

1/9/59

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 By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

Document of 11 pages
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLICY PLANNING STAFF
TOP SECRET

188

TO : The Secretary

JAN 9 1959

THROUGH: U - The Under Secretary C.A.H.
 S/S g

FROM : S/P - Gerard C. Smith gms

SUBJECT: NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany

Handwritten notes:
 m/200
 to Secy
 See [unclear]
 1/16/59

1. I understand that Ambassador Bruce is, upon his return from Paris, to discuss with Chancellor Adenauer the possible establishment of a NATO atomic stockpile in the Federal Republic.

2. If we should then proceed to negotiate a stockpile agreement there would be the possibility of a leak. In any event, publicity would be unavoidable as and when a related agreement for the exchange of technical data was laid before the Congress.

3. Publicity concerning this proposed move against the background of the Berlin crisis could have two harmful effects:

(a) Free world support for our position in the Berlin crisis might be somewhat weakened by distracting and conflicting concerns over imminent West German nuclear rearmament. The Soviets would be able to stir up fears in Western Europe - including the Federal Republic - over this proposed move, thus creating disunity at the very moment when unity is most needed.


(b) This might make the Soviets more intransigent, - not only because they would perceive Western disunity but also because they would feel that only by bringing the crisis to a head could they prevent early German nuclear rearmament. Tab B SNIE 100-13-58/indicates that preventing this is a part of one of their major objectives in creating the crisis.

Tab C 4. In a recent telegram for Ambassador Bruce (Paris 2363 of December 27) General Norstad states that, although it would be desirable to move forward promptly, timing is not critical from a purely NATO military standpoint. Nor

would

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PPS 57-61 / 130 / Germany TS



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- 2 -

would prompt initiation of stockpile negotiations be likely to get this issue out of the way before any East-West discussions over Berlin. In view of the duration of these negotiations and the requirement for Congressional action, our move would seem more likely to focus attention on the issue while such discussions were taking place.

5. I would hope therefore that, whatever decision might be reached in principle with the Chancellor, consideration could be given to deferring action involving substantial danger of publicity while the Berlin crisis is at its peak.

cc: G - Mr. Murphy
EUR - Mr. Merchant
S/AE - Mr. Farley

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By <u>RWD</u>	NARS Date <u>2/8/88</u>

23 January 1959

NOTE TO CONTROL DIVISION:

Subject: JCS 1907/162 - Berlin Situation. (U)

1. At their meeting on 23 January 1959 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that JCS 1907/162 would be revised as indicated below:

a. Page 894, paragraph 2, insert the following as the penultimate sentence:- "Allied forces will not fire unless fired upon."

b. Page 894, paragraph 3, second sentence, line 5, delete the word "force" and substitute the word "formation", and add the following to the end of the sentence:- "opening fire only if fired upon".

2. Please take necessary action to effect the above changes.

H. L. Hillyard
H. L. HILLYARD
Brig. General, USA
Secretary

Secy to CNO (JCS)
Dir/Plans, AF
MarCorps L/O
Dir JS

(Re: JCS 1907/162)

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By DD NARA Date 4/10/87

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690-F

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Department of State

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WMSC

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 2072, January 24, 3 p.m.

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EO 11652: XGDS 1 2 (3) 4
Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

Since Secretary Quarles recent visit, when the matter was exhaustively discussed, we have devoted considerable thought in consultation with General Norstad to the question of a possible NATO program for the production of second generation IRBM's in Europe. With Meili now scheduled to meet with US, British, German, and French representatives on this subject on January 27, time has obviously come to firm up a US position which satisfactorily comprehends complete military and POL factors involved. The essential elements in such a US position are, in our view, the following:

1. To meet the NATO military requirement stipulated by Saceur in his letter of December 9, 1958, to Meili and the chairman SGN, second generation IRBM's should be available to the alliance by 1963.

2. The US is nearing the end of the presently planned production schedule for first generation IRBM's (Thors and Jupiters) and we believe that, on balance, it would be in the over-all interest to round off the current production effort at the level of eight squadrons

and to apply the presumed savings (or a substantial part thereof) to a second

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
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- 2 - POLTO 2072, January 24, 3 p.m. from Paris

to a second generation production program under the aegis of NATO. The question arises as to the respective roles the US and its European allies should play in such a program, bearing in mind possible divergences between the over-all NATO objectives sought and the various national objectives which will make their influence felt.


3. Provided that an understanding could be reached that NATO military requirements would enjoy first priority in the program and that the weapons would be made available to the alliance within the general framework of the heads of government decision of December 1947 placing the IRBM's at the disposal of Saccor, the US should welcome and encourage an essentially European initiative under NATO auspices to produce second generation IRBM's. Any such agreement should be supplemented by an understanding that the question of use of any production capacity after NATO requirements have been met would be subject to later NATO determination. If the European countries concerned could reach agreement on this basis, the US should give technical and financial assistance both through MWDP and WPP funds and end item procurement.

4.

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(b)(1)

it is our considered belief that the US should not assist in accelerating the creation of diverse and uncoordinated national centers of strategic weapons and that we should give positive support to a European IRBM production scheme only if it is designed to strengthen the alliance as a whole along the lines laid down by the heads of government in December 1957.

5. With these considerations in mind, we believe that the proposed second generation IRBM program should be based on US willingness to make available to the alliance a solid-fuel, polaris-type missile with the role allocated to the European countries of producing an appropriately designed land-based launching apparatus for this weapon. Such a combined effort gives maximum assurance



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- 3 - POLTO 2072, January 24, 3 p.m. from Paris

assurance that NATO will have the best weapons available at the time they are required and under conditions that will unify rather than divide the alliance. It represents the most efficient and rational allocation of resources that we can envisage over the next few years and provides a sound basis for bringing the present liquid-fueled IRBM production to a close. We think that applying the savings thus gained to such a NATO sponsored second generation effort as recommended would be a most worthwhile investment both for the US and for the alliance as a whole.

Norstad concurs. USRO/Defense element concurs except for first sentence paragraph 5 because understand from recent discussions with Quarles that US will not supply completed missiles (except samples) from US production sources.

Foregoing drafted prior to receipt TOPOL 2428, which does not change our views. We propose to hold mainly listening brief at January 27 meeting.

NOLTING

JE/9

Note: Read by Mr. Fassenden (RA) 5:45 p.m. 1/24/59 CWO-JRL

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NR: EC 9-10120
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311116Z JAN 59

ACTION J-5
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- CJCS 2
- Dir JS 1
- Secy JCS 1
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- J-3 2
- J-4 1
- J-5 2
- J-6
- JMAAD
- NSC/JCS 1
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R/RA 1

Ref: JCS 1907/162 dtd 13 Jan 59 as amended by N/H
 of JCS 1907/162, dtd 22 Jan 59 and N/H dtd 27 Jan 59.

1. With reference to so much of para 1 of the draft memo for the Secy of Def (inclosure A to reference) as states that it is anticipated that General Norstad as USCINCEUR/SACEUR would be charged with detailed military planning and conduct of military operations, it must be noted that JCS instructions for planning and execution of tripartite or US only actions must be addressed to USCINCEUR.

2. With ref to so much of action 7, page 888 of appendix A to inclosure A of ref, as states that the United States should indicate willingness to provide the Commander of the Military Force on the Ground, it should be noted that the ground corridor to Berlin lies in the NORTHAG (British) zone of action and the operations will take place in the NORTHAG (British) zone of action. Although it is agreed US should indicate willingness to provide a commander, it would appear desirable from the practical military standpoint that the British provide the commander.

3. Similarly, employment of a US reinforced division on the axis of operations will necessitate its removal from Seventh US Army and from the central Army group zone of action for employment in the NORTHAG (British) zone of action.

4. With ref to implementing the appropriate degree of national mobilization the different periods under appendix A to inclosure A to reference, it is assumed that these measures will include deployment of appropriate M plus 1 month

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(31 JAN 59)

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Ad W 3-10-59

Preparing Sheet prepared by: Col. Lester L. Wheeler, USA
 Extension 57043
 International Policy Branch, J-2

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1172 BERLIN 9105
 31 Jan 59

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By <u>R&D</u>	NARS, Date <u>2/8/88</u>

NR: EC 9-10120

PAGE 2

forces.

5. With RF reference to appendix A to inclosure A of reference these check lists should distinguish between those actions which are NATO, those which are tripartite, and those which are US actions only.

6. An additional action is recommended for inclusion on page 888 of appendix A: "Designation of a single commander for tripartite forces in Berlin."

7. With reference to appendix B to inclosure A of reference, the concept does not clearly cover the case of non-violent obstruction of access to Berlin, e.g., Destruction of large number of bridges, etc.


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(31 Jan 59)

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6-92

This document consists of 4 pages.
 No. 1 of copies, Series A.

~~SECRET~~
 (with ~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment)

TO: G - Mr. Murphy
 FROM: RA - B.E.L. Timmons *BEFT per Rm*
 SUBJECT: Second Generation IRBM's for Europe

RA
Jul (33)

2/5/87

VND 931084

Problem

MEM/CMA

3-30-74

USRO and General Norstad have raised basic policy issues regarding production of a second generation IRBM for Europe (FOLTO 2072 attached). ~~TMA~~ USRO-Norstad disagree fundamentally in their approach with the position advocated by Defense (TOPOL 2428 attached). An early resolution of the issues involved is needed in order for the U.S. to have a position to guide its participation in the second generation IRBM Working Group that has now been created by Mr. Meili and which is due to begin meeting later this month.


Discussion

1. General Norstad has stated that there is a high priority requirement for deployment in Europe by 1963 of hard-based and/or mobile IRBM's with a very fast reaction time which would be considerably more effective operationally than the Thor and Jupiter IRBM's. He and USRO recommend that this be accomplished by U.S. provision of solid-fuel Polaris-type missiles on a grant basis, with the Europeans to produce the ground support equipment (which reportedly would be at least as costly as the missiles themselves). Mr. Holiday has estimated that an initial operational capability could be achieved on this basis in approximately two years. Defense informs us that Polaris-type missiles could be added to the U.S. production line at a cost of \$1 million per missile (exclusive of the ground support equipment). On this basis, the cost to the U.S. of supplying 10 squadrons of Polaris-type missiles (equivalent to SACEUR's current requirement) would be \$15 million per squadron, or a total of \$150 million. In addition, there would, of course, be some cost involved in U.S. technical assistance to the Europeans in their development of the ground support equipment.

2. At the Heads of Government Meeting in December 1957, the United States offered assistance for NATO production of IRBM's. Since that time, the question has been discussed within NATO in a desultory fashion. France, Germany and the UK appear to have varying degrees of interest in a European production effort and the key question from their point of view has been the extent of U.S. initiative and assistance. The British wish to produce IRBM's as soon as possible for their independent use and apparently intend to proceed with their Blue Streak program unless a satisfactory NATO program is developed. The French, of course,

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will also want independent control of whatever is produced in Europe and may be presumed to hope to have their own nuclear warheads by the time a European IRBM is produced.


3. The Defense Department believes that production of a second generation IRBM should be undertaken entirely in Europe, and that U.S. assistance should be limited to provision of technical information and some financial aid through MNDP, FAP and modest OSP. This approach appears to be based primarily on current and prospective U.S. budgetary limitations. The European countries would have the alternative of copying the latest U.S. weapon's design (presumably Polaris) or of developing a new weapon system. Estimates of the earliest obtainable operational capability on this basis range from 1965 to 1970. (Mr. Quarles is reported to have told Ambassador Burgess and General Norstad during their recent Paris conversations that if a European production program is not decided upon shortly, he believes the U.S. should consider production of two additional Thor/Jupiter squadrons - beyond the 8 squadrons now under contract - for European deployment).

*1-2, 1965-66
Dm with MOD view*

4. A primary consideration underlying the USRO-Norstad recommendation is the importance of ensuring maximum NATO control of strategic as well as tactical capabilities in Europe and of preventing the increase of independent national nuclear-capable forces. They believe that the only possibility of accomplishing this lies in a U.S. offer of Polaris missiles to Europe with the understanding that they would be assigned to SACEUR. Such an offer should, of course, have a great financial appeal to the Europeans since it would save them a great deal of the enormous costs involved in IRBM development and production. This would be particularly significant in the case of Britain if it led to the cancellation of the UK's Blue Streak program which should free substantial resources for improvement of UK conventional capabilities. Thus, it is possible, although perhaps unlikely, that a U.S. offer of Polaris would persuade France and the UK to accept some form of NATO framework or control for second generation IRBM's.

5. The converse of the USRO-Norstad position is that the U.S. should not assist in accelerating the creation of diverse and uncoordinated national centers of strategic weapons. This would mean that any U.S. assistance (including technical information) to a European IRBM program should be strictly conditioned on NATO control of the finished weapons. It is almost a forgone conclusion, of course, that the French and British would insist on independent national control over a strategic weapon produced entirely in Europe. Therefore, such a U.S. position would prevent a NATO IRBM production program from getting under way, although it would not preclude eventual European production outside the NATO framework.

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-3-

Possible U.S. Positions:

The courses of action open to us appear to be as follows:

1. U.S. technical assistance and limited financial support, but no insistence on NATO control. If a successful program were developed on this basis, it would result in several independent national capabilities which would probably have a disruptive effect within NATO and increase the chances of irresponsible military action. An independent German IRBM force might represent the principal hazard in political terms. The European program should eventually meet European defense needs but at great expense and diversion of European resources and some years later than SACEUR's stated 1963 requirement.

2. U.S. technical assistance and limited financial support conditioned upon NATO control. This would mean an early end to the NATO effort and SACEUR's requirements would not be met over the foreseeable future. The British would not be unhappy and would proceed with Blue Streak. French resentment at the U.S. would be intensified. The French might in due course succeed in developing an IRBM by themselves or on a FIG basis outside NATO, but this would take a long time and be considerably more costly than (1) above.

3. U.S. provision of Polaris missiles, together with technical assistance for European production of the ground support equipment, conditioned upon NATO control. This should make it possible to meet SACEUR's requirement with an operational capability in the relatively near future, possibly by 1962 or 1963. It would mean a considerably reduced financial outlay for the Europeans and possibly would enable the UK to redress the balance of its forces. The initial cost involved for the U.S. would apparently be on the order of the investment required for deployment of 2 Jupiter squadrons (about \$200 million), but there are no budgetary means in sight for the FY 60 funding which probably would be required, and a high-level political decision would have to be made in the near future to request increased appropriations for this purpose. There is an outside possibility that such a U.S. offer might persuade France and the UK to accept some form of NATO commitment.

State
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4. U.S. provision of Polaris missiles without insistence on NATO control. This would involve the same military and financial considerations as under (3) above, but would have the political consequences indicated under paragraph (1).

EUR:RA:RNMagill:mw
2/5/59

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PARIS PASS USCINCEUR, USRO, SHAPE

NOFORN

WHILE STILL ON AMERICAN SOIL, MIKOYAN PUBLICLY ATTACKED ADENAUER
AND STRAUSS BY NAME. HE SINGLED ADENAUER OUT AS MAJOR OBSTACLE
TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND WEST, IN EUROPE.
HE IDENTIFIED HIM WITH INFLEXIBILITY, WITH IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY
NOT MERELY TO SOVIET UNION BUT TO ANY AGREEMENT. IN SO DOING HE
WAS ALSO ATTACKING SECRETARY DULLES AND ATTEMPTING CREATE GULF
BETWEEN THESE TWO STATESMEN WHOSE CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
WELL KNOWN AND PEOPLES OF AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE WHOSE
YEARNING FOR PEACE COULD BE SATISFIED, WERE IT NOT FOR SINISTER
COLLUSION.

PERSONAL ATTACK STRAUSS RELATED TO ATTACK ADENAUER, AND CONJURES
UP IMAGE RENASCENT GERMAN MILITARISM, AND "FUROR TEUTONICUS", NOW
BARELY HELD IN CHECK BUT LIABLE EMERGE AND BREAK OUT AGAIN AT
ANY TIME AND DRAG NOT MERELY EUROPE BUT WHOLE HUMANITY WITH
INTO APOCALYPTIC HOLOCAUST.

THUS UNHOLY ASSOCIATION DULLES, ADENAUER AND STRAUSS, PRESENTED
BY SOVIET LEADERS, NOT ONLY PREVENTS SOLUTION EUROPE'S PROBLEMS
BUT CONTAINS WITHIN ITSELF SEEDS DESTRUCTION IN THE FUTURE.

611.61/2-1659 HBS

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-2- 1780, FEBRUARY 16, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM BONN.

THIS MAY BE SAID CONSTITUTE MAJOR THEME CURRENT SOVIET POLITICAL WARFARE, BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH SOVIETS FORMULATING THEIR TACTICAL MOVES IN PERIOD NEGOTIATION INTO WHICH WE SEEM BE ENTERING.

WE BELIEVE IT UTMOST IMPORTANCE BE AWARE APPEAL WHICH SUCH THEME LIKELY HAVE IN COMING MONTHS, UNLESS WEST FINDS WAY EDUCATE PUBLIC OPINION SO THAT GOAL SOVIET POLICY AS CLEAR TO MAN IN STREET AS TECHNIQUE BY WHICH MOSCOW HOPES TO REACH IT.

ONE OF MAJOR TRENDS IN WESTERN THINKING RECENT MONTHS IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH PUBLIC OPINION NOW DISPOSED TAKE AT FACE VALUE EXPRESSED SOVIET FEARS WITH REGARD GERMANY. IMPORTANT WE CLARIFY OUR OWN THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT.

GENERALLY AGREED THAT GERMANY'S ROLE IN SOVIET EYES IS OF DIFFERENT ORDER FROM THAT ANY OTHER FOREIGN POWER. RECOLLECTIONS OF LAST WAR, OF FORMIDABLE INDUSTRIAL AND MANPOWER POTENTIAL GERMAN PEOPLE, AND OF POLITICAL PROCESSES BY WHICH INOFFENSIVE WEIMAR REPUBLIC WAS SUDDENLY TRANSFORMED INTO REALITY HITLER'S WAR MACHINE, LEND COLOR AND PLAUSIBILITY TO FEARS THIS MAY HAPPEN AGAIN, NOTWITHSTANDING DISAPPROVAL AND LAMENTATIONS WESTERN GOVERNMENT'S WHOSE FAILURE PREVENT THIS EVENT 30 YEARS AGO SEEMS SUGGEST THAT THEY WOULD AGAIN BE POWERLESS COMPARABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. IN SOVIET POLITICAL CALENDAR NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS ARE NO LONGER AND NO SAFER THAN TIME WHICH ELAPSED BETWEEN 1930 AND 1933.

EASY FOR SOVIET UNION HARP ON THESE HISTORICAL FACTS AND EVOKE IN MINDS PEOPLES WESTERN EUROPE WHO HAVE ALSO RECENTLY SUFFERED SO MUCH FROM GERMAN AGGRESSION SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE TO BASIC THESIS THAT GERMANY FUNDAMENTALLY STILL POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR, WHICH MIGHT IN ALTERED CIRCUMSTANCES ABUSE WEAPONS INTENDED ONLY FOR HER DEFENSE, AND EMBARK ONCE AGAIN ON MAD ADVENTURE. ASSURANCES BY WEST, EXPRESSED IN MOST FORMAL AND BINDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, SUCH AS THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, DO NOT CARRY FULL CONVICTION, BECAUSE THEY RELATE ONLY TO PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. SUCH ASSURANCES PROVIDE NO CONVINCING GUARANTEE THAT FUTURE COURSE EVENTS WILL RESPECT THEIR PRESENT VALIDITY. WITH

SUCH

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-3- 1780, FEBRUARY 16, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM BONN.

SUCH ARGUMENTS, SOVIET UNION CAN EXERT POWERFUL INFLUENCE ON WESTERN POPULAR ATTITUDES. IN PROPORTION AS REARMAMENT GERMANY PASSES FROM PLANNING AND TRAINING STAGE TO PHYSICAL COMPLETION, SO FEARS AND WARNINGS FOR FUTURE UTTERED BY SOVIET UNION GAIN IN PLAUSIBILITY AND IN POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS.

WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE HERE CONCERNED LESS WITH SINCERITY SOVIET PROPAGANDA WHEN IT POINTS SIGNS "REVANCHIST" GERMANY, THAN WITH DEGREE PLAUSIBILITY WHICH SUCH ACCUSATIONS MAY ACHIEVE, AND CONSEQUENT EFFECT WESTERN POPULAR THINKING.

WHEN WE ASK OURSELVES WHAT KREMLIN'S REAL ATTITUDE IS TOWARD GERMANY, THINK WE MUST ACCEPT FACT THAT WHETHER IT SINCERELY BELIEVES IN DANGER RENEWED GERMAN AGGRESSION OR NOT, IT WILL NEVER RENOUNCE EXPLOITATION WESTERN FEARS OF MILITARISTIC RESURGENCE GERMANY, FOR THESE FEARS ARE FACTOR OF GREAT VALUE TO IT IN PROSECUTION ITS LONG TERM POLICY: ISOLATION AND NEUTRALIZATION GERMANY, DISINTEGRATION OF WESTERN DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, EVICTION US ARMED FORCES FROM EUROPEAN CONTINENT, AND ABSORPTION EUROPE - IN OTHER WORDS LIQUIDATION OF THE EUROPEAN FRONT IN WORLD-WIDE SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST UNITED STATES.

THIS EXPLOITATION HISTORICAL AND EMOTIONAL FACTORS WHICH MILITATE IN ITS FAVOR TAKES SPECIFIC FORM OF WARNINGS ABOUT CONSEQUENCES OF THE "NUCLEAR REARMING" GERMANY. EVEN THOUGH CAN BE DEMONSTRATED THAT ADDITIONAL QUOTA WESTERN MILITARY STRENGTH REPRESENTED BY NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WESTERN GERMAN NATO FORCES RELATIVELY MARGINAL, SOVIET UNION CAN MARSHAL POWERFUL ARGUMENT, WHICH KHRUSHCHEV HAS ALREADY USED, WHICH IS, IN OUR OPINION, FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO COUNTER: THAT SUCH NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT "IN GERMAN HANDS" VASTLY INCREASES DANGER THAT IF, ONE DAY, GERMAN POLICY RESTS IN HANDS OF A "REVANCHIST" MADMAN (I.E.: TYPE OF GERMAN IN WHOSE ROLE SOVIET UNION HAS CAST STRAUSS), GERMANY WILL BE IN POSITION CREATE INCIDENT, INDEPENDENTLY OF WILL OF WESTERN POWER WHICH MAY PROVE UNCONTROLLABLE AND WHICH WILL INEVITABLY INVOLVE SOVIET UNION ITSELF. IN THIS HYPOTHETICAL CASE, EMPHASIS IS LAID ON FUTURE IRRESPONSIBILITY AND UNCONTROLLABILITY GERMANY, RATHER THAN ON ITS ROLE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DELIBERATE WESTERN AGGRESSIVENESS.

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BRUCE

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TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1780 FEBRUARY 16, 2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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PARIS PASS USCINCEUR, USRO, SHAPE.

NOFORN.

MAY BE THAT THIS ELEMENT IN SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY CONTAINS SUFFICIENT DEGREE SINCERITY TO JUSTIFY MOST CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF POSSIBILITY MUTUAL CONCESSIONS LEADING TO STABILIZATION SITUATION CENTRAL EUROPE, SO LONG AS WE ADHERE FIRMLY TO PRINCIPLE THAT OUR OWN SECURITY POSITION MUST NOT BE WEAKENED AS RESULT ANY CONCESSIONS WE MAY MAKE, AND SO LONG AS WE CONTINUE ASSUME THAT EVEN STABILIZATION SITUATION IN EUROPE WOULD NOT SIGNIFY THAT SOVIET UNION HAD GIVEN UP ITS LONG-TERM GOAL OF EUROPEAN DOMINATION, OR THE CONTINUING EXPLOITATION OF THE MEANS TO REACH IT.

VITAL IMPORTANCE ADHERING TO BASIC PRINCIPLES OUR EUROPEAN POLICY UNDERSCORES NECESSITY OUR AVOIDING, PARTICULARLY AT THIS TIME, ANY COURSE ACTION, OR POSTURE, SUGGESTING DISPOSITION COM Promise ON THESE PRINCIPLES. THIS CONSIDERATION PROMPTS US EXPRESS OUR CONCERN AT EXTENT TO WHICH CONCEPT FLEXIBILITY BY WEST SEEMS TO BE ACQUIRING OVERTONES WILLINGNESS BY UNITED STATES TO ABANDON SOME OF PREMISES ON WHICH OUR POLICY HAS HITHERTO BEEN BASED.

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By NARA, Date 6-10-88

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-2- 1780, FEBRUARY 16, 2 PM, (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM BONN.

IT ONE THING RETAIN OUR BASIC POSITION AND TO CAST ABOUT FOR WAYS PRESENTING IT MORE CONVINCINGLY AND ATTRACTIVELY TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WEST AND ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. IT QUITE ANOTHER THING TO HOIST FLAG OF FLEXIBILITY AS THOUGH IT WERE KIND OF NEW RALLYING POINT AROUND WHICH AN ENTIRELY NEW STRATEGY IS TO BE PLANNED. FLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATING TACTICS, IN WILLINGNESS DISCUSS ALL APPROACHES TO PROBLEM IS DESIRABLE DEMONSTRATION WESTERN INITIATIVE. HOWEVER WE MAY ALREADY HAVE REACHED POINT DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO POPULAR BELIEF THAT WEST ABANDONING ITS FORMER STEADFASTNESS, I.E.: ITS ADHERENCE TO BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE HITHERTO GOVERNED ITS POLICIES IN RELATION TO SOVIET UNION AND PROBLEM EUROPE. WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE SUCH BELIEF WOULD UNDERMINE CHANCELLOR'S AUTHORITY GERMANY, AND WOULD REPRESENT SUBSTANTIAL VICTORY FOR MOSCOW.

IF WE ENTER CONFERENCES THIS SPRING AGAINST SUCH BACKGROUND POPULAR EXPECTATION, WE MAY BE LATER FACED WITH UNPLEASANT PROSPECT DISILLUSIONMENT IN OUR OWN CAMP, AND POSSIBLE GENERATION PRESSURES WHICH MIGHT DRIVE SOME OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO DANGEROUS COMPROMISE.

MAYBE WE SHALL HAVE, SO TO SPEAK, TO INSTITUTIONALIZE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, TO BE PREPARED WAGE CONTINUOUS WAR NEGOTIATION IN PUBLIC FORUM, AT EVERY LEVEL, WITH OR WITHOUT AGENDA OR PREPARATION (SHORT OF SUMMIT MEETINGS), AND TO OUTLAST THE SOVIET UNION AT CONFERENCE TABLE.

OUT OF THIS PROCESS, AT SOME STAGE WHEN SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSION HAS BEEN EXHAUSTED, POSSIBLE THERE WILL EMERGE IN WEST SENSE OF NECESSITY FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND SOVIET UNION. FEEL WE SHOULD BE PREPARED CONSIDER SUCH AN EVENTUALITY, FOR WHICH THE PRECEDING TRAIL BY CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE SET THE STAGE FOR US AND OUR ALLIES.

BRUCE

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By *[signature]* NARA, Date *6-10-88*

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DATE 1/28/88
NARS, Date

3

Recategorized as
Category "A"
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Warren A. Henderson
OCT 11 1965

UNDER SECRETARY
FEB 23 1959
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has acknowledged this letter from Mr. Baruch, but he wanted you to have a copy so that you would know his present thoughts on our relations with Russia.

Ann Whit

611.61/2-2359

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By	NARS Date

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

MESSAGE

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

DATE 5 Dec 1980

JCS WASH DC HARVEY A MCKEE LT COL USAF
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

TO : USNMR PARIS FRANCE

INFO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE

NR : JCS 955369

21 FEB 59

FOR GEN NORSTAD. FROM JCS.

CINCEUR, his component commanders, and USCOB have taken certain military actions pointed largely towards Berlin and generally in accordance with policy that they will be visible to Soviet intelligence but not cause public alarm. As results of Secretary Dulles visit to Europe, and of later political and military discussions on subject of both Berlin and Germany as a whole are there any military actions you feel we should take here to strengthen your US forces. We would also appreciate any comments on your progress with French and British in line with your comments to us on your visit here.

ACTION

INFO	
CJCS	2
Dir JS	1
Secy JCS	1
Dep Secy	1
J-1	1
J-2	1
J-3	1
J-4	1
J-5	1

ORIGIN: JCS

DISTR : CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC

JCS 955369

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FROM: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE

TO : JCS WASH DC

NR : EC 9-10240

SGD NORSTAD

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 JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

DATE 5 Dec 1980

231148Z FEB 59

Reference: JCS 955369 *attached*

1. On 18 Feb, after my return from US I directed the establishment at Hq US EUCOM of a small concealed US-only group, to be a nucleus for any tripartite staffs I might have to form, and meanwhile to consider military problems concerned with access to Berlin.

2. On 19 Feb, in conversation with Sir Frank Roberts, the British NATO Ambassador, I broached to him the subject of above. I asked him to give this information to Selwyn Lloyd, and to tell him:

(1) That I would welcome participation of one or more British Officers in the group being formed at US EUCOM, as either members or observers; and

(2) That I was quite willing to move forward in this area without formal instructions provided I was sure the Governments wished me to do so.

3. I would prefer to await the British response to the foregoing before approaching the French.

4. Will respond separately to your other question in ref msg.

ACTION: JCS

INFO : CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC

INFO	
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Dep Secy	2
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J-2	2
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J-4	1
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ACTION J-3

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(23 Feb 59)

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
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TOP SECRETENCLOSUREto JCS 1907/169
5 Mar 59MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

BERLIN (U)

00085P60

4 March 1959

1. The increased tempo of events surrounding the Berlin crisis plus growing indications that military force may be required to preserve U.S. interests makes it mandatory that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reexamine our military preparations. The recent national level decision restricts military preparations for possible eventualities to the extent that only minor steps may be taken to insure preparedness at a time when there may be a grave threat to our national security.

2. The meeting of the National Security Council scheduled for 5 March will provide an opportunity for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to express, through their Chairman, the fact that they view the situation with the utmost gravity, and are particularly concerned regarding their inability to insure proper military preparations under the national guidance now in effect.

3. I therefore recommend that the Joint Staff be directed to examine, as a matter of urgency, J.C.S. 1907/162 and provide recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows:

a. Those preparatory measures which are considered mandatory from a military point of view.

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JCS 1907/169

- 959 -

Enclosure

JCS 1907/169
4 Mar 59

REF ID: A66777

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Mar 5, 1959MEMORANDUM BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

for the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

RECOMMENDED MARINE CORPS ACTIONS TO IMPROVE READINESS TO MEET
POSSIBILITY OF GENERAL WAR RESULTING FROM BERLIN CRISIS

Serial 0003A6459

5 March 1959

1. In the course of the meeting of 4 March 1959 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to provide a list of recommended actions which each Service should undertake immediately to improve their readiness to meet the possibility of general war arising from the Berlin Crisis.

2. As a basic premise the Fleet Marine Forces should be deployed to forward positions or embarked and at sea not later than 20 May 1959.

3. To attain this posture of general war readiness the following specific actions are recommended for immediate implementation:

a. Build the Marine Corps' 3 Division/Wing Teams and supporting establishment up to full T/O strength by:

(1) Limited mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve,

(2) Holding all personnel at convenience of the government.

b. Have alternate CP fully operational by 1 May 1959.

c. Curtail or cancel all non-essential commitments for Marine Corps units.

d. Increase the present amphibious shipping to provide, by 1 May, a total amphibious lift for two T/O strength division/wing teams, and deploy one division/wing lift to each ocean.

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JCS 1907/168

- 956 -

Enclosure

JCS CR 1459 / 4172 Berlin / 1905 (4 Mar 59)

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b. Any additional preparatory measures which are mandatory but were not contained in J.C.S. 1907/162.

c. Measures to keep commanders of unified and specified commands completely informed as to the situation and what specifically might be expected of them now and in the event of a further deterioration of the situation.

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2181, MAY 4, 7 PM

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IN MY CONVERSATION WITH KHRUSHCHEV TODAY HE REFERRED TO MR. DULLES' ILLNESS AND SAID ALTHOUGH HE HAD REPUTATION OF BEING VERY ANTI-DULLES, HE THOUGHT IN LAST YEAR OR SO DULLES HAD BEEN FOLLOWING MUCH SOUNDER POLICY AND HE INDICATED HE HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR HIS ABILITY. HE HAD SHOWN HIMSELF FLEXIBLE AND REALISTIC. KHRUSHCHEV HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY DULLES' STATEMENT THAT FREE ELECTIONS WERE NOT ONLY WAY TO REUNIFY GERMANY.

HE THOUGHT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER WAS BEING MUCH MORE RIGID.

HE INQUIRED HOW I THOUGHT GENEVA CONFERENCE WOULD GO. I SAID I COULD NOT PREDICT OUTCOME BUT EXPECTED BE THERE MYSELF. REFERRING TO HIS REMARKS ABOUT FLEXIBILITY I SAID I THOUGHT THAT OVER LAST 20 YEARS OR SO THERE HAD BEEN ENORMOUS CHANGES IN AMERICAN SYSTEM WHEREAS IN SOVIET UNION THEY WERE VERY RIGID. WE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED WHEN MR. KHRUSHCHEV CAME TO POWER BY HIS STAND ON DIFFERENT ROADS TO SOCIALISM AND HIS POSITION AGAINST DOGMATISM IN SOVIET SYSTEM. THIS SEEMED TO HAVE CHANGED AND NOW IT WAS REVISIONISM THAT WAS PROCLAIMED THE GREAT DANGER. SO LONG AS SOVIET UNION STUCK TO RIGID INTERPRETATION OF HS IDEOLOGY IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO WORK OUT A MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION.

IN REPLY KHRUSHCHEV DISCOURSED AT LENGTH ON VARIATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT AGRICULTURAL POLICY TO WHICH THEY ATTACHED GREATEST IMPORTANCE WAS QUITE DIFFERENT IN ALL VARIOUS SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THIS WAS ALSO TRUE OF OTHER MATTERS. HE UNDERSTOOD OUR INTEREST IN YUGOSLAV AFFAIR BUT THAT WAS SIMPLY BECAUSE YUGOSLAVS WERE OPPOSING SOVIET UNION AND NOT

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-2-2181, MAY 4, 7 PM FROM MOSCOW

FOR ANY IDEOLOGICAL REASONS. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING
HE THOUGHT THERE WERE REAL POSSIBILITIES OF OUR WORKING
OUT UNDERSTANDING.

THOMPSON

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By <u>RWD</u>	NARS, Date <u>2/17/88</u>

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

DATE 13 Jan 1982

MAY 21 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military and Non-Military Counter-measures in the Berlin Crisis

Reference: Memorandum for the National Security Council from the Executive Secretary, April 28, 1959

Forwarded below is a report from the group, chaired by Mr. Murphy, which was established to coordinate further planning on countermeasures in the Berlin crisis.

Since physical difficulties over access to Berlin seem likely to come as gradual harassments rather than as a sudden blockade, a study of appropriate counter-harassments has been made. The Soviet Union and GDR enjoy various advantages if the issue is limited to the Berlin area and corridor. Therefore we have studied what counter-harassments might be undertaken by the West in other world areas.

The study's main findings are:

1. US capabilities to carry out counter-harassments alone are limited and do not provide a sufficient range of appropriate retaliations.
2. Allied capabilities are considerable, particularly against Soviet bloc shipping in allied ports and possibly in the Kiel Canal and the Dardanelles.
3. Tripartite agreement on and NATO support of both the principle of counter-harassment and specific types of projected counter-harassments should be sought. Some agreement on sharing ensuing financial losses and other costs may be essential.

4. An

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JCS (unclassified)
JCS 291 Germany (May 1959)
Dec 5 2001
(1959)

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By R.W.D. NARS, Date 2/17/88

-2-

4. An inter-allied operational group should be established soon.

This study will be used as a basis for initiating Tripartite counter-harassment planning as soon as possible.

Acting Secretary

1. Background
The Military Committee
Special WSC Meeting of 13
paper to meet a void in
decided to be undertaken
of allied traffic to
harassment is aimed at
and harassment of

S/S - 20

Enclosure:

Study of "Allied Counter-Harassment of Soviet Bloc Transportation", May 15, 1950.

2. Summary of Counter-Harassment

1. Harassment of Soviet Bloc
2. Harassment of Soviet Bloc
3. Harassment of Soviet Bloc
4. Harassment of Soviet Bloc

5. Harassment of Soviet Bloc
6. Harassment of Soviet Bloc
7. Harassment of Soviet Bloc
8. Harassment of Soviet Bloc

(2) Harassment of Soviet Bloc
(3) Delay of convoys
(4) Harassment of Soviet Bloc
(5) Harassment of Soviet Bloc

10. Harassment of Soviet Bloc
11. Harassment of Soviet Bloc
12. Harassment of Soviet Bloc
13. Harassment of Soviet Bloc

S/P:G.Morgan:jco

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 By RJD NARS, Date 2/17/88



THE JOINT STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20 May 1959

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DATE 13 Jan 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL TRIEBEL

Subject: Brief of Paper dated 15 May 1959, Subject:
 Allied Counter-Harassment of Soviet Bloc
 Transportation.

1. Background

a. The Murphy Committee which was formed as a result of the Special NSC Meeting of 23 April 1959 has developed the subject paper to meet a void in Berlin contingency planning as to allied action to be undertaken in response to Soviet or GDR harassment of allied traffic to West Berlin. Protracted and intensified harassment is viewed in the paper as being more likely than sudden total blockage of access to Berlin.

b. The paper has received the approval of the Murphy Committee, has been released to the U.K. and France for their comment, and a report to the President on the action is awaiting the signature of the Acting Secretary of State.

2. Concept of Counter-Harassment

a. Counter-harassment is conceived as action which is as nearly as possible equivalent in kind and severity to the original harassment and which is clearly intended to be removed when the harassment itself is ended. It is immaterial whether harassment is performed by the GDR or Soviets.

b. Examples of harassments are:

- (1) Requiring GDR visas for allied personnel not stationed in Berlin.
- (2) Imposition of tolls on the autobahn.
- (3) Delay of convoys.
- (4) Intermittent physical obstruction of ground access by passive means.

c. The targets for counter-harassment are primarily Soviet, GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Polish transportation. A caution has been inserted in regard to Poland because of the U.S. policy of encouraging her independence from the USSR.

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d. A more detailed, but not exhaustive, list of harassments and appropriate counter-harassments is included as an annex to the paper.

3. Main Findings

a. U.S. capabilities to carry out counter-harassments alone are limited and do not provide a sufficient range of appropriate retaliations.

b. Allied capabilities are considerable, particularly against Soviet bloc shipping in allied ports and possibly in the Kiel Canal and the Dardanelles. Legally, the possibility of effective measures in the latter places may be limited by the international status of the waterway.

c. Tripartite agreement on and NATO support of both the principle of counter-harassment and specific types of projected counter-harassments should be sought. Also, some agreement on ensuring financial losses and other cost may be essential. (Consultation on a tripartite basis has already been initiated.)

d. An inter-allied operational group should be established soon. This group to be prepared to recommend promptly specific counter-measures and coordinate their implementation when approved.


L. V. GREENE

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TO: Secretary of State

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FOLL LUNCHEON FOR HARRIMAN YESTERDAY HE, KHRUSHCHEV, KOZLOV, MIKOYAN, GROMYKO AND I HAD NEARLY TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WHICH CENTERED MOSTLY ON GERMANY AND BERLIN FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS; FULL TEXT BY DESPATCH.

KHRUSHCHEV WAS SERIOUS BUT GENIAL AND REPEATEDLY ASSERTED HIS DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH US. HE SUGGESTED WE SHOULD DRAW APPROPRIATE LESSONS FROM HISTORY WHICH US DID NOT APPRECIATE AS MUCH AS SOVIET UNION WHICH HAD TWICE BEEN INVADED BY GERMANY. I REPLIED HISTORIC LESSON WE DREW WAS THAT WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT ERROR FOLLOWING FIRST WORLD WAR OF GIVING GERMANY GROUNDS FOR THINKING SHE WAS BEING MISTREATED. KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE WAS NOT IMPRESSED BY THIS ARGUMENT. HE EXPRESSED HIS CONTEMPT FOR ADENAUER WHO HAD TRIED TO FLATTER HIM AND WAS TRYING TO STIR UP TROUBLE NOT ONLY BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND WEST BUT ALSO BETWEEN WESTERN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND BRITAIN. I SAID OUR EXPERIENCE WITH ADENAUER HAD SHOWN THAT HE GENUINELY WANTED TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF GERMAN MILITARISM AND HAD WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTED PLANS FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WHICH WOULD PREVENT THIS. HE SAID WE MUST FACE GERMAN PROBLEM SERIOUSLY AND RECOGNIZE THAT ULBRICHT AND ADENAUER COULD NEVER AGREE. WEST WOULD NEVER CONSENT TO A COMMUNIST GERMANY AND HE WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ADENAUER'S ABSORBING EAST GERMANY. BEST PLAN WAS TO CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY AND LIQUIDATE REMAINS OF WAR. WHEN I POINTED OUT WE HAD RECOGNIZED PRESENT SITUATION

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SITUATION BY PROVIDING FOR A PHASED PLAN HE SAID WE HAD ALLOWED 2 AND ONEHALF YEARS WHEREAS HE WOULD PREFER 250 YEARS. WHEN GROMYKO POINTED OUT OUR PLAN BASED ON ELECTIONS KHRUSHCHEV SAID WEST WOULD NOT ALLOW VIETNAM TO BE ABSORBED THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS AND HOW COULD WE EXPECT SOVIET UNION TO ALLOW ADENAUER TO ABSORB FOR MORE IMPORTANT AREA OF EAST GERMANY. IT WAS CLEAR THAT A REUNITED GERMANY WOULD JOIN NATO. WEST WANTED THEM TO ALLOW GREATER POPULATION OF WEST GERMANY TO DECIDE ISSUE. HE HAD NO GOOD ANSWER TO MY ARGUMENT THAT OUR PLAN PROVIDED FOR POSSIBILITY SEPARATE VOTE IN TWO PARTS OF GERMANY. KHRUSHCHEV ASKED ME IF WE WOULD EVER ALLOW WEST GERMANY TO OPT FOR SOCIALISM. I SAID HE WOULD DOUBTLESS NOT BELIEVE ME BUT I WAS SURE THAT IF WEST GERMANY TOOK SUCH A DECISION IN A SUPERVISED ELECTION THAT WAS NOT UNDER PRESSURE OF THREATS, WE WOULD ABIDE BY THE DECISION. KHRUSHCHEV SAID I HAD BEST BE CAREFUL AND WAS I SO SURE THAT THIS MIGHT NOT ONE DAY HAPPEN AFTER SOVIETS HAD CONTINUED TO IMPROVE THEIR OWN ECONOMIC POSITION AND STANDARD OF LIVING IN EAST GERMANY HAD BEEN RAISED. HE SAID THAT ADENAUER DID NOT WANT GERMAN REUNIFICATION FOR FEAR GERMANY WOULD GO SOCIALIST.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID IT WAS CLEAR GERMAN QUESTION COULD NOT BE SETTLED NOW AND HE HAD THEREFORE PUT FORWARD HIS BERLIN PROPOSAL. HE HAD DEVELOPED THE FREE CITY SOLUTION PERSONALLY ALTHOUGH HIS ASSOCIATES AGREED WITH HIM. HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE ALMOST ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE FOR THE FREE CITY. HE EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE THAT SOVIET GOVT WHICH CAME TO POWER AFTER DEATH OF STALIN ATTACHED TO KEEPING ITS WORD AND THAT IT WOULD FAITHFULLY FULFILL ANY GUARANTEE GIVEN. WE SHOULD KNOW THAT WHEN DISCUSSIONS WERE RESUMED IN GENEVA WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT CHANGE IN SOVIET POSITION AS THEY COULD NOT GO BEYOND PROPOSALS ALREADY PUT FORWARD. HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION TO BE THAT IF THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT IN GENEVA THERE WOULD BE NO SUMMIT CONFERENCE. IF THIS WERE SO, VERY WELL,

BUT HE

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1 BUT HE
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-3-2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW

BUT HE WOULD THEN CONCLUDE SEPARATE PEACE TREATY AND
OUR OCCUPATION RIGHTS WOULD CEASE TO EXIST. HE KEPT
HIS TEMPER WHEN I INQUIRED HOW HE COULD RECONCILE THIS
STATEMENT WITH HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE
THE SOVIET GOVT ATTACHED TO KEEPING ITS WORD. THIS LED
TO A LONG AND INCONCLUSIVE ARGUMENT ABOUT WHO WAS TO
BLAME FOR BREAKDOWN OF FOUR POWER COOPERATION IN GERMANY.
HE POINTED TO OUR CONCLUSION OF SEPARATE TREATY WITH JAPAN.
THEN I SAID WE HAD RESERVED SOVIET RIGHTS HE REPLIED THAT
THEY HAD BEEN KICKED OUT OF ALLIED COUNCIL AND WE HAD
ESTABLISHED MILITARY BASES IN JAPAN. MIKOYAN INTERJECTED
THEY WOULD GIVE US SAME DEAL ON GERMANY AS WE HAD GIVEN
THEM ON JAPAN.

