

NLE MR Case No.

78-151

Document No.

17

July 1, 1959



83/633

The President, in talking of his conversation with Deputy Premier Kozlov, said that first of all he liked the man -- that he was frank and willing to state clearly the Russian positions. The President said what we have to do is to "thaw out" the Russian defenses. About Berlin we say we will never have our rights there diminished. The Russians say this is an illogical position. We admit it is illogical, but we will not abandon our rights and responsibilities -- unless there is a way made for us to do so.

a.

Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers as  
President of the United States,  
1953-61 (Ann Whitman File)

ACW DIARIES

Box 10, ACW Diary,  
July 1959(2)

7/10/59  
(105)  
July 13, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
July 10, 1959, 6 PM

Others present: Secretaries Herter, Dillon,  
Murphy, Merchant, General  
Goodpaster



Mr. Herter began by saying that the group had considered very carefully the President's idea of talking with Khrushchev and thought that this was a very worthwhile thing to do. To this end they suggested that the President send word very confidentially to Khrushchev, through Kozlov who is leaving in the next day or two, that if there are results at Geneva sufficient to justify a summit meeting, he would propose that it be held in Quebec and that Khrushchev come down to the United States for a few days in advance, seeing the President at Camp David. The President would then plan to go to Moscow in October and on to India. The idea would be for Mr. Murphy to see Kozlov very quietly in New York on Sunday to put this matter to him.

The President said if he went to Moscow at that time he would have to skip Western Europe since if he stopped in one place he would have to stop in many. Mr. Herter said he and his associates also thought there would be value in the President going to Paris for about two days just ahead of the summit meeting to hold a "Western Summit" and have one day of conversations with de Gaulle.

The President commented that one reason he had thought of having Khrushchev over within the next couple of weeks was that this might do some good at the Geneva sessions which are being resumed on the thirteenth. Mr. Herter said he and his associates felt that sending the message now to Khrushchev would have much the same effect. One reason he is taking advantage of Kozlov's


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E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.204

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By DJH Date 7/2/21

Staff for 1 sub / 105 / 2 / State Dept - 1959 (May - Sept) (4)  
also WDE dining / 43

return is that Khrushchev is planning to go to Poland early next week with attendant possibility that he might make provocative public statements there.

The President then considered a draft of a letter to Khrushchev and a draft of a "talking paper" which Mr. Murphy would use. He suggested changes to make it clear that this is not a pressure tactic on Khrushchev. He also suggested as a reason for Quebec as a site the problem he may face in late August or early September arising from the wind up of the Congressional session.

Mr. Herter asked what the President would think about telling the British and the French of this, and specifically about mentioning it to Selwyn Lloyd. The President thought that he should go no further than to say that we are discreetly inquiring whether Khrushchev would like to make an exchange of informal visits. Mr. Herter said he would like to broach the idea of Quebec to the British and the French, since they will be studying the summit problem.

The President said that Mr. Murphy might mention the possibility of Khrushchev visiting a few other places in the United States -- such as the agricultural station at Beltsville and other points of interesting economic activity.

The President next referred to Khrushchev's meeting with Harriman

The President said a meeting of himself with Khrushchev would be useful for one thing. If Khrushchev were to threaten war or use of force, he would immediately call his bluff and ask him to agree on a day to start. Mr. Herter felt that such a direct answer would be most useful in our dealing with Khrushchev, who seems to have, or to be trying to create, the impression that we will not stand up to him.

Mr. Herter said it would have to be made clear that this is not a social or ceremonial visit but is a business trip for the purpose of informal discussions. The President agreed with this but recalled that the Russians are great ones for ostentation and formal display at social dinners, etc.

It was agreed that the State Department group would revise the documents along the lines suggested by the President and send them over to him Saturday morning.

  
A. J. Goodpaster  
Brigadier General, USA





TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT  
(Monday, 13 July at 10:30 a.m.)



1. At the beginning of the meeting, Tom Stephens was present for a discussion of the request by Representative Bonner for an appointment with the President for himself, the two North Carolina Senators and some North Carolina residents for the purpose of inviting the President to speak on Virginia Dare Day at the Lost Colony Pageant on approximately August 18 with some flexibility to meet the President's convenience. The President, after some discussion, felt that he should not consider the invitation for the following reasons: (1) he had made a disproportionately number of appearances in North Carolina as compared with other states; (2) possibility of a Summit meeting; (3) probability of Congressional pressures; (4) if he could be away at that time he would hope to be getting some rest.

The President said, however, that if the Legislative Liaison people felt that it was worthwhile, he would consider making a tape recording. In any event, he indicated to me that he would rather prefer to see Congressman Bonner without the Senators because of their position in the Strauss matter.

2. I indicated to the President that I considered the Record of Actions routine and would approve it on his behalf.

3. I reported to the President on my final roundup with respect to the unilateral offer on the part of the U.S. to bring large numbers of Russian students to this country. I summarized for the President the attached statement, indicating the positions of the various agency heads.

The President then said that he had started on this idea about three years ago when the colleges and universities weren't full.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 24 (b)

PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.2 (2)(3)(4)(5)(7)

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MR 80-71 #24  
BY DJH 1/26/84

NJC letter 2/17/83  
DATE 1/26/84

OSANCA / 9 pgs. Asst. S. / Pres. S.S. / 4 / 'Mtg. w. the Pres. June - Dec 1959 (6)'

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Had his advisers agreed with him at that time the undertaking would have been a practicable one. Now he fears that the pressures on educational institutions from our own population is such that we might not be able to handle the Russian students. As an example he cited the fact that Barnard College has found it necessary to rent a hotel to accommodate its students.


I indicated to the President that I felt that my mission was accomplished and that I would do nothing further unless there was some indication from him.

I also reported to the President that only the Vice President seemed still to favor bringing increased numbers of the "managerial class" to the U.S.

4. I then indicated to the President that I wished to discuss three matters which involved Berlin, and to some extent, the Foreign Ministers conference in Geneva.

The first related to the level of troops in Berlin and his request that a study be made of what the number might appropriately be. I indicated that I had levied a request on Mr. Murphy and the answer had not been forthcoming, largely because he had difficulty getting a coordinated Defense view. I reported to the President that the JCS had just completed a review and were opposed to any reduction. However, it appeared that Defense was taking a less obdurate view and that I hoped within a few days there would be an answer for him.

I also reported that I was informed that General Norstad and the military in Washington were concerned about a limitation without inspection and verification as a precedent which might be bothersome in later and broader disarmament negotiations. The President indicated that he did not have in mind that there would be any limitation but if there were to be a reduction it would be unilateral and not necessarily permanent.



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The third item had to do with the Department of Defense's concern that the State Department was materially weakening the US position with respect to Berlin. I indicated to the President that the JCS had concluded that our negotiating position, from a military point of view, would be stronger now than two and a half years from now, and that this was also the conclusion of an ad hoc committee consisting of State, Defense, JCS and CIA. The President found this hard to believe. In any event, I pointed out to him that on the basis of a State Department paper, which had been made available to Defense, Defense felt against the background at this time, the State Department was proposing a two and a half year moratorium with respect to Berlin; or alternatively, proposing a "guaranteed free city" or a UN trusteeship for Berlin. Either of the latter courses was felt by Defense to demonstrate a retreat by the US. I pointed out to the President that this matter had been brought to my attention on Saturday afternoon by the Defense Department and they were somewhat concerned that there was a Presidentially approved paper which they had not been privileged to see. I told the President that I had discussed this with Mr. Murphy and that he felt that Defense was unduly excited and if they fully understood the situation, their cause for concern would disappear. The President then asked me who really was raising the

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issue and I pointed out that it was Defense. He commented that negotiations with respect to Berlin were primarily a State Department matter and that for purposes of this sort Defense was not a policy-making body but an operating body. I responded that I nevertheless felt it my duty to bring to his attention major differences of view in matters of such supreme importance.



He then summoned Mrs. Whitman and asked her if she had a copy of the "talking paper" which he had approved for Mr. Herter's use in the resumed conferences.. She did not have such a copy but the President told me that it contained a number of positions which Mr. Herter felt he might be forced to take if there were to be any progress at all towards a basis for a Summit meeting.

5. I then indicated to the President that I proposed to request a status report from NASA for the NSC. I pointed out to him that NASA is required by law to make unclassified reports to the Congress and that the report to the Council would be brief and supplementary to such other reports, covering matters with implications for the national security. The President approved this proposal.

6. The President handed to me a copy of a letter to him from Mr. C. D. Jackson, asking me to read and consider it.

Gordon Gray  
Special Assistant to the President

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CIA MEMORANDUM

13 July 1959

U. S. Negotiating Position on Berlin - 1959-62

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum states a US view of the probable alteration of the balance of military power between the present and 1961/62. The West's ability to maintain its position in Berlin after a moratorium would depend on many nonmilitary factors and also upon interim developments which cannot now be foreseen. Among these will be the view the Soviets will then take of their over-all power position vis-a-vis the West, since this will determine the degree of pressure they will think it feasible to apply. They may, for example, take a different view of the military trends discussed above. Likewise, the view taken generally in the West of the relative power position will bear heavily on the outcome of a new trial of strength over the city.

2. In our view, the probable course of developments between now and 1961/62 will lead both the Soviets and the West to conclude that the relative power position of the USSR has substantially improved, and that the position of the West in Berlin is more untenable than it is now. The most important and the most predictable of these is the Soviets' relative gain in nuclear delivery capabilities referred to above. Their increased ability to inflict catastrophic damage on the West, and particularly on the US, is likely to convince them that they can apply still greater pressure on positions like Berlin without assuming increased risks. Awareness of these Soviet gains may reduce the inclination in the West to take a firm and united stand for an exposed position like Berlin. In Western Europe in particular, realization that the US has become more vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack may sap the conviction that the USSR would in a showdown really be deterred by US retaliatory capability. Any decline of confidence in US power would also have some erosive effect on the firmness of the resistance spirit in West Berlin.

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Authority: MR 81-224#3  
By: JLB MED 2/6/89

APPROVED

CASE

DATE 25 JAN 1989

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Copy 3 of 4 Copies (INR)

INR-14765, Att. #3

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE of the  
Staff Secretary Records 1952-61

SUBJECT SERIES: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUBSERIES

Box 4, Joint Chiefs of Staff (17)

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-2-

3. Other developments over the next few years are likely to reinforce an impression in both the Bloc and the West that the Bloc is growing stronger relative to the West. The outlook is for a period of political stability within the Bloc under the firm leadership of Khrushchev. Bloc economic growth is likely to continue at a rate more rapid than that of the West. New Soviet scientific achievements are likely to further enhance Soviet world-prestige. At the same time, NATO seems likely to be in for a rough passage, in part over issues unrelated to the confrontation with the USSR, and this will probably add to an impression of declining strength in the West relative to the USSR.

4. A number of developments are possible by 1961/62 which may counterbalance the impression that the USSR is in a stronger position to contest an issue like Berlin. It is possible, for example, that Khrushchev will no longer be on hand to give Soviet policy its present quality of exuberant and confident brinkmanship. After his departure from the scene other Soviet leaders, especially in the early succession phase, might play a more cautious game. There may be political or economic difficulties and setbacks within some Bloc state, or in relations between members of the Bloc, which would diminish the impression of growing Soviet power. Depending on wholly unpredictable political developments in the principal Western states, the West may react to the sense of a growing Soviet threat by increasing its unity and determination.

5. Taken together, all the above considerations point in the direction of making the Berlin position more difficult to defend at a later date. Nevertheless, the tendency is not in our view so highly probable or so weighty that we must take this as a foregone conclusion. The importance of factors which cannot now be foreseen is likely to be as great as those which can now be tentatively estimated. It is also possible that the Soviets will estimate that their over-all world position in 1961/62 offers such favorable prospects of important gains without serious risks that they will not wish to provoke a sharp new crisis over Berlin which would jeopardize such gains. Moreover, the West has open to it actions and policies which could have the effect of improving the outlook.

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6. Even if the relative Soviet power position improves in fact and in the world's view of it, we believe that the USSR will still be under considerable constraint, in 1961/62, in seeking to enforce its will on a key issue like Berlin. The Soviets' relative gain in nuclear capabilities will not enable them to conclude that they can surely defeat the West in a general nuclear war at a cost that they would regard as acceptable, except in the highly unlikely event that they were able to achieve complete strategic surprise. They will still be deterred from bringing maximum pressure to bear because they will still wish to avoid nuclear war and they will still be uncertain that the West would allow itself to be expelled from Berlin without going to war. The fact that there will continue to be a considerable degree of deterrence imposed on Soviet actions will mean that, in 1961/62 as at present, they will be led to seek their aims by negotiation. Their negotiating position will probably be stronger but it will not be so decisively strong as to compel the West to accept their demands.

7. All of these imponderables bearing on the situation following a moratorium period would be profoundly affected by the actual terms of the moratorium. Most damaging to the strength of the Western position in 1961/62 would be any implication in those terms that at the end of the moratorium a fundamental change in the status of the city was a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, if the West agreed merely to resume negotiations later, without prejudice to its present rights and clearly with the intention to continue to uphold them and with them the freedom of the city, this fact would offset other factors acting to weaken the Western position. The terms of the moratorium would probably be the singly most important factor affecting the attitude of the population and political leadership of West Berlin in particular. Likewise any so-called peripheral concessions attending the moratorium, in particular any reduction of Western troop strength in Berlin, could seriously weaken the will of the city to maintain resistance. Without this, as the Soviets clearly recognize by their attempts to obtain drastic peripheral concessions, the position in West Berlin would in fact become indefensible.

3. BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

(NSC 5810/1; NIE 11-4-58; NIE 100-59 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Overseas Internal Security Program", dated April 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2079; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Status of Military Mobilization Base Program", dated April 21, 1959; NSC 5906; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Basic National Security Policy", dated June 19 and July 6 and 7, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 21C3 and 2105)

Mr. Gray indicated that the Council would now proceed to resume consideration of NSC 5906 and called attention to the fact that a four-page Change Sheet had been given to each member of the Council this morning. He also noted that a number of other changes had been agreed upon in the Planning Board as well as in conferences between Secretary Dillon and Secretary Anderson of the Treasury Department. (Copies of Mr. Gray's briefing note and of the Change Sheet are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum).

Mr. Gray passed over Paragraphs 19 and 20 with a brief comment. When he came to Paragraph 23 he noted that there was a split between the Majority Proposal on the one hand and a proposal by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other. He also pointed out that the Majority Proposal for Paragraph 23 had been revised in the Change Sheet which had been distributed to the members. The revised Majority Proposal read as follows:

"a. The United States should seek:

- "(1) To prevent or retard the development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons capabilities.
- "(2) To prevent or retard the acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons components by nations which do not now possess them.

"b. If, however, it becomes clear that efforts to achieve agreed international controls affecting nuclear weapons development will not succeed, or if there is substantial evidence that the Soviet Union is permitting or contributing to the development of nuclear weapons capabilities by Bloc countries, the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with them or provision to them of appropriate information, materials, or nuclear weapons, under arrangements for control of weapons to be determined.

1990 / 1992 copy  
 memo of disc at the 4130 mtg of the NSC, including  
 July 6, 1959



"c. In anticipation of the possible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by such allies, the United States should now urgently consider within the Executive Branch plans for the development of multi-national (e.g., NATO) arrangements for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons.

"d. Legislation should be sought when and as necessary for b and c above."

The Defense-JCS Proposal which was much shorter read as follows:

"23. [Fourth sentence of par. 13 of NSC 5810/1, amended.] It should be U.S. policy to exchange with, or provide to, additional selected allies scientific and technical information in order to assist the research and development of nuclear weapons capability among our most reliable allies and to enhance our own knowledge. Seek legislation as necessary to authorize such exchange or provision of information."

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

TOP SECRET

2114.

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Continued)

forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. When the use of U. S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force should be promptly and resolutely applied in a degree necessary to defeat such local aggression. Force should be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities broadening into general war. Local aggression as the term used in this paragraph refers to conflicts occurring outside the NATO area in which limited U. S. forces participate because U. S. interests are involved. Conflicts occurring in the NATO area or elsewhere involving sizeable forces of the United States and the USSR should not be construed as local aggression. Incidents in the NATO area such as incursions, infiltrations and hostile local actions, involving the United States and the USSR, are covered by the NATO political directive and strategic concept."

- (4) Pages 16-18, paragraphs 23 and 24: Revise paragraph 23 to read as follows, and delete paragraph 24:

"23. a. The United States should discourage:

"(1) The development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons production capabilities.

"(2) The acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons components by nations which do not now possess them.

"b. Whenever the President determines it is in the U. S. security interests to do so, however, the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with them or provision to them as appropriate of (1) information; (2) materials; or (3) nuclear weapons, under arrangements for control of weapons to be determined.

1990 / 997 (exhaust)  
Award of Behns by the Sec at its 45th mtg  
held on July 30, 1959 (+ approval  
by the President on Aug. 5, 1959)  
Action No 2114

ACTION  
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2114.

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Continued)

"c. In anticipation of the possible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by such allies, the United States should now urgently consider within the Executive Branch plans for the development of NATO arrangements for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons.

"d. Legislation should be sought when and as necessary for b and c above."

- (5) Pages 54-55, paragraph 62: Revise to read as follows:

"62. Outer Space. The United States should continue actively to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space as needed to achieve scientific, military and political\* purposes. Objectives should include: (1) a broad-based scientific and technological program in space flight and planetary-interplanetary exploration which will extend human knowledge and understanding; (b) a military space program designed to extend U. S. military capabilities through application of advancing space technology, without invading the responsibilities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; (c) a civil space program designed to promote the peaceful uses of outer space; and (d) as consistent with U. S. security, achievement of international cooperation in the uses of and activities related to outer space--for peaceful purposes, and with selected allies for military purposes.\*\*

"\* The term 'political' includes consideration of psychological factors.

"\*\* This paragraph will be subject to reconsideration following the current review of 'Preliminary U. S. Policy on Outer Space' (NSC 5814/1) by the National Aeronautics and Space Council."


- c. Noted that the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization would submit a report on the review of paragraph 58 of NSC 5906 (Mobilization Base) by August 31, 1959.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT  
(Monday, 27 July 1959 at 10:30 a.m.)



(Gordon Gray)

1. Robert Gray, Secretary to the Cabinet, joined us to discuss the Cabinet paper "Removal of Papers by Retiring Department and Agency Heads" (CP 59-58/4). I pointed out to the President that the paper which he had approved did not specifically advert to classified documents of the National Security Council and that it seemed well to have the covering memorandum make some reference to these papers. Thereupon Mr. Robert Gray presented to the President the draft document which is attached to Mr. Lay's copy of this memorandum. The President approved the document and Mr. Robert Gray left the meeting.

2. I then asked the President whether he would be willing to see Mr. Charles A. Haskins for a few minutes at the conclusion of my business with the President to discuss the Jackson Committee study in view of the fact that Mr. Haskins was to be the President's personal representative. I indicated that I felt that it would make Mr. Haskins a more useful representative from the point of view of morale and it seemed to me important for Mr. Haskins to hear from the President the limitations he wished put upon the scope of the study. The President said he would see Mr. Haskins and I added that Mr. Edward McCabe would come in at the same time.

3. I then discussed the draft Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of July 23 with the President and called his attention particularly to Item 1 c. I indicated that the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization had requested that it participate in any such study. I also pointed out to him that there was a difference of view between Defense and the Bureau of the Budget as to the second sentence in paragraph 1 c, Defense wishing it deleted and Budget wishing it retained even though it might be modified in some respects.

The President said that he wanted no "ponderous studies" on this subject and that he wished an examination to be made by capable junior officers. He wasn't even sure that he wished the study to be an NSC

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 24 (b)

MB 80-71 #20

BY DJH 1/26/84


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PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.2 (3)(4)(5)(7)  
NSC 2/17/83; CIA 3/31/81

WE DATE 1/26/84

09A NSA/Spec Asst 1 / Pres 215/4 / Meeting w the Pres, June-Dec. 1959 (4)  
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undertaking. However, he thought that such a study might be just for the benefit of the members of the National Security Council. He felt that he would like a picture of what the military believes to be the situation after a nuclear exchange. He would like to know what they felt to be the status of our resources, how we would have to use them, and in what way we would have to use them. For example, would our remaining resources be necessary for the purpose of winning the war or would the problem be one of survival.

He then recalled that the request that he had made in the July 23 meeting was that junior staff officers make the study and that the senior officers of the Services should not involve themselves except as they took an interest in what their subordinates were doing. The President felt that he would like to know what really would be the military problem under the conditions of a nuclear exchange and thought it was possible that such a study would show that rather than planning to increase and enlarge the military services in such a situation, quite a different approach might be indicated. He reiterated that perhaps our whole "mobilization base" thinking for such an emergency is obsolete, adding that a study might suggest an enlargement.

I indicated to the President that we would reflect that he had made a request for a study by junior staff officers with the participation of staff from OCDM. He approved this approach.

4. I then presented the attached draft memorandum to the President for his approval. I reminded him that he had directed that this procedure be followed some weeks ago, but that I had delayed taking action at Mr. Harr's request until we were nearer the point of having a new Chairman of the OCB. Mr. Harr had felt and I had agreed with him that the letter of appointment to the new Chairman might be used as an occasion to indicate that the action concerning progress reports was not a downgrading of the OCB but rather put a heavier requirement upon the OCB.

I pointed out to the President that the State Department legislation had now been passed by the Congress and he would soon be in a position to appoint Mr. Murphy. The President approved the attached draft.

5. I reported to the President that in connection with current discussions about aid to Libya..... there had emerged for the first time to my knowledge the fact that the military perhaps did not consider the Wheelus base in Libya

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The President, however, indicated that the DCI would never quite meet the prescription of the Hull Board. He said that he agreed with the Hull Board but in order to go all the way with their recommendations he would be faced with the presently unacceptable course of acquiring a new DCI.



6. I indicated to the President that I intended to proceed with a request of the Defense Department to report on the general effects of the new logistics base paragraph of Basic National Policy. He gave his approval.

7. I went over with the President, the outline of the State Department discussion paper on NATO which I indicated would form the basis of an early Council discussion. The President took issue with the observation that any reduction of U.S. forces committed in Europe would be a change in policy. He said that he had often pointed out that the stationing of American divisions in NATO Europe was originally conceived of as a temporary deployment and only until such time as the West German buildup developed and other NATO countries could meet the ground force requirements. He acknowledged that he and Foster Dulles never saw eye-to-eye on this point, and that the State Department had consistently felt that we had commitments in the area which the President did not acknowledge. In any event, he approved the general approach to the discussion.

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8. I then brought up with the President certain problems which might become troublesome in the post-Khrushchev visit time period. I referred to Mr. Harr's memorandum to the President on this subject and I said that I wondered whether there was a necessity of a Council discussion with respect to our policies or any part of them with respect to, for example, East-West Exchanges, Civil Aviation, East-West Trade, etc. The President displayed some irritation at the question, and also at Mr. Harr's memorandum. He said there was no change in our policy and he didn't understand why people were suggesting that there was. He saw no necessity for a Council discussion. As far as the problems of government officials and the operators generally were concerned, he felt they should proceed as before.

Gordon Gray  
Special Assistant to the President

cc: Mr. Lay

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

7/30/59

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Action

Control:

21089

SS

Rec'd:

JULY 30, 1959

Info

FROM: GENEVA

7:42 P.M.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: CAHTO 183, JULY 30, 9 P.M.

2

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS TALK WITH GROMYKO TODAY MADE CLEARER THAT THREE MAJOR UNRESOLVED POINTS WILL MAKE AGREEMENT VERY DIFFICULT. THE FIRST DEALS WITH THE CONTINUATION OF ALLIED RIGHTS IN BERLIN ON WHICH WE FEEL IT ESSENTIAL TO GET SOME LANGUAGE WHICH IN LIGHT OF PAST RUSSIAN STATEMENTS AND THREATS WILL GIVE US STRENGTH IN ANY RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS AFTER POSSIBLE MORATORIUM FOR FEW YEARS. THE SECOND IS THE SOVIET INCREASING INSISTENCE ON SOME REDUCTION IN TROOP LEVELS IN BERLIN WHICH TO THEM APPEARS TO BE ALMOST A SINE QUA NON IN ORDER TO SHOW: A) THAT THEY HAVE MADE TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN CHANGING STATUS QUO BERLIN; B) THIS BEGINNING OF LIQUIDATION OF OCCUPATION RIGHTS; C) SUCH A SHOCK TO MORALE BERLINERS AS TO BEGIN A PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERIORATION OF REAL IMPORTANCE. THIRD, THE LINKAGE OF DIRECT ALL-GERMAN TALKS WITH THE TIME LIMIT TO BE PUT ON ANY TEMPORARY MORATORIUM AGREEMENