construction program through the FY-62 budget. The President noted that of the total number we build, we expect to maintain on station at any time. Mr. Gates said the total size of the Polaris program must be determined in relation to the decisions concerning Minuteman. He added that we have a considerable problem on how to finance such a large program, and that some people question the soundness of assigning submarines to NATO, lessening their immediate availability to the United States.



Mr. Irwin said the Europeans have been talking about a 100-missile force as an initial objective, not necessarily submarine based. They could be on surface ships or even on mobile equipment on land. Mr. Gates said the Europeans could put about 80 Polaris missiles on coastal ships for a total of \$225 million. The President commented that new technical questions would be raised by surface usage of these missiles, since the platform is less stable. They also would be much more vulnerable.

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Director of the Psychological Strategy Board is appointed by the President, and is responsible to the PSB for organizing its work, directing its staff and assuring that its decisions are carried out. However, he is not a member of the Board. The Board

~~TOP SECRET~~
- 4 -

The President said he favors the basic theory that had been presented. He thought there were two questions -- first, the reaction of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and second the provision of proper financing. He asked whether, if the Europeans build up a missile force, they would have to buy the missiles from us. Mr. Gates said they would have to buy either the missiles or most of the components.

The President then asked when this question will come up for a decision or action requiring the U. S. to take a position. Mr. Gates said it would happen the following day when the President was scheduled to see Spaak. Also, it will come up before the North Atlantic Council meeting in December, and is involved in the 1962 budget.

Mr. Gates said that a paper had been worked up with the State Department and, except for certain minor divergences, which could be worked out, had been agreed upon with the exception of one major difference. This relates to the question of multinational manning of the initial submarines.



The President observed that in that case there would be need for a multi-national school for crew men. It might be that nationals of other countries could be on our submarines for training. Mr. Merchant thought there would not be too much difficulty in this, if there were, for example, 80 against 20 people of other nationality aboard the ship.

The President said that a submarine crew is a very tight company. Punishment taken by the commander and leadership measures must have the force of governmental law behind them. On land, insubordinate or ineffective people of other countries can be sent away. This can hardly be done aboard ship and the men would have to stay there. Aboard ship the captain's word must be law. Mr. Gates said he thought the multi-national control could be achieved through SACEUR and the NATO commands. The men would be in intimate contact aboard ship and

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. Psychological Warfare planning and conduct by the armed forces transcends the boundaries of any one service, and is not only peculiarly susceptible to combined operations, but often necessarily must be employed in that manner. Witness the dropping of leaflets by aircraft. To be effective, psychological operations must be timely and must be carefully coordinated.

it would
would
and tra
a cross
differ

The Pr
he cou
nation
operat
later t
separa
was se
paper
sible f

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

standi
The Ex
being
becaus
said h
some
with a
applied
though
inform
ment
mind.
be sur
matter
to do t

Mr. G
and m
by five
are ta
than \$

3. That
to e
Army
sib
psy

~~TOP SECRET~~
- 5 -

it would take three years to train the crews. He agreed that it would be possible to put a few riders aboard the submarines and train them. He did not think it would be practical to have a cross-section of the nations on the same ship because of differences of law, religion and habit.

The President said that if the ships are assigned to SACEUR, he could put the squadron under one of his subordinate international commands, even if the submarine itself would be operated with a one-nation crew. He added that, perhaps at a later time, it would be possible to have crews for separate ships from separate countries. Mr. Merchant said that the State Department was seeking a maximum of multi-nationality, and asked that the paper be drafted so as not to foreclose mixed manning at some possible future time.

Mr. Merchant said with these understandings he was prepared to accept the Defense proposed language. The President said that, with the very high type of personnel now being assigned to the NATO commands, these problems do not arise, because they are able to take a multi-national point of view. He said he favors the proposal, particularly because he wants to have some means of showing how necessary it is to work in close harmony with allies. Mr. Douglas said the same considerations might be applied to our air units in Germany. The President said he thought the matter should now be taken forward with SACEUR and informally with Spaak. Mr. Gates said he and the State Department representatives would indicate to Spaak what we have in mind. The President thought this was all right but said it should be surrounded by many "ifs" including the necessity to take the matter to Congress. Mr. Merchant thought it would be all right to do this, stressing to Spaak that he must keep this secret.

Mr. Gates came back to the matter of the need for additional funds and money to do this, since it amounts to increasing our program by five submarines. The President said he understood that we are talking about something like \$550 million, of which not more than \$100 million could, at the most, be spent in the first year. Also,

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. That the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division is inadequately staffed to efficiently coordinate psychological warfare operations for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and should be relieved of this responsibility; it should remain the point of contact within the JCS for

there w
progr
Genera
for tact

Mr. Me
owners
advanta
the Eur
affirme
and that
idea of
since
comple
the firs
multina

done an
how und

The Pr
about th
stage in
need a
need to
while th
themse
said th
the hea
step fo
came to
NATO
to tryin

6. Th
an
Wa

7. Th

~~TOP SECRET~~

there would seem to be reason to take something out of the program if these forces are added. I recalled to him that General Norstad had regarded this as a substantial replacement for tactical air strength.

Mr. Merchant asked whether there should be multinational ownership of the submarines. The President said he saw much advantage in our keeping ownership of the ships, but allowing the Europeans to put in their own missiles. Mr. Gates reaffirmed that the first five ships would belong to us completely and that we would commit them to NATO. He questioned the idea of multinational ownership. The President agreed in this since many laws are involved. He thought there must be a completely worked-out plan regarding the submarines beyond the first five. Mr. Irwin said the technique might be one of multinational financing and control.

Mr. Gates said his great desire is to get the job done and to keep this question out of all other plans that are now under consideration.

The President said that the Congress should be told clearly about this scheme -- that it is in two stages and what each stage involves. The Congress should be told that we will need a new law for the second stage. He did not think we would need to finance all five of these ships at once. He thought while they are being built the Europeans can be doing something themselves as a contribution toward this effort. Mr. Merchant said that the questions of ownership, financing and control are the heart of the NATO scheme. He thought this was a new step forward for NATO. The President said that if the group came to the conclusion that it is necessary to have genuine NATO ownership for the vessels, he would give his approval to trying to work this out.



A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

~~TOP SECRET~~

6. That all of the psychological warfare activities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force be combined into one joint Office of Psychological Warfare directly under and responsible to the Secretary of Defense.

TAB

1.

10/13/60

10/17/60

TOP SECRET

October 13, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
October 13, 1960

Others present: Secretaries Douglas, Gates, Irwin,
Merchant, Mr. Foy Kohler, General
Goodpaster

Mr. Gates said the question the group wanted to discuss relates to the idea suggested by Mr. Bowie, that a force of NATO Polaris submarines be developed and deployed in European waters. He recalled that the United States had made a proposal to NATO last year regarding MRBMs. In this, NATO has not yet taken action. Also, he noted that the whole strategy of NATO is under review in connection with the "ten-year study" proposed by the United States last December. Pending the results of the broader studies of this kind, the present question is simply a weapons matter. The first question is whose submarines these were to be. For the interim force, the proposal is to turn five submarines, manned by American crews, over to SACEUR. This involves, first of all, a substantial issue of money and military policy. It also raises the question which submarines will be utilized. If we put this kind of string on those in our present program, we will limit their freedom of operation and hence their capability below that now planned. If we add five submarines to the program we are now contemplating, we are adding something like \$725 million in additional funds.



The President observed that we now have land and air forces under the control and command of SACEUR, even though naval forces have been withheld in peacetime. He said that these naval forces have a new mission -- not the control of the seas

DECLASSIFIED

MR 85-52748

DATE 8/19/83

Staff Secy / AM T+M / 5 / NATO (6) [1959-1980]

PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 1.4 (X)(4)(5)
NSC Letter 5/20/86

FILE DATE 8/19/86

UNCLASSIFIED

but rather to serve as a mobile, seaborne, "bomber" force.

Mr. Merchant said the basic idea here is to provide a multi-lateral, Polaris-borne MRBM. This would have three favorable results. It would give a lift to NATO, through its having a striking force of its own.

There would be five submarines initially, with U. S. crews. Ultimately, a permanent force would be created, multi-national in character, of which this would be a part.

He recognizes that these must be carefully coordinated with SAC's forces. Mr. Gates said that he himself very much likes the idea of putting the force at sea. General Norstad, however, would be only for the first increment. Beyond that, he sees considerable value in a land-based mobile 1000-mile missile.

The President commented that if we get our own Polaris and ICBM forces properly coordinated, we could accomplish the tasks that need doing without necessitating a change in NATO weapons and concept.



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

The President said that he thought these would have to be five additional submarines. He commented that we seem to be thinking of national Polaris forces of submarines. Mr. Gates agreed that there has been thought of a force of about this size. Mr. Douglas pointed out that there has been no agreement on the total size of our program, Mr. Gates said that the presently approved program is submarines, including those for which long lead time items have been authorized, and that this will be the construction program through the FY-62 budget. The President noted that of the total number we build, we expect to maintain on station at any time. Mr. Gates said the total size of the Polaris program must be determined in relation to the decisions concerning Minuteman. He added that we have a considerable problem on how to finance such a large program, and that some people question the soundness of assigning submarines to NATO, lessening their immediate availability to the United States.



Mr. Irwin said the Europeans have been talking about a 100-missile force as an initial objective, not necessarily submarine based. They could be on surface ships or even on mobile equipment on land. Mr. Gates said the Europeans could put about 80 Polaris missiles on coastal ships for a total of \$225 million. The President commented that new technical questions would be raised by surface usage of these missiles, since the platform is less stable. They also would be much more vulnerable.

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

The President said he favors the basic theory that had been presented. He thought there were two questions -- first, the reaction of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and second the provision of proper financing. He asked whether, if the Europeans build up a missile force, they would have to buy the missiles from us. Mr. Gates said they would have to buy either the missiles or most of the components.

The President then asked when this question will come up for a decision or action requiring the U. S. to take a position. Mr. Gates said it would happen the following day when the President was scheduled to see Spaak. Also, it will come up before the North Atlantic Council meeting in December, and is involved in the 1962 budget.

Mr. Gates said that a paper had been worked up with the State Department and, except for certain minor divergences, which could be worked out, had been agreed upon with the exception of one major difference. This relates to the question of multi-national manning of the initial submarines.

The President observed that in that case there would be need for a multi-national school for crew men. It might be that nationals of other countries could be on our submarines for training. Mr. Merchant thought there would not be too much difficulty in this, if there were, for example, 80 against 20 people of other nationality aboard the ship.

The President said that a submarine crew is a very tight company. Punishment taken by the commander and leadership measures must have the force of governmental law behind them. On land, insubordinate or ineffective people of other countries can be sent away. This can hardly be done aboard ship and the men would have to stay there. Aboard ship the captain's word must be law. Mr. Gates said he thought the multi-national control could be achieved through SACEUR and the NATO commands. The men would be in intimate contact aboard ship and



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

it would take three years to train the crews. He agreed that it would be possible to put a few riders aboard the submarines and train them. He did not think it would be practical to have a cross-section of the nations on the same ship because of differences of law, religion and habit.

The President said that if the ships are assigned to SACEUR, he could put the squadron under one of his subordinate international commands, even if the submarine itself would be operated with a one-nation crew. He added that, perhaps at a later time, it would be possible to have crews for separate ships from separate countries. Mr. Merchant said that the State Department was seeking a maximum of multi-nationality, and asked that the paper be drafted so as not to foreclose mixed manning at some possible future time.

Mr. Merchant said with these understandings he was prepared to accept the Defense proposed language. The President said that, with the very high type of personnel now being assigned to the NATO commands, these problems do not arise, because they are able to take a multi-national point of view. He said he favors the proposal, particularly because he wants to have some means of showing how necessary it is to work in close harmony with allies. Mr. Douglas said the same considerations might be applied to our air units in Germany. The President said he thought the matter should now be taken forward with SACEUR and informally with Spaak. Mr. Gates said he and the State Department representatives would indicate to Spaak what we have in mind. The President thought this was all right but said it should be surrounded by many "ifs" including the necessity to take the matter to Congress. Mr. Merchant thought it would be all right to do this, stressing to Spaak that he must keep this secret.

Mr. Gates came back to the matter of the need for additional funds and money to do this, since it amounts to increasing our program by five submarines. The President said he understood that we are talking about something like \$550 million, of which not more than \$100 million could, at the most, be spent in the first year. Also,

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

there would seem to be reason to take something out of the program if these forces are added. I recalled to him that General Norstad had regarded this as a substantial replacement for tactical air strength.

Mr. Merchant asked whether there should be multinational ownership of the submarines. The President said he saw much advantage in our keeping ownership of the ships, but allowing the Europeans to put in their own missiles. Mr. Gates reaffirmed that the first five ships would belong to us completely and that we would commit them to NATO. He questioned the idea of multinational ownership. The President agreed in this since many laws are involved. He thought there must be a completely worked out plan regarding the submarines beyond the first five. Mr. Irwin said the technique might be one of multinational financing and control.

Mr. Gates said his great desire is to get the job done and to keep this question out of all other plans that are now under consideration.

The President said that the Congress should be told clearly about this scheme -- that it is in two stages and what each stage involves. The Congress should be told that we will need a new law for the second stage. He did not think we would need to finance all five of these ships at once. He thought while they are being built the Europeans can be doing something themselves as a contribution toward this effort. Mr. Merchant said that the questions of ownership, financing and control are the heart of the NATO scheme. He thought this was a new step forward for NATO. The President said that if the group came to the conclusion that it is necessary to have genuine NATO ownership for the vessels, he would give his approval to trying to work this out.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

DECLASSIFIED

U. S. State Department
United States of America

89-46 OUTGOING AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS

Document No. 2732

Charge:

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 731

Date: October 15, 1960
5 Fl

SENT TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY 1511

PASS DEFENSE PCR IRWIN

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FROM THURSTON

AMB
MIN
UMBER
POL-4
THURSTON
SHAPE/L
FINV
MAS
EP
FP

General Norstad, Ambassador Burgess and I wish submit following joint observations and recommendations re problem of nuclear sharing within Alliance:

I. The existing NATO atomic stockpile arrangements established pursuant to the decisions of the Heads of Govt at the end of 1957 are satisfactory from a military viewpoint, that is, they ensure availability to NATO-assigned forces, whether US or non-US, of nuclear components when needed. Furthermore, these stockpiles have a NATO character that is often overlooked. They serve delivery systems which are deployed in accordance with NATO plans drawn up by the International Staff of SACEUR and reviewed by the IAC in Annual Reviews in the light of other military plans. Also IAC is constantly consulted as to situations anywhere in the world which might lead to the use of atomic weapons.

However, as Adenauer so persuasively argued at his September meeting with Spaak, Norstad and others, the Europeans have neither the assurance that these stockpiles will in fact be maintained by the US in Europe nor

~~SECRET~~
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY PROHIBITED UNLESS "ONCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: ML 89-46
Date: 5/24/89

Electronic reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes.

1989/2772

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS

Charge:

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 731

- 2 -

Date:

do the Europeans feel that they have the same authority as the Americans in making these weapons available to the forces when they would have to be used. As he put it, if the defense of Europe is to rest upon these nuclear stocks, means should be found to give Europe a greater voice in their use and to guarantee their continued availability.

II. From some of the recent discussions with Spak in Washington, we have the impression that the proposed establishment of a NATO NREM Force is viewed as a pilot project in the field of nuclear sharing and that formula eventually worked out for NREM's might later be extended to other atomic weapons. Reference is also made to current studies placing emphasis on the need to maintain a high degree of conventional military strength in the NATO Shield Forces. We are sympathetic to idea of giving more attention to strengthening conventional forces on Continent but do not accept suggestions that would virtually eliminate land-based atomic weapons from Allied Command Europe. As seen from here, therefore, the significant quantities of atomic weapons already allocated for use in Allied Command Europe will not diminish and will continue to constitute an essential part of the deterrent against Soviet conventional or nuclear attack.

III. Both the Chancellor and Spak believe that the proper path to meeting the needs of Europe in this field is through the Alliance and not through selective bilateral arrangements. Our recordings here indicate that this is a widely accepted

~~SECRET~~
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS

Charge:

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 731

Date:

- 3 -

view that would receive the support of an overwhelming majority of the NATO Govts. It might not directly satisfy French pretensions but would certainly go a long way to meeting French arguments and would in the long run fortify the position of those elements in France who are unhappy about the political, economic and military implications of the priority de Gaulle wishes to give to the establishment of a purely national atomic striking force. Furthermore, there might well result increased pressure on France from her NATO Allies in the direction of encouraging French participation, thus supplementing internal pressures.

IV. The question arises as to whether it is necessary or desirable to await the successful initiation of a NATO NREI program to strengthen the collective authority of NATO over the use of nuclear weapons. Foremost in the European mind is their desire for a greater voice in the use of existing weapons which now repeat now contribute to their own defense, and from this standpoint, prospect of eventual NATO NREI Force will be regarded as of great importance but will not serve as substitute. We believe urgent consideration should be given to the formulation of a US proposal which could be put into effect at an early date and which would apply to the existing as well as the prospective NATO atomic stockpiles and atomic weapons.

Under this approach one could foresee a two-element program; one being the

~~SECRET~~
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Electrostatic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes.

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS

Charge:

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 731

Date:

- 4 -

establishment of ground rules governing the maintenance and use of atomic weapons generally within the Alliance; the other, the special arrangements which would be applied in the case of the MRBM force.

V. At the present time certain categories and certain numbers of atomic weapons (that is, warheads or nuclear components) are earmarked for deployment in NATO Europe to meet the requirements of approved NATO military plans. It would be quite feasible for the NATO military planners to determine the order of magnitude and types of these weapons, on a minimum basis, that would be required to execute successfully the immediate defense of NATO Europe in an atomic war. It is with respect to these weapons that the following US assurances could be given:

- a. These weapons are to be transferred to NATO for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty,
- b. They will be maintained and deployed only in accordance with agreed NATO plans.
- c. These weapons would be immediately available for use in accordance with agreed NATO plans and policies:
 1. by order of SACEUR in the event of Soviet nuclear attack on the NATO area;

~~SECRET~~
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Direct reproduction made
Embassy Library for
copy

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS

Charge:

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 731

- 5 -

Date:

2. in other contingencies, by such other procedures as may be approved by the NAC (which would preserve the right of self-defense). *does not say: for authorization of NAC*

d. That in order to safeguard the security of the classified design data for the weapons and delivery systems, the US would make available to the Alliance appropriately trained military personnel, responsive only to NATO authority, to maintain physical custody of the weapons. *10/17/60*

e. A select committee of Parameps to the NAC, perhaps including Reps of SCW countries, plus two additional rotating members to give appropriate geographic and command representation, would be established under the chairmanship of the Secretary General to receive periodically for its information and consideration data regarding the size and composition of those stocks of NATO atomic weapons as they grow and change in accordance with approved NATO military plans.

f. Though under this scheme physical custody of the stockpiles would continue to be exercised by US nationals, the fact that the custodians would be subject to the authority of the Alliance rather than only to the President of the United States would represent an important psychological as well as political change in the eyes of all other partners in the Alliance. This change would presumably require some revision in the Atomic Energy Act. Otherwise, the putting into effect of this proposal would involve a minimum of legal and financial difficulties.

VI. We recognize that the proposals outlined might have to be put into effect

~~SECRET~~
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Electrostatic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes.

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS

Charge:

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 731

- 5 -

Date:

in a series of steps and that order of these steps depends on several factors, including reactions not only of our Allies, but also US Congress and public. From US viewpoint POLARIS proposal might be acceptable first step as it involves minimum release of US control and has certain dramatic appeal. But we believe that serious consideration should be given to question of whether steps as to existing stockpiles could be made at same time or even before. The European reaction would certainly be improved.

VII. Impressive as MREM program standing on its own would be, we believe that US undertakings recommended herein, whether preceding, accompanying, or following MREM proposals, would represent a significant assurance to our Allies, an assurance which Norstad, on the basis of his wide European contacts on this subject over a considerable period of time, believes would be far more effective. It would go to the heart of the fundamental European concern as to their influence over and guarantees about the weapons on which their defense now rests. It is the kind of forward movement to which Chancellor Adenauer and other European leaders will give their enthusiastic support for its intrinsic value, as well as for its value as a sign of renewed United States strength and leadership.

Ambassador Houghton and Lyon have read above and concur entirely. Realizing, of course, that steps proposed do not go as far as de Gaulle would like, they consider that US move in this direction would be timely and constructive from viewpoint US-French relations.

Drafted and authenticated by:
SHAPE/L:RLL/hurston:grv:10/15/60

~~SECRET~~

HOUGHTON

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Electrostatic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes.



Nuclear Capabilities in NATO Area

1. At the NSC meeting of August 25, 1960, the President directed you to arrange for the preparation, not later than October 15, 1960, of a report on U.S. policy regarding future nuclear weapons capabilities in the NATO area, including recommendations as to whether and under what circumstances it might be in U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France. This report was to contain suggestions regarding appropriate legislative action, if necessary, to carry out policy recommendations. The report also was to take into account the "Bowie" study and the Defense study being prepared in connection with the joint State-Defense report on "The Future of NATO", as called for by NSC Action No. 2219-b.

2. At its meeting of October 5, 1960, the PB agreed to a State proposal that this report be combined in a single report that would also encompass "The Future of NATO" and "Contributions of the U.S. and Other Nato Nations to Collective Defense Posture". PB agreement was, however, subject to the understanding that, if the new procedure delays presentation to the NSC of any one of the three subjects, the report on that subject would be submitted separately. The combined report was scheduled for PB discussion today.

3. Since the President's directive of August 25, 1960, arose out of a discussion of the general problem of increased nuclear sharing with allies and is obviously interwoven, at least as now combined by the State proposal above, with the future of NATO and the collective Defense posture, it seems pertinent for you to examine the President's directive in the light of a White House meeting of October 3, 1960, preparatory to Mr. Spaak's visit to the White House on October 4, 1960. The proposals there advanced and the actions apparently agreed seem to me to have covered in large part the reasons for the reports charged to the PB. I doubt, however, that you will wish to discuss in full PB session at this time proposals made to and decisions taken by the President apparently in the absence of at least Treasury, Budget and OCDM.

4. For today's PB discussion, therefore, I suggest that you try simply to ascertain the reasons for the slippage in the PB reports and to establish a new and firm deadline.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 87-324 #4
BY DDJ DATE 1/7/91

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET

OSANKA / NSC (Briefing Note) / 1/4 / nuclear sharing with France, US, Brit, Allies

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

**USNMR SHAPE
UNITED STATES MESSAGE**

OFFICIAL INCOMING MESSAGE

C-176/132029Z

TOR/132040Z

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

ROUTINE

FROM: OSD

TO: USNMR

INFO: USCINCEUR

NR: DA 984253

13 Oct 60

FROM GENERAL LOPER TO GENERAL NOBSTAD
USCINCEUR FOR COL BAKER

REFERENCE: OSD Msg DEC 28198 (LN 12933-3)

I have now been informed by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that Congressman Hollifield and party are planning the orientation visit to United States, NATO and U.S. organizations deployed in Europe during period 26 November through 12 December 1960. Special interest can be expected to be the same as that indicated by previous message. Composition of group is not repeated at this time but understand it will be headed by Congressman Hollifield and will include Durham, Price, Hosmer, Bennett and course staff members with a total party estimated at twelve. Composition of party will probably not repeat not be firm until after national elections.

Final decision has not repeat not been made on detailed itinerary. I am sending by separate message today to EUCOM and USNMR information and comment on the committee's tentative plan which has been worked out with help of Colonel Baker of EUCOM Headquarters who presently is in Washington. The following countries are involved: United Kingdom, West Germany.

LN 15570

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

HQ US EUCOM Form 35-C, 1 Nov 56

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NR.

CLASSIFIED WITH DEFENSE	
AGL (1) 6-60-15M-77446A	
Agency Case	OSD 89-MDR-218
NLE Case	89-188 #5
By	246
NLE Date	8/13/91

*Norstad pp/ab/ Adams Nuclear Policy
10/13/60*

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

**USNMR SHARE
UNITED STATES MESSAGE**

OFFICIAL INCOMING MESSAGE

C-176/132029Z

TOR/132040Z

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

ROUTINE

FROM: OSD

TO: USNMR

INFO: USCINCEUR

NR: DA 984253

13 Oct 60

FROM GENERAL LOPER TO GENERAL NORSEAD,
USCINCEUR FOR COL BAKER.

REFERENCE: OSD Msg DEC 98198A (LN 12933-3)

I have now been informed by the House Committee on Atomic Energy that Congressman Hollifield and party are planning the orientation visit to United States Allied, NATO and U.S. organizations deployed in Europe during period 26 November through 12 December 1960. Interest can be expected to be the same as that indicated by previous message. Composition of group is not repeat not known at this time but understand it will be headed by Congressman Hollifield and will include Durham, Price, Hosmer, Bennett and course staff members with a total party estimated at twelve. Composition of party will probably not repeat not be firm until after national elections.

Final decision has not repeat not been made on detailed itinerary. I am sending by separate message today to EUCOM and USNMR information and comment on the committee's tentative plan which has been worked out with help of Colonel Baker of EUCOM Headquarters who presently is in Washington. The following countries are involved: United Kingdom, West Germany.

LN 15570

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

HQ US EUCOM Form 35-C, 1 Nov 56

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NR.

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS	
AGL (1) 6-80-15M-77446A	
Agency Case	OSD 84-MDR-218
NLE Case	89-188 #5
By	ALC
NLE Date	8/13/91

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

**USNMR SHAPE
UNITED STATES MESSAGE**

OFFICIAL INCOMING MESSAGE

NR: DA 984253

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN

Page 2

Before the Committee agrees on a definite itinerary, you may want to offer comments on sensitive problems which such a visit may pose. Problem of clearance into Jupiter site and other allied installations will be handled by Department of State in accordance with State-Defense Circular CG 366, December 9, 1959.

I have received a preliminary report that Senator Pastore's trip was very successful and party was most complimentary of your EUCOM escort officer. Hope similar arrangement can be made for Congressman Hollifield's party.

ACTION: AIR OPS (US EEM) SUSP: 15 Oct 60

INFO: OSACEUR, COFS, SECY, ACCOFS, AIR DEP, P&P, VIS FILE

LN 15570

(13 Oct 60)

DTG/131731Z

RM

AC-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION—PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION—NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS

COPY NR.

CONFIDENTIAL

10/19/60

File: GERMANY

xref: ✓ US Support (Atomic)
ATOMIC-NUCLEAR POLICY

19 Oct 60 ltr. Norstad to Strauss clarifying statements made at Coventry.

Gist: Did not suggest change of US policy for giving MG 70
nuclear delivery systems to FRG.

Statements misconstrued in press, but since little
attention resulted, Norstad proposes passive PI action,
unless matter subsequently revived by press.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ML 89-269 #9
By L/6 NLE Date 1/22/92

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

October 24, 1960

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 464th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, October 20, 1960

Present at the 464th NSC Meeting were the Secretary of State, presiding; the Acting Secretary of Defense (Franke); and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and Mr. Bradley Fisk, for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State (Dillon); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; The Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy, for National Security Affairs, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Mr. Robert H. Johnson, the Director, NSC Secretariat.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2166-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2177, 2191, 2195, 2201, 2206, 2213, 2217, 2228, 2239, 2259, 2261, 2269 and 2273; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 5, 1960; NSC Actions Nos. 2283 and 2309).

Mr. Dulles introduced Council discussion of the situation in Cuba by presenting that part of his intelligence briefing which dealt with this subject. He said that we believe that active opposition to Castro continues among scattered groups inside Cuba despite fear caused by executions and increasing repression. There are about 1000 guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains. These are poorly armed and have inadequate provisions, but their worst problem is their lack of unity and of effective popular leaders. Most of the potential leaders are either in jail or have left the country. Some could be sent in, however. Most of the guerrillas who were captured and exhibited in trials last week were seized in the lowlands and were seized some weeks ago.

..... indicate that there have been further defections from the military within Cuba and isolated acts of

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS	
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC F89-1081
NLE Case	78-89#37
By	File NLE 8/23/91

AWP/NSC/13

TOP SECRET

sabotage. A new decree is ready for issuance which will impose compulsory military training on all males and females between the ages of 14 and 40.

Mr. Dulles noted that Soviet military aid continued; that three shipments have arrived and that a fourth is aboard a Soviet vessel enroute to Cuba. We have recent indications that these shipments have included anti-aircraft artillery, machine guns, jeeps and possibly tanks. We have no definite word on whether they included MIGs. [.....] indicates that Cuban pilots and maintenance personnel are being trained in Czechoslovakia.

Guevara is expected to leave for Moscow today as Castro's representative to the 7th of November celebrations. Reportedly, he will also sign a new economic agreement with the USSR. [.....] indicates that Guevara may visit Communist China and hopes also to visit Yugoslavia and Japan. It will be of interest to see, Mr. Dulles suggested, whether a further arrangement on sugar is concluded. The possibility of a sensational Soviet offer has been reported. The Soviets do not need sugar and purchase of Cuban sugar could be a very costly operation for them. The Cuban Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs has indicated that Cuba intends to recognize East Germany. A Cuban sugar magnate, Julio Lobo, who recently left Cuba after his holdings were seized by the government, has said that Guevara had stated to him that while Khrushchev may admit the possibility of co-existence between capitalism and socialism, such co-existence was not possible in Cuba.

Cuba was likely to react strongly to the new U.S. export controls. It may press charges of new U.S. aggression. What it will do was, however, difficult to guess. A few American companies which had not so far been seized - Sears Roebuck, Woolworth, and Coca Cola - may now be intervened and taken over. Castro may make a personal appearance before the UN to present the Cuban case.

After Mr. Dulles had completed his briefing, Secretary Herter described foreign reaction to the U.S. export embargo. He stated that prior to the action, U.S. missions in Latin America had been asked to get the reaction of the Foreign Offices. On the whole, the reaction had been good, in fact, surprisingly good. None of the countries considered it to be an act of external aggression and Chile was the only country that had expressed doubts. An interesting aspect of the reaction was the fact that a number of

the countries did not think we had gone far enough. Mr. Herter suggested that we should work through various missions with a view to getting further inter-American action at the Quito Conference on March 1. The most unfavorable reaction had come from Canada. The Bank of Nova Scotia in Cuba has not been nationalized. The Canadian General Motors is thinking of supplying spare parts to Cuba. The Canadian reaction was discouraging, particularly if it meant that the Canadians would play the part of supplier to Cuba. The NATO countries, on the other hand, had already inquired about trans-shipment controls and are more likely to cooperate.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that two problems had been mixed up in the newspaper accounts of the Canadian reaction. The first was the problem of trans-shipment from the U.S. via Canada to Cuba. The second was direct sales by Canadian companies to Cuba. We had never asked the Canadians to do anything about the second of these problems although the press had raised it immediately in Canada. This was a problem about which Prime Minister Diefenbaker would do nothing. The problem of trans-shipment controls was, however, under consideration in the Canadian Cabinet. In response to a question as to why we were asking the Canadians and no one else to apply trans-shipment controls, we had told the Canadians that the reason was that we had not previously applied destination controls to Canada. We pointed out that we were asking their cooperation in order to avoid the necessity for applying such controls. Probably in the end, Secretary Dillon observed, the Canadians would come through in some form on the trans-shipment problem.

Another thing that had stirred up the Canadians, Secretary Dillon indicated, arose out of the old problem created by the fact that many Canadian companies are controlled by U.S. parent companies. One example of this problem in the current situation involved a subsidiary of Continental Can in Canada which, upon learning that a Canadian steel company had an order for tin plate from Cuba, told the steel company that if it filled the order, it could expect no business from Continental Can for the indefinite future. We have told the Canadians that they have to realize that this action was an expression of private industry's feeling about Cuba. We had stated that although such action was probably not wise, it would probably continue to happen. However, the Canadians were very sensitive about this problem. Mr. McCone asked Secretary Dillon whether we encouraged such action by American companies. Secretary Dillon indicated that we did. Mr. McCone suggested that since most Canadian companies were controlled by U.S. companies we ought to get them to cooperate in enforcing the export embargo.

Mr. Gray noted a newspaper story which suggested that perhaps our action on U.S. exports had come too late. This story indicated that in recent weeks the Cuban Government had bought overwhelming quantities of spare parts. He suggested that Mr. Fisk comment on this story when he made his report on the export controls. Secretary Dillon said that while we had no figures on monthly exports to Cuba for September, figures through August totally disproved this news story. In August, exports were \$18 million, the lowest level they had ever reached. There had been no significant change from May through August in exports of machinery and vehicles which were running about \$3 million per month. Exports of chemicals dropped from \$4 million in May to \$3.1 million in August. Unless there was a surge in exports in September and the first half of October, the story was not borne out by the facts. Mr. Fisk stated that he had no later figures and agreed that exports had been dropping. There was no evidence, he indicated, of a great build-up just prior to the imposition of controls. Secretary Dillon stated that it was our impression that if we had ^{not} imposed controls within two or three weeks, there would have been some important shipments to Cuba. Several American companies were holding shipments back in anticipation of some such action by the Government.

Mr. Fisk then gave the Council a full report on the probable effects of the export controls. He pointed out that Cuban industry is primarily of U.S. design and that Cuba could not conveniently get maintenance and operations supplies to operate its industry from any other source. U.S. machinery and vehicle shipments to Cuba declined from \$189 million in 1957 to \$101 million in 1959 and to \$28 million in the first eight months of 1960. There were a number of reasons for this decline including Cuban import and exchange controls, the reluctance of U.S. firms to advance credit, reduced orders by management because of the uncertain situation, and the reluctance of U.S. suppliers to make shipments to Cuba.

The situation now, Mr. Fisk continued, was one where a minor break-down often resulted in a costly shut-down. A number of firms have ceased operations or have greatly curtailed them for lack of maintenance, repair and operations supplies. Cuba, for example, needed \$1 million in bus parts in order to put a number of buses back in operation. It needs hundreds of items for its power and light operations, the absence of which would hamper the sugar industry. The U.S. action should result in major shut-downs and have a snowball effect. Thus the shut-down of a rayon plant would affect tire production and thus would affect automotive transport. Reduced availability of automotive transport would in turn affect movement of all kinds of goods.

Mr. Fisk stated that Cuba could get supplies from the USSR or other Western powers but that since Cuba has predominantly a U.S. economy, replacement would require time-consuming efforts. Cuba was already having difficulties and these difficulties would become worse and more damaging. He noted, for example, that absence of control valves could cause plant closures. Eventually this problem could be surmounted but in the meantime vast amounts of productive capital were kept idle. Tin plate obtained from the USSR had proved unsatisfactory. A catalyst obtained from a non-U.S. source for a Cuban oil refinery was mixed with supplies obtained from the U.S. with disastrous results. Wood pulp obtained from the USSR had not worked in a Cuban rayon plant.

Mr. Fisk pointed out that exports from the U.S. to Cuba totalled \$616 million in 1957; \$281 million in six months of 1959; and \$196 million in six months of 1960. U.S. imports from Cuba were not as important to the U.S. as Cuban imports from the U.S. were to Cuba. Seventy-eight per cent of U. S. imports were accounted for by sugar. Other imports included tobacco, fruits and vegetables, and nickel.

Mr. McCone inquired as to whether the Moa Bay and Nicaro operations had been closed down. Secretary Dillon stated that Moa Bay was shut down and we had given thirty days' notice that we would shut down Nicaro on the 4th of November. The Nicaro plant has been locally, but not publicly, intervened. Local labor has taken it over and the few Americans still there are gradually leaving. The Cubans may attempt to run the Nicaro plant and pile up the nickel. The nickel cannot be used by the Soviet Union or elsewhere. Until the thirty days are up, the plant continues to run and we are paying for its operation.

Mr. Stans inquired as to whether we had frozen Cuban credits and assets. Secretary Dillon pointed out in response that such action would require invocation of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Mr. Dulles noted that, in any event, most of the Cuban assets in the U.S. were gone. In response to a question from Mr. Gray, Secretary Herter indicated that the actions on U.S. exports had been taken under the Export Control Act and that such action, therefore, did not involve the declaration of a national emergency.

Mr. Gray observed that we could not predict the results in Cuba of our action on U.S. exports. The reaction could range upward to an effort to take Guantanamo. He noted that

Mr. Dulles suggested to him the day before that Castro might cut off Cuban sugar exports to the U.S. He inquired as to the impact such action would have upon the U.S. Secretary Dillon stated that such action by Cuba would be in accordance with our own ideas. We plan to set aside Cuba's sugar quota for the first quarter of next year. The Secretary of Agriculture had recommended the initial step in this direction to the President last week - the removal of all controls on U.S. sugar beet production. The U.S. sugar beet growers know the purpose of this action although we have not announced our plans with respect to Cuban sugar imports.

Secretary Dillon went on to say that the Canadians had had what he could only call the presumption to tell us that one reason they were worried about the U.S. action was the fact that they had received reports from their diplomatic sources which did not agree with ours, indicating that the U.S. action would cause a serious loss of good feeling toward the U.S. in Latin America. When we had asked them about the reaction they had got in Central America, the Canadians had had to admit that they had no representative in that area.

Mr. Stans said that he looked upon this U.S. action as a major move and assumed that further moves would follow. He assumed that we were studying all economic sanctions that might be applied and that we would not stop half-way. Secretary Herter indicated that every possibility was being explored. The action on exports was clearly within our own domestic jurisdiction and could not be interpreted under the Rio Treaty as an act of aggression. If we took action which could be interpreted as going beyond the Treaty, it would make us vulnerable to action against us in the OAS. It was for this reason that the Latin American reaction had been so encouraging. Secretary Dillon noted in this connection that the press release had emphasized that this action was in defense of American industry and a sovereign act of the U.S. If we invoked the Trading with the Enemy Act under a new proclamation of emergency, that would be a clearly political act. Such action would cause real problems. If we could accomplish the same result in another way as, for example, we had been able to do in the case of sugar, we would be better off. Secretary Scribner agreed that, in view of the fact that the Cubans had few assets left in this country, we would have to pay quite a price to get very small results if we were to invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act.

Mr. Stans asked if we knew whether the military support being provided by the Bloc was for internal security purposes only or also included equipment that could be used in an attack

on other nations. Secretary Herter stated that the Latin American countries were worried about the possibility that Cuba was obtaining equipment for the latter purpose. In the discussion which followed, it was indicated that Cuba might be getting some tanks which could be used in an external attack. It is also possible that Cuba will have two squadrons of MIGs by the first of the year. Secretary Herter noted that there is a sensitivity in Cuba to the possibility of a fake U.S. attack on Guantanamo to justify military action by the U.S. against Cuba. Secretary Dillon pointed out that there were indications that Cuban aircraft on Cuban airfields had been recently painted with U.S. insignia. Our Ambassador was asking about these aircraft in a note which would state that it was well-known that there were no U.S. aircraft in Cuba and which would suggest that the Cubans might be preparing a provocative military action.

Mr. Gray asked whether the local diplomatic and military authorities had all the authority they required to effect evacuation of U.S. personnel. Secretary Herter pointed out that dependents of U.S. personnel had been told to leave Cuba. General Lemnitzer and Secretary Dillon noted that the dependents of U.S. civilian officials and U.S. military personnel had left Cuba. Secretary Herter noted that we were planning to recall our Ambassador. The situation was hopeless from the point of view of diplomatic negotiations; the OAS Committee of Six had been boycotted by Cuba. In response to a question from Secretary Scribner, Mr. Dulles stated that there were about 4000 non-official U.S. personnel in Cuba. Secretary Herter stated that all these people had been alerted but that they were staying on in Cuba if they wished to do so. A warden system had been initiated so that in the event of violence, these people could be called and could go to places from which they could be evacuated.

The National Security Council:


- a. Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba on the basis of a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, comments by the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State on free world reactions to U.S. controls on exports to Cuba, and a report by Mr. Bradley Fisk, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, on the probable effects of such U.S. controls on the Cuban economy.
- b. Noted that the Department of State is studying all forms of possible sanctions against Cuba which the


United States could impose consistent with its international obligations.

- c. Noted a report by the Secretary of State on the status of evacuation of U.S. citizens from Cuba.

- 2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY
- 3. FUTURE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN THE NATO AREA

(NSC 5906/1, paragraph 24-c; NSC 5910/1, paragraph 42-a; NSC Actions Nos. 2140-b, 2166-b-(9), 2204 and 2274-d and e; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies", dated August 23, 1960; NSC Action No. 2292-b)





Mr. Dulles next turned to the Sino-Soviet dispute, describing a review of the dispute which Khrushchev made to the satellite leaders while they were in New York. Khrushchev had stated that the U.S. was now deterred from war by the military strength of the USSR. While the USSR could liberate the world from capitalism by war, to do so would now set humanity back centuries. Therefore, the USSR could not urge war. The Communist Chinese, he said, did not understand this situation. They cited Lenin's authority and argued that peaceful co-existence will lead to the downfall of socialism. Khrushchev stated that the Chinese did not understand that Lenin taught the inevitability of war before any socialist society existed. Lenin would have revised his views today because socialist systems are now in existence. Khrushchev made the following charges, among others, against the Chinese: the Chinese were engaged in splinter activity; they pretended to accept Soviet leadership but actually rejected it; they say that Nehru and Nasser support imperialism and thus antagonize these important leaders; they refuse the USSR bases in their harbors for Soviet submarines; and after the Bucharest Conference China had invaded Soviet territory and built fortifications.

Khrushchev had gone on to say that the November meeting to deal with this dispute was scheduled to go forward as planned and that a Party commission was preparing documents for signature at that meeting. He stated that the Chinese needed discipline; that Mao lives the life of a hermit; and that the cult of personality was strong in Communist China and is mixed with Buddhism. The USSR could not accept the claim that Mao is the greatest Marxist dialectician. Moscow, he indicated, cannot back down in this dispute.


Mr. Dulles continued, stating that the Soviets were apparently working to confront the Chinese with unanimous condemnation by world Communist Parties.


Secretary Herter observed that State experts who had analyzed Khrushchev's behavior in New York believe that it is related to his battle with Mao. His actions were designed to show that he could be tough with the West. Mr. McCone asked how we could account for the violent Soviet support of Communist China for UN membership. He had been surprised, he said, by the violence with which the Russians had made a play for Chinese representation at the recent meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. He said that he took the schism between the Chinese and the Russians with a grain of salt. In response Mr. Dillon observed that the Chinese may not want to get into the UN at this time and that Soviet support does not necessarily coincide with Chinese views. Mr. Dulles agreed that having Communist China in the UN would put the Chinese Communists under some discipline.

Turning to the situation in France, Mr. Dulles stated that the extreme Right, the extreme Left and the friends of the European Community were joining up in the French Assembly to attack De Gaulle's legislation appropriating funds for an independent French nuclear striking force. Debre had made the matter a question of confidence which would be voted upon on Monday. If this vote should go against the government, elections would be required. When the delegates decided how to vote, they would weigh the question of whether they should risk their jobs at the polls. They would probably choose not to do so, particularly since a great many of them must rate their chances of being re-elected quite low. Those who have broken with De Gaulle - Soustelle and the others - would have difficulty being re-elected since we believe De Gaulle is still very popular in the country. We therefore expect the vote of no confidence to be defeated. Secretary Herter indicated his agreement with this judgment but pointed out that De Gaulle's margin would be narrower than in the past. He noted that a defeat on a motion of no confidence would have a different effect from a defeat on a motion relating to the nuclear striking force alone. It was for this reason that Debre had adopted this approach. Mr. Dulles stated his belief that De Gaulle could be defeated on the nuclear issue if it were voted upon separately. Mr. Dillon noted that a test vote had indicated that a twenty-five vote shift would have changed the outcome.

Mr. Dulles went on to observe that General De Gaulle was in a most difficult position. There had been no progress on Algeria;

talks with the FLN had not been resumed. The Algerian rebels were in a position to get more outside assistance because of the new position the Soviets had taken on Algeria. The rebels might get aid from either the Russians or the Chinese or both. Mr. Dillon stated that if an election were held and if it could be limited solely to the question of an independent nuclear striking force, there would be a substantial majority against the measure. Whether De Gaulle was afraid of this possibility, we did not know. Mr. Dulles noted that De Gaulle's program called for a \$5 billion expenditure over a period of four years.





Mr. Gray said that he would understand that Mr. McCone's thinking would be an input into the study now going on so that the Council would have the benefit of Mr. McCone's views at the time it considered that study. Mr. Gray then reviewed the history of this project beginning with the President's request in August at Newport. In this connection he noted that the Planning Board had agreed that the study on nuclear sharing should be combined with those on the future of NATO, contributions of the U.S. and other NATO nations to collective defense posture, and future nuclear weapons capabilities in the NATO area. He concluded by stating that he wanted to be sure that the heads of agencies concerned understood the basis on which the Planning Board was proceeding. He indicated he was sorry that it would not be possible to submit a paper to the Council earlier, but the Government did not always move as fast as we would like.

Mr. Dulles next turned to the situation in Argentina where, he indicated, it looked as though Frondizi had out-maneuvered his opposition in the army. While Frondizi had had to make some compromises, these compromises did not appear to be significantly harmful to his position. The creation of a special

committee to investigate Communist activities was a good development. The important thing was that he had managed to keep the same economic team which was directing the stabilization program.


The National Security Council:


2. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Soviet missile-space activity; propaganda by the USSR regarding the Soviet man-in-space efforts; recent developments with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute; and the situations in Cuba, France, Argentina, Laos and the Congo.
3. Noted that a report on this subject would be incorporated in a comprehensive report on U.S. policy with respect to NATO which is now in preparation by the Department of State and Defense, with participation as appropriate by the Atomic Energy Commission; which will be available for consideration by the Council about November 17; and which will include sections on U.S. political and economic objectives and programs in NATO, military objectives and programs, scientific and technological objectives and programs, nuclear sharing and future nuclear capabilities in the NATO area, and the contributions of the U.S. and other NATO countries to collective defense.


4. U.S. POLICY TOWARD LAOS
(NSC 6012)

Mr. Dulles began his briefing on Laos by pointing out that many of the developments there related to U.S. actions on which he assumed the Secretary of State would wish to report. The picture in Laos today was better than a week ago. Souvanna Phouma had moved a little away from insisting on an early agreement with the Pathet Lao. We do not know whether the Soviet Ambassador made any offers to Souvanna Phouma in his initial meeting but we believe that the meeting was exploratory. The King had not signed the new Soviet Ambassador's accreditation papers but probably will. Meanwhile there was a slight hope that the King, Souvanna Phouma, and Phoumi could be brought together. Mr. Dulles observed that Mr. Parsons and Mr. Irwin had done a fine job and had moved the situation along.

Secretary Herter called on Secretary Dillon to bring the Council up to date on latest U.S. actions. Mr. Dillon indicated he would report on the latest situation rather than on the involutions that had occurred. /








The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Laos.

5. U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CONGO
(NSC 6001; NSC Actions Nos. 2262, 2270, 2276, 2284, 2287 and 2295)

Mr. Dulles began his briefing on the Congo by stating that the situation was not much changed. Unfortunately, we do not think that Lumumba's position is worsening and may, in fact, be improving because of the support it is receiving from the UN troops. [.....] it appears that the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea may make a proposal in the UN for a good offices delegation which would go to the Congo to seek political reconciliation. The effect of such reconciliation would be to restore Lumumba to power. Morocco was also backing Lumumba. [.....]



Mobutu had now dropped his idea of reconvening Parliament and planned to carry on with his group of administrators until the end of the year. He was optimistic if he thought that he could actually do so. Mr. Dulles referred to Mobutu's meeting with Tshombe in Katanga and to the agreement between the UN and Katanga that UN troops should be moved into a rebel area in Katanga. He noted that on the 19th of October, Mobutu had arrested a group of Lumumba's supporters but that they had been released almost immediately. Mr. Dulles concluded by stating that the situation in the Congo was about the same as it had been and that action in the UN appeared to be the next development.

Secretary Herter said that the most disturbing aspect of the situation was Hammarskjold's apparent change of heart. How much of this was due to the hammering he had received from the Soviets and how much was the result of pressure from others we

did not know. Hammarskjold had sent a stiff letter to Tshombe and to the Belgians requesting them to get rid of all Belgians in Katanga. Such action would probably lead to considerable chaos in Katanga. Ambassador Timberlake was very worried about the new Hammarskjold line. |

.....
..... Hammarskjold's thinking then and now was to get the Congolese Parliament in session. One difficulty in this connection was that the members of Parliament were afraid to go to Leopoldville.

Secretary Herter went on to describe the economic deterioration that was taking place in the Congo. A half-million dollars had been allocated for public works for the unemployed. Probably two-thirds of the people in Leopoldville were without jobs. We were afraid that Hammarskjold's new line will mean the re-appearance of Lumumba. Cordier has stated that if Lumumba once more becomes the principal figure in the Congo, there would be no place for the UN; in such a situation the UN might as well pull out. The U.S. has put up money twice for the Congo. In addition to the one-half million dollars for public works, we had put money up for imports of spare parts in order to get some kind of industrial activity going. However, there was not anyone in the Congo who could handle this money. Soviet and Chinese money has been coming into the Congo We hope that someone will get parliamentary support and that this will clarify the situation. For Lumumba to get back in would just not be the answer, however.

Mr. Stans asked how much we could rely on the alleged disaffection of the members of Parliament from Lumumba. Secretary Herter stated that Ileo had been going around the country talking to members of Parliament and was quite optimistic. He thinks he can get Parliament to back Kasavubu. We did not know, however, how many members of Parliament would come back to Leopoldville.

.....
.....
.....

Mr. Gray said that he did not know what our limits were in dealing with Hammarskjold but he thought that the UN was taking a peculiar position when it stated that, if Lumumba came back, the UN would be out of the Congo, and yet that the UN had a responsibility to bring Lumumba back. Mr. Gray felt we should do everything we could to change Hammarskjold's view. If Hammarskjold

was worried about Khrushchev, we should give him some assurances. We should use our best persuasive power to convince him that he is not obligated to do something which will result in having the UN kicked out of the Congo. Secretary Herter observed that we were likely to get the same negative reaction from Hammarskjold on this as when we had approached him on the UN's efforts to prevent the arrest of Lumumba and the relationship of this action, which was very favorable to dangerous elements, to the neutrality of the UN. Secretary Herter pointed out that Guinea had introduced a resolution in the UN calling for the seating of Lumumba's delegation. The new African states had caucused on this resolution and except for Mali and, possibly, Togo and the Ivory Coast, these states were opposed to the resolution. We doubt that these states would favor the seating of Kasavubu's representatives but they are definitely against Lumumba. This fact could affect Hammarskjold's thinking. Secretary Dillon noted that there were indications of disagreement among Hammarskjold's advisers within the UN Secretariat.

Secretary Franke inquired about progress in moving Western technicians into the Congo. Secretary Herter stated that such movement had now stopped; there was no one that you could deal with in the Congo; there was no government that could make an agreement. Seventeen technicians had got in at the start and these were all still in the Congo. The move to push the Belgians out was bad; eventually, they would have to leave but now they were the only stabilizing force. He stated there had been no indication of an answer to Hammarskjold's letter to Tshombe. Secretary Dillon noted that this letter had been printed in a Brussels paper. Mr. Dulles pointed out that some Belgian technicians were back in the Congo as a result of invitations from local officials. In one case a UN official had tried to prevent such a Belgian from returning but his efforts had been repulsed by the Congolese official concerned. Secretary Herter said that he had talked with Mr. Palmer, our new Ambassador to Nigeria, a country to which evacuees had moved from the Congo. Many of these evacuees, particularly the missionaries, had now gone back. Mr. McCone noted that mining operations in Katanga continued on a normal basis. Mr. Stans said that the Presbyterians who had returned to their missions in the Congo, had found no damage to their property; it remained just as they had left it.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in the Congo.

ROBERT H. JOHNSON

0131/60

10/31/60

DECLASSIFIED
DATE 11/17/00 BY DOD

Talking Paper for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for use in discussion with the Secretary of Defense on 31 October 1960

Subject: Third Generation MRBM's (U)

JCS 1960 CCS #720 (Aug 60) Sec 1

Reason for Discussion - Mr. Gates has requested the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to brief him on the status of third-generation MRBM requirements and development prospects. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) have been invited to attend.

Background - In response to a Secretary of Defense request to study MREM requirements, dated 1 August 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by memorandum dated 29 September 1960, informed the Secretary of Defense that they considered that there is a valid requirement for a third-generation MRBM and recommended the initiation of the development of a new system with a maximum range of at least 1200 nautical miles which would be adaptable to land mobile, hard fixed, and water-borne configurations.

- Initiation of the development of a third-generation MREM will have an impact upon the FY 1962 DOD budget. It is understood that this facet of the problem motivated Mr. Gates' request for a presentation. The briefing is now expected to take the form of a short introduction followed by key questions, and the answers thereto, covering major political, military, economic, and technical aspects. ISA and Joint Staff representatives have assisted the DDR&E in formulating these questions and answers.

Discussion - The anticipated questions and DDR&E answers, together with Joint Staff comments thereon, at attached.

Prepared by: T.J.B. SHANLEY
Colonel, USA
AE&GM Branch, J-5
Extension 53838

#720 (Aug 60)

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS AE&GM BRANCH
DATE 20 Oct 81

X-1/A

MRBMs; B6218 (1961) 9051/4610 (24 Mar 61) "Mil Aspects of the Contoy of AF - 1 - MRBMs + other TML in ACE" (most docs w/d, 7/88, but a few docs with hints)

QUESTION 12: What is the Position of the State Department on NATO MRBM's?

ANSWER: It is anticipated that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) will provide the answer to this question. The principal aspects of the State Department views are as follows:

- (1) State desires to defer consideration of third generation MRBM's until current negotiations on second generation systems for NATO are complete.
- (2) State is in favor of exclusively water-borne deployment of MRBM's

DISCUSSION:

a. The most important State Department position with respect to the question of third generation NATO MRBM's was expressed by Secretary Herter in his meeting with Mr. Gates on 14 September 1960 when he deferred consideration of a third generation MRBM phase in the NATO MRBM program. He considered it more important to get on with the phase wherein second generation MRBM's will become available to NATO.

b. Another important aspect of the State Department's position with respect to NATO MRBM's is the firm conviction held by influential people in the Department, including Secretary Herter himself, that there is no political advantage to be gained by basing MRBM's ashore. They point up the "host country" problems which could result in veto on the use of land-based MRBM forces, the fears and controversies which would result from their movement over European roads with the possibilities of nuclear accidents and particularly the magnet effect or damage to a nation that would result from the enemy's attacks on MRBM forces on its soil. State, however, strongly supports the concept of providing NATO with a sea-borne MRBM capability.

November 5, 1960

~~TOP SECRET~~



Dear Tom:

You will recall I spoke to you briefly yesterday about the "response doctrine" problem. The NSC Action I had in mind is number 2300 d., and reads as follows:

"Noted that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs would confer with the President and the Secretary of Defense with regard to the proposal for a study of the capabilities, plans and programs to ensure the survival of the decision-making machinery and of reliable means of communication with the surviving retaliatory forces on land, at sea, and in the air, within the time dimensions of a surprise ballistic missile attack. In this study, attention should be given, with the participation of the Department of State, to the problem of an effective and flexible response that is not dependent upon the survival of the seat of government and other vital links of the planned system for command and control."

I will be in touch with you soon to discuss the best procedure.

Sincerely,

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable
Thomas S. Gates
Secretary of Defense

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3-204

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR 79-12671
mmt Date 6/10/80

NSA/Spec Asst S. / Subj S.S. / 7 / Dept of Def. (6) [May-Nov 1960]

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONTROL NO. DATE
NOV 7 1960
FOR COMMUNICATIONS USE

NO: POLTO 674

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM USO PARIS

TO: Secstate WASHINGTON

PRIORITY

FILE MR CASE NO. 89-46
E 00 2

2734

PASS DEFENSE FOR GATES AND IRWIN.
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

Following our several exchanges on subject US policy vis-a-vis NATO re nuclear weapons, we have been giving thought to what we can expect to put forward at NATO Ministerial Meeting mid-December. Norstad and I think our action should be guided by the following factors:

1. Some US proposal directed toward strengthening NATO's nuclear atomic forces is necessary at this time in view of widespread governmental and public expectations and need to keep up momentum.

2. It would be unfortunate, perhaps seriously harmful to certain NATO Governments, if complex US proposals were sprung on Ministers without adequate prior consideration. (We have in mind great difficulty which Norwegians had in accepting US proposals in December 1957 without sufficient advance knowledge.)

3. We therefore recommend promptest possible action to lay groundwork for consultations with our NATO Allies. Department is already aware of Adenauer's desire that the

DISTRIBUTION ACTION FOR

POL 4 INFO 10

SES 8
DWF 3
SP 1

AIB
POL 4
DLEK
SECURSON
SHAPSL 1
RUCOHL 1
MIS

DELETED BY: DCM: FEN/1
M. Thurston
11/17/60

AUTHORIZED BY:
W. Randolph Burgess

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: MR 89-46 #2
Date: 5/24/89

UNCLASSIFIED

689/2784

As already reported, our European friends are concerned fundamentally with how they can be assured that atomic weapons will continue to be available for their defense and what voice they will have in the decision as to use of the weapons. It seems to us, therefore, that the package to be delivered at the December Ministerial Meeting should include two essential parts:

a. A statement of principles to the effect that:

(1) The United States is prepared to work out within NATO ways and means by which our Allies will be assured that the atomic weapons on which their defense rests will continue to be available when needed.

(2) The United States is likewise prepared to take steps to give the Alliance greater authority over the use of these weapons.

b. Announcement of the concrete steps which the United States is now prepared to make towards this end.

5. The question arises as to what specific commitments we will be in position to make by mid-December. Essence of this problem is what can be done by the Executive Branch without modification of present legislation. From here it would seem that a US guarantee regarding the continued availability of a certain level of existing stocks of nuclear weapons during the life of the Treaty and the US intention to commit to NATO five POLARIS submarines by end 1963 are two important steps that can and should be announced by mid-December.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTROL 312

we understand as/they do not require legislative action.

We believe that a US statement of general principles along lines suggested, together with steps we immediately plan to take towards this end would have far reaching and positive impact in Europe, particularly if accompanied by undertaking to make recommendations to new Congress for authorization to give the Alliance greater authority over the use of these weapons as suggested above (along lines Embtel 1511).

BURGESS

Electrostatic reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

11/12/60

2

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 12, 1960

Dear Jack:

Congratulations again. Yours was a great victory, even though it was a bit close in some states. Nixon had the fabulous advantage of having had eight years of Madison Avenue build-up and the blind support of one of the most popular men in our history.

I am glad that New York gave you a good solid majority of over 400,000 (not quite the 500,000 that I had been predicting). I was naturally pleased with the progress that we have made upstate. Some votes were lost in the city due to the local messy situation with the police and schoolteachers' strike. Incidentally, you may have noticed we have elected three new Democratic Congressmen, and have added to our representation in the State Legislature.

But congratulations are not the reason for this letter.

I had a most interesting talk yesterday with a Russian by the name of Alexander Korneichuk whom I had known quite well in Moscow during the war. Among other things he is a Russian playwright, a member of the Communist Party Central Committee, high in the Ukrainian government, and, I am told, quite close to Khrushchev. He was over here with a group of Soviet intellectuals for a conference at Dartmouth, at the invitation of Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review and financed by the Ford Foundation, promoting the exchange of ideas between a parallel group of Americans.

We had a blunt and frank talk. He indicated that Khrushchev wanted to make a fresh start, forgetting the U-2 incident and all of the subsequent gyrations. He expressed the opinion that arms limitation and particularly nuclear control was a vital question. The Russians don't want another devastating war - they have too much at stake. They recognize the danger of the present tensions, including the spread of nuclear weapons among other countries, unless an agreement is arrived at fairly soon.

POF 125 / USSR from 1960

The Honorable John F. Kennedy
from Averell Harriman

2.

He admitted the ideological conflict between us would continue on a world-wide basis, but he hoped that Khrushchev's statement, that the conflict could be carried on on a competitive basis without war, would be accepted as sincere. I told him that I believed the single most important subject was to open up the Soviet Union still further and get away from their present closed society. He argued that much had been done in this direction, but I maintained that it was obviously not enough - and I got the impression that in his heart he agreed. However, the Soviet military and Khrushchev consider secrecy as a military advantage.

He asked me whether you would follow out FDR's policies. I said 'Yes' insofar as they concerned our 'good neighbor' relationships with the underdeveloped countries; that he could count on that, and Mr. Khrushchev would find much tougher competition in his attempts to communize them; but that there would be no appeasement on principle or on the positions our country had taken in our relations with the Soviet Union. I restated my personal opinion, which I had stated publicly fifteen months ago on my return from the Soviet Union, that I thought arms control should be the first subject of consideration between us. He didn't take issue with this.

In the ideological argument with Peiping, he said he believed Peiping was coming around to Khrushchev's interpretation that war was no longer inevitable. On the other hand, I doubt that Moscow-Peiping relations are free of underlying tensions.

He asked me how I thought you and Mr. Khrushchev would get along if you met. I said Mr. Khrushchev would find you were not interested in scoring points in debate, and that you would be direct and clear in your discussion of the issues. I told him that if Mr. Khrushchev was sincere in trying to get back to where we left off before the May meeting, he would not mention the U-2 incident again.

We had further discussion on what might be done to improve relations. I mentioned the release of the RB-47 pilots as of first importance.

The Honorable John F. Kennedy
from Averell Harriman

3.

2

He said that he would report our conversation to Khrushchev. I naturally underlined that everything I had said was personal.

This conversation tends to confirm my interpretation of Khrushchev's message to you as being an indication that he wants to start afresh. I thought your answer was good.

I would like to have an opportunity to talk with you about our relations with the Soviet Union, and other parts of the world. I would be glad to come to Palm Beach for a brief chat, if that would suit your convenience.

Again, my congratulations.

Sincerely,

COPY

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 15, 1960

Dear Jack:

I called on the Soviet Ambassador yesterday at his request. (I happened to be in Washington as I was speaking at the Women's National Democratic luncheon.) He translated to me verbally a message which he had received from Mr. Khrushchev to be delivered to me personally.