THOMPSON

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TO: Secretary of State

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PARIS 425, BONN 339.

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KHRUSHCHEV ASKED WHAT WAS WRONG WITH SOVIET PROPOSAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT WEST BERLIN AND ITS POPULATION WAS OF NO IMPORTANCE TO SOVIET UNION. I SAID I COULD BELIEVE THIS BUT BERLIN WAS CLEARLY IMPORTANT TO EAST GERMANS WHO WANTED TO ABSORB IT AND SOVIET PROPOSALS SEEMED TO US CLEARLY DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THIS OBJECTIVE.

KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO SECRETARY HERTER'S SPEECH WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS AN INCORRECT STATEMENT OF THE POSITION. GROMYKO HAD NOT INTENDED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT BUT WOULD NOW BE OBLIGED TO PUT RECORD STRAIGHT.

I REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENT THAT SOVIET UNION HAD MADE ITS MAXIMUM OFFER AND SAID I THOUGHT SAME WAS TRUE OF WEST ALTHOUGH VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR OFFER WERE POSSIBLE. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS WE SHOULD CANCEL THE MEETING. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIM BUT MERELY TRYING TO EXPLAIN MY UNDERSTANDING OF MY GOVT'S POSITION. I EXPLAINED THIS IN SOME DETAIL REFERRING TO SOVIET ACTION IN DISPOSING OF EAST BERLIN AND NOW TRYING TO MOVE IN ON WEST BERLIN. WHEN I OUTLINED THE CONCESSIONS WE HAD MADE AND THE DISTANCE WE HAD GONE TO MEET HIS POSITION HE SAID HE HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED OUR PROPOSAL WHICH DID

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-2- 2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW.

WHICH DID IN FACT CONTAIN MANY CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS. IT WAS NOT BAD EXCEPT FOR ONE FACT AND THAT WAS THAT IT WAS TO OPERATE UNTIL GERMAN REUNIFICATION WHICH WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. IT MIGHT BE ALL RIGHT AS AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT TO OPERATE UNTIL A PEACE TREATY COULD BE DRAWN UP AND CONCLUDED.

I REFERRED TO A REMARK HE HAD MADE THAT OUR TROOPS IN BERLIN HAD NO MILITARY VALUE AND THAT EVEN IF WE HAD 100,000 THERE THEY WOULD BE WIPED OUT IMMEDIATELY IN THE EVENT OF WAR. I ASKED WHY WAS HE THEN SO ANXIOUS TO GET RID OF THEM. HE REPLIED THAT WHILE THEY WOULD HAVE NO MILITARY VALUE IN THE EVENT OF WAR THEY DID HAVE A MILITARY VALUE NOW. GROMYKO EXPLAINED THAT SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN BERLIN OPERATED UNDER THE PROTECTION OF WESTERN TROOPS. IF PEACE TREATY WERE SIGNED THEY COULD NO LONGER FULFILL THIS FUNCTION. I SAID THIS INDICATED THAT SOVIET UNION OR GDR WOULD DECIDE WHICH ORGANIZATIONS WERE LEGITIMATE AND WHICH WERE NOT. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF BERLIN AND SHOWED CLEARLY WHERE SOVIET PROPOSALS WOULD LEAD. KHRUSHCHEV SAID THIS WAS AN EXAGGERATED INTERPRETATION.

I ALSO REFERRED TO THE LACK OF RECIPROCITY IN SOVIET PROPOSALS ON PROPAGANDA ETC. KHRUSHCHEV SAID IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL ACTIVITIES IN EAST GERMANY AND ALLOW BONN TO BE FREE TO CONTINUE THEM. I SAID WE RECOGNIZED THIS AND WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH IT BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT ARRANGEMENTS ON THIS MATTER THAT APPLIED TO WEST BERLIN BUT NOT EAST BERLIN.

KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO HOLDING OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN WEST BERLIN AS A PROVOCATIVE ACT BUT NOT IN ANY MANNER SUGGESTING SOVIETS INTENDED TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT.

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KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO HOLDING OF PR
IN WEST BERLIN AS A PROVOCATIVE ACT BY
SUGGESTING SOVIETS INTENDED TO DO ANYTH

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-3- 2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM(SECTION TWO OF TWO),FROM MOSCOW.

KHRUSHCHEV THEN TOLD ANECDOTE TO ILLUSTRATE THESES I
WAS MERELY REPEATING OLD ARGUMENTS.

HARRIMAN EMPHASIZED STRONGLY THAT BOTH PARTIES IN US
SUPPORTED PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON BERLIN. KHRUSHCHEV
SUGGESTED THAT WHILE POLITICAL PARTIES MIGHT BE IN
AGREEMENT SOME OF OUR PEOPLE WERE NOT BUT HE RECOGNIZED
THEY HAD TO DEAL WITH OUR GOVT. KHRUSHCHEV CONCLUDED
CONVERSATION BY SAYING WE SHOULD WORK OUT AN INTERIM
ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD LEAD TO A PEACE TREATY AND HE
SUGGESTED THIS COULD BE DONE IN A WAY TO AVOID ANY
ASPECT OF AN ULTIMATUM.

UNLESS DEPT PERCEIVES OBJECTION I PROPOSE INFORM MY
FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES OF THIS CONVERSATION.

THOMPSON

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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.
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June 29, 1959

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SUBJECT: Conversation with Khrushchev June 25 Concerning Germany and Berlin

L I M I T D I S T R I B U T I O N

Supplementing my referenced cable, Khrushchev told me he had no desire to try to separate the Western allies from each other and that he would like to get along well not only with us but with our friends, even including the West Germans. Then he proceeded, however, to make contemptuous remarks about Chancellor Adenauer.

When he said that a united Germany would join NATO and that the Soviets had no illusions on this point, I remarked that this might be true but was a problem which could be dealt with and which we were prepared to examine in all sincerity. There had been many statements by high American officials to the effect that we sought no military advantage from the reunification of Germany.

When Khrushchev said that Adenauer and Ulbricht could never agree and implied that we should accept the indefinite division of Germany, I said the real problem was that the Soviets appeared unwilling ever to allow a country which had gone Communist to change its mind and revert to a capitalist system. When he did not dispute this I went on to say that this raised a fundamental problem in our relations and one which would always keep us at odds. So long as the Soviets followed such a policy that Communism was a one-way street, we would be obliged to oppose Communism or any steps in that direction wherever they developed. I said that as matters now stood, once a country became Communist it appeared that the whole power of the Communist Bloc would be used to maintain it in the Bloc. I could imagine a case where a country might wish to try a socialistic or Communist experiment but if it meant it was irrevocably to remain Communist despite the wishes of its people, then we must be obliged to oppose such a development; otherwise the Communists would eventually achieve their goal of world domination.

In discussing the Western proposals at Geneva regarding Berlin, I spelled out in detail the concessions which the West had made. In commenting on this Khrushchev appeared to recognize that we had in fact made a genuine effort to meet the Soviet point of view, but he made clear that nothing would satisfy him that failed to perpetuate the division of Germany.

Llewellyn E. Thompson
Llewellyn E. Thompson

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TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

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	7/7			

SUBJECT: Conversation with Khrushchev

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Supplementing my telegram #2665, the following points developed in my conversation with Khrushchev on the occasion of the luncheon given for Averell Harriman on June 25.

During the course of the luncheon Khrushchev talked about the current Plenum of the Central Committee and said that in addition to the members of the Central Committee there were about 700 Communist and Government officials attending. I raised the question of the decentralization of industry and observed that a lot of their plans still appeared to be on paper. I also said it seemed to me that 104 was an unwieldy number of Councils of National Economy. Khrushchev agreed on both points and said their plans called for a consolidation of the existing Councils of National Economy, but said this would have to be done gradually. He also said they would further decentralize the operation of the economy but could not do this until their production reached higher levels. The present system did not sufficiently develop local initiative but until they had bigger margins to work with they could take no chances by not keeping tight control in Moscow.

In the course of this conversation Khrushchev remarked that both Bulganin and Kaganovich had supported him in his plan to decentralize. He said Molotov was opposed and that in general both Molotov and Kaganovich were opposed to any innovations or changes in the system.

There was a good deal of banter across the table between Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Kozlov. At one point Harriman asked if Khrushchev were not worried that we would try to keep Kozlov in America. Later on Harriman said that if Khrushchev came we would really make an effort to hold him. When Mikoyan said this would be a splendid idea, Khrushchev said that it was perfectly clear why Mikoyan supported this idea as he was after Khrushchev's job. Although said with a smile, one could not help but think the remark made Mikoyan uncomfortable.

At another point in the conversation Harriman made some remark about their completing the Seven Year Plan in five years. Khrushchev said that there was one thing he did not need to worry about as this would not happen. In discussing planning, Khrushchev said their Seven Year Plan was merely an outline of a general direction since science and technology were developing so fast today.

L. Thompson: cmg

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that it was impossible to plan accurately seven years in advance. He referred to the tendency of the industrial ministries and other economic units to demand resources three or four times in excess of their needs but said that despite this their plans had worked out fairly well. He said this had been possible despite the fact that the Soviet Union was surrounded by American bases.

In connection with the opening of the American Exhibition, he said he had to leave for Poland on July 14 and did not plan to return until July 23 or 24. He said he would arrange his schedule, however, to be sure to be here for the opening of our Exhibition. He spoke as though he dreaded the Polish trip as he said the Poles would insist on his doing a lot of traveling and speaking, which was very tiring. He looked to be in better health than the last time I had seen him, but obviously is beginning to find he does not have the energy he once had.

I shall submit a separate report supplementing that part of our conversation which related to the German and Berlin questions.

Llewellyn E. Thompson
Llewellyn E. Thompson

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JCSM-269-59
13 JUL 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Relative Military Capabilities in the
1959-1961/62 Time Period (U)

1. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that during FY 1960 the military capability of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union provides the most favorable basis for political negotiation by the United States that is likely to exist within the foreseeable future. Through 1960, the atomic retaliatory forces of the United States will continue to provide a capability to inflict such loss and damage upon the enemy as to achieve a significant margin of advantage which, if exploited effectively in conjunction with other military operations, would permit the United States and its Allies to prevail in general war.

2. Despite continued improvement in the quality and posture of the forces of the United States and its Allies as presently programmed and within current expectation for FY's 1961 and 1962, Soviet technological advances will probably continue to diminish the margin of U.S. military superiority. By the end of this period, with a continuance of present trends and programs on both sides, and with no major technological breakthroughs on either side in the intervening years, the most probable position will be that of each side having military strength of potentially decisive proportions with an advantage, possibly conclusive, to the side taking the initiative.

3. In summary, we are now in a relatively better position than the USSR to negotiate from a position of military strength; our negotiating position in this regard is deteriorating and it does not appear that we will retain this advantage into the period under consideration.

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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

ARLEIGH BURKE,
Chief of Naval Operations.

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Rec'd: JULY 27, 1959
12:44 P.M.

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 327, JULY 27, 5 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF SEVEN)

PRIORITY

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FOR PRESIDENT FROM VICE PRESIDENT.

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY

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OPEN AIR LUNCHEON AT SOV GOVT DACHA BEGAN AT 3:30
AND CONTINUED UNTIL 8:45. ALL MEMBERS BOTH AMERICAN
AND SOV GROUPS WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT INCLUDING WIVES.

FOLL SUMMARIZES ACCOUNTS LONG AND SOMETIMES REPETITIVE
CONVERSATION; SUBJECT LATER REVIEW AND CORRECTION:

KHRUSHCHEV: AFTER ABOUT 1/2 HOUR CASUAL TABLE TALK
KHRUSHCHEV LAUNCHED SERIOUS PHASE OF CONVERSATION WITH
DISCOURSE ON SOV ROCKET AND ATOMIC PROWESS. HE HAD HAD
LONG SESSION YESTERDAY WITH SOV SCIENTIST WHO HAD PRESENTED
PLANS TO HIM FOR LAUNCHING ROCKETS INTO EARTH ORBIT WITH
PAYLOAD 100 TONS. THIS WAS SUFFICIENT FOR ALL KINDS
OF INSTRUMENTATION; ALSO SUFFICIENT TO CARRY MAN AND
EQUIPMENT FOR HIS RETURN TO EARTH. PROJECT ONLY CAL-
CULATION AT PRESENT BUT SOLIDLY BASED AND CLEARLY REALIZABLE
WITH DIFFICULTY. HE THEN REFERRED TO ACCURACY OF MODERN
MISSILES, CITING SOVIET ICBM LAUNCHING ABOUT WEEK AGO
OVER 7,000 KILOMETERS COURSE WITH FINAL DEVIATION OFF
TARGET 1.7 KILOMETERS IN DISTANCE AND 1.4 KILOMETER
DEVIATION TO RIGHT. HOWEVER ACCIDENTS WERE ALWAYS POSSIBLE.
COUPLE OF MONTHS AGO SOV GOVT HAD BEEN VERY WORRIED

WHEN

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WHEN ICBM OF SAME TYPE HAD MALFUNCTION. ENGINE CUTOFF HAD NOT WORKED AND MISSILE HAD OVERSHOT SET COURSE BY 2000 KILOMETERS. SOV GOVT FEARED MIGHT LAND IN ALASKA BUT FORTUNATELY FELL INTO OCEAN. WHILE MISSILE CARRIED NO WARHEAD ACCIDENTAL LANDING ALASKA, HE REALIZED, WOULD HAVE CREATED GRAVE INCIDENT.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE SUPPOSED WE HAD MONITORED THESE SHOTS.

HE KNEW THAT WE DO THIS SYSTEMATICALLY AND CONFIRMED SOVS DO SAME FOR OURS. SOVS HAVE WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE US OPERATIONAL PLANS AND ASSUMED THAT WE HAVE WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE THEIRS. HE THEN REPEATED STATEMENT MADE TO HARRIMAN THAT INVESTMENT OF 30 BILLION RUBLES SUFFICIENT TO COVER SUPPLY OF MISSILES OF ALL TYPES ADEQUATE TO ENSURE DEVASTATION OF ALL PRINCIPAL TARGETS IN US AND EUROPE.

NIXON: INQUIRED ABOUT ANOTHER STATEMENT KHRUSHCHEV REPORTEDLY MADE TO HARRIMAN - THAT SOVS HAVE SUPPLIED MISSILES TO COMMUNIST CHINA TARGETED ON TAIWAN AND STRAITS.

KHRUSHCHEV: DENIED HE HAD TOLD HARRIMAN SOV GOVT HAD SUPPLIED ROCKETS TO CHINESE. SAID HE HAD TOLD HIM "IF RPT IF OTHER SIDE AGGRESSED THEN SOV UNION WOULD SUPPLY ROCKETS TO CHINESE."

NIXON: ASKED WHETHER IN TALKING OF 30 BILLION RUBLE INVESTMENT FOR ROCKETS KHRUSHCHEV WAS TALKING OF WHAT SOV UNION ACTUALLY HAS OR WHAT IT COULD HAVE.

KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED HE WAS TALKING OF WHAT SOVIETS HAVE. (HOWEVER THERE WAS AT THIS POINT CONSIDRRABLE DISCUSSION BETWEEN SOV LEADERS AND INTERPRETERS. CONSENSUS OF RUSSIAN-SPEAKING AMERICANS PRESENT WAS THAT KHRUSHCHEV WAS TALKING IN TERMS OF PRESENT SOVIE ABILITIES RATHER THAN OF ACTUAL STOCKS OF MISSILES ON HAND.

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DISCUSSION BETWEEN SOV LEADERS AND
OF RUSSIAN-SPEAKING AMERIC
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CAPABILITIES RATHER THAN OF ACTUAL STOL
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-3- 327, JULY 27, 5 PM (SECTION ONE OF SEVEN) FROM
MOSCOW - CORRECTED PAGES 3 AND 4

NIXON: ASKED WHY IF SOVS WERE SO ADVANCED IN MISSILES THEY
CONTINUE TO BUILD BOMBERS.

KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED SOVS HAVE ALMOST STOPPED PRODUCTION
OF BOMBERS. BEING BUILT ONLY IN NUMBERS SUFFICIENT TO
MAINTAIN TRAINING OF SOV AIR PERSONNEL SO THIS INVESTMENT
WLD NOT BE LOST. MAYBE SOMETIME THESE BOMBERS WOULD
BE USEFUL FOR SOME LIMITED PURPOSE BUT THIS WAS NOT LIKELY.
MISSILES MUCH MORE ACCURATE AND NOT SUBJECT TO HUMAN
FAILURE AND HUMAN EMOTIONS. SAID HUMANS FREQUENTLY
INCAPABLE OF DROPPING BOMBS ON ASSIGNED TARGETS BECAUSE
OF EMOTIONAL REVULSION, FACTOR NOT PRESENT IN MISSILES.
CITED INCIDENT IN WORLD WAR TWO WHEN RUSSIAN BOMBADIERS
CLAIMED TO HAVE HIT ADVANCED TARGET BUT WHEN TERRITORY
RECOVERED SOVS FOUND TARGET UNSCATHED BECAUSE BOMBS
JETTISONED HARMLESSLY. KHRUSHCHEV THEN WENT ON
TO SAY REALLY OBSOLETE ELEMENT IN ARMS WAS NAVIES
WHICH COULD ONLY PROVIDE "FODDER FOR SHARKS". CITED
CRUISER FOR EXAMPLE AS BEING COMPLETELY USELESS, A
"SITTING DUCK".

NIXON: OBSERVED KHRUSHCHEV APPARENTLY DID NOT INCLUDE
SUBMARINES IN HIS ANALYSIS OF MODERN NAVAL CAPABILITIES,
SINCE SOVS WERE REPORTED BUILDING SUBS IN QUANTITIES.

KHRUSHCHEV: CONFIRMED SOVS ARE BUILDING "AS MANY SUBS
AS THEY CAN". MIKOYAN INTERVENED AND SAID "AS MANY
AS THEY NEED".

NIXON: COMMENTED SUBS USEFUL AND SECURE FOR LAUNCHING
MISSILES.

KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED LAND BASES MUCH BETTER. SUBMARINES
HAD LIMITED MISSILE RANGE, CAPABLE ONLY OF DESTROYING

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PORTS AND SUBURBAN AREAS. MORE IMPORTANT FOR PURPOSE
OF DESTROYING ENEMY NAVAL POWER AND PARALYZING COMMUNICATION,
A FACTOR WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY BE IMPORTANT TO SOV UNION
IN ANY WAR SINCE POTENTIAL ENEMIES WERE HIGHLY DEPENDENT
ON SEA COMMUNICATIONS. HE SAID SOVIET ROCKETS
LAUNCHED FROM ZAUSZNOW HAVE EFFECTIVE RANGE 600 KILOMETERS
WITH LATER IMPROVEMENTS WILL BE POSSIBLE EXTEND THIS
RANGE TO 1000 KILOMETERS.

NIXON: THEN REFERRED TO QUESTION OF FUEL FOR MISSILES,
SAYING WE UNDERSTAND USSR HAS MADE GOOD PROGRESS IN THIS
FIELD, TO JUDGE BY THRUSTS THEY HAVE ATTAINED. CLEARLY
FUTURE CALLED PLAN DEVELOPMENT OF SOLID FUELS, EASIER
TO STORE AND MAINTAIN IN READINESS.

KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED THIS WAS TECHNICAL SUBJECT WHICH
HE WAS NOT CAPABLE OF DISCUSSING.

MRS. NIXON: OPPORTUNELY CREATED DIVERSION IN TALK WHICH HAD
REACHED STICKILY WAR-LIKE STAGE BY EXPRESSING SURPRISE THERE WAS
SUBJECT KHRUSHCHEV NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS. TO HER KHRUSHCHEV
"ONE-MAN GOVT" SEEMED TO KNOW EVERYTHING AND TO HAVE EVERYTHING
FIRMLY IN OWN HANDS. MIKOYAN INTERJECTED THAT EVEN KHRUSHCHEV DID
NOT HAVE ENOUGH HANDS SO NEEDED OTHERS TO HELP HIM.

NIXON: TURNED TO KHRUSHCHEV'S RECENT STATEMENTS ABOUT PUTTING
SOV MISSILE BASES IN ALBANIA AND BULGARIA.

KHRUSHCHEV REPLIED THIS QUESTION RELATED ESTABLISHMENT US MISSILE
BASES IN ITALY AND GREECE. BOTH THESE COUNTRIES WERE WITHIN 300
KILOMETER RANGE OF ALBANIA. THEY COULD BE BETTER HIT FROM BASES
THERE AT THIS SHORT RANGE WITHOUT ENDANGERING NEUTRALS. WHEN VP
INTERJECTED "OR WITHOUT DANGER TO YOURSELVES FROM FALLOUT"
KHRUSHCHEV DISMISSED THIS AS "ANOTHER QUESTION".

THOMPSON

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INTERJECTED "OR WITHOUT DANGER TO YOURSELF
KHRUSHCHEV DISMISSED THIS AS "ANOTHER QUESTI-
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2:17 P.M.

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 327, JULY 27, 5 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF SEVEN)
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FOR PRESIDENT FROM VICE PRESIDENT

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY -- LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

HE THEN REFERRED TO TURKEY. WHILE HE HAD NOT MENTIONED
TURKEY IN HIS SPEECHES, TURKEY COULD OF COURSE BE HIT
EFFECTIVELY DIRECT FROM SOV TERRITORY AS WELL AS FROM
BULGARIA. HOWEVER, HE SAID, SOVS HAD NO BASES IN THE
BALKANS YET. BASES WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN ALBANIA WHEN
US BASES WERE ESTABLISHED IN ITALY AND IN BULGARIA WHEN
US BASES WERE ESTABLISHED IN GREECE.

NIXON: ASKED WHETHER SOVS DID NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS NATO AND THE
SEPARATE COUNTRIES BELONGING TO NATO.

KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED "YES", BUT MEMBERS HAD TO MAKE
DECISION ABOUT BASES IF THEY WANTED AVOID BECOMING
MISSILE TARGETS.

NIXON: OBSERVED KHRUSHCHEV FREQUENTLY MADE STATEMENTS
PUBLICLY OF THE KIND HE WAS MAKING PRIVATELY TODAY.
WHEN WEST READ SUCH STATEMENTS POSSIBLE THAT THEY GET
AN IMPRESSION WHICH KHRUSHCHEV DID NOT INTEND. NIXON
ABLE APPRECIATE THAT TODAY THE TALK WAS FRANK AND
STRAIGHTFORWARD, BUT WHEN SUCH TALK PUBLISHED THROUGHOUT
WORLD FREQUENTLY CREATES IMPRESSION OF A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT
TO FREIGHTEN. PRESIDENT WAS HIGHLY COMPETENT IN THE
MILITARY FIELD AND COULD DISCUSS THESE MATTERS AT LENGTH.
AS KHRUSHCHEV KNOWS, US HAS GREAT POWER ALSO BUT WE DO
NOT WANT TO HAVE TO USE IT. PRESENT POWER CAPABILITIES
COULD ONLY LEAD TO MUTUAL DESTRUCTION. THEY WERE NOT

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-2- 327, JULY 27, 5 PM (SECTION TWO OF SEVEN) FROM MOSCOW
- CORRECTED PAGE TWO

YET EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO INSURE THAT RETALIATORY POWER COULD BE ELIMINATED EVEN WITH A SUDDEN BLOW. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, ESSENTIAL BOTH SIDES FULLY REALIZE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIALITIES MODERN WEAPONS AND APPROACH QUESTION TO FIND MEANS OF AVOIDING THEIR USE. HE WAS SURE THAT KHRUSHCHEV, LIKE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, SINCERELY WANTS PEACE.

KHRUSHCHEV: EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT AS TO THE PRESENT CORRELATION OF FORCES AS BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS. HE DENIED SOVIET LEADERS MADE STATEMENTS THREATENING DESTRUCTION BUT CHARGED AMERICAN MILITARY FIGURES ARE ALWAYS DOING SO AS REGARDS THEIR ABILITY WIPE OUT SOV UNION. (THE VICE PRESIDENT INDICATED DISSENT BUT KHRUSHCHEV HELD FLOOR). HE THEN CONTINUED TO SAY HE WOULD REVEAL A SECRET. VP UNDOUBTEDLY WAS FAMILIAR WITH MARSHAL VERSHININ'S STATEMENT ABOUT A YEAR AGO ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES OF DESTRUCTION. THIS WAS KHRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENT WRITTEN BY HIM AND DISCUSSED WITHIN GOVT. PRESIDUM HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED AT WHAT LEVEL STATEMENT SHOULD BE ISSUED; FINALLY CHOSE VERSHININ TO EQUATE WITH SOURCES OF US THREATS WHICH SOV GOVT COULD NOT LET PASS IN SILENCE. THEN CITED A BOOK HE UNDERSTOOD TO BE CURRENT IN ENGLAND ABOUT PESSIMISTS AND OPTIMISTS. PESSIMISTS SAID ONLY 6 ATOMIC BOMBS WOULD WIPE OUT UK. OPTIMISTS SAID 9 OR 10 WOULD BE REQUIRED. WHO IS RIGHT? THEN WENT ON TO SAY "TURKEY IS YOUR BASE. WHY ARE YOU THERE? THIS IS A POOR COUNTRY". HE WOULD TELL US ANOTHER SECRET. USSR KEEPS NO NAVY IN BLACK SEA AS NAVY FORCES THERE ARE VULNERABLE AND OF NO USE. "SINCE WE CAN DESTROY YOUR BASES IN TURKEY WHO DO YOU KEEP THEM? MIKOYAN INTERJECTED ANSWER WAS "FOR PURPOSE OF POLITICAL DOMINATION". KHRUSHCHEV REPEATED "IF YOU INTEND TO MAKE WAR ON US I UNDERSTAND. IF NOT, WHY DO YOU KEEP THEM?" HE THEN REFERRED TO THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY SAYING DECISION TO CONCLUDE MADE BY HIM. MOLOTOV HAD "D CONCLUSION TREATY WAS NOT POSSIBLE. KHRUSHCHEV ASKED "WHY? WANT TO KEEP THEM IN ORDER TO MAKE WAR? IF SO I UNDERSTAND.

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-3- 327, JULY 27, 5 P.M., FROM MOSCOW (SECTION TWO OF SEVEN)

BUT IF NOT THEN KEEPING OUR FORCES THERE GIVES AN IMPRESSION OF AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS WHICH WE CAN'T REFUTE." QUESTION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH IN PRESIDIUM AND DECISION FINALLY APPROVED BY EVERY MEMBER EXCEPT MOLOTOV. KHRUSHCHEV SAID "WE GAINED BY THIS. WE HAVE BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH AUSTRIA, EVEN BETTER THAN WITH FINLAND."

HE ADDED "DESPITE BOURGEOIS REGIMES IN BOTH COUNTRIES", THEN SAID WHEN HE HAD CHARGED CHANCELLOR RAAB WITH BEING A CAPITALIST RAAB HAD REPLIED HE WAS ONLY "SMALL CAPITALIST". KHRUSHCHEV WENT ON THAT HE HAD ALSO PROPOSED TO PRESIDIUM DECISIONS TO PULL OUT OF PORT ALLY BASE IN FINLAND AND PORT ARTHUR." IF THE PORT ALLY BASE WERE MAINTAINED". HE ASKED MOLOTOV, "HOW WERE THEY TO PROVE TO THE FINNS THEY HAD NO HOSTILE INTENTIONS?" KHRUSHCHEV THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF THE US WOULD DO THE SAME THING WITH RESPECT TO BASES, WORLD TENSIONS WOULD BE RELAXED. "I PUT TO YOU THE SAME QUESTION THAT PUT TO MOLOTOV. WHY KEEP THEM?" HOWEVER, HE CONTINUE, "NOW YOU ARE ARRANGING FOR BASES IN IRAN. (AMB THOMPSON INTERJECTED A DENIAL.) KHRUSHCHEV CONTINUED THAT HE HAD READ THE TREATY AND SAID IT PROVIDED FOR "US AID IN THE EVENT OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION." WHAT DID THIS MEAN?

NIXON: SAID HE HOPED KHRUSHCHEV DID NOT THINK SOVS COULD HOLD MEETING OF COMMUNISTS OF 51 COUNTRIES IN MOSCOW WITHOUT OUR KNOWING WHAT THEY WERE UP TO AND WHAT KIND OF DIRECTIVES THEY WERE GETTING. JUST RECENTLY IN POLAND KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF OPENLY DECLARED SOVS SUPPORT COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONS EVERYWHERE.

KHRUSHCHEV: "YOU SHOULDN'T PAY YOUR AGENTS." CLAIMED NOTHING CAME OUT OF MOSCOW MEETINGS THAT WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN PRESS. "YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND OUR TEACHING." YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT CONSPIRATORIAL PARTIES LIKE THE ANARCHISTS AND NARODNIKS IN OLD CZARIST RUSSIA. EVEN THEN THE COMMUNISTS DISAGREED. WE ARE MASS TEACHERS

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AND ARE AGAINST TERROR (IN RESPONSE VP'S DISSENT, KHRUSHCHEV SPECIFIED "TERROR AGAINST INDIVIDUAL") HE CONTINUED THAT IF SOVS SUPPORT COMMUNIST UPRISING TAKING PLACE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY THAT IS DIFFERENT QUESTION. IF BOURGEOISE DOESN'T SURRENDER POWER PEACEFULLY THEN IT IS TRUE FORCE IS NECESSARY.

NIXON: OBSERVED THAT SOVIETS THEREFORE CONSIDER WORKERS IN CAPITALIST STATES "CAPTIVES" WHOSE LIBERATION IS JUSTIFIED.

DR. EISENHOWER: ADDED THIS SEEMED CLEARLY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

KHRUSHCHEV: DENIED THIS POLICY CONSTITUTED INTERFERENCE. STRESSED SOV SUPPORT ONLY IF RPT IF INTERNAL UPRISING TAKES PLACE.

NIXON: ASKED HOW UPRISING IN NORTHERN IRAQ LAST WEEK FITTED INTO KHRUSHCHEV'S THEORIES. THIS RESULTED IN CONSIDERABLE EXCHANGE AMONG THE RUSSIANS WITH CONFUSION BETWEEN LAST WEEK'S UPRISING AND LAST YEAR'S REVOLUTION.

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NO: 327, JULY
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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 327, JULY 27, 5 PM (SECTION THREE OF SEVEN)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 327, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GENEVA 25
FOR PRESIDENT FROM VICE PRESIDENT

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY - LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

KHRUSHCHEV: FINALLY REPLIED HE DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT THIS
UPRISING AND COULD NOT COMMNT.

NIXON: WENT ON TO CITE CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

KHRUSHCHEV: SAID ALL RIGHT. THIS WAS INTERESTING EXAMPLE.
COMMUNIST PARTY WAS ONLY ELEMENT IN COUNTRY WHICH HAD
NOT SURRENDERED TO GERMANS. AFTER WAR PEOPLE ROSE UP
AND TOOK POWER. THERE WAS NOT ONE RED ARMY SOLDIER IN
COUNTRY. CZECH REVOLUTION WAS LIKE US REVOLUTION."
DID GEORGE THIRD GIVE US INDEPENDENCE? NO, PEOPLE
WON IT BY REVOLUTION." OF COURSE, HE CONCLUDED,
WE SYMPATHIZE WITH SUCH POPULAR UPRISINGS.

NIXON: RAISED PERSONAL QUESTION ABOUT INCITEMENT OF
SOVIET PRESS AND RADIO CALLING FOR TERRORISM AGAINST
MRS. NIXON AND HIMSELF IN VENEZUELA. MOB HAD TRIED TO
KILL THEM AND SOV PRESS AND RADIO HAD AFTERWARDS APPROVED.
HOW DID KHRUSHCHEV SQUARE THIS WITH HIS STATEMENT?

KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED- YOU ARE OUR GUEST BUT "MY
MOTHER IS THE TRUTH". I WILL ANSWER YOUR QUESTION.
YOU WERE TARGET OF RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION OF THE PEOPLE.
THEIR ACTS WERE DIRECTED NOT AGAINST YOU PERSONALLY BUT
AGAINST US POLICY -- THE FAILURE OF YOUR POLICY.

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NIXON: SAID HE ACCEPTED KHRUSHCHEV'S RIGHT TO HIS OPINION AND HIS SYMPATHY FOR SUCH ACTS. WANTED POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN MILITARY POWER LIKE THAT OF SOV UNION IS COUPLED WITH SUCH REVOLUTIONARY POLICIES THERE IS GRAVE DANGER OF MATTERS GETTING OUT OF CONTROL. IN COMPARISON 2,000 KILOMETER MISTAKE ON ICBM RELATIVELY SMALL ERROR. SUCH DANGERS WERE REASON WHY STRONG MEN LIKE KHRUSHCHEV AND EISENHOWER SHOULD MEET. BUT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF GIVE AND TAKE. KHRUSHCHEV WAS ONE OF MOST EFFECTIVE SPOKESMEN FOR HIS OWN VIEW VP HAD EVER SEEN. HOWEVER, KHRUSHCHEV HAD ONE THEME. US WAS ALWAYS WRONG, SOVIET NEVER. PEACE COULD NOT BE MADE THAT WAY. TAKE GENEVA FOR EXAMPLE. SECRETARY HERTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD GONE A LONG WAY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO SOV POINT OF VIEW. SOVS HAD NOT CONCEDED ANYTHING.

KHRUSHCHEV: RETURNED TO VENEZUELA, SAYING VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS SMACKED OF IMPERIALISM. US INTERFERED IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WANTED TO CONTROL VENEZUELA'S DECISIONS. WITH ITS POLICIES US WOULD BE HATED EVERYWHERE. EVEN IN TAIWAN LAST YEAR THERE HAD BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN RIOTS. THESE WERE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS BUT AGAIN US POLICY. US DETERMINED FOR ITSELF RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. PEOPLE WOULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH POLICIES. NOW AS TO QUESTION OF GIVE AND TAKE. SOVS CANNOT MAKE CONCESSIONS ON QUESTION OF INSURING PEACE. SOV POLICIES ARE FORMULATED ON GLOBAL BASIS TO APPEAL TO ENTIRE WORLD, NOT JUST US. WHEN US REJECTS SOVIET PROPOSALS, REST WORLD SUPPORTS SOV POSITION. AS FOR GENEVA -THIS IS A TEA PARTY. IT MAKES LITTLE OR NO SENSE. SOV GOVT HAD CONSIDERED RECALLING GROMYKO. KEY PROBLEM IS LIQUIDATION STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY. THIS EMBRACES ALL OTHER QUESTIONS. LIKE TAPESTRY. IF ONE THREAT IS REMOVED, EVERYTHING UNRAVELS. IN SEEKING SOLUTION SOV GOVT PONDERED HOW IT COULD MAKE PROPOSAL FOR WHICH IT WOULD NOT BE BLAMED BY WORLD OPINION AS SEEKING GAIN FOR SELF. LEGAL POSITION WAS CLEAR. WEST SETTLED WITH WEST WITHOUT REGARD TO SOV INTEREST. SOV RIGHT TO

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-3- 327, JULY 27, 5 PM (SECTION THREE OF SEVEN), FROM MOSCOW

REPARATIONS WAS JETISONED. WEST INTRODUCED MONETARY REFORM, COMBINED THREE WESTERN ZONES AND SET UP GERMAN GOVT. SOVS MOVES IN EAST GERMANY ONLY FOLLOWED LATER. NOW THE USSR HAS NO SAY AND NO CLAIMS IN WEST GERMANY. WEST VIOLATED POTSDAM BY MILITARIZATION, EVEN ATOMIC ARMAMENTS." WE HAVE SUBMITTED A REASONABLE PROPOSAL WHICH YOU REFUSE. WHY?"

YOU STILL INSIST THERE IS FOUR POWER RESPONSIBILITY. TAKE THE PARALLEL OF VIETNAM (VICE PRESIDENT INDICATED DESIRE TO RESPOND BUT KHRUSHCHEV KEPT THE FLOOR). HE CONTINUED THERE ARE NOT TWO CORRECT ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS BUT ONLY ONE AND THE WHOLE WORLD KNOWS. IN VIETNAM, CONTRARY TO AGREEMENT, FOR OVER THREE YEARS NO FREE ELECTIONS DESPITE WILLINGNESS OF HO CHI MIN. WHY? IT WAS NOT JUST REFUSAL OF DIEM SINCE EVERYBODY KNOWS US PULLS STRINGS ON HIM. SO THREE POWER AGREEMENT, SUBSCRIBED TO BY US HAD BEEN VIOLATED. ANYWAY, HISTORICAL PROGRESS NOT DETERMINED BY LEGAL DOCUMENTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR SETTING UP SOV GOVT INSTEAD OF CZARS AFTER WORLD WAR ONE. SIMILARLY, FACT MUST BE FACED THERE ARE NOW TWO GERMANIES. HE HAD NOTED REPORTS IN WESTERN PRESS ON HIS TALKS IN POLAND, ACCUSING HIM OF WANTING A PARTITION OF GERMANY OR DEMANDING ALL GERMANY GO SOCIALIST. SELL, HE WOULD COMMENT: "YOU HAVE NO INTENTION TO MAKE WAR OVER WEST GERMANY; NEITHER DO WE; WHAT YOU WANT IS THAT ALL GERMANY BE CAPITALIST, ISN'T IT?"

DR. EISENHOWER INTERJECTED THAT WE WANT WHAT THE GERMAN PEOPLE WANT FOR THEMSELVES. KHRUSHCHEV CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED SAYING SOVS WANT SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED GERMANY RECOGNIZED BY AGREEMENT.

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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 327, JULY 27, 5 PM (SECTION FOUR OF SEVEN)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 327, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GENEVA 25

FOR PRESIDENT FROM VICE PRESIDENT

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY - LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

NIXON: DID NOT PROPOSE TO REHASH POST-WAR HISTORY. SOVS OBVIOUSLY HAD THEIR VIEWS, WE HAD OURS. WISH, HOWEVER, MAKE FEW POINTS. WAS GLAD TO KNOW KHRUSHCHEV RECOGNIZED ELECTIONS WERE GOOD WHETHER IN VIETNAM OR IN GERMANY. (KHRUSHCHEV INTERJECTED HE DID NOT SAY THAT, ONLY THAT WE SHOULD LET GERMANS DECIDE.) NIXON RESUMED REASON FOR NOT HOLDING ELECTIONS IN VIETNAM WAS IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS CREATED THERE BY COMMUNISTS. ICC HAD NOT BEEN ABLE OPERATE IN NORTH VIETNAM AT ALL.

KHRUSHCHEV: INTERRUPTED TO TAKE FLOOR AGAIN AND RETURNED TO SUBJECT WEST BERLIN. SAID SOV GOVT HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED LAST YEAR WHAT PROPOSALS IT COULD MAKE TO BRING END TO STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY. REALIZED WESTERN PRESTIGE INVOLVED AND WORLD UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET PROPOSALS NECESSARY. STRICTLY LEGAL WAY TO TERMINATE WAR, OF COURSE, WOULD BE PEACE TREATY. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION IN BERLIN HAD GOVERNED ALL GERMANY. THREE WESTERN POWERS DID NOT OBSERVE AGREEMENT, SETUP WEST GERMAN GOVT AND ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION CAME TO AN END. AT THAT POINT BERLIN CEASED TO BE CAPITAL OF ALL GERMANY. PROPERLY, THREE POWERS SHOULD THEN HAVE GONE AWAY BUT THEY REMAINED AND CREATED DIVIDED BERLIN. WE WANTED TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THIS SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN AND FIND WAY TO ASSURE NO INJURY TO WESTERN PRESTIGE SO NEITHER SIDE WOULD GAIN OR LOSE. HOWEVER, WEST ACCUSES

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US OF INTENDING TO INGULF WEST BERLIN. IN REPLY SUCH ACCUSATIONS WE SAY: SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO GUARANTEED WEST BERLIN. USSR WILLING JOIN TOKEN FORCE WITH YOU UNDER TREATY REGISTEED WITH UN. IF YOU DON'T WANT US, THEN ANY OTHER NEUTRAL FORCE ACCEPTABLE. YOU ARE FOLLOWING SAME LINE MOLOTOV WANTED TO FOLLOW IN AUSTRIA. ACCORDING TO MACMILLAN YOU HAVE 11,000 TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN. LET IT BE 12,000 OR MORE. THEY HAVE NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. WHY ARE THEY THERE? I TOLD HARRIMAN THAT IN CASE OF WAR THE MORE THE BETTER, SINCE THEY WILL BE PARALYZED. IN STALINGRAD WE CAPTURED 90,000 GERMAN GROOPS. SAYING ABOUT TO CLOSE, KHRUSHCHEV SUMMARIZED SOVS CANNOT ACCEPT PERPETUATION OF STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY OR OCCUPATION REGIME IN WEST BERLIN. COULD, HOWEVER, AGREE TO ELIMINATE COMPETITION THERE, AVOID MORAL INJURY TO EITHER SIDE. IN SHORT, SOVIETS PREPARED TO "SLOW THIS QUESTION DOWN" WITH SOME PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT ON WEST BERLIN. WEST COULD TELL ADENAUER ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH WEST GERMANS ON REUNIFICATION. WE ALL TELL GERMANS WE HAVE NO INTENTION TO QUARREL OVER THEM AND WILL ACCEPT AGEEMENT WORKED OUT BETWEEN TWO GERMANIES.

