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February 3, 1960

**MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
February 3, 1960**

Others present: Chairman McCone, General Goodpaster

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Mr. McCone spoke to the President about going to Notre Dame University in June to receive a degree and make a speech. He said the gathering would be in the open and might number as many as 50,000. The President said he does not like outdoor speeches, but has wanted to visit Notre Dame for a long time, and will plan to do so. Mr. McCone said he would work with Father Hesburgh to shorten the ceremony in every way possible, and added that he thought the President could attend for the initial part of the ceremony, and leave when his own participation was completed.

Mr. McCone recalled that Father Hesburgh is the Vatican's representative on the IAEA and that Father Hesburgh had been instrumental in composing the differences between McCone and Emelyanov two years ago when they had a violent argument over charges made by Emelyanov in an open meeting.

Mr. McCone said there are three vacancies coming up on the Atomic Energy Commission. The first was caused by the death of Mr. Vance, whose term ran to mid-1960. The JCAE is agreeable to a 5 1/2 year term for the man to take this position, with the idea of providing continuity. The second prospective vacancy is that of Dr. Williams who is suffering from cancer, which is now reaching an advanced stage. His term runs to 1961. The third is that of Mr. Floberg who may leave to assume a law partnership; his term runs to 1962. His loss will be acute since he has been doing a very fine job. Mr. McCone said he had been talking with the President's staff about possible replacements.

Mr. McCone next reported on the experimental explosions now being conducted at Los Alamos to verify safety of certain atomic

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weapons. [

] The experimental explosions are following the creep method and are now approaching the design content of plutonium. They will continue for the next two or three weeks. The outcome may well be to confirm the safety of these weapons.

Mr. McCone said he is concerned regarding the question of the threshold concept as it affects any suspension of atomic testing. The President said he has had word that the British take the stand that, if we are ^{not} successful in getting an agreement based on the threshold concept, they will settle for less. Mr. McCone said he is inclined to be very critical of the UK in this matter. They were opposed to a suspension of testing until they had completed the tests they were ready to conduct. Since that time, having received design information from us under the new law they have been "living off of us" and have no need to continue testing themselves. Mr. McCone added that we had learned indirectly of a statement by a senior British official involved in this matter that if the United States were to resume testing, Great Britain would take the matter to the UN and join in condemning U. S. action. Initially the President did not recall having received this information previously. I reminded him that we had received it through very indirect means. The President expressed considerable displeasure at this British stand. He said that if we were able to get an agreement on the basis of the threshold concept we would simply say that below the threshold we will do whatever we decide to do.

Mr. McCone stated that with regard to underground tests he has a problem with his laboratories, the members of which are keen to resume testing. The President said he was aware of this but there are policy questions involved. Mr. McCone said he has given instructions for the digging of tunnels in Nevada as a means of being prepared for tests should they be reinstated. This does not of course prejudice the decision as to resuming them.

Mr. McCone commented on a matter he had discussed with Mr. Herter (and Mr. Herter had mentioned to the President yesterday.) This is an apparent divergence between Emelyanov (who works directly under Khrushchev) and the Soviet negotiators in Geneva who are under Gromyko. Mr. McCone said he is willing to meet with Emelyanov to see if any way out of the impasse over



the threshold concept can be found, provided Secretary Herter wants him to do so.

Mr. McCone next said that he is concerned over any thought of suspending the production of fissionable material in our atomic plants. Such a suspension is very hard to police. The President said he thought production, or curtailment of production, is not too difficult to police. Mr. McCone said it is not so difficult at any particular plant, but that it is difficult to be sure the inspection is comprehensive. He then went on to say that we know a great deal more about their atomic plants than they think we do. He suggested that we might offer to close down specific plants in our establishment of the same general power input as some of their plants, and ask them to close down specific plants in reciprocity. The President said he liked the idea suggesting for example that we could designate a plant of theirs in the Urals and say that if they will close that we will close an equivalent plant. Mr. McCone said the same could be done for their production facilities at Tomsk, and that we could shut down some of our facilities at Hanford. If this were done, we could then think of extending the measures to the "open skies" proposal to make the control more comprehensive. The President said the matter would simply be one of padlocking a plant and putting a party of as few as two men at each to see that it remained closed.

Mr. McCone said he begins to see some progress on atomic power plants in the California area. He thought PG&E and Southern California Edison would each build a 300,000 kw plant providing the government gives research assistance. The Joint Committee has indicated agreement. These plants should be competitive with conventional power sources, since the fuel costs in California are quite high.

Mr. McCone next spoke briefly concerning the space program, noting that he has been a member of the NASC. He is glad to see the acceleration of the Saturn and Nova programs. The President said the matter is completely psychological. The action "burns him up" to a considerable extent. But he sees no other answer to public concern over our progress in space exploration. Mr. McCone said he is not convinced that the funds would have to come from additional money. He said he thought the organization of



space activity is not too good, and thought that NASA and ARPA should be together in a single space organization. The President said he disagreed with this idea. He feels that there is an essential difference between peaceful and military space activities. Mr. McCone next said that he has concern about the effectiveness of manned aircraft. Air defense means are gaining in capability to intercept and destroy them. Except for the combination of the Hound Dog type of air to surface missile with such aircraft, they constitute an asset of rapidly declining value. He said the Polaris missile is wonderful in his estimation and that he has great hope for the Minuteman. He pointed out that these have warheads of [redacted]. He thought the Titan is of importance because of its ability to deliver a weapon of [redacted]. The President commented that due to the laws that govern explosive force, the effect diminishes only as the cube root of the size. Also, he understood the [redacted] is about to be stepped up to about [redacted]. Mr. McCone acknowledged that this is true.

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Regarding the aircraft the President said that we must not act too quickly in disposing of them. It will take a long time to get a missile force ready, in position, with short times to prepare for firing. In the meantime we should keep the B-52, with the Hound Dog missile. He acknowledged that aircraft, over a longer period, are going out. Mr. McCone mentioned how effective the Sidewinder missile has proven, notably in the combat in the Formosa Strait. The President said he thought the B-52 is still a good plane, particularly if used with the Hound Dog missile.

A. J. Goodpaster
 Brigadier General, USA

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Lt Col Vernon Walters/dem

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: 21 January 1960
Place: President's Office, Elysee Palace, Paris
PRESENT: General de Gaulle
General Norstad
Colonel de Rougemont
Lt Colonel Vernon Walters

General Norstad thanked the President for receiving him and stated that this conversation arose as a result of talks between General de Gaulle and President Eisenhower during which it was felt that it might be useful if General Norstad talked to him on air defense and other matters. General de Gaulle then asked whether it was merely on air defense questions or on other things.

General de Gaulle said that the Atlantic Alliance was not in question, that it must be maintained as long as the Soviet threat endures, and especially now just before the Summit meetings we must not be divided.



General Norstad said he knew that General de Gaulle had been briefed by his own authorities, and he would like to touch on air defense matters, but also perhaps enlarge the picture.

General de Gaulle then said he would like to say a word about air defense himself. He said that there were two possibilities regarding a war: first, there was general, strategic, nuclear war; and, secondly, something less than this which would involve fighting in Germany: The French were willing to give all the means and forces in this forward area for the battle in Germany, but if this battle were lost, the countries of Europe, France and Great Britain, would still have to defend themselves. The first battle in Germany would be integrated and the second would not. There might not be much left and it might involve partisan-type fighting against occupation; but the governments should not be completely deprived of means to fight. They must preserve the national entity; and that was all.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)
MR 92-295-1
DATE 10/17/96

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General Norstad replied that SHAPE's policy was to preserve this national entity at the highest possible level. He discussed in general terms the organization of A.C.E., pointing out that integration was at the level of the largest national units, that is, Army or Corps; and that, similarly, the ATAF's contained very large national components, such as 1st CATAC and Seventeenth Air Force. General Norstad then said that the most effective part of any air defense was, of course, the strike against the sources of enemy air power, such as airfields and missile-launching sites. He indicated in a general way some of the delivery systems and indicated that France would contribute both in aircraft and in missiles, and outlined the types of missiles that would be found in A.C.E. in 1963.

General de Gaulle asked whether the range of the REDSTONE was 250 miles.

General Norstad then spoke of the weapons situation in general terms, giving some orders of magnitude of availability of nuclear weapons and discussed SACEUR's atomic strike plan and means by which targets would be attacked.

General de Gaulle expressed considerable interest in this and commented that it was extremely well planned. He asked a number of questions relating to this matter.

General Norstad said that if at some later date General de Gaulle had some time available he would be happy to give him a further briefing on this subject, and General de Gaulle nodded.

The General spoke of aircraft on the alert and said he would like to come now to the air defense situation. [He showed the chart showing the breaks in the radar coverage in 1956, and another chart showing the 18 radar sites and communications systems which had been financed by NATO.] He then showed General de Gaulle a chart of the speed of penetration into the area of A.C.E. of enemy fighters flying at speeds of MACH 1 and MACH 2. General Norstad explained the function of the early-warning system and indicated that automatic or semi-automatic data-transmission equipment would be required, and one French-built system was under study; it was interesting because it used transistors rather than tubes. General Norstad then pointed out that there would be a belt of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) in Germany, comprising some 150 batteries, and that 12 of these were

planned to be French in 1963. Behind these were some 700 Allied fighters. General de Gaulle asked what the number of French fighters would be, and on receiving the answer around 100, he said he felt that this might be too high and asked if they included forces from the 1st CATAAC. General Norstad replied that they did indeed include 2 squadrons from the CATAAC.

General de Gaulle then asked about the status of the British Fighter Command, and General Norstad replied that this was under SHAPE, but that the fighters could not be transferred outside the area of the United Kingdom without national agreement, and that this would also be true for the DAT.

General de Gaulle pointed out that the British had a different situation and were more independent. He asked under whom the DAT commander would serve, and was told that it would be under AIRCENT. He asked who AIRCENT was, and was told that it was Air Marshal Broadhurst. He said that the British enjoyed their own special line of command and that he would want exactly what the British had.

General Norstad said that to do this would be an offense against judgment inasmuch as it would split the battle in the middle and did not make military sense. However, he understood that there might be political or other considerations that made this expedient for General de Gaulle and if he needed it, General Norstad would be willing to accept this and support it before the Military Committee, if this was what General de Gaulle wanted. He explained that he did not like the system because it was not the most effective one, but if General de Gaulle felt that he had to have this, General Norstad felt that, with the cooperation of the French Air Forces, something satisfactory could be worked out that he could support.

General de Gaulle said that this would still be different from what the British had and they had certain special advantages. General Norstad replied that there were none that the French could not have, that he had negotiated this matter himself, and that Mr. Macmillan might not have some of the special concessions he thought he had. General de Gaulle laughed and said, "Then it may not work."

General Norstad pointed out that CINCAIRCENT was directly under General Valluy, a French officer, who would certainly wish to insure coordination of this matter. Furthermore, CINCAIRCENT had

a Deputy for Air Defense. None of these positions in NATO were assigned by countries, but generally they were given to officers of the same nationality, and for four years this Air Defense Deputy had been a French General Officer, and was currently General Pelissie of the French Air Force.

General Norstad then said that another French Officer, General Valluy, controlled a very large percentage of the nuclear weapons available to A.C.E. in time of war. General Norstad also pointed out that if an intrusion took place, basically, the decision to engage the intruder would be made by the sector controller, and if this took place over France, this sector controller would be a Frenchman under the DAT; but it was essential that all of the information, data and means for the air defense of Europe be employed as a whole in order to insure their most effective use.

General de Gaulle then asked, "Why was this not settled before I arrived, and why is it so important to you? After all, the French contribution is not large, and why do you attach so much importance to this question?"

General Norstad said that all of the other countries had agreed that the best defense can be furnished by NATO by defending it as a unit, that the French contribution to NATO was not critical, but that the defense offered by NATO to France was critical and that maximum effect would be obtained in air defense if all of the available forces were used as one. He explained that General Eisenhower, in his original terms of reference, had been assigned responsibility for air defense in the zone of the land battle. This had meant, in effect, *(inserting) (inserting) that this was not a part of the Alliance and did not have much to say.* Subsequently, in 1955, General Eisenhower had been assigned responsibility for the coordination of air defense from a planning point of view. General Norstad stated that when he had been at Fontainebleau he had endeavored to obtain Netherlands, Belgian and French agreement to place at least a forward part of their areas under a common air defense set-up and they had agreed to do so. Although there had been some difficulties, due to national sensibilities, particularly as between the BENELUX countries and France, these had been surmounted. With the shrinkage of time due to the increases in aircraft speeds, the problem had become more acute, and last year he had felt obligated to accept the responsibility for an integrated air defense, an additional load he did not particularly wish to assume.

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General de Gaulle then asked under whom the U.K. Fighter Command would operate, and General Norstad answered under SHAPE and that if General de Gaulle desired that this be the case with the DAT he would be willing to do it on this basis.

General de Gaulle nodded and said, "We will see what we can work out."

General de Gaulle asked General Norstad what he thought of the recent Russian missile launchings into the central Pacific. General Norstad stated that this was an impressive achievement and that they had fallen quite close to the target, perhaps within fifty miles. General de Gaulle asked whether they had been fired from the Caspian Sea area, and General Norstad indicated that he believed they had been fired from a range just north and east of the Caspian.

General Norstad then recalled the President's recent statement concerning the reliability and accuracy of the last 15 ATLAS firings. General de Gaulle said he had no doubt concerning this. He was just inquiring to get a general idea of what the Russians had done.

General de Gaulle thanked General Norstad very warmly for coming and talking to him about these matters.

General Norstad again repeated that he would be available to give General de Gaulle a fuller briefing on the Strike Plan at a later date, if the General so desired, and General de Gaulle nodded. General Norstad said he understood that General de Gaulle did have problems. General de Gaulle said that he did indeed have problems, and that they were moving quickly. General Norstad said he hoped they were not too difficult, and General de Gaulle nodded rather sadly and said that they all wound up the same way.

He then walked to the door with General Norstad, thanking him again for this explanation, and saying again how impressed he had been with the thoroughness of the organization of the Strike Plan.

Subsequently, in an adjoining room, General Norstad said to Colonel de Rougemont that his offer was firm to place the DAT directly under SHAPE and separate the DAT from the forward area in Germany, even though this ran counter to his judgment and split the battle in the center; if this was what General de Gaulle wanted,

he would accept it, defend it before the Military Committee, and attempt to work it out on this basis. He stated that he desired that his firmest language be recorded for the French minutes in this respect. He also said that he would re-work MC 54/1 in such a way as to eliminate the expression "integration" and substitute some other phrase, such as "unification" or "centralization." He asked that Colonel de Rougemont note this in speaking with the French national authorities.



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NLE MR Case No. 85-226
Document No. 10

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February 8, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
February 5, 1960

Others present: Mr. Herter, General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter saw the President briefly after NSC meeting. He told him there is need for a uniform answer regarding the question of new legislation to authorize transfer of atomic weapons to our allies. [He had a proposed statement to the effect that "there is no present intention" of seeking such legislation. The President was reluctant to go that far. He said he has a fixed idea that we should treat our allies properly.] Mr. Herter asked if the President had in mind to have a review made of the whole law. He commented that the Administration is having great trouble with the JCAE, for example in connection with the question of an airborne anti-aircraft weapon for Great Britain. He thought we could simply say that the President has adequate powers. The President said he did not think he would go that far. After further discussion the President edited the proposed statement and approved it as a basis for discussion with our allies and as a basis for comment by our press officers. He said he thought we should go into this whole question thoroughly.



A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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Authority ML 85-226-10
By JLG NLE Date 6/10/89

(PD) 80FC0255

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, Office of the
Staff Secretary Records, 1952-61

SUBJECT SERIES: STATE DEPARTMENT SUBSERIES

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Box 4, State Department -
October 1959 - February 1960 (6)

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February 12, 1960

692/412

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
February 8, 1960

Others present: Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

Secretary Herter said he had received a friendly letter from Selwyn Lloyd regarding our threshold proposal. Mr. Lloyd had indicated that the British will support us as far as they possibly can.

With regard to talks on Berlin, Mr. Herter said the French have submitted a paper covering six points which they say were "agreed" at Paris. One of these gives some trouble -- the statement that there was an agreement to stand fast on our juridical position in Berlin. The President said he thought we did agree to stand fast on our juridical position. He said that this was, however, in the context of holding to that until we had something better, and also recognizing that this is ^{not} a good basis on which to argue our case before the world. It is now fifteen years since the war ended and this reason is wearing thin. The point is that he doesn't want simply to give this up, since we would then be left with nothing. The real question is this -- is there any kind of a step that can be taken from here. He thought we could talk with our allies about this. The President said it is all right to state that we will make no concession without a quid pro quo. He mentioned that there has been some thought that if we do not raise the question of the eastern frontiers they will not raise the question of West Berlin.

Mr. Herter said that Khrushchev shows some signs of moving into a commitment that he will conclude an early treaty with East Germany. We have always said that such action cannot prejudice our rights in West Berlin. It is necessary to think again of our contingency plans. He thought it was desirable to talk to the Germans about these.

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10/12/91

Agency Case NSC F 90-1023

FILE CASE 90-300415

By [illegible] FILE DATE 7/31/91

The President said that if we are going on the theory that the East Germans are going to block access to Berlin, we must consider what the city is going to do economically. It was one thing to support it with an airlift when it was at a subsistence level after the war. Now, however, there is a tremendous amount of trade and industry on which the city's prosperity depends.

The President asked Mr. Herter to furnish him with a brief regarding our juridical position in West Germany.

Mr. Herter next mentioned the matter of new passes for our forces in Germany. We are inclined not to accept the change in the passes which purports to have the East Germans "register" the pass.

The President went back to Western agreement that we would not give away rights in Berlin. But if anything can be found that would be better for both sides, it is all right to make a change. He reiterated that if the Soviets and the East Germans block civil access to West Berlin they can make the city stagnate.

Mr. Herter said the real problem is the German elections. These must be held before September 1961. Until they are held Adenauer will be almost immovable. He said he would get our thoughts in shape on West Berlin before Adenauer is here in March.

Mr. Herter then gave the President a memorandum recommending State Department reorganization. He said Senator Jackson has put in legislation, or is about to do so, based on the thought of having a Secretary of State and below him a Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Herter indicated some sympathy with this approach. He commented that it would take the place of the idea of a First Secretary of the Government.

The President recalled that he had discussed the First Secretary proposal with Mr. Dulles at length. It is his intention to put this proposal in during the present session. He recalled

that the State Department had gotten impatient and wanted to reorganize itself. There is some tendency of this proposal to cut across the First Secretary proposal. On the specific point of having the USIA become an operating agency within the State Department, the President recalled that Mr. Dulles had wanted originally to limit the State Department to policy. However, when he saw the need for control of day-to-day operations, he began to change his position. Mr. Herter said the only really important change proposed is that respecting the USIA. At the present time there is a danger of having parallel lines of foreign policy. It is almost impossible to separate policy responsibility from operational responsibility. His thought is that if we had a Secretary of State and a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the top man could dovetail all affairs including diplomatic, economic and informational.

The President said that we have representatives from many departments engaged in foreign affairs. Someone is needed to coordinate all of this, and there is need for a new title. The title of Secretary of State has a historic meaning, and will not do.

Mr. Herter said the last proposal for a First Secretary was for an individual not to be confirmed by the Senate, and to be essentially a staff officer of the President in the White House having only delegated powers. The President said he completely disagreed with this. The man should be confirmed, have an established salary and necessary staff. There is a need for permanency. He should not be in the White House. The President went on to say that one problem with the proposed reorganization is that USIA cannot confine itself simply to international political relationships. It must disseminate information regarding the Defense Department and many other activities of the Government. Rather than put it in the State Department, his thought has been to put all under one man, allowing the State Department to retain the diplomatic and policy-recommending function.

The President said that one major value of the proposal would be to make the officials of USIA and ICA members of the Foreign

Service. Mr. Herter commented that this would only apply to a few of the top people. The President asked whether the four proposed additional positions would be political appointees, i. e., policy level men. Mr. Herter said they would.

After further discussion the President said that this proposal seems generally all right. It may prejudice his First Secretary proposal, but he is determined to put it in to the Congress anyhow.

Mr. Herter next brought up an invitation he had received to address the Press Club, and answer questions regarding disarmament. The President said he would see no objection and would in fact be delighted for the Secretary to do so. He suggested a quick review of the world situation as he sees it now, mentioning the German issue, the question of testing, the strengthening of the free world including Latin America. In so doing he could stress our common basis of religion.

The President next referred to his South American trip. He said he knew it would be a good will trip, but he wanted to know what he should plan to talk about as regards substantive things. Mr. Herter said one problem is that Brazil and Argentina have been following diametrically opposed economic schemes. Brazil has not met the IMF requirements, whereas Argentina has. There are two great things in Brazil -- one is Brazilia into which Kubitchek has put a great deal of money, and the second is Operation Pan America, which is his pet proposal. The President recalled that Ayub had told him that he was spending much less money on Rawalpindi than Kubitchek is spending on Brazilia; in fact, he is limiting the expenditures to \$12 million a year. The city will build slowly so that Pakistan does not wreck itself.

..... They have a range with something over 100,000 head of cattle on it occupying an area larger than the state of Georgia. Such diversity between the rich and the poor creates terrible tensions.

Mr. Herter next raised the question of disarmament. He said there is beginning to be question whether we could do anything in the atomic field. The President said he tends to agree, and to feel that this must be kept until the last. Mr. Herter said that one problem is that Defense insists they have great atomic requirements extending out as far as 1968.

This means that there will be no monopoly on possession of the nuclear weapons. The President said that it is because of this possibility that he has always strongly favored the sharing of our weapons. It makes little sense not to share them when nations can, with facility, provide them for themselves.


A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
(Tuesday, 9 February 1960 at 11:45 a.m.)

1. I first took up the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of February 4. I told the President that the only difficulty was in Paragraph 3 b. I recommended to him that a period be placed after February 15, and that the remainder of the sentence be taken out. I felt this would meet the needs of the situation, although not every agency would be entirely happy.

2. I then discussed with the President, Mannie Sprague's recommendation that a modest low-key press release of the appointment of the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad be put out. The President said that he thought it might be better if Mannie Sprague could be considered a consultant to the President so that no report would be indicated. I pointed out to the President that C. D. Jackson and Phil Reed were also involved; that there would be staff for the committee; and that in Mr. Sprague's judgment and in mine as well, the operation could not be kept a secret one. I said that Mr. Sprague and I both felt that a brief announcement, which wouldn't do much more than indicate the existence of the committee, would eliminate a lot of speculation. The members of the Committee then could simply stand on the President's announcement.

The President said that he was very wary of reports which the press and public demanded be made public. I reminded the President that as far as the old Jackson Committee of 1953 was concerned, an announcement was made of the formation of the Committee and later a sanitized version of the Committee's report had been made public and there had been no difficulty with it.

The President then read the draft press release which I prepared for his approval, and he struck out the language, "with particular reference to international relations." The draft approved by him is attached.

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-204

MR 77-175 #28

By DJH Date 10/28/81

TOP SECRET

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 1-301 (2)(c)(d)

NJC letter 9/29/81

NLE Date 10/28/81

OSANSA / Spec Ass'ts 9 / Pmb 5-9 / 4 / 1960 - Mtgs w the Pres. - Vol 1 (7)

He then said that he wished it fully understood by Mannie Sprague if there was to be a report to the President that the Committee should bear in mind that there should be one report which would go to the President which would not be made public and another prepared for public consumption.

3. I presented to the President a letter for his signature appointing Mr. John F. Doherty, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, vice Mr. J. Walter Yeagley resigned. I told the President that The Attorney General had recommended this appointment. The President signed the letter.

4. I then brought up the question of increased nuclear sharing with our allies, which had been the subject of some discussion at the President's press conference of February 3. The President said that he had simply said in the press conference what he believed and what he had said before. I observed to the President that I had heard him say the same thing at least four times in NSC meetings in forceable terms but that the State Department hadn't really agreed. He wondered what the problems of the State Department were and I said that it was primarily the proliferation of nuclear weapons without any control and what they generally referred to as the nth country problem.