In this message the Ambassador was instructed to give me Mr. Khrushchev's greetings and congratulations on his behalf over the victory of the Democratic Party. The message then continued as follows:

"As Mr. Harriman could see for himself, Mr. Khrushchev had criticized Mr. Kennedy as well as Mr. Nixon, in accordance with the suggestion Mr. Harriman had made." (This undoubtedly refers to an oral message I had sent to him, that if he wanted to elect Nixon, the surest way to do so was to criticize Nixon and express approval of Kennedy.) "Some of the statements of both candidates were unfavorably commented on in the Soviet press, though the criticisms of Nixon were a stronger rebuff. Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues in the Soviet government understood the need for anti-Soviet statements during the campaign, and for that reason they had shown restraint in overlooking them.

"Mr. Khrushchev knows that Mr. Harriman has always paid attention to Soviet-American relations, and Mr. Khrushchev believes there may now be a better chance of improving them.

"The task of today is that there must be some realistic way found to improve our mutual relations. Also, solutions must be found to the pressing international issues, such as strengthening peace in Europe, disarmament, and others. So far as our (Soviet) side is concerned, there will be no lack of attempt and desire to reach a positive result. If the leading people of both countries could unite to act in the same direction to achieve mutual goals, then we (Soviets) can say with all confidence that things will proceed 'not too badly.' (This is a Russian colloquialism.)

"Mr. Khrushchev hopes that Mr. Harriman agrees with this. Of course he may ask what is meant by 'not too badly'. What criteria should be chosen? Mr. Khrushchev tried to convey the thought in his message to Senator Kennedy by saying he

100-100-100-100

Nov. 15, 1960

hoped we could follow the line of relations that existed during President Roosevelt's time, when Mr. Harriman was Ambassador. Mr. Khrushchev has been thinking over the question of whether under present conditions this can be achieved. He has come to the conclusion that it is not only desirable but possible. With a return to the spirit of Soviet-American cooperation which we had during the war, not only would the people of both countries gain, but so would the people of other countries and no one would lose."

This is a rough translation, but the essence is clear. Its style shows that it was written by Khrushchev himself. It is further indication that Khrushchev wants to make a fresh start.

I said to the Ambassador that if Mr. Khrushchev was in earnest, I hoped he would think about things he could do to pave the way for improved relations. I said it would be well for Mr. Khrushchev not to refer to the U-2 incident again, and on the positive side, to make some gesture such as the release of the RB-47 crew.

Menshikov accused me of trying to trade with him. I denied that, and pointed out that Mr. Khrushchev should realize that after the kind of things he had been saying publicly, some act on his part to show the American people that he was having a change of heart would be helpful.

Menshikov expressed the hope that we could come to some agreement on disarmament and nuclear control, as without such control China and other countries would obtain nuclear weapons in a few years, with attendant increase in the danger of nuclear war.

When I asked Menshikov how things were going with China, he shied away from the question, maintaining there were no fundamental differences. However, he said he thought it would not be difficult to get China to agree to disarmament proposals, if we had reached an agreement.

I asked him what Mr. Khrushchev meant by a return to the relations we had during the time of President Roosevelt, but he obviously was not instructed and he wouldn't commit himself. I repeated what I had said to Mr. Korneichuk (My letter to you of November 12), that you would undoubtedly develop a good neighbor policy towards the underdeveloped countries, which would make more difficult the realization of Mr. Khrushchev's ambitions to communize them; also, that I believed you would want, if possible, to come to an understanding with Mr. Khrushchev for our mutual benefit, but that you would not appease nor make any compromises of principle.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - page 3.

November 15, 1960

This message is intriguing in that it was obviously written by Khrushchev himself. During the war I found out I couldn't get anywhere on matters of importance without getting to Stalin himself. Undoubtedly the same situation exists today with Khrushchev. He is a realist. He came to my house when he was in New York a year ago, even though he knew that in my articles I had been blunt in my criticisms of Soviet policies as well as of him.

Sincerely,

/s/ Averell

The Honorable John F. Kennedy
Palm Beach
Florida

11/16/60

FIELD, CALIF.
CHAIRMAN
IN PRICE, ILL.
NE N. ASPINALL, COLO.
BERT THOMAS, TEX.
THOMAS G. MORRIS, N. MEX.
JAMES E. VAN ZANDT, PA.
CRAIG HOSMER, CALIF.
WILLIAM H. BATES, MASS.
JACK WESTLAND, WASH.
JAMES T. RAMEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

JOHN D. FAYORE, R.I.
VICE CHAIRMAN
RICHARD D. RUSSELL, GA.
CLAYTON F. ANDERSON, N. MEX.
ALBERT GORE, TENN.
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA
HENRY DWORSHAK, IDAHO
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
WALLACE F. BENNETT, UTAH

Congress of the United States

JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

November 16, 1960

COPY

VIA AIR MAIL

Honorable John F. Kennedy
United States Senate
c/o Senator Lyndon B. Johnson
LBJ Ranch
Hye, Texas

Dear Jack:

Within the past several weeks a number of newspaper articles have reported informal proposals to European allies by the present Administration to permit greater cooperation in nuclear weapons. Increasing reports are being published that the upcoming November meeting of NATO parliamentarians and the subsequent December NATO Council meeting will result in United States proposals to furnish NATO and allies with Polaris IRBM equipped nuclear submarines, and support for an independent NATO nuclear strike force. We have reason to believe from informed sources that there is some basis for these published reports.

Without going into the actual merits of the reported proposals or any other alternative courses of action that might be considered to enhance the nuclear capability of our allies, I feel constrained to bring to your attention certain basic facts which I believe have an important bearing on this matter.

During the past year, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been seriously disturbed over certain actions and contemplated actions on the part of the present Administration involving nuclear weapons custody and transfer arrangements with certain individual allies which have raised serious legal and policy questions. Two examples are discussed below:

- (1) You may recall approximately one year ago reports that consideration was being given to placing MB-1 air-to-air nuclear weapons aboard British planes. Negotiations for the MB-1 British arrangements have been held in abeyance this past year, pending further discussions with the Joint

RB-246 (JCAE) / for Comm / 323 / Fall Negot. NATO

COPY

Honorable John F. Kennedy

November 16, 1960

In view of the above circumstances, and your general familiarity with the role of Congress and the Joint Committee in this field, I believe you will agree that it would not be desirable for the outgoing Administration (with or without the participation of representatives of the new Administration) to make any commitments on nuclear weapons and submarines which the new Administration will be required to honor, unless there is a real emergency. In any event, it would seem extremely desirable to discuss the background of any potential commitments with leading members of the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, before such commitments are made. I frankly do not see how this could be done adequately before Congress reconvenes and the new Administration goes into office.

I recognize that prime responsibility on foreign affairs rests with the President. However in the case of nuclear weapons, a certain sharing of responsibility lies with the Congress under section 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act. Cooperation with any nation or regional defense organization for communication of classified atomic energy information or transfer of nuclear material under sections 144 and 92 can take place only if the proposed Agreement for Cooperation, together with the approval and specific determinations of the President has been submitted to the Congress and referred to the Joint Committee and a period of sixty days has elapsed while Congress is in session. The proposed Agreement for Cooperation does not become effective if during the sixty day period Congress passes a concurrent resolution of disapproval. You appreciate, of course, that under the present law, and particularly section 92, atomic weapons cannot be transferred from the United States to another nation or group of nations.

You may rest assured that the Joint Committee and its staff will be available to assist you should you desire and will be happy to review with your staff specific details and background within the knowledge of the Committee.

Best personal regards,

Clinton P. Anderson
Chairman

Honorable John F. Kennedy

COPY

November 16, 1960

Committee as to its legality under the present Atomic Energy Act. Within the past several months, however, certain other arrangements have been entered into and commitments made by the present Administration with individual allies of similar dubious legality. They have been justified by certain legal fictions, but the practical result is the loss by the U.S. of full custody and possession of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

- (2) The Administration last year also proposed to transfer nuclear submarines to The Netherlands, and to France. Since we considered the design information and "know-how" on nuclear submarines of great importance to our defense, we questioned whether the advantages to be gained outweighed the possible security hazards. The Administration promised not to undertake negotiations on these matters without prior consultation with the Joint Committee.

Security classifications imposed by the Executive Branch prevent me from being more specific concerning these arrangements in a letter of this nature but I believe your staff should be fully briefed on the details.

The present difficulties have arisen in large part out of hasty commitments made in late 1957 after the Russian Sputnik debacle. The Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act in 1958 to carry out some of these commitments, but, as indicated above, much uncertainty exists.

Near the end of the last session, I authorized a study of the whole nuclear weapons custody problem, along with other civil-military relationships in atomic energy. In pursuance of this study, several members of the Joint Committee are visiting U.S.-NATO installations during the period of November 26 - December 13. We expect to have a report on the subject early in the next session.

UNCLASSIFIED

Draft Record of Action

caar 2709

NATO IN THE 1960's

(NIE 20-60; SNIE 20-2-60; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Issues of U. S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO", dated November 10, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 2149, 2204-c, 2274, 2292 and 2323; NSC 5906/1, paragraph 24-c; NSC 5910/1, paragraph 42-a; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies", dated August 23, 1960; NSC 6017).

1. Noted and discussed a report on the subject (NSC 6017), prepared by the Departments of State and Defense, in response to the reference NSC Actions calling for reports on: (a) The Future of NATO; (b) The Roles and Contributions of the United States and Other NATO Nations; (c) Future NATO Nuclear Capabilities and the Problem of Nuclear Sharing; on the basis of a presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of problems identified by the NSC Planning Board concerning policy issues connected with long-range U. S. planning and guidance required for U. S. participation in the forthcoming North Atlantic Council Meetings and related to proposed ten-year planning for NATO.

2. Discussed the following issues of U. S. policy which flow from the above report:

a. With respect to NATO military planning (see pars. 44-56, NSC 6017):

(1) Defense Alternative. The U. S. should continue to support current NATO strategy. Within this strategy, there is a requirement for increasing



DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case NSC F 89-1224
NLE Case 79-252-1
By dno NLE 6/27/92

MEMO

the capability of the shield forces in the form of modernization of present forces, both nuclear and conventional. NATO forces should have a level of capability, nuclear and non-nuclear, which will provide a flexibility of response ranging from the capability to (a) meet any overt Soviet Bloc military action with sufficient strength and determination to force the Soviets either to withdraw or continue the military action in the full knowledge that such continuation will constitute general war and that NATO will retaliate with all weapons and forces, to the capability to (b) destroy, in conjunction with external national retaliatory forces, the will and ability of the Soviet Bloc to wage general nuclear war.




The proposal to establish a NATO MRBM force holds promise of providing timely modernization of a portion of the shield's nuclear capability. Similarly, timely modernization of the shield's conventional capability should continue.

- (2) State Alternative. The U. S. should strengthen non-nuclear forces in Europe in the degree required to give NATO the option in the event of non-nuclear attack by Soviet forces in being,

does not say immediately

of responding without resort to nuclear weapons. The object would be to hold such an attack for a period long enough to allow opportunities for negotiation and to permit the Soviets to appreciate the risks of the course on which they are embarked. Priority should be given to the build-up of NATO non-nuclear forces as necessary to this end. Such a NATO non-nuclear capability would (a) reduce European concerns that any hostilities in Europe would lead directly and immediately to nuclear war, and thus enhance European confidence in NATO strategy; (b) enhance the deterrent to limited forms of Soviet aggression in Europe by making clear that NATO had the ability to respond without use of nuclear weapons, if it should wish to do so.



TOP SECRET

- (3) Treasury-Budget Alternative. It would be desirable to undertake a review of current NATO strategy directed toward planning goals which will be more fully supported by NATO allies than has been the case with MC-70. Such military strategy should have as its objective military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility, and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and, in conjunction with external retaliatory forces, to prevail in general war should one develop.



TOP SECRET

b. With regard to future roles and contributions of the United States and other NATO nations in the collective defense effort:

* (1) The NATO MRBM force proposal which the U. S. Government hopes it will be in a position to make, involving, among other things, five U. S. POLARIS submarines for NATO, would represent a dramatic reaffirmation of U. S. involvement in the defense of Europe. [However, it could not substitute for the maintenance of strong U. S. NATO-committed forces in the forward areas of NATO Europe.]**

(2) The United States should explore the possibility of increasing the German force contribution, taking into account the political and psychological sensitivities involved in an increase in German forces. (See paragraph 57-a-(8), NSC 6017.)

* Budget reserves on this paragraph.
** Treasury questions this conclusion.

- (3) The United States should press the other members of NATO to take vigorous measures to make maximum progress toward the achievement of their NATO force requirements. (See paragraph 57-a, NSC 6017.)
- (4) In order to achieve greater efficiency and economy of NATO-wide operations, and, in some instances, to assist in reducing U. S. dollar expenditures abroad, the United States should consider:
- (a) Taking a more active lead in achieving greater integration of logistics for ground and air forces in Allied Command Europe and in standardization of weapons, equipment and organizations, including greater sharing of U. S. logistics facilities in Europe on a reimbursable basis. Some budgetary and balance of payments savings could be effected through greater logistics integration and this would also assist in meeting legitimate German requirements in this area.
- (b) Progress in allocation of military tasks according to geography and national capacity, taking into account national responsibilities for internal security and external national responsibilities.

- (5) The United States should continue to press for common financing of installations and certain weapons as well as for greater emphasis on coordinated multilateral European development and production of modern weapons as a means of having the European member countries assume a larger share of the burden in these areas; and of increasing Western European capabilities within a multilateral framework.
- (6) The United States should continue to urge press in the integrated command of NATO forces.
- (7) The United States should support a NATO policy of permitting, when NATO security is not obviously at stake, temporary withdrawal of NATO-committed forces to meet external situations as national forces.
- (8) The United States should encourage whenever possible the evolution of more realistic attitudes in Norway and Denmark with regard to the stationing of foreign troops on their soil and the storage of atomic weapons.


ED

c. With respect to nuclear sharing:

State-Defense

Chairman, AEC

(1)




*most of rest of
Call for not copied*

Chairman, AEC
(Continued)

(2) NATO Multilateral Arrangements. (See paragraphs 67-74, NSC 6017) A U. S. proposal should be advanced which could be put into effect at an early date and which would apply to the existing as well as the prospective NATO nuclear stockpiles. This approach would encompass a mutually compatible, two-element program: One being the establishment of ground rules governing the custody and use of NATO nuclear stockpile weapons; the other, the special arrangements for the introduction of MRBM's. The latter should be undertaken in accordance with the NATO MRBM force proposal.* The former should be proposed along the following lines:



* Major questions of interpretation and implementation of the proposal are still being reviewed by State and Defense.



d. In the face of the Soviet challenge in the field of science and technology, the U. S. should enlist the support of the other NATO nations in seeking:

- (1) To sustain a growing scientific and technological base in the Atlantic Community.
- (2) To improve the application of science and technology to military programs.
- (3) To improve the application of science and technology to non-military programs.



In so doing the U. S. should be prepared to consider further participation in institutions of science and technology in NATO countries and to establish improved means of speeding the exchange of scientific and technological information.

November 21, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 467th Meeting of the National Security Council, in Atlanta, Georgia on Thursday, November 17, 1960

Present at the 467th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; and the Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles commented that "Castro-itis" was affecting Central America and parts of South America. Castro propaganda had certainly played a part in the recent revolts in that area. There was no evidence yet that Cuban "bodies" had been involved but there was no doubt of Cuban intrigue. Somoza says that he has hard evidence of Cuban involvement

Mr. Dulles stated that the Guatemalan revolt was largely by disaffected army officers. Also, it was not yet over. The government has control of a key city on the road to Puerto Barrios. The revolutionists held Puerto Barrios for awhile. However, they have now been driven out into the hills but are still a menace. The government air force is worn out it is still needed. Ydigoras, while he has suppressed this revolt for the present, cannot be sure to keep the top on the Guatemalan political volcano.

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case NSC 589-1084
NLE Case DA 78-93 #25
By DVA NLE Date 1/16/91

TOP SECRET

AWP/NSR/13

UNCLASSIFIED


Mr. Dulles then turned to the Nicaraguan rebels who were based in Costa Rica. This was a most severe revolt but the action was concentrated near the border. The revolt has generally been put down. It included extreme Leftists who had been in Cuba.

Mr. Dulles reported that in El Salvador Leftist elements have now entrenched themselves in the government and were being encouraged by the Cuban Embassy. In Honduras also the Cuban Embassy was cultivating Leftist groups. There is a strong pro-Castro element in Venezuela although it has suffered a set-back. Betancourt still has considerable opposition.

Secretary Herter commented that the overall picture presented by Mr. Dulles was accurate but not pleasant. Mr. Herter said that he planned to take up with the President, after the NSC Meeting, the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan requests for U.S help to prevent outside assistance to the rebels. Mr. Herter said that the Communists were taking full advantage of recent developments in Latin America. The OAS may call a consultative meeting, probably to name an investigative group. Secretary Herter said he was hopeful that this process would lead to the OAS taking specific sanctions against Cuba. He said that the OAS Peace Commission was headed by a Mexican and had a number of Leftists on it. Therefore, the U.S. preferred the appointment of an investigative committee.

Mr. Dulles then turned to South Vietnam where a coup attempted by a paratroop brigade had failed. It was on the point of success and might have succeeded if it had been alert. However, the Vietnamese army has now moved in and taken over. Mr. Dulles said that this development had caused one OCB Member (subsequently identified as Secretary Merchant) to question whether the U.S. should stop training paratroops. Diem was now under pressure to broaden his government but he also had counter-pressures to take action against the leaders of the revolt. This was an unsettled situation which offered an opportunity for North Vietnam to step up guerrilla activities.

Mr. Dulles said that Laos seems to have reached a point of decision. The government has been somewhat weakened by Phoumi's take-over of Luang Prabang. Souvanna Phouma is now taking a more definite anti-American tone.



UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

Secretary Herter commented that, regarding Diem, press statements promising reforms had unfortunately been made by his brother. This brother and his sister had been the target of many popular objections to the Diem government.

Mr. Dulles reported that in Thailand there are rumors that discontented army officers are planning a move against Sarit. Sarit, based on some false rumors, has recently attempted a more conciliatory attitude toward the USSR.

Regarding Algeria, Mr. Dulles said that De Gaulle's decision to hold a plebiscite probably would make the army very unhappy. Developments may be moving during the next two months toward a crisis in the Algerian situation which will bring things to a head. Mr. Dulles believed that De Gaulle's proposal would probably get support in both France and Algeria but it would definitely have the opposition of the colons and of the army in Algeria.

Secretary Herter said that we have information that De Gaulle's attitude has changed radically and that he is now moving toward a realistic solution. However, he will not tell us just what he plans. In the UN there is a build-up of heavy support for a UN referendum in Algeria but we have not been given the information by De Gaulle which we need to support French plans. Mr. Herter said he was hopeful that before the UN situation comes to a head, we will have better material from the French.

In answer to the President's question as to why the U.S. delegation to the UN should not make a suggestion for a reasonable solution, Secretary Herter said we were doing this and had sent word about it to Couve de Murville.

The President, reverting to the Central American situation, said that it seems to him that we have got to make strong representations to the governments there that each must make proposals within its country which will rival those of Castro. The President thought that Estenssoro and, he believed, Frondizi were trying to do this but they were not explaining their proposals to the people well enough for them to understand. The President thought that they should develop proposals which will break down Castro's influence among the more ignorant parts of the populace. Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

Herter said that Ydigoras is about to do this in Guatemala
 Mr. McCone
 suggested emphasizing the hardships of the Cuban people. The
 President said that the Latin Americans do not believe them,
 even the governments. The governments are now saying that
 Castro, as a revolutionist, still has tremendous prestige al-
 though as a statesman he has lost position. Even when you show
 the other Latin Americans the facts, they do not seem impressed.

The National Security Council:


Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of
 Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific refer-
 ence to recent developments regarding Central and South
 America, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Algeria.

2. NATO IN THE 1960's

(NIE 20-60; SNIE 20-2-60; Memo for NSC from Executive
 Secretary, subject: "Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the
 Defense Posture of NATO", dated November 10, 1959; NSC
 Actions Nos. 2149, 2204-c, 2274, 2292 and 2323; Memo for
 NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Increased Nuclear
 Sharing With Allies", dated August 23, 1960; NSC 6017;
 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "NATO in
 the 1960's", dated November 16, 1960; Memo for NSC from
 Executive Secretary, subject: "Special NSC Meeting", dated
 November 16, 1960)

Mr. Gray briefly explained the background of the report on
 the subject which was being considered by the Council and asked
 Secretary Herter if he would like to summarize it. Secretary
 Herter suggested instead that the Council deal with the urgent
 issues since the paper as a whole would have to be reviewed
 further before being put to the President for final approval.

Mr. Gray then asked whether there was agreement on the pro-
 posal that the U.S. commit itself to maintain available for NATO
 those nuclear weapons required for approved NATO military plans.
 After a brief explanation of this proposal by Secretary Herter,
 no disagreement was expressed to this proposal.



UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

1649

Secretary Herter said that he thought everybody had the same objective in this matter. He, however, hesitated to put the plan forward as a firm proposal at the NATO meeting on December 15 because he felt that to make it effective, it would require (1) Congressional approval and (2) approval of the incoming administration. He thought it doubtful that you could get clearances on this matter in time. If such clearances could be gotten, he would be delighted but if we are to make specific proposals, these clearances should be obtained during the next two weeks so that our allies could have in the neighborhood of two weeks before the NATO meeting to consider it. The issue was really a question of presentation; namely, how do we answer the question as to whether the U.S. Government will feel the same way six weeks after the NATO meeting. Obviously, we will have to say that U.S. approval would be subject to Congressional action.

Secretary Gates said that, speaking philosophically, he felt that this administration had an obligation and an opportunity to wind up with a firm proposal on this subject with whatever caveats are necessary. Obviously, we cannot deliver because of the need for a change in the law. Besides, there are two separate phases anyway. He thought this was a very imaginative idea and he was afraid that, if we put this only in for discussion at NATO, we will not be clearing up our proper business. The next President may reverse anything we do, but we should present this proposal as the best opinion of the people who have been working in this field all these years.

The President commented that we almost always have to say to our allies that we will have to get legal authority for our proposals. He saw no reason why we should not say that, under certain assumptions, these are the things we think ought to be done.

Secretary Herter noted that the paper under Council consideration says that Congressional action would be required. This could go hand in hand with Executive action and he believed it provided enough of a caveat.

The President said that this administration should not hesitate to say what we think is good for NATO. After all, the next administration may not even agree to the general concept of NATO. Secretary Herter commented that it would not hurt his feelings if the President said we should make this a firm proposal.

Mr. Stans said that there was some ambiguity as to what is intended since the paper glosses over the question of financing.

He noted that we are proposing to deploy five POLARIS submarines by 1963 and not to withdraw them without North Atlantic Council agreement. Secretary Gates pointed out that our commitment not to withdraw was effective only if NATO agreed to the second phase.

Mr. Stans said that the five POLARIS submarines would probably cost about \$500 million and then we were proposing 100 additional missiles. Secretary Gates noted that the latter missiles were to be bought by the NATO countries. Mr. Stans said that the paper still did not indicate what was meant by "multilateral financing" in Paragraph 3-a. The President noted that this would still have to be worked out.

Mr. Stans said that he, nevertheless, thought that the cost to us and others ought to be indicated. Secretary Gates said that this was impossible except on the five U.S. POLARIS submarines because we do not know the configuration of the remainder and do not know whether they will be land or sea based.

In answer to Mr. Stans' question as to whether the five POLARIS submarines were within the approved POLARIS program, Secretary Gates said that he had asked the President this question and did not yet have a definite answer. Secretary Gates thought that we would be producing POLARIS submarines at the rate of about five per year for the next few years. He thought we could handle the NATO submarines by lending them as they are ready and then arranging to pay back the U.S. program. We might contribute one at a time and replace it in the budget as we go along. Technically, he admitted, that this meant the five submarines were additional to the present program. The President said he agreed with the proposal for the five POLARIS submarines being deployed to NATO.

In answer to Mr. Stans' question as to whether we were agreeing not to withdraw them, Secretary Gates said that there would be no conditions on that deployment (it would be the same as the Sixth Fleet) until NATO goes along with the second phase. Secretary Gates thought that if we could get a NATO MRBM force, we would probably want to be tied up in it.

Secretary Herter said that the basic problem was a fear of NATO that if the Soviets attack Europe only, we would not join with them. This proposal would give NATO its own deterrent strength.

In answer to Mr. Stans' question as to whether this constituted a precedent, the President commented that there was

UNCLASSIFIED

no precedent in the first phase. He added, however, that he thought it would be a good deal if we could get the second phase force in being down the road. Mr. McCone said that he thought we would have to make a commitment to NATO regarding tactical missiles.

The President said that he had recently been listening to the views of Robert Bowie and others and he thought that we must have the right to sell nuclear weapons to our allies if we feel they needed them. The President asked Secretary Gates as to what the proportion of expense would be in the MREM program over the years.

Secretary Gates said that we were not committing ourselves in principle until NATO agreed to a 100 missile force and made it subject to NATO control. Only then would we put our five submarines under NATO control. Meanwhile, we have no commitment affecting the freedom of our sovereignty until NATO agrees to the second phase. Mr. Gates admitted that he thinks there is a real question as to whether Congress will ever agree to NATO control as proposed in the second phase because it involves a constitutional issue.

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

Mr. Stans noted that Paragraph 6 of the proposal says that NATO should parallel the MREM advances with strengthening of other forces. He felt that there was no request for a concession to reduce NATO requirements in any other respect if the MREM proposal was agreed.

Mr. Irwin said that Defense did think it might be possible to reduce aircraft requirements. He pointed out, however, that NATO has no defense against missiles. If NATO knows that there is no such defense, the European members' support of NATO will deteriorate if we take the position that they can have no missiles with a 1000-1500 mile range. We would then be saying that they have no defense and no offense and we do not think it necessary for them to have either. Mr. Irwin thought this position would fracture the alliance.

The President said that as he sees it, until there is some basic change in the world situation, there is no escape from the arms race. What we ought to be talking about are the millions that we spend at home which cut into our budget as we strain for an adequate defense. We seem to be licked on the need not only for butter and eggs but also champagne while we continue to spend heavily for world defense.

Mr. Stans noted that as we do this, we and others are also being urged to build up our conventional forces. Secretary Gates said that he disagreed with any concept that conventional forces were needed for a limited war in Europe. Mr. Stans thought that if the MREM proposal led to a reconsideration of conventional forces, we might achieve a better balance. He thought the U.S. had still made no judgment as to the effect of the planned Russian demobilization on our requirements. He thought that the Russian

demobilization would certainly change their mobilization potential. Secretary Gates thought that there was no real change in the threat to NATO. Mr. Dulles said that the Russian demobilization seemed to be slowing down. Mr. Stans said that if they, nevertheless, go through with it, they will be changing to a nuclear threat to NATO. He still felt we should study the implications of the proposed Russian demobilization.

The President remarked that at yesterday's press conference, he had been asked if the reduction in dependents overseas indicated that the U.S. was planning any redeployment of forces. He had reminded them that our deployment to Europe was originally considered an interim emergency matter. He thought it was high time that we should say to the Europeans that with their 225 million people, they should do more so that we could bring some of our troops out. The only flaw is the fact that De Gaulle is keeping 600 thousand French troops in Algeria. The President noted that Foster Dulles was always against any reduction in our forces in Europe because he thought it would break up the alliance. That is why the President had been obliged to remind the press conference yesterday that our deployment was originally an emergency measure.

Mr. McCone thought one way to solve that problem might be to give the Europeans their own nuclear deterrent. After all, they were only spending one-third to one-half of what we are spending on our military forces.

The President stated that he had no objection whatever to the proposed MREM program. He thought it should be put forward but he thought we should put it in the context that we are going to cut down on some other things.

Secretary Herter said that the Europeans already suspect that we are going to cut down our forces in Europe. The President noted that State and Defense have always ^{said} that if we cut our European forces at all, it will result in the neutralization of Europe. Secretary Gates noted that we have recently been putting the pressure on the Europeans to live up to MC-70 and we have been pretty successful in getting them to build ^{up} their forces. He agreed with the President, however, that we should not be locked in concrete on our European forces forever. Secretary Herter admitted that he could not visualize a war in Europe which would not lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Gates noted that the cost of maintaining U.S. forces at their present level was so high that it left only

about \$5 billion in the Defense budget for modernization. He thought that there were still too many people in the military services and too many deployed overseas. The President thought that we should figure out a plan which was reasonable over the long term. At the time this was going on, we should also try to cut other expenses in Europe. Secretary Herter expressed the hope that we would not cut our forces while the Berlin threat remained.

The President commented that if Europe was going neutral, we had better find it out now. He said that he did not mean for us to deny our responsibilities because we had established our defense line in Europe but we should not have to do it all. He noted that the Europeans had built up their industry to the point where they can compete very successfully with us.

Mr. Patterson asked whether the MREM proposal would not put the pressure on the Europeans to put up more forces and Secretary Gates agreed. The President said that this sounded like the theory of giving a spoiled child ten more dollars to do what he should. Secretary Gates pointed out that we would not give up our control of our submarines until NATO agreed to build theirs. In answer to Mr. Stans question, Secretary Gates repeated that we would keep U.S. control of those POLARIS submarines until the second phase had been agreed upon. Mr. Stans said he thought it was wishful thinking to believe that NATO would also build up its conventional forces.

The President said that he wanted to leave a legacy of the finest ideas and plans this administration could develop. He thought that we must think what is the proper balance during the next six weeks. We should develop programs and plans that we think are feasible and that Congress would not feel it had to cut down.


Mr. Gray asked Mr. McCone if he wished to press the AEC proposal regarding Paragraph 2 of the MREM paper, that the U.S. should decide under what conditions it would be willing to release the POLARIS submarines for NATO use. Mr. McCone said that while he wanted that AEC view noted, he was enthusiastic about the MREM program. He thought that making the use of the submarines subject to North Atlantic Council agreed procedures left the question of conditions open. Mr. Gray pointed out that the bracketed phrase in Paragraph 2 was now to be deleted and Mr. McCone said that this made the proposal O.K. from his viewpoint.

Mr. Gray then asked whether the President felt that representatives of the next administration should be informed before the MREB proposal is made to NATO. The President thought that we should make clear to NATO that this is what we are suggesting but that the next administration may change it.

Mr. Scribner pointed out that Paragraph 6 says that the U.S. as well as other NATO nations should strengthen its conventional forces. The President said that the first sentence of Paragraph 6 should say that "the U.S. believes that other NATO nations" should strengthen conventional forces.

Mr. Gray then called on Mr. McCone to explain his view about the inadequacy of existing NATO stockpile arrangements. Mr. McCone said that he had recently examined bases in NATO and, realizing our heavy dependence on nuclear weapons, he believed that the procedures do not permit a proper response due to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. He thought this problem should be re-examined urgently, recognizing that any changes will require amendment of the law.

The President said that his idea was that we must get every single modification in the law that will allow a quick response but not delegate it to someone who would inadvertently start a war. He thought we should get the change in the law and then provide regulations which will prevent unfortunate accidents.



General Lemmitzer said that our missile bases are distributed and not concentrated. He said that the present arrangements were satisfactory to General Norstad. However, General Lemmitzer said he would like to go into this matter further with Mr. McCone.


2 w PAVS
TWO

UNCLASSIFIED


Mr. McCone said he was not critical of what our military were doing in Europe. They were only living up to the requirements of the law.