KHRUSHCHEV COULD SEE NOTHING UNACCEPTABLE TO THIS PROPOSAL IF WEST SOUGHT PEACE. HOWEVER, WHEN WEST SOUGHT TO CONTINUE STATE OF WAR WITH GERMANY SOVIETS SUSPECT WE ARE TRYING TO CONTINUE COLD WAR, MAYBE TURN IT INTO HOT WAR. IF TWO SIDES AGREE AND WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM GERMANY COULD BE NO, REPEAT NO, CONFLICT. KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF COULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCT EVERY RED SOLDIER AND POSSIBLE INCIDENTS. SOVS HAVE NO OTHER CONFLICT WITH US, THERE IS NO CLAST OF INTERESTS. YOU CAN DEVELOP YOUR OWN WAY, WE OUR WAY. YOU MAY PRAY FOR YOUR COMMUNIST CAPTIVES, BUT WE WON'T MATCH YOU IN PRAYING.

POINTED OUT KHRUSHCHEV'S OBSERVATIONS ANSWERED

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-3- 327, JULY 27, 5 PM (SECTION FOUR OF SEVEN), FROM MOSCOW

MANY TIMES. REPEATED NEITHER SIDE LIKELY CONVINCE OTHER
TODAY CORRECTNESS OUR DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF HISTORY.
FOR EXAMPLE, COULD ARGUE ENDLESSLY ON RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS. WE COULD POINT OUT SOV RIGHTS
RESERVED BY TERMS OF WESTERN ARRANGEMENTS WITH WEST
GERMANS. OUR 11,000 TROOPS IN WEST BERLIN AND OTHERS
IN FEDERAL REPUBLIC, WE COULD POINT TO 18 SOV DIVISIONS
IN EAST GERMANY. MAJOR DIFFERENCE IN VIEW REUNIFICATION.
KHRUSHCHEV HAS SAID WEST DOESN'T REALLY WANT REUNIFICATION.
(KHRUSHCHEV CONFIRMED.) KHRUSHCHEV IS STUDENT OF HISTORY.
SHOULD NOT NEED TELL HIM WHY REUNIFICATION ESSENTIAL
FOR PEACE. OTHERWISE WE PLANT SEEDS FOR EMERGENCE FUTURE
LEADER WHO FEELS COMPELLED ACCOMPLISH REUNIFICATION.
AS TO BERLIN PROPOSALS, KHRUSHCHEV MUST BEAR IN MIND HIS
ACTION, NOT OURS PRECIPITATED PRESENT CRISI. NOW
WE MUST LOOK FOR WAY OUT, MUST AGREE ON REASONABLE
SETTLEMENT. KHRUSHCHEV BELIEVES HIS PROPOSAL REASONABLE
BUT SHOULD LOOK AT POSITION IT WOULD PUT US IN. WE
SHARE COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR GERMANY AND BERLIN.
NO ONE OF FOUR CAN SAY SITUATION MUST BE CHANGED -
THIS WAY" AND OTHERS MUST AGREE.

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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 327, JULY 27, 5PM (SECTION 5 OF 7)

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 327; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GENEVA 25.

FOR PRESIDENT FROM VICE PRESIDENT

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY

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STATUS QUO MUST REMAIN. KHRUSHCHEV COULD NOT EXPECT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, FOR EXAMPLE, AGREE ATTEND HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE TO ACCEPT KHRUSHCHEV PROPOSAL. WHERE GREAT POWERS ARE CONCERNED EACH MUST BE PREPARED DISCUSS PROPOSALS OF OTHER. KHRUSHCHEV WOULD NOT WANT TO ATTEND CONFERENCE SIMPLY TO SIGN WESTERN PROPOSALS ON DOTTED LINE. GENEVA CONFERENCE CANNOT END WITH NO, REPEAT NO, PROGRESS EVEN AS TO PROCEDURE FOR FUTURE DISCUSSIONS. WE HAVE OUR POINT OF VIEW, YOU HAVE YOURS. NEITHER COULD BE EXPECTED ATTEND CONFERENCE IF ONE SIDE IN ADVANCE SAYS "ONLY OUR WAY GOES". WHATEVER PAST MISTAKES AND MIS-UNDERSTANDINGS EITHER SIDE PRESIDENT AND AMERICAN PEOPLE CANNOT ACCEPT UNILATERAL DIKTAT. HE WAS NOT SAYING CHANGES CAN'T BE MADE; ONLY STRESSING THAT WHERE BIG POWERS CONCERNED CLIMATE MUST NOT BE ONE OF CRISIS AND TENSION. HE WOULD ASK AMBASSADOR THOMPSON TO SPEAK IN LIGHT HIS OWN EXPERIENCE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

THOMPSON: POINTED OUT COMPLICATED TECHNICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED BUT STRESSED VICE PRESIDENT HAD UNDERScored FACT THIS IS DANGEROUS CRISIS NOT OF OUR MAKING. WEST HAD SUBMITTED ALL GERMAN PROPOSALS BUT THEN REALIZED OVER-

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-2- 327, JULY 27, 5 PM (SECTION 5 OF 7) FROM MOSCOW

ALL SETTLEMENT NOT NOW POSSIBLE, AND HAD GONE FAR IN MAKING CONCESSIONS TO SOVIET VIEWS ON BERLIN. RECENTLY HAD PROPOSED TO PROLONG PRESENT CONFERENCE IN ORDER PREVENT DEVELOPMENT OF CRISIS. (KHRUSHCHEV INTERJECTED THIS WAS PROPOSAL OF ADENAUER, WHO HAD EVEN SUGGESTED TEN YEAR PERIOD. NIXON OBSERVED KHRUSHCHEV HIMSELF HAD EARLIER REFERRED TO POSTPONEMENT). THOMPSON RESUMED, SAYING NECESSARY FIRST TAKE MEASURES PREVENT DEVELOPMENT OF CRISIS, THEN MAYBE IN INTERIM MAKE PROGRESS ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS ATOMIC TESTS AND DISARMAMENT. SUBSEQUENTLY OTHER QUESTIONS MIGHT BE EASIER.

KHRUSHCHEV: AGREED PRESIDENT COULD NOT BE CONFRONTED WITH SITUATION OF GOING TO CONFERENCE ONLY TO SIGN ONE-SIDED PROPOSAL. MEETING HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ONLY MADE SENSE IF PURPOSE TO NEGOTIATE AND SEEK TERMS ACCEPTABLE BOTH SIDES. SAID: "I AGREE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO SIGN OUR PROPOSALS; LIKEWISE NO SENSE IN ME GOING TO CONFERENCE ONLY TO SIGN AGREEMENT PERPETUATING PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS."

NIXON: REITERATED KHRUSHCHEV OPENED UP SITUATION LEADING TO GENEVA CONFERENCE. SOVIETS WANTED STATUS QUO CHANGED. DETAILS OF PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE DISCUSSED TODAY. HOWEVER IMPLICIT THAT IF HIGH LEVEL MEETING WERE HELD PURPOSE MUST BE DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES. US WAS NOT DEMANDING SOVIETS ACCEPT WESTERN VIEWS.

KHRUSHCHEV: SAID WHAT NIXON MEANT BY STATUS QUO WAS PERPETUATION STATE OF WAR. SOVIETS FAVOR STATUS QUO BUT AFTER LIQUIDATION OF STATE OF WAR. SOVIET PROPOSALS RETAIN PRESENT FRONTIERS AND PRESERVE EXISTING SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

NIXON: OBSERVED THIS ONLY TURE IN BERLIN.

KHRUSHCHEV: RETORTED: "YOU WANT TO PERPETUATE OCCUPATION".

NIXON: REPLIED WEST CERTAINLY COULD NOT ACCEPT SOVIETS' PROPOSED CHANGES. KHRUSHCHEV WOULD CERTAINLY NOT LIKE WESTERN PROPOSAL IN WHICH AFTER A PERIOD OF

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ERENCE. YOUR PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE THAT IF HIGH LEVEL MEETING W. DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES. US WAS NOT RETAIN WESTERN VIEWS.

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NIXON: OBSERVED THIS ONLY TURE IN BER-
KHRUSHCHEV: SAID WHAT NIXON MEANT PERPETUATION STATE OF WAR. SOVIE-
BUT AFTER LIQUIDATION OF STATE OF

NIXON: RETORTED: "YOU WANT TO PERPET-
CHANGES. KHRUSHCHEV WOULD CERTAINLY NOT
WESTERN PROPOSAL IN WHICH AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME

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-3- 327, JULY 27, 5 PM (SECTION 5 OF 7) FROM MOSCOW

TIME WE WOULD TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION.

KHRUSHCHEV: CONCLUDED: "WE PROPOSED A PEACE TREATY BUT ADENAUER REFUSED EVEN THOUGH GERMANY IS THE LOSER."

THOMPSON: SUMMARIZED BASIC DIFFERENCES. SOVIETS SAY WILL NOT SUBSCRIBE ANY PERPETUATION BERLIN SITUATION INDEFINITELY. WE SAY WE CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO INDEFINITE PARTITION OF GERMANY AS WOULD RESULT FROM ALL SOVIET PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD.

KHRUSHCHEV: "LET'S BE FRANK. YOUR PROPOSALS CALL FOR ELECTIONS SO A REUNITED GERMANY WOULD BE YOUR ALLY. GDR DOES NOT WANT TO BE SWALLOWED. AND CAN YOU IMAGINE US ACCEPTING SUCH RESULT?" HE CONTINUED: "INEXORABLE FACT IS EXISTENCE TWO GERMANIES. IF YOU ARE AGAINST RECOGNITION GDR WE COULD FIND FORMULA FOR PEACE TREATY WITHOUT INVOLVING RECOGNITION. YOU WOULD RECOGNIZE OUR RIGHT TO CONCLUDE PEACE TREATY WITH GDR. THEN ON WEST BERLIN WE COULD AGREE PRESENT SOCIAL SYSTEM CONTINUES AND ACCESS GUARANTEED. WE RECOGNIZE IN IMPASSIONED PRESENT CLIMATE SUCH AGREEMENT MIGHT BE MORALLY EMBARRASSING. CONSEQUENTLY WE CAN AGREE THAT ONLY AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME THE SOURCE OF THE TROUBLE WOULD BE DONE AWAY WITH. YOUR PROPOSALS FOR A PROVISIONAL SETTLEMENT HAVE SOME REASONABLE POINTS. PERHAPS WE COULD COMBINE YOURS AND OURS."

NIXON: ASKED WHETHER KHRUSHCHEV DID NOT SEE POSITION THAT A TIME LIMIT WOULD PUT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER IN, TO WHICH KHRUSHCHEV RETORTED WE TOO HAD PUT TIME PERIOD OF 2 1/2 YEARS.

THOMPSON: CLARIFIED TIME PERIOD ORIGINAL WESTERN PROPOSALS CONTEMPLATED ELECTIONS IN GERMANY. WHEN WEST REALIZED THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED WE PROPOSED CONCESSIONS TO AVOID DEVELOPMENT OF CRISIS. SEEMED IMPORTANT NOW TO START STEP BY STEP TOWARD AGREEMENT. HOWEVER IF SOVIETS FORCED CRISIS, WE WOULD FIND THIS DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH THEIR WORDS ABOUT PEACE.

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KHRUSHCHEV:

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KHRUSHCHEV: RETORTED "AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE CAREFUL IN TALKING OF PEACE. WHAT HE SAID SOUNDED LIKE THREAT. IF HE SPOKE THAT WAY THEN SOVIETS WOULD CONCLUDE PEACE TREATY AND WEST BE IN POSITION OF MAKING WAR AGAINST PEACE TREATY. EVERYONE WOULD RECOGNIZE WHO WAS TO BLAME. IF SOVIETS HAD INTENDED ACT UNILATERALLY THEY WOULD BY RIGHT HAVE CONCLUDED PEACE TREATY, THEN LET WEST LAUNCH WAR IF THEY COULD.

THOMPSON: SAID NOT THREAT AGAINST SOVIETS INTENDED. HAD ONLY SAID THEY WERE THREATENING TO FORCE A CRISIS.

KHRUSHCHEV: ASKED WHAT STEPS WE PROPOSED TO TAKE? "WHAT NEED IS THERE FOR YOU TO REMAIN IN WEST BERLIN IF YOU HAVE NO INTENTION OF MAKING WAR AGAINST US? ARE YOU TRYING TO MAINTAIN YOUR OCCUPATION RIGHTS OR TO ENSURE PRESERVATION WESTERN BERLIN'S SOCIAL SYSTEM?" IF LATTER WE HAVE NO DISAGREEMENT. IF FORMER THERE IS NO BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. BUT WHATEVER TIME PERIOD IS INVOLVED IT LOGICALLY FOLLOWS THAT PEACE TREATY, WHETHER CONCLUDED BY BOTH SIDES OR ONLY BY US, ENDS OCCUPATION RIGHTS.

NIXON: "WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT VITAL INTERESTS OF BOTH PARTIES ARE INVOLVED. NEITHER CAN CONFRONT THE OTHER --" KHRUSHCHEV INTERJECTED "WE PROPOSE ONLY PEACE". THOMPSON OBSERVED "ARE SUCH OFFERS AS TROOP LIMITATIONS AND NO ATOMIC ARMAMENT NOT PEACEFUL?"

NIXON: WE SEEM TO AGREE NO SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE IF ONE SIDE SEEKS A FOREGOING CONCLUSION. BERLIN IS IMPORTANT BUT IN THE LONG RUN DISCUSSION BY KHRUSHCHEV AND PRESIDENT OF SUCH MATTERS AS DISARMAMENT, TESTS, TRADE AND THE LIKE MIGHT BE MORE IMPORTANT. FOR SUCH DISCUSSION TO BE FRUITFUL THERE MUST BE CLIMATE OF CALM, NOT OF CRISIS.

KHRUSHCHEV: SAID HE AGREES BUT US SHOULD NOT THREATEN WAR. MAYBE NIXON HAD ASKED AMBASSADOR TO DO THIS SO AS NOT TO HARM HIMSELF.

THOMPSON

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INTERJECTED "WE PROPOSE
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ON: WE SEEM TO AGREE NO SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE
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KHRUSHCHEV: SAID HE AGREES BUT US SHOULD NOT
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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 327, JULY 27, 5 P.M. (SECTION 6 OF 7)

1

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 327, REPEATED INFORMATION GENEVA 25

FOR PRESIDENT FROM VICE PRESIDENT

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY

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NIXON: SAID HE HEARD AMB'S STATEMENT. AMB HAD ONLY SAID THAT IF WE WERE CONFRONTED WITH IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION THEN WE HAVE MEANS TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY ABOUT IT.

KHRUSHCHEV: REPEATED QUESTION RE WHAT STEPS? SOVS WOULD NEVER TAKE MILITARY STEPS. WE SHOULD ACCEPT WHAT GERMANS WANT. (MIKOYAN INTERJECTED "CONFEDERATION".) HOWEVER HE STILL SOUGHT ANSWER TO QUESTION WHETHER US SEEKS PRESERVE OCCUPATION RIGHTS OR SOCIAL SYSTEM. IF US SEEKS UNPEACEFUL SITUATION THEN RETAIN TROOPS. THEN THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES OF CONFLICT, ACCIDENTS, CLASHES IN AIR CORRIDORS. IF US FAVORS PEACE NO REASON RETAIN RIGHTS OF OCCUPATION. IF US ONLY SEEKS PRESERVE SOCIAL SYSTEM WITH FULL ACCESS, AGREEMENT POSSIBLE. AS TO DISARMAMENT AND TEST: ON FORMER ON MAY 10, 1955 SOVS TOOK UP AND PRESENTED AS THEIR OWN WESTERN PROPOSALS WHICH WEST THEN REJECTED. SOVS WILLING TO TALK DISARMAMENT BUT NOT ON BASIS ONE AGAINST FOUR. "PARITY" NECESSARY FOR SUCH TALKS.

NIXON: ASKED WHETHER KHRUSHCHEV CONSIDERS ATOMIC FALLOUT DANGEROUS. KHRUSHCHEV AGREED SCIENTISTS SAY SO. NIXON THEN ASKED

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-2- 327, JULY 27, 5 P.M. (SECTION 6 OF 7), FROM MOSCOW

THEN ASKED WHY SOVS DO NOT ACCEPT PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR ABOVE-GROUND TESTS WHICH WOULD SOLVE FALLOUT, THEN ENGAGE IN CONTINUING TECHNICAL TALKS ON UNDERGROUND PROBLEM.

KHRUSHCHEV: ASKED WHAT ABOUT OUTER SPACE? ABOVE 50 KILOMETERS? PRESIDENT PROPOSED TO CONTINUE NON-ATMOSPHERIC TESTS.

NIXON: ASKED WHETHER SOV POSITION THEN ALL OR NONE.

KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED "YES, ALL OR NONE." SAID SOV GOVT DOESN'T UNDERSTAND WHY US REFUSED. US STARTED EARLIER, PRESUMABLY HAS MORE BOMBS. USSR HAS NOT MADE SINGLE UNDERGROUND TEST AND HAS NO INTENTION DOING SO. FURTHERMORE, SOVS HAVE NO TACTICAL, ONLY STRATEGIC ATOMIC WEAPONS. TACTICAL WEAPONS MADE NO SAVING ON EXPLOSIVES. MAYBE US SO RICH IT WANTS TO SPEND MONEY UNNECESSARILY. SOVS DO NOT.

NIXON: ASKED WHETHER SOVS HAD GIVEN ANY CONSIDERATION PEACEFUL POSSIBILITIES "ATOMIC DYNAMITE"?

KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED HE THOUGHT THIS CONCEPT MISLEADING. POSSIBLE TO TEST WEAPONS UNDER GUISE PEACEFUL USES. WHAT IS NEEDED FOR TESTS IS ONLY EXPLOSION. SOVIETS OPPOSE. FOR CONSTRUCTION WORK TNT EXPLOSIONS SUFFICIENT. (SOME DISCUSSION ENSUED AMONG RUSSIANS, MIKOYAN REMINDING KHRUSHCHEV SOVS HAD ACCEPTED LIMITED, EQUAL NUMBER PEACEFUL UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS. KHRUSHCHEV ACKNOWLEDGED BUT SAID CONSIDERED FOOLISH MISTAKE).

NIXON: SAID HE THOUGHT DISCUSSION INDICATED POSSIBILITY USEFULNESS HIGH LEVEL TALKS ON SOME ASPECTS THIS SUBJECT. KHRUSHCHEV AGREED HE CONSIDERED THIS "RIPE QUESTION". NIXON RESUMED, REPEATING CLEAR THAT TALKS COULD BE USEFUL BOTH BETWEEN

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BOTH BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV AND PRESIDENT OR AT HEADS OF GOVT MEETING, BUT ONLY IF ATMOSPHERE OF CRISIS REMOVED.

IN THIS CONNECTION HE WANTED TO COMMENT: KHRUSHCHEV HAD SAID CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION ON CAPTIVE NATIONS HAD CREATED BAD ATMOSPHERE FOR VPS VISIT. HE WISHED TO SAY GENEVA HAD GREAT IMPACT IN US. PRESIDENT NECESSARILY RESPONSIVE TO PUBLIC OPINION AS WAS KHRUSHCHEV. THUS IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT GENEVA NOT BREAK UP IN DISAGREEMENT BUT SHOW SOME PROGRESS. PEOPLE EVERYWHERE WOULD CONSIDER THIS ESSENTIAL.

KHRUSHCHEV: POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD JUST SPEND 10 DAYS IN POLAND WHERE PROBLEMS UNDER DISCUSSION AT GENEVA HAD VITAL IMPORTANCE. HOWEVER HE HAD NOT ONCE DURING VISIT PUBLICLY MENTIONED GENEVA SO AS NOT TO MAKE FOREIGN MINISTERS POSITION MORE DIFFICULT.

NIXON: SAID IN LAST ANALYSIS ACTION TAKEN AT GENEVA DEPENDED NOT ON FOREIGN MINISTERS PRESENT THERE AS MUCH AS ON HEADS OF GOVT TO WHOM THEY RESPONSIBLE. THUS HE HAD BEEN GLAD TO HEAR KHRUSHCHEV SAY HE WAS HOPEFUL. HE WOULD REPEAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS AT GENEVA BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SET STAGE SO THAT FUTURE MEETINGS COULD BE FRUITFUL.

SAID SOVS CONSIDER THEIR FORMULA ELASTIC. IF AFTER 18 MONTHS TWO GERMANY'S FAIL TO AGREE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD RETURN TO QUESTION OF BERLIN. UNDER SUCH ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNMENTS COULD GO TO SUMMIT CONFERENCE. NECESSARY REALIZE FURTHER CONCESSION IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOVIETS, AS THEY COULD NOT SUBSCRIBE TO PERPETUATION SITUATION. HE CONTINUED MIKOYAN HAD REPORTED TO HIM GERMAN MENACE ALSO REGARDED AS DANGEROUS IN UNITED STATES. FRENCH GOVT SOURCE HAD SAID UNFORTUNATE GERMANY DIVIDED ONLY TWO PARTS - BETTER THREE OR FOUR. BRITISH FEEL SAME.

NIXON: SAID IF PRESIDENT US AND PRIME MINISTER USSR AGREED REVIVAL GERMAN AGGRESSIVENESS NOT TO BE THE CASE, THEN IT NEVER WOULD BE THE CASE. US AND USSR HAD FOUGHT TOGETHER ONCE AGAINST HITLERITE GERMANY. BOTH WERE MORE POWERFUL NOW. DO SOVIETS FEAR GERMANS?

KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED

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KHRUSHCHEV: REPLIED "NO" BUT SITUATION NOW DIFFERENT. THEN PROCEEDED REVIEW WORLD WAR TWO. USSR WAS ALONE. FRENCH AND BRITISH WERE AGAINST SOV UNION AND HAD US SYMPATHY. DESPITE THIS GERMANY, JAPAN, ITALY DEFEATED. NOW NEW ALIGNMENT OF FORCES. "CHINA COVERS USSR FROM THE EAST" ; HALF KOREA, VIETNAM SOCIALIST; EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SOVIET ALLIES, EXCEPT YUGOSLAVIA WHICH IS NEUTRAL. (BUT I THINK IF WERE ATTACKED YUGOSLAVIA WOULD FIGHT ON OUR SIDE"). THERE REMAINS ONLY UK. OTHER SMALLER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE NO POWER. THUS GERMANY COULD PROVOKE WAR; DRAW IN OTHERS. THIS WOULD BE CLAMITY. IN SUCH CASE WE COULD DESTROY GERMANY, UK, FRANCE ON FIRST DAY. WE WOULD HAVE LOSSES, TOO, BUT THEY WOULD BE DEVASTATED. SHOULD WE ALLOW ADENAUER TO THREATEN US ALL WITH CONFLICT? WE MUST TRY WITH YOU TO INSURE SAFETY FOR OUR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN.

THOMPSON

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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 327, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY GENEVA 25.

FOR PRESIDENT FROM VICE PRESIDENT

GENEVA FOR SECRETARY--LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

NIXON: ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION IN SOV POSITONN. HE COULD SEE NONE IN WAY KHRUSHCHEV HAD LAID POSITION DOWN. SUPPOSE THIS WERE THE PRESIDENT OF THE US ACROSS THE TABLE FROM HIM INSTEAD OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. "IS YOUR POSITION SO FIXED YOU WOULD NOT EVEN LISTEN TO THE PRESIDENT?"

KHRUSHCHEV: SAID HE WOULD TRY TO REPLY FRANKLY. MAYBE EASIER TO SAY WHAT SOVS COULD NOT ACCEPT. SOVS COULD NEVER ACCEPT PERPETUATION OF OCCUPATION REGIME IN BERLIN. ON ANYTHING OUTSIDE THAT SOV POSITION WAS "FLUID AND FLEXIBLE." BUT IF QUESTION ONLY PERPETUATE EXISTING SITUATION IN BERLIN NO POINT IN MEETING. INVITED US PRESENT -"ANY PROPOSALS YOU WANT" TO ENSURE PRESENT SOCIAL ORDER IN AND ACCESS TO BERLIN. WITH REGARD TO PEACE TREATY STATUS QUO OF TWO GERMANIES COULD BE ENSURED UNTIL TIME RIGHT FOR LIQUIDATION, OF MILITARY BLOCS. MOST LIBERAL PROVISIONS COULD BE AGREED TO, EVEN SUCH AS WITHDRAWAL OF OUR TROOPS FROM EAST GERMANY AND POLAND, PERHAPS GRADUALLY...

DR EISENHOWER: POINTED OUT HE PRIVATE CITIZEN, EDUCATOR, WITH ONLY LIMITED EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION FOR PRIVILEGE OF ATTENDING HISTORIC MEETING OFFERING GREAT HOPE. EMPHASIZED US PEOPLE NEVER

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STARTED WAR AND WISH MOST PASSIONATELY THAT ALL PEOPLES COULD LIVE IN PEACE, AND CHOOSE ~~THEIR~~ GOVTS. AND METHODS FOR PROGRESS. NOTED PRESIDENT WILL HAVE COMPLETED 25 YEARS OF SERVICE TO COUNTRY IN ANOTHER YEAR AND HALF AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT BY SOME MIRACLE WITHIN THAT TIME, BEFORE HIS ADMINISTRATION ENDS, SOMETHING WOULD BE DONE TO ENSURE THAT NO RPT NO WAR SHOULD EVER HAPPEN.

NIXON: SAID HE WANTED TO ADD TO WHAT DR. EISENHOWER HAD SAID. THOUGHT THAT DECISIONS TAKEN IN NEXT YEAR WOULD DETERMINE FATE OF WORLD FOR NEXT 50 YEARS OR MORE. THESE DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, KHRUSHCHV AND OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT BUT ESSENTIALLY THE PRESIDENT AND KHRUSHEV WERE KEY.

KHRUSHCHEV: AGREED. HE WISHED TO GERMINATE MEETING BY ASKING DEPUTIES TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. BOTH WERE FIRST DEPUTIES. HE WOULD GIVE PRIORITY TO MIKOYAN BECAUSE OF AGE BUT IN CONTEST WOULD NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY KOZLOV FIRST.

MIKOYAN: SAID KHRUSHCHEV STATEMENT SOV POSITION SO CLEAR, REASONABLE ALL MEMBERS GOVERNMENT SHARE, SUPPORT SAME LINE. HE HAD TRIED EXPRESS THESE VIEWS IN US HAD SEEN THEIR WAS DESIRE THERE TO UNDERSTAND. SOVIET LEADERS ALL MEN OF PEOPLE HAVING DEEP ROOTS. VICE PRESIDENT HAD SEEN TODAY ON MOSCOW RIVER SUPPORT SOVIET PEOPLE THESE POLICIES. HE PROPOSED WE SUBSTITUTE POLICY OF DICTATE AND ULTIMATUM BY POLICY PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP.

KOZLOV: ECHOED MIKOYAN SAYING ENTIRE GOVT AND ALL SOV PEOPLE SUPPORT SOV POSITION.

KHRUSHCHEV: TERMINATED TALKS BY STRESSING NO DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS AMONG MEMBERS OF GOVT OR CENTRAL COMMITTEE COMMUNIST PARTY OR AMONG PEOPLE. ALL DESIRE ONLY PEACE.

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FINAL NOTE: IN R
HALF-APOLOGIZED
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JULY 27, 4 PM, FROM MOSCOW. (SECTION SEVEN OF SEVEN)

FINAL NOTE: IN PRIVATE EXCHANGE AFTER MEETING, KHRUSHCHEV
HALF-APOLOGIZED FOR ATTACK ON AMBASSADORS, SAYING NO
OFFENSE MEANT. THOMPSON REPLIED NO THREAT MEANT.

THOMPSON

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HOPE FOLLOWING REVIEW OF SOVIET PROBLEM WILL BE HELPFUL IN PREPARATION FOR KHRUSHCHEV'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT.

ROOT OF PROBLEM LIES, OF COURSE, IN SOVIET IDEOLOGY TO WHICH KHRUSHCHEV AND TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE COMMITTED AND IN WHICH THEY GENUINELY BELIEVE. OUTSTANDING SOURCE OF TROUBLE IS THEIR BELIEF THAT CAPITALISM IS OUTMODED FORM SOCIETY WHICH MUST INEVITABLY BE REPLACED BY SOCIALISM AND EVENTUALLY COMMUNISM. SOVIET LEADERS INSTINCTIVELY IMPELLED ATTEMPT MAKE THIS COME TRUE, BECAUSE IF THIS BASIC TENET DISPROVED WHOLE CREED IS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR HOLD ON POWER LOST. CREED HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO EXTENT OF ADMITTING CAPITALISM CAN BE OVERTHROWN BY PEACEFUL METHODS AND PARTICULARLY BY POWER OF EXAMPLE. KHRUSHCHEV STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT BY OUTPRODUCING US SUPERIORITY OF COMMUNISM WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND MASSES OF WORLD WILL DEMAND ITS ADOPTION BY THEIR COUNTRIES. ANOTHER BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT ONCE A COMMUNIST REGIME IN ANY COUNTRY SEIZES POWER, WHOLE STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST BLOC IS PLEDGED TO MAINTAIN IT. IN ADDITION TO INFERIORITY COMPLEX ATTRIBUTABLE TO NEW AND CRUDE COUNTRY COMMUNISTS FEEL NECESSITY ON IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS FOR VICTORY OVER FREE COUNTRIES IN EVERY TYPE COMPETITION FROM MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER TO SPORTS AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS.

WHILE IT WILL, OF COURSE, NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONVERT A FANATICAL COMMUNIST SUCH AS KHRUSHCHEV IT MAY WELL BE

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POSSIBLE SHAKE HIS CONVICTIONS ON SUCH MATTERS AS RELATIVE MILITARY STRENGTH OF SOVIET UNION AND US AND TO DEMONSTRATE FALSITY OF MARXIAN ANALYSIS OF WEAKNESS CAPITALIST SOCIETY. TO MAKE MAXIMUM IMPRESSION ON KHRUSHCHEV IT SEEMS ESSENTIAL TO ME THAT WE CONCENTRATE ON MAKING CLEAR NOT ONLY AMERICAN INTENTIONS -- OUR DESIRE FOR PEACE AND REFUSAL TO SURRENDER -- BUT ALSO LONG-RANGE PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH OUR SYSTEM. OUR TASK IS NOT THE IMPOSSIBLE ONE OF CONVERTING KHRUSHCHEV, BUT RATHER SEEKING PRESENT PICTURE OF REALITY TO WHICH IT IS HOPED HE MIGHT ADJUST.

BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL AS GENERAL APPROACH TO FOLLOW UP ON VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT THAT COEXISTENCE NOT ENOUGH BECAUSE IT DIVIDES WORLD INTO TWO CAMPS AND THAT WE MUST PROCEED BEYOND COEXISTENCE IN ORDER ENLARGE CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

ON SPECIFIC ISSUES IT IS POSSIBLE KHRUSHCHEV WILL TAKE STRONG POSITION IN HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND RESERVE SUCH CONCESSIONS AS HE MAY BE WILLING MAKE UNTIL PRESIDENT'S RETURN VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE WILL PROBABLY BE CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TO AVOID GIVING PRESIDENT ANY EXCUSE FOR NOT CARRYING OUT HIS VISIT HERE.

INCREASINGLY CLEAR WHAT KHRUSHCHEV BASICALLY WANTS NOW IS TO STABILIZE COMMUNIST REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY EAST GERMANY AND POLAND, WHILE REMAINING RELATIVELY FREE TO FURTHER COMMUNISM WHEREVER OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF. HE DOUBTLESS ALSO SEEKS RELAXATION OF TENSION WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM DIVERT RESOURCES AND MANPOWER TO CARRYING OUT HIS AMBITIOUS ECONOMIC PLANS AND FOR SAME REASON TO OBTAIN WESTERN CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY. I BELIEVE HE REALIZES THAT WITHOUT SOME PROGRESS ON THESE LINES HIS GOAL OF OUTSTRIPPING US IN ECONOMIC FIELD CANNOT BE ACHIEVED.

KHRUSHCHEV HAS MADE CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BERLIN PROPOSAL WAS HIS PERSONALLY AND I AM INCLINED BELIEVE

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PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO TOP LEVEL TALK WHICH HE WAS ALSO COMMITTED TO SECURE HAS ENABLED HIM TO DEFER IF NOT ABANDON FORCING SHOW-DOWN ON BERLIN. WHILE HE COULD REVERT TO PREVIOUS POSITION IF TALKS GO BADLY I BELIEVE HE NOW REALIZES TO SOME EXTENT DANGERS OF SUCH COURSE.

I SUGGEST IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT KHRUSHCHEV DOES NOT CONSIDER HIMSELF AGGRESSOR IN BERLIN ISSUE. ACTIVITIES OUR PROPAGANDA AND INTELLIGENCE AGENTS THERE AND FLOW OF REFUGEES LEAD HIM BELIEVE THAT EAST GERMAN REGIME IS IN FACT THREATENED BY EXISTENCE BERLIN ON PRESENT BASIS. WHILE HE DOUBTLESS HAS IN BACK HIS MIND POSSIBILITY AND EVEN INTENTION THAT EAST GERMANY EVENTUALLY ABSORB BERLIN, I BELIEVE HE IS GENUINE IN HIS ASSERTION THAT HE PREPARED GUARANTEE MAINTENANCE PRESENT SOCIAL SYSTEM THERE AT LEAST FOR SOME YEARS TO COME. HE PROBABLY INTERPRETS OUR REFUSAL ACCEPT HIS TERMS AS INDICATION OUR DETERMINATION CONTINUE COLD WAR.

THOMPSON

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OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 500, AUGUST 8, 6 PM (OFFICE OF TWO OF TWO)
SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS
SOV

PRIORITY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

SO FAR AS GERMAN REUNIFICATION CONCERNED, I AM CONVINCED
PRIMARY FACTOR WHICH PREVENTS KHRUSHCHEV GIVING THIS
SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS HIS INABILITY CONSIDER ABANDONEMENT
OF A COMMUNIST REGIME AND FEAR OF CHAIN REACTION IF SUCH
RETREAT EVER TOOK PLACE. HE BELIEVES THAT IN FEW YEARS
LIVING STANDARDS IN EAST GERMANY CAN BE RAISED TO POINT
WHERE REGIME WILL BE AT LEAST ACCEPTED IF NOT SUPPORTED
BY POPULATION.

SOVIET LEADERS JUDGE US BY THEMSELVES AND ARE THEREFORE
DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR INTENTIONS. ALMOST ONLY MOVE WE
COULD MAKE WHICH WOULD CONVINC THEM WE DO NOT HAVE
HOSTILE AND AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS WOULD BE ABANDONMENT
OUR BASES, PARTICULARLY IN GERMANY. I BELIEVE KHRUSHCHEV
WOULD BACK DOWN IF WE SHOULD ACCEPT HIS VAGUE OFFERS OF
MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL TROOPS FROM GERMANY, POLAND AND HUNGARY
AND THAT HE WOULD COUNTER SUCH MOVE BY DEMAND FOR
ABANDONMENT ALL OUR FOREIGN BASES. I REALIZE, OF COURSE,
THAT EVEN MAKING SUCH OFFER WOULD HAVE GREAT DISADVANTAGES
FOR US. IF SUCH WITHDRAWAL WERE IMPLEMENTED IT WOULD ALMOST
CERTAINLY RESULT IN CIVIL WAR IN GERMANY AND PROBABLY
UPRISINGS IN POLAND AND POSSIBLY HUNGARY. ONLY
POSSIBILITY FOR PEACEFUL GERMAN REUNIFICATION I CAN SEE
WOULD BE A SITUATION IN WHICH THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD NOT
BE CONSIDERED AS VICTORY FOR CAPITALISM OVER COMMUNISM.
THIS WOULD REQUIRE TIME AND WEST GERMAN WILLINGNESS
RUN RISKS OF CONFEDERATION OR OTHER STEPS TO FUZZ UP
ISSUE, AND PARALLEL STEPS IN SUCH FIELDS AS DISARMAMENT.

I BELIEVE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
NND 867400
NARA, Date

SECRET

-2- 500, AUGUST 8, 6 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW

I BELIEVE TALKS WILL CENTER CHIEFLY ON GERMAN QUESTION, PARTICULARLY BERLIN, AND TRADE. ON BERLIN I SUGGEST PRESIDENT SHOULD EMPHASIZE WE MORE CONCERNED AT EAST GERMAN INTENTIONS THAN THOSE OF SOVIET UNION. PRESIDENT COULD POINT OUT THAT OUR TROOPS IN BERLIN ARE NOT IN FACT OPERATING AS OCCUPATION TROOPS AND AS THEY HAVE NO MILITARY VALUE WE CANNOT HELP BUT BE ALARMED AT SOVIET EFFORTS REDUCE THEM SINCE THIS IMPLIES DESIRE PLACE BERLIN AT MERCY OF EAST GERMANY. HE COULD POINT OUT THAT WE RECOGNIZE BERLIN IS A DANGER POINT AND OFFER ON BASIS OF RECIPROCITY TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE TENSION THERE IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER ANY AGREEMENT IS REACHED OR NOT. ON GERMAN QUESTION AS WHOLE, SUGGEST PRESIDENT SHOULD ATTEMPT CONVINCE HIM OF OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT CONTINUED DIVISION OF GERMANY MENACE TO PEACE AND THAT IF IT CANNOT BE RESOLVED NOW WE UNWILLING TAKE ANY STEPS WHICH WOULD FURTHER CONSOLIDATE DIVISION AND SOW SEEDS FUTURE CONFLICT. DIFFICULT PROBLEM IN THIS CONNECTION WILL BE THAT OF ATOMIC ARMING OF WEST GERMANY WHICH KHRUSHCHEV LIKELY HIT HARD. BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED LAY GREAT STRESS ON OUR HOPES FOR GENERAL DISARMAMENT.

BOTH SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WILL ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE AND THERE IS SOME DANGER THAT IF OUR ATTITUDE TOO NEGATIVE SOVIETS MAY BE INCLINED REVERSE PRESENT POLICY TOWARD CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES.

KHRUSHCHEV ALSO LIKELY RAISE QUESTION ON NON-AGGRESSION PACT AND THIS IS ONE AREA IN WHICH I SUGGEST WE SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO OUR POLICY. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE BILATERAL NON-AGGRESSION PACT OR DECLARATION ON NON USE OF FORCE BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD AVOID PROBLEM OF EAST GERMANY. ON MULTILATERAL PACT WHICH PRESUMABLY WOULD BE WORKED OUT AT SUBSEQUENT SUMMIT MEETING, I BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED ARRANGE FOR SEPARATE EAST GERMAN ADHERENCE IN ORDER AVOID PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION.

AN IMPORTANT

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
NND 867400
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EAST GERMAN AD...

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-3- 500, AUGUST 8, 6 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW

AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN COMING TALKS IS PERSONALITY OF KHRUSHCHEV. HE HAS EXCEEDINGLY COMPLEX CHARACTER, IS DANGEROUSLY IMPULSIVE, QUICK-TEMPERED, AND SENSITIVE TO REAL OR IMAGINED THREATS. I BELIEVE THAT IN GENERAL HIS INTERNAL POLICIES IN SOVIET UNION ARE TO OUR ADVANTAGE IN THAT THEY ARE TENDING TO MAKE SOVIET UNION MORE NORMAL COUNTRY IN WHICH PEOPLE PLAY SOME ROLE. IN CONTRAST TO STALIN, KHRUSHCHEV HAS GENUINE INTEREST IN WELFARE SOVIET PEOPLE. BECAUSE OF HIS AGE AND HEALTH AND IMMENSE STRAIN OF RUNNING COUNTRY AS LARGE AND HIGHLY CENTRALIZED AS USSR, I AM CONVINCED HE WILL NOT LONG REMAIN IN POWER AND THERE IS LITTLE ASSURANCE THAT ANY AGREEMENTS MADE WITH HIM WOULD BE CONTINUED BY HIS SUCCESSOR. PROBABLY MOST WE CAN HOPE ACHIEVE IN COMING TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS IS CONTINUATION PRESENT TRENDS WITHIN SOVIET UNION, SOME KIND OF SETTLEMENT OF BERLIN SITUATION, AGREEMENT ON CESSATION ATOMIC TESTS, AND APPRECIABLE EASING OF TENSION. THIS MAY GIVE US POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS ON GENERAL DISARMAMENT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. IN ANY EVENT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS OUR RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION WILL BE PAINFUL AND DIFFICULT AND THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF DRAMATIC SOLUTION.

THOMPSON

FKG/22

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AIRGRAM

Department of State

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

Date Sent: August 8, 1959

Rec'd: CN 213

EUR info

FROM: AmEmbassy, Bonn

TO: SECSTATE, WASHINGTON

RPTD: PARIS for USRO and Thurston

REF: STATE PASS DEFENSE

No. 8 G-63

Subject: Ministerial Director Hopf on Federal Republic Possession Atomic Warheads

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During July 31 luncheon Hopf stated Adenauer coming more and more to rely on views Strauss. Defflin believes that FedRep must eventually have control over its own warheads on assumption early French control and consequent strong political pressures in Germany. Chancellor has not yet bought this view, however, repeated statements contend that FedRep cannot depend on U.S. indefinitely for defense which today means atomic retaliatory capability. Hopf stated he found it difficult imagine U.S. President "pushing button" to save Berlin if he knew full well "New York, Chicago, and Washington" would be destroyed. This not "question of pledge, but humanity" and U.S. must realize precarious position in which such a possibility puts W. Europe, for if U.S. not willing to risk all, Russia may practice atomic blackmail and "take over Europe piece by piece starting with Berlin." Certainly such would also not be in U.S. long range interest.

Notwithstanding above line of reasoning which supports Strauss thesis for German national possession, Hopf went on to argue that U.S. should not agree to give FedRep control over its own warheads, even if France, Benelux, and Italy were to obtain national control. He gave as reasons (1) Russian "paranoid" fear of Germany which he personally believes West completely underestimates ("60 percent of German territory under Comrade and Soviets fear we will risk all to recover"), (2) a wide-spread fear or distrust that Germans have for themselves, (3) old fears in England, Italy, and other countries, and (4) would help stop spread of such weapons to "countries like Egypt, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc." Conversely, Hopf stated, if FedRep voluntarily renounced such control for all time, not only would people accept such decision, but it would have soothing external effect.

He stated German populace would get excited over problem only if FedRep government requested control and U.S. rejected request. Therefore, he believed that FedRep should voluntarily renounce, for if France and others had national control would be difficult for U.S. to withhold from FedRep. He added it would "probably be better for U.S." to help France because De Gaulle, whom he considers egoist in class with

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SECSTATE, WASHINGTON

SECRET

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with Strauss, will get his atomic bombs anyway and will continue to rock NATO boat until he gets concessions. He stressed point, however, that U.S. troops must remain in Germany as concomitant to control over German atomic warheads, and that sufficient delivery systems and warheads for both forces must be "stationed here in Germany" to deter Russian aggression in concert with other elements U.S. and U.K. power and largely unaffected by French gyrations.

COMMENT: Hoff's views on German possession of atomic weapons are not entirely new, although perhaps heretofore not so completely amplified. In addition to his pronounced pro-American attitude, Hoff apparently has some reservations concerning Chancellor's policy on France. He has on previous occasions stated his conviction that FedRep tie to U.S. afforded by NATO is only real justification for NATO insofar as Germany concerned. Impression received he has no confidence "continental power bloc" could ever be match for Soviet Bloc, and that he fears if FedRep obtained own custody warheads U.S. administration could no longer convince Congress and people to maintain present U.S. forces in Europe. Believe this last thought may be heart his reasoning.

According to "Die Welt" article of August 6 Strauss reported to have said that necessary for French-German participation in control of warheads for German and French delivery systems. Confirmation of statement difficult obtain as Min still vacationing Bavaria, but if true will be first time Strauss, to best of Embassy knowledge, has made this statement publicly.

PETERIAKE

MAILED ECON:CD H.J. Tassa

[Handwritten signature]

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

POL: Mr. Percival (seen)

RAK
E:SEC BHEGANICHeta 3130

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TOP
SECRET

August 20, 1959

TO :

FROM :

REF NO: DEF 963975

PERSONAL FOR IRWIN FROM NORSTAD.

In preparing presidential papers for his forthcoming trip to Bonn, London and Paris, the following may be helpful:

1. OVERALL PROBLEMS OF NATO CONCERN

A. Need for Strong U.S. Reaffirmation of Support for NATO and Confidence in Its Continued Development As Bulwark of the West.

In view of the forthcoming reciprocal visits of the President and Khrushchev as well as certain divisive tendencies within the Alliance, I believe it is essential that the President draw on his unique position as leader of West in both war and peace to emphasize to European leaders with whom he talks that strengthening of NATO continues to be major aspect U.S. international policy. Discussions with Soviets are only beginning of what necessarily will be extremely long and not too promising process of attempting probe possibilities of improving present international atmosphere. NATO effort continues to be foundation on which U.S. and allied security rest. U.S. supports and encourages further development of political consultative processes in

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NLE Case	89-22244
By	215 NLE Date 3/8/94

Norstad M, Policy Rte Genes / 90 / NATO General (5)

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NATO and believes an unrelenting effort should be made to meet agreed military objectives of the Alliance. There should be no letting down of the guard at this critical time. Though President cannot be expected to engage in detailed discussion of current NATO problems with European leaders, I would hope that he will be disposed to talk about NATO as a growing dynamic institution responsive to the underlying technical and political requirements of our age. Peace time coalitions of past centuries not satisfactory model for organizing collective security in 1960. Strength of NATO depends not only on individual strength of member countries but also on degree of their willingness to create and give life to institutions in which the collective strength is merged in peace time and in war time. Though U.S. not least among nations of world in material and spiritual strength, it believes itself all the stronger in firmly knit institutional arrangements with allies in common cause. Restrictions necessarily imposed on each member of such close-knit alliance loom into insignificance compared with great advantages gained in truly collective effort.

Looking to forces outside the Alliance and to present tendencies within the Alliance, I am convinced that if the President can rekindle the NATO flame along line briefly sketched above, nothing could be more salutary on the European scene at this time. At same time, it would be helpful to make

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-3-

the point that if direction of Alliance fragmented, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain U.S. military position in Europe and defense of West as a whole may suffer.

my own view is that tripartism is a dangerous concept
8. Tripartism

Within Alliance itself chief current problem is

..... of NATO concerns during past year. My specific views on this are reported in section of this message dealing with France.

..... questions concerning it will no doubt arise in President's discussions with other European leaders. Believe interest of Alliance will best be served by President's leaving clear impression that U.S. opposed to tripartite directorship concept. Further-

more, President's talks with leaders of other continental countries will afford opportunity to make clear that U.S. does not consider Within NATO framework many possibilities for individual countries and groups of countries to express their particular and regional interest. However, when these tend toward exclusive groupings, then Alliance is threatened. Keynote of Alliance as stated in treaty is preservation of peace through determination now that attack on one is attack on all. Exclusive groupings inevitably vitiate this principle.

C. Atomic Policies

In my view, President's approach to atomic questions should be based on two principal considerations. 1) The American people continue to feel most strongly--and have conveyed their views in unmistakable terms through their representatives in Congress--that international peace and security will be jeopardized by increase in number of countries possessing independent military nuclear power. Though hopes for international control of this formidable military power have thus far been disappointed, it is incumbent on all those who have responsibility to continue to make an effort in this direction. Therefore, for example, negotiations continue with the Soviets and the UK on the question of nuclear testing. Questions in this field may also arise in the forthcoming conversations with Khrushchev. Under these circumstances the United States cannot follow a policy of deliberately encouraging other governments to embark on nuclear weapon production programs. 2) Insofar as the military requirements of the Alliance are concerned, the steps in which the President played the leading role in December 1957 towards the provision of a nuclear capability to the allied forces have borne fruit.

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No doubt as time goes on improvements can be made within the framework and spirit of the existing arrangements. In discussions on this subject the President can usefully revert to the strong statement he made in December 1957 assuring our allies that an attack on any one of them would lead to immediate action by the United States.

2. GERMANY

Likely to be Raised:

(a) German Reaction to Tripartite Directorate

Germans may express interest in alleged US-UK "bilateral organization", in de Gaulle idea for Tripartite Directorate, and relation of these ideas to US-German bond. He can be reassured that

and that U.S. policy is solidly behind NATO as means of overcoming divisive influences in Europe.

(b) German Fears of Disengagement

Germans are concerned over the possibility of deterioration in either U.S. or U.K. posture in Europe, or NATO posture as a whole. Signs of weakness are seen in talk of disengagement, "thinning out", U.K. military policy in general and

continuing evidences of the British desire to reduce forces in Europe. Germans will welcome reassurance that U.S. will exert its influence to retain U.K. forces in Europe at present levels and will continue to support the build-up of NATO forces.

U.S. Should Raise:

(a) German Progress in NATO

In NATO in general, and in three specific areas, Germans have made effective effort which has benefited common defense significantly. In terms of facilities and land, Germans have made a large contribution and at the same time, are making marked improvement in organization and equipping of their own forces.

..... In addition, German activity in NATO defense production, including purchase of NATO-developed aircraft, and planned participation in NATO production, is of marked benefit to the NATO posture. On the whole, the German contribution has been of great value. U.S. recognizes this and appreciates it. I think they should be complimented on performance.

3. UNITED KINGDOM

Likely to be Raised.

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U.S. Should Raise:

(a) Reduction of U.K. Forces in BOAR

British have repeatedly indicated intention to reduce the BOAR from the present level of 55,000 to 45,000. They originally intended to make reduction during 1958 but U.S. pressure and financial assistance resulted in a decision to maintain the 55,000 through 1959.

Any further cuts would have obvious serious effects on NATO. The Berlin situation makes any reduction in the near future especially untimely. Believe these points should be made with the British, emphasizing the seriousness with which we view any further reduction in BOAR for present.


(b) British Cooperation With NATO

U.K. has responded promptly and effectively to U.S. request to assist NATO in redeployment of 9 USAF squadrons from French bases. Bases have been made available; public relations worked out effectively; and the questions on control in Parliament handled adroitly and in spirit of full cooperation. I think British should be commended for whole episode.

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4. FRANCE

Likely to be Raised and Should be Raised by U.S. in any case:

(a) Tripartitism

France seeks formal US-UK-French organization for global planning, i.e., the use of our atomic weapons throughout world. Believe President should make clear we cannot set up formal consultative procedure for France or any other country, with a veto over our use of our strategic atomic power. We do not have such an organization with UK at present. Would be disruptive to NATO Alliance and suspected by free world nations outside Alliance; US ready to consult with French whenever feasible in advance of major developments but impossible and unwise to hamstring freedom of action in fast-moving pace of world events today.

(b) Atomic Cooperation

De Gaulle recognizes Congressional limitations in this field and is moving ahead to achieve independent French nuclear weapon capability through purely French efforts. Will still likely question US attitude. My views on this problem are covered in (c). In addition,

since France primarily aims to join US-UK "nuclear club", it should be remembered that Point can be made with de Gaulle that common projects and sharing of responsibilities (nuclear stockpile and IRBMs) leads inevitably to closer relations between countries. Such working approach would assist France toward nuclear goal (and would contribute as well to a practical relationship in the direction of Tripartitism).

(c) Africa (Algeria)

De Gaulle wants general support for his Algerian policy, which is necessarily somewhat nebulous due to French political circumstances. This is his crucial African problem, although the African Community may well be a Pandora's Box. Tie up of French forces in Algeria is serious detriment to I think we should give him our support Nothing else offers hope of stability there for moment. However, he should be made aware that this is not a blank check on unknown policy.

(d) NATO Military Relationship

The withdrawal of its Mediterranean fleet, the refusal of integrated air defense program, the rejection of IRBMs and of NATO Atomic Stockpile (and consequently necessary displacement of nine USAF squadrons to Germany and UK), and lesser problems are symptoms of de Gaulle's fundamental objection to integrated defense arrangements for Alliance. While he may not raise these subjects individually, the general discussion should open way and the opportunity should not

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[Retyped for preservation purposes by LKS on 12/17/87]

be lost to bring home the fact that developments since World War II have greatly changed military strategy. Large degree of integration is absolutely essential to meet today's possible rapid challenges.

5. ITALY

Likely to be Raised:

(a) Italy's Concern Over NATO

Italy may express concern over both French attitudes toward NATO and the possibility of some let down in U.S. resolve as result of the U.S.-Soviet meetings. Point can be made that U.S. treats Alliance as a whole and will continue to do so with no lessening of resolve now or in the future.

U.S. Should Raise:

(a) Italian Military Progress

Italy has demonstrated her will to contribute to NATO military power. Of further interest is the expressed intention of Italy to increase military budget by 4% annually, a trend which is of real promise in terms of an increasingly effective Italian contribution to ACE. I think it would be useful to compliment them on their contribution to NATO.

6. SPAIN

Likely to be Raised:


(a) US Military Assistance

Spain wants more military assistance and advanced weapons. US is seeking to provide Spain maximum assistance consistent with heavy requirements world-wide. Since 1953 Defense Agreement with Spain, US has delivered \$307 million worth of military assistance.

(b) Relocation of US Bases in Spain

Spain points out that our four airbases make Spain vulnerable to air attack, especially cities of Madrid and Zaragoza. US considers relocation of bases would be too costly and would stimulate opposition in Congress to our general programs in Spain.

.....



9/24/59

This document consists of 2 pages
 of 9 copies, Series ASECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR MUTUAL SECURITY COORDINATION

September 24, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE UNDER SECRETARY

THROUGH: S/S WMM

FROM: U/MS - J.M. Wilson, Jr.

SUBJECT: Production of IRBMs for NATO Europe

8254
 Friday, Sept 25
 11:30 a.m. Room 5100
 (Additional)

Mr. White's memorandum to you of today's date on the above subject raises a series of difficult problems which would indicate that we are in no position to reach decisions on this matter with Defense in the absence of further consideration within the Department of the several issues raised and considerably greater information from Defense than they have thus far provided.

I understand that S/P has grave reservations with regard to the control issue. These, together with the reservations already noted by Mr. White in the addendum to his memorandum, suggest the desirability, in the absence of a clearly defined Departmental position, of avoiding any definitive pronouncement on this subject at tomorrow's meeting. Defense, on the other hand, will probably be pressing for at least a statement of preliminary views.


We concur in general with the views expressed in the EUR memorandum with regard to costs, and would like to emphasize the absolute necessity of obtaining further data from Defense in this regard before any intelligent policy decision can be reached. In our opinion this subject should be examined in much greater depth, not only from the standpoint of possible direct costs to MSP but also in terms of the total cost to NATO itself; that is, the possible over-all cost to the European nations and the U.S. (both MAP and DOD) of installing any one of several varieties of delivery systems (including both production costs and related maintenance and infrastructure costs), or meeting the NATO requirement by means which might avoid coordinated European production entirely.

You will recall that when this subject was last discussed many months ago with Mr. Quarles, the cost question was wide open. It is my recollection that Mr. Quarles at that time directed that a serious effort be made within Defense to cost out various alternative schemes for meeting the second generation IREM requirement. To my knowledge we have never been informed of the results of those studies if they were ever made. At that time three alternatives were under discussion: (1) delivery of a U.S. produced model (e.g. POLARIS) on a grant basis to European countries, with a ground delivery system developed and produced in Europe; (2) provision of U.S. "know-how" in the form of technical advice and specifications on U.S. production models (e.g. POLARIS) to make possible European coordinated production of a "Chinese copy" in addition to the ground delivery systems; and (3) coordinated European


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production of a brand new model to which the U.S. would contribute technical advice and "know-how". The United States contribution to all of these schemes would include, in addition to the items noted above, MWDP and FAP assistance, and with certain exceptions OSP.

I believe that each of these alternatives should still be costed, if only in general orders of magnitude, before we are in a position to reach any decision. As indicated above, this should be done on a basis of the total cost to NATO of the various alternatives. In addition, it would probably be desirable to ask Defense for comparative purposes to indicate what the cost would be of increasing the United States POLARIS submarine capability to the extent necessary to have the U.S. Navy meet the NATO IREB requirement without European assistance.

Quite aside from U.S. and foreign budgetary considerations, it may also be worthwhile to examine the question in terms of the possible effect of these alternatives on the U.S. balance of payments position. Quite obviously the more end item equipment the U.S. can deliver with resultant savings in FAP, MWDP, OSP and Infrastructure costs, the better the effect would be in pure balance of payments terms. The same would be true if the requirement were met by the U.S. Navy. If at the same time this could be accompanied by commensurate or offsetting increases in the amounts contributed by European countries to the achievement of MC-70 objectives the better off we might be in the long run. At the same time, it is probably unrealistic to expect European countries to increase their contribution to the extent of meeting both MC-70 and IREB requirements. In the case of the UK and France, this seems particularly unlikely, unless they can be persuaded to abandon their independent IREB efforts.

In summary, I believe we can profitably press Defense extremely hard on the costing issue, emphasizing the need for consideration of this problem not only from the standpoint of relative costs to MAP but also from the standpoint of the effect ^{on} the over-all financial position of NATO countries, with the relative priority to be attached to the achievement of MC-70 goals as not the least of these considerations.

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U/MSJ:JMW:ldac

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 DOD Doc 5200.1
 By R.D. NARS, Date 2/17/88

10/6/59

FM HONDI (U) (S)

UIC: MTIT

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FROM: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE
 TO : CJCS WASH DC
 INFO: USAMBASSADOR BONN GERMANY
 NR : EC 9-5302

DECLASSIFIED BY:
 JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
 DATE 13 Jan 1982

061402Z OCT 59

USAMBASSADOR BONN FOR USCINCEUR LIAISON OFFICER.

This message forwards below a LIVE OAK letter,
 subject: "Designation of a Single Commander for Military
 Airlift Operations to Berlin" (S), signed by General Norstad,
 to the Chief of Staff of National Defense, France, United
 Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, and Chairman, United States Joint
 Chiefs of Staff.

General Norstad's letter is quoted as follows:

"Headquarters
 United States European Command
 Office of the Commander in Chief

Subject: Designation of a Single Commander for
 Military Airlift Operations to Berlin (S)

To: Chairman, United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Chief of Staff of National Defense, France
 United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff

1. The tripartitely agreed basic paper, "Berlin
 contingency planning", dated 4 April 1959, states in
 paragraph 12A that the three powers should take steps to
 maintain their unrestricted air access to Berlin; in
 paragraph 12B it assigns specific responsibility for re-
 viewing air contingency planning to the three Embassies at
 Bonn. In consultation with LIVE OAK.

2. The Commanders of the Air Forces of France,
 the United Kingdom and the United States in Germany, have

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By <u>DOD</u>	Date <u>5200 1</u>
By <u>R.D.</u>	NARS, Date <u>2/17/88</u>

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

NR : EC 9-5302

PAGE 2

prepared tripartite airlift contingency plans to meet four possible situations, which could occur separately or jointly, as a result of Soviet actions. These plans are:

- A. Tripartite Operation Plan, Civil Airlift,
24 July 1959.
- B. Tripartite Operation Plan, Garrison Airlift,
24 Nov 1958.
- C. Tripartite Operation Plan, Triple Play, 18
June 1959.
- D. Quadripartite Berlin Airlift Plan (QBAL),
9 April 1959.

3. A study of these plans indicates the need for a centralized authority to review and control the plans and to coordinate their implementation. This is particularly true for the more complex plans cited in paragraphs 2C and D, above.

4. I am in a good position to act as your agent in reviewing and coordinating these plans, initiating their implementation when directed by the three governments and maintaining operational control of their execution. If you agree with my being given this responsibility, I intend delegating to the Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe, the authority to coordinate planning for these military airlift operations and to exercise operational control over the airlifts if they are executed.

/S/ Lauris Norstad
General USAF


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(6 Oct 59)

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10/9/59

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY

EUR

10-9-59

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To: G - Mr. Merchant

From: EUR - Ivan B. White **IBW**

Subject: Second Generation IRBMs

EUR**FILE**

As you requested at the meeting on Tuesday, we have attempted below to phrase a US offer of assistance for an IRBM program conditioned on NATO control, together with a US proposal for re-examination of the requirement for second generation IRBMs, as they might be presented to NATO. This approach, of course, assumes a US decision on the NATO control issue. It also assumes that we would have completed the costing exercise with Defense and Norstad, as outlined in your letter to Irwin, and concluded that even a long-term indigenous European IRBM program would probably involve a serious diversion of resources from the achievement of NATO Shield Force requirements. If we were to conclude otherwise, or to decide that an IRBM program was required in any event by military and/or political considerations, we would presumably adopt a different approach.

740 5612/10-959

The proposal might be made along the following lines:

1. We have considered carefully the findings of the informal NATO Working Group on IRBMs and the proposals made by former Assistant Secretary General Meili in his letter of June 11, 1959 to Ambassador Burgess. The US continues to be willing to assist a coordinated NATO program for development and production of IRBMs if the North Atlantic Council decides, in the light of SACEUR's military requirements, that such a program should be initiated and the Governments wishing to participate can develop an agreed plan which is acceptable to the NATO military authorities and to the Council.


2. The President's December 1957 offer of US assistance for coordinated NATO programs in the modern weapons field was intended solely as a means of increasing the strength of NATO forces. In keeping with this objective, US assistance for the development and production of IRBMs would be subject to an understanding that all missiles produced as a result of the NATO program would be assigned to SACEUR. Insofar as US nuclear warheads were needed for these missiles, the US would be prepared to provide the warheads in accordance with NATO Atomic Stockpile arrangements developed with the countries in which the missiles would

be deployed

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be deployed in accordance with SACEUR's recommendations.


3. Before a NATO decision is reached to proceed with an IRBM program, we believe that careful consideration should be given by the Council, in consultation with SACEUR, to the question of the relative priority that should be accorded IRBMs as compared with other NATO Shield Force requirements in the light of the total resources that are likely to be available within NATO for these purposes. The magnitude of the expenditures required for an IRBM program could prove to be so great as to impinge significantly on our capacity to achieve and maintain other shield forces. We propose, therefore, that this question be examined by a special committee of the Council and that the Council reach a judgment, on the basis of the Committee's findings and the recommendations of SACEUR, as to whether an IRBM program could be carried out without impairment of other NATO Shield Force requirements, and, if not, which should be given the highest priority.

4. If the Council were to decide, on the basis of such an examination, that an IRBM program is required, we are prepared to consult further with the interested Governments regarding the concrete approach to be adopted, and to assist in the implementation of whatever plan is agreed between the Governments concerned and the NATO military authorities and approved by the Council.

The approach outlined above would very likely be turned down by the French (and possibly the British) or result in a negative Council decision regarding the feasibility and desirability of an IRBM program. The Germans might well sympathize somewhat with a probable extremely adverse French reaction. The British would be satisfied with the collapse of a NATO program but, unless they were persuaded to shift the emphasis of their own defense program, would probably be looking to us for assistance in developing a UK IRBM program and would be most unhappy with the clear implication, deriving from our position in NATO, that we would not assist in the creation of a non-NATO IRBM capability for the UK. The reaction of all three would reflect their sense of need for an independent nuclear strategic deterrent in Europe which is based on their growing reservations regarding the credibility of the US response to limited hostilities in Europe. These reservations take into account not only the advent of nuclear parity between the US and the USSR, but also the possibility of a reduction of the US force commitment in Europe which could be brought about by a combination of East-West detente and US budgetary and balance of payments problems.