I reminded the President that this was one of the discussion topics which we were working on and that I had discussed this with him in December upon his return from his trip. The President then said perhaps he had spoken too hastily in the press conference. I suggested that on the contrary, it would be helpful for him to have made the reference at his press conference because we would now be in a position to move along with the discussion paper without successful resistance from the State Department. He asked us to proceed as rapidly as we could.


5. I then reported to the President on a meeting of the Planning Board of February 5 with the seven consultants who came to discuss major national security problems. I said that I felt impelled to report one particular matter to the President, and that was Mr. John J. McCloy's concern about the missile situation. Mr. McCloy had said he was getting increasing reports from around the country and from prominent and responsible people that they were confused and in some cases concerned. I said to the President that I felt that we should take seriously the concern of such individuals as Jack McCloy as distinguished from much of the political talking that is going on. I said I felt that this was the same thing that underlay Mr. McCone's observation at the February 4 NSC meeting.

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The President said that he had discussed this with the Legislative Leaders earlier in the day and that he had concluded that he would go on television for 15 minutes. I asked him whether he intended also to refer to the so-called "space lag" and he emphatically replied that he did not. I agreed that it would be wise to confine it solely to the Defense situation.

6. I then briefly discussed with the President progress in the OCB in the period which I had served as Chairman. He was interested in my judgment that the change had been beneficial to the work of the Board.

7. [REDACTED]



Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

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Box 47

Shannon

2/12/60
(= 2/8/60)

February 12, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
February 8, 1960

Others present: Secretary Herter, General Goodpaster

Secretary Herter said he had received a friendly letter from Selwyn Lloyd regarding our threshold proposal. Mr. Lloyd had indicated that the British will support us as far as they possibly can.

With regard to talks on Berlin, Mr. Herter said the French

Mr. Herter said that Khrushchev shows some signs of moving into a commitment that he will conclude an early treaty with East Germany. We have always said that such action cannot prejudice our rights in West Berlin. It is necessary to think again of our contingency plans. He thought it was desirable to talk to the Germans about these.

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E.O. 11652, Sec 3.204

MAR 8 76-54 # 23
By DJH Date 6/24/82

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

EO 12065, Sec. 1-301 ()

280A State, State 119129 WIC 5107/22

NLE Date 6/24/82

Mr. Herter next raised the question of disarmament. He said there is beginning to be question whether we could do anything in the atomic field. The President said he tends to agree, and to feel that this must be kept until the last. Mr. Herter said that one problem is that Defense insists they have great atomic requirements extending out as far as 1968.

This means that there will be no monopoly on possession of the nuclear weapons. The President said that it is because of this possibility that he has always strongly favored the sharing of our weapons. It makes little sense not to share them when nations can, with facility, provide them for themselves.

5/11/2/60
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A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

3/8/60

UNCLASSIFIED

March 8, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT March 8, 1960

Others present: Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant,
Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Gates,
Mr. Douglas, Mr. Irwin, General
White, General Goodpaster



Secretary Herter saw the President alone for a few moments before the others came in. The President said that the purpose of Ambassador Menshikov's visit had been to deliver a letter from Khrushchev. In this letter Khrushchev expressed concern regarding the President's statement in recent press conferences about giving atomic weapons to our allies. The President said Khrushchev's tone had been quite respectful. The only hint of a threat was a statement that if the United States did this the Soviets might be forced to consider doing it also. The President said he told Menshikov that the United States had tried, for just this reason, to turn over all atomic weapons to the UN in 1947. The Soviets objected at that time. He added to Menshikov that he shared concern over the wider distribution of these weapons.

At this point the remainder of the group (except for Mr. Douglas and Mr. Irwin, who came in a few minutes later) joined to discuss a new development regarding our plan of action to institute high level flights to West Berlin. Mr. Herter recalled that we had, with some difficulty, obtained the agreement of the British and the French to sending a message to the Soviet commanders in Berlin on the initiation of these flights. Almost immediately, there was a serious leak of information to Joseph Alsop who wrote a column about it, highly accurate except for his indication that this note had in fact actually been sent. Concurrently Secretary Douglas was considering the matter for the first time, and had major question as to the desirability, for

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 90-309 #19

BY SKS DATE 7/9/91

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- 2 -

operational reasons, of initiating such flights. The JCS concurred that initiation was neither necessary nor desirable for operational reasons.

Mr. Herter recalled that the State Department, when this whole question was raised some months ago, had taken the position that they would interpose no objection if Defense made a firm statement that there was an operational necessity for these flights and that the flights would be conducted on a regular basis. Defense had made such a statement, State had gone ahead with consultations with our allies, and now we find that the U. S. is somewhat out on a limb. He anticipated some problem with the British and French if we now change our stand. The President said he thought we should simply tell them that we made a mistake and do not wish to compound it. He said the only reason he would see for going ahead is that we feel there is a need to take some action respecting Berlin that would show our independence. Mr. Gates said there had been a lot of publicity about our new intentions following the leak, and Mr. Herter said it would look like backing down in the face of Soviet pressures by the Soviet press. The President said the matter is simple in his judgment. Until the action of sending the note to the Soviets has been taken, the whole matter is in a study phase.

Regarding the question of operational need, General White said that there would be an operational requirement for flight at altitudes above 10,000 feet if another airlift had to be instituted to Berlin. The President said this consideration had been very much in his mind. However, he thought that we have made clear our right to do so and that if the necessity for an airlift arose, we would at that time do whatever we needed to do. He added that if this change in position causes the State Department any distress, the Secretary of State could tell the British and the French that the President, on considering the matter, had decided there is no operational necessity.

General White said he should add a further view of the JCS -- that they believe this is the time to start flights at altitudes above 10,000 feet if we are going to do this at any time. This

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would be a cold war tactic. The President said that these considerations fell outside the military sphere, and were of concern to the State Department. He reiterated that the Secretary of State might say that on final review of the question of operational need, following the President's return from South America, he decided not to initiate this action.

The group then left, except for Mr. Gates who remained to report to the President on a meeting he had attended on the question of the Armed Forces Museum. He said there was little support for this proposal among the group he met with. They seemed to regard it as an alternative to the work of the Smithsonian Institution. The President said he found this hard to understand. A record of military activity in this country since 1607 would show military participation in every turning point in our nation's history since that time. He thought this should make a fascinating story. He illustrated the difference between a sterile exhibition and the kind of museum he has in mind by an example from the teaching of military history. He said that when he was a cadet, military history was taught by rote at West Point, and consisted simply of memorizing where each unit was on a certain day, who was its commander, what was its strength, etc. In later years a very wise senior officer of the Army suggested that he read romantic historical novels of the periods of various wars and thereby obtain a background for the military history. Gradually as he did this military history took on an entirely different meaning. He would have thought a fascinating story could be told through displays showing how our forefathers fought to defend themselves -- their log forts, their two-pounder guns, their squad huts at Valley Forge, etc.

Mr. Gates said he was afraid the President was going to get a report that would not say very much. Unfortunately, he felt that the Smithsonian people regarded this proposal as competitive with their own activities for funds.

6.
A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

2/11/60 NH
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89-246

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33
Action

Document No.

2

Classification

Control: 8070

Rec'd: MARCH 11, 1960
9:12 A.M.

EUR

FROM: BONN

Info

TO: Secretary of State

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INR

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RMR

NO: 1743, MARCH 11, NOON

AS REFLECTED MYTEL 1716, CHANCELLOR REMAINS FIRM, AND IN FACT RIGID, IN HIS VIEW RE NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN AT SUMMIT CONFERENCE. TO MY QUERY, DURING CONVERSATION MARCH 8, AS TO WHETHER GERMAN PEOPLE WERE PREPARED TO FACE UP TO SITUATION WHICH MIGHT PREVAIL IF NO SUMMIT AGREEMENT POSSIBLE ON BERLIN AND KHRUSHCHEV SHOULD PROCEED WITH SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WITH EAST GERMAN REGIME -- WITH DANGER THAT MIGHT ENTAIL FOR BERLIN ACCESS -- ADENAUER REPLIED THAT DULLES HAD ONCE SET OUT FOR HIM SUCCESSIVE STEPS WHICH WESTERN ALLIES MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE TO MAINTAIN BERLIN ACCESS IN THAT CONTINGENCY, AND HE HAD ASSURED LATE SECRETARY OF FULL SUPPORT OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND GERMAN OPINION, UP TO AND INCLUDING USE OF MILITARY FORCE. THESE ASSURANCES, HE SAID, WERE STILL VALID.

WHEN, IN REPLY TO CHANCELLOR'S OFT REPEATED VIEW THAT EMPHASIS IN SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE SHIFTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FROM BERLIN TO DISARMAMENT, I SUGGESTED AS PERSONAL VIEW THAT IF CONVERSATIONS BEGAN WITH BERLIN, SEQUENCE WOULD MORE LOGICALLY BE BERLIN-GERMAN UNIFICATION-DISARMAMENT, HE AGREED. HE EVADED ISSUE, HOWEVER, WHEN I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, AGAIN IN MY PERSONAL VIEW, BEST WAY TO MOVE DISCUSSION FROM BERLIN TO GERMAN UNIFICATION WOULD BE SOME NEW AND PERHAPS BOLDER PROPOSAL FOR ALL-GERMAN TALKS, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMED EVIDENT HE WAS AWARE I HAD FOUND SOME AGREEMENT FOR THIS THESIS IN FOREIGN OFFICE.

WHILE THERE HAS BEEN, THEREFORE, NO CHANGE IN CHANCELLOR'S VIEWS SINCE CONCLUSION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, I THINK IT EVIDENT THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT IN GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, AND THAT ADENAUER, ATTUNED AS HE IS TO DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING MODDS OF HIS PEOPLE, HAS BEEN CONFIRMED

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-2- 1743, MARCH 11, NOON, FROM BONN

RIGHTNESS OF HIS FIRM ATTITUDE. ONE WAY OF PUTTING IT MIGHT BE TO SAY THAT GERMANS HAVING AT SOME TIME IN RECENT PAST FACED FACT THAT UNIFICATION WILL BE POSSIBLE ONLY IN DISTANT FUTURE, HAVE FASTENED UPON BERLIN AS SYMBOL OF THEIR FRUSTRATION AND ARE DETERMINED THAT IT SHALL NOT BE LOST TO THEM. IN THIS FRAME OF MIND THEY ACCEPTED FULLY CHANCELLOR'S THEORY, GENERALLY ENDORSED BY BRANDT, THAT ANY CHANGE IN BERLIN STATUS CAN ONLY BE FOR WORSE.

EVIDENCE OF THIS ATTITUDE IS, I BELIEVE, TO BE FOUND IN UNANIMITY OF ALL PARTIES ON THIS ISSUE, WHICH, AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, IS FIRST TIME SUCH AGREEMENT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE ON ANY ONE ASPECT OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. THIS UNANIMITY IS, I AM SURE, MOST IMPORTANT RECENT DEVELOPMENT FOR FUTURE OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, AND ITS VALIDITY CANNOT BE DENIED BY DIFFERENCES AMONG PARTIES ON DETAILED ASPECTS OF HANDLING OF THIS POLICY.

I THINK IT NOT IMPROBABLE THAT THIS STAUNCHER ATTITUDE ON BERLIN HAS FOUND ITS ROOTS IN, AND HAS BEEN FED BY, UPSURGE OF NATIONALISM WHICH HAS BEEN SO APPARENT IN GERMAN REACTIONS TO CRITICAL ATTITUDE BRITISH PRESS, WESTERN CRITICISM OF ANTI-SEMITIC INCIDENTS, AND GENERAL OUTBURST RE GERMAN-SPANISH MILITARY TALKS. THIS REACTION, ONLY BEGINNING TO BE AUDIBLE, IS TO EFFECT THAT IN WHOLE OF POST-WAR PERIOD GERMANS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR ATTACHMENT TO IDEAS AND IDEALS WHICH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, AND NOTABLY UNITED STATES, HAVE ADVOCATED. WHEN THEN, THEY ASK, SHOULD GERMANS, 15 YEARS AFTER CLOSE OF HOSTILITIES, BE REGARDED AS SECOND-CLASS MEMBERS OF THIS COMMUNITY WHICH THEY CONSIDER THEY HAVE LOYALLY SUPPORTED AND TO WHICH THEY HAVE SO ARDENTLY DESIRED TO BELONG.

IF THIS ANALYSIS BE IN ANY WAY CORRECT, THEN I THINK IT MUST BE CONCLUDED THAT WE ARE RAPIDLY APPROACHING END OF THAT ERA OF COMPLETE DEPENDENCE GERMANS UPON US, WHICH SOME OF US HAVE AFFECTED TO DEPLORE, AND THAT WE SHALL SOON BE FACED WITH AN INDEPENDENCE WHICH, IF NOT HEEDED AND GUIDED TO OUR INTEREST, MAY CONTAIN ELEMENTS OF GRAVE DANGER.

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.

DOWLING

LFS

SECRET

3/15/60

March 15, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
March 11, 1960

Others present: General Norstad, General Goodpaster

General Norstad said, when he saw General de Gaulle in January following the President's discussion with de Gaulle in December, the meeting was a good one, and it seems to be having a good effect. General de Gaulle apparently had no conception of how much NATO really amounts to in providing a powerful defense. He said he would like to have an air defense scheme based on the same system as is applied to the United Kingdom. General Norstad has proceeded with the development of this; it will shortly be put before de Gaulle in specific written form, and there appears to be a good chance of reaching an agreed solution. As to the Navy, the French insist on keeping their fleet out of NATO. The proposal they advanced was no good at all, and General Norstad is keeping the pressure on them to come back with a more sensible proposal. There has been no progress on the atomic stockpiling project. It is clear that we did the right thing in pulling our air squadrons out of France. This action did a lot toward bringing the French to their senses, and there is a generally more healthy attitude developing.

The President asked whether General Norstad thought he should be in Washington while de Gaulle is here. General Norstad thought it would be better not to be here, but said he would send an estimate of the status of these problems to the President about a week ahead of de Gaulle's visit. He asked me to remind him concerning this.

General Norstad said he was much interested in Adenauer's visit and forthcoming discussions with the President, specifically on the matter of disarmament and possibilities for control and inspection. From a military standpoint he thought a system of

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.204

MR 77-72 #6
BY DJH Date 12/5/80

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control and inspection could be instituted covering a portion of West and Central Europe. This would utilize mobile inspection groups with total personnel coming to something like 1500. The techniques of the President's Open Skies proposal, using advanced photography, would be included. Also there would be overlapping radar nets, with Western radars located as far east as Poland, and Communist radars located in Western Germany. It is necessary to designate a specific area to which these techniques would be applied. He thought they could give effective inspection, which would let us know what is going on where that might have appreciable military significance. The system would give substantial relief from the danger of surprise surface attack which is very much on the minds of the Europeans, and could thereby reduce tensions without loss of security.

General Norstad thought that the minimum area for such a project should include Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, Belgium, Holland and Denmark. We would have with the Russians joint inspection teams, with each party having the right to go anywhere in the area upon notification to see what is happening there.

The President thought that after such a system had been proved out, it would be possible to do some thinning out. General Norstad thought the proposal is itself very attractive to the West and to the uncommitted countries. After twelve to eighteen months' experience with it, we could consider some thinning out. He said the Secretary of State, Mr. Eaton and the UK authorities are for it. Defense Minister Strauss of Germany personally said he would support it. Adenauer is the problem. Adenauer says it does not go far enough, stating that it should be applied to all of the Communist bloc and all of NATO. General Norstad thought, however, that Adenauer may be brought around to this, with the idea of having it taken up at the summit meeting rather than through the disarmament conference. He thought that the President should take this up with Adenauer, feeling that the President should be able to jar Adenauer. If this is done, others can follow up with other authorities. The reports from France are that the French technical authorities may oppose the proposal, and take a very tough line,

stating that any such scheme would lead toward neutralism. However, there is a report from Bonn that at the last meeting of Adenauer and de Gaulle, one of them talked about inspection within a limited area and there was some indication that the two were in agreement on this.

The President said the proposal seems to be one of picking an area, and establishing within it a common inspection system which is least objectionable in terms of the numbers of its participating personnel but gives an effective safeguard. There would be no reduction of forces until the system has been proved out. He thought Adenauer's first question would be to ask what would be the ratio of forces in East Germany to those in West Germany. General Norstad said that in the initial stage each side would announce its force levels and their locations, thus providing a "military blueprint." He said he had not discussed this matter specifically with the Belgians, the Dutch, or the Danes. He said it should be kept simple. However, it might be possible to add Alaska, Siberia and perhaps some of the northwest U. S.

The President asked if Mr. Eaton will be taking this up with the other members of the Western five of the disarmament group. General Norstad said he would not. However, Mr. Green of Canada is strong for the proposal, but has cautioned that it is best not to raise it at a low level. General Norstad said Mr. Herter is enthusiastic about the idea of the President talking to Adenauer about this. Adenauer has a great liking for the President and the United States, and he felt the President could convince Adenauer this system would in fact give better security.

The President said that security reasons are only part of the story. At the present time Adenauer is thinking almost wholly in terms of local politics in Germany. General Norstad agreed that for political reasons there must be areas included in the scheme additional to West Germany. Also, it should not be put forward as a way to reduce forces, but rather to give an added degree of security which will permit changes to be made in our forces. The President said the big value in his mind is that it would get a system of

inspection started. General Norstad suggested that with regard to detail, Adenauer could be advised to talk to General Norstad. The President said he would stress that this is a practical inspection scheme. If, after eighteen months, it is working well, then the West could see what next it might do. General Norstad thought the scheme might have as an incidental effect the bringing about of a better atmosphere regarding Berlin and Germany. The President thought the trouble with the scheme is that if Adenauer wants to interpret it as an indication that the Americans are getting weary of staying in Europe, he can and will do so. General Norstad advised stressing that it is a measure of added security, and recalled the President's dedication to European security -- specifically that he came to Europe to set up NATO, disrupting his personal life, in order to bring added security to that area.

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



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3/15/60
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March 15, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
March 14, 1960

Others present: Secretary Herter, Secretary Dillon, Mr. Dowling, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Hillenbrand, General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter said that Chancellor Adenauer wants to see the President alone for a while during his appointment tomorrow. The President said he would do this, and would listen to the Chancellor who seems increasingly confirmed in the rigidity of his attitudes. He thought he was going to have to tell Chancellor Adenauer that the American people are not going to be disposed to subordinate themselves and their objectives to those of the Chancellor. Mr. Herter commented that the difficulty for the President in relation to the summit is that it is our objective to attempt to have meaningful negotiations, and we are in fact committed to the Russians to do so, but that Adenauer takes the stand that certain topics should not even be discussed. The President stated strongly that he would decide what the United States would or would not discuss at these meetings.



Mr. Herter said that the Chancellor is going to raise the matter of German assets. He handed the President a one-page summary memorandum which he suggested the President give to Adenauer. After discussion the President said he felt the State Department should hand Adenauer the memorandum. Although we have supported the principle of honoring private property, and returning the private German assets, we have a treaty signed with the Germans which says that we owe them nothing.


Mr. Herter then gave the President a briefing memorandum on points Chancellor Adenauer is likely to raise; and also a suggested statement that could be given to the press after the meeting between the two men. The President read these with care. Mr. Dillon said that,

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AWP (DDE diary) / 4 (Staff Notes March 1960 (3))

with regard to aid to the underdeveloped nations, the Germans are really doing very little in a form in which help is useful, i. e., in long-term loans. Most of what they are doing is simply financing their own exports on a very short-term basis. Secretary Anderson stresses this point. The President said he thought he would tell Adenauer if he wants to brighten up the German reputation, which has suffered recently because of the Jewish incidents, the approach to Spain on bases, etc., long-term loans would be an area in which the Germans could do something worthy and effective.



The President said that Berlin seems to him to be the key. This is an abnormal situation. He does not see how we could support the economic life of West Berlin if civil access were restricted. The Soviets and East Germans could observe the letter of existing commitments and still starve West Berlin, since the rights pertaining to the economic life of the city are very cloudy.

Mr. Herter said the problem is that the Germans are unwilling to explore any alternatives to the present status of Berlin. Mr. Dowling stated that German opinion insists upon the retention of occupation rights, and holds strongly that any alternative status for West Berlin would be less desirable than the present one. Should there be an attempt to shock West Berlin, the West

Germans would in his opinion subsidize and support the city, even to include an airlift.

..... He came back to the point that he does not understand what he could do if access to West Berlin were restricted for civil transit. Mr. Dowling reiterated that the Germans would pay for an airlift, but Mr. Herter commented

.....

Mr. Herter observed that Adenauer is being subjected to continuing propaganda attack, of a most bitter personal nature, by the Russians. The President said that our situation is that the West, except for Adenauer, thinks we should explore alternatives on Berlin. Adenauer will not touch this, and the allies are therefore divided. For our part we stand by our position insofar as it is a matter of not being thrust out by force. Adenauer is not being realistic with regard to the threat of starving Berlin out, however.

Mr. Herter suggested that the application of the principle of self-determination may help to solve our questions in West Berlin and East Germany. The President recalled that Khrushchev had said he had agreed to self-determination in East Germany, but only after ten years of preparing for it. Mr. Herter said that Khrushchev had talked of self-determination in Pushtunistan when he recently visited Afghanistan and that perhaps this could be applied in East Germany.

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- 4 -

The President commented that the possibilities in the Berlin situation are such that this is something over which a war could occur. Mr. Dowling said the German people are very firm on this matter. He commented that a spirit of nationalism seems to be growing quite fast in Germany. By 1961 we will find the Germans very strong militarily and beginning to push on some of their objectives. Mr. Herter commented that this is a very dangerous development, especially in connection with the unsettled status of the East German frontiers. Mr. Dowling said there are no longer any Germans in Western Poland; nearly seven million of them were moved out at the close of the war. He thought the President should talk to Adenauer and press him very hard on this. He regarded this matter most seriously and said it could be a cause of war. Mr. Herter suggested that the question of the eastern frontiers may be a reason for the Soviet drive for a peace treaty, which would purport to settle the border question.

Ambassador Dowling suggested that there are two things to push Adenauer on -- the border question and the matter of recognizing Eastern Germany. He did not think that it would be wise to push Adenauer hard on the subject of Berlin.

The President asked Mr. Herter to tell Von Brentano that the President and the Chancellor should meet with Mr. Herter and Von Brentano present. Mr. Herter recalled the Chancellor's request for a few minutes alone with the President. Mr. Dowling suggested thirty minutes for their private discussions.



A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



F NATO of S. T. 3/16/60
Feb 5 1960

U.S. MISSION TO NATO AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 1442

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DATE HOUR

NO: TOPO
FROM: WASH DC P.M.

SECRET

REC'D: MARCH 16, 1960 4:50 PM

TO: USRO PARIS FOR ACTION

P R I O R I T Y

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PRITY SENT PARIS TOPOL 1809 RPTD INFO LONDON 6934 LONN
1977 ANKARA 2572 ATHENS 2613 BRUSSELS 1068 COPENHAGEN 711
LISBON 448 LUXENBOURG 176 OSLO 845 OTTAWA 550 REYKJAVIK 241
ROME 2822 THE HAGUE 1256 MOSCOW 1897 GENEVA 1974

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USRO FOR ACTION

EMBASSY AND ALL OTHER ADDRESSEES FYI ONLY

GENEVA FOR EATON AND WADSWORTH

PARIS DELIVER BURGESS 8:00 AM MARCH 16.