Secretary Herter noted that the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was going over to Europe and that this trip might prove helpful. He thought, however, that it would be desirable if Mr. McCone could join the Committee on the trip. Mr. McCone indicated that he might be able to do so for a few days.

Mr. Gray suggested that the Record show that Defense and JCS and the Chairman, AEC, should re-examine NATO stockpile arrangements in order to see what changes in the law might be required to give assurance of prompt and proper response. The President agreed and thought we should leave a legacy of thought about all such restrictive laws which we think are very bad. He cited the requirement of notifying the Joint Committee on certain decisions 60 days before they could be put into effect. The President thought possibly Mr. Kennedy could get some of these changed during the "honeymoon" period with Congress.





UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET






Secretary Herter asked if the MREM proposal could be worked out and made available to NATO about ten days in advance of the December 15 meeting. The President agreed. General Lemnitzer reported that the Joint Chiefs were in full agreement on the MREM proposal, noting that the U.S. in the first phase keeps control of the submarines. General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs feel very strongly that the proposal should be put forward to NATO as a firm proposal.







As the President was leaving the meeting, Mr. Gray recommended to him and the President approved that the remainder of the State-Defense report (NSC 6017) be referred to the Planning Board for further study and recommendation.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed certain issues contained in a report on the subject (NSC 6017), prepared by the Departments of State and Defense, in response to the reference NSC Actions calling for reports on (a) The Future of NATO; (b) The Roles and Contributions of the United States and Other NATO Nations; (c) Future NATO Nuclear Capabilities and the Problem of Nuclear Sharing; on the basis of a presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of certain policy issues (identified by the reference memoranda of November 16, 1960) connected with U.S. planning and guidance required for U.S. participation in the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meetings, as indicated below.
- b. Noted the President's approval of the presentation at the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meeting of the following firm U.S. proposals, subject to the caveat regarding necessary U.S. Congressional action:*

 - (1) The United States will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area (including Turkey), under U.S. custody, such U.S. nuclear weapons as are furnished for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans.
 - (2) The NATO MREM proposal (contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum on the subject, "Special

*See NSC Action No. 2336-c for a further agreement on the procedure to be used at the forthcoming NAC meeting.

UNCLASSIFIED

NSC Meeting", dated November 16, 1960), subject to the following amendments:

- (a) Paragraph 2, page 1: Delete the bracketed phrase and the footnotes thereto.
- (b) Paragraph 3, page 1: In the third line insert the words "buy and" between "therefore" and "contribute".
- (c) Paragraph 3-a, page 2: Delete the Defense version; include the State version, deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto; and add a new footnote reading as follows:

"* As indicated above, the multilateral financing of the 100 additional MRBMs will be exclusive of U.S. participation."

- (d) Paragraph 3-c, page 2: Delete the footnote thereto.
- (e) Paragraph 4, page 3: Revise the third and fourth lines to read as follows:

"would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement by sale of POLARIS missiles and of the required equipment".
- (f) Paragraph 6, page 3: Revise the first line to read as follows:


"6. The United States emphasizes that other NATO nations should undertake".

In the third line, substitute "their" for "its".

c. Noted the President's directive that the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, arrange for a re-examination of present NATO stockpile procedures in order to indicate what legislative changes might be required to give assurance of a prompt and proper response within the short reaction times of missile warfare.

d.

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET




f. Referred the subject report (NSC 6017) and related memoranda to the NSC Planning Board for further study and comment on policy issues not covered by the above actions, with particular reference to consideration of studies looking toward a long-term plan to reduce U.S. force deployments and expenditures in Europe.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, JCS, and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate implementation.

The actions in d and e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC.


JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Menshikov, November 21, 1960

On Monday, November 21, 1960, the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Menshikov, called on me in New York. He read to me in translation another message he had received from Khrushchev to be delivered to me personally.

Mr. Khrushchev said he had considered the essence of the conversation which I had had with Mr. Menshikov (reported in my letter of November 15), and that he had a positive reaction to the thoughts I had expressed. (Menshikov said that his report to Mr. Khrushchev had included the idea of forgetting the incidents of the past, and the suggestion that there might be some gesture on Khrushchev's side of a more friendly attitude such as the release of the RB-47 fliers.)

"On the whole, Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues were sympathetic to these considerations. If Mr. Harriman would talk over these matters unofficially, it might be useful. It would be still better if Mr. Harriman were authorized to state the views of President Kennedy himself on any particular issue. This would assist greatly in arriving at an understanding of the positions of both sides on the questions that required solution. There are quite a few issues that have accumulated, and it is high time to discuss the conglomeration of issues that have built up since the end of World War II. The Soviet government is ready to discuss all of these questions. If President Kennedy and his government have the same desire, then we shall have grounds for settling them. The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States would be set 'right' and this would be a great thing both for our country and for the

canon of peace in the whole world.

Menshikov, Nov. 21, 1960

4
-2-

I told Menshikov that I felt sure that President Elect Kennedy would not authorize anyone to have talks until he had assumed office. I explained that it was not customary for our President Elect to take any substantive positions during the interval between his election and inauguration. The first step in international affairs would be the appointment of the Secretary of State. He asked about the meeting with the Brazilian President Elect, and I pointed out you and Mr. Quadros were in the same position of being Presidents Elect, and it was therefore not a discussion with a representative of another government.

I do not think that Mr. Khrushchev's somewhat overly eager attitude should be interpreted to mean that he is ready to compromise the stands he has taken on issues in the past, although it does indicate that he wants to make a fresh start.

REPORT OF

CONFERENCES WITH AMBASSADOR MENSHIKOV

November 28 and 29, 1960

DECLASSIFIED
NLK-84-214
By BNM NARA Date 9/85

5

CONFERENCE WITH AMBASSADOR MENSHIKOV, NOVEMBER 28, 1960, AT
575 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY

Menshikov advised me that he had informed Khrushchev of our previous conversation and had received a long further message which he proceeded to translate from voluminous notes in Russian. A tight condensation follows.

Desiring to begin an exchange of opinions, Mr. Khrushchev wishes to outline some views of the Soviet on questions touched upon at our last talk.

I. DISARMAMENT

Mr. Khrushchev agrees with all those who consider this the most important problem. It should be settled without delay. Peace or war depends on how this can be peacefully solved.

Since an atmosphere of confidence does not exist between our countries Mr. Khrushchev believes that we should not sit passively by, but should roll up our sleeves and attack the problems -- remembering that measures toward disarmament will help disperse suspicions.

He says that the U.S.S.R. wishes to find a "way out of this stalemate". When the development of such destructive weapons has reached such unprecedented levels, general and complete disarmament is the only way out. Experience shows that a partial approach complicates achievement of agreement, and partial measures mean maintaining the war potential.

Partial measures do not settle the main problem or eliminate the threat of war.

So agreement on general and complete disarmament is the only way to end production of fissionable materials.

The United States proposal of ending production of fissionable materials makes sense only if nuclear weapons are simultaneously destroyed and their future use prohibited.

Khrushchev says that if we are serious about disarmament and the danger of nuclear war, we must take the following steps:

- 1) Stop production.
- 2) Prohibit use.
- 3) Destroy nuclear weapons, so that fissionable materials can only be used for peaceful purposes.

However, he says, the U.S.S.R. is not against partial steps where they contribute to ultimate disarmament, noting, by way of example, the reduction of the armed forces by the U.S.S.R. and the fact that the U.S.S.R. has insisted that all testing and development be stopped.

Negotiations on the test ban convince Khrushchev that the United States is to blame for no agreement. We have, he says, kept open the possibility of further tests in order to gain an advantage in the control system. He thinks that the United States, by threatening resumption of tests, is trying to force the U.S.S.R. to make concessions and conclude a treaty which will be favorable to Western arms and intelligence services while the arms race goes on.

5

The U.S.S.R., Khrushchev says, cannot agree to an unequal position damaging its security.

So he feels it is necessary to begin by working out basic principles of general and complete disarmament. The views of the U.S.S.R. were put forth at the recent General Assembly. The U.S.S.R., Khrushchev says, is not seeking unilateral advantages but is striving to reach acceptable agreements and is ready to consider any constructive proposals.

Khrushchev repeats that if the West will agree to general and complete disarmament, then the U.S.S.R. will accept any control and inspection worked out by the West. However, it is obvious, he says, that on every phase of disarmament controls should be established to correspond to the needs.

The U.S.S.R. proposes a special session of the General Assembly in March or April on disarmament alone. Khrushchev argues that such a meeting "will contribute to the mutual trust which is so indispensable". However, he says, it will not be possible to work out details but only the main principles of a treaty and assign the details to a committee on disarmament. He believes that the present committee should be enlarged to include five neutral nations and should be charged with working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament pursuant to the "foundations, terms of reference or directives" of the General Assembly.

He concludes by saying that it is important that neutral states participate in great international issues.

II. GERMANY AND BERLIN

Khrushchev contends that the only practical way to liquidate tension and stabilize the situation in Europe is by concluding peace treaties with the two German states. But, he says, if the United States is not ready to recognize East Germany it would be acceptable for each country to decide whether to sign one treaty or two treaties. The U.S.S.R. is prepared to sign two treaties.

The essence of the peace treaties, Khrushchev says, is recognition of the "unalterability" of the present boundaries of Germany and the existence of two German states. He insists that any peace treaty must also solve the question of West Berlin.

In West Berlin, he says, the U.S.S.R. proposes to make de jure what already exists de facto. Thereby, Khrushchev concludes, nobody loses anything, and no one gains at the expense of the other side. At the same time, he argues that such a settlement would improve relations, and would remove mistrust and suspicion in Europe about West Germany.

Khrushchev says that, if the United States does not like the Soviet draft of a peace treaty, the U.S.S.R. is ready to discuss an American draft. Possibly we have proposals of our own concerning the treaty. The Soviet Union is convinced that a "common language" can be found on every provision, assuming there is no question about German boundaries.

Khrushchev contends that the abnormality of the situation in West Berlin is recognized by everybody. It would be "incorrect to complicate the question by any groundless talk about joining West Berlin with West Germany because the U.S.S.R. does not consider West Berlin a part of West Germany" (this seemed to be a reference to the corridor proposal). Khrushchev dismissed the idea of treating East and West Berlin as a single city by saying that it would be "incorrect to introduce the question of East Berlin because it is an organic part and capital of East Germany". "The U.S.S.R. thinks the proposal to transform West Berlin into a free city is the best solution because it gives due regard to the protection and freedom of citizens of West Berlin. We do not propose to change the social and economic order in West Berlin or its close ties with West Germany".

He argues that West Berlin should not (a) permit subversive activities and hostile propoganda against East Germany and other Socialist countries, and (b) participate in blocs of a military-political nature.

He says that the United Nations and the four powers should give "wide and efficient guarantees not to interfere with the free city and its ties with the outside world".

Taking into account considerations of prestige, Khrushchev suggests that perhaps there should be a transition period before a final decision is reached on the creation of a free city. This transition period might take the form of a temporary

agreement for a strictly limited time. He says this is subject to discussion.


Khrushchev also wants to emphasize the unstable situation in West Berlin where life depends on the relations of the four powers and on the relations between the two Germanys. "For instance, a breach of the trade agreement by West Germany would provoke retaliatory measures which would be grounds for banning shipments from or to the Federal Republic. Such justified and logical measures would affect West Berlin also. This example shows how ripe the time is to work out a new status for West Berlin."

III. COLONIALISM

The U.S.S.R. argues that the colonial system has outlived itself but that the process of liberation has not been completed.

Khrushchev contends that the U.S.S.R. is not seeking any advantage in this connection. "All we are doing is to help these countries get and keep their independence. We call upon the United States to do likewise".

"You know these countries need scientific, economic and technical assistance and do not want to be the arena of sharp conflict between the great powers for spheres of influence. We believe our two countries could help to normalize relations in these regions".



At the conclusion of our talk Mr. Menshikov asked for my comments and I reported that the repetition of their views about Berlin was not encouraging. I added that the talk about ending colonialism was of course propaganda as it had virtually ended already.

Ambassador Menshikov asked if he could see me again during the evening to continue our talk. When I said it was impossible he said he would wait over to see me the next day.

A.E.S.

5

CONFERENCE WITH AMBASSADOR MENSHIKOV, NOVEMBER 29, 1960, AT
575 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY

Mr. Menshikov asked for my reflections on Mr. Khrushchev's message. We had a rather fruitless talk about Khrushchev's insistence that the Western powers agree to "general and complete disarmament" first before discussion of the phases and details of disarmament and control.

Menshikov quoted Khrushchev as saying: "If the Western powers agree to carry out general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union is ready to accept Western proposals on international control. If a decision is taken on total and universal disarmament and on the destruction of weapons, we shall be ready to accept any controls. Let the Western countries prepare the proposals, we will accept them * * * any proposals they wish to submit. But if the West insists on control and inspection first, then we think that its objective is not disarmament but intelligence -- to find out what the Soviet Union has".

After some discussion of the meaning of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on general and complete disarmament he urged that Khrushchev's proposals at the U.N. this fall be compared with the United States proposals at Geneva last summer. He said that would disclose "great differences" because there had been no agreement by the West to the basic principle of general and complete disarmament.

A.E.S.

6

Kingsland, Georgia
November 22, 1960

Honorable John F. Kennedy
President-Elect
Palm Beach, Fla.

Dear Jack:

I am taking the liberty of reporting some conversations with callers in New York last week as of possible interest to you.

U.S.-Soviet Relations. On Wednesday, November 16, Ambassador Menshikov brought me a "long message" from Krushchev. I have had several such messages from K since I visited him in the U.S.S.R. in 1958. The substance was as follows:

K sends you (Stevenson) greetings and regrets that he did not see you in New York during the General Assembly. He says that your activities toward better relations, lessening tensions, are very much appreciated and will always have support in Moscow, etc.

Krushchev sees a better possibility for fruitful action now, especially in relation to disarmament. He has high hopes that we can reach understandings. War must be avoided. He does not wish to argue about who is stronger, but to reach understandings and cooperate.

Disarmament would settle - basically - everything. It is K's first priority. He agrees we cannot do it overnight, but should lay foundations by agreements "at the top". He urges discussion off the record by letter and representatives - not "on the rostrum with the world as audience." Mr. K. deems it advisable to use not only official channels, because official language has so many "reservations". He wants informal talks with representatives of the new president there or here. When "on the rostrum" we have to repeat "old accusations".

Krushchev hopes for agreement on nuclear testing "in a short time" after President Kennedy's inauguration. He asked me to tell President Kennedy that the time is coming when it will be "easier to reach an understanding and that he has a sincere desire to do so".

After questioning, Menshikov said K's basic position on disarmament was enunciated in his concluding speech before the U. N. That is not an "ultimatum", however, and "he is ready to hear the other side". If we reach a basic agreement that our objective is complete and general disarmament, any disagreements "can be settled", and they will agree to "any" inspection and control.

As on several previous occasions with me, Ambassador Menshikov became ambiguous when questioned about the form and formality of "basic agreement on disarmament". In response to my request,

he agreed to give me the fundamentals of basic agreement in the Soviet view. He then asked me to suggest how to do something more effective on all outstanding questions, of which disarmament was the most important to them.

With respect to Berlin - he said the proposals for internationalization of both Berlins was 'impossible'. With respect to China - he said "they could not be helpful" in connection with renunciation of China's claim to Taiwan and that the Chinese would never accept the idea of "two China's". But on the "expansion" of China elsewhere, the Russians would be "glad to help".

Several times he quoted K as wishing me to know that "of course we had different views but they should not endanger the peace", as Mr. Nixon seemed to insist.

Latin-America. My visitor was a friend of fifteen years, Hernan Santa Cruz of Chile, deputy director of F.A.O. for Latin America and a "liberal". He said the situation was explosive; social unrest and stagnant economy. Last year population increased 2.6 per cent and average per capita income declined .03 per cent. Per capita food production declined 4 per cent and is now lower than before the war. Foreign investment decreased \$300 million.

"The new administration in the U. S. should make clear at outset that it is concerned first of all with the people of Latin America, not just the ruling classes and American business. The Bogota meeting was a beginning, a first recognition by U. S. of the causes and cures for social unrest. The U. S. should favor economic and political integration in Latin America as in Europe. The U. S. should say clearly that it expects taxation and land reform. The Communists are opposing integration and aggravating nationalism, which offers the U. S. an opportunity."

"The non-Communist countries should be prepared to invest \$2 billion dollars annually for five years on a rising scale, following pre-investment surveys by the new bank, the U. N. Special Fund, the OAS and ECLA."

Guinea. You may have heard from Bill Foster about the efforts to persuade Sekou Toure to postpone agreement with the U.S.S.R. on building the Konkure' dam until after your administration is in office.

For more than five years I have been concerned with economic development in West Africa. Stanley Osburne, president of Olin-Mathiesen, which has a large investment in Guinea, came to see me, as he often does, to report that he has assured Sekou Toure that U. S. aid in financing the dam will be given prompt and sympathetic attention by the new administration. He said he felt he had to say this - even without authority - in order to induce President Sekou Toure to delay his pending agreement with the Communists.

Honorable John F. Kennedy
Page 3

6.
November 22, 1960

Forgive this hurried dictation from the "piney woods" of Georgia.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Adlai E. Stevenson".

Adlai E. Stevenson

AES:em

7

Conversation with Ambassador Menshikov
December 14, 1960

I called on Mr. Menshikov for coffee at the Embassy about 2:30 o'clock Wednesday, December 14, 1960 at his request (really as an alternative to his offer to come to New York to see me.)

After some generalities in which I again explained that it was not possible for the new Administration to have any substantive discussions until after inauguration, and the Ambassador argued the point, the Ambassador asked why there could not be informal discussions at least with both sides explaining their approach. I expressed the opinion that it was impossible for anyone representing the new Administration to take any position until the President with his Cabinet and new advisors, had decided on policies. Finally, the Ambassador asked me if I would like to know what Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues had in mind. I said that if he didn't expect me to comment on it, I would certainly be interested.

Mr. Menshikov produced what appeared to be a thick memorandum (about 20 pages) and gave me the points. He did not translate it in detail - he turned the pages rather rapidly. I made notes, but as the points were so general I got nothing concrete from them:

"Senator Kennedy's election gives new hope to Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues of the possibility of developing relations between our two countries as they were during the war under President Roosevelt.

"They had noticed and were encouraged by Senator Kennedy's speech of October 1959, in which he said that we should try to find the points of common agreement, leaving aside those on which

7

its disastrously devastating effects. 'War is a common enemy' and we should work together against it. The avoidance of nuclear war depends on our two countries." I asked about China. The Ambassador replied that China would accept the same strict controls.

"Mr. Khrushchev had noted that Senator Kennedy had spoken against the U-2 incursions. This gave confirmation to their thought that Senator Kennedy would join in exerting efforts to reach a settlement over the differences: disarmament; Berlin; better relations generally.

"Senator Kennedy's election makes all this more possible. Mr. Khrushchev knows that it will be difficult, but we should try to reach agreement. Mr. Khrushchev feels that valuable results would be achieved. For example, Senator Kennedy's statement on Africa to end colonialism was agreed to by the Soviet government, and we could work together for this common end and avoid the possibility of conflict on that continent. Perhaps agreement could be reached on the subject of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries(!). Mr. Khrushchev's views have been submitted to the United Nations. The Soviet government does not want any material resources in Africa, -- They have all the minerals they need. Perhaps agreement could be reached to end military bases in Africa, and to compete only in the economic field. In this each could do its best. We might agree on a zone free of military bases and nuclear tests, as was proposed by Mr. Nkrumah.

"In the past, people had placed great hope in the United Nations, but now many are disillusioned. The United States has attempted to use the United Nations for its own ends -- but

"We obviously have different ideologies, but we should attempt to keep these differences out of our relations. If they are accentuated, it could lead to war. Peaceful co-existence means competition and, if possible, cooperation. We may disagree but we should not resort to armed conflict, and we should adhere to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Cooperation in the economic field would improve our trade relations, Mr. Khrushchev does not demand that we end our restrictions against the Soviet Union, but if the United States decided to do that, it would be useful and improve relations.

"These are some of the thoughts of Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues and their hopes of the improvement of relations with the new Administration.

"As to West Berlin, perhaps if we are not ready to accept a free city, an interim solution might be found. Mr. Khrushchev states again that he doesn't want to control West Berlin. He has some new ideas, though they are based on his old proposals."

Mr. Menshikov explained that Mr. Khrushchev wanted to have informal talks as soon as possible, with a non-official exchange of views. These should be off the record, without any publicity, and might be useful.

Mike Mansfield
Barbara Texaco
Wesley
10-11-68

MO4

BLAIR:

FROM FREEDMAN: HERE IS THAT CONFIDENTIAL MEMO FOR LAWRENCE (AND CARROLL) ABOUT WHICH SALISBURY SPOKE WITH YOU, WITH THIS INTRODUCTORY NOTE FROM SALISBURY:

"THE FOLLOWING IS A COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL MEMO OF A CONVERSATION WHICH I HAD YESTERDAY AT THE URGENT REQUEST OF MENSNIKOV HERE IN NEW YORK.

"I HAVE PASSED THE MEMO TO STEVENSON FOR HIMSELF AND RUSK AND I THINK THAT SALINGER SHOULD HAVE IT FOR KENNEDY AS WELL.

"THE OBJECT OF MENSNIKOV'S CONVERSATION WAS OBVIOUSLY TO PASS HIS VIEWS ON TO KENNEDY AND HIS STATE TEAM.

"I AM IMPRESSED BY THE NOTE OF URGENCY WHICH MENSNIKOV STRIKES. HE REPEATED AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT 'NO TIME SHOULD BE LOST.'

"I THINK IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SOMETHING IS EATING KHRUSHCHEV. THE MOST OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE HAS BEEN GIVEN A TIME ULTIMATUM FROM THE CHINESE AND THEIR FRIENDS AND MUST PROVE HIS POLICY BY MAKING SOME PROGRESS WITH US IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS -- OR FACE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES."

HERE IS THE SALISBURY MEMORANDUM COVERING THE CONVERSATION:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
AMBASSADOR M. A. MENSNIKOV

FROM FREEDMAN: HERE IS THAT CONFIDENTIAL MEMO FOR LAWRENCE (AND CARROLL) ABOUT WHICH SALISBURY SPOKE WITH YOU, WITH THIS INTRODUCTORY NOTE FROM SALISBURY:

"THE FOLLOWING IS A COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL MEMO OF A CONVERSATION WHICH I HAD YESTERDAY AT THE URGENT REQUEST OF MENSHIKOV HERE IN NEW YORK.

"I HAVE PASSED THE MEMO TO STEVENSON FOR HIMSELF AND RUSK AND I THINK THAT SALINGER SHOULD HAVE IT FOR KENNEDY AS WELL.

"THE OBJECT OF MENSHIKOV'S CONVERSATION WAS OBVIOUSLY TO PASS HIS VIEWS ON TO KENNEDY AND HIS STATE TEAM.

"I AM IMPRESSED BY THE NOTE OF URGENCY WHICH MENSHIKOV STRIKES. HE REPEATED AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT 'NO TIME SHOULD BE LOST.'

"I THINK IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SOMETHING IS EATING KHRUSHCHEV. THE MOST OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY IS THAT HE HAS BEEN GIVEN A TIME ULTIMATUM FROM THE CHINESE AND THEIR FRIENDS AND MUST PROVE HIS POLICY BY MAKING SOME PROGRESS WITH US IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS -- OR FACE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES."

HERE IS THE SALISBURY MEMORANDUM COVERING THE CONVERSATION:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH

AMBASSADOR M. A. MENSHIKOV

CONVERSATION WAS HELD THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, IN NEW YORK

AT HIS URGENT REQUEST

HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A PRIVATE, OFF THE RECORD CONVERSATION.

1. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IN RESOLVING SOVIET-AMERICAN DIFFERENCES, GETTING ON WITH DISARMAMENT AND ESTABLISHED A DETENTE.

READY TO ACT AT A TIME "WHEN MR. KHRUSHCHEV IS IN A POSITION TO MAKE AGREEMENTS."

3. MR. KHRUSHCHEV AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REGARD MR. JOHN KENNEDY AS A VERY SERIOUS AND ABLE MAN WHO TAKES A POSITIVE VIEW TOWARD THE URGENT PROBLEMS OF THE DAY.

4. "OF COURSE NOTHING CAN BE DONE UNTIL AFTER JANUARY 20" BUT THE OPPORTUNITY EXISTS FOR INFORMAL, OFF THE RECORD EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS IN ORDER TO CLEAR THE WAY AND TO SAVE TIME.

5. WHAT IS NEEDED ARE DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS RATHER THAN MORE REFERRING OF QUESTIONS TO COMMISSIONS, INVESTIGATING GROUPS, WORK GROUPS, ETC. ALL OF THIS WILL DELAY SOLUTIONS. THERE IS NO TIME TO BE LOST.

6. "ALREADY A YEAR HAS BEEN LOST" (DUE TO BREAK-OFF CAUSED BY U-2). I SAID HAD THE PRESIDENT RETURNED KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT IMMEDIATELY IN OCTOBER, 1959, THE U-2 WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED AND TIME WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN LOST. MENSHIKOV SAID: "I AM NOT AUTHORIZED TO PROPOSE ANYTHING BUT DOES NOT WHAT YOU HAVE SAID MAKE EVEN MORE URGENT THE QUESTION OF A MEETING OF THE PRINCIPALS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME (UNDERLINE) BEFORE THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE NOT TO SEE AGREEMENT HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO ACT AND PREVENT IT" (END UNDERLINE)

7. THERE MUST BE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND THE U S A. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS WAR AND DISASTER FOR ALL.

8. "THERE IS MORE TO BE GAINED BY ONE SOLID DAY SPENT IN PRIVATE AND INFORMAL TALK BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY THAN ALL THE MEETINGS OF UNDERLINGS TAKEN TOGETHER.

9. OF COURSE KENNEDY WILL HAVE A VERY BUSY SCHEDULE AFTER JANUARY 20. BUT THE QUESTION IS HOW COULD A MEETING BE BROUGHT ABOUT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

10. I JOKINGLY SAID THAT PERHAPS KHRUSHCHEV WOULD LIKE TO SPEND A VACATION AT PALM BEACH. MENSHIKOV SAID:

THAN ALL THE MEETINGS OF UNDERLINGS TAKEN TOGETHER.

9. OF COURSE KENNEDY WILL HAVE A VERY BUSY SCHEDULE AFTER JANUARY 20. BUT THE QUESTION IS HOW COULD A MEETING BE BROUGHT ABOUT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

10. I JOKINGLY SAID THAT PERHAPS KHRUSHCHEV WOULD LIKE TO SPEND A VACATION AT PALM BEACH. MENSNIKOV SAID: "YES, BUT IT TAKES TWO TO MAKE THAT POSSIBLE. THERE MUST BE AN INVITATION AS WELL AS AN ACCEPTANCE."

11. I SAID I THOUGHT THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION WOULD WISH TO FEEL ITS WAY A BIT -- POSSIBLY TESTING SOVIET INTENTIONS AT THE GENEVA NUCLEAR TEST NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE GOING INTO ANYTHING MORE ELABORATE. THIS DREW NO SPECIAL REACTION FROM MENSNIKOV.

12. I RAISED THE PROBLEM OF CHINA'S ADHERENCE TO THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN, DISARMAMENT, ETC. WOULDN'T THE CHINESE DECLINE UNLESS WE RECOGNIZED PEKING. RECOGNITION, MENSNIKOV SAID, WAS OUR BUSINESS. BUT CERTAINLY CHINA WOULD HAVE TO COME INTO THE U N. IF SHE WAS IN THE U N THIS SHOULD TAKE CARE OF THE QUESTION (PRESUMABLY OF ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS).

13. I SUGGESTED THAT THE U S A MIGHT FEEL IN THE PRESENT PERIOD A SLIGHT MILITARY WEAKNESS VIS A VIS THE SOVIET UNTIL THE MISSILE DISCREPANCY WAS OVERCOME AND THIS MIGHT CAUSE US TO BE ELUCTANT TO NEGOTIATE. MENSNIKOV SAID THAT IT WASN'T POSSIBLE TO DELAY; THAT THERE WAS NO PERFECT TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS THAT "IT IS NOW TIMELY AND WE MUST NOT LET THE TIME

HE SAID HE KNEW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP VERY WELL, EARLY MR. KHRUSHCHEV AND MR. MIKOYAN: THEY WERE KEEN



SECRET - LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2/16/60



MEMORANDUM

FOR: Mr. Gordon Gray
The White House

FROM: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. *WS*
Director
Executive Secretariat

Attached for your personal information is a copy of the Department's memorandum of conversation regarding the meeting between representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC and the White House on November 16 concerning MREMs for NATO and Nuclear Sharing.

Attachment:
As Stated.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *MR 89-17#1*
By *JWS* 1/23/92
NLE Date



Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in M 11/25/60
Approved in S 11/28/60

DATE: November 16, 1960
(2)

SUBJECT: Meeting on NATO MRBMs and Nuclear Sharing

PARTICIPANTS:

<u>State</u>	<u>Defense</u>	<u>AEC</u>	<u>White House</u>
The Secretary	Secretary Gates	Mr. McCone	Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. Merchant	Mr. Douglas		Mr. James Lay, Jr
Mr. Gerard Smith	Mr. Irwin		
COPIES TO:	Mr. Hayden Williams		
Mr. Kohler	General Lemmitzer		
	Aides		USRO - Amb. Burgess
COPIES TO: S/S	S/B	L	Defense - Secretary Gates
C	EUR	H	AEC - Chairman McCone
G	RA	S/AE	The White House - Mr. Gordon Gray
S/P			Amemb Paris - Amb. Houghton
			Amemb Paris - Mr. Thurston

The Secretary opened the meeting by posing the question of whether or not the NSC nuclear sharing papers should be presented to the President with splits. He pointed out that early Congressional consultation would be very difficult because of the fact that the individuals would be widely dispersed. Moreover legal difficulties had arisen and our lawyers had a number of questions relating to the October 3 NATO MRBM proposals. Finally we had to consider the long range implications which would require action by the new Administration. Therefore he doubted the advisability of putting the matter up to the President at present. He said that at the December NATO Ministerial meeting the US Delegation could suggest the lines of our thinking, with the development of specific proposals left for the May meeting.

Mr. Douglas said that some aspects, particularly the 5 Polaris submarines, could be separated out for the December meeting.

Mr. McCone said he felt the Planning Board could work forever and get no farther than it is today. He thought we should discuss the question with the President, maybe/ ^{not} in the form of a definitive paper but as to philosophical approach. He commented in this connection that he thinks the existing custody and control arrangements make

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
SECRET

NATO

INFORMATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case # State 8804490
NLE Case # 89-1702
By ML NLE Date 11/27/92

NATO a "paper tiger." "They just won't work quickly and effectively." As to Congressional consultation he cited the upcoming trip of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee to Europe. He had refused to go but Commissioner Graham was going as well as AEC's Assistant General Manager and some staff. They would bring back proposals and we needed to develop our basic philosophy.

Mr. Gray referred to the President's request in August. He said that he did not insist on the paper as such but he agreed with Mr. McCone that there was need to discuss the basic philosophy with the President.