With these

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With these considerations in mind, it would seem to us essential that we develop a parallel US position or proposal which would serve to reassure the Europeans of our firm commitment to the defense of Western Europe. Such a proposal should not, of course, acknowledge the validity of European doubts regarding the credibility of the US deterrent and should be presented as desirable on its own merits. We are not sure what measure would best serve this purpose, but Norstad's proposal for transferring authority to NATO for the use of the NATO Atomic Stockpile, coupled with a guarantee that the US contribution to the stockpile would be available to NATO for the life of the Treaty, strikes us as being worthy of consideration on its own merits and as a move that could be useful in this connection. It would not, of course, meet French (or British) aspirations in the strategic weapons field. However, it should help to satisfy doubts regarding US intentions and to counter the logic of the extreme de Gaulle position on independent French control of nuclear weapons, although it could not be fully effective in either respect so long as SACEUR is an American.

If, as appears most likely, the US proceeds with a reduction of forces in Europe in the near future, European apprehensions regarding US intentions would be greatly stimulated. Honesty would require that we reveal such a force reduction in this year's Annual Review and it would thus be highlighted at the December Ministerial meeting. If such a development should coincide with the collapse of a European IRBM program as envisaged above, we would, in effect, be withdrawing US forces from Europe while declining to help the Europeans develop a retaliatory force of their own, and such a posture could obviously have far-reaching political repercussions.


Concurrence:RA - Mr. Tuthill *W/*

cc: C - Mr. Reinhardt
 S/P - Mr. Smith
 S/AE - Mr. Farley
 U/MSC - Mr. Bell

GER - Mr. Hillenbrand
 WE - Mr. McBride
 BNA - Mr. Willoughby

RA
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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

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 E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.1

NND 931084
 By MR WBS Date 09-30-1996

November 2, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

FROM : G - Mr. Merchant *LJM*
 SUBJECT: Second Generation IRBM's

RM/R
 FILE

You asked me on September 25 to discuss the second generation IRBM issue with the interested bureaus in the Department with a view to arriving at a coordinated Departmental position.

The problem was discussed under the following guidelines which I suggested:

1. The terms of the President's commitment at the December 1957 NATO meeting.
2. U.S. policy toward 4th nuclear nations.
3. NATO military requirements.
4. The probability of smaller MSP appropriations during the next five years and current administration views that financially able countries should share more of the burden.
5. The effect of any decision by its terms on our political relations with NATO, and particularly with France, Germany, and the UK.
6. The possibility of a non-American SACEUR at some future time.
7. The effect on disarmament negotiations and East-West relations in general.

It developed clearly in our discussions that:

1. Any U.S. financial assistance to either a NATO IRBM program or national single country IRBM programs would cut seriously into our planned aid to fulfill MC-70 goals (in which there is already a critical shortfall).
2. Any U.S. technical or financial assistance to either type of program would significantly improve the capability of non-nuclear allies concerned to produce their


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G: LTMerchant

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own missiles and likewise greatly increase the incentive to develop or acquire nuclear warheads. This would be particularly true of France in light of its existing nuclear program.

3. Any U.S. assistance resulting in a purely national IRBM capability, including nationally controlled warheads, would to some degree complicate prospective disarmament negotiations.

4. The U.S. has limited financial resources to contribute to such programs. Their cost is still uncertain but the estimates should be refined when Defense replies to our letter of October 2.

5. The U.S. cannot be certain of the degree of urgency in the NATO military requirement for these programs nor do we know SACEUR's precise thinking on the IRBM program's priority vis-a-vis MC-70 goals. This we plan to ascertain.


My tentative conclusions, all of which I think are shared by the large majority of the participants in the meetings I have held and with which the Secretary has indicated informal agreement, are that (1) we must find a course of action which will fulfill honorably the President's commitment to NATO; (2) we should not go beyond the minimum necessary to achieve this and do this as inexpensively as possible; (3) under no circumstances should we support a program of assistance limited to any single ally; and (4) all missiles produced under any program should be committed in advance to SACEUR control for NATO purposes.

Approval by you of the foregoing tentative conclusions would suggest that our fulfillment of the President's 1957 commitment would be achieved by offering technical assistance (very possibly on a cash reimburseable basis) for a coordinated NATO program of development and production of second generation IRBM's to be committed to SACEUR control.

However, before reaching a final decision and establishing a course of action, we require further costing data from Defense and General Norstad's reaction to this line of thought, with particular reference to the impact of such an IRBM program on the achievement of MC-70 goals and the relative priorities which he would assign thereto. I am urgently seeking to elicit this data and General Norstad's

views

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-3-

views in collaboration with Jack Irwin. Defense has not come up with answers yet despite prods. Mr. Irwin, however, has promised imminent reply.

We should also be giving preliminary consideration to the presentation of this problem to the North Atlantic Council after we have obtained the cost data, received General Norstad's view, and confirmed or modified our conclusion. As Tab A I attach a thoughtful memorandum on this subject from Mr. Ivan White.

(10/9/59)

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Attachment:

Tab A - Memorandum from Mr. White, EUR,
to Mr. Merchant

G:LTMerchant:mt/sp

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
NNND 867400
Date

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

TO: EUR - Mr. Foy D. Kohler

FROM: SOV - Richard H. Davis

SUBJECT: Possible Indications that the Soviets are Preparing for Serious Negotiations

A careful rereading of Khrushchev's Supreme Soviet speech of October 31 inclines us to believe that he said a number of things which would probably have to be said properly to prepare Soviet opinion for the prospect of serious negotiations. More precisely, they seem to be an attempt to capitalize on the broad Soviet desire for peace and to focus this desire so that Khrushchev can claim popular support to buttress him in any intra-Party discussions. We recognize that it could be claimed with some validity that these things might be said to authenticate the Soviet desire for settlements in order better to blame the Western nations should the negotiations fail to yield objectives desirable to the Soviets. However, it seems to us that this objective could have been accomplished without going to the lengths of the speech.

We do not pretend that any firm conclusions can be made from this evidence nor that whatever "concessions" Khrushchev might be prepared to make would suffice to make agreements possible. We should also point out that RSB probably does not incline to our view and we are passing along a copy for their comments. Nevertheless, without claiming that this represents in any sense a balanced analysis, we were struck with the following:

1. Khrushchev speaks of "mutual concessions" five times in the space of two pages. He states in several different ways that "the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems means... the need for mutual concessions, compromises--adaptations if you like--on both sides in the domain of inter-state relations in the solution of mature, practical questions, in the

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interest of maintaining and strengthening peace." This is the first Soviet reference to the need for Soviet concessions in some time. You will recall that prior to the Geneva negotiations Western statesmen's demands for concessions by both sides were consistently denounced by Soviet propaganda media as an unacceptable application of market terminology to vital issues of peace, a demand for "bargaining" on principles.

Particularly striking is the reference to Brest-Litovsk as an example of "Lenin's wise and flexible foreign policy". Numerous other instances of Soviet concessions less damaging to Soviet national interests might well have been cited, and the reference to "Trotsky's adventurist policy"--"no war, no peace"--is a lethal and scarcely veiled warning to possible dissenters.

It should be noted that Khrushchev states adamantly that concessions cannot be made in matters affecting "the actual nature of our socialist system, our ideology". This, he says, would be a "betrayal of the cause of the working class" and the "fire of merciless criticism must be opened on him" who would contemplate it. This disclaimer seems to be less a contradiction of the necessity for "concessions" but more in the nature of assurance that he, Khrushchev, realizes the limits to which he can go and no critics need worry about it.

2) Less striking but possibly in the same pattern is Khrushchev's statement that "Communists know that the working class, the working peasantry, and all the working people pay for war with their blood and the capitalists make profits from wars." This seems to supply for the Soviet people the unchallengeable justification of any "mutual concessions" made for the sake of peace.

It also seems to us that the almost unprecedented Soviet publication of the text of Acheson's recent speech to the International Union of Parliamentarians fits into this context. Khrushchev is obviously documenting his case that there are important circles in the United States which do not want settlement. However, this could have been done

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by the usual authoritative Soviet commentary or through a judicious use of extractions from Acheson's speech without exposing Soviet readers to a lengthy and reasoned exposition of the need for Western firmness against Soviet encroachments. Going to this length, is Khrushchev not validating in the most convincing manner possible the wisdom and the virtual necessity of his supporting Eisenhower, who is a bulwark against such "propagandists of the cold war" by negotiating with him--and suggesting that it might not be possible to negotiate with his successors unless the process is begun with Eisenhower?

See #3 of Moscow telegram 1537 also.

cc: RSB
S/P

EUR:SOV:JAarm:age:pld

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 Authority VND 949520
 By DMD NARA Date 4/10/97

11/25/59

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 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 WASHINGTON

NOV 25 1959

Dear Mr. Merchant:

This letter responds to your communication of October 2nd which raises many questions concerning IRBM's for NATO. We have tried to be responsive but in some instances it has been impossible to reply completely, particularly with respect to European costs. An exhaustive survey of several months' duration covering the European industrial community would be necessary to provide authentic information. We have, however, developed estimates and these are attached at Tabs A and B. At Tab C we have replied to your specific questions to the extent possible.

Of greater importance, however, is the need to move forward with European production of 2nd Generation IRBM's, both because the U.S. has a commitment to assist and because it is in our interest to do so. If current trends continue, estimates indicate that missiles will be available to the Soviets by the mid-60's in sufficient quantities and of required accuracy to launch an effective surprise attack against our air base complex in Europe. Though planning and execution of a surprise attack with desired success would be most difficult for the Soviets, the effectiveness of our air base complex will deteriorate over the next few years. At the same time penetration by the NATO strike force will be increasingly difficult so that a NATO missiles force will tend to become the most credible retaliatory posture.

A 2nd Generation IRBM force will not be available from U.S. resources since the U.S. is not contemplating a national IRBM program. I believe that provision of a minimum IRBM force in Europe by 1963 plus creation of a manufacturing capability is a current major problem, and one to which we should now address our efforts. Tentative studies indicate that 80 mid-range missiles, in place and operational, in Europe by 1963 would meet ACE minimum requirements at that time. The ultimate number of such weapons required to meet the Soviet threat then and thereafter is as yet undetermined, although it will number several hundreds; however, a precise answer should not prevent us from moving forward.

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The 1963 goal set forth is within our reach, both production- and cost-wise. Cost to the U.S. should be under \$100 million, as illustrated in Tab A.

A brief tabulation of costs to the United States and the NATO countries (based on the information currently available) follows. These estimates cover provision by the U.S. of 50 complete missiles and technical assistance on a grant aid basis with the NATO countries bearing the costs of U.S. components for 30 additional missiles plus all ground environment and launch equipment.

	Cost to the U.S. (Millions)	Cost to the NATO Countries (Millions)
1. Technical and Facilities Assistance	\$ 47.5	--
2. Fifty (50) Complete Missiles and Spares	50.0	--
3. US Manufactured Components for 30 Additional Missiles	--	30.0
4. Licenses	--	10.0
5. Launch and Ground Environment (Average 2.2/M)	--	176.0
6. Overhaul Facilities	--	18.0
TOTAL	97.5	234.0


A capital investment of at least \$100 million will be required for the NATO countries to produce missiles additional to the fifty "grant" missiles, but including the assembly of the thirty missiles from the purchased components. Without additional data on European industry, it is impossible to estimate the unit cost of European-produced missiles.

A 2nd Generation program, perhaps combined with General Norstad's concept of transfer of authority over the atomic stockpile to NATO, could give real impetus to the European military effort. We believe it important that the United States have a positive proposal to make with respect to the European IRBM program at the forthcoming December meetings. I recommend we make a proposal along the lines of Tab D.

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Page 2 of 3 Pages

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In considering this course, the fact must be faced that once we provide the European countries with complete missiles and with parts and components to be assembled in Europe, we will be giving them the know-how to produce such missiles and later generations on their own. However, no national missiles would be produced until NATO requirements were met. At the same time, I consider it inescapable that the European countries ultimately will attain a missile capability through their own effort, and believe that it is in the U.S. interest that they attain such capability with U.S. help. U.S. control is more likely to be enhanced if we assist the Europeans.

As the first step in this program I recommend that we proceed with the provision to NATO of full IRBM technical information and technology to the extent legally permissible. Proposed instructions to USRO are contained in Tab E. Attention is invited to the stipulation concerning prior agreement on deployment of both missiles and warheads.

I recommend that this matter be given early attention with a view to reaching a favorable conclusion. We stand ready to consult with you about any details.


Sincerely,

Thomas Gates

Deputy Secretary


Attachments
 Tabs A - E

Honorable Livingston T. Merchant
 Deputy Under Secretary of State



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
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : EUR - Mr. Foy D. Kohler

DATE: December 3, 1959

FROM : GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand *MJH*

SUBJECT: Proposed Second Generation IRBM Program



While the various difficulties which GER found in previous proposals for a second generation IRBM program still exist, the new Defense Department proposals seem to involve strategic considerations of a considerably more over-riding character. Although the details are not spelled out, we assume that the Federal Republic would be a major participant in this program both in its production and stationing phases.

If we decide to go ahead, we should be fully aware of the relationship which such a program has on the development of our position for the forthcoming negotiations with the Soviets. It would, of course, be inconsistent with any attempt to add a ban on long-range nuclear weapons within the agreed area to Norstad Plan proposals linked to troop reductions.

The letter from Mr. Gates to Mr. Merchant does not mention one essential ingredient in the chain of logic necessary to justify such a program despite the objections which can be made to it on political grounds. We understand that our own ICBM missile gap will be coming to a head around 1963, and that this is also linked to the requirement of a dispersed IRBM capacity in Europe. The question is therefore raised as to whether the Europeans should likewise be told that the IRBM program, and its urgency, has a direct relationship to the anticipated ICBM imbalance. Despite the emphasis put in the Defense presentation on the need to have the IRBMs to offset the forthcoming Soviet capability to launch an effective surprise attack against our air base complex in Europe, our NATO colleagues will almost certainly also relate the IRBM program to the broader question of the dwindling value of the US strategic deterrent.

Finally, in our presentation of this IRBM program, we must be exceedingly careful not to create the impression that it is merely part of a process of American withdrawal from Europe. Given the present atmosphere of suspicion on this subject, this is a conclusion to which the Europeans will almost inevitably jump. We will have to make clear, insofar as we are able, that the IRBMs are intended as replacements for aircraft rapidly becoming obsolescent, but not for the American presence per se.

CC: G - Mr. Merchant
RA - Mr. Tuthill

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EUR:GER:MJHillenbrand:all

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 By DDP NARA Date 4/10/87

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11,417

December 4, 1959

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MERCHANT

FROM : S/P - Gerard C. Smith

SUBJECT: Second Generation IRBMs

RM/R

FILE

1. I have only recently received a copy of the DOD letter to you of November 24 concerning IRBMs.

2. In the absence of some further consideration, it is not clear to me that the DOD letter alters the five factors mentioned in your memorandum of November 2 to the Under Secretary as reasons for the recommendation that we should offer "technical assistance (very possibly on a cash reimburseable basis) for a coordinated NATO program of development and production of second generation IRBMs to be committed to SACEUR control."

a. It is still true that any US financial aid would "cut seriously into our planned aid to fulfill MC-70 goals (in which there is already a critical shortfall)". The DOD estimate of about \$100 million for US provision of the initial missiles and component parts does not take account of the increased MAP which might be needed, as in the first generation program, to help some European countries provide these missiles with supporting equipment (estimated cost: over \$200 million). There is the further question as to how provision of even the missile and component parts would jibe with the President's decision at the NSC yesterday that we should phase out of grant military aid to countries financially able to pay (which likely would be the countries most interested in IRBMs--France and Germany).

b. It is still true that US assistance "would significantly improve the capability of non-nuclear allies concerned to produce their own missiles and likewise greatly increase the incentive to develop or acquire nuclear warheads." The present DOD proposal, like the earlier proposal, not only

would


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S/P - Smith

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would permit European countries to meet national requirements from the coordinated production program once SACEUR requirements had been fulfilled, but apparently contemplates that they would do so. Once the European countries -- particularly Germany--had thus acquired a national strategic delivery capability, they would surely press strongly for national production or control of warheads to be used in these missiles.


c. It is still true that "any US assistance resulting in a purely national IRBM capability, including nationally controlled warheads, would to some degree complicate prospective disarmament negotiations." This prospective complication has been one of the major reasons for our opposition to IRBM deployment in Germany, which would be reversed by this proposal.

d. It is still true that "the US has limited financial resources to contribute to such programs." We should bear in mind, in this connection, that the costs stated in the DOD letter relate only to the initial 80-missile program and leave out of account the production and deployment costs of later missiles, which would be a very substantial drain on European--and perhaps even US--resources. These DOD estimates probably substantially understate even the 80-missile cost, if our experience to date is any guide.

e. The DOD letter does not give us a definitive basis for judging "the IRBM program's priority vis-a-vis MC-70 goals", although it defines the military requirement for missiles and states that diversion of resources to this program would be acceptable. This still leaves a question in my mind as to whether it is in the US national interest to assign resources to a program so clearly related to general war, which is already deterred by our own long-range striking force, rather than to building up the shield defense and deterrence against limited incursions and local hostile action.

3. I would be inclined, therefore, to adhere to your previous conclusion that: "(1) we must find a course of action which will fulfill honorably the President's commitment to NATO; (2) we should not go beyond the minimum necessary to achieve this and do this as inexpensively as possible; (3) under no circumstances should we support a program of assistance limited to any single ally; and (4) all missiles produced under any program should be committed in advance to SACEUR control for NATO purposes."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY COORDINATOR FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

WASHINGTON

December 16, 1959

~~TOP SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bell
Mr. Wilson

SUBJECT: Second Generation IRBM

FROM: Seymour Weiss

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Authority NND 887426

By 1/3 NARA, Date 7/3/96


1. I have been attempting to sort out the extraordinarily complicated series of problems which surround the proposal for the provision of U.S. aid for second generation IRBM's for NATO. While I have had some success in identifying certain of the problem areas which require further thinking through, I have by no means been able to put all the pieces in logical order. However, I would like to call to your attention at this time one aspect of the problem which, I am convinced, requires further and prompt action. This deals with the definitive establishment of the intrinsic as well as the relative military importance of the requirement.

2. It seems to me that those who support the proposed second generation effort, while undoubtedly motivated by a variety of different considerations, assume implicitly or state explicitly that the requirement is one of the highest importance from a military point of view. The SHAPE memorandum to the Standing Group dated October 13 is one source of support for the "paramount importance" of such a weapon to be in operation after the period ending in 1963. A further support is to be found in the Gates to Merchant letter of November 24 which states that it is in our interest to have such a missile system, which given decreasing effectiveness of our air complex over the next few years "will tend to become the most credible retaliatory posture." On the other hand, those in State who have expressed doubts about the wisdom of the proposed program have based their doubts at least in part on the question of the value of this weapons system especially in terms of relative importance compared to conventional equipment requirements. There is also an implicit assumption on the part of both those who "accept" and those who "doubt" that MAP availabilities are limited in such a way as to preclude adequately meeting the second generation and conventional requirements for MAP forces. I would like to suggest that we do not have sufficient information to judge (a) the intrinsic military importance attached to having the second generation IRBM in NATO following the 1963 period, (b) whether the annual magnitude of MAP resources which would be required for financing the second generation is so large as to necessitate a choice between it and conventional requirements and

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finally if an annual maximum limit is agreed upon as a planning assumption, (c) the relative importance which would exist between meeting the second generation requirement and conventional force requirements for the same period (i) within NATO and (ii) outside of NATO, assuming a specific annual MAP limitation.

3. While the Gates-Merchant letter was intended to meet the requirement for this information, and to some extent does, I agree with the S/P view that the need has not been adequately met.

4. I doubt that it ever will be through exchanges of communication. The security problem is too great. Also, no agency, least of all Defense, likes to lay bare its uncertainty over important policy matters. Yet I think there are uncertainties in this picture.

5. It seems to me that under the circumstances the best way to get at the problem is to propose a Gates/Twinning-Herter/Dillon meeting on the subject. Prior to such a meeting I think we need to fully staff out within State the questions which we would like to see pursued in such a meeting.

6. This won't get us answers to the "national control" problem or other similarly political issues which S/P and EUR have identified. However, it could provide highly important information concerning the military importance attached to this operation against which the political judgments could more knowledgeably be made.

7. If you agree with the proposal for such a meeting, I would recommend that we begin at once to sound out EUR and S/P. If they seem agreeable and if events now taking place in connection with the NATO meetings and otherwise have not obviated the need for such a meeting, we might prepare a recommendation for Mr. Dillon to the foregoing effect, early in January.

8. Since writing the above, I have discussed this general problem with Henry Owens. He agrees that it would serve a useful purpose if we could nail down the question of the military value of the second generation program (specifically as it might relate to U.S. strategic deterrent requirements). He likes the idea that we get the record clear on this matter for he suspects it will show that they are not an essential part of our strategic requirement given their timing and projected targets, and agrees that if this

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is established it would be easier to attack the remaining political problems without confusing the issue with a military rationale. Alternatively he also agrees that if it can be shown that this weapons system is an essential part of the U.S. strategic deterrent and of maintaining the nuclear balance between the Soviets and ourselves the justification for moving forward with it would be greatly strengthened. Henry said he would talk to Gerry Smith about the matter as soon as he, Henry, returned from a projected Christmas leave. This suggests that we pick up the ball about the first of the year, as I proposed in (7) above, and see if we can't proceed to nail this one down. Do you agree?

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