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED INFORM NAC ORALLY IN PRIVATE SESSION
MARCH 16 SUBSTANCE CORRESPONDENCE EXCHANGED BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV
AND PRESIDENT. DEPARTMENT WISHES STRESS PRESENTATION SHOULD
BE ORAL WITH NO RECORD AND SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN
MAINTAIN SECRECY SINCE PRIVILEGED PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
INVOLVED. BEGIN FYI. ADENAUER WILL BE INFORMED BY PRESIDENT
DURING CHANCELLOR'S VISIT. SIMILAR SUMMARIES TO THAT WHICH
FOLLOWS ARE BEING CONVEYED TO UK FRENCH CANADIAN AND ITALIAN
EMBASSIES BY DEPARTMENT. END FYI.

ACTION:
POL 4
INFO:
OES 5
DEF 3
ET

AMB
MIN
NINECON
POL 4
ULMER
TINKSTON
SHAPEL 1
EUCOIL 1

IN MODERATELY TONED AND CAREFULLY PHRASED LETTER DATED MARCH 3
KHRUSHCHEV STATED HE DECIDED WRITE LETTER WHEN HE CONVINCED
HIMSELF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS AT PRESS CONFERENCES FEBRUARY 3
AND 17 AND SECRETARY'S STATEMENT FEBRUARY 8 WERE INTERPRETED
AS EXPRESSION US INTENT TO EQUIP US NON-NUCLEAR ALLIES
PARTICULARLY WITHIN FRAMEWORK NATO WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
VERY IMPORTANT THAT NONE OF NUCLEAR POWERS (AMONG WHICH FRANCE
MENTIONED) TAKE ANY STEPS THAT COULD COMPLICATE SOLUTION
PROBLEM OF COMPLETE ELIMINATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NUCLEAR
TEST NEGOTIATIONS AND 10-NATION DISARMAMENT TALKS DIRECTED
TOWARD THIS END. IF US ALLIES EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR WITHIN
FRAMEWORK OF NATO HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLACED AT THEIR DISPOSAL
USSR WOULD HAVE EVERY JUSTIFICATION HAND OVER THESE WEAPONS
TO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN RESPONSE THEIR REQUESTS. SPECIAL
CONCERN EXPRESSED OVER NUCLEAR SHARING WITH FRG WHICH MIGHT
BE TEMPTED USE WEAPONS TO FULFILL "SPECIAL MISSION" TO WHICH
CHANCELLOR RECENTLY REFERRED. WIDENING CIRCLE OF NUCLEAR
POWERS WOULD CREATE OBSTACLES TO DISARMAMENT AND INCREASE

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Authority: 100-89-47-40
5/18/89

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TELEGRAM CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE TWO

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CONTROL: 1442

DANGERS NUCLEAR WAR. SOVIET POLICY TO PREVENT WORLD WAR AND BRING ABOUT PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL.

IN RESPONSE MARCH 12 PRESIDENT WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY CLARIFY US POLICY AND REMOVE MISAPPREHENSIONS US PURPOSE. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS PRESIDENT'S LETTER:

1. REMARKS ABOUT FRG REFLECT MISUNDERSTANDING NATURE POST-WAR GERMAN STATE. FRG DESIRES PEACE AND DOES NOT PRESENT AGGRESSIVE THREAT TO ANY COUNTRY.
2. KHRUSHCHEV IN ERROR WHEN INFERRING CHANGE HAD TAKEN PLACE OR WAS IN PROGRESS IN US POLICY ON TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR INFORMATION ON THEIR DESIGN OR MANUFACTURE. US POLICY TO AVOID WIDENING CIRCLE NUCLEAR POWERS AND THIS POLICY IMPLEMENTED IN ACTIONS OF US AND REFLECTED IN BASIC LAWS ESPECIALLY ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954 AS AMENDED. HOWEVER WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT USSR PLACES NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT DISPOSAL OF MEMBERS WARSAW PACT OR OTHER OF ITS ALLIES.
3. MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT STATES WITH MAJOR INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BE SATISFIED INDEFINITELY WITH SITUATION IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNCONTROLLED AND THEY THEMSELVES DO NOT HAVE SUCH WEAPONS FOR THEIR DEFENSE AGAINST FORCES WHICH KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF MADE CLEAR ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS ALREADY POSSESS MOST MODERN AND DESTRUCTIVE ARMAMENTS. TO HELP MEET THIS LEGITIMATE NEED OF OUR ALLIES NATO ATOMIC STOCKPILE SYSTEM ESTABLISHED. UNDER THIS SYSTEM CUSTODY ATOMIC WARHEADS REMAINS IN US ALONE AS PROVIDED BY LAW AND THEY CAN BE USED ONLY IN DEFENSE AGAINST AGGRESSION. CIRCLE NUCLEAR POWERS NOT WIDENED THEREBY.
4. WHILE IT GENERALLY AGREED TECHNICAL MEANS NOT NOW AVAILABLE FOR ASSURING ELIMINATION PAST AND PRESENT STOCKS NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUREST METHOD OF DEALING WITH PROLIFERATION PROBLEM IS TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS UNDER VERIFIABLE CONDITIONS. SPECIFICALLY EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE (A) TO REACH AGREEMENT AT GENEVA ON DISCONTINUANCE THOSE NUCLEAR TESTS WHICH CAN NOW BE EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED (B) TO ADOPT SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES UNDER AEGIS INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY TO ENSURE THAT FUTURE EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR POWER PRODUCTION DOES NOT ITSELF BECOME SOURCE FOR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR PRODUCTION NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND (C) TO AGREE IN THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS BEGINNING MARCH 15 TO PROPOSAL WHICH US HAS URGED REPEATEDLY SINCE 1956 I.E. CESSATION PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURPOSES AS SOON AS EFFECTIVE INSPECTION MEASURES ARE AGREED AND OPERATING AND SIMULTANEOUSLY THEREWITH TO BEGIN TRANSFER

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TELEGRAM CONTINUATION SHEET

PAGE THREE

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CONTROL: 1442

OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FROM WEAPONS STOCKS TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES. SINCE THERE LITTLE PROSPECT ACHIEVING MUCH IN FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AT SUMMIT UNLESS SOME SOLID PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HOPE KHRUSHCHEV WOULD INSTRUCT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES AS WE HAVE OJAS MAKE EVERY EFFORT ELIMINATE DIFFERENCES TO POINT WHERE THERE WILL BE SOMETHING CONCRETE TO DEAL WITH AT PARIS IN MAY.

HEATER

MJS

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3/19/60

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March 19, 1960

Dear Selwyn:

We have now concluded our talks with Dr. Adenauer and Herr von Brentano and I would like to give you a brief account of the discussions at the White House and here in the State Department. Except for the Chancellor's proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin (which I shall comment on later) the visit produced no surprises. The range of subjects covered is fairly accurately reflected in the joint statement which was issued after the meeting of the President and the Chancellor at the White House.

As you might expect, the Chancellor both publicly and privately emphasized the importance he attached to the disarmament question. He thinks that the Heads of Government must do everything in their power to make progress in this field. He plainly does not think we can rely on the Ten-Power Group at Geneva to make the progress he considers necessary. We can all certainly agree that the topic is of paramount importance.

The Chancellor, laying stress on the unity of the German political parties on the Berlin and German questions, reiterated his willingness to back up the firmness of the German position with their willingness to face the dangerous consequences which such an attitude might force us to face. For our part, we developed two points in response. The first was that we did not intend to withdraw American forces from Europe until substantial progress has been achieved toward a workable disarmament program. Until that occurs we would not even discuss the matter. The second was that the American flag would be flying over Berlin as long as present conditions continued and no agreement acceptable to the Federal Republic and West Berlin had been concluded. At the same time we have been stressing to the Germans that starting from this basis, it should be possible to consider realistically the various alternatives open to the West.

Copy
JWB

The Right Honorable
Selwyn Lloyd, C. B. E., T. D., C. C., M. P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
London.



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Authority MR 91-5341
By JWB NLE Date 7/10/91

Herter pp/ 8/ Mar 1960 (2)

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The Chancellor's public proposal for a plebiscite in West Berlin not only caught us by surprise; it was a new idea to his entourage and his Embassy here. Since he made the proposal the Germans have been having second thoughts. They are now thinking in terms not of a plebiscite to be conducted by us, but rather by the political parties in Berlin. This would make the plebiscite a less formal measure, with fewer juridical overtones, and have the advantage that it could more easily be arranged before the Summit meeting takes place. That method would also avoid prejudging the modalities of a possible plebiscite in East Germany.

We have taken no position on the plebiscite idea. Even in its modified form we can see certain disadvantages which need to be carefully weighed. First off, the question to be put in a plebiscite would have to be very carefully formulated indeed. Secondly, while we have little doubt on this score, there is always the possibility that the plebiscite result might be less than overwhelming on our side. But most dangerous of all is the implication that the results of the plebiscite are designed as a form of pressure on us, rather than the Soviets, that it somehow gives us less freedom of action than we might otherwise have. Finally, a plebiscite conducted on the Western side might harm the public acceptability of future possible proposals on our side for plebiscites in East Germany and East Berlin. In any case, we expect the Germans to lay their proposal before us in the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin, where we can all have a go at the advantages and disadvantages of the idea.

We discussed General Norstad's plan for a zone of inspection with the Chancellor a bit and then had longer talks on this subject with Herr von Brentano. The Germans advanced their usual line on the undesirability of proposing plans to the Soviets which covered limited zones, since these tend to lead to the neutralization in a political, as well as a military sense, of the area covered.

After considerable discussion, Brentano was at least able to agree that it would be a good idea to consult General Norstad on the military value of a zone of inspection. Once we have an appraisal from him, the Germans will have a basis on which to provide their own military comments. I think this represents a measure of progress in getting

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forward with the idea, although one cannot be too optimistic considering the firmness of the German position. Von Brentano made quite clear that the Germans would oppose any zone limited to a European area constituted principally by Germany. We agreed that it was very especially necessary to avoid any leak to the effect that this idea was even being considered.

We told Brentano we had no fixed ideas on the area which should be included in the zone of inspection although we always included Alaska and a portion of Siberia in the discussions. We also told him that we are interested primarily in safeguards against surprise attack and the defense of Europe. The Soviets are not likely to accept any proposal we make, but it will provide a good test of whether they are interested in inspection sense. After General Norstad's comments are available, we think this problem might be canvassed in the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin.

You will, of course, be getting further details of our talks through the regular channels. I have only tried to mention in this letter what seemed to me to be the highlights. As you can see, the talks, while certainly useful, produced no particular new developments in connection with our Summit preparations.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,



Christian A. Herter

EUR:GER:Vigderman:3:CAHerter:jmr
Cleared: EUR - Mr. Kohler

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MC 77-67#12

By D.W.D. Date 10/25/77

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
(Monday, 21 March at 10:30 a.m.)

1. I first took up with the President the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of March 17, pointing out to him that there was difficulty only with respect to the item involving U.S. Policy Towards the West Indies. I asked him to read the language as it appeared in the draft and then to read the language which had been suggested by State and Defense. He approved the substitute language as indicated in the attached copy of the Draft Record.

2. I then discussed with the President the general subject of nuclear sharing with our allies. I said that I raised the question because of the story in the Sunday New York Times which had purported to reflect the contents of his recent response to Mr. Khrushchev to the effect that he had no present intention or plans to transfer nuclear weapons to allies. I reminded the President that the Planning Board was working on three discussion papers: (1) Possible direct relationship with France, (2) the question of a NATO multi-lateral authority, and (3) a general paper on the implications of nuclear sharing. I said that I wondered whether developments had tended to make these studies less urgent. The President said that if we were to proceed with the studies now they would have to be based on certain assumptions, among them particularly being that there was no promise of agreement with the USSR with respect to reduction and control of armaments. If such an agreement were reasonably in prospect we would not wish to be transferring weapons to allies. I said that it might seem prudent not to seek to get the papers before the Council before the Summit Meeting and that in any event the President would not be sending up legislation prior to the Summit Meeting or perhaps even prior to the conventions and the elections.

The President said that under all the circumstances he felt we might put this matter on the "back burner" for a while. However, he felt very strongly that he wished to leave a legacy to his successor of the NSC conception of the matter. Certainly he felt that if we must continue to arm for defense for the indefinite future, we cannot deny to our allies those weapons which most assuredly our enemies have. Again he repeated that before he left office he wanted NSC convictions in the matter on the record.

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Finally, he said that in summary, he thought that the Planning Board should pull out this study when we were not being pushed too hard on other urgent matters.

3. I then told the President that although I had not mentioned this matter to Jim Hagerty, I wished to convey to him some thinking given me by Mr. Ted Braun a few days ago. Mr. Braun feels very strongly that we should consider permitting Life Magazine to do a picture story on the NSC. Mr. Braun is of the opinion that recent press and television comment arising out of the Lovett testimony has been damaging to the NSC, which he considers a vital and indispensable arm of government in the national security field. Mr. Braun thinks that such an undertaking need not be defensive in character and need not in any way reveal substance. I pointed out to the President that a picture of the NSC in action would lay at rest such false statements as had appeared in the Manchester Guardian to the effect that the President permits debate of important national security matters in the Council with 75 officials present.

The President said he would have no objection and the real question was perhaps the choice of a medium. I repeated that Mr. Braun had suggested Life as possibly being the magazine which would give the greatest exposure. The President said perhaps it would be well to discuss this matter in a limited meeting of the NSC.

4. I then said to the President that I was afraid that we had had some failure of coordination with respect to Cuba for which I would have to take a major share of the responsibility. I reminded him that he had at one point asked me to see that the State Department reported to him as to exactly what we were doing in the OAS with respect to Cuba. I told him that it was understood with the State Department that this report would be given at the beginning of the Special Meeting with him on the afternoon of March 17, and he would recall that when I called upon Secretary Herter, Secretary Herter said he would deliver his report to the President, which he had in his pocket. ✓

I then said that I had learned from Mr. Allen Dulles on the night of March 19 that he was quite upset that he had learned about Mr. Bonsal's return to Cuba only from the newspapers. Mr. Dulles had not felt that he should have a voice in the policy of whether Mr. Bonsal should return but rather that he be fully informed in view of the fact

that Mr. Bonsal's return might have a serious impact upon matters which had been discussed with the President in that meeting.

The President said that he was not aware of any failure of coordination and that in any event we had not closed our embassy in Havana and the return of the Ambassador was perhaps not as consequential to Mr. Dulles' purposes as the latter had thought. I said that I would not wish to make a big issue of the matter but repeated that I had been in error for not pressing Mr. Herter more fully from his point of view on the Cuba situation.

5. I reported briefly to the President with respect to the Advertising Council Conference on March 15 and 16.

6. I told the President that there was another report from the Secretary of Defense and the DCI with respect to a recommendation to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated December 11 regarding fusion of COMINT-ELINT activities.

I found it necessary to confess to the President that I had not remembered to bring the paper with me but said that it was similar to many others that I had discussed with him. I recommended that he permit me to handle this memorandum in accordance with the usual procedure. (The record should show that the President noted the existence of the memorandum and that he directed that it be referred to the President's Board for its information and consideration and that the DCI and the Secretary of Defense expedite completion of the assessments and the issuance of guidance called for in the recommendation with a further joint report to be submitted to the President thereon by June 15, 1960).

7. In a lighter vein, I reported to the President with respect to exchanges of correspondence with Mr. William T. Reid, Class of 1901 at Harvard and in particular Mr. Reid's messages to the President and Mrs. Eisenhower. At the conclusion of this discussion the President then told me of a recent conversation he had had with Kenneth Royall.



Gordon Gray

cc: Mr. Lay

Approved by White House 4/20/60
Approved by U 4/5/60
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

March 28, 1960
2:45-4:15 p.m.
Camp David

Subject: Summit Negotiations

Participants:

British Side

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
Sir Norman Brooks
Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. C. D. W. O'Neill
Mr. Phillip F. de Zulueta

U.S. Side

The President
Under Secretary Dillon
Assistant Secretary Kohler
General Goodpaster

Copies to: S/S S/AE Amembassy London-Amb. Whitney
G EUR-2 Amembassy Moscow-Amb. Thompson
C H Amembassy Bonn - Amb. Dowling
S/P L Amembassy Paris -Amb. Houghton
S/B I A The White House-Gen. Goodpaster

During the discussion of nuclear test questions between the President and the Prime Minister, the President had commented, in speculating on Soviet motives with respect to that conference, on the importance which he felt the Russians attached to a confirmation of the post-war German borders, and of the real fear they have of a reunited, armed Germany. In this connection, he had cited the many placards he had seen during his recent visit to Germany demanding the return of the lost East German provinces. The Prime Minister had cited the statements on the German borders already made by General de Gaulle, and had suggested the possibility that this subject might be explored in connection with the forthcoming May Summit meeting. After the conclusions of the nuclear test talks, the President reverted to the subject, referring to the strong statements made to him by Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev during his visit here, and to the fervent remarks on the border question made to him just a few days ago by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jaroszewicz.

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Agency Case NSC F90-1052
NLE Case 90-311 #3
By [Signature] NLE Date 7/17/91

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The Prime Minister said that in view of the Western democratic processes, press pressures and leaks, he felt that it would be necessary for the Heads of Government to a great extent "to play it by ear". The process of preparations, the drafting of position papers, were dangerous operations and it was very difficult to try to reach fall-back positions in advance.

The President agreed, saying it seemed there was always someone with a good friend who was a journalist, and then headlines were inevitable. Moreover, despite repeated efforts, it had been proved to be almost impossible to track down responsibility for such leaks.

Mr. Dillon remarked that some of our officers in the Department had in fact felt that concessions in other areas, specifically with respect to the nuclear agreement, might be valuable in exchange for some reasonable Soviet position on Berlin. He indicated that the Department was considering such possibilities.

The President pursued this thought, commenting that if we were willing to take a moratorium of perhaps two years on nuclear testing, the Soviets might be expected to do some kind of a similar moratorium with respect to Berlin.

The Prime Minister then turned to the subject of the adamant German position, recalling the efforts the President had made during the Western Heads of Government meeting at Rambouillet to persuade the Germans and French to face up to what would happen if an impasse were reached at the Summit, and the Soviets carried out their threat to conclude a separate treaty and put the East Germans in charge.

However, he said, the real weakness of the position in Berlin relates to the question of civilian supplies. Berlin is now a big industrial city.

The Soviets

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The Soviets have no obligations with respect to Berlin's trade, sources of supply of raw materials, and the like. He said he had told de Gaulle and Adenauer it was all right to stand on the "juridical position", but had tried unsuccessfully to get them to answer the question as to what we do when the Soviets move.

Mr. Macmillan said he thought that de Gaulle's strong stand was a rather formalistic position intended to keep the Germans from accusing him of weakness. However, he thought that in the last analysis de Gaulle might not be as tough on this question as he now seemed.

The President said we must keep in mind the danger that if we let the Germans down they might shift their own position and even go neutralistic. He was very worried about who would then hold the central bastion in Europe.

The Prime Minister indicated that he did not share the President's views. He pointed out that the Germans had now had an effective military build-up and were accustomed to it. He expressed the opinion that in fact the Germans now liked playing soldier again and would not likely change their role.

The President said flatly that he would take a strong Germany. He pointed out that the West was afraid of a strong Germany only when there was a weak Soviet Union. Now the central problem was the strength of the Soviet Union. He commented that this would probably not be the case if Hitler had not committed so many blunders.

Prime Minister Macmillan then said that he personally thought the West and Berlin would be better off under a "free city" arrangement or other variant plans which had been considered by the Western powers. However, he recognized that such an arrangement was not obtainable, and said if you can't get that then there is no choice but an interim arrangement.

The President said that frankly he did not see how a city like West Berlin, surrounded by hostile elements who could hamper and ... at will, could long survive.

The Prime Minister said that in any case it was important not to get ourselves into a ridiculous position which we can not maintain.

The President commented that on the other hand it would be a serious blow to the entire Western position if we showed ourselves to be weak in Germany.

Mr. Dillon

CP, we don't have to worry about the future

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Mr. Dillon said that we had some hope that the Germans might be more forthcoming in considering the Berlin problem following the Adenauer visit and the President's conversations with him. We would perhaps have a test of this in the sessions of the Working Group on Germany beginning next week.

The President then reported on his conversation with Chancellor Adenauer with respect to inspection zones. He said he had referred to zones not only in central Europe but also outside, specifically suggesting the possibility of Alaska and parts of Siberia, but emphasizing that no change in force levels would be involved. He said the Chancellor had seemed to be in hearty agreement, but the following night at Secretary Herter's he had blown up and even asserted that there had been no mention of a zone in central Europe. Mr. Dillon supplemented the President's statement by saying that subsequently, however, German Foreign Minister von Brentano had agreed that the question could be discussed in the quadripartite working group, and that General Norstad's military opinion could be sought.

The President said that some kind of arrangement like this, versions of which have been under discussion at various times for some years, might be a very useful product of the Summit.

The Prime Minister strongly agreed, saying that this was why he was so anxious to achieve a nuclear agreement to show that something concrete in the way of cooperation in settlements could be achieved. The President assented, saying that he had thought it might be possible to get something specific in the disarmament field and that the zonal inspection plan seemed like a possibility.

Mr. Dillon commented that the Soviets appear to be seeking not something specific in this field at the Summit but rather some kind of subscription to general ideas or principles of agreement which would clearly be undesirable.

The Prime Minister then turned to the subject of tactics and procedures, saying he felt the preparatory groups had given no thought to this aspect of the Summit preparations. He thought that you would get nowhere in the kind of vast plenary sessions which had been held in Geneva in 1955. Even the so-called "private sessions," he said, had about a thousand people. The whole procedure was then reduced to formal speeches made around what looked like a boxing ring. He felt that this was a subject we must think about. Mr. Dillon agreed and pointed out that tactics and procedures would be the main subject for discussion among the three Foreign Ministers on April 12.

The President

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The President then commented that the Summit was beginning to creep up on us. He said that we would discuss the nuclear test question further tomorrow after the report of the experts and inquired whether there was anything else to be discussed today. The Prime Minister said that the Foreign Minister had some idea on the possibilities of a statement defining peaceful co-existence. The President commented that President Roosevelt had tried this way back in 1933 with the Litvinov agreement, under which the Soviets were not going to interfere in internal affairs any more, but this effort had come to nothing. Mr. Dillon commented that we were afraid that there was no possibility of a reasonable agreement on this subject so long as the Soviets maintained their fictitious distinction between the Government and the International Communist Party apparatus.

The President then said that if the nuclear testing agreement went forward, it would raise for us the problem of China. The Prime Minister inquired whether we accepted this, asking specifically whether we "recognized the existence" of China. Mr. Dillon replied that we had always done this and cited as an example the Korean negotiations and the Ambassadorial talks. With respect to a nuclear testing treaty, this did not necessarily involve legal recognition, but it was accepted that the Chinese Communists must at the appropriate time adhere to the treaty which was drawn to include all the countries of the Eurasian land mass as well as the Sahara.

The President then referred to his talks and correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev in which Khrushchev had raised his strong opposition to dispersion of nuclear capabilities to other powers. The Prime Minister commented

The afternoon session terminated on this note at 4:15 p.m.

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-204

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MB 77-175 #26
By DJH Date 12/81

April 5, 1960

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT (Gordon Gray)
(Tuesday, 29 March 1960 at 10:00 a.m.)

1. I first discussed with the President, the Record of Actions of the March 24 meeting of the NSC. I reported to him that there were no problems with the record itself. However, I wished to say to him that the Secretary of State wanted the President's attention called to one particular matter. This was in connection with the presentation by Dr. Kistiakowsky on the feasibility and national security implications of a monitored agreement to stop or limit ballistic missile testing or production. I reminded the President that following Dr. Kistiakowsky's presentation, Mr. Herter and Admiral Burke, as well as Dr. Kistiakowsky, indicated their view that further continuing studies were needed. The President was concerned that too many people would be taken from their regular work, and no clear-cut decision was made. Secretary Herter does not wish to insist that the Record of Actions direct further studies but wished it to be understood with the President that there will be further study.