Mr. Gates said he wanted to return to the question of philosophy. We had been through a tough exercise and could leave out the matters on which there would be need to consult our allies. We could go ahead with the NATO MRBM proposals and promise as to US intentions. He felt we must have a December proposal especially in view of other moves related to the balance of payments actions which could constitute a reduction or threatened reduction of forces and enhance our dependence on the nuclear deterrent.

The Secretary commented that only the October 3 paper was approved in principle by the President. He referred to the Defense proposal to drop paragraph 3 of this but said this would simply bring up the basic question on use related to the permanent deterrent force. After some discussion on whether consultations had to be held in advance on the use question the Secretary expressed his doubt that the President would approve a proposal in December and whether this would be the best from a national point of view in any case in view of future action required by the new Administration.


Mr. Gates reverted to the question of reduction of military dependents, pointing out that this also involved future action -- that nothing would be done before January 20 and that the new President might reverse the decision. He felt we would miss an opportunity for leadership if we did not table a proposal in December.

The Secretary replied that our allies were bound to ask whether this had been concerted with the new Administration. He felt the key to the proposal was the multilateral set-up involved. Mr. Gates insisted that the contribution of five submarines would be a major step. The Secretary replied that simply putting this proposal forward would involve nothing but the stationing of five Polaris submarines in the NATO area. He added that there was the



possibility of offering to maintain the level of the NATO atomic stockpile. Some further argument ensued but the Secretary felt that we should go ahead with the offer in December only if it were a firm United States Government proposal, not if it were one reversible in sixty days. Mr. Douglas thought there would not need to be much Congressional consultation with respect to the first phase; the second step would depend on future action by our allies as well as ourselves and we could simply express US intent to secure Congressional action.

Mr. McCone turned to the subject of the NATO atomic stockpile saying that he had examined the present and contemplated deployments which were enormous. In this connection he thought we must reexamine the use formulae. When the Secretary remarked on the difference in the AEC and DOD views, Mr. Gates said this reexamination could be done later, it was a question of legal restrictions.




General Lemnitzer said that we could not avoid a discussion of the MRBM proposals in December, citing in this connection an Italian paper presented to the Military Committee on the subject. After some further discussion the Secretary said the question was how far we could go. Mr. Gates said he thought we could give our allies the full MRBM paper tomorrow. They would have to agree to the proposal later but also the United States was committed to deliver only at a much later date. Mr. Douglas commented that the commitment of the five Polaris submarines was an important step in itself.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

-4-



LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

INFORMATION COPY



In a more general way the key to NATO solidarity would be a dramatic multilateral proposal. Without the full support of the new Administration, putting a proposal forward would do more harm than good. If there were not such support in December we would be laughed out of court. If the President-elect should approve the multilateral proposal in principle, then the Congressional consultations would be relatively easy. Mr. Gates said he flatly disagreed. He said the President-elect couldn't agree at this stage. He felt that there was a serious situation in NATO. We had worked hard for a long period of time to meet this situation and must go ahead to meet the doubts of our allies. We were still responsible. This was not only our opportunity but our responsibility.

The Secretary said that he thought it would be better in December to indicate only our line of thinking plus perhaps the specific undertakings to maintain the level of the stockpile and to commit five Polaris subs to NATO.

Mr. Douglas commented that if the Secretary were willing to do that much in December then he saw no trouble from Defense point of view.


The Secretary continued to cite the briefing he had given Senator Fulbright in preparation for the NATO Parliamentarians Conference as to our line of thought since the subject was bound to be discussed at that meeting.

Mr. Gray reiterated that while it was not necessary to go into detail he thought it was essential to give the President a fill-in. He hoped that State could highlight the problems and present the different views in the Planning Board paper.

Reverting to the question of consultation with the President Mr. Smith said that perhaps in a week or so we could produce an agreed paper for the presentation. The Secretary said he saw no reason why we should not have a paper this afternoon adequate for the discussion with the President. We needed only to cover the following points: (1) could we make a commitment on the NATO stockpile; (2) could we assign the five Polaris submarines to NATO; (3) considerations relating to the second step or multilateral MRBM proposal; and (4) what should we do about

Mr. Gates said the Department of Defense would suggest adding the question of NATO strategy but there were demurrers that this was not a problem which could be usefully tackled at present. Mr. Gray remarked that the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget would immediately raise the question as to whether the five Polaris subs were a part of the 19 already budgeted for. Mr. Douglas said the answer to that was that there was no chance of having the fiscal year 1962 budget go to 10 Polaris submarines.

The Secretary then suggested that an outline be prepared on the specific points which had been discussed as well as a draft of a proposal we would like to put forward at the Paris meeting. He added that the question of nuclear submarine cooperation was secondary but Mr. Gray pointed out that the President had specifically requested NSC views on this subject.



Mr. Kohler commented that there was still some difference as to whether a statement should be made at the December meeting or whether a US government proposal should be put forward. The Secretary said that was the question to be decided in Augusta.

Mr. Douglas then repeated that if we agreed to go ahead with commitments on the level of atomic stockpile and the assignment of five Polaris submarines to NATO, this should be entirely satisfactory. However Mr. Gates indicated that he would want to go farther toward making a firm proposal along the lines of the entire October 3 paper as revised.

The meeting then adjourned with an understanding that drafting would go forward immediately along the lines discussed and be ready later in the day.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

INFORMATION COPY

11/25/60
The President
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON



November 25, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Increased Sharing With Selected Allies of
Scientific Information Relating to Military
Research and Development, and Its Application

REFERENCES: NSC Actions Nos. 1804 and 2215-g

The NSC Planning Board, pursuant to NSC Action No. 2215-g, reviewed NSC Action No. 1804 (340th NSC Meeting, approved by the President on October 19, 1957) and considers that this Action should be rescinded because the objectives thereof have been accomplished.

It is requested that each member of the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, indicate his action with respect to the above recommendation, by completing and returning the enclosed memorandum form, if possible by or before Monday, December 12, 1960.

James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12336, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 92-20441
BY *L/b* DATE 9/3/92

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

OSANSA/NSC(SUB)/6/ Nuclear sharing w Allies / WOE

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL



(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Increased Sharing With Selected Allies of
Scientific Information Relating to Military
Research and Development, and Its Application

REFERENCE: Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated November 25, 1960

As requested, I am indicating below my action with respect
to the NSC Planning Board recommendation contained in the reference
memorandum:

Concur: _____

Do not concur: _____

Comments:

(Signature)

(Title)

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

12/60

II. SUMMARY EVALUATION OF OUR ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES TO FULFILL CURRENT MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND BASIC OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED IN NSC 5906/1.

Overall Evaluation. Between June 1959 and June 1960, there was little change in either the magnitude or character of major U.S. combat forces. Newer weapon systems will be more evident during FY 1961. All Services find it necessary to maintain adequate forces equipped with weapon systems of proven capability to satisfy security requirements and, at the same time, to provide for the development of new systems of yet unproven operational capability. There are two main aspects of this problem.

The complexity of modern weapon systems has resulted in extraordinarily long procurement lead times, and greatly lengthened technical training programs.

Development and procurement of these new weapon systems become more costly each year, and so it has become increasingly difficult to accomplish modernization within available resources.

General War. In evaluating our general war capabilities, the JCS note the requirement for forces capable of both nuclear and conventional operations. While these forces now have a greater capability for delivery of nuclear weapons than ever before, this may not in itself represent a net gain in relative military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Our deployed forces are subject, with little or no warning, to attack by significant communist forces. Within the near future, the Soviet Union may bring into operational readiness intercontinental ballistic missiles with the capability of attacking our base complex in the United States. The security of our long-range, land-based nuclear retaliatory forces will be increasingly dependent upon such factors as adequate warning, airborne alert capability, hardening and mobility. During FY 1961, two of our ballistic missile early-warning installations (Thule, Greenland and Clear, Alaska) will be operational. One site has an initial operational capability today. Full coverage is not scheduled for completion

We have no active defense against ballistic missiles but development effort on Nike Zeus continues at the highest priority. A coordinated Soviet attack against our long-range nuclear retaliatory forces, our deployed land-based forces, our logistical base, and our naval forces at sea would be extremely difficult to execute with complete surprise, and only a coordinated attack with almost complete surprise could endanger our effective retaliatory power.

Electrostatic reproduction made for preservation purposes by the Eisenhower Library for replacement of a deteriorating manuscript item.

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT SERIES
PRESIDENTIAL SUBSERIES

Box 5, 1960 - Meeting with President - Volume 2 (2)

596 / 8871

NSC 6013, Part 1
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b) 2
MR 85-37143
AND 2/16/86

PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.4 (D)(4)
NSC 6013, Part 1
DECLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/86

Limited War. As the Soviet nuclear, ballistic missile and conventional capabilities grow, the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced in Communist dealings with the rest of the world. In their continual probing of the strength and determination of the West they will be more aggressive in their use of political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. Although the Communists probably would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor as to make clear that further involvement would incur serious risk of general war or political disadvantage, the chances of their miscalculating such risks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing. Our military capacity to counter a single local aggression supported by the Sino-Soviet Bloc is adequate to meet national security requirements. Dependent upon the location and size of force required, we would be hard pressed to execute limited military operations simultaneously in two or more areas of the world and maintain an acceptable general war posture. In the latter event, national measures providing for a degree of mobilization and augmentation of lift capabilities might well be required.

Our capability to conduct non-nuclear war is very substantial and although it has not kept pace with our growing nuclear capability it has increased. Additionally, we must continue to rely, to a considerable extent, upon indigenous forces to cope with guerrilla and jungle warfare.

Cold War. Unified Commanders have formulated plans and are active in assuring increasingly effective utilization of their resources in the cold war. MAAGS, missions, attaches, rotational forces, pre-stockage of equipment, exchange officers on military staffs and in military schools, weapons demonstrations, show of force, official military visits and assistance in national disasters contribute to the over-all cold war effort. In order to limit the Sino-Soviet initiative in cold war, the United States must develop a broad range of capabilities whereby it may counter Sino-Soviet Bloc and communist activities in many parts of the world. Portions of South America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are areas of particular vulnerability.

Mutual Security. In both limited and general war, a substantial contribution is expected from our allies. Military planning takes cognizance of the limitations and capabilities of indigenous forces. Although our national security is predicated upon the concept of collective security, the United States must continue to develop adequate strength and a strategy for its employment to deter or successfully wage war, survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny, and to maintain the leadership of the Free World.

Summary. The previous annual reports and evaluation by the JCS recognized the probable diminishing relative military advantage of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. From the position we occupied with a great manned bomber fleet supported by a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons, at a time when the Soviet Union was very limited in long-range bombers and nuclear weapons, it was to be expected that our margin of advantage would certainly decrease. *But* our over-all military power continues the greatest in the world today.

Our task is to maintain our effective retaliatory capability and to improve our ability to defeat or contain local aggressions. The probable strength of the Soviet Union in ballistic missiles calls for major effort on our part to increase the survivability of our retaliatory strike forces. This need has given emphasis in our programs to increase warning, quick reaction, dispersal of bombers, and hardening, mobility and concealment of missiles.

In last year's report it was stated that by the end of FY 1962, with a continuance of present U.S. and Soviet trends and programs, and with no major breakthrough, each side may be expected to possess military strength of potentially decisive proportions.

Although this is possible, the progress made in our programs referred to above, to make certain the survival and readiness of effective retaliatory power, gives reasonable assurance that in the period ahead no enemy can expect to launch an attack against us without inviting his own destruction.

With respect to limited and local aggression more adequate provision has been made for Army modernization and for airlift. Also, since the end of fiscal 1960 our readiness has been increased by the deployment of an additional attack carrier to the Mediterranean and the Far East, the deployment of the first POLARIS submarine in the Atlantic, and the achievement of a capability to mount a significant airborne alert.

The ICBM site activation program suffered some delay in construction and initial installation and checkout of equipment. Delay in operational readiness occurred at the first five (5) sites. Scheduled target dates will be met from March 1961.

Dec '60

~~SECRET~~

coordinated production in Europe of modern weapons developed in the United States, we will continue to provide the necessary technical assistance.

I am convinced that the fundamental concepts of our existing NATO military strategy remain valid. Our efforts must continue to be directed toward building forces of a level of capability, nuclear and non-nuclear, which will provide an adequate flexibility of response. We must be prepared to meet any overt Soviet Bloc military action with sufficient strength and determination to force the Soviet either to withdraw or to accept the full risk of retaliation.

In our planning which leads toward achieving these ends, we must be prepared to act vigorously and imaginatively. Our MRBM concept is put forward in this spirit. It stems from a realistic analysis by SACEUR of future military requirements. We consider that it offers the best available means of providing timely modernization of a major element of the Shield's nuclear capability.

In conclusion, after some seven years of close association with NATO, I do not underestimate the difficulties. Looking back, however, the nations of NATO, working together, have kept the peace, and they have made giant accomplishments. I am confident that the Alliance will continue to grow in strength and purpose over the difficult years ahead.



p7 of "Statement by Secy Gates to the NATO Ministerial Meeting - Dec 1960 (u.d.)
OSANSA / NSC / Policy pp 129 / "NSC 6017 - NATO in the 1960s"

SECRET

12/60
~~SECRET~~

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY GATES TO THE NATO
MINISTERIAL MEETING -- DECEMBER 1960

(Made under Agenda Item III, Military Questions)



I appreciate this opportunity to make a brief statement. I believe it inappropriate to present detailed views or recommendations on specific military items. Instead, I have a few thoughts which I believe basic if we are to continue to progress now and over the future.

You have read the year-end report of the military authorities which states that "without further progress towards meeting the NATO military requirements, the ability of the major NATO Commanders to carry out their missions, including the full implementation of the forward strategy, will remain in jeopardy; and the contribution of these forces to the overall deterrent will not be fully effective." This statement clearly means that if war comes, some of us cannot be fully defended. It means also that the shortfalls weaken the deterrent. I believe the point should be made that a significant and growing Soviet military threat exists. Their tactics, as we interpret them today, can change very quickly with events.

The United States considers that NATO force requirements over the long term must be met in such a way that the required forces are achieved in the most economic fashion. This would involve continuing efforts to achieve balanced collective forces, standardization, and integration of command structure and in some cases of logistic systems, and would require consideration of geographic as well as other strategic factors. An effective NATO defense posture can be maintained only if the NATO members contribute their proper share to the common effort. To this end the United States will, of course, continue to provide a fully effective strategic deterrent force and our fair share of forward deployed forces. We believe, moreover, that our partners in NATO should make the greater contribution which their economic positions enable them to make.

The United States is undertaking programs which are today and will be of significant importance to NATO security before the long-range planning period has run its full course. We continue to expand our activities in basic and applied research and in development of advanced weapons and space programs. We are moving forward into production when the state of the art warrants such action. These programs require vast sums of money and the finest technical manpower. You are familiar with the powerful mixed strategic deterrent force of the United States and with our advanced aircraft and mid-range and intercontinental ballistic missile systems. There exists also a significant United States capability to handle local situations short of general war. However, sometimes those not intimately connected with our military program have difficulty in visualizing its extent and ever-changing complexity. All of the free world can share our confidence in its total balanced adequacy and power which we are dedicated to improve and to preserve.

DECLASSIFIED

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (a) (1)(4)(6)

DOD letter 7/2/85

NLE DATE

7/2/85

~~SECRET~~

Authority MR 85-21442


NLE Date 7/12/85

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, Office of the Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs

Records, 1952-61

1987/1141
Policy Papers Subscribed
SN 29, NSC 657 - NATO in the 1960s



Finally, we support in a varying degree projects in the areas of mapping, geodesy, meteorology, manned and unmanned maneuverable space vehicles, and defense against unfriendly satellite activity.



All of these programs will be of great importance to NATO security.

The United States is determined to continue its military assistance program as a vital part of its contribution to NATO and the free world. The economic and industrial situation is such that the need for external military assistance in some countries cannot be appreciably alleviated in the foreseeable future. There are, however, two significant respects in which changing circumstances appear to require some alteration in our military assistance program.

First, in light of the expanding scope and cost of vital military, space and scientific programs that fall primarily on the United States to maintain, we cannot continue indefinitely to provide military equipment on a grant basis to nations which now have the financial capability of purchasing their military equipment. We are confident that, as full partners in the common defense, all NATO nations who are able to assume the full financial responsibility for their own defense requirements will do so. It was in this spirit that arrangements have been made to terminate grant military assistance to the Governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. However, as I have already stated, the United States is determined to continue its military assistance program in aid of those nations unable to meet their own military needs, and expects those Western European nations who are able to do so will share this determination and also will help.

Secondly, in recent years, the United States has used its military assistance programs as a means of supporting coordinated research, development and production of modern weapons in Europe. As weapons become more complex and costly with each new technological development and as long as the balance of payments situation of Western Europe continues to be stronger than that of the United States, we feel the coordinated approach must be increasingly employed. In those instances in which production lines are already established in the United States or elsewhere and where it is not worthwhile establishing additional ones, European countries which are planning the procurement of modern weapons should give consideration to the possible advantages of purchasing such weapons from existing production facilities. When decisions are made to initiate

~~SECRET~~

coordinated production in Europe of modern weapons developed in the United States, we will continue to provide the necessary technical assistance.

I am convinced that the fundamental concepts of our existing NATO military strategy remain valid. Our efforts must continue to be directed toward building forces of a level of capability, nuclear and non-nuclear, which will provide an adequate flexibility of response. We must be prepared to meet any overt Soviet Bloc military action with sufficient strength and determination to force the Soviet either to withdraw or to accept the full risk of retaliation.

In our planning which leads toward achieving these ends, we must be prepared to act vigorously and imaginatively. Our MRBM concept is put forward in this spirit. It stems from a realistic analysis by SACEUR of future military requirements. We consider that it offers the best available means of providing timely modernization of a major element of the Shield's nuclear capability.

In conclusion, after some seven years of close association with NATO, I do not underestimate the difficulties. Looking back, however, the nations of NATO, working together, have kept the peace, and they have made giant accomplishments. I am confident that the Alliance will continue to grow in strength and purpose over the difficult years ahead.



~~SECRET~~

SECRET

EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT BY
SECRETARY OF STATE HERTER AT NATO MEETING,
Paris, December 1960

It is equally urgent that NATO fulfill its established requirements for its other Shield forces as well as for its MRBMs. In case of an attack, NATO forces should be able to meet the situation with a response appropriate to the nature of the attack. In speaking to the NATO Parliamentarians, General Norstad said that "our forces must have a substantial conventional capability", that they should be "made up of army, navy and air force elements of suitable types and equipped with a balance of conventional and nuclear weapons", and that "the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle should be a high one". Unless all NATO Shield goals are substantially achieved, NATO Military Commanders will not have that flexibility of response that will enable them to meet any situation with the appropriate response.

Whether or not the Soviets carry out their announced force cuts, they will maintain large and ready ground, as well as air and missile, forces which will continue to pose a grave threat to the forward areas of NATO. Soviet progress in ballistic missiles may increasingly encourage them to believe mistakenly that they can threaten the forces of NATO without serious danger of general war. Thus, failure to achieve adequate NATO Shield forces in the near future will place our Alliance in growing peril of general war by Soviet miscalculation.

* * * * *

We wish to continue to make a maximum contribution to Free World security, but, as indicated in our Annual Review submission, we are increasingly concerned with how to allocate our resources in the best manner. As was stated in that submission, some further changes in U. S. force deployments may become advisable as studies of over-all U. S. programs progress. In fact, some redeployment may become a necessity unless our balance of payments can be brought into a more reasonable equilibrium.

SECRET

Dec 60

SECRET (✓)

EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT BY
SECRETARY OF STATE HERTER AT NATO MEETING,
Paris, December 1960

It is equally urgent that NATO fulfill its established requirements for its other Shield forces as well as for its MRBMs. In case of an attack, NATO forces should be able to meet the situation with a response appropriate to the nature of the attack. In speaking to the NATO Parliamentarians, General Norstad said that "our forces must have a substantial conventional capability", that they should be "made up of army, navy and air force elements of suitable types and equipped with a balance of conventional and nuclear weapons", and that "the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle should be a high one". Unless all NATO Shield goals are substantially achieved, NATO Military Commanders will not have that flexibility of response that will enable them to meet any situation with the appropriate response.

Whether or not the Soviets carry out their announced force cuts, they will maintain large and ready ground, as well as air and missile, forces which will continue to pose a grave threat to the forward areas of NATO. Soviet progress in ballistic missiles may increasingly encourage them to believe mistakenly that they can threaten the forces of NATO without serious danger of general war. Thus, failure to achieve adequate NATO Shield forces in the near future will place our Alliance in growing peril of general war by Soviet miscalculation.

* * * * *

We wish to continue to make a maximum contribution to Free World security, but, as indicated in our Annual Review submission, we are increasingly concerned with how to allocate our resources in the best manner. As was stated in that submission, some further changes in U. S. force deployments may become advisable as studies of over-all U. S. programs progress. In fact, some redeployment may become a necessity unless our balance of payments can be brought into a more reasonable equilibrium.



DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Authority MIC 85-21441
By ALC NLE Date 8/22/85

OSAN SA / NSC / Pottery Pp / 29 / "NSD 6017 - NATO in the 1960s"

12/2/60

December 2, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 468th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, December 1, 1960

Present at the 468th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); Mr. John N. Irwin, II for the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 1 and 2); the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Agency (Item 1); the Director, National Science Foundation (Item 1); and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Item 1). Also attending the Meeting were General Curtis LeMay for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency (Washburn); the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Dr. Walter Whitman, Department of State; Mr. Hayden Williams, Department of Defense; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; Mr. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Mr. James B. Connelley, Assistant Secretary of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Mr. Joseph P. Kamp, Assistant Secretary of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology. Also attending the Meeting were the Special Assistant to the President for Security of the Office of the Secretary; the Executive Secretary of the Office of the Secretary, NSC.

1. INTERNATIONAL
(NSC Action)

Mr. Gray read the draft Discussion Paper on the future NSC Agency. The Council Planning Board decided that the mission of the Agency would be to make a formal presentation, after which the Council would be asked to consider the draft NSC Action which had been prepared. The Council also decided that a Discussion Paper might be prepared on the subject and declassified. The Council also asked Dr. Kistler to make a presentation on the subject.

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS

E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)

Agency Case NSC 889-1085

NLE Case 78-89-25

By [Signature] NLE Date 12/23/91

TOP SECRET

AWP / NT-103
NSA

distributed to Council members. Mr. Gray then called attention to the presence of Dr. Waterman, Dr. Glennan, and Dr. Whitman (State Department Science Adviser).

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the advances of science, especially the application of science to technology, have a profound effect on the relations between nations. He would try to amplify the relationship of science and technology to national security objectives. In the first place, he would like to point out that the most essential international scientific activities are those performed by scientists themselves, that is, non-governmental activities. Dr. Kistiakowsky then displayed two charts giving examples of non-governmental and governmental international scientific activities as follows:

Non-Governmental

Personal contacts
Meetings and conferences
Scientific organizations
Publications

Governmental
(Cost \$100 million per year)

Fellowships & Exchange Programs
Support of Research Abroad
Oceanography research
Space
NATO science programs

Dr. Kistiakowsky said the U.S. engaged in international scientific activities because such activities are completely necessary. The advances of science were speeded up by exchanges of information, while contact between U.S. scientists and scientists of different traditions could be stimulating and provocative, leading to the development of hypotheses which might in turn lead to major scientific advances. Moreover, some fields of science required an international scope for adequate development, e.g. oceanography, meteorology, and space. Also, the U.S. national scientific effort could be enhanced by enlisting foreign scientists and facilities possessing unique capabilities. Our space efforts, for example, would be hampered if we were not able to take advantage of the Jodrell Bank installation.

Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that international scientific activities could also make contributions not only in the strictly scientific areas but also in political, psychological, and intelligence areas. The special characteristics of science that enabled it to make contributions in these non-scientific areas were: the independence of science from political beliefs, the fact that science is of interest to all nations, the promise which science offers to newly emerging nations, and the tendency to identify science with national strength and well-being. International scientific activities with Sino-Soviet Bloc countries could contribute to U.S. national

security by contributing to (1) a reduction of the barriers between the U.S. and the Sino-Soviet Bloc (2) ferment in thinking (3) a reduction of political tensions (4) increased contacts with the satellite countries, [.....]
..... Dr. Kistiakowsky believed that the accomplishments of the U.S. scientific community had made a profound impression on Russian scientists. The long-term effect of this impression could not be predicted and, of course, US-USSR relations would not be determined by scientific contacts alone. Nevertheless, in a period of political tension, scientific contacts remain one of the few channels through which the U.S. might reach influential Russians. Moreover, scientific contacts with some of the satellite countries, for example, Czechoslovakia, remain one of the few means of preserving U.S. influence in countries with a long tradition of orientation toward the West.

Turning to scientific contacts between the U.S. and non-Communist countries, Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that such contacts can (1) increase the contributions of other countries to our security (2) demonstrate the identity of U.S. interests with the interests of allies and neutrals (3) provide solutions to the problems of the newly-emerging countries, and (4) expand scientific effort in friendly nations.

In Dr. Kistiakowsky's view, scientific strength and leadership were now major factors in assessing the strength and prestige of a nation. He believed the U.S. led the world in science even though Soviet propaganda had somewhat distorted the truth about this matter. Dr. Kistiakowsky thought that, in general, international scientific activities could (1) demonstrate the leadership of U.S. science (2) demonstrate the leadership of the U.S. in international scientific activities (3) strengthen the UN and (4) promote scientific and economic advantages by cooperation.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he hoped his remarks had high-lighted international scientific activities and the relation of these activities to science in general and to national security. He then asked the question: Are we taking full advantage of our opportunities in the field of international scientific activities? He replied that it was not possible to make a flat evaluation. Our international scientific activities were quite extensive but he was not certain whether they were well pointed toward deriving maximum benefit from the world situation. Certain problem areas required further study:

the possible need for an organization in government to evaluate scientific programs as a whole; the extent to which foreign policy considerations should affect bilateral scientific programs with the USSR; the possible requirement for policy guidance to assist various government agencies to take advantage of the opportunities in international scientific activities; and the issues raised by contact with scientists from unrecognized regimes. Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that the Federal Council for Science and Technology should have a role in studying some of these problem areas. The Science Advisory Committee believed that the U.S. was now at the threshold of new opportunities to enhance U.S. security through international scientific activities. However, we needed some central recognition of the available opportunities and some means of encouraging government agencies to take advantage of them. In conclusion, Dr. Kistiakowsky read the draft NSC Record of Action prepared by the Planning Board and suggested that it be adopted by the Council.

Mr. Gray commented that the Planning Board had felt generally that recognition by the Council of the importance of international scientific activities in their relation to national security was desirable. The draft Record of Action was intended to provide this recognition.

Secretary Dillon said the Department of State fully supported Dr. Kistiakowsky's remarks as to the importance of international scientific activities. The Department of State had a real and continuing interest in these activities and worked closely with Dr. Kistiakowsky in this field.

The President noted that the Federal Council for Science and Technology had been established by executive order and would therefore continue in existence under the new administration unless the latter took definite action to terminate it. He asked whether when the administration changed, the various departments would still include civil servants who would have a definite interest in international scientific activities and who could, therefore, prepare the report called for by the draft Action. The President then asked whether the Science Advisory Committee had also been established by executive order. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied that the Committee had been established as part of the White House, although a very old executive order had created a Science Advisory Committee in ODM. The President said he wanted to make sure that the officials concerned with scientific activities were aware of their responsibilities for carrying on these activities after a change of administration. He would like to do what he could to enhance their stature and tenure. General Persons reported that in his liaison with representatives of the incoming administration, he had formed the impression that the latter would like to continue the government's scientific work.

Mr. McCone noted that international exchanges, which are carried on with practically all nations, were very important in the atomic energy field. Ten days ago he had met for three hours with his Soviet counterpart to discuss the US-USSR exchange program for 1961. Mr. McCone said he had a violent discussion with the Russian official on such questions as secrecy, the U-2, test negotiations, and Khrushchev's statement that the U.S. is grinding out missiles like sausages. Despite these differences, however, agreement had been reached on the principle that the exchanges should be continued and a program for 1961 had been adopted. Moreover, the USSR was now prepared to release 250 technical journals to the U.S. Mr. McCone explained that the USSR was obliged to make these journals available to the U.S. under the exchange agreement but that it had heretofore refused to honor this part of the agreement. Finally, as an example of another international scientific activity in the atomic energy field, Mr. McCone referred to a meeting scheduled to be held in India on January 16 in connection with the dedication of a test reactor. The U.S. would send Commissioner Robert Wilson to this meeting.

The President recalled that the Science Advisory Committee had been set up by Dr. Killian in 1957. He wondered whether the civilian personnel working for the Committee would continue under the incoming administration. Dr. Kistiakowsky said their continuance would be at the pleasure of the next administration since they are members of the White House Staff.

Dr. Glennan reported that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration had tracking stations in fourteen countries and was constructing such stations in seven additional countries. Scientific contacts with other countries in the field of scientific satellites and communications satellites were increasing. NASA was trying not to force its way into other countries but was endeavoring to encourage other nations to develop their own scientific strength. NASA heartily endorsed international scientific activities.

Dr. Waterman indicated that the National Science Foundation had great interest in international scientific activities. Indeed, NSF was the major agency sending U.S. scientists abroad and awarded NATO fellowships.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

b. Noted the following NSC Planning Board conclusions:

- (1) International scientific activities relate directly and increasingly to the national security objectives of the United States.
- (2) In several respects those activities are especially suited to the pursuit of those objectives.
- (3) It is both opportune and desirable that a special effort be made now (a) to determine whether the United States is taking full advantage of the opportunities which are presented by international scientific activities to advance our national security objectives and (b) to assure that all feasible and reasonable steps to this end are taken.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the Federal Council for Science and Technology for appropriate action, with the request that a report on such action be made to the National Security Council.

2. NATO IN THE 1960'S
(NSC 6017; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Special NSC Meeting", dated November 16, 1960; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "NATO MREM Force", dated November 29, 1960)

Mr. Gray called attention to the draft Record of Action of the 467th NSC meeting held in Augusta on November 17. That draft Record of Action contained a paragraph which stated that "the U.S. will make a commitment to maintain those nuclear weapons required for approved NATO military plans, deployed under U. S. custody in accordance with agreed NATO plans." The President had tentatively approved this paragraph but Defense had requested reconsideration and had suggested the following language as a substitute: "The U.S. will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area, under U.S. custody, its contributions of nuclear weapons to meet the requirements for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans."


Mr. Irwin said the Department of Defense did not disagree with the substance of the tentatively approved paragraph but both

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that some "tightening up" of the language would be desirable. The Defense proposal differed from the tentatively approved paragraph in four respects. In the first place, Defense proposed to use the word "keep" instead of the word "maintain". The President said he had no objection to this change. Continuing, Mr. Irwin said that in the second place, Defense proposed to use the phrase "in the European NATO area" in order that the language would be more specific as to the geographical region covered. The President asked whether the five POLARIS submarines which the U.S. would commit to SACEUR might not be stationed in international waters. He had not favored the Defense language when it had been shown to him earlier because he had thought it could be interpreted to mean that the U.S. contribution of nuclear weapons would necessarily be stationed within the NATO countries. Mr. Irwin said that the word "European" might be deleted from the Defense proposal. Mr. Gray asked whether the Defense proposal did not refer to weapons other than POLARIS submarines. Mr. Irwin said the Defense paragraph referred to the whole nuclear weapons stockpile. The President said that the paragraph could, therefore, include POLARIS submarines. Mr. Irwin agreed.

Mr. McCone felt that the paragraph should contain a provision that we could withdraw nuclear weapons from the NATO stockpile. He was becoming alarmed at the projected size of the NATO stockpile. Secretary Dillon said we were committed to keep in the NATO area only those nuclear weapons required for the accomplishment of approved NATO plans. The President wondered whether we should not say that the U.S. would "keep at any time the nuclear weapons to meet the requirements."

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that some "tightening up" of the language would be desirable. The Defense proposal differed from the tentatively approved paragraph in four respects. In the first place, Defense proposed to use the word "keep" instead of the word "maintain". The President said he had no objection to this change. Continuing, Mr. Irwin said that in the second place, Defense proposed to use the phrase "in the European NATO area" in order that the language would be more specific as to the geographical region covered. The President asked whether the five POLARIS submarines which the U.S. would commit to SACEUR might not be stationed in international waters. He had not favored the Defense language when it had been shown to him earlier because he had thought it could be interpreted to mean that the U.S. contribution of nuclear weapons would necessarily be stationed within the NATO countries. Mr. Irwin said that the word "European" might be deleted from the Defense proposal. Mr. Gray asked whether the Defense proposal did not refer to weapons other than POLARIS submarines. Mr. Irwin said the Defense paragraph referred to the whole nuclear weapons stockpile. The President said that the paragraph could, therefore, include POLARIS submarines. Mr. Irwin agreed.

Mr. McCone felt that the paragraph should contain a provision that we could withdraw nuclear weapons from the NATO stockpile. He was becoming alarmed at the projected size of the NATO stockpile. Secretary Dillon said we were committed to keep in the NATO area only those nuclear weapons required for the accomplishment of approved NATO plans. The President wondered whether we should not say that the U.S. would "keep at any time the nuclear weapons to meet the requirements."



Continuing his exposition of the differences between the Defense proposal and the tentatively approved paragraph, Mr. Irwin said that, in the fourth place, Defense wished to use the expression "to meet the requirements for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans" instead of the term "required for approved NATO military plans". The President said it seemed to him that Mr. Irwin's fourth point described a distinction without a difference. Mr. Irwin said that the language in the tentatively approved paragraph, "deployed in accordance with agreed NATO plans", could be interpreted to mean a more specific deployment than was suggested by the Defense change.

The President said he was still disturbed by the expression "NATO area". He did not know how the NATO area would be defined. Mr. Irwin explained that the tentatively approved version of the paragraph did not mention the area at all. Defense thought it was desirable to specify the area in which the U.S. would be committed to keep nuclear weapons. The President suggested that the paragraph might say that we would keep weapons promptly ready for NATO

use. He wondered whether that was not the meaning we were trying to express.

Mr. Gray then referred to the draft statement of policy on the NATO MREB Force which had been revised at the Augusta Council meeting on November 17. After the Augusta meeting Mr. Stans had made a suggestion for a revision of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the paper and this suggestion had been tentatively approved by the President. Other agencies had requested reconsideration and under cover of a memorandum dated November 29 the NATO MREB paper had been circulated to the Council with two versions of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 in parallel columns

as follows, the left-hand version being taken from the original paper and the right-hand version being Mr. Stans' proposal.

"The U.S. would consider the five POLARIS submarines as a contribution to the NATO MREB Force, described in paragraph 3 below and, in the event of its establishment, would undertake not to withdraw them from NATO without NAC consent during the life of the Treaty."

"The United States would consider the five POLARIS submarines as a contribution to the NATO MREB Force, described in paragraph 3 below and, in the event of its establishment, and subject to the measures called for in paragraph 6 below, would undertake not only to commit them to SACEUR but to agree not to withdraw them from NATO without NAC consent during the life of the treaty."

Secretary Dillon called attention to an error in the right-hand version of the sentence which contained the phrase "would undertake not only to commit them to SACEUR". The sentence was intended to refer to our commitment of five POLARIS submarines to the NATO MREB force, a commitment which was not the same as the original commitment to SACEUR referred to in the first sentence of Paragraph 2 of the NATO MREB paper. The words he had just quoted were confusing because they seemed to be talking about the first phase of the commitment. Mr. Dillon then turned to the expression in the right-hand version, "subject to the measures called for in Paragraph 6". He said this was a difficult question which brought up the problem of how the U.S. proposal on NATO MREBs would be presented in Paris. Secretary Dillon had no objection to Mr. Stans' suggestion that our contribution of five POLARIS submarines to the NATO MREB Force should be linked to the measures called for in Paragraph 6 as a statement of our own understanding of our objective. However, he felt very strongly that if the U.S. proposal were presented to the NATO countries with our commitment of POLARIS submarines to the NATO MREB Force linked to the measures in Paragraph 6, the proposal would be unacceptable because we would be asking our NATO allies to provide 100 MREBs unconditionally while we were willing only to commit ourselves on condition that we were unilaterally satisfied as to the additional measures which these countries would carry out, measures which were not spelled out. Secretary Dillon reported that in Europe last week he had presented the substance of the NATO MREB proposal orally to Adenauer, Couve de Murville, and Lord Home as well as to Senators Johnson and Fulbright. He discovered there were divergent views as to the substance of the proposal in the three capitals but there was agreement on principle.

Ambassa-
dor Burgess and General Norstad agree that it would be undesirable to present a detailed proposal. Secretary Dillon therefore felt that the concept of a multilateral MREB Force should be put forward as a concept but that the text of the NATO MREB paper should not be distributed to the other governments concerned. Chairman Holifield of the Congressional Joint Committee concurred. Secretary Dillon said the Department of State therefore believed that Ambassador Burgess and Secretary Herter should present (1) our stockpile proposal (2) our specific offer of five POLARIS submarines to be used under present NATO procedure for the use of national forces made available to NATO and (3) the hope that other NATO governments would wish to consider a NATO MREB Force involving 100 additional medium-range ballistic missiles. In connection with the third point, the U.S. would indicate that it would be prepared to consider a permanent MREB Force if NATO could see its way clear to the establishment of such a force. We would further state that we realize the establishment of a permanent force would raise a large number of technical military and political problems as well as problems of ownership which would require discussion. Secretary Dillon said this procedure which he had just outlined would be a substitute for the tabling of a detailed paper which would imply that we have a blueprint ready. He felt it was important to discuss this matter with NATO on an equal basis rather than to confront NATO with a complete scheme. He had talked the matter over with Secretary Gates who had agreed with his idea of presenting the NATO MREB Force as a concept rather than as a detailed plan.

The President inquired whether Mr. Dillon was indicating that our policy paper on the subject should say what our objective is and should then indicate what our tactical approach to NATO should be in view of the doubts of our NATO allies. Secretary Dillon said that Mr. Stans' suggestion for revision of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the NATO MREB paper was acceptable as a statement of U.S. policy but was not acceptable as a statement of the way we should approach NATO. Mr. Stans said he had no objection to eliminating from his proposal the expression "not only to commit them to SACEUR." He thought the problem of words in the NATO MREB paper was becoming more important all the time.

He had assumed that as we completed the five POLARIS submarines and deployed them, there would be concurrent action by NATO to buy 100 MREMs and also to strengthen MC-70 forces. There was also a question as to whether we were deploying the five POLARIS submarines to NATO permanently. The President said the proposal involved two phases. In the first phase we had complete control of the POLARIS submarines; in the second phase, we transferred them to NATO.

Mr. Irwin said that with respect to Mr. Stans' desire to make the contribution of five POLARIS submarines to the NATO MREM Force subject to the measures in Paragraph 6 (i.e. additional vigorous measures by the other NATO nations to strengthen their other forces), the Department of Defense had serious problems, not only in connection with the presentation of the NATO MREM proposal but also in connection with the secret statement of U.S. policy. The NATO MREM Force was intended to solve some of the political and military problems of NATO, including the problem of multiplicity of nuclear weapons. If we inserted in the proposal a condition which indicates that NATO must proceed to acquire 100 MREMs, after which we will decide subjectively whether other NATO nations have accomplished enough improvement in MC-70 forces, we would be ensuring defeat of the proposal before it is presented to NATO. Even if the condition suggested by Mr. Stans is included only in our own policy statement and is not revealed to NATO, the condition three or four years from now will arise to haunt us.

Secretary Dillon suggested that we should tell the other NATO countries that the NATO MREM Force could not be established at the expense of improvement in MC-70 forces. He agreed with Mr. Irwin that in the presentation of the NATO MREM proposal, we could not give the other NATO countries the impression that our willingness to commit POLARIS submarines to the NATO MREM Force is subject to our unilateral interpretation as to improvement in MC-70 forces.

Mr. Stans believed that the President's recent decision to reduce U.S. troop deployments abroad renders it especially necessary to make the MREM Force contingent on MC-70 improvements. The President remarked that the MREM paper referred to "the life of the treaty". He pointed out that if the treaty were denounced, the present discussion would be very academic. We should assume good faith on the part of our allies or we will not have allies. At the same time we must make clear to our allies what we expect of them.

Mr. Irwin said that Defense was satisfied with the NATO MRBM paper. He had been with Secretary Dillon when the latter had presented the NATO MRBM proposal in Europe. He himself had talked with Defense Minister Strauss and to the Defense Ministry in London. Secretary Dillon had presented the proposal during his recent trip to Europe in the manner in which Defense would like to see it presented to the North Atlantic Council. Secretary Dillon spoke to the paper but did not provide a copy of it to the governments with which he discussed it. Mr. Irwin felt there should be both a presentation and a paper. If substantial changes were made in the MRBM paper, Mr. Irwin felt sure the Secretary of Defense would like an opportunity to consider them. Mr. Stans suggested that after the Council meeting those principally concerned might be able to devise some words which would meet the difficulties which had arisen. Secretary Dillon re-iterated that he wanted to avoid making a flat, detailed proposal to the NATO countries. The President said he would like to strengthen NATO through the things we do at home in order that we might redeploy some of our U.S. divisions from Europe. He regarded the maintenance of $5\frac{1}{2}$ - 6 U.S. divisions in Europe as unproductive.

Mr. Gray suggested that the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the NATO MRBM paper might contain the phrase "and assuming reasonable action under Paragraph 6" as the statement of the condition under which we would contribute POLARIS submarines to the NATO MRBM Force. The President commented that he understood the anxiety expressed by Mr. Stans but he believed the left-hand version of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the paper was the most desirable version. Mr. Irwin said the point of Paragraph 6 of the paper was to provide the U.S. with an opportunity to encourage other NATO nations to strengthen their MC-70 forces. Mr. McCone felt that Paragraph 6 should not be made a condition precedent to the contribution of POLARIS submarines to the NATO MRBM Force. Mr. Stans expressed anxiety lest the policy in Paragraph 6 not be conveyed to the other NATO countries if the NATO MRBM paper was to remain a U.S. statement of policy and was not to be tabled. Secretary Dillon said the substance of Paragraph 6 could be conveyed in an oral presentation on our proposal. The President suggested we might even put a footnote to Paragraph 2 referring to Paragraph 6 but he did not want to use the phrase "subject to the measures called for in Paragraph 6." Mr. Gray suggested that in Paragraph 6 the expression "the U.S. should make clear" might be substituted for "believes." As a counter-suggestion, Mr. Irwin proposed the substitution of "emphasis" for "believes" since the NATO MRBM paper might subsequently be tabled.

Mr. Gray said he had intended to bring up the question of whether the five POLARIS submarines would be internationalized in the second phase but he believed this was now a detail and need not be considered.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed a revised paragraph 2-b-(1) of the draft Record of Actions of the 467th NSC Meeting, distributed at the meeting, and agreed that it should read as follows:

"(1) The United States will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area (including Turkey), under U.S. custody, such U.S. nuclear weapons as are furnished for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans."

- b. Discussed the paper on "NATO MRBM Force", as amended at the NSC meeting on November 17, 1960, transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 29, 1960; and adopted it as a statement of U.S. policy subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 1, paragraph 2, second sentence: Include the version in the left-hand column and delete the version in the right-hand column.

(2) Page 3, paragraph 6, first line: Substitute the word "emphasizes" for the word "believes".

- c. Agreed with the proposal by the Acting Secretary of State that the following procedure should be used at the NAC meeting:

(1) The United States should present as a firm proposal the commitment regarding nuclear weapons (as agreed upon in a above).

(2) The United States should present a concept for a NATO MRBM force and in that context offer to commit five POLARIS submarines to NATO as an interim MRBM force. The remainder of the statement of policy on "NATO MRBMs" adopted by b above should link the interim force to the permanent force but generally be presented in terms which make it clear that the establishment of a permanent MRBM force will require study and consideration by NATO and that U.S. participation therein will require Congressional approval.

- (3) In making the presentation, the United States should emphasize the great importance it attaches to parallel efforts by the European NATO nations to improve the defensive strength of the Alliance in the ways described in the statement of policy on NATO MRBMs.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently reflected in the Record of Actions of the 467th NSC Meeting, and circulated to the National Security Council for appropriate implementation under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

3. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles said he would report first on Soviet missile and space activity with the assistance of a chart.

Mr. Dulles then noted that during the preceding night the USSR had launched an earth satellite. The launching has been announced by the Soviet radio which states that the satellite weighs 10,050 pounds and has two dogs aboard. Apparently, an attempt will be made at a soft landing and recovery of the animals.

Mr. Dulles reported that Lumumba's whereabouts in the Congo were unknown. He was believed to be on his way to Stanleyville by road but it was possible he might be traveling by river. There was also a rumor that he had gone to Luluaberg. If Lumumba turns up in Stanleyville, he will have tribal and other support of such a nature that civil war in the Congo may ensue. During the last few days Lumumba's supporters have been trekking toward Stanleyville in small numbers.

Mr. Dulles said that things were quieter in the Congo today than they were yesterday but the situation remains dangerous. The UN Representative in Stanleyville had asked for

the emergency air evacuation of 1000 Europeans yesterday but had cancelled the request today. |

Mr. Dulles concluded his briefing on the Congo by reporting that the Kasavubu government was asking the UAR Ambassador to leave the country.

Mr. Dulles then estimated that the situation in Laos was moving closer to all-out civil war. Phoumi is carrying out limited military operations from Savannakhet in the narrow neck of the country as a part of his threatened offensive action against the government. Souvanna Phouma's forces are moving to Luang Prabang and are now less than 80 miles from the city. One column has defected to Phoumi and no serious conflict has taken place. On the political side, efforts to unseat Souvanna Phouma continue. Phoui and Phoumi are endeavoring to induce a majority of the members of the National Assembly to go to Luang Prabang to form a new government of national safety which would bring together all the anti-Communist forces in the country. |

Mr. Dulles said the world conference of Communist leaders in Moscow was still going on. An effort was now being made to patch up a communique. However, the issues between the USSR and Communist China had not been settled. The deep ideological gap had not been bridged. |

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Soviet missile-space activity; developments in the Congo and Laos; and the current Moscow conference of Sino-Soviet Bloc leaders.

4. U.S. POLICY TOWARD GERMANY
(NSC 5803; OCB Report on NSC 5803, dated November 2, 1960)

Mr. Harr summarized the reference report by the Operations Coordinating Board on U.S. Policy toward Germany, emphasizing the economic recovery of the country, its political stability, its build-up of military forces, and Adenauer's support for European integration. Mr. Harr said the OCB recommended a review of U.S. Policy toward Germany because the German situation was different in the three following respects from the situation which had obtained when the policy was adopted: (1) Berlin is now an active arena of struggle between the U.S. and the Sino-Soviet Bloc; (2) U.S.-German relations have changed qualitatively; and (3) the U.S. has achieved its immediate post-war objectives in Germany and is now faced with a new generation of problems.

Mr. Dillon said he was concerned that a full-scale review of U.S. Policy toward Germany might have untoward effects if it became known to the public or to the Germans. Any leak of the fact that we were reviewing this policy would be disturbing to the Germans. He would prefer that we emphasize updating the German policy paper so that if the fact that the paper is being considered becomes known, we can say we are only updating the paper and not reviewing it.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the reference report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board, as summarized orally by the Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination.
- b. Agreed that the statement of "U.S. Policy toward Germany" (NSC 5803) should be brought up to date by the NSC Planning Board, but that this action should not be interpreted as an overall substantive review of U.S. policy toward Germany.

5. U.S. CIVIL AVIATION POLICY TOWARD THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
(NSC 5726/1; OCB Report on NSC 5726/1, dated November 2, 1960)

Mr. Harr said this policy should be reviewed because of (1) the increasing ability of the Soviet Bloc to compete in civil aviation operations world-wide; (2) the actual participation of the USSR in international airline operations; (3) the increasing infiltration of the Soviet Bloc into the aviation program of the less-developed countries; and (4) the question of U.S. difficulties in the implementation of Paragraph 31 of the policy which deals with the development of programs designed to promote the Free World aviation position in the new under-developed areas.

Mr. Harr noted that the Department of Defense had expressed concern because the Soviet Union appeared to have a greater capability for delivering promptly to under-developed areas such civil aircraft as the latter needed. The OCB was currently endeavoring to inventory what the U.S. might do to meet this challenge. So far the U.S. had encountered delays and frustrations in financing provision of aircraft to under-developed countries.

Mr. Gray concluded the meeting by remarking that the Council might arrive at January 21, 1961 without having finished all the projects which it is now carrying on its agenda. The President said he thought there would be some problems left on January 21.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the reference report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board, as summarized orally by the Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination.
- b. Agreed that "U.S. Civil Aviation Policy toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc" (NSC 5726/1) should be reviewed by the NSC Planning Board, as recommended by the Operations Coordinating Board.



MARION W. BOGGS

R 12/7/60

TELEGRAM

NATO M. ~~Stock~~ Policy
Foreign Service of the
United States of America

2752

INCOMING

AMERICAN EMBASSY PARIS

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
Classification

ACTION: USRO

INFO

AMB

MINECON

PCL/R

UIMER

SHAPE/L-1

THURSTON

EUCOM/L-1

CINCEUR-7

MAS

MAAG

BAE

EP

PF

FROM: WASHINGTON

NO: CIRCR 822 December 6, 8 PM

P R I O R I T Y

VERBATIM TEXT

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Control: 676

Recd: Dec. 7, 1960
2:23 PM

89-45
4

Following is message to USRO:

I believe you should now give NAC an advance presentation of our approach on MRBM's and NATO atomic stockpile. Presentation should be made at private meeting which you should request Spaak call Monday if at all possible. You should read from text of presentation given below. Text should not be distributed although if requested to do so, you may review notes that others make for reporting your presentation. FYI. Brevity of introductory material in text is based on desirability of reserving fuller statement for Ministerial Meeting. END FYI.

BEGIN TEXT

I should like to inform you in advance of the principal points that the US intends to make at the Ministerial Meeting in connection with the military aspects of NATO long-range planning. The US will have a more extensive statement to make at that time. It should suffice here to say that the principal considerations governing our approach have been (A) the importance of meeting SACEUR's military requirements for MRBM's, (B) the appearance of a growing European interest in having a larger role in the control of NATO's nuclear defense, (C) an apparent desire in Europe for further assurance that US nuclear weapons will remain available for other NATO forces as long as needed, (D) the politically divisive effects on NATO of a proliferation of independent national nuclear weapon programs, and (E) the increasing importance of strengthening other NATO forces, both conventional and nuclear, in order effectively to deter Sov Bloc aggression, whether limited and non-nuclear or massive.

With these considerations in mind, we have been seeking ways and means of providing a collective basis for the common defense which would reduce potential desires for national nuclear weapons capabilities and enhance the continued political cohesion of the alliance. Our conclusions and exploratory suggestions are

FORM 7-60

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

MK 89-45-4

By

[Signature]

NLE Date

5/19/89

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

REPRODUCED FROM THIS COPY IS

2752/692

SECRET

PAGE 2

CONTROL: 676

intended to be in support of this general objective. Although there is little time remaining before the Ministerial Meeting, it might be useful to have some advance informal discussion on these points in private NAC meetings, and would be most interested, of course, in any personal or official views that the other members may wish to express. The principal points we will make at the Ministerial Meetings are as follows:

1. With respect to the NATO atomic stockpile as a whole, wish to assure the Council that it is the firm intention of The United States to maintain US weapons contributed to the stockpile available for NATO use so long as they are required by, and in accordance with, agree NATO military plans.
2. With respect to SACEUR's MRBM requirement, we intend by the end of 1963 to commit to NATO five US Polaris submarines, which would, at least initially, operate under SACEUR in accordance with existing procedures.
3. We would hope that other NATO Governments, for their part, would wish to consider creation of a multilateral NATO MRBM force involving approximately 100 Polaris MRBM's in addition to the 5 US Polaris submarines in order to help meet SACEUR's MRBM requirements through 1964. The US would be prepared to consider facilitating development by NATO of a permanent multilateral MRBM force if the NAC, in conjunction with SACEUR should develop and adopt a plan which would maximize the effectiveness of such a force as a deterrent and establish its multilateral character. We recognize that consideration of such a multilateral force would raise a number of political, technical, financial and legal problems, including those of ownership, control and manning which would require detailed consideration in the NAC during the coming months. The creation of a permanent multilateral force would of course require Congressional action in the US, and we assume that Parliamentary action would also be required in other NATO countries.
4. Our present concept is that the targeting of such a NATO force would be planned by SACEUR in coordination with the other retaliatory forces of the alliance. We would also conceive of this force as seaborne, in order to maximize deployment security.
5. We have in mind that the question of MRBM requirements beyond those for 1964 should be considered subsequently, taking into account the prospects for new weapons and conclusions reached in the process of NATO long-range planning.
6. We wish to emphasize the importance of the other NATO nations undertaking to parallel advances in the MRBM field with additional vigorous measures to strengthen their other forces which are equally

SECRET

essential for deterrence in accordance with NATO military plans. It is of great importance for NATO to maintain a flexibility of response. Progress in the MRBM system should not be permitted at the sacrifice of progress in building NATO's other forces. End text.

...
carefully.

HERTSR

ml

Electrostatic reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes.

AUG 10 1960
JACCOA 73
12/4/60

copy
654

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE
OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

8 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation - Chairman McCone/General Norstad

Chairman McCone met with General Norstad at 1000 hrs this date. After a brief private discussion, Mr. McCone outlined briefly a consensus of the views of the JCAB on their recent trip as interpreted by Commissioner Graham, Mr. Ick and Mr. King. The points covered by Mr. McCone are included in the notes which are attached herewith.

During this part of the discussion, General Norstad pointed out that each expended nuclear weapon would be reported to the Pentagon, where presumably global fall-out records would be maintained. In any event, he had directed the formation of a specific section to deal with the fall-out problem and he would write Congressman Hoffield about this section in the near future. Regarding the vulnerability of the Jupiter ICBM's, General Norstad commented that these missiles would eventually be replaced, but that they served a very useful purpose today -- particularly from the psychological viewpoint -- by demonstrating that something was being done now.

Following this discussion, Mr. McCone outlined his own personal views:

DECLASSIFIED WITH E.O. 13526
OSD 89-MOR-0674
Approved by: 89-4249
Date: 1/18/11

Mr. McCone indicated he was somewhat concerned by the questions which are continually being asked by responsible Europeans:

He said he knew of no way to resolve these two extreme views. General Norstad commented that the views could not be reconciled. Fundamentally, the problem is to develop greater confidence in the United States.

Mr. McCone then expressed his very deep concern over the number of weapons were to leak out, there would certainly be very grave political repercussions. General Norstad commented that we screen all the requirements and attempt to hold down the number, but there is the problem of contingency targets and the time required to redistribute weapons. Mr. McCone, referring specifically to the

Davy Crockett, commented that if there were a ground war, there should be time to deploy weapons from the United States. General Norstad said that he was not sure he agreed with the Davy Crockett concept. In any event, the number must be kept down and some redeployment from the United States should be feasible.

Mr. McCone then raised the question of the US MRBM proposal. He said that the Committee continually raised the question of whether intelligence indicated that there was an increasing danger of war at this time. In all cases, the answer to this question had been negative. Accordingly, the Committee wondered why the United States must submit a major policy proposal on MRBMs and nuclear weapons just a few days before the new Administration was to take office. Mr. McCone said his answer to this question was that the first phase or actual proposal amounted simply to an augmentation of the Other points would be raised for discussion purposes only. This answer appeared to satisfy the Committee.

S. W. DOWNEY
Colonel, U. S. Army
Executive to SACEUR

12110/60

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 1024

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DATE

December 10, 1960 4:2

NO: TOPOL 846
Dec 9, 7PM

FROM: WASHINGTON

TO: USRO PARIS FOR ACTION

P R I O R I T Y ~~Not~~

2753

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - USRO PASS THURSTON

Quoted below is text Secretary's statement on MREMS and related matters for incorporation in his statement under agenda item II, long-range planning. Text approved at meeting yesterday Secretaries Herter, Gates and Anderson, and approved by President today.

Begin Text

I would like now to develop for you the present views of my government on the principal military aspects of long-range planning for the alliance.

Our progress in meeting NATO defense requirements over the past decade has been substantial. The task has been not merely to offset Communist manpower and material. It has also involved the creation, for the first time in history, of a coalition of sovereign countries, whose political and military policies have been so harmonized as to constitute a real deterrent to Communist armed attack. Without such unity in the Atlantic community, the politico-military position of a monolithic Communist system would have created an overwhelming superiority. That is why the Soviets persistently seek to weaken and divide the alliance. That is why, it is so important that we approach the military tasks of the sixties, as we have discharged those of the fifties, in a spirit of common effort and common purpose.

DISTRIBUTION ACTION TO:
POL-4
INFO TO:
OES-8
DER-13
ECON-1
PF

AMB
MINISCON
THURSTON-1
SHAPEL-1
EUCOML-1
POL-4
ULMER-1
MAS-1

The principal long-range military tasks seem to us to be twofold.

First, there is the need to maintain an effective NATO nuclear capability in the alliance.

Second, there is the urgent and equally important need to meet other shield requirements.

I shall discuss each of these two needs, in turn.

I shall take up the nuclear field first. There are three principal areas for consideration here, as General Norstad indicated in his speech to the NATO Parliamentarians.

18

Reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS

Agency Case 100-180465X
NLE Case 89-45-3
By 210 NLE Date 5/17/89

REPRODUCTION OF UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS PROHIBITED

ESca/6981

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~Electrostatic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library
for preservation purposes.

First, there is NATO's mid-range ballistic missile requirement.

My government offers the following concept for consideration by the alliance as a means of meeting this requirement.

We suggest that the alliance consider creation of a special kind of force to operate this weapons system. As we conceive it, such a force would be truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing and control, and would include mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.

A suitable formula to govern decision on use would have to be developed to maximize the effectiveness of this force as a deterrent and to establish its multilateral character.

Let me say a word about the reasoning underlying this concept, which seems to us a logical extension and development of the consideration which NATO has been giving to this NATO ballistic missile question since 1957.

We believe that creation of additional national nuclear weapons capabilities would have a marked divisive effect on the alliance. It would mean duplication of effort and diversion of resources, tend to stimulate competition within the alliance in the nuclear weapons field, and increase the possibilities of nuclear war through miscalculation or accident. *by mutual agreement*

We believe, therefore, that the multilateral concept offers the best means of providing a collective basis for the common defense in the MREM field. Its fulfillment would have immense political significance for the cohesion of the alliance. My government believes that this concept offers a rational approach to the problem of the MREM power of the alliance and, if successfully fulfilled, might offer a precedent for further moves in this field.

We do not discount the many difficulties involved in creating such a force. The legal, technical, financial, and political problems would need to be carefully considered and jointly resolved by the alliance. Participation by the United States in a multilateral force would of course require Congressional action, and we assume that Parliamentary action would also be required in other NATO countries. But NATO has had successful experience with multilateral approaches, e.g., in our infrastructure programs and our NATO military headquarters. If the other members of NATO should wish to pursue this approach, we would be prepared to explore it with them and believe that the task would be well within the bounds of the possible.

As an initial step, and to meet SACEUR's MREM requirements for

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CLASSIFIEDElectrostatic reproduction made
by the Eisenhower Library for
preservation purposes.

1963, my government offers to commit to NATO before the end of 1963 -- as an interim MREM force - five Polaris submarines having a combined capability of firing eighty missiles. During this interim phase, these submarines would operate in accordance with existing procedures. This step would not only greatly enhance NATO's military capabilities; it would also reaffirm the continuing US commitment to Europe's defense by the fact that this newest component of US nuclear striking power will be available as part of that defense. In taking this step, we would expect that other members of NATO would be prepared to contribute approximately 100 missiles to meet SACEUR's MREM requirements through 1964, under the multilateral concept which I have already indicated. The US would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement by sale of Polaris missiles and of the necessary equipment and vehicles for deployment in such a multilateral force. It would seem desirable that this force be deployed at sea. Our concept contemplates that the five US Polaris submarines would be a contribution to the multilateral force upon its establishment and that they would be made available under US custody nuclear warheads for the Polaris missiles.

Decisions on NATO MREM requirements beyond 1964 and how such requirements should be met should be considered subsequently, taking into account the prospect for new weapons and conclusions reached in the process of NATO long-term planning.

The second point which General Norstad referred to was what he termed the "extremely interesting thought" of a NATO strategic force.

I would merely point out here that the nature of MREMS gives them a character somewhat different from the delivery systems they are designed to replace. It would seem that SACEUR should plan the targeting for the MREM force in coordination with the other retaliatory forces of the alliance, in order to gain the greatest deterrence for the alliance as a whole. While these MREMS are required as modernization of the tactical strike capability, the line between "tactical" and "strategic" capabilities in the nuclear field is becoming ever more blurred.

The third point is the question of broader sharing in the control of nuclear weapons. Creation of a multilateral NATO MREM force would of course represent a major step in this direction. It appears that there may be a desire for further assurance that the US will continue to make its nuclear weapons, including those for other systems, available for use by other NATO powers when needed to carry out their alliance obligations. There should be no doubt on this score.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION


SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET CLASSIFIED

This document reproduction made by the Eisenhower Library for preservation purposes.

It is the firm policy of the United States to keep in the NATO area, under US custody, nuclear weapons contributed by the US to the stockpile for the execution of approved NATO plans.

*must have
done w.
right
Dec 15/60
628*



I turn now to the second of the long-range military tasks that we face: the strengthening of other shield forces.

It is equally urgent that NATO fulfill its established requirements for its other shield forces as well as for its MREMS. In case of an attack, NATO forces should be able to meet the situation with a response appropriate to the nature of the attack. In speaking to the NATO Parliamentarians, General Norstad said that "our forces must have a substantial conventional capability," that they should be "made up of army, navy, and air force elements of suitable types and equipped with a balance of conventional and nuclear weapons," and that "the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle should be a high one." Unless all NATO shield goals are substantially achieved, NATO military commanders will not have that flexibility of response that will enable them to meet any situation with the appropriate response.

Whether or not the Soviets carry out their announced force cuts, they will maintain large and ready ground, as well as air and missile, forces which will continue to pose a grave threat to the forward areas of NATO. Soviet progress in ballistic missiles may increasingly encourage them to believe mistakenly that they can threaten the forces of NATO without serious danger of general war. Thus, failure to achieve adequate NATO shield forces in the near future will place our alliance in growing peril of general war by Soviet miscalculation.

Let us be under no illusion that by deploying MREMS we can afford to skimp on the equally important task of building up other shield forces. The addition of MREMS to the forces of NATO would not, in any way, substitute for other contributions to the shield, except that in the case of NATO tactical air squadrons, it is our understanding that the meeting of MREM requirements should permit some reduction.

We believe that most of the other members of the alliance now

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

have ample economic and military potential to provide more fully for NATO defense. I can speak frankly here since my government, in spite of having to carry tremendous financial and technical burdens in other areas vital to alliance defense, is substantially meeting its MC-70 requirements.

I urge that each of your governments consider, in the course of our long-range planning, what increased contribution it can make to this goal, not only in amount, but also in quality, with all that this involves in the way of training, supporting facilities, supplies and reserves.

These then are the two overriding military needs that I believe we must address in the course of long-range planning: the HREMS and other nuclear weapons needs, and the necessity to meet our other shield requirements. Action to meet both these needs should be planned and concerted only as related elements of our long-range military program for the decade ahead.

That program will only be effective if it is mounted by an alliance that is united on basis political - as well as military - issues. The basic purpose of our armed forces is to maintain the security of the NATO area, but these forces will only be effective to the extent that agreement regarding political issues creates the will and determination to use force if and when necessary. Effective consultation and coordination on basic political issues is thus a vital element in the alliance deterrent.

End text.

HERTZ

TO: NATO SECRETARY GENERAL, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
FROM: USIO, WASHINGTON, D.C.

URGENT 1024Z
FM USIO
TO NATO SECRETARY GENERAL
INFO: USIO, WASHINGTON, D.C.

RE: NATO DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
PRIORITY

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

9 December 1960

SUPPLEMENT TO MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation Chairman McCone, General Norstad
8 December 1960

Entire document declassified by the ISCAP
except for portion(s) identified as Restricted
Data or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) by
the Department of Energy, which is outside
jurisdiction of the ISCAP

In addition to the notes attached to the subject Memorandum
for Record, Mr. McCone made the following points during his dis-
cussion of the Committee's impressions:

a. He is in favor of selling U235 to the United Kingdom.

b. He is also in favor of selling U235 to the French,
although he recognizes that General Norstad does not agree. State
is against this proposal, but the President appeared to be in favor
of it.

c. He was very impressed with the Dutch squadron at
Volkel, but somewhat concerned about reaction times after the first
two aircraft.

DOE-FRD

d. [REDACTED]

e. He was concerned with the vulnerability of our nuclear
retaliatory systems, particularly to low-level attack.

f. Almost all of the targets for the nuclear delivery
are in Hungary. This raises questions regarding
excessive fall-out in this country and the difficulties of employing
the units at [REDACTED]. A decision was made not to attack targets in
Hungary.

h. The IRBM's in Italy are extremely vulnerable to sabotage. Congressman Westland had pointed out that he could easily destroy these missiles with a high-powered rifle. Because of this vulnerability he thought SACEUR should give consideration to canceling the remainder of the Jupiter program.

S. W. DOWNEY
Colonel, U. S. Army
Executive to SACEUR

TELEGRAM

NATO At. 31. g = 12/13/60, 12/17/60
Foreign Service of the
United States of America

2754

INCOMING AMEMBASSY PARIS

N. (et) NLE (et) (et) 89-45

Document No. 2

(M)

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 1298

Recd: Dec 13, 1960
4:20AM

ACTION: MAS
INFO:
AMB
ADMIN
MINECON
FIN
PCL 6
TIMER
POL R
THURSDAY
SAFE
EUCOM-1
CINCEUR
MAAG
SAE
USAFE
EP 1
PP

FROM: WASHINGTON
NO: 2483, Dec 12, 4PM

SENT MOSCOW 1008 RPTD INFO LONDON 3199 PARIS 2483 WARSAW
PRAGUE BUDAPEST BUCHAREST SOFIA BELGRADE UNNUMBERED

PARIS FOR USRO

Before Friday December 16 you should explain to appropriate Soviet high level official MRBM concept which US government is presenting to NATO Paris meeting. (earlier instruction used by Burgess in informing permanent council December 6 pouched to you December 6 as CIRTEL 822, December 6). You may draw for general guidance on DEPCIRTEL 835, as amended by subsequent CIRTEL, both being sent you by cable. In particular, you may want to emphasize following points:

SS 15

ACTION:
POL 10
INFO:
OES
ECON
DEF 10
TREAS
PAA
SN

1. No transfer of physical custody over warheads from US to other countries is proposed. Therefore, no spreading of nuclear capabilities is envisaged. The concept is merely logical development of 1957 NATO heads of government decisions.

2. There is no change in present US policy which seeks to prevent proliferation of national nuclear capabilities. On contrary, multilateral MRBM concept is intended to inhibit that proliferation which we believe might otherwise develop if there were no adequate means of meeting pressures for national capabilities. Such national capabilities would create more risk of accidental war and perhaps greater obstacles to disarmament.

3. NATO is purely a defensive alliance and we want vigorously to press ahead with attempts to seek arms control agreements. Any NATO missile program will of course - - like other free world and Communist military programs - be subject to disarmament agreements that may be reached.

FYI. We realize this approach to Soviets unlikely to affect their propaganda exploitation of MRBM proposal

FORM 15-50
4-59-58

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "DECLASSIFIED"

Authority MR 89-45#2

By *[Signature]* NLE Date 5/19/89

Electrostatic reproduction made

SECRET 12821

/19

SECRET

PAGE TWO

CONTROL: 1298

but on balance we believe desirable to have made official
explanatory statement directly to Soviet Government.

We are informing British and French Embassies Washington
of your approach to Soviets.

For Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade only:

You should not make formal approach but you may draw on
above in informal conversations with officials of governments
to which you are accredited.

HENDERSON

hnd

SECRET

Albert Zimmerman
NA RG 59 DF 1960-63 Box 1904

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: 1009558
By: [signature]
Date: 9-5-95

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

44-L
Action
SS

Info
G
SP
C
H
EUR
UMSC
UMSS
INR
TRSY
RMR

SECRET

Classification - Control: 10063

Rec'd: DECEMBER 17, 1960
4:13 PM

B. 1405
DF 60-3

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 872, DECEMBER 17, 8 PM

DEPT PASS TREASURY AND DEFENSE FOR KNIGHT

FOR DILLON FROM IRWIN

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DF 60-63 Bx 1904

U-note to
Elhiale
on heading
Sullivan

36
RMR File
[signature]
515-10
1/3/61

SUBJECT: MEMO OF RECORD OF MTG WITH MIN STRAUSS, DEC 17, 1960

1. MET WITH MIN STRAUSS THIS MORNING ON PROPOSED INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM FROM THE US. ALSO PRESENT WERE DR. KNEIPER, MESSRS. KUSS AND FORMAN.

2. INITIAL STRAUSS PROPOSAL WAS THAT \$125 MILLION COULD BE PREPAID IMMEDIATELY ON EXISTING CONTRACTS AND THAT \$250 MILLION COULD BE PREPAID WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS ON ORDERS FINANCED FROM THE 1961 BUDGET. MIN STRAUSS POINTED OUT THAT LARGE PROCUREMENTS FROM THE US EXTREMELY DIFFICULT SINCE US ACTION WHICH RESTRICTED GERMAN SUPPORT FACILITIES SEARCH TO FRENCH MEANT THAT INCREASE IN FRANCO-GERMAN ARMAMENTS HAS BEEN DEMANDED BY THE FRENCH GOVT. IN ADDITION HE POINTED OUT CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING AMERICAN TANKS BECAUSE OF THEIR SIZE. HE NOTED THAT IF THE US COULD GET AGRMT FROM FRANCE TO PRODUCE THE FRENCH-GERMAN STANDARD TANK, THIS WOULD BE GOOD BUT HE DOUBTED FRENCH WILLINGNESS TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT IN THE LONG LARGE ORDERS FROM THE US WOULD DEPEND UPON PURCHASE OF ADVANCE WEAPONS, LIKE POLARIS.

3. IN A DISCUSSION OF THE SIZE OF PROCUREMENT FROM THE US, I STRESSED AND STRAUSS FOR THE FIRST TIME SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND

THE ADDITIONALITY
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

SECRET

762A.5-MSP/12-1760

HBS
UNCLASSIFIED FILE
FILED
DEC 21 2 58 PM '61

Destroyed in RM/R
Date 12/2/61
[signature]
Name [signature]

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

SECRET

-2- POLTO 872, DECEMBER 17, 8 PM FROM PARIS

THE ADDITIONALITY CONCEPT WITH REF TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM. HE NOTED THAT WE HAD TWO COURSES OF ACTION, FIRST TO ACCEPT THE IMMEDIATE PREPAYMENTS WHICH COULD BE MADE; AND SECOND, TO INVESTIGATE INDIVIDUAL ITEMS FUNDING. HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THE PROBLEM OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT FOR PROCUREMENT AS WELL AS POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY ASSISTANCE CONCEPT WITH CHANCELLOR ADENAUER UPON HIS RETURN TO BONN. THERE WAS GENERAL AGRMNT THAT DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJ MIGHT BE CONTINUED IN BONN AT THE END OF THE FIRST WEEK IN JANUARY.

I SAID THAT WE WERE VERY INTERESTED IN ARRIVING AT AGRMNT IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON A SPECIAL PROCUREMENT PROGRAM FOR 1961 FOR \$400-\$500 MILLION (IN EFFECT ON \$600 MILLION LESS MAP AND SPECIFIC ITEMS THAT WERE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT) WITH AGRMNT IN PRINCIPLE TO CARRY ON THIS LEVEL OF PROCUREMENT FOR FOUR YEARS THEREAFTER. MIN STRAUSS AGREED TO CONSIDER HOW IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH \$450 MILLION, ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT CLEAR FROM HIS PREVIOUS CONVERSATION HOW HE WOULD ACHIEVE THIS.

AT THE END OF THE MTG, KUSS AND FORMAN MET WITH KNEIPER BRIEFLY AND DISCOVERED THAT THE FIGURES THAT KNEIPER HAD PROVIDED TO STRAUSS DID NOT INCLUDE SPARE PARTS TRAINING AND TRAINING AMMUNITION PURCHASES FROM THE US WHICH WERE INCLUDED IN THE US PROPOSALS. KNEIPER INDICATED HE WOULD CHECK FUTURE PROCUREMENT PLANS ON THESE ITEMS UPON HIS RETURN AND WOULD ADD THEM TO THE PROPOSAL. WITH THE ADDITION OF THESE ITEMS, ACHIEVEMENT OF A PROCUREMENT PLAN EQUALING OR EXCEEDING \$450 MILLION BECOMES MORE POSSIBLE.

BURGESS

BHH

12/60

= PRV 58-60: 21/674 AA
12/17/60 (not quite my same)

~~SECRET~~

Secretary's Statement
at NATO Ministerial Meeting
Under Long Range Planning

Political-Military Section

I would like now to develop for you the present views of my Government on the principal military aspects of long range planning for the Alliance.

Our progress in meeting NATO defense requirements over the past decade has been substantial. The task has been not merely to offset Communist manpower and material. It has also involved the creation, for the first time in history, of a coalition of sovereign countries, whose political and military policies have been so harmonized as to constitute a real deterrent to Communist armed attack. Without such unity in the Atlantic Community, the politico-military position of a monolithic Communist system would have created an overwhelming superiority. That is why the Soviets persistently seek to weaken and divide the Alliance. That is why it is so important that we approach the military tasks of the sixties, as we have discharged those of the fifties, in a spirit of common effort and common purpose.



The principal long-range military tasks seem to us to be twofold.

First, there is the need to maintain an effective NATO nuclear capability in the Alliance.

Second, there is the urgent and equally important need to meet other Shield requirements.

I shall discuss each of these two needs, in turn.

I shall

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 85-530#2
by JL62 NLE Date 3/10/86

~~SECRET~~

Staff Secy / Int 7x M/5 / NATO (6) [1959-1960]
nid, sent December 1960 (or shortly before) - sent to DRC 12/8/60

SECRET

-2-

I shall take up the nuclear field first. There are three principal areas for consideration here, as General Norstad indicated in his speech to the NATO Parliamentarians.

First, there is NATO's mid-range ballistic missile requirement.

My Government offers the following concept for consideration by the Alliance as a means of meeting this requirement. We suggest that the Alliance consider creation of a special kind of force to operate this weapons system. As we conceive it, such a force would be truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing and control, and would include mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.

A suitable formula to govern decision on use would have to be developed to maximise the effectiveness of this force as a deterrent and to establish its multilateral character.

Let me say a word about the reasoning underlying this concept, which seems to us a logical extension and development of the consideration which NATO has been giving to this whole ballistic missile question since 1957.

We believe that creation of additional national nuclear weapons capabilities would have a marked divisive effect on the Alliance. It would mean duplication of effort and diversion of resources, tend to stimulate competition within the Alliance in the nuclear weapons field,

and increase

SECRET

*From
Amel
very m
not just
sampled*

and increase the possibilities of nuclear war through miscalculation or accident.

We believe, therefore, that the multilateral concept offers the best means of providing a collective basis for the common defense in the MRBM field. Its fulfillment would have immense political significance for the cohesion of the Alliance. My Government believes that this concept offers a rational approach to the problem of the MRBM power of the Alliance and, if successfully fulfilled, might offer a precedent for further moves in this field.

We do not discount the many difficulties involved in creating such a force. The legal, technical, financial, and political problems would need to be carefully considered and jointly resolved by the Alliance. Participation by the United States in a multilateral force would of course require Congressional action, and we assume that parliamentary action would also be required in other NATO countries. But NATO has had successful experience with multilateral approaches, e.g., in our infrastructure programs and our NATO military headquarters. If the other members of NATO should wish to pursue this approach, we would be prepared to explore it with them and believe that the task would be well within the bounds of the possible.

As an initial step, and to meet SACEUR's MRBM requirements for 1963, my Government offers to commit to NATO before the end of 1963 - as an interim MRBM force - five Polaris submarines having a combined capability of

~~SECRET~~

-4-

capability of firing eighty missiles. During this interim phase, these submarines would operate in accordance with existing procedures. This step would not only greatly enhance NATO's military capabilities; it would also reaffirm the continuing U.S. commitment to Europe's defense by the fact that this newest component of U.S. nuclear striking power will be available as part of that defense. In taking this step, we would expect that other members of NATO would be prepared to contribute approximately 100 missiles to meet SACREUR's MREM requirements through 1964, under the multilateral concept which I have already indicated. The U.S. would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement by sale of Polaris missiles and of the necessary equipment and vehicles for deployment in such a multilateral force. It would seem desirable that this force be deployed at sea. Our concept contemplates that the five U.S. Polaris submarines would be a contribution to the multilateral force upon its establishment and that there would be made available under U.S. custody nuclear warheads for the Polaris missiles.

Decisions on NATO MREM requirements beyond 1964 and how such requirements should be met should be considered subsequently, taking into account the prospect for new weapons and conclusions reached in
the process

~~SECRET~~

the process of NATO long-term planning.

The second point which General Norstad referred to was what he termed the "extremely interesting thought" of a NATO strategic force.

I would merely point out here that the nature of MRIMs gives them a character somewhat different from the delivery systems they are designed to replace. It would seem that SACEUR should plan the targeting for the MRIM force in coordination with the other retaliatory forces of the Alliance, in order to gain the greatest deterrence for the Alliance as a whole. While these MRIMs are required as modernization of the tactical strike capability, the line between "tactical" and "strategic" capabilities in the nuclear field is becoming ever more blurred.

*plan down
in app.*

The third point is the question of broader sharing in the control of nuclear weapons. Creation of a multilateral NATO MRIM force would of course represent a major step in this direction. It appears that there may be a desire for further assurance that the U.S. will continue to make its nuclear weapons, including those for other systems, available for use by other NATO powers when needed to carry out their Alliance obligations. There should be no doubt on this score. It is the firm policy of the United States to keep in the NATO area, under U.S. custody, nuclear weapons contributed by the U.S. to the Stockpile for the execution of approved NATO plans.

Our suggestion for consideration of a multilateral NATO MRIM force does not preclude exploration of the concept of increasing the authority

*9 257N
1459-
see 12/10/60
p 4*

the authority of the Alliance over the atomic stockpile as a whole. As the Council considers a multilateral force, its examination of that possibility will bring into sharper focus the question of increasing Alliance authority over the Atomic Stockpile.

I turn now to the second of the long-range military tasks that we face: the strengthening of other Shield forces.

It is equally urgent that NATO fulfill its established requirements for its other Shield forces as well as for its MRMs. In case of an attack, NATO forces should be able to meet the situation with a response appropriate to the nature of the attack. In speaking to the NATO Parliamentarians, General Norstad said that "our forces must have a substantial conventional capability," that they should be "made up of army, navy and air force elements of suitable types and equipped with a balance of conventional and nuclear weapons," and that "the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle should be a high one." Unless all NATO Shield goals are substantially achieved, NATO Military Commanders will not have that flexibility of response that will enable them to meet any situation with the appropriate response.

Whether or not the Soviets carry out their announced force cuts, they will maintain large and ready ground, as well as air and missile, forces which will continue to pose a grave threat to the forward areas of NATO. Soviet progress in ballistic missiles may increasingly encourage them to believe mistakenly that they can threaten the forces of NATO without serious danger of general war. Thus, failure to achieve adequate NATO Shield forces in the near future will place our

Alliance in

SECRET

-7-

Alliance in growing peril of general war by Soviet miscalculation.

Let us be under no illusion that by deploying MRMs we can afford to skimp on the equally important task of building up other Shield forces. The addition of MRMs to the forces of NATO would not, in any way, substitute for other contributions to the Shield, except that in the case of NATO tactical air squadrons, it is our understanding that the meeting of MRM requirements should permit some reduction.

We believe that most of the other members of the Alliance now have ample economic and military potential to provide more fully for NATO defense. I can speak frankly here since my Government, in spite of having to carry tremendous financial and technical burdens in other areas vital to Alliance defense, is substantially meeting its MC-70 requirements.

I urge that each of your governments consider, in the course of our long range planning, what increased contribution it can make to this goal, not only in amount, but also in quality, with all that this involves in the way of training, supporting facilities, supplies and reserves.

These then are the two overriding military needs that I believe we must address in the course of long range planning: the MRMs and other nuclear weapons needs, and the necessity to meet our other Shield requirements. Action to meet both these needs should be planned and concerted closely as related elements of our long range military

program for

SECRET

SECRET

-8-

program for the decade ahead.

That program will only be effective if it is mounted by an alliance that is united on basic political - as well as military - issues. The basic purpose of our armed forces is to maintain the security of the NATO area, but these forces will only be effective to the extent that agreement regarding political issues creates the will and determination to use force if and when necessary. Effective consultation and coordination on basic political issues is thus a vital element in the Alliance deterrent.



SECRET



12/19/60

DÉLÉGATION NÉERLANDAISE AUPRÈS DU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Paris, December 19, 1960.

Dear Dean,

I have not ^{yet} given you a reply to your very interesting letter of November 1st, in which you made some prophecies about the outcome of the elections and the nominations which might follow.

Personally, I am glad about the result of the elections as, to my mind, a change of administration was bitterly needed. I had hoped that Kennedy would have obtained a large majority but, although in home policy he may well be faced with many more difficulties, it may be, on the other hand, that in the field of foreign affairs a system of bipartisan policy, as was more or less operating under the Truman regime, may evolve.

One of the reasons why I refrained from writing was the sentence in your letter when about possible nominations you did not mention yourself. Many of our mutual friends in NATO have been hoping, and we still do hope, that a specific nomination in NATO might follow. We need strong men here, with sufficient influence at home, and every time I see your name mentioned in the press, as Sulzberger did again this morning in the New York Times, I feel the hope growing that this prophecy about yourself might be wrong.

When I wrote to you in August about the gloomy world situation (and you tell me that you also take a grim view of the future), I tried to explain my comment against the background of the complete lack of leadership in the West.

Yesterday the annual conference of NATO, where Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Finance met, came to an end. I have been at many international conferences during the last twelve years, but I never attended one yet which left in my mind such an unsatisfactory impression. Perhaps most of the ministers were too tired; they have been running around at the United Nations in New York and have, every week, another meeting of CENTO, SEATO, the Six or the Seven, or the Council of Europe, or whatever else it may be. This can be an excuse, but the spirit which existed in our time, that

The Honorable Dean Acheson,
2805 - P. Street N.W.,
Washington D.C.

U.S.A.

Adress op 185 / 1960 Dept of WH Advisor, 1960 Adv-ber




we all worked for one single purpose, was absent. Moreover, there was during the discussions no direct contact between the ministers, even not on the vital problems with which we are faced now.

It may interest you that there was one refreshing factor and that was, that at his first attendance of a NATO Council the new British Foreign Secretary Lord Home made a strong impact. He was vigorous, has a good sense of humour, is keen and intelligent. Green for Canada was most disappointing; moral rearmament at its worst! Lange of Norway was sound as always, but his health is not improving and he getting a little bit older. Belgium and Portugal are very bitter about the U.N., just as France, although Couve de Murville is too clever a man to let himself be carried away by his emotions. Germany, and especially the Minister of Defense, threw its weight around but was basically sound. Our own delegation was not in very good form. The United States was, in this difficult period before the change of administration, correct but did not show much imagination.

To give you an example of how the personal diplomacy is in this period still thriving: I heard from Couve de Murville that it is the intention that the next Summit Meeting of the Six, which had to be postponed because of Adenauer's slight illness, should be held now on the 20th of January! Brentano told me that he was convinced that Adenauer, who is loyal to NATO and to his friendship with the United States tries to work for another delay, as he considers that no Summit of the Six should take place before the Kennedy Administration has come into office and some indications have been given about the direction of the new policy to be followed.

The difficulties, which arose during the meeting, culminated in Spaak informing the Permanent Representatives at a private session with them alone that he is going to resign! He was in disagreement with the policies followed by several Ministers, there was in his opinion insufficient consultation and practically no unity of action and there was such a lack of imagination about the coming economic threat from the U.S.S.R. and the steps which would have to be taken by the West against this threat, that he could not accept to continue his task any longer.

You know Spaak as well as I do. He is brilliant, but he is also easily excited and he can be carried away by his temperament. It seems to me that he has gone too far now to come back on his resignation and this may well have a harmful effect on the cohesion in the Alliance. The moment



this becomes public knowledge, the Russians will make use of it and point to the split which then becomes apparent in NATO. I think that Spaak went too far in some of his accusations, but it must also be recognized that the reaction he received from the United States on several of his suggestions was discouraging. However, a man who takes such an important decision when he is angry is always wrong; many of us tried to explain that to Spaak, but I am afraid that it is beyond repair.

One of the most difficult consequences of this decision is that in the coming months we have to find solutions for some very complicated problems:

1. There are first of all what are now called the Norstad proposals. These proposals were for the first time discussed at my house in Menaggio between Adenauer, Norstad, Spaak and myself. The main reason for these proposals was of a political character.

De Gaulle had just made his speech in Grenoble, where he stated that those countries who had no atomic weapons could only be considered as satellites. This statement had angered Adenauer to the extreme. But he was not only angry; he feared even more that the growing nationalism in France would have similar repercussions in Germany and he could not believe that after his death there would be a successor strong enough to oppose the creation in Germany of a national atomic force. According to Adenauer, the chance to prevent the resurrection of a national German army was once missed when France turned down the European Defense Community, and if now the possibility to create a multilateral European nuclear weapons system was not accepted, nobody would be able to prevent Germany in the future from creating such a system for itself. And Germany could do that better and sooner than France!

This is, to my mind, a very important factor, because the fear which the U.S.S.R. always feels for Germany might be increased if Germany were to create its own nuclear weapons system to such a degree of danger that the consequences might be fatal.

Another reason was that, looking at NATO problems from a more general point of view, many of the difficulties which exist at the present moment find their origin in the lack of authority the Council has. By giving power to the Council, the authority is bound to increase, but this will



DÉLÉGATION NÉERLANDAISE AUPRÈS DU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

- 4 -

only be possible if every country would be willing to send the right type of representative.

The reaction of Adenauer on these suggestions, which Norstad had discussed with me the evening before, can only be described as enthusiastic.

I shared these views and this has been the reason that with some of my friends I have tried to support Norstad strongly. Naturally, there are a great many legal, political technical and military aspects to this problem and we have to find a solutions for them before May next.

2. The second point is that long range planning in NATO for the sixties must be formulated in this period; also a solution has to be found for the new machinery and methods to deal with the cold war in the economic field.

....
To give you some idea of the lines along which some of us are thinking in this respect, I enclose a memorandum I drafted myself on NATO's competence and objectives in the economic field.

It will be extremely difficult to find solutions for all the problems I indicated above when the fifteen nations have to discuss with each other their different opinions under the leadership of a Secretary General who has indicated that he does not agree with the attitudes of some of the important members of the Alliance and that for that reason he is going to resign in May.

Personally I am not inclined to take these problems as too tragic; furthermore, also a man like Spaak can be replaced. Thorough consideration should be given to the choice to be made and this has to be done at a very early stage. Discussions are already going on at this moment and it seems to me that the first inclination is to try and find a Britisher. But whether a man of sufficient caliber is available is not yet certain. If a first class candidate could be found, then I am sure that after some time the difficulties which now exist will disappear. There is all the more reason for that because the NATO Alliance is in itself sound and it will remain the backbone of Western policy and defense.

I write this letter to you on a completely personal basis. I do not give a copy to our Foreign Office and I am



DÉLÉGATION NÉERLANDAISE AUPRÈS DU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

- 5 -

going to discuss it only with one of my friends, but I feel bound to do so because the matters I explained to you have to be dealt with as soon as possible. Therefore, I fervently hope that the new dynamo in the White House will soon start humming, because we need leadership from there. Sometimes I see that you are consulted as - whatever the average age of the new Administration may be - a wiser statesman and I hope that what I write to you can remain private and personal, but not unnoticed.

My health is all right again!

With best wishes to Alice and yourself from both of us for a very happy Christmas and New Year,

As ever

Wirk

December 23, 1960

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 471st Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, December 22, 1960

Present at the 471st NSC meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; Mr. Alan H. Belmont for the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (Items 1 and 2); the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Items 1 and 2); the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. John N. Irwin, II, Assistant Secretary of Defense; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. U. S. POLICY ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE
(NSC 5802/1; NSC Action No. 2151-f-(1); Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 14, 1960; NSC Action No. 2300; NIE 11-8-60; NIE 11-5-59; NSC 6022)

AND

2. MEASURES FOR THE PASSIVE DEFENSE OF THE POPULATION, WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO FALLOUT SHELTER
(NSC 5802/1; NSC 5807; NSC 5807/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Policy on Continental Defense", dated July 14, 1960; NSC Action No. 2300-e; Memos for NSC from Deputy Executive Secretary, subject: "Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population, with Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter", dated December 7 and 8, 1960)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on NSC 6022. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case NSC F89-1088
NLE Case 80-435#3
By LWO NLE Date 1/7/91

AWP/NSC/13

In the course of his briefing, Mr. Gray referred to paragraph 4 of the statement of policy, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserved their position on language which questions the U. S. capability to develop and deploy an adequate anti-ICBM system during the 1960's barring technological breakthrough.

General Lemnitzer said the word "adequate" was the key word in this paragraph. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt the paragraph downgraded the possibility of achieving an anti-ICBM system in the 1960's. A really adequate anti-ICBM defense would probably never be achieved.

Mr. Gray pointed out that current policy on continental defense contemplated an active defense against ICBM's. A part of our old shelter policy and other continental defense policy were predicated on an active defense. We are now less optimistic about the possibility of an active defense against ICBM's than we were in 1958, when current continental defense policy was written. Part of the reason for reviewing the 1958 policy is to take account of the change in our estimated capabilities to employ active defense against ICBM attack.

General Lemnitzer believed there was a possibility of getting an effective anti-ICBM system by 1970, but whether the system would provide complete coverage by then was another question. Mr. Gray wondered how effective the system would be.

Secretary Gates said he disagreed with the Joint Chiefs' view on this point. He had been told that even if we spend \$500 million a year beginning this year, and assuming that all the complicated hardware functioned properly, we would be able to defend only 20% of the population against ICBM's by 1969. Secretary Gates felt the statement in the paper was conservative.

Mr. Stans suggested the paper should make the statement that the time by which an active defense against ICBM's can be developed is uncertain.

The President said the scientists who talked to him had indicated uncertainty about the time at which an anti-ICBM system could be developed.

Mr. Gray suggested that the years immediately ahead constituted a "period of greatest danger", one of several such periods we had lived through. The policy statement is indicating that we have little hope of an effective active defense against ICBM's. At the same time there are those who demand a vastly increased shelter program. Mr. Gray wondered therefore whether some of the difficulties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not stem from the fear that the \$500 million a year now being spent on an active anti-ICBM system would be devoted to shelter construction.

General Lemnitzer agreed that Mr. Gray had correctly identified a part of the JCS concern. People might believe it was useless to spend money on an anti-ICBM system if the possibility of achieving an effective system were downgraded.

The President pointed out that the word "questionable" was used in paragraph 4. He felt this word meant we were in doubt as to whether an anti-ICBM system would be developed in the 1960's.

Secretary Gates felt the word "questionable" was the right word, since there was this doubt. He referred again to the fact that even with a great deal of effort we would be able to cover only 20% of the population with an anti-ICBM system by 1969. Accordingly, he believed the statement in paragraph 4 was correct.

Mr. Scribner thought the effort now being devoted to developing an anti-ICBM system should not be reduced. The difficulty was that some people, upon seeing statements like that in paragraph 4, would want to divert money from the anti-ICBM missiles to shelters.

The President said the statement in paragraph 4 seemed correct to him, and he believed it should be included in the policy paper. The statement was merely a statement of fact. He asked whether anyone could assure him that we would have an anti-ICBM system in the near future.

General Lemnitzer agreed that in so far as the statement was true there should be no objection to including it in the policy paper. The statement apparently meant that we can't count with certainty on achieving an active anti-ICBM defense in the 1960's. On the understanding that this paragraph would not be the basis for a major shift of funds from active to passive defense measures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would withdraw their reservation.

Mr. Gray then explained paragraph 7, dealing with the question of relative emphasis.

Secretary Gates said that in terms of such things as airborne alert, enhanced ground alert, BMEW's, dispersal, mobility and hardening, our policy has veered more toward passive defense than toward interceptor planes and anti-missile missiles. We are now spending more on passive defense operations than on active defense; this is Defense Department policy. Accordingly, Secretary Gates thought that language leaning toward passive defense should be incorporated in the policy statement.

Mr. Gray said the issue was how much effort the United States should devote to passive defense of the population.

The President said that paragraph 7 referred to passive defense of our retaliatory capability. Mr. Gray said that part of the paragraph referred to retaliatory capability, while the remainder referred to the defense of the population.

Secretary Gates believed the Majority language in paragraph 7 stated what we were actually doing more accurately than the Budget-JCS language.

The President said he saw no objection to the Majority language.

Mr. Stans said the language proposed by Budget was the language of the present continental defense policy. He had tried to discover the significance of proposing a change in present policy on relative emphasis. He could see no reason for such change because, as Secretary Gates had said, we have been carrying out passive measures within the scope of the present policy. Secretary Gates believed the language of current policy could be improved because it referred to "predominant emphasis" being placed on active defense. It was not true that predominant emphasis was now being placed on active defense.

The President believed the Majority language in paragraph 7 should be adopted.

Mr. Stans pointed out that the Majority language in paragraph 7-b referred to "increased attention to measures for the passive defense of the U. S. population". In the Budget version this language would be deleted.

The President said he would never agree to delete language of this nature. In his view, we should be doing a lot more than we are doing for passive defense of the population. He believed in doing everything possible to alert people without getting them hysterical.

Mr. Gray suggested that paragraph 7-b might be put aside for the moment, inasmuch as it was related to the divergences of view in connection with paragraphs 20 and 21. The paper contained three versions of paragraphs 20 and 21. One alternative reflected a program which would soon be presented by Governor Hoegh; the other alternatives reflected a different approach. Mr. Gray suggested that Governor Hoegh make his presentation on "Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population, with Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter", after which some of the splits would fall into place.

Governor Hoegh said that the key element in the passive defense of the population was fallout shelter, which would contribute to deterrence of war and, in the event the deterrent failed, would protect the population, enabling the nation to survive and go on to win the war. He said the OCDM goal was fallout shelter for the whole population within five years. This goal was to be achieved by providing encouragement to the people and to industry to provide their own fallout shelter without undue panic or haste. Governor Hoegh then displayed charts showing the cost of currently-approved measures. Measures approved by the NSC would have approved expenditure of \$97 million, 1959 to 1961. Actually because of reduction in appropriation requests, only \$15.65 million were expended. In FY 1962, \$42.9 million is being requested.

Governor Hoegh said 25% of the population had an adequate basis for fallout shelter in existing structures. A recent Gallup poll shows that 71% of the people favor fallout shelter. He pointed out that more than a million people had already built fallout shelters, while 13 million families had chosen the safest place in the home in case of attack. OCDM had constructed 400 prototype shelters.

Governor Hoegh then turned to proposed measures, and displayed a chart along the following lines:

	<u>FY 1962</u>	<u>5-year Total</u>
<u>PROPOSED MEASURES</u>		
Federal Buildings		
New military	10	50
Existing military	20	100
Grants in aid	16	90
Tax credits	800	4000
Federal matching grants	2	2
NEAR system	<u>0</u>	<u>50</u>
TOTAL	<u>848</u>	<u>4292</u>
Total of approved and proposed measures	890	4512

Governor Hoegh said that certain proposed measures could be taken without cost -- namely, Presidential actions, the inclusion of shelter provisions in Federal loan programs, and State actions. Governor Hoegh emphasized the need for Presidential action. He

suggested that the President might make the statement regarding fallout shelter in a press conference, or in the State of the Union Message, or might announce that he was building a fallout shelter at Gettysburg.

In connection with State actions, Governor Hoegh gave as an example the fact that some States and cities do not assess a property higher for tax purposes because it has a shelter. He also noted that many local communities are correcting their building codes to facilitate shelter construction.

In conclusion, Governor Hoegh said that if all the proposed measures except the tax credits were adopted he believed the necessary action by the American people would be stimulated. However, all actions other than the tax credits would be needed to produce this effect.

The President thought it would be illogical to allow tax credits for shelter construction. He said people take a great many actions for their own welfare without claiming tax credits. In response to a question from Mr. Gray, Governor Hoegh said he was not pressing for the adoption of tax credits at the present time.

Mr. Gray said he would like to read the goal stated in the OCDM paper: "The goal of the Federal Government should be that the entire population has fallout shelters within five years with such governmental support and assistance as is required to meet this goal."

The President felt the goal should be stated differently. It should be stated as a goal of fallout shelter within five years with the role of the Federal Government defined more precisely.

Mr. Gray then summarized for the Council the Planning Board comments on the OCDM report on "Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population." (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.) When Mr. Gray noted that Budget and Treasury would put shelters in only some Federal buildings rather than in all suitable buildings, the President commented that "some" Federal buildings would be his choice too.

General Lemmitzer said he agreed with the argument that fallout shelter in military buildings would be a great stimulus to private construction of shelters.

Before Mr. Gray finished reading the Planning Board comments on the OCDM report, the President said there was no need to read all the comments.

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. Gray said that the essential differences of view could be summarized as follows: Some officials think we should adhere to shelter programs already approved, while others believe it is necessary to adopt new measures.


Mr. Stans said that provision in the budget had already been made in the FY 1962 budget for the items shown on page 19 of the OCDM report except for the \$25 million for shelters in existing civilian Federal buildings. \$2 million had been put in the budget for this item, with the understanding that a supplemental would probably be requested by the new Administration if a larger shelter program were approved.

The President felt it would be undesirable to refuse, say, \$10 million for shelter in new civilian Federal Buildings. Mr. Stans said this item was in the budget. The President believed he would oppose both extremes. He wished to put the Federal Government out in front so that it could show what can be done in the shelter field. However, a vast program of shelter in old Federal buildings would be difficult.

Governor Hoegh said that for \$100,000 a fallout shelter for 5000 persons could be built under the Treasury Building. The President protested that the Treasury Building would be in a main target area and subject to blast. Governor Hoegh said a calculated risk had to be taken on this point; Washington might not be hit. The President believed that fallout shelter would have to be constructed on a selective basis in old buildings. He believed that the \$2 million mentioned by Mr. Stans was a little low in view of the way we spend money on some other things.

Governor Hoegh asked whether the \$2 million could not be raised to \$10 million or \$15 million for shelter in existing civilian Federal buildings. The President said that in any case the \$2 million should be increased.

Mr. Stans suggested that the exact amount be left open for decision after a survey of the buildings. /



Secretary Herter said that funds for fallout shelter in the new State Department building had not been allowed. The President then said that \$10 million should be put in the budget for fallout shelter in existing civilian Federal buildings. This represented his view, but he doubted that Congress would appropriate the money.

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. Stans said he would like to see consideration of a user charge as a means of recovering part of the cost of the NEAR system.

Secretary Gates said he wished to express an unpopular philosophy. He was worried about increasing emphasis on fallout shelter because he feared this would lead to control over our economy. Our people were not accustomed to doing things by halves. He feared that fallout shelter might lead to regimentation, and that controls would change our type of society.

The President said no one had made more speeches than he had favoring private enterprise and a free economy, but he was unable to see how the construction of fallout shelters, as proposed in the OCDM paper, would lead to controls. He recalled that in 1953 or 1954 the Council had discussed a \$40 billion shelter program, and that might have resulted in a different story. But our shelter policy was devoted to Federal Government leadership and stimulation, not to compulsion. He did not want to get the Federal Government too far into the shelter work, but it would be stupid for the Federal Government to be indifferent.

Governor Hoegh said he believed that people would build their own fallout shelters as indicated by the Gallup poll he had previously mentioned.

The President wondered whether a large number of people in the Gallup poll had favored shelters because they thought the Government would pay for them.

Secretary Herter said he believed in the goals stated in the OCDM paper. The question was the means of achieving these goals. He would hesitate to go on record as approving the details of the OCDM program unless he were sure that the proposed measures would be implemented.

The President said that Governor Hoegh had what he needed for implementation in the FY 1962 budget.

Secretary Gates pointed out that the proposed measures shown on Governor Hoegh's chart were not funded in the FY 1962 budget.

The President said that with respect to new Federal buildings additional money could not be put into the budget until the designs were known.

UNCLASSIFIED ~~TOP SECRET~~

Secretary Herter asked whether the cost of fallout shelter in existing buildings could be absorbed by the Defense budget. Secretary Gates said that Mr. Stans had already absorbed everything that could be absorbed in the Defense budget.

Mr. Stans said that some proposals made in the OCDM report could be handled on the basis of legislative recommendations. The President believed that recommendations on civil defense should be incorporated in the State of the Union Message. Governor Hoegh thought a single piece of legislation should be introduced to carry out the passive defense program contained in the OCDM paper.

Mr. Scribner said people favored fallout shelter, but he wondered whether they favored it enough to build it. He believed that in an emergency people working in the center of Washington would try to get home so that a fallout shelter under the Treasury Building, for example, would not be very useful.

The President said that Treasury employees would need a fallout shelter at home as well as under the Treasury Building. He had often wondered whether officials would be inclined to go to a relocation site or would attempt to reach home.

Mr. Scribner believed people would have to be frightened before they would build large numbers of fallout shelters. He also felt that many shelters probably were used for storage and did not have adequate food or water supplies on hand.

Governor Hoegh pointed out that 6% of the people have a two-weeks supply of food on hand.

The President said we were talking about measures which would awaken the American people without making them hysterical and which would stimulate them to take action by showing that the Government is serious about this problem. He believed we should be fairly conservative in the tone of our legislative recommendations. Mr. Stans said the Budget Message could submit recommendations for fallout shelter. The President suggested that a requirement for the preparation of new legislative recommendation on fallout shelter be incorporated in the NSC Record of Action.

Mr. Gray said OCDM would be requested, in consultation with Defense and Budget, to prepare a revised statement of policy on measures for the passive defense of the population. The revised paper should include a statement of financial implications as guidance for the next Administration. The new paper would be designed to supersede our current policy on "Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Fallout Shelter" (NSC 5807/2). Mr. Gray also suggested that the alternative paragraphs 20 and 21 of NSC 6022 be referred back to the Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion.

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. Gray said that paragraph 23 could also be resolved by the Planning Board. In connection with paragraph 23, the President said he was becoming more and more pessimistic about the possibility of evacuating cities in the event of a nuclear attack.

Mr. Gray then called attention to paragraph 25, which involved the issue of the extent to which civilian items should be stockpiled. Mr. Gray pointed out that originally it had been the policy to stockpile for survival and that this policy had been subsequently extended to stockpiling for recovery. Part of the Planning Board wished to stockpile for initial recovery only, while the remainder of the Planning Board wished to stockpile for recovery, omitting the word "initial".

The President asked where machinery such as bulldozers would be stockpiled. Governor Hoegh said all stockpiles would be located underground. He added that OCDM was encouraging the citizens of local communities to stockpile such things as medical supplies. He thought it was essential to have a stockpile policy because of the deficiency of essential items which would exist after a nuclear attack.

The President wondered how the survival of the stockpiles would be assured. Governor Hoegh said the stockpiles were relatively safe because of their storage underground.


The President wondered whether we could not induce the drug companies to locate their warehouses in safe places. Governor Hoegh said this had been attempted, but the drug companies preferred to keep their supplies stockpiled near the market. The President said that policies such as the one under discussion might work if the people of the United States could be stimulated to believe in the desirability of advance preparations against the possibility of attack.

After Governor Hoegh had made some drafting suggestions for paragraph 25, Mr. Scribner asked how recovery was defined. Did the word mean that we would stockpile enough material to place the country on a pre-attack basis within a short time? In other words, was complete recovery meant, or only the minimum of recovery essential to get the country functioning on an austere basis again?

Secretary Gates thought paragraph 25 was too open-ended. The President wondered why a time limit could not be put on stockpiling. When Governor Hoegh said this was a difficult matter to prejudge, the President replied that OCDM was prejudging the matter when it decided on the amounts to be stockpiled. Governor Hoegh said he interpreted the word "recovery" to mean that the

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

nation has survived the attack, restored free government and institutions, and has the necessary items for the people to live and get back to a production basis sufficient to support continued viability of the country. The President said he was not completely convinced that free government could be restored very soon after a nuclear attack. He believed if materials were to be stockpiled, it was necessary to know exactly what the policy was and how much it was necessary to stockpile.



Secretary Herter asked whether we were now talking about the stockpiling of food and medical supplies. Mr. Gray said the issue was whether to stockpile such items as food and medical supplies only or whether to stockpile all items essential to recovery.

Mr. Stans said removal of the word "initial" in paragraph 25 would change present policy in a major way. Even under the paragraph as redrafted by Governor Hoegh, almost every element of society would have to be stockpiled. The President believed our policy could not go too far. Mr. Stans thought that any phase of stockpiling could be dealt with separately and specifically. Mr. Gray pointed out that under Governor Hoegh's language structural steel might be stockpiled, since such action would not disrupt the economy at a time when steel production is declining.

The President said the problem had no real solution. No one knows in what condition a nuclear attack will leave the country. He was unable to see how we could stockpile enough supplies to enable us to resume our normal industrial processes immediately. Perhaps after a nuclear attack we would all be nomads.

Governor Hoegh believed it would be necessary to restore our industrial society after an attack in order to enable the people to survive. He thought perhaps our society would be restored on the 1920 basis. Secretary Gates said it perhaps would be cut back to a 1776 basis. The President doubted that the stockpile itself would survive. He said our imagination could not encompass the situation which would result from an attack on this country involving the explosion of 2000 megatons. He concluded that war no longer has any logic whatever. Mr. Gray said the word "initial" would be left in paragraph 25, and the right-hand version of the split was adopted.

As an additional comment on stockpiling, the President said there would be no transportation after a nuclear attack to carry stockpiled items where they were needed. Governor Hoegh felt transportation would not be completely destroyed. He believed railroad transportation facilities would survive and be restored to normal in about thirty days. The President did not agree, believing that the railway centers in the cities would be completely destroyed. He was willing to go along with the stockpiling of medicine, but he didn't believe that raw materials and semi-manufactured items should be stockpiled.

Mr. Gray then turned back to paragraph 12-b, where there was a split over whether the United States should "attempt to develop" AICBM capability by the earliest possible date, or should "ensure some operational" AICBM capability by the earliest possible date. In response to questions from the President, Mr. Gray said the language of this paragraph would be adjusted to indicate clearly that it referred to an anti-missile missile system. He felt the issue was between the present research and development priority for the AICBM and an operational capability.

General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt operational capability should be the objective. The President said the paragraph should be drafted in such a way as to take out both versions of the split.

Mr. Gray then turned to paragraph 19-a, where Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed deletion of a provision that the Secretary of Defense should consult with the Director, OCDM, with respect to the location of new fixed retaliatory bases and major military administrative headquarters. Secretary Gates wondered whether the provision which Defense objected to would give the Director, OCDM, a veto power. As long as no veto is implied, he was certainly willing to consult with the Director, OCDM.

The President felt the provision for consultation should remain in the paper because various factors in addition to the military factor needed to be considered. The President recalled that he had once raised this question in connection with the location of a TITAN base near Denver.

Mr. Gray said that the other divergencies of view in NSC 6022 could be settled on the basis of actions the Council had already taken.

The National Security Council:

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTINENTAL DEFENSE:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6022; in the light of the presentation referred to in Item 2 below.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6022, subject to the following amendments:

- (1) Page 2, paragraph 4: Include the bracketed sentence; deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.
- (2) Pages 4 and 5, paragraph 7: Include the MAJORITY version (deleting the BUDGET-JCS version), with the following changes:
 - (a) Subparagraph 7-a: Insert the word "military" before "active defenses" and before "passive measures".
 - (b) Subparagraph 7-b: Insert the word "civilian" before "passive defense".
- (3) Pages 9 and 10, paragraph 12-b: Revise to read as follows:

"b. Against ballistic missiles: The United States should continue efforts to develop at the earliest possible date an effective anti-ballistic-missile capability as a matter of highest national priority,* both for its own value and to offset the practical and psychological disadvantages of possible Soviet claims of success in this field."

- (4) Pages 14 and 15, paragraph 19-a: Include the bracketed words; deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.
- (5) Page 15, paragraph 19-b: Include the word "selected"; deleting the brackets and the footnotes thereto.
- (6) Pages 15, 16, 16-A and 17: Referred the alternative versions of paragraphs 20, 21 and 23 to the NSC Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion at this meeting.
- (7) Page 17, paragraph 24: Delete the word "initial", and the brackets and the footnote thereto.

UNCLASSIFIED ~~TOP SECRET~~

- (8) Pages 17 and 17-A, paragraph 25: Include the TREASURY-DEFENSE-BUDGET version, deleting the MAJORITY version.

MEASURES FOR THE PASSIVE DEFENSE OF THE POPULATION, WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO FALLOUT SHELTER

- a. Noted and discussed a presentation by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, based on the enclosures to the reference memorandum of December 7, 1960; in the light of the views of the Treasury Department thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 8, 1960, and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, as referred to at the meeting.
- b. Noted the President's approval of the objective of obtaining fallout shelter for the population within five years, principally with local and private effort, and with Federal resources to be confined largely to setting an example and stimulating individual efforts to attain the objective but not to guarantee its attainment.
- c. Noted the President's directive that suitable language to support the policy in b above be prepared for the State of the Union and Budget Messages, and that legislative proposals authorizing appropriate implementing measures be prepared for submission to the Congress in January; subject to the normal Executive clearance process by the Bureau of the Budget.
- d. Requested the Director, OCDM, in consultation as appropriate with the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, to prepare, in the light of the discussion at this meeting, a revised statement of policy on the subject, together with an estimate of the financial implications, for consideration by the Council on January 12, 1961, to supersede NSC 5807/2.

NOTE: The actions in b, c and d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, OCDM, for appropriate implementation, in consultation as appropriate with the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget.


UNCLASSIFIED

3. NATO IN THE 1960'S


(NIE 20-60; SNIE 20-2-60; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Issues of U. S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO", dated November 10, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 2149, 2204-c, 2274, 2292 and 2323; NSC 5906/1, paragraph 24-c; NSC 5910/1, paragraph 42-a; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Increased Nuclear Sharing With Allies", dated August 23, 1960; NSC 6017; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "NATO in the 1960's", dated November 16, 1960)

Mr. Gray noted that it was 17 minutes before eleven o'clock, and asked whether the President wished to discuss NATO military strategy at this time.

The President said he would like to hear the views of the Council on this subject. Mr. Gray then briefed the Council on the subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)



UNCLASSIFIED



Mr. Scribner thought the budget situation and the balance of payments were integral parts of the total NATO picture. The President said the United States would be stronger if some U. S. troops were redeployed from Europe to the United States. The United States is the reserve force of the whole world. The reserves should be in the rear instead of in the front line. NATO would be stronger if U. S. forces were redeployed.

Secretary Gates asked whether the President was endorsing the "forward strategy". The President replied in the affirmative, and added that our NATO allies, now that they equal us in production and population, should do their part.

Secretary Herter said the U. S. position toward NATO had been stated in the paper the United States had tabled at the NATO meeting. The President said the statement to which Secretary Herter referred was not as tough a statement as he would have made. Secretary Herter said only one country -- namely, Germany -- had reacted adversely to the U. S. statement. Secretary Herter then suggested that the statements which he and Secretary Gates had made at NATO should be appended to the Record of Actions of this meeting. Secretary Gates and the President concurred.

This shows what an idiot H. was. The Army that we are complained is proof we were for mild!

Mr. Gray concluded the meeting by saying he interpreted the discussion at this morning's meeting to mean that there would be no change in our basic NATO strategy.

The National Security Council:


- a. Discussed NATO basic military strategy, on the basis of NSC 6017, with particular reference to the three alternatives stated in paragraph 2-a of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of November 16, 1960.

UNCLASSIFIED ~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

- b. Noted the President's statement that no change appears necessary in NATO basic military strategy or in the related provisions of basic national security policy (NSC 5906/1).
- c. Noted that the President reiterated the current U. S. position regarding NATO planning, as reflected in the statements by the Secretaries of State and Defense at the recent Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (attached hereto).

NOTE: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for information to the NSC, together with copies of the statements by the Secretaries of State and Defense referred to in c above.



MARION W. BOGGS

UNCLASSIFIED

Mrs. B...
UNCLASSIFIED

Briefing Note for the
NSC Meeting of December 22, 1960

OM/11a
12-21-60 (Revised)


MEASURES FOR THE PASSIVE DEFENSE OF THE POPULATION

As a result of the Council discussion of continental defense in September, and the poor prospect at that time for active anti-airable defense, the President asked COMB, State and Defense to re-examine policies and programs for passive defense of the population, with particular regard to fallout shelters. We have just discussed, as part of the continental defense paper, the policies on civil defense. This paper outlines a program.

Before getting into the details, I want to note that this program is broader than national security. For that reason, it may be desirable to consider it in the Cabinet, too. I want to call your attention also to the fact that the paper has a somewhat different format than the present shelter paper, NSC 5807/2. On the basis of the Council's action today, NSC 5807/2 will have to be examined.

Briefly, the paper before you estimates that the present program will fall far short of the proposed objective, which is to have fallout shelter for the entire population in five years. Accordingly, the paper proposes a five-year program which concentrates on requiring shelter in all Federally-supported housing construction and an income tax credit of \$25 per shelter space for completed and satisfactory shelters. The cost of this 5-year program to the Federal Government is estimated at \$513 million in appropriations and about \$4 billion in tax losses. An additional \$5-10 billion would be borne by private citizens. It is stated that no economic controls of any kind nor any curtailment of other government construction would be needed..

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: *NSA-16304*
By: *AKC* NLE Date: *11/19/91*



Treasury submitted an extensive dissent which has been distributed to you. Treasury objects to the adoption of the five-year objective, and states a preference for continuing the present program, which, it contends, ^{not} has been fully implemented.

~~In its discussion of the ^{cost of Defense} ~~cost~~ paper, the Planning Board felt that the fall-out shelter program should not rest entirely on the poor outlook for active defense against ballistic missiles.~~ Turning to the cost summary of the program, which appears on page 19, the PB found no quarrel with measures A through F, ^{and G} and Budget pointed out that ~~measures~~ ^{A-F} were already in the FY 1962 Budget. On G[?] and H[?], Budget and Treasury would put shelters in only some existing Federal buildings, an approach which would cost something like 10% of the figures shown. Budget and Treasury want H financed out of present DoD funds instead of from additional money. Measures I and J are opposed by Treasury and HHFA. Measure K is opposed by Budget and Treasury, which point out that millions either pay no income taxes or less tax than the credit allowed, ^{this tax credit would mean} and that the Federal Government would pay a sizeable part of the cost of the shelter program. State expressed a preference for a direct payment rather than a tax credit. Treasury opposes measures L and N. On N, Budget and Treasury believe that some user charge could be worked out so that the Government would not have to bear the \$50 million cost of the generating equipment.

As I see it, the problem before us today is what action, if any, should be taken with respect to the President's FY 1962 Budget and Program on measures G through N.

- CALL ON Governor Hoegh
- Secretary Gates
- Secretary Harter
- Acting Secretary Scribner
- Mr. Stans

471

Mr. Baggs
UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET


Briefing Note for
NSC Mtg. 12/22/60

ASBaford:tms,gb
December 21, 1960

DISCUSSION OF FUTURE NATO MILITARY STRATEGY


1. May I suggest that we discuss as one the last two items on today's agenda, since both concern future NATO Military Strategy and both relate to the Council discussion at Augusta, on November 17, 1960, of NSC 6017 - NATO IN THE 1960's. You will recall that we had planned on that occasion also to consider military strategy but that time made it impossible to do so. You will also recall that the NSC Planning Board, to facilitate discussion, prepared a draft record of action which was transmitted to the Council by Memorandum for the Executive Secretary dated November 16, 1960: subject: NATO IN THE 1960's.

2. I believe that that draft memorandum will be helpful in identifying certain of the differences of view regarding NATO military strategy that are pertinent to the Secretary of State's report on discussions at Paris concerning military strategy. Therefore calling on the Secretary of State I would like to ask, therefore, that you turn to the November 16, 1960 draft Record of Action. The principal issue with respect to NATO military planning begins at the bottom of page 1, at para. 2a. As we discuss the Paris meeting, it might be useful to bear in mind the alternative positions in the draft record suggested respectively by Defense, State, and Treasury-Budget. They are, in my own, admittedly oversimplified version, as follows:



UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~



May I now ask the Secretary of State to report on the NATO Ministerial meeting, especially those parts of it that touched upon military strategy.

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE)

The Secretary of Defense doubtless wishes to add his impressions?

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

The Joint Chiefs?

(CALL ON CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

Perhaps the Secretary of the Treasury has additional observations.

(CALL ON THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

December 27, 1960



Dear Dirk:

Your most interesting letter of December 19 and its enclosure have left me with gloomy thoughts. Almost everywhere the prospect is displeasing. In this hemisphere our relations with Canada are deteriorating seriously. And to the south of us from Mexico to Argentina there is a restlessness which has our best friends in Latin America gravely worried. From Japan and Laos, through India and Africa, to General de Gaulle and the British Labor Party, both in crisis, there is trouble everywhere. What you tell me about NATO and Spaak does not surprise me, but it does depress me.

I have already taken one step to assure that your thoughts do not go unheeded and will shortly take another. Paul Nitze, whom you remember and who was and is very close to me, has just been asked and has agreed to become the Assistant Secretary of Defense in the new administration charged with the military participation in foreign affairs other than by force. He was, as you know, head of the Policy Planning Staff under me and will, I believe, exercise great influence in the new administration since he is also an intimate friend of Dean Rusk, the new Secretary of State. I have gone over the content of your letter with Paul, who is fully impressed with its seriousness. In the near future I am expecting to see Dean Rusk here in Washington and will do the same with him.

Since the election I have had two long talks, one with the President-elect, and the other with the Secretary of State designate, on people and policies. I am glad to say that my strong endorsement of Dean Rusk for the position of Secretary of State coincided with the views expressed to Kennedy by some of my associates in the Truman Administration and led, when difficulties developed about his earlier favorite for the position to Dean Rusk's appointment.

The Honorable
Dirk U. Stikker,
Palais de l'O.T.A.N.,
Paris, France,

I was very favorably impressed by my talks with both of these men. Rusk, of course, I knew well, but I was delighted to see that the eight years since we had worked together and his position as the head of the Rockefeller Foundation had developed him and given him a sense of authority and command which will be very much needed in the Department.

Kennedy I have never known well, though I have known him over quite a long time. We had talked over the telephone during and after the campaign, but had not met in person for about a year. I was impressed by his air of calmness, of authority, of seriousness, and of modesty. He came to call on me at home to get my views and listened as though he were considering carefully what I said. We talked together for an hour and a half. He was quite willing to concede his lack of knowledge and experience in fields where this existed. He was eager to learn. I had a feeling he would be decisive.

He had made up his mind, so I was told by Bob Lovett, that in his judgment the opposition to appointing me Secretary of State would be considerable and he had quite early determined not to consider it further, if he had ever considered it at all. At the end of our talk he asked whether there was any position which I should like to have. I said that there was not. He then mentioned the NATO post. I said that I thought policies were more important than posts and that I could be of more help to him as an adviser and consultant than I could 3000 miles away talking about ideas which might or might not be the policies of the United States government. Dean Rusk raised the same question with me, and I gave him the same answer.

I quite agree that it is of the greatest importance that the United States should send a man of reputation and authority within the administration to NATO, and I think that this will be done, but I think that it is even more important that this administration should with the utmost speed possible develop a military strategy for the defense of the center of the free world and a political policy toward Europe and the Soviet

Union which will complement it to fill the complete void which now exists.

Your report of the problems which led to the discussions at your house in Menaggio and of the outcome of these discussions is most interesting and helpful. Cy Sulzberger has written along these lines in the New York Times -- as he has also written of the depressing effect of the last NATO Ministers' meeting -- but one is never sure whether these newspaper reports are good or bad guesses from fragmentary knowledge. In my talk with Mr. Kennedy I had told him what your letter confirms, that "the main reason for the Norstad proposals was of a political character," and I guessed the nature of its purpose pretty well. This purpose is most important as the Chancellor rightly pointed out.

But is it your view that to devise "a multilateral European nuclear weapons system" goes beyond the political purpose for which it has been proposed and provides an adequate military strategy for the defense and strengthening of NATO? I should think not. We seem to have gotten to the point where the best efforts of all the NATO partners in the nuclear field are unlikely to produce a counter weapon nuclear capability. Hence the reluctance on both sides to use strategic nuclear weapons will grow, and, without some other capability, the appeal of NATO will continue to decline. Here, so it seems to me, lies the problem for military and political inventiveness in the new administration.

I should like to see it solved along two lines: (1) within NATO to devise military strategy and capability with concurrent NATO political institutions to make these effective; (2) outside of NATO, and far broader, another political development involving Western Europe and North America in the interest of greatly increased production for three purposes -- (a) the increasing needs of our increasing populations, (b) the needs of adequate defense, conventional as well as nuclear, and (c) the provision of export capital where it can be wisely used in undeveloped countries.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON

December 30, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: NATO in the 1960's

- REFERENCES:
- A. NIE 20-60; SNIE 20-2-60
 - B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Issues of U. S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO", dated November 10, 1959
 - C. NSC Actions Nos. 2149, 2204-c, 2274, 2292, 2323
 - D. NSC 5906/1, paragraph 24-c
 - E. NSC 5910/1, paragraph 42-a
 - F. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Increased Nuclear Sharing With Allies", dated August 23, 1960
 - G. NSC 6017
 - H. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "NATO in the 1960's", dated November 16, 1960
 - I. NSC Action No. 2362

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 471st NSC Meeting on December 22, 1960 (NSC Action No. 2362):

- a. Discussed NATO basic military strategy, on the basis of NSC 6017, with particular reference to the three alternatives stated in paragraph 2-a of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of November 16, 1960.
- b. Noted the President's statement that no change appears necessary in NATO basic military strategy or in the related provisions of basic national security policy (NSC 5906/1).
- c. Noted that the President reiterated the current U. S. position regarding NATO planning, as reflected in the statements by the Secretaries of State and Defense at the recent Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (attached hereto).

The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President on December 29, 1960, are transmitted herewith for information. Also enclosed is a copy of the statements by the Secretaries of State and Defense referred to in c above.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND 889026
By HEM/KOS, (NSA), Date 2/21/91

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

12/30/60 / TAB C

~~SECRET~~

SECRET - NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED

1/6/61

PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PARIS FRANCE

OSD WASH D C

ALO 20

DISTRIBUTION:

DUSCINCEUR
COFS
SECY
ACOFB
THURSTON

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LOPER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

1. Thank you very much for your DEF 988200.

2. We had not intended to furnish information concerning numbers and types of atomic weapons. However, even without that type of material, the information we are providing is of such a sensitive nature that it should be considered by Defense. Accordingly, letter of transmittal is addressed to Chmn JCAE thru SECDEF and the letter with inclosures will be hand carried personally to you by Col Taylor.

3. Answers have been prepared to questions 1 thru 13. In view of the wide range of technical and operational problems and the major policy aspects involved in Question 14, I have decided to reserve my position on this question pending further

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: *ML 89-191 #5*
By: *PVD*
NLE Date: *1/5/91*

6

Jan 1961

SECRET - NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED

LAURIS NORSTAD, General, USAF
4006 1 2

S. W. DOWNEY
Colonel, U. S. Army
Executive to SACEUR

SECRET - NOFORN

UNCLASSIFIED

should 1/10/61 15/10 (1)

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET - NOFORN

USNMR SHAPE PARIS FRANCE

study. The answer to Question No. 1 includes information which is necessarily classified COSMIC TOP SECRET. On the other hand, much of this information must be available in the Pentagon in other forms and under other classifications. I hope you will bear this ~~point~~ in mind in deciding the manner in which the information is submitted to the Committee.

4. Col Taylor departs by Flight A-424 tonight and will contact you on his arrival Sat morning, 7 Jan.

SECRET

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET - NOFORN