I expressed the view to the President that our record of studies regarding reduction and control of armaments had been uneven and spotty. We had had massive efforts such as those conducted under the leadership of Harold Stassen and other ad hoc groups such as the Coolidge group, and others. However, there had not been a clear-cut continuity and continuing preparation. I said I wished to put forward for the President's consideration the notion that there might be established for control and reduction of armaments, a mechanism somewhat similar to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC. Such a committee should of course be under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State and would be a limited group which would report periodically to the Council. This would in no way disturb the internal structure of State and Defense and if an interdepartmental group were set up, it could receive its guidance from and report to the subcommittee and through it to the Council.

The President felt that the notion was worth exploring and directed me to consult with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on the basis of a document which would contain a proposed charter and

Mar. 29

OS/MSA/ ^{inside} Pres Assts of Pres. 4/5/4/ '1960 - Mtgs w the Pres - Vol. 1(4)
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"Continental Defense" and the Planning Board was now actively working on a revision of the Continental Defense Policy paper with full participation of the Bureau of the Budget. I said that this then left the "Control of the Seas" presentation, which was to be given in a Special Meeting of the Council on Friday, April 1.

The President felt that it was all right to invite Mr. Stans to this meeting and also to expose him to the results of the "targeting" study. He said he wished to make it clear, however, that none of these studies should be staffed through the Bureau of the Budget.

7. I reported to the President that I had some uneasiness about the fact that the Council had not recently discussed Germany and Berlin and I wondered whether he wished to have something soon before the Council in this connection. The President said that he felt that as long as Chancellor Adenauer's position is as inflexible as it seems to be there seemed to be little profit in discussing unification alternatives or alternatives with respect to Berlin. However, he wanted the best thinking brought to bear on the subject and if the Planning Board could come up with any new approaches, by all means he would want them to be brought to the attention of the Council.

8. I then explained to the President what underlies the topic of Iran on the Council agenda for April 1. I pointed out that the problem with respect to the Iran paper was one that would arise to plague us increasingly in the months ahead. This was a situation in which the objectives and policy guidance in papers were generally still valid but the general considerations sections needed considerable updating, some papers to a much greater degree than others. I said that it disturbed my sense of orderliness to have papers in existence which were obviously outdated.

The President said it seemed to him that we could make a note for the record as to the date that any policy guidance seemed to be valid which would be an updating of the paper itself. I agreed but pointed out that this still left the general considerations to be dealt with. The President wondered whether the Planning Board could not update these papers, feeling that there was no point in taking the Council's time for this purpose, but also agreeing that he wished the NSC records to be left in a tidy condition for his successor, whoever the successor may be.

Mar 29

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4/6/60 Mr. Gray
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Briefing Note for the
NSC Meeting of April 7, 1960

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4-6-60
(Revision)

FRANCE
(Memo for NSC, 4-4-60)



The next item is a small change in the French paper.

Last November 4 the President approved the new French paper, paragraph 48 of which provided that the U.S. would not enter into any further commitments to give France grant aid for military equipment or training.

Then in December the President approved Action 2158, which involved a decision not to provide military equipment on a grant basis to any nation financially able to pay for such equipment. It was understood at the time of that Council discussion that training was excluded from the prohibition, but there was no discussion of training with respect to France.

The Departments of State and Defense now wish to make new commitments to provide military training to France on a grant basis. Accordingly, they wish to delete the restriction on such commitments in paragraph 48 of the French policy paper. Such a deletion would not be inconsistent with the policy decision of Action 2158.

This change has been recommended by the Planning Board.

Is there any objection to it?

jos
agf

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.4

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BY llw DATE 2/11/91

OSANSA / NSC / Briefing Note / 6 / France, US Pol. Towards

April 7, 1960

MEMORANDUM


SUBJECT: Discussion at the 440th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, April 7, 1960

Present at the 440th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; Mr. C. Douglas Dillon for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Scribner); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and Mr. Philip A. Ray for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken:

1. U.S. POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICA
(NSC 5818; NIE 70-59; NSC 6001; NSC 6005; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 15, 1960; Memo for All Holders of NSC 6005, dated March 22, 1960; NSC Action No. 2199; Memo for All Holders of NSC 6005, dated March 30, 1960)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on NSC 6005 as amended by the NSC Planning Board in the light of the Council discussion of March 24. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). After completing the reading of his Briefing Note, Mr. Gray said he wished to raise one additional point. At the Council Meeting



of March 24 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed the insertion of a new paragraph in NSC 6005 providing for technically competent observers in African countries to keep abreast of military developments. The Council had discussed this proposal and decided that the question was an operational one. Accordingly, the paragraph had not been included in the policy paper. General Cabell, however, was concerned over this problem and wanted to discuss it further.

General Cabell said the paragraph proposed by the JCS was of interest to CIA but was, in his view, too narrow. He suggested that the paragraph might be amended to provide that competent observers would be established in African countries to keep abreast of military or internal security developments. He also suggested that the title of this section of the paper (Page 14) be changed from "Military and Strategic" to "Military, Strategic and Internal Security." Mr. Gray said he understood General Cabell's suggestions were acceptable to Defense, but he wondered whether the Department of State still felt that the paragraph was of such an operational nature that it should not be included in the policy paper. Mr. Dillon said he had no objection to including the paragraph as amended in the paper.

Mr. Dillon then asked leave to discuss a broader aspect of NSC 6005. He noted that discussion of this paper at two meetings of the Council had been devoted primarily to the differences of opinion on financial assistance to the indigenous countries, on the share of assistance to be provided by the U.S. and the metropolises, respectively, and so on. After discussion, it appeared that there was really not much difference of opinion on these subjects. However, he desired to emphasize the overriding political significance of the area, the fate of which is now hanging in the balance. Mr. Dillon thought the fate of the area would depend on the actions taken by the U.S. and Western Europe (1) to solve the difficult problems which the newly-independent countries of West Africa were facing and (2) to meet the aggressive Soviet Bloc attack in the area. He considered West Africa a priority area from the political point of view and believed the U.S. would have to assume an active role to protect U.S. political interests there. Such an active role for the protection of our political interests would be a departure from the traditional U.S. position with respect to Africa.

The President said it seemed to him that Mr. Dillon was saying that the Operations Coordinating Board should do a very good job of implementing the policy in NSC 6005. Mr. Dillon agreed.

Mr. Dillon then remarked that Paragraph 18-B of NSC 6005 was technically deficient in that it referred to UN assistance "other than development financing." This language did not take account of the fact that the World Bank was a Specialized Agency of the UN. Mr. Gray said the language of the paragraph could be adjusted to reflect the relationship of the World Bank to the UN. The phrase "other than development financing" in Paragraph 18-B was designed to preserve a provision which appears in Paragraph 32 of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1). Mr. Dillon felt it would not be difficult to adjust the language of Paragraph 18-B.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6005, as amended by the enclosures to the reference Memos for All Holders of NSC 6005; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 15, 1960.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6005 as amended by the enclosures to the reference Memos for All Holders of NSC 6005, subject to the following further amendments:
 - (1) Page 12, paragraph 18B: Insert an asterisk after the words "(other than development financing)", and insert the following footnote thereto:

"* This provision does not preclude the operations of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations."
 - (2) Page 14: Revise the heading preceding paragraph 29 to read "Military, Strategic and Internal Security".
 - (3) Page 14: Insert the following new paragraph after paragraph 30 (renumbering subsequent paragraphs accordingly):

"31. Establish technically competent observers in African countries to keep abreast of military or internal security developments, subject in each case to the approval of the Secretary of State."
 - (4) Page 16, old subparagraphs 31-c and -d: Revise to read as follows (deleting the first two footnotes thereto):

"c. Wherever it is determined to be infeasible or inconsistent with U.S. national security interests to rely on the sources in subparagraph b to meet the

external capital needs of a particular territory or nation, be prepared on the basis of case-by-case appraisal of country or major project requirements to extend economic development assistance or special assistance consistent with the foregoing guidance.*

"d. Be prepared to extend to independent nations and, in consultation with the metropolitan power concerned, to dependent territories (1) U.S. technical assistance and (2) U.S. special assistance for the improvement of education and training, with particular emphasis to be given to the meeting of the needs which are common to all of the countries of the area. Be prepared to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P.L.480 when appropriate.

"* Specific guidance for Guinea and Liberia is provided in paragraphs 38 and 44 below."

c. Noted the statement by the Under Secretary of State that the area covered by this paper has taken on great political importance to the United States, and the statement by the President that the Operations Coordinating Board should make a special effort to ensure the effective implementation of the policy contained in NSC 6005.

NOTE: NSC 6005, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6005/1 to supersede those portions of NSC 5818 which relate to West Africa (a statement of policy toward South, Central and East Africa, NSC 6001, has been approved to supersede that portion of NSC 5818 relating to South, Central and East Africa) for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President, together with the action in c above.


2. NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING

Mr. Gray said the Secretary of Defense had just returned from the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting, on which he would make a brief report. Secretary Gates said that before going to the NATO Meeting he had spent two days with the U.S. Armed Forces in Germany and Berlin. He had been very pleased with the morale, state-of-readiness and equipment of these forces and recommended that any Cabinet members traveling to that part of Europe should make it a point to visit our armed forces.

The NATO Defense Ministers Meeting, Secretary Gates continued, was in a relatively low key; indeed it was almost in the nature of a meeting for the technical sharing of information. The meeting produced no spectacular results. One of the items on the agenda was the West German logistics problem which was concerned with the problem of unit training. The Germans received a great deal of sympathy because of their logistic problems, but no specific action was taken. A second item on the agenda concerned the integration of logistics. The Germans proposed the establishment of special committees to expedite action on allocations and production, a move which we resisted because of the political and economic difficulties involved. At the end of the meeting the problem remained in the proper channels, General Norstad being assigned the task of taking the first steps. With respect to research and development, we agreed to share information at an earlier stage, but emphasized the point that an effective job had been done in the area of multi-lateral cooperation. The Germans were disappointed because no measures were established to expedite action in this field; they felt more standardization was needed to produce more end items cheaper. Secretary Gates reported that a third item on the agenda had been the sharing of the NATO defense burden. The U.S. made a strong appeal on this subject; while reiterating our support of NATO and our willingness to do our share, we urged that the other NATO countries improve their position relative to ours, pointing out that their financial capabilities were now at a high level. We urged that they make use of the element of political determination as well as financial capacity. The response to this appeal was generally good. Italy announced a new increase in its military budget in the course of the meeting, a development which was surprising in view of the position of the Italian Government at the time. The communique of the meeting recognized the need for sharing the NATO defense burden. A further item on the agenda concerned a U.K. paper on defense planning which purported to be a follow-up on the Secretary of State's idea that NATO planning should be reviewed periodically. The U.K. paper, however, attempted to define such terms as "limited war", "deterrence", and "a limited probe". It also emphasized the idea of support for the first stage forces. This paper was interpreted by the press as being in conflict with the West German logistics paper and possibly inconsistent with the political directive. We took the position that the U.K. paper was consistent with the political directive. The U.K. views reflected in this paper will probably be brought to the attention of the Istanbul meeting of the Western Foreign Ministers early in May. Secretary Gates felt that the real motive behind the U.K. paper, however, was a desire by the new Minister of Defense to present a new U.K. image which would wipe out the Sandys image, rather than an effort to have an effect on NATO planning. Secretary Gates reported that the Germans had also introduced a paper on psychological warfare and had proposed the establishment of committees. We had


resisted this proposal and pointed out the political nature of the subject. This problem will also probably come up at the Istanbul meeting. The U.S. proposals on mid-range ballistic missiles elicited little comment. The question of the relationship of France to NATO, including integrated air defense, stockpiling, etc., did not come up and is probably being reserved by France for discussion when President De Gaulle visits the U.S. The new French Defense Minister appeared capable and authoritative.

Secretary Gates felt that some of the side conversations which had taken place during this meeting had been very illuminating and one of them, that is a conversation between the Americans and Canadians, had been very disturbing in addition.



Certain elements in Canada are emphasizing what they call "domination" of Canada by the U.S. in defense matters, are saying that peace and detente are just around the corner, and are insisting that there is no point in building up Canadian defenses. Mr. Gates thought the forthcoming meeting in July of the Canadian and U.S. State, Defense and Treasury Ministers might be our last chance to attempt to change the Canadian attitude. He ventured to suggest that the President might wish to talk to the Canadian Prime Minister before this July meeting. Secretary Gates concluded his observations by remarking that the reporters who covered the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting seemed to be primarily interested in the problem of disarmament and had told him that the great issue in the U.S. election would be disarmament.

The President said he too was disturbed at the Canadian attitude toward defense. He had never taken this question up with Diefenbaker; perhaps he should do so. Mr. Dillon said we had had our ups and downs with Canada in various fields. At the present time the U.S. and Canada had reached agreement in the economic field and just recently had arrived at a compromise on fisheries in connection with the Law of the Sea Conference. At this conference the Canadians had showed considerable willingness to cooperate with the U.S. and the U.K. However, he wished to second Mr. Gates' view that the current Canadian attitude on defense was disturbing.



After Secretary Gates had referred once more to the Three Ministers Meeting in Ottawa in July, Mr. Dillon remarked that he felt this meeting would succeed only if there were a preliminary preparatory meeting.

Secretary Gates then asked General Twining if he wished to add anything to the briefings on the NATO Defense Ministers meeting. General Twining felt the West Germans were becoming quite aggressive in international councils and that this aggressiveness was manifested both by the West German ministers and by the West German military officers.

General Twining said he was also disturbed at the deterioration in U.S.-Canadian relations. Secretary Gates thought that part of the German aggressiveness at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting was really a sensitivity stemming from the fact that Khrushchev was at that time traveling about France attacking Germany.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Secretary of Defense.
- b. Discussed the importance of seeking to improve Canadian relations and cooperation with the United States, particularly in military matters.

- 3. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY
- 4. U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (NSC 5902/1; NSC Action No. 2178)

General Cabell reported that the creation of a new Indonesian parliament by Sukarno had been followed by rumors of plots against Sukarno during his absence from the country. The first reaction to the new Indonesian parliament had been strongly adverse because one-fourth of the new deputies are pro-communist. This fact has aggravated the concern which was already felt in Indonesia over Sukarno's soft attitude toward communism, over poor economic conditions, and over the continuing rebellion. General Cabell doubted that Nasution would attempt to oust Sukarno, even though he was ambitious to seize

power, because he no doubt fears he cannot enlist sufficient support for such a move. There was always the outside possibility that Nasution would move against Sukarno, but a continuation of the present situation without a military takeover was the most probable development.

Turning to Iraq, General Cabell reported that the army, with the support of Kassem, was spearheading a tougher policy toward communism. Kassem had made a number of moves against communism and was resisting communist demands. He had commuted some death sentences desired by the communists and had postponed some executions. Kassem had rejected a communist bid for the licensing of the Communist Party, had forcibly suppressed certain communist strikes, and had refused the communists permission to demonstrate. The army has increased its security precautions and its discipline had improved. General Cabell felt that the army was now the mainstay of the regime in Iraq, with Kassem's dependence on the army steadily increasing. Recently Iraq has been showing some improvement in its attitude toward the West, with Iraqi officials becoming more friendly toward Western diplomats, and Iraq seeking bids by Western firms on its development program. The Soviet effort to counter this trend favorable to the West consists of Mikoyan's visit to Baghdad, beginning tomorrow, in connection with a trade fair. Mikoyan will be the highest Soviet official ever to visit the Arab world. He is reported to be bringing with him an offer of assistance to Iraq.

General Cabell then noted that Soviet-Iranian relations continued at an impasse. There were no indications that Iran had approached the USSR with respect to a meeting of Khrushchev and the Shah in Europe this summer. Communist elements in Iran may be stepping up their activities. At any rate, the Soviet Embassy is increasing its contact with Iranians, while SAVAK, the Iranian security organization, asserts that it has uncovered a communist network among non-commissioned officers in the Iranian Army. The East German radio is broadcasting instructions to Tudeh members to revive the Tudeh organization, possibly on the theory that the Tudeh can now make a show of strength in the present situation in Iran. The Shah, feeling that things are going well internally, expects to make the new parliament which will be elected this spring more pliable. The Shah also believes that his recent land reform measures have increased support for the regime. General Cabell did not agree with this feeling, tending to believe that the Shah's reform measures have alienated new groups of people without causing any groups already opposed to the Shah to come over to his side. General Bakhtiar is continuing to formulate plans to deal with the contingency which would arise in the event the Shah disappears. Some observers allege that General Bakhtiar's contingency plans are really designed to overthrow the Shah.

General Cabell believed that the position of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic continued to grow weaker. Dissidence was rife and active plotting against the regime was in process, so that many observers are predicting the early fall of the government. Apparently Trujillo himself has failed to grasp the situation and is refusing to relax any of his controls. According to his son, Trujillo is mentally trapped by his advisers. Trujillo's recent resignation as leader of the party was an act of political gamesmanship and is not to be taken seriously. Many people remember that on a previous occasion Trujillo invited the formation of opposition parties and then took police action against all those who tested his sincerity by forming such parties. The pro-Castro element among the Dominican dissidents are counting on Cuban support. General Cabell wondered whether Mr. Dillon wished to add anything to these remarks on the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Dillon recalled that the Department of State had informed the Council in January that it had no expectation that the Trujillo regime would endure and no hope that it would reform; accordingly, the U.S. objective was the creation of an organization of moderate elements which could become a successor government. Since that time a great deal of activity in this field has been going on and our contacts with moderate dissident elements in the Dominican Republic have considerably improved. However, it now appears that Trujillo may fall before our policy of building up moderate successor elements has had time to succeed. Therefore, the State Department is examining other alternatives which would require rapid action through the OAS or by the U.S. on behalf of the OAS. The Department of State will consult with the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the military aspects of these other alternatives. Mr. Dillon felt that the situation in the Dominican Republic was serious.

General Cabell reported that the Castro regime in Cuba continued to further communist objectives in Latin America. The Fourth National Congress of the Youth Section of the Communist Party in Cuba, meeting in Havana, had drawn delegates from Soviet Bloc as well as Latin American countries. A preparatory meeting for an ostensibly non-communist Latin American Youth Congress is scheduled for April. A Cuban mission is touring Latin America to publicize this Youth Congress. Other Latin American communist efforts centered in Cuba include a Latin American Peace Conference, a Latin American Conference "to create the apparatus to fight imperialism" and hemisphere labor meetings. General Cabell said the trend toward closer Cuban economic and trade contacts with the Soviet Bloc continued. Cuba recently concluded with Poland a trade agreement which was reported to provide for the shipment of helicopters from Poland to Cuba. This agreement had followed trade agreements with the Soviet Union and East Germany; Cuba also appeared to be negotiating with Hungary. The first shipment of

Russian crude oil is now enroute to Cuba, which has announced a plan for the establishment of government gasoline stations selling gasoline made from Soviet oil. In this connection, General Cabell thought the Cuban Government may be planning to take over the Texaco refinery in Cuba. Seventy Cubans would leave this month for a tour of the USSR and seventy Russians would tour Cuba. Some of the top Cuban communists were going to Moscow to explore Soviet willingness to make military commitments to Cuba. Internally, Castro was tightening his political controls. He had accelerated his plans for dominating the universities. The government-dominated leaders of student organizations had established special courts for the trial of students accused of counter-revolutionary activity. Two thousand students from rural areas had been selected by Castro to attend the University of Havana and help control the student bodies. Anti-American tirades in Cuba, including personal villification of President Eisenhower, continued. As against these developments General Cabell wished to report on two somewhat more favorable aspects of the situation. There was an increasing possibility that the Conference of Underdeveloped Nations would not be held at all or would turn out to be a much less significant conference than Cuba had anticipated. Replies to the Cuban invitation for this conference had been much less enthusiastic than the Cubans had expected, a development which was due in part to the U.S. attitude. For example, Venezuela, Cuba's closest friend, had recommended postponement of the conference. A second favorable development concerned the campaign to expose Castro in Latin America. In Brazil, for example, a correspondent [.....] had written a series of articles emphasizing Castro's trend toward communism. These articles had been prominently displayed in the Brazilian press and had apparently had a great deal of impact on the Brazilian leaders.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situations in Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba.

Noted and discussed the statement by the Under Secretary of State that the position of the Trujillo regime is deteriorating more rapidly than was anticipated at the time of the Department of State presentation on January 14, 1960 (NSC Action No. 2178). Therefore, alternative policies in the event of an early collapse of that regime were being actively considered by the Department of State, and would be the subject of consultation with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

5. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2166-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2177, 2191, 2195, 2201 and 2206)

Mr. Dillon said the information related by General Cabell on the Cuban-Polish trade agreement apparently came from Cuban sources. We had talked to the Poles about this agreement and had been informed by them that no helicopters or military equipment of any kind would be sent to Cuba. The Poles had insisted that the only aircraft involved in the trade agreement were small Piper Cub-type planes for crop dusting. Mr. Dillon noted that in the Shergales case, the Department of Justice intended to convene a grand jury in Miami. We have affidavits from Shergales and from his common-law wife stating that he was a Castro agent. Apparently Shergales, under pressure from the Castro Government is now about to retract this testimony. Mr. Dillon said we had queried our Havana Embassy as to the number of Americans now in Cuba and had been told that only 6000 U.S. citizens remained on the island, a decrease of 3000 since the last estimate was made.

The President asked whether President Lleras directly or indirectly referred to Cuba in his speech yesterday. Mr. Dillon said he had found no reference to Cuba in the press reports of the speech. The President said Lleras was very much on our side and had given the impression that he hoped the OAS would take Castro and the Cuban situation more seriously in the future. Before Lleras left Colombia he asked other Latin American leaders a number of questions about Castro. The President added that if we could get Latin America on our side, we could do whatever we wished with respect to the situations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Mr. Dillon believed that any anti-Castro statement or action by Lleras would be more effective if it were taken after his return to Colombia. If he took action when he was in the U.S., it might be interpreted to be a result of U.S. pressure. The President agreed and pointed out that Lleras took some action before coming to the U.S. The Vice President said that Lleras' speech had been couched in general terms with a great deal of emphasis on the concept of freedom. His speech could be aimed at any country violating the precepts which it contained and there had been no specific mention of the situation in Cuba.

Mr. Gray reported that in conversations with State Department officials, he had noted an intense concern with respect to the sugar legislation pending in Congress. Mr. Gray wondered, in view of the importance of sugar legislation to our general security position in Cuba, if everything was being done that could be done to secure passage of the legislation. The President said he understood the legislation was in the Agricultural Committee of The House. Mr. Dillon said Representative Cooley was adamant on this question. The Congressional leadership appeared to prefer a one-year extension of

the Sugar Act which would incorporate the flexible provisions desired by the Administration. The provision for flexibility might be written into the measure when it reached the Senate. Mr. Dillon believed that a one-year rather than a four-year extension would be passed by Congress. The President wondered how it would be possible to make economic arrangements on a one-year basis. Mr. Dillon agreed that operating on a one-year basis was virtually impossible, but said that Representative Cooley had special reasons for wanting only a one-year extension. These reasons were connected with his desire for passage of a broad agricultural act next year. Mr. Gray wondered whether the sugar legislation should not be discussed on a bi-partisan basis with the Congressional Leaders at an appropriate time. Mr. Dillon said the difficulty was that Cooley's position was supported by both parties because sugar legislation was such an emotional issue that the leadership feared that a debate on the floor on a plan for a four-year extension could not be kept within proper bounds.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba.

6. U.S. POLICY ON FRANCE

(NSC 5910/1; NSC Action No. 2158; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 4, 1960)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the proposal to amend Paragraph 48 of U.S. Policy Toward France (NSC 5910/1) in order to permit the U.S. to make new commitments to provide military training to France on a grant basis. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

The President asked what was involved in this proposal. He asked General Twining what kind of military training we provided to France. General Twining said he was not prepared to answer that question. Mr. Gray said not much money was involved in this proposal. Mr. Dillon said the change in the French policy paper was largely a matter of principle. The change should be made so that France would not be the only country in the world which could not be provided with grant assistance for military training. The President approved the amendment to Paragraph 48 of NSC 5910/1 proposed by the Planning Board.

The National Security Council:

Agreed to recommend, in the light of the reference memorandum of April 4, 1960, and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as read at the meeting, that the words "and training" be deleted from the second sentence of paragraph 48 of NSC 5910/1.

NOTE: The revision in NSC 5910/1, as recommended by the above action and approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5910/1.

7. U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN
(NSC 5821/1; OCB Report on NSC 5821/1, dated December 11, 1959;
NSC Action No. 2170-b; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated March 16, 1960)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on this item, which concerned the question of whether or not there is need to review NSC 5821/1. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). After reading his Briefing Note Mr. Gray said he would like to suggest that if the Planning Board does up-date the General Considerations in the Iranian policy paper, it submit its revision to the Council for a Memorandum Action rather than for consideration at a Council Meeting.


Mr. Dillon said he had a reservation on the problem presented by Mr. Gray. If the Planning Board undertook to rewrite the General Considerations in all the policy papers one year old or older, he feared that many of the State Department officials who should be devoting their time to the formulation and implementation of policy would be compelled to devote themselves to purely editorial work.

The President said he had previously discussed this problem with Mr. Gray. He had less than ten months remaining in his present office and he wished to look at the matter from the standpoint of the succeeding administration. We need not say to the next administration that we have looked at every paper in the Council to determine whether or not it is up-to-date. However, the Planning Board should examine each paper and be able to say to the Council that it has reviewed the paper and that the paper needs no revision, so it can be said that we had thought about the situation in a particular country up to such and such a date. He liked to keep things tidy for the next administration. He pointed out that he was not trying to create more work; indeed, as various officials became busy with the political campaign there might not be as much time for NSC meetings.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral report by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the views of the NSC Planning Board regarding the need for review of U.S. Policy Toward Iran (NSC 5821/1), in the light of the enclosures to the reference memorandum of March 16, 1960.
- b. Agreed that the NSC Planning Board should bring up-to-date the "General Considerations" section of NSC 5821/1, and circulate their recommended revisions to the Council for adoption by Memorandum Action.

- c. Noted the President's statement that he wished to leave NSC policy papers which remain in effect in a current condition for the next Administration. Accordingly, the President desired that the NSC Planning Board submit for Memorandum Action by the Council revisions in NSC policy papers (other than of a purely editorial nature) required for the purpose of bringing them up to date. Where the NSC policy papers did not require revision except of a purely editorial nature, the NSC Planning Board should make a written report to that effect to the Council as a matter of official record.



MARION W. BOGGS

Briefing Note for
NSC Mtg 4-7-60

M. Bogg
PJHalla/emb

US POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICA

This draft statement of policy has been reconsidered by the Planning Board in the light of the Council's discussion on March 24. With one exception, the splits in the text and in the Financial Appendix have now been resolved. The Planning Board's effort in dealing with the splits [in paras. 9, 16, 18, and 31-b] was to follow as closely as possible the line in Basic Policy, while taking account of the special situation in West Africa and the Secretary of State's understandable requirement for some flexibility in dealing with it. I will read the two key paragraphs as agreed upon by the Planning Board.

READ PARAGRAPHS 16 and 18 (pages 10 and 11)

The Planning Board also agreed to include a paragraph (18A, page 11) which had previously been on the State Department side of the splits to the effect that the U.S. should "Pursue actions which will assist newly independent areas to maintain a Western orientation, mindful of the natural desires and intense sensitivities of the Africans, particularly with respect to their newly-acquired independence. Make clear wherever possible that self-government and independence impose increasing responsibilities which the people must assume". At State's suggestion, a paragraph was added (para. 18B, page 12) to encourage expansion of United Nations activities in the area and assistance (other than development financing) to the newly emerging states designed to promote constructive political and economic development and to complement U.S. efforts.

West Africa

Since the Planning Board's last discussion of this paper, agreement has been reached by the agencies most directly concerned on the one remaining split in Para. 31-c on page 16.

The agreed language which I will read has been circulated informally, since time did not permit getting out an official revision.

READ Para. 31-c [New language underlined.]

"31-c. Wherever it is determined to be infeasible or inconsistent with U.S. national security interests to rely on the sources in subparagraph b to meet the external capital needs of a particular territory or nation be prepared on the basis of case-by-case appraisal of country or major project requirements to extend economic development assistance or special assistance consistent with the foregoing guidance.***"

The related footnotes on pages 18 and 19 explaining the Treasury-Budget split would be deleted.

Agreement was also reached to delete the first footnote on page 16 dealing with the Special Program for Tropical Africa and to cover this subject in a revision of Para. 31-d, which I will also read.

READ Para. 31-d. [New language underlined.]

"31-d. Be prepared to extend to independent nations and,

in consultation with the metropolitan power concerned, to dependent territories (1) U.S. technical assistance and (2) U.S. special assistance for the improvement of education and training, with particular emphasis to be given to the meeting of the needs which are common to all of the countries of the area. Be prepared to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P. L. 480 when appropriate. (Delete first footnote on page 16.)"

The rationale for these changes covers three types of cases: (1) the Special Program for Tropical Africa, which would not operate on a case-by-case basis [Para. 31-d (2)]; (2) cases, such as Guinea, in which the metropole turns its back and in which instance the U.S. would consider an aid program on a country basis; and, (3) cases where primary responsibility is assumed by the European metropole (primarily the U.K. or France) and in which a U.S. determination to extend aid would be made on the basis of a "case by case appraisal of ... major project requirements" [Para. 31-c]

Does the Secretary of State have any comments concerning this paper?

CALL ON Secretary Herter.

Briefing Note for the
NSC Meeting of April 7, 1960

Mr. Bagge
GW/llw
4-6-60
(Revision)

FRANCE
(Memo for NSC, 4-4-60)

The next item is a small change in the French paper.

Last November 4 the President approved the new French paper, paragraph 48 of which provided that the U.S. would not enter into any further commitments to give France grant aid for military equipment or training.

Then in December the President approved Action 2158, which involved a decision not to provide military equipment on a grant basis to any nation financially able to pay for such equipment. It was understood at the time of that Council discussion that training was excluded from the prohibition, but there was no discussion of training with respect to France.

The Departments of State and Defense now wish to make new commitments to provide military training to France on a grant basis. Accordingly, they wish to delete the restriction on such commitments in paragraph 48 of the French policy paper. Such a deletion would not be inconsistent with the policy decision of Action 2158.

This change has been recommended by the Planning Board.
Is there any objection to it?

Briefing Note for
SC Mtg. 3/24/60 *April 7*

Mr. [unclear]
ASB: tms
March 22, 1960

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

1. The next item on the agenda concerns the question of whether or not there is need to review NSC 5821/1--U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN. You will recall that this item was discussed briefly by the Council on January 7, 1960, when the Council deferred decision, pending a study by the Department of Defense of certain military assistance requirements which the Shah of Iran had discussed with the President.
2. The Department of Defense, after reviewing a letter from the Shah to the President concerning the proposed Iranian requirements, together with an Iranian Survey of her military positions vis-a-vis Iraq and Afghanistan, has concluded that the Iranians have overstated the threat from Iraq and Afghanistan and have apparently used the overstated threat as a basis for a request for military assistance that is not only excessive but is also beyond Iranian capacity to use effectively. The President has replied to the Shah generally along the lines of the Defense review.
3. The Planning Board reassessed the need for review of U.S. Policy Toward Iran in the light of the foregoing and agreed that no review is required. The Planning Board recognized, however, that, while the OBJECTIVES and POLICY GUIDANCE sections are still valid, the section on GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS is out of date. I call this to your attention because it points up a problem that will repeatedly plague the Planning Board over the next few

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PB Representative,

months. It is my own view, shared, I believe, by the Department of Defense, that it is desirable that NSC Policy papers be up-to-date in all respects and not simply in respect to OBJECTIVES and POLICY GUIDANCE. The majority of the Planning Board feel, however, that to up-date the GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS section of a paper that otherwise requires no review, involves unnecessary and unproductive effort. The majority does not object to an up-dating when the GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS are so patently invalid in important aspects as to cast reasonable doubt concerning the validity of the policy guidance that follows. They argue that the burden of proof should lie with those proposing up-dating and point out that in the present case, Iran, the thrust of the GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS is consistent with the policy guidance, even though some of the facts are no longer valid. Nonetheless, the Planning Board agrees that Council guidance would be helpful. I should add perhaps, that my own view may be somewhat colored by a personal reluctance to pass on to a new Administration NSC Policy papers that contain background statements of situations and facts that are obviously no longer correct.

h. I should like also to report that I have authorized, since the Planning Board discussion, a new procedural arrangement that may help, at least partially, to resolve this problem. You will recall that OCB reports, even when they recommend against policy review, always contain an evaluation and discussion of developments in the period since the preceding OCB report on the particular area. If, in future, it were possible to have OCB reports to all holders of the policy paper reported upon and thus insure that all such holders will have available an up-to-date appraisal for information and record.

5. Perhaps the Secretary of State would like to comment on the majority view.

(CALL ON SECRETARY OF STATE)

6. Would the Secretary of Defense care to say a word in favor of my sense of orderliness.

(CALL ON SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

NLE MR Case No. 91-142

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Document No. _____

1094/448 = 7(2) 328

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
22 April 1960.

**Present: The President, General DeGaulle, Mr. Claude Leber,
Lt Colonel Vernon A. Walters**

After the usual exchange of amenities the President said he had some papers he would like to give General DeGaulle. First was for his confidential and personal information and related to our deterrent capabilities. It covered some of the weapons systems in our deterrent capabilities. The second paper he wished the General to look at covered four (4) points which we thought might be useful for discussion at the summit. He wondered whether the General would care to discuss these at this time or whether he would prefer to think it over and talk about it at a later time. The third paper related to procedures at the summit. He felt that it was important to the three Western powers that they agree in advance, and if they are agreed, General DeGaulle, as the head of the host government, might perhaps write a letter to Mr. Khrushchev setting forth our understanding concerning procedures to be followed at the summit. General DeGaulle thanked the President and said he would retain the first paper (deterrent capabilities). On the second paper (questions for discussion at the summit), he would like to have an opportunity to read it over and talk to the President subsequently.

On the third paper, he said he agreed with the idea of his sending a letter to Khrushchev, and he would do so after they had worked out an understanding between the three Western powers.

The President then said that at their last meeting they had discussed means of insuring satisfactory consultation as between France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and that the Embassies were working on this problem and that it was his feeling that the three countries were in much closer contact than had been the case previously. He wondered whether General DeGaulle shared

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shared this opinion and the French President said that he did.

The President recalled they had decided to do this without having recourse to heavy, ponderous machinery or organization, and General DeGaulle expressed his agreement with this concept.

The President then said that he would next talk about a matter that was really none of his business, but he felt he should tell General DeGaulle he had received a communication from nine African powers telling him that French efforts to suppress the rebellion in Algeria were driving the African nations out of the Western camp. They could not countenance this effort to perpetuate colonial rule. His reply then was that this was none of his business, but rather between them and France, but he felt he would be remiss if he did not mention the tone of these communications. They had also protested about the French nuclear tests in the Sahara. The President said that as he understood it, General DeGaulle still stood by his statement of September 16th and he would like to confirm this for himself so that he could perhaps reaffirm his support for this policy. He said that while General DeGaulle might have used independent expressions in his speech at Constantine, he felt certain that his policies remained the same.

General DeGaulle said that this was indeed the case. He still stood by his statement of September 16th, at which time he had offered the Algerians three choices: complete independence with secession from France; complete Frenchification or else an Algerian government tied to France by treaty. If the choice were for independence, then they could secede. He had asked the rebel leaders to discuss a cease-fire with him. They had refused to do so unless the future status of Algeria were also discussed. He could not do this as it would imply recognition of the rebels as an Algerian government. The only way a true Algerian government could be set up was through a free expression of the people's feelings in the referendum. But a referendum could not be held while the fighting was going on. He had told the Algerian rebels that if they were able to agree on a cease-fire, he would call a round-table conference and they would all work out the referendum together. They had refused to do so, so obviously when he visited the Army in Algeria, he could not tell them anything other than they must continue the task of pacification until such time as the rebels were prepared to discuss a cease-fire.

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He said he would like to point out that France had a mandate from the United Nations on Togo and Cameroon. Following the UN vote, France had given both of them their independence, and France was in the process of signing treaties on independence with other States such as Madagascar and the Mali Federation. In a year the French Community would be an association of independent states. The President said he was delighted to hear this and he hoped the U.S. would enjoy with the countries of the French Community the same close and warm relations which we had with France itself.

General DeGaulle said that in regard to the nuclear tests, he did not feel they had contributed a great deal to area contamination. The President said there are some indications that fallout from tests held as long ago as 8 or 9 years might still be present, and that the scientists themselves did not agree on the exact consequences. He did convey the thought to General DeGaulle that it might be well to hold such tests underground. He was not attempting to absolve himself from any of our previous tests.

General DeGaulle said that he would take note of what the President said and that the French were looking now to find suitable underground locations in Corsica. The President said he would be fortunate if he could find some caves because the underground excavations involved were very expensive.

General DeGaulle said he had found Mr. Khrushchev in a fairly moderate frame of mind. He had offered to try and help settle the Algerian question, but General DeGaulle had asked him to stay out of this matter. Khrushchev had told him that he hoped the French would remain in some form in Algeria because if they left the Americans would move in and that would be worse. The President laughed and said he had enough headaches right now without taking on Algeria, but this was typical of Khrushchev's attempts to divide the Western alliance. He did the same thing with us and he did it with the British. General DeGaulle said it was essential that we not be divided, but that we be united and he felt that if Khrushchev realized that we would not back down he would not do anything rash or present us with an ultimatum. In discussions with General DeGaulle he had mentioned the possibility of a two-year moratorium on the status of Berlin although saying at the end of that time

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some solution would have to be found.

The President and General DeGaulle then discussed the Oder Neisse border and felt that this seemed to be permanent and that a Western guarantee of this border might be a valuable card to play in some way if tacit West German consent could be obtained to it. It was felt that this could not possibly be obtained prior to the German elections next year, but thereafter some flexibility on the part of the Germans should be hoped for. General DeGaulle said that France was anxious to be close to Germany and to have good relations with her, but for understandable reasons she was not unduly anxious for German reunification or to see Germany grow larger. Khrushchev's attempts to stir up anti-German feeling in France had not been successful. His reception in France had been "correct" but not enthusiastic despite occasional groups of communists. General DeGaulle felt that if the summit meeting could be kept going for a week without a split, this in itself would be a success and lead to later summits and the creation of an atmosphere of relaxation of tension. He said that he had told Khrushchev "you say you want to relax tensions. If this is true why do you harass us with questions like Berlin that can only lead to trouble." He felt that we should not allow ourselves to be pushed out of Berlin, but that we should not use the word never, never, never; and that a Western guarantee of the Oder Neisse line might relieve Polish pressure on Khrushchev, as not merely communist Poles were concerned about this frontier, but all Poles were.

The two Presidents then discussed the Gettysburg trip on Sunday and agreed to go alone with their interpreters.

After further cordial amenities General DeGaulle took his leave of the President.


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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION - PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
22 April 1960.

Present: The President, General DeGaulle, Mr. Claude Lebe
Lt Colonel Vernon A. Walters



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Agency Case NSC 581-391
NLE Case MR 57-106 73
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shared this opinion and the French President said that he did.

The President recalled they had decided to do this without having recourse to heavy, preponderous machinery or organization, and General DeGaulle expressed his agreement with this concept.

The President then said that he would next talk about a matter that was really none of his business, but he felt he should tell General DeGaulle he had received a communication from nine African powers telling him that French efforts to suppress the rebellion in Algeria were driving the African nations out of the Western camp. They could not countenance this effort to perpetuate colonial rule. His reply then was that this was none of his business, but rather between them and France, but he felt he would be remiss if he did not mention the tone of these communications. They had also protested about the French nuclear tests in the Sahara. The President said that as he understood it, General DeGaulle still stood by his statement of September 16th and he would like to confirm this for himself so that he could perhaps reaffirm his support for this policy. He said that while General DeGaulle might have used independent expressions in his speech at Constantine, he felt certain that his policies remained the same.



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
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The President said he would be fortunate if he could find some caves because the underground excavations involved were very expensive.

The President laughed and said he had enough headaches right now without taking on Algeria, but this was typical of Khrushchev's attempts to divide the Western alliance. He did the same thing with us and he did it with the British.

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After further cordial amenities General DeGaulle took his leave of the President.

Vernon A. Walters



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4/25/60

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, 25 April 1960
Place -- The White House
Present --

The President	General DeGaulle
Secretary Herter	Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
Under Secretary Dillon	Ambassador Alphan
Ambassador Houghton	Mr. de Courcel
General Goodpaster	Mr. Lebel
Colonel Walters	



The President opened the conversation by saying that in their talks on the previous day, General DeGaulle and he were agreed on procedures for the summit; that General DeGaulle would write Mr. Khrushchev setting this forth and that they were in hopes of finishing by Sunday, but if not, the President might return from Portugal for the meeting. They had agreed that disarmament would be the major subject for discussion though there was a slight difference of approach between our way of approaching it and General DeGaulle's. General DeGaulle.....

..... He himself, in the light of Khrushchev's rejection of his open skies proposal at Geneva in 1955, wanted to start out more modestly with a limited area in which inspection techniques could be tested.

Secretary Herter then said that this would be tantamount to opening the whole of the Soviet Union to inspection,

The President said he could see no objection to making this proposal although he was not very optimistic about it being accepted, but that his proposal was something in the nature of a fallback position.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case NSC F91-601
NLE Case MR 91-11-22
by OJH NLE Date 8/13/91

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Secretary Herter asked whether this covered nuclear weapons and the President said that it did not; it involved delivery systems, as both he and General DeGaulle were agreed that the weapons themselves could easily be hidden, but it related only to the means of delivery.

The President then said that he did not see any reason why this should not be proposed.



The President said that in the field of contacts, he and General DeGaulle were agreeable to proposing that we might double present contacts, and if need be, triple them. We would have no difficulties in this field. He had once asked Mr. Hoover, head of the FBI, whether it would greatly increase his problem if we allowed in 10,000 Russian students instead of 40, and Mr. Hoover assured him that it would not. Secretary Herter pointed out that we had offered the Russians to exchange a large number of students and that they had found this awkward and had finally come up with 23.

General DeGaulle then said that though we might agree to increase exchanges, this did not mean that we would necessarily buy two or three times as much from them. For instance, France purchased a million tons of petroleum a year from them. Such a proposal did not mean France would be obligated to buy two million tons. Nevertheless, he said, Khrushchev always comes back to the subject of an increase in trade between the East and West. The President said that if we agreed on other things we could look into the problem of increasing trade.

Secretary Herter pointed out there are certain legislative limitations such as the Johnson Act.

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The President pointed out that if this type of provision were included in a formal treaty and it were ratified by the Senate, it would have over-riding effect and be the supreme law of the land. Secretary Dillon pointed out that what the Soviets were really after was long-term credits and that the Johnson Act limited these. Secretary Herter said he had one concern in this respect. If a declaration came from the summit advocating greater commercial exchanges, this might encourage other nations to send trade missions to Moscow and would, in turn, give the Soviets an opportunity to send large numbers of people to other countries to carry out subversive activities.



The President said that any statement covering an increase in East-West trade would have to be drafted very carefully.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville said that the real problem lay in the fact that the Soviets really don't have much to sell, and they have trouble in paying for what they do buy. Secretary Dillon said that the Soviets were driving for credits but we would rather see such credit, as it were available, go to help non-communist, under developed nations. General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev admits that they don't have much to sell now, but says that they were developing at a high rate and in a few years will have a great deal to sell. The President expressed then the view that the most we could do at the summit would be to appoint a committee to study what could be done to expand East-West trade, but that the matter of social and cultural exchanges would be no difficulty. General DeGaulle and the French Foreign Minister expressed their agreement.

On the matter of Germany, General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev had told him that Berlin constituted a dangerous situation. There was still fire in the ashes of World War II and this might flare up if not settled; that we must regulate the status of East Germany and West Berlin. He would never allow either of them to belong to Adenauer, but he did not insist that ~~East~~ West Berlin be a part of East Germany. It could become an international city under the United Nations' control with guaranteed access. General DeGaulle said he told Khrushchev that if he divided Germany permanently in this manner; if he treated Berlin as something apart; he would be rekindling that fire and creating, at least on the German side, a reason for war. He said he had asked Khrushchev why he brought up matters of this type if he really wanted relaxation of

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tensions. After all we had lived with the present situation in Berlin for 15 years; there was no reason why we could not go on for a further number of years.

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General DeGaulle said that when he told Khrushchev this bluntly he became less urgent and said that they could go along for two years, at the end of which, if no settlement had been reached, he (K) would have to sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, but in the meanwhile there would have to be some temporary arrangement on Berlin. General DeGaulle said that he had told Khrushchev that if he was trying to tell us that we would have to get out of Berlin at the end of two years the answer was "no go", and that as for his temporary arrangement on Berlin this would depend on what he was trying to put into it.

The President said that he felt that the background or theme we should operate against is that we believe in the self determination of peoples, and that we feel they should be allowed to express themselves freely concerning their own future; peoples of Berlin, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or other areas, and if we stress this constantly it will require considerable acrobatics on the part of Mr. Khrushchev to prove that he was right in trying to dispose in a dictatorial fashion of the people of West Berlin and East Germany. We should stress that we believe in this. General DeGaulle replied that we did believe in this, but he did not. The French President said that in order to relax tensions, if we made these proposals early in the Conference, it would prevent the discussion on Berlin and Germany from becoming venomous and acrimonious later on.

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General DeGaulle then said that in this same framework we might see if something could be done jointly to assist the under-developed nations. Even if we only accepted in principle and leave to a committee the task of working out the specific implementation.

The President pointed out that the Soviets have not supported such projects financially when undertaken under the aegis of the UN. For instance, their quota of the Special Fund was 15 million dollars and Secretary Dillon stated that they had only put in one million dollars. Their performance with regard to the Children's Fund was similar.

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General DeGaulle said that Khrushchev had expressed pessimistic views regarding the U.S. disposition and then pirating the President's proposal of 1953, he said he had proposed using part of the savings on disarmament to assist under-developed countries. The President again expressed doubts regarding the Soviet's disposition to do anything substantial, and General DeGaulle again expressed his desire to make some proposal in this area and try and work out the details.

Secretary Herter said that he was just a little concerned regarding the order in which the topics were discussed at the summit because if we reached agreement on a number of these things the Soviets might then become very tough on Berlin at the end of the Conference.

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General DeGaulle said that we should seize the initiative and say to the Russians "have you come here to seek a detente or not". If so, let's talk about disarmament and exchanges and perhaps joint assistance to the under-developed nations. He will, nevertheless, talk about Berlin, but perhaps not so violently.



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Secretary Herter expressed concern again concerning the Soviet's taking such earlier agreements as might have been reached for granted, and then become difficult on Berlin. General DeGaulle said that we should make it clear that all of the agreements were tied together and that if the Conference broke up over Berlin, anything that had been agreed earlier would not hold. For this reason he favored small meetings. On the first day, perhaps, the four chiefs of government alone and later the foreign ministers would join them. He felt that they should hold their meetings in the mornings, leaving the afternoons free for bi-lateral visits and exchanges, and at the end a large meeting could be held with ambassadors and other members of the delegation. He felt that private contacts with Khrushchev were effective. Both the President and General DeGaulle agreed that Khrushchev talked in a more reasonable fashion when he was alone and that the presence of other Soviets seemed to make him more intransigent. The President indicated that he would go to Lisbon on the 23rd,

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but might return if the Conference had not concluded. General DeGaulle said that he had hoped they might be finished by Saturday night, particularly if they had restricted meetings.

Washington

The President then asked about a communique and General DeGaulle said he was agreeable either way. The President said there was only one thing he would like to see included in the communique, and that was General DeGaulle's statement of September 16, 1959 on Algeria still stood, and he could use the occasion to reaffirm his support for the General's statement. General DeGaulle said he did not like to use the word Algeria, but in his speech to Congress he would express his belief that nations have the right to self determination in democracy.



The President said that sections of our press were indicating that General DeGaulle had hardened his stand and he knew this was not so in light of what the General had told him, and was merely seeking an occasion to reaffirm his support. General DeGaulle said that the last time he had told the President in advance that he would make the statement and the President had then expressed his support. He would make a statement to this effect in New York tomorrow and if the President wished to indorse, that it would be fine. Secretary Herter then asked about the communique and the President recalled that they had indicated on the previous day that a brief communique might be forthcoming.

General DeGaulle said that such a communique might say that these conversations had been useful in defining the position that they would take in common to go to the summit for the purpose of achieving a relaxation in the international situation. The President said he thought that would be helpful.

General DeGaulle indicated that he would pay a final call on the President the following morning with Madame DeGaulle, and the President said that he would receive them in the residence.

Secretary Herter again expressed concern that if in order to achieve relaxation of tension we gave Khrushchev everything he wanted early and then he got tough on Germany at the end, this would not be good. General DeGaulle said that there was a

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gamble involved and this was that Khrushchev did want to be known as the man who had relaxed tensions and that we would indicate that if the Conference broke up over Berlin, that nothing that had been agreed previously would stand. Secretary Herter said that we should not announce anything until the final communique, and General DeGaulle agreed with this and said that everything should remain open and connected until the final communique.

It was then agreed that Secretary Herter and Mr. Couve de Murville would meet immediately after lunch and work out a communique. Both the President and General DeGaulle expressed their agreement in advance to whatever communique was worked out by the Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister.

Vernon Walters
Colonel, U. S. Army



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4/26/60

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

26 April 1960

Dear General Norstad:

I am inclosing a copy of a presentation which General Loper gave to the Planning Board of the National Security Council today. This was in response to Mr. Gordon Gray's desire that the board acquire a better understanding of today's atomic arrangements with NATO and the United Kingdom. I prepared this presentation and did a "Texas Steal" from your SHAPE Special Ammunition Storage document. This was done to avoid people getting various interpretations of what they think is the situation. I have clipped the passages which may be of interest.

I am disturbed to find well meaning Indians in our State and Defense staffs who do not understand that your stockpile program is a most dynamic one which has just rounded the first curve with present focus on the straightaway.

In all my career there was one period in which my family and myself experienced a sincere feeling of a spirit of accomplishment and that was from 1954 through 1958. Jane joins me in sincere best wishes to you and Mrs. Norstad.

Sincerely yours,

Philip L. Hooper
Colonel, USA

Inclosure:

As indicated

General Lauris Norstad
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SHAPE Headquarters
Paris, France

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Authority	MR 90-10#1
By	JWS 12/13/90
NLE Date	

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Norstad MP 196 / Atomic - Nuclear Policy (2)

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4/26/60

PRESENTATION

by

HONORABLE HERBERT B. LOPER
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)

before

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PLANNING BOARD

on

TUESDAY, 26 APRIL 1960

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case <u>OSD 89-MDR-499</u>
NLE Case <u>90-10 # 2</u>
By <u>SP</u> NLE Date <u>1/12/50</u>

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
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Background Briefing on Increased Nuclear Sharing
With Our Allies


I have been asked to present certain facts as to existing nuclear weapons arrangements with our allies as background for further Planning Board consideration of "The Pros and Cons of Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies". A number of suggested questions on the subject were given to us and I believe the answers to these questions will unfold during the course of this presentation. I propose to cover the highlights of the legislative authority, the present arrangements with NATO, NATO atomic stockpile plans, and this in some detail, to include the state of military readiness currently attainable. I will outline the arrangements that are now in effect with individual countries :



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With the advance of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in this field as well as the maturing of the North Atlantic Alliance, the need for some sharing which would assist certain allies to prepare realistic defense plans and equip themselves for the employment of or defense against nuclear weapons became evident. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 consequently authorized limited sharing, inasmuch as the President might authorize transmission of information (only) with respect to planning and training to other nations or regional defense organizations, if they were making "substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security". These transmissions are limited in that no atomic information relating to design or fabrication of atomic weapons could be given except external characteristics (size, weight, shape), yields and effects. By 1958, a still greater degree of sharing became necessary in the national interest, and after careful review by the Executive Branch and the Congress, amendments to the law were enacted to permit an enlarged scope of cooperation, subject to Congressional concurrence, with other countries or regional organizations making "substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security", and on the basis of a Presidential determination that such cooperation "will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable

unreasonable risk to the common defense and security".
In determining the extent of cooperation with another
nation, the amended act differentiated between those
nations which had made substantial progress in the atomic
weapons field and all others.



the
scope of cooperation agreements the United States enters
into cannot exceed the transmission of information
necessary to train, plan, evaluate capabilities of
potential enemies, establish weapon compatibility with
carriers, and the transfer of non-nuclear parts of atomic
weapons systems exclusive of parts of atomic weapons.

So much for the legislative backdrop.

Now let us look at what applications have been made
under this legislative authority to NATO. Basically,
there are two:

(1) First

(1) First an agreement for cooperation regarding atomic information entered into and ratified by all the NATO countries in June, 1955, and,

(2) Second the NATO stockpile plan initiated in December, 1957.

The 1955 agreement regarding atomic information permits NATO, and specifically, the military rather than the political arm of the Alliance, to receive information necessary:

- (1) to develop defense plans;
- (2) to train personnel in the employment of and defense against nuclear weapons; and
- (3) to evaluate the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons.

The specific types of atomic information transmitted to NATO have been limited to the following:

- (1) For planning purposes, general magnitude of the number of atomic weapons, giving types, yields, and fuzing options, which will be made available to NATO commands.
- (2) The extent to which there is interchangeability of nuclear components among the various types of weapons.
- (3) Effects to be expected from the detonation of nuclear weapons under the various conditions of burst.

(4) General

*CP not
trained in
atomic
war*

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- (4) General description of basic safety features.
- (5) Weapons which can be carried by the different types of delivery vehicles.
- (6) The estimated military results to the extent that it will influence NATO planning in general terms, to be expected from the strategic air offensive.
- (7) Intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities for nuclear warfare.

This agreement has permitted the military planners within the Alliance to integrate atomic weaponry in their plans for the defense of Western Europe. Schools for officers of the international staffs have been and are operating under the auspices of SHAPE and EUCOM for the purpose of improving the atomic education level of subordinate commands within Allied Command Europe. -
So much for the information going to NATO.

The NATO atomic stockpile plan represents the second major step toward integrating an atomic capability within the forces of the Alliance. The plan was prepared pursuant to the communique issued by the North Atlantic Council after the December 1957 Heads of Government meeting in Paris which stated that the North Atlantic Council "decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads which would be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need." This decision was based upon the proposal that the United States "would deploy nuclear warheads under

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United States custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations directly concerned.

Now this proposal was no small offer. It is just now being really digested by our allies and, as you gentlemen well know, the metabolism rate varies considerably with the various NATO countries.

SACEUR and SACLANT's plans for implementation of the NATO stockpile give us a good insight as to the true military value of the United States proposal, and for a basic understanding of the package, they deserve a rather detailed look. These plans formulated by the allied staffs, and distributed to the Ministers of Defense and now in the process of implementation, assume that:

(1) NATO countries will have, in general, the atomic delivery units specified in the 1958 NATO Military Committee paper (MC-70).

(2) The second assumption is in addition to the forces listed in MC-70, there will be Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile squadrons which will require support by the NATO Special Ammunition Storage Program.

I will make direct

reference

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reference to the SACEUR's plan for this afternoons
background study.

SACEUR's concept of operations includes the following
and I will quote from his document because these are the
words being studied by our allies:

"(1) Atomic weapons allocations for this theater
are based upon stated requirements by SACEUR in support
of plans for the defense of Allied Command Europe.

"(2) On the basis of the SACEUR approved plans,
United States CINCEUR is requested to take action to
position the atomic weapons with custodial organizations
which are with or near the delivery forces in order that
the weapons may be readily available. Weapons will be
operationally assigned to commanders to support plans
on the basis of missions and tasks, delivery capability
and availability of weapons.

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"(4)

SACEUR will also coordinate his plans with those of commanders outside Allied Command Europe."

The plan focuses specific attention to the subjects of custody and security. The plan states: (and again I am quoting)

"(1) Custody is defined as the control of access to the atomic weapons. Custody will be maintained by United States personnel. (On the side, the understanding we and the Congress have as to custody is that United States custody requires that control of access to the weapons must be maintained to the extent that it would take an act of force to obtain either weapons or information concerning the weapons without proper authorization.)


"(2) Security is defined as protection against hostile elements of any nature. Security of atomic weapons will normally be the responsibility of the NATO country whose atomic delivery unit is being supported. This responsibility includes security of weapons in storage sites; weapons in transit between storage sites; and weapons in transit between shipment terminals and storage sites and supporting weapon maintenance facilities."

Now let us check the military readiness provided by the plan. Does it meet the criteria: "stocks of nuclear

weapons

weapons which would be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need" and are the allied forces going to be capable of carrying out their delivery mission? In the case of availability we can examine each of the delivery systems as spelled out in the SHAPE document.

"(a) Surface to surface missile and atomic capable artillery for support of land forces. (Applies to Honest John and Gun types).



(2) Limited maintenance, final assembly, and check-out will be performed at the custodial storage sites. Comprehensive maintenance will be performed at support sites within Allied Command Europe.

"(b) Maritime aircraft for atomic anti-submarine warfare.

(1) Anti-submarine

(1)

(2) Maintenance and check-out of the atomic warheads normally will be performed in the facilities within the custodial storage sites. Maintenance beyond the capabilities of these facilities will be performed in the United States.


"(c) Strike Squadrons

(1)

(2) Maintenance and check-out of the weapons normally will be performed in the facilities within the custodial storage sites. Maintenance beyond the capabilities of these facilities will be performed in the United States.


"(d) Surface-to-surface missiles of the MATADOR and MACE type.

(1)



(2) Maintenance, assembly and check-out of the warheads normally will be performed in the facilities within the custodial storage sites. Maintenance beyond the capabilities of these facilities will be performed in the United States.

"(e)




(2) Maintenance of atomic warheads and assembly into the missile nose cone will be performed within

within the surveillance and inspection building.

"(f) Air defense missiles of the NIKE HERCULES type.

(1)



(2) Mating, check-out, and limited maintenance of the atomic warheads will be performed at the launching sites. Comprehensive maintenance of the atomic warheads will normally be performed at support sites."

Of course, there is the other half to the military readiness picture and that is "are the allied forces going to be capable of performing their complete nuclear weapon delivery mission?" In this regard the training objective desired by SACEUR of the Allied Countries is that allied units must be capable of performing their complete atomic delivery mission starting with their pick up of the weapon at the gate of the United States custodial site. This involves a training program which provides training on ground handling, loading, testing, and in-flight monitoring as appropriate to insure the

success

success of the mission. It is in this training area that the legal authority in the form of bilateral agreements plays a major role in the transmission of information applicable for the respective systems. We will look at these more closely in a few minutes.

To go on with SACEUR's plan, it outlines the following general procedures for establishing storage sites for support of Allied Command Europe atomic delivery units:

"(a) SHAPE furnishes the overall plan and operational guidance to the Major Subordinate Commanders and prepares construction criteria for the sites.

"(b) The Major Subordinate Commanders select the general locations of custodial storage sites. United States CINCEUR selects the general locations of support and depot sites.

"(c) SACEUR informs the Ministers of Defense of NATO countries of the plan and forwards construction criteria.

"(d) SHAPE includes sites in current recommended NATO common infra-structure programs.

"(e) Major Subordinate Commanders make detailed arrangements with host nations, user nations, and the United States concerning the exact location of sites, security, construction, communications, and operation of sites during peacetime, periods of alert and hostilities in accordance with the guidance provided by SHAPE.

Finally,

"(f) Host nations, user nations and United States conclude separate agreements as required on training, personnel, administration and housing, logistical support and related aspects."



It is the requirement of this last step that leads us to the United States bilateral agreement with the individual countries participating in the stockpile plan.

This chart (#1) covers the types of atomic agreements which represent the final step in permitting the full implementation of the NATO stockpile plans by the participating countries. In other words, once the particular country has the delivery means, these agreements permit the appropriate training, necessary arrangements for the weapons, and further, permit the country to attain a complete stockpile to target capability. The present status of each of these agreements with the NATO nations is shown on this chart. (#2)


Up to this point we have covered NATO applications only, and, in brief, the above applications are based on the transmission of atomic information and the transfer of non-nuclear parts of weapons systems.

In summarizing the NATO situation we can say that:

Without clouding the issue with national political aspirations, if a NATO nation is sincerely interested in attaining the ability to use nuclear weapons effectively, SACEUR's plan which I have just covered gives her just this. The price is the presence of detachments of custodial personnel with the country's delivery units and SACEUR's control of use in the defense of the Alliance.



pk excerpted



..... arrangements,
we can relate these to specific hardware applications
underway with the individual countries as shown on this
chart. (#3 and #4).


This next chart (#5) gives us a view of the particular
weapons compatible with the delivery systems. Note that
these include our most modern systems.

Included in the suggested questions you furnished us,
Mr. Gray, was one inquiring as to problems in this overall
area. There are as can be expected in a program of this
magnitude, day to day problems created by the scarcity of
available land for custodial sites particularly on the
continent; the numbers of United States personnel required;
and certainly some language difficulties. However, I
would like to point to two separate areas that may need
consideration. The first pertains to the military

necessity



*Obv. mostly
pre-deleg.*

necessity for immediate reaction to a threat. Although




The second and final area goes beyond the immediate military needs and addresses itself to the question of increased nuclear sharing. This sharing could take either or both of the following forms.

*plg exempted - observation
or pay*



The United States can provide an adequate quantity and quality of nuclear weapons to cover actual needs for deterrence or defense.



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TYPES OF ATOMIC AGREEMENTS

1. RELEASE OF INFORMATION AND TRANSFER
OF ATOMIC MATERIAL.

2. STOCKPILE - INTRODUCTION AND STORAGE
OF WEAPONS; CUSTODY, SECURITY
AND RELEASE OF WEAPONS;
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS. DETAILS
PECULIAR TO EACH U.S. SUPPORTING
MILITARY SERVICE; HOUSING, MESSING,
TRANSPORTATION, ETC.

April 28, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 442nd Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, April 28, 1960

Present at the 442nd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State (Henderson); the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Acting Attorney General (Walsh); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the meeting were the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (LeMay), the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President (Aurand); the Staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee - Lt. General Thomas F. Hickey, USA (Ret), Director; Brig. General Paul S. Ehrick, USAF, Deputy Director; Colonel Kenneth R. Dyer, USA, Chief of Staff; Colonel Lloyd D. Chapman, USAF; Capt. Edward L. Dashiell, USN; Capt. Eugene B. Fluckey, USN; Colonel William J. Hovde, USAF; William C. Matthias, Colonel Richard Rothwell, USMC; Colonel Yale H. Wolfe, USA; CWO William A. Barbee, USA; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. REPORT BY THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
(NSC Actions Nos. 1260, 1330, 1430, 1463, 1532, 1641, and 1815; NSC 5816; NSC Action No. 2009)

Mr. Gray said that today the 1959 Report submitted by the Council's Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5816, would be the subject of an oral presentation by members of the Subcommittee Staff. He recalled that under the terms of the Presidential Directive in NSC 5816, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was established as part of a permanent procedure "to

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	<u>NSC 581-1057</u>
NLE Case	<u>MR 80-361 #9</u>
By	<u>DJH</u> NLE Date <u>1/18/81</u>


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
provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury on the continental U.S., and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter these net capabilities."

Mr. Gray said the Subcommittee report for 1959 would ordinarily have been presented toward the close of 1959 but that the presentation was delayed until this spring because of the need for completion of the "targeting" study (APPRAISAL OF RELATIVE MERITS, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE, OF ALTERNATIVE RETALIATORY EFFORTS) presented to the Council on February 12, 1960.

Mr. Gray noted that the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman of the Subcommittee), the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairmen of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Lt. General Thomas F. Hickey, USA (Ret.), Director of the Staff of the Subcommittee, was also present for the presentation. Mr. Gray asked General Twining whether he had anything to add to this introduction.



Pages 3 through 6 exempted in their entirety.



Mr. Gray wondered whether the Council should now consider arrangements to provide continuity of the Subcommittee and the Subcommittee Staff. The President said this question need not be decided at this time.


The Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff then withdrew from the meeting.

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The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the Annual Report for 1959 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5816, as presented orally by the Director and other members of the Subcommittee Staff.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

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Mr. Dulles thought there was little doubt that Syngman Rhee's resignation would be accepted by the Korean National Assembly, which would become responsible for solving the crisis in the Republic of Korea. Huh Chung, who had recently been appointed Foreign Minister, was now acting as President of Korea in accordance with Korean constitutional processes providing for the succession to the Presidency of the Foreign Minister upon the death or resignation of the President and Vice President. Mr. Dulles reported that American observers had a high regard for Huh Chung, who was a former mayor of Seoul and a friend of President Rhee. Huh Chung had displayed a great deal of competence in recent negotiations with Japan. Mr. Henderson added that Huh Chung had shown a genuine desire to reach an agreement with the Japanese in the recent negotiations, contrary to the attitude displayed by President Rhee. Continuing, Mr. Dulles said the Korean populace might be aroused to take further mob action if it feels that reforms are proceeding too slowly. At present the attitude of the Korean population is very friendly toward the U.S. Mr. Dulles was of the opinion that the U. S. Ambassador to Korea handled the situation with great skill.

Mr. Dulles reported that our Ambassador and General Magruder had been cheered in Korea. The President was not sure that the applause of the Korean crowd was an unmingled blessing. He said this applause could easily turn to condemnation as soon as we did something the crowds did not like. Mr. Henderson agreed that it was dangerous to allow mobs to have an influence on decisions. The Vice President asked whether our activities in Korea had made us, in the minds of the people, responsible for the new Korean government. The President said we had warned Rhee about the consequences of his course of action. However, he (the President) was not aware that we were about to be made responsible in the eyes of the Korean people for the change in the Korean government. Mr. Dulles did not believe that the Korean crowds did give us credit for the change in the Korean government.

Turning to Turkey, Mr. Dulles reported that that country might find itself in a critical situation sometime during

the next few years. Since early 1960 the opposition party in Turkey, the Republican People's Party of ex-President Ismet Inonu, has been increasingly oppressed by the government. Some questions have arisen as to the validity of the last election in Turkey, although the situation is not as bad as it was in Korea. The Turkish Government has now appointed a committee to investigate subversive activities. This committee, exercising wide powers, has been moving against Inonu and his party. Mr. Dulles felt this problem required careful consideration by the U.S. Government in the future. The Turkish Army was probably behind the government; however, there was a strong popular feeling in favor of Inonu. Unless constitutional procedures are more carefully followed in Turkey, a situation similar to that now existing in Korea might develop. The Inonu Party may attempt demonstrations at the time of the NATO Council Meeting in Istanbul.

Mr. Dulles anticipated that May Day in Cuba would bring forth mass demonstrations in support of Castro. The Cuban Government may nationalize sugar mills and refineries and may make an attack on the Panama Canal policy of the U.S. A meeting of "democratic political personalities" planned for Havana will include a great many Left-Wingers, including Carlton Beals and assorted draft dodgers from the U.S., all of whom will be going to Havana at Cuban expense. Some of the high-ranking Cuban communists will spend May Day in Peiping. Soviet tankers and cargo ships will soon arrive in Cuban ports. In fact one Soviet tanker has already unloaded fuel oil in Cuba. Some of the leading U.S. petroleum companies doing business in Cuba expect they will shortly be faced with a demand that they process Soviet crude oil. The READERS DIGEST, which produces its Latin American edition in Cuba, is about to write a story on Guevara and anticipates that as a result its copy will be seized. The DIGEST is moving its operations out of Cuba.

Mr. Dulles reported that in Indonesia the Army, in Sukarno's absence, was supporting an anti-Sukarno campaign. Mr. Dulles, however, doubted that Nasution would make any move toward taking over the government from Sukarno even though Nasution is undoubtedly quite disturbed at the situation in Indonesia. Mr. Dulles said that one of the salient features of the Indonesian situation was the fact that the economy was slowly deteriorating.

In Laos, Mr. Dulles noted, conservative and anti-communist candidates won an overwhelming victory in the recent election. However, the Laotian Army probably became over-enthusiastic in several places and may have rigged the elections in some districts. Mr. Dulles believed the anti-communists would have won the election without any rigging. However, the organization of

of a new government would be difficult because the anti-communists, although united in opposition to communism, are split among themselves in all other matters.

Mr. Dulles reported that the collectivization program in East Germany appeared to be backfiring to such an extent that embarrassment for the East German regime might be created on the eve of the Summit Meeting. During the week of April 13-19 5400 East German refugees crossed the line into West Berlin or West Germany, in contrast to the normal average of 8000 per month. This represented the highest level of refugee exodus from East Germany since 1956.

Mr. Dulles believed the Arab boycott of U.S. shipping in the Middle East would probably take place. Thus far we have been unable to convince the Arab states that the U.S. Government does not have legal authority to prevent picketing in this country of the UAR ship CLEOPATRA. [.....]

[.....]

Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR and Communist China were conducting a kind of debate through public pronouncements in their journals on communist ideology. Both sides were quoting freely from Lenin. Three principal ideological points appeared to be at issue. The first point concerned the inevitability of war. The Chinese Communists say war is inevitable as long as imperialism exists and maintain that the "socialist camp" will win such wars as occur. The Soviets, on the other hand, maintain that the strength of the Bloc is now so great that the theory of inevitable war may be cast aside in favor of "peaceful competition". A second point at issue concerns the peaceable intentions of the West. The Chinese Communists maintain that the West is increasing its military preparations. They say that since general war with the Sino-Soviet Bloc would be fatal for the imperialist powers, the U.S. is planning to use its military forces to fight limited war. The Soviets, on the other hand, say that the U.S. is seeking peace. A third point concerns the possibility of peaceful co-existence. The Chinese Communists maintain that the capitalist powers are now tottering on the brink of destruction to such an extent that an aggressive policy by the communist world would complete the disintegration of the West. The Soviets, on the other hand, maintain that an aggressive policy by the communist powers would rally the West to make a final desperate effort. Mr. Dulles believed this doctrinal dispute indicated that the

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Chinese Communists feel a detente would be to their disadvantage. They fear that an agreement for the maintenance of the status quo in the West might lead to an agreement for maintenance of the status quo in Asia, thus blocking their aggressive desires.

Mr. Dulles believed it was necessary to watch carefully the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Sixty additional fighter planes, probably MIG-17s, had been moved from other parts of China to airfields near the Taiwan Strait recently. The Watch Committee, although noting that the Chinese Nationalists are concerned about the situation, believes that the Chinese Communists do not intend immediate military activity against Taiwan. Of course the Chinese Communists have the capability of initiating an attack in the Taiwan Strait with little or no warning. Mr. Dulles thought it was possible that the Chinese Communists might decide to engage in some military activity in the region of the Taiwan Strait in order to put diplomatic pressure on the USSR in connection with the Summit Meeting.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to recent developments in the Soviet space program; intelligence activities by Soviet fishing trawlers; the situations in the Republic of Korea, Turkey, Cuba, Indonesia, Laos, and the Taiwan Strait; the East German collectivization program; possible Arab boycott of U.S. shipping; and Sino-Soviet ideological differences.



MARION W. BOGGS

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FILE MR Case No. 98-335

Document No. 1

4/22/60

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Retain class'n Change/classify to _____
 With concurrence of DAE
 Declassify In part and excise as shown
EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)
FPC/HDR by gdl 6/11/95

April 28, 1960

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MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
April 22, 1960

Others present: Chairman McCone, General Goodpaster

Mr. McCone said that, while in France the previous week, he had met for forty-five minutes with President de Gaulle. The latter was in a good frame of mind. He had just returned from his meeting in England which had gone very well. He said President de Gaulle had told him that he and Khrushchev had agreed that the best way to eliminate nuclear weapons is to eliminate their means of delivery. De Gaulle had also told him that Khrushchev had recognized controls must accompany disarmament. He said de Gaulle had told him the two had discussed the question of conventional armaments in relation to atomic armaments and Khrushchev had said he would carry disarmament to the point where only a limited conventional force was left. Mr. McCone said General de Gaulle had asked him whether, if the Summit meeting were to end successfully, we would give the Soviets information about our atomic weapons. Mr. McCone told him that our law would not permit this.



Mr. McCone said General de Gaulle next asked him what, if anything, he thought the United States and French might do at this time regarding the provision of atomic weapons to France. Mr. McCone told him that he felt that the time was inappropriate to try to do anything. He said General de Gaulle agreed with him that the time is not suitable, now or in the near future, and that he felt the French must go ahead themselves with this development. The President commented that we are forcing other countries to become nuclear powers. Our laws are based on an incorrect premise that we have, and can continue to have, a monopoly. The Belgians, the Italians, the Germans, Swedes, even the Turks will want to develop their own. Mr. McCone said that the French atomic authorities informed him

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.4(b)
MR 95-335-01
BY gdl DATE 1/10/96

that the Indians are working up an atomic establishment of their own.

The President said he has become more concerned about the consequences of testing on the human body. He felt that our scientists may have been too rosy regarding the possibilities of damage to the world. Mr. McCone said he would not, knowing what he does now, recommend resumption of testing in the atmosphere.

Mr. McCone said that General de Gaulle had expressed gratitude for our help with regard to peaceful uses of the atom.



Mr. McCone said he had held several talks with members of the French atomic commissariat and the Foreign Office. The former say that they are aiming at an output of about 100 kg. of plutonium per year, but this may run higher. In addition, they are building atomic power plants, the operation of which will, in two or three years, double or triple this figure. They showed Mr. McCone a gaseous diffusion model plant which should produce 2000 to 3000 kgs. of U-235 each year. They told him they are exploring underground methods of testing, and know that they must continue testing if they want to have effective, reliable weapons. He said he was much impressed by what he saw but that it is very expensive, and that they are finding it so. The President commented that if the French are to test, they should keep the tests underground.

Mr. McCone said the French asked whether they could send a team to study our underground testing techniques. Mr. McCone told them that now is not the time to do so, but that he thought this could be done later, particularly if we go forward with a program of seismic research using atomic explosions. In addition, he said the French asked whether we would send a team to France to evaluate whether they have now made "substantial" progress in the sense of the provision in the Atomic Energy Act. Mr. McCone said he told them that, under the history of the law, this is not the case. With regard to the atomic submarine, he recalled that we broke off negotiations on this when

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the French withdrew their fleet from NATO. He said the French told him that they would not agree to suspend the atomic tests without destruction of existing atomic inventories on the part of other countries being carried out. He said the French gave strong indication they would like to stop work on the gaseous diffusion plant and buy U-235 from us. He noted they had not wished to do this a year ago. In reply he said he told them that there is more chance of doing this than of making any of the other kinds of exchanges. The President commented that he had understood from Mr. Herter that the law prohibits doing this. Mr. McCone said he did not think a change in the law would be required. It is a matter of a determination which is then subject to being voted down by the Congress. He concluded by saying that he had given them a little encouragement with regard to this particular possibility.



A. J. Goodpaster
A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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US/IC/9

Approved by White House 5/16
Approved by S 5/16
Approved by M 5/15

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
Paris, May, 1960

1994/1063

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION



Date: May 15, 1960
Time: 2:30 p.m.
Place: Elysee Palace

Participants:

United States

The President
Secretary Herter
Under Secretary Merchant
Colonel Walters

France

President de Gaulle
Prime Minister Debre
Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville
Mr. Andronikov (interpreter)
Mr. Stakovich (interpreter)

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Macmillan
Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
Sir Anthony Ambold

Federal Republic of Germany

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister von Brentano
Dr. Carstens

Subject: Meeting of Western Chiefs of State and Heads of Government with Chancellor Adenauer.

Copies to:

White House
S/S
G - Mr. Hare
EUR - Mr. Kohler
Embassy London - Amb. Whitney

Embassy Paris - Amb. Houghton
Embassy Moscow - Amb. Thompson
Embassy Bonn - Amb. Dowling

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By HJ
Date 12/16/92
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GENERAL DE GAULLE said that they were met together to discuss problems of Germany and Berlin which would be taken up at the Summit if there were a Summit. He wished to welcome them to this meeting.

THE PRESIDENT then said he felt that inasmuch as the Chancellor was present he might wish to suggest subjects for discussion.

CHANCELLOR ADENAUER said that this was a problem of general interest and that there were two points relating to policy.

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First, the problem of Germany as a whole and the problem of Berlin. Khrushchev had tried to separate the Berlin problem from that of Germany as a whole. The Soviet purpose was to dominate all of Germany and we should remember that if this were to occur it would upset the whole equilibrium in Europe. This matter had been exhaustively discussed by him, the Foreign Ministers, and in the NATO Council. He would like to emphasize his strong feeling that Khrushchev should not be allowed to make Germany and Berlin the principal subject of this Summit meeting. He felt that we should put major emphasis on disarmament. The German problem is not the only problem in the world. There are others in Korea, Red China and elsewhere. These can only be solved through progress in disarmament because only by such progress can we establish the atmosphere of confidence and trust which is essential.

GENERAL DE GAULLE then noted that the Chancellor had made two particular points, namely that the Western powers not allow Berlin to become the chief topic at the Summit meeting, but that disarmament should be the major topic. If progress were made on disarmament, this could lead to a detente. He had pointed out that the Soviets wished to dominate Germany and thereby enhance the position of the Soviet bloc.

THE PRESIDENT then said he would like to ask whether the Chancellor had read Khrushchev's latest proposal on Berlin, and, if so, did he have any comments.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that this was the one relating to a temporary arrangement at the end of which there would have to be a change in the status of Berlin, and if Khrushchev obtained our agreement to this even tacitly he would have part of the cake.

THE CHANCELLOR jokingly said he did not know whether this was really Khrushchev's last proposal. There had been several of these last proposals. He fully agreed with General de Gaulle that at the end of two years Khrushchev would have part of the cake.

THE PRESIDENT said that in this paper of Khrushchev's he did note one element which seemed new to him, and this was the fact that Khrushchev seemed willing to concede that West Berlin could make any political-economic arrangements that it wanted with other countries (except of course military arrangements). At Geneva he had been unwilling to agree to this and this seemed perhaps one advance by Khrushchev.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that at Geneva, where he had not been present -- he felt Khrushchev had not excluded relationships of the free city with outside states and organizations but he had made it quite plain that he would not allow West Berlin to belong to the German Federal Republic.

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THE PRESIDENT said that he had read this paper rather hurriedly on the plane and the Secretary added that it was an English translation from a French translation of a Russian original.

General DE GAULLE said he felt what Khrushchev wanted was a city which would belong to no one and accepted the fact that it would not belong to the German Democratic Republic.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had understood in this latest note that Khrushchev had withdrawn his objections to a political link with the Federal Republic.

General DE GAULLE said that he felt Khrushchev had made it plain on many occasions that he would not allow the city of West Berlin to belong to the Federal Republic but in any case they could ask him.

THE PRESIDENT said that the worst part of the paper was the end of it where it was indicated that at the end of the two-year period there must be a new status for the city.

THE CHANCELLOR said that he was very fearful that if there were any such two-year undertaking that there would be a flight of people and capital from West Berlin, that the city would be weakened both in its economic life and in its spirit, and would no longer have the same will to resist pressures from the East.

THE PRESIDENT said that he would like to ask one question which bothered him, and it was this. If, for instance, we are unable to find a satisfactory solution for the Berlin problem over a period of ten years and we maintain our juridical rights, what could the East do to strangle West Berlin economically by tightening down on communications and trade by means short of war. Khrushchev could allow us to maintain our juridical position but create great difficulties for the city itself.

THE CHANCELLOR replied with some animation that the President had spoken of a ten-year period. This was very different from the two years proposed. The great difference lay in the fact that in ten years it is probable that some decision will be taken on disarmament and if that is so, the situation in Europe will be completely changed both for the East and for the West. In such an atmosphere the same importance will not be attached to Berlin. There is a great difference between ten years and two years. The situation in ten years will be very different from what it is now. Khrushchev was using West Berlin as a lever in the cold war to impair the prestige of the free world. In an atmosphere of detente resulting from progress on disarmament it would be relatively easy to solve the Berlin problem.

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THE PRESIDENT said that perhaps he had not made himself sufficiently clear. He would withdraw the mention of the ten-year term, but we must face practical facts, whether it was over one, two or five years. If we maintain our juridical position in Berlin and keep our troops and supply them, what would happen if the Soviets were indirectly to try to strangle the city, using all possible means while technically leaving open our single access to the city. This is a practical problem we have to face.

THE CHANCELLOR said he did not believe that Khrushchev would start a war by strangling Berlin. He also believed that Khrushchev knows that in such a war there would be neither victor nor vanquished. In two speeches he had made great promises to the Soviet people and he himself was deeply committed to an expansion of the Soviet economy. If he were unable to do this, it would produce unforeseeable consequences for him. It was well to remember that he was first of all a Russian Nationalist and only after that a Communist. The Chancellor apologized for mentioning this, but Khrushchev knew that the Americans were not as ill-informed concerning the Soviet Union as he had thought, and he did not believe that Khrushchev would do anything that would jeopardize the existence of Russia. He was confident that Khrushchev would not start a war over Berlin.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that in seeking to arrive at a relaxation of tensions it was logical to start talking about disarmament. If he really wants a detente, progress can be made. If not, he can harass us on the issue of Berlin.

PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN said that he would like to know what the answer was to the President's question. We had a legal right to keep our troops in Berlin and to supply them and the population we are supposed to be occupying. The President had asked what would happen if by measures short of war such as saying that the roads were not working, the canals had fallen in, that the roads and bridges were in poor repair, pressure was put on West Berlin.

THE PRESIDENT said he agreed. He would like to know what our rights were. Did they include the right of West Berlin to make a living? He felt that we might be able to keep the channel for the supply open but that the city could be put in a difficult economic situation.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that Khrushchev could indeed do this but he could not do it if he wants a detente. We should stand on our rights. He shared the Chancellor's belief that any backing down in Berlin would be a grave blow to the prestige of the West.

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THE PRESIDENT said he shared that belief but was trying to figure out what we could do. Any soldier in facing war would have to seek another answer. By what means could we keep the people of Berlin healthy, happy and prosperous? He agreed that we are not weakening in our position in maintaining our juridical rights. Khrushchev must want relaxation of tensions. Otherwise he could not see a real answer on the problem of Berlin.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that the geographical situation of West Berlin is very awkward but we had lived with it for a long time and we could still live with it.

THE PRESIDENT said that he didn't know about anybody else, but he himself was getting older. General de Gaulle replied "You don't look it."

THE CHANCELLOR said that he agreed with General de Gaulle. If Khrushchev really wants a detente, Berlin will not be an acute problem. If he does not, it can become very disagreeable. He had recently made a trip to Japan and he hoped he would have occasion to talk to them later about it. People in Asia were following very closely what was happening between East and West and any loss of prestige for the West, in Europe in particular, would have grave repercussions in Asia. General

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that he did not like the intimation that in two years the status of Berlin had to be changed. To accept a practical arrangement, leaving our rights untouched, was something else again.

PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN inquired what was meant by the statute of Berlin (he had misunderstood "status" to mean "statute"), and GENERAL DE GAULLE explained this.

THE PRIME MINISTER then went on to say that the last Soviet proposal was impossible. At Geneva the West had proposed a temporary arrangement following which the discussion would continue, and this had been better. It had not been bad.

THE CHANCELLOR said he would like to remind Mr. Macmillan that the status of Berlin was rather clearly set forth in the treaties signed in New York in May 1949 and Paris in June 1949, ending the Berlin blockade. The Soviets undertook clear obligations thereunder and if they were now able unilaterally to repudiate these, what faith could we have in any new arrangement with them.

try to answer my question is: does our policy have any effect on the choice indicated by the underlined

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THE PRESIDENT wondered whether Khrushchev had brought up with any of them the question of the borders of Germany. Not long ago he had seen the Deputy Prime Minister of Poland in Washington who had indicated that if the United States would guarantee the borders of Poland, this would lead to a great lessening of tension. The President said that he could not discuss this without speaking with his ally, the Federal Republic, but he wondered if the matter had been brought up with any of the others. The Deputy Prime Minister had implied that the Berlin situation would be eased and relations with the Federal Republic improved.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that Khrushchev had indicated to him that it would be nice if the Western powers were to recognize the German-Polish border, but that it did not make any real difference if they did not. France hoped that at the opportune time it would be possible to improve relations between Poland and the German Federal Republic. General de Gaulle then said they were all aware of the fact that the Summit meeting itself was open to question.

THE PRESIDENT said that it looked as if Khrushchev was trying to put him in the dock and GENERAL DE GAULLE said he had already started trying.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that Khrushchev would talk to Mr. Macmillan in the meantime and they would meet later.

THE PRESIDENT asked whether they thought he would go through with his threat. He hoped that no one was under the illusion that he would crawl on his knees to Mr. Khrushchev.

GENERAL DE GAULLE smiled and said that no one was under that illusion.

THE PRESIDENT wondered whether he would go immediately to Moscow or not.

GENERAL DE GAULLE said that Khrushchev would be seeing Mr. Macmillan this afternoon and they would all meet thereafter but he felt the sense of responsibility for the conference.

The conference then concluded.

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MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE
AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
Paris, May 1960



Contingency Position Paper

Bilateral Discussions of President and Chancellor Adenauer

1. Summit Discussion of Germany and Berlin (the President may wish to raise)

Recommended U. S. Position

The President might state that he is satisfied, after reviewing the preparatory work for the Summit, that the Western Heads of Government are reasonably well prepared for discussing the question of Germany including Berlin with Khrushchev. He might note that the solidarity of the Western alliance on the question is exemplified by the May 3 NAC communique. With respect to the question of Germany in its larger aspects, he might comment that the proposal for an all-German plebiscite strikes him as an effective way of emphasizing the basic issue of self-determination. With respect to Berlin, he might observe that there is little reason to expect any real agreement at the Summit but that he hopes the edge can be taken off the crisis by deterring unilateral Soviet action and possibly smoothing the way for further discussions. The President might remind the Chancellor that, since the treatment of Germany including Berlin at the Summit will be essentially a tactical problem, the Western Powers must maintain a certain amount of negotiating flexibility. At the same time, he might reassure the Chancellor that the determination of the United States to continue to press for German reunification and to maintain the freedom and security of West Berlin in the interim remains as firm as ever.

Anticipated German Position

The Chancellor will probably regard his meeting with the President as an opportunity for an eleventh-hour admonition about the importance of maintaining a firm

Western position

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Western position on Germany and Berlin. He may express some uneasiness about the possibility of Prime Minister Macmillan's diverging from the Western position as developed by the Four Power Working Group and the Foreign Ministers. The Chancellor would undoubtedly be reassured if the President commented along the lines of the recommended U.S. position above.

Discussion

See "U. S. Position on Working Group Report on Germany Including Berlin" (SMP D-2/1).

2. Norstad Plan (the Chancellor might raise)

Anticipated German Position

The Chancellor may express strong objections, on political grounds, to a European inspection zone of the type proposed by General Norstad and express the hope that the proposal may be regarded as dead.

Recommended U. S. Position

The President might reply that he recognizes some of the Allies have strong political objections to the proposal. Although he considers that the plan could have military advantages, he understands the political objections and is not suggesting agreement on a proposal of this nature for possible use at the Summit.

Discussion

See separate position paper "Norstad Plan" (SMP D-1/2).

3. Intelligence Flight over Soviet Union (the Chancellor may raise)

Anticipated German Position

It is possible that the Chancellor may allude to the shooting down of the U.S. plane on an intelligence mission over the Soviet Union and express his understanding of the reasons why such flights are regarded as necessary.

Recommended U. S. Position

It is doubtful that the President would have to do more than take note of the Chancellor's comments.

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4. Plight of Evangelical Church in Soviet Zone (the Chancellor may raise)

Anticipated German Position

The Chancellor may refer to the difficult situation of the Evangelical Church in the Soviet Zone and mention in particular the likelihood of new efforts by the Communist regime to put financial pressures on the Church.

Recommended U. S. Position

The President might reply that he agrees that such a development would be serious, for he regards the Evangelical Church as one of the most important remaining bonds between the people of West and East Germany. He might add that we will inform the appropriate American officials about the Chancellor's comments and ask them to consider what assistance they might be able to give.

Drafted by: GPA - Mr. McKiernan Cleared by:

- GER - Mr. Hillenbrand
- EUR - Mr. Davis
- C - Mr. Achilles
- M - Mr. Merchant

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* May 25, 1960
* Berlin * 5/25/60

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 445th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Tuesday, May 24, 1960

Present at the 445th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director and the Deputy Director (Staats), Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency (Washburn); the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy, National Security Affairs, Science and Technology, and Security Operations Coordination; the Under Secretary of State (Dillon); the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John W. Irwin, II; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency (Item 1); the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Bryce Harlow, Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES

The President said that this day was the anniversary of the death of John Foster Dulles. He had sent a note to Mrs. Dulles telling her that the Council remembered Mr. Dulles and held him in high respect. The President suggested that the Record of Actions contain a notation along these lines.

The National Security Council:

Noted that the President was writing a letter to Mrs. John Foster Dulles today, telling her that all members of the National Security Council were remembering the former Secretary of State on this first anniversary of his death, and his great service to this Council.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case NSC F89-1060
NLE Case 78-229-48
By JLB NLE Date 1/12/91

U.S. Mr. Staats said Kosygin was coming here before Mr. Stans visited the Soviet Union. The President said that in that case, he believed it was desirable to wait and see whether Kosygin came. He thought we did not have to formulate a general policy but should be able to handle high-level visits on an ad hoc basis. Secretary Herter said he understood that in any case we would not for the present interfere with the visits of lesser officials or with the travel of private citizens.

Secretary Herter said another issue was the question of resumption or continuation of the nuclear test agreement negotiations. The scientists in Geneva were continuing their international discussions without interruption. He believed that we should continue these negotiations.

Another issue concerned disarmament. The representatives of the Five Western Powers involved in the disarmament negotiations are meeting on May 30 and an East-West disarmament meeting is scheduled for June 7. Secretary Herter believed we should maintain our position with respect to disarmament and continue to participate in the Geneva negotiations, although he believed these negotiations would prove to be sterile and futile, with the USSR stubbornly adhering to its position in preparation for bringing the matter up as a propaganda exercise in the UN General Assembly this fall. The President agreed with the views expressed by Secretary Herter, saying that the Soviets not the U.S. should be the ones to make the nuclear test negotiations or the disarmament negotiations futile.

Mr. McCone said the nuclear test suspension negotiations differed from the disarmament negotiations in that a mere extension of the nuclear test talks keeps the U.S. in a strait-jacket. He felt we ought to press for decisions on nuclear testing. If no agreement is reached, the USSR can keep us at the conference table indefinitely while the moratorium on nuclear testing continues. Secretary Herter agreed that the nuclear test suspension negotiations did bring up the whole question of the moratorium on nuclear testing. He also agreed that the U.S. could not continue the Geneva negotiations indefinitely because such a continuation would mean that the USSR is obtaining a moratorium on nuclear testing without giving up anything in return. The President said we must eventually set a time limit for completion of the nuclear test negotiations.

Secretary Herter felt we must continue contingency planning with respect to Berlin, particularly with respect to the possibility that the Soviets might put pressure on the Berlin economy. The President believed it would be desirable to ask for an intelligence estimate on the possibility of Soviet pressure on

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the Berlin economy. He had raised this question with Adenauer but had not been able to elicit a satisfactory response. The President wondered what the Soviets could do to Berlin as a city while remaining within the letter of the international agreements respecting Germany and Berlin. The Berlin airlift of 1949 had barely kept the population of Berlin alive. The President did not know what action we would take if the Soviets cut off Berlin's trade and restricted all transportation to one road. Adenauer always says we must preserve our juridical position. The President felt that we might end up preserving our juridical position while losing Berlin.

Secretary Herter said that economic counter-measures to be taken by the West in the event of Soviet pressure on Berlin's economy were very important. We must have a clear understanding with our allies whether or not they will take economic counter-measures against the Soviet Bloc even at the sacrifice of their trade with East Germany. Mr. Gray asked whether Mr. Merchant's Contingency Planning Group was studying this economic question. Mr. Herter answered in the affirmative. Mr. Gray then reminded the Council that when the existing Berlin crisis first arose, a Contingency Planning Group had been constituted under the chairmanship of Mr. Murphy, who had been succeeded by Mr. Merchant.

Secretary Gates said he had spent two hours on Saturday going over the military contingency planning for Berlin. Unhappily, he found this planning in an unsatisfactory state because the military planning depended at every stage on political decisions which had not yet been made. There was not even a specified commander for Berlin, the appointment of such a commander being dependent on political decisions. Thus while military plans exist, they are, in Secretary Gates' view, really ineffective because so much time would be required to obtain political decisions in the event of Soviet action against Berlin. Secretary Gates wondered whether some political decisions could not be obtained in advance.

Secretary Herter said that if we pressed the British too far in connection with political decisions, the British were inclined to begin thinking over much about the possibility of general war over Berlin. The President said Macmillan had said to him: "Do you want the British to go to war for two million of the people we twice fought wars against and who almost destroyed us?"

Secretary Herter believed the Communists would be increasingly aggressive in the Far East during the coming period, particularly in North Vietnam, North Korea, and the Taiwan Strait. The Russians

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would probably encourage diversionary Communist activity in the Far East and we should be particularly alert for any signs of such activity.

Secretary Herter then turned to the question of enhancing Free World strength. He said he did not know what the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind but he felt that any action showing that we are maintaining and increasing our military strength would be very helpful from the standpoint of foreign policy. Secretary Gates said he had been taking the position that the Defense position was not prepared on the assumption that the USSR would make any significant concessions at the Summit Conference. He believed the Defense budget, as currently approved by the President, was satisfactory, subject of course to continuing review. He saw no need to step up the production of long-lead time items although more maintenance and operations funds could be spent to improve our defense posture. We might also be able to increase the strength of our deployed forces.

The President did not believe it would be desirable to increase the strength of our deployed forces. He said we were trying to be stable in our military planning and to have a ten year military program. We should not get excited every time Khrushchev is guilty of worse than usual deportment. He would have no objection to any quiet actions which would improve our military posture but he did not want to take any military action of a more dramatic nature which could be regarded as being caused by the break-up of the Summit Conference. Secretary Herter said he did not have any panicky actions in mind. The President said that before the break-up of the Summit Conference, he had agreed to eighteen more ATLAS squadrons and to an increase in POLARIS missiles. He felt we should continue these programs and perhaps quietly strengthen them.

Secretary Anderson noted that Administration officials had testified that we would be ready if war came tomorrow. If we should now take military actions which could be attributed to the break-up of the Summit Conference, we would be admitting weakness and causing concern to our allies. Secretary Gates agreed but added that some actions to improve our defense posture could be accomplished quietly with maintenance and operations money. He would not, of course, go to Congress and ask that the deterrent forces be doubled or anything like that. General Twining said our forces were in a better state of readiness at the present time than they had ever been in.

Secretary Herter said our NATO partners are showing an extraordinary degree of solidarity with us at the present time. He

600,00121
DATE: June 13, 1960
TIME: 3:00-4:15 P.M.
PLACE: Room 5105 IS
6/13/60

SUBJECT: NATO Long-Range Planning Views of NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak

378,800

PARTICIPANTS: M. Paul-Henri Spaak
M. Andre Saint-Sleux
Ambassador Bungeo
DUE - Mr. Kohler
S - Mr. Boule
S/P - Mr. Smith
S/P - Mr. Owen
RA - Mr. Foccardini
RA - Mr. Tabin
DOD/ISA - Mr. Hayden Williams
(*Chef du Cabinet to M. Spaak)

COPIES TO: See Separate Page

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1. General Approach and Timing.

After introductory pleasantries, Mr. Kohler asked M. Spaak to give us the benefit of his views on NATO long-range planning.

M. Spaak opened by saying that this is a difficult problem. The Alliance has existed since 1949 with its primary purpose to stop the communist advance. Whether the Soviet intention is to wage cold war emphasizing military threats or peaceful co-existence stressing economic warfare the ultimate communist aim is the same. No matter how one examines the problem, he comes to the conclusion that an absolute necessity for the Alliance continues to exist. What is needed now is to maintain and adapt NATO to present and future circumstances. It is not necessary to think of altering the Treaty, which would both be very difficult and also unnecessary in view of the flexibility of the Treaty provisions. Actually the effectiveness of the Alliance largely rests more upon the spirit of its members than in strict observance of Treaty obligations.

At the close of his statement, Spaak observed that the 10-year planning report might in its introduction indicate that nothing revolutionary is required, but rather that the Alliance, in setting its course for the next ten years, should determine to continue doing what it is already doing - but to do it more audaciously and more effectively.

Spaak further said it is his intention during the early part of July to call together the Permanent Representatives for a discussion of NATO long-range planning. He would present to them a memo incorporating his ideas as expressed

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By [Signature] NLE Date 2/26/89

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to us, and asking them in return to submit their governments' views early in September.

In response to a question from Mr. Owen, Spaak said that he intended to urge other countries to make serious preparations for the long-range planning exercise, but that to date only Canada and the UK had been making such preparations.

Mr. Smith observed that the atmosphere for long-range planning should now be better since the non-summit. Spaak responded that the reaction in some ways was improved, but he referred to the very animated discussion of the "directorate" in last Wednesday's Council meeting and to what he considered to be the unsatisfactory Western response to the latest Soviet disarmament note, and implied that some of the ground gained was now being lost.

2. Political Consultation.

The rule to be followed on political consultation, Mr. Spaak suggested, is that of the most intimate possible consultation in accordance with the recommendations of the report of the Three Wise Men. However, a number of questions are posed:

(a) The geographical boundaries of consultation should be extended as widely as possible. This would involve more cooperation with CENFO and SEATO, but a clear distinction would have to be drawn between the broadening of the Alliance for the purpose of political consultation and any extension of military obligations, concerning which many members are very hesitant.

(b) The form of consultation will have to be decided. There are four alternatives, of which Spaak openly expressed his preference for the first:

- (1) Standing Committees of the Council set up on a regional basis, as for example, Africa, the Far East and Near East, and having varied composition with the three principal world power members on all committees and two additional members chosen on the basis of regional interest. These committees would exist for the exchange of information, to develop common policies for the respective regions, and to prepare discussion in the Council as a whole.
- (2) Establishment of a committee along the lines of the UN Security Council composed of the five larger members permanently, that is, the US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy with two other members being elected on a rotating basis. In such a committee, the major powers might be willing to expose their thinking at an early stage since it would be rather more intimate than the Council. The committee also would prepare subject matter for discussion in the Council.
- (3) A NATO observer in a committee of three (US, UK, France) following the precedent set in the recent summit preparatory period. This might perhaps work out in connection with proposal (1) above. Finally, (4) the notion of a "directorate", which Mr. Spaak rejects. In the first place, he doubts that there could be such a directorate, since unanimity could not be reached and De Gaulle in particular would not submit to a majority of the other two. Second, because establishment of such a directorate would set in motion a disastrous trend toward neutralism among the smaller members.

Mr. Bowie

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Mr. Bowie having raised the impact of the development of the European community on NATO relationships, Spack responded that until now this has been a conflict between the Six and the Seven which has had no impact on NATO and to which he thinks a solution will be found. In answer to a more pointed question from Mr. Bowie, Spack stated that the impact of growth of the Six on relations between the US and Europe would depend upon the spirit in which the Six developed. He went on to be more specific with regard to the De Gaulle problem. He was prepared to admit that De Gaulle was not a European in the image of Robert Schuman, but in discussing De Gaulle's policy, as in discussing Khrushchev's, one is very dependent upon hypothesis. Certainly a very great deal depends upon the way in which the US asserts its leadership in the Alliance.

Ambassador Burgess observed that there is now a much better feeling between the Six and the Seven, so that he is fairly optimistic about a reconciliation. He further mentioned as a perplexing factor De Gaulle's concept of a Europe united from the "Atlantic to the Urals". Spack responded that it is interesting that this is the second time De Gaulle has used this expression, but this time it is to be found in a different, more historic and theoretical, part of his speech. On the other hand his favorable mention of a Western European confederation appeared immediately after his allusion to the decision of the Six to accelerate.

3. Military Problems.

The long-term NATO military problem, in M. Spack's view, centers on the question of atomic arms. As a general proposition it is clear that national armies of the traditional type are outdated for European defense, and greater integration, or perhaps better stated cooperation, is needed. He went in fact to accelerate the cooperation of member countries. The solution lies in establishing atomic arms under NATO control and with common financing on the same basis as infrastructure. This would facilitate cooperation and avoid inequities in bearing financial burdens. This is not only a military problem but also a political one, which quite frankly has to do with the French problem. It also involves the question as to the decision with regard to making war, especially since the distinction between strategic and tactical atomic weapons is on the way out.

Mr. Smith asked about M. Spack's references to a common NATO nuclear armament and asked whether M. Spack's thinking had gone as far as a multi-national strike force. Spack indicated that this was the only possible solution to the problem. Mr. Smith made clear that he was asking about the possibility of a genuinely multi-national force, in which personnel of different nations would be intermingled so that no single country would have a national capability readily at hand -- an EEC transplanted to the nuclear field. M. Spack said that this was how he had understood the question and, provided that the term "EEC" was not used, he believed that was a feasible -- as well as necessary -- solution. He came back, however, to France as being at the heart of the atomic armaments question, and said he could not envisage a solution to the atomic problem without some solution of the French relationship.

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No particularly felt that this was so after the briefing of the Council by General Harstad the previous Friday.

Mr. Kohler asked, speaking purely in hypothetical terms: if we helped to give the French an independent deterrent, could we depend on cooperation in the nuclear weapons field involving French soil and would not other countries, particularly Germany, then demand an independent deterrent? Spaak indicated that we had to assume that the answer to the first question is affirmative, although he had not discussed the point with the French. With regard to Germany, the position is that Germany is bound by the UNO restrictions, and one can look forward to these remaining in effect even over a period as long as 10 years. The change in the Western European attitude toward Germany since the war has been phenomenal but it has limits; the Germans would be making a very great psychological error in talking of an independent deterrent. The rest of Western Europe would have no objection now or in the future to a French independent deterrent, but it would be a mistake to think that they would have no objections in the case of Germany.

Mr. Smith said that, in that case, the French were making an error in encouraging Germany by themselves preaching the validity of an independent deterrent. Spaak responded that no one can do anything with De Gaulle's complex with regard to an independent deterrent. It is known to be foolish, especially on financial grounds, but there it is. Mr. Smith suggested that US aid for the creation of such a deterrent could not fail to affect German thinking in this regard.

Mr. Kohler wondered whether, thinking over the next 10 years, we would have to revise the NATO Command Structure -- a question which De Gaulle has raised. He had not, of course, envisaged from the beginning that SACSSR would always have to be an American. Spaak replied that most Europeans would not wish any change, that they would like to have an American, but that it would be interesting to know if the NATO Commander could not be divorced from any US command. He thought this an important question but not one involved in the 10-year plan report.

Mr. Owen raised the question as to how a decision would be reached concerning use of any NATO multi-national atomic force. Spaak elaborated his view on this, that the alliance being defensive, a response would be automatic in the case of an attack with atomic weapons. Mr. Owen asked what would happen if the attack did not involve use of atomic weapons. Mr. Spaak said that the hypothesis was unrealistic, since Khrushchev is relying heavily on atomic weapons. He agreed with H. Saint-Meur that if this contingency occurred NATO was committed to using nuclear weapons as necessary for defensive purposes. Mr. Kohler then agreed with H. Spaak's suggestion that it is more likely that if the USSR intended seriously to start something it would begin with an attack on the US rather than Europe.

4. Economic Cooperation.

Here Mr. Spaak accepted the problems proposed by the creation of the ECSC,

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particularly in relation to aid to uncommitted underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. A common Western approach is needed, based upon political considerations, and he doubts that such a common policy can be drawn up by an organization like the OECD, which includes a considerable number of neutrals. We must get rid of the complex that NATO is an alliance limited strictly to the military aspect. NATO should become the forum where economic policy, that is political-economic policy, is examined and where "broad directives" can be drawn up, execution being left to technical bodies such as the ICD. Furthermore, a policy must be adopted for coordination of aid to the five "under-developed" countries within the alliance (including the southern area of Italy) and also to certain countries in Africa which are rather closely linked to the alliance.

Mr. Schuler expressed surprise that Spax had omitted mention of economic relations and competition with the USSR, with particular reference to the extension of credits to the USSR and the organization of competition, as for example through exclusive buying or the stabilization of prices. Spax responded that until now he has failed to arouse any interest in implementing Article 2. There is no common approach among the members with regard to credits, and all governments backed away from his suggestion at Istanbul with regard to stabilization of prices. Ambassador Burgess commented that credits would provide a good case study of the alliance capability to work together, and suggested that it would be helpful if the other member governments would raise the level of their representatives in ECOTAD and be prepared to instruct their representatives with greater attention to political than commercial considerations. Spax said that it is interesting to compare the rise in credits from the West to the USSR with the rise in USSR credits to the under-developed areas, and suggested the possible conclusion that the West in this way is financing Soviet penetration of the under-developed areas.

5. Joint Production and Science.

H. Spax then referred to two remaining fields of cooperation within the alliance, that is, the "common production of certain things" and science. In both of these fields, he felt that results so far had been meager. He made no further mention of the first of these two, but went on to say particularly with reference to science that the Eisenhower-Eisenhower declaration of interdependence should increasingly be translated into deeds. A beginning had been made in the science field, but as Dr. Ramsey had said at the end of his two years as the first Science Advisor, so far there were only some drops in the ocean. It is hard to know what should be done, but it definitely seems that this is a matter of will in the first place, and then the translation of that will into action.

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6/29/60

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JUN 29 1960

Dear Mr. President:

Under Sections 41 and 91 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, certain activities of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) require prior determinations or directive action by you. Specifically:

- a. Under Section 41b, the quantities of special nuclear material to be produced and the quantities of special nuclear material to be available for distribution by the Commission pursuant to Sections 53 and 54 are subject to your determination at least once each year.
- b. Under Section 91a(2), the production of atomic weapons, or atomic weapon parts is subject to your express consent and direction, which must be obtained at least once each year.
- c. Under Section 91b, the delivery to the Department of Defense (DOD) of special nuclear material or atomic weapons, and authorization of the DOD by the AEC to manufacture, produce, or acquire atomic weapons or utilization facilities for military purposes, are subject to your direction.



To implement the above programs during Fiscal Year 1961, it is recommended that:

- a. You approve the production for Fiscal Year 1961 in Commission facilities of U-235 and plutonium in the maximum amounts attainable consistent with safety and good operating practice. The estimated production is U-235 (ETP) and plutonium.
- b. You determine plutonium to be available for distribution by the Commission pursuant to Section 53, and plutonium and U-233 (unseparated) pursuant to Section 54, in addition to quantities previously determined.
- c. You approve the production for Fiscal Year 1961 of atomic weapons in the quantities shown by the following

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 NLE Case 89-478-1
 By JK NLE Date 1/24/90

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Mr. President

table and attached key (LXI-5813), together with such additional atomic weapon parts not containing special nuclear material as are necessary for re- search, development, training, and possible operational purposes and for transfer to other nations pursuant to agreements for cooperation. Also, that you approve such minor variations, not to exceed 10%, from these specifically stated numbers of weapons as the Commission may determine to be necessary because of changes in the available supply of special nuclear material or the Commission's production capacity, or as otherwise may be mutually agreed to by the Commission and the DOD because of changed military requirements.

Fiscal Year 1961 Weapons Production

	<u>7/1/60</u>	<u>7/1/61</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>	<u>Retired</u>	<u>Gross Production</u>
Thermonuclear					
Weapons	Key A	Key B	Key C	Key D	Key E
Fission Weapons	Key F	Key G	Key H	Key I	Key J
Total	Key K	Key L	Key M	Key N	Key O

d. You approve in addition to that previously approved (1) transfers to the DOD [redacted] U-235 (ETP) and [redacted] Pu and (2) authorization for the DOD to manufacture, produce, or acquire 9 utilization facilities for items listed in Exhibit "C".

e. You approve transfer to the DOD of unspecified quantities of special nuclear material [redacted] required for training, research and development purposes, and operational instruments; and weapon components and parts not containing special nuclear material for training, research and development or utilization in the manufacture or production of weapon or missile systems.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) John A. McCone

Chairman



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Attachments (3)

1. Exhibit "A" - Estimated Distribution of Special Nuclear Material Through June 30, 1961.
2. Exhibit "B" - Status of Presidential Determinations Under Section 41b.
3. Exhibit "C" - Additional Presidential Authorizations for Utilization Facilities Required Pursuant to Section 91b.

The President
The White House



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Mr. President

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PRESIDENT'S ENDORSEMENT TO THE COMMISSION

The recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission contained in the foregoing paragraphs a through e are approved; and the Commission is hereby directed to take the actions necessary to implement the recommendations.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

The White House
June 30, 1960



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
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EXHIBIT "A"

ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIAL
NUCLEAR MATERIAL THROUGH JUNE 30, 1961
IN KILOGRAMS

	<u>U-235(ETP)</u>	<u>Plutonium</u>	<u>U-233</u> (Separated)
<u>Peaceful Uses</u>			
Domestic (Section 53)	4,523.0	57.28	26.65
Foreign (Section 54)	1,556.8	15.00	1.00
Commission (Sections 31 and 32)	<u>11,473.8</u>	<u>1,154.43</u>	<u>21.96</u>
Total Peaceful Uses	17,553.6	1,226.71	49.61
<u>Military Uses (excluding weapon production)</u>			
Weapon Research and Development (Section 91a(1))			
Weapon Tests (Section 91a(1))			
Military Power, Research and Development (Section 91a(1))			
Non-Weapon Transfers to DOD (Section 91b)			
Transfers to Other Nations (Section 91c)			
Total Military Uses			
<u>Contingency</u>			
GRAND TOTAL			



The preceding table summarizes maximum amounts (net) of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 expressed as equivalent top product (ETP), plutonium, and U-233, which, according to our present planning will have been distributed as of June 30, 1961, under the two major program areas: Peaceful and Military Uses (excluding weapon production). The amounts shown are cumulative through June 30, 1961, and those for weapon tests are the anticipated fabrication requirements for Fiscal Year 1961. The category "Non-Weapon Transfers to DOD (Section 91b)" does not include the possible transfer of unspecified quantities of special nuclear material [.....] for miscellaneous purposes.

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In addition to the above quantities, the estimated distribution of source material under Section 63 (domestic licensees) is 132.4 kg. of U-235 (ETP).



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EXHIBIT "B"

STATUS OF PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATIONS
UNDER SECTION 41b (FOR SECTIONS 53 AND 54
DISTRIBUTIONS) IN KILOGRAMS

Section 53 - Domestic Licensees

	<u>U-235(ETP)</u>	<u>Plutonium</u>	<u>U-233(Separated)</u>
Previous Presidential Determinations	50,000	57.50	53.60
Commitments (Including Distributions) Made by AEC Through April 15, 1960	<u>35,000</u>	<u>26.00</u>	<u>25.20</u>
Balance Not Committed	15,000	31.50	28.40

Section 54 - Foreign Governments - Peaceful

Previous Presidential Determinations	50,000	22.00	5.00
Commitments (Including Distributions) Made by AEC Through April 15, 1960	<u>49,950 ^{1/}</u>	<u>2.00</u>	<u>0.10</u>
Balance Not Committed	50	20.00	4.90



In addition to the above quantities, the commitments (including distributions) of source material under Section 63 are approximately 440 kg. U-235 (ETP).

Note

1/ This number is based on ceiling amounts contained in agreements for cooperation and estimated commitments under agreements that do not specify ceiling amounts. Our estimate of realistic commitments based on presently planned foreign programs is 38,275 kg. U-235 (ETP). The Commission may soon request a further Presidential determination to permit additional commitments to be made for Atoms-For-Peace Program.

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Mr. President

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EXHIBIT "C"

ADDITIONAL PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATIONS
FOR UTILIZATION FACILITIES REQUIRED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 91b

Naval Programs

SS(N) 595 Flunger
SS(N) 596 Barb
SS(N) 604 Haddo
SS(N) 605 Jack
SS(N) 606 Tinoso
DLG(N) 25 Bainbridge (2 Reactors)

Army Programs

Stationary Medium Power Plant
No. 1

Portable Medium Power Plant
No. 2B

Diamond Ordnance Reactor Facility



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Since the breakdown of the Summit Conference in Paris the Soviets have clearly embarked on a major propaganda and agitational campaign with the United States as its chief target. It seems designed to increase international tension, provoke and encourage disorders wherever possible and has involved a wide range of threats, provocation and blackmail. In the field of action the Soviet Government has broken off the disarmament negotiations on June 27 when conceivably with new Western proposals forthcoming, of which the Soviet Government was aware, an opportunity for genuine progress might have presented itself. In addition, on July 1 the Soviets shot down a United States military plane over international waters.



In most respects this campaign has followed the previous cold war propaganda campaigns with one very important innovation. For the first time in its history the Soviet Union has asserted its willingness in recent weeks to give military support to any regime which seems to serve Soviet purposes, and to threaten atomic retaliation against any country which might take action against such regime. Such threats have been made in the case of Cuba with reference to the United States, and in more generalized terms in the case of the Congo. These threats are probably merely part of the current war of nerves designed in the first instance to weaken the prestige and leadership of the United States, to separate it from its allies, and in particular to pose as champion of all colonial

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or former colonial peoples in the world. Even though there may be no serious intention of acting militarily on these threats, they do appear to enunciate a new doctrine with the Soviet Union coming close to asserting the right of military intervention in any part of the world when it suits its purposes to do so. This is undoubtedly in part a reflection of the Soviet belief in its present military power.

It is this aspect of current Soviet behavior which requires something more in response than mere words. Some form of action should be taken to bring calmly and coldly to the attention of the Soviet Union the dangers of its current attitude. While they may have no intention of acting on these threats, it is nevertheless possible that the Soviets if they feel that this propaganda campaign is succeeding might progressively commit themselves in future courses of action in the military field which would be extremely difficult for them to disavow if ever put to the test. In addition, we must consider the effect of this Soviet campaign of threat and blackmail on other countries, particularly the uncommitted areas of the world. If this campaign seems to be proceeding without any strong response on the part of the United States, it might well create the impression that the Soviets are in fact in total command of the situation and that the United States is unable or unwilling to devise any appropriate counter.

In surveying the fields in which the United States could take action which might have a salutary and sobering effect upon the

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Soviet Union and offset any psychological disadvantageous effects of this campaign in certain parts of the world, it would seem that an increase in our military and mutual security budgets through a request for supplementary appropriations in the August session of Congress would be the best for these purposes. It would fall into the category of action and not words; it could be presented in the most sober and calm manner in order to avoid any impression of panic or belief in the imminence of war but would serve as evidence of American determination not to be browbeaten by Soviet threats or blackmail, and a very timely reminder that the United States has the resources and will if necessary to add in the future even more appreciably to our military defenses if Soviet behavior renders it necessary.

It could be presented to Congress in a very simple message, merely stating that since presentation of the United States military budget and military assistance part of the Mutual Security Act, the world situation due to Soviet actions had considerably worsened, listing if necessary the specific acts and threats which the Soviet Union has indulged in since the collapse of the Summit Conference. This could be set against the backdrop of the calm attitude of the United States and its allies which makes absolutely clear that the responsibility for the increase in international tension is due solely to Soviet actions and attitudes during this period. The ideal thing would be for the Congress to authorize the President to spend at his discretion up to _____ dollars to supplement the existing budget, in order to place our forces in a special state of readiness to deal with

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any contingency that may arise, and to utilize a portion thereof for the increase of the defense systems of our allies and, if conceivable in Congressional terms, a certain portion for emergency economic aid in the event of special need.

The exact Soviet purposes in mounting this extreme campaign is not entirely clear. It most probably does not forecast Soviet military action, but on the other hand the element of uncertainty is sufficient to justify placing ourselves and our allies in a special state of readiness quite apart from the salutary effect such action on our part should have on the Soviet leadership.



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President to Prime Minister. Advise date and time delivery.

QUOTE June 30, 1960

Dear Harold:

The ideas set forth in your letter of June 27 about our future tripartite political consultations are quite satisfactory to us. Your original suggestions and the discussion held here in Washington on June 1 appear to provide a means by which the tripartite meetings of our foreign ministers can be made more useful. I assume that their next meeting will take place this fall in New York in connection with the United Nations General Assembly. The arrangements for this meeting would, in accordance with the suggestion we have all approved, be made by Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Mr. Merchant and by whomever the French select for this task.

While this arrangement should improve our tripartite political consultation, it does not meet General de Gaulle's desire

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Drafted by: EUR:WE:LDBrown:blh 6/29/60

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - John A. Calhoun

Clearances:
 The White House - Gen. Goodpaster
 M - Mr. Merchant (in draft)

The Secretary (in draft)

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desire to see such consultation paralleled by strategic discussions by military representatives along the lines he proposed in his original memorandum. In his letter to you of June 10, of which he sent me a copy, General de Gaulle suggested that our military representatives in the Standing Group could hold talks outside the regular deliberations of that body. In my reply I expressed to him my doubts as to the practicability of using any part of the NATO mechanism for strategic consultations, believing that our Allies would object. I am sure that this would be the case, as it would be difficult to keep secret such consultations and the very fact that our representatives to the Standing Group were meeting separately to discuss global strategic matters would lead other members of the alliance to believe that we had, in fact, established some sort of inner directorate. This impression we must avoid.

It does seem, however, that we must find some way to cope with this aspect of General de Gaulle's thinking. It might be possible, for instance, to have talks here in Washington by appropriate military representatives. You and the French might delegate this responsibility to a senior military officer assigned to Washington. The French might, in such case, select their representative to the Standing Group. We, on the other hand, could select an appropriate general officer who has no connection with the Standing Group itself. These talks, of course, would have to be conducted along previously-agreed guidelines, but I am sure that we could work this out.

In this

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In this connection, I would like to recall that a year ago we did hold tripartite talks on Africa under the chairmanship of Robert Murphy. At these talks military representatives were present. Both you and the French were represented by your members of the Standing Group. At those talks the French requested separate and continuing military talks. After a period of consideration we agreed to do this, selected an appropriate officer to head up our side, and informed the French we were ready. They have never responded to this offer.

I think, nevertheless, that we could re-new this offer and I would propose so doing in my reply to General de Gaulle. This may not be the organized strategic planning on a global scale, including the question of the use of nuclear weapons anywhere, which he appears to want. It is, however, a definite move forward in the field of military consultation which may in the end strengthen our alliance. It will, of course, have to be carefully and discreetly conducted.

I will ask the State Department to discuss this matter more fully with your Embassy here with the hope that we can work out promptly a common position which we can communicate to General de Gaulle.

With warm personal regard,

As ever,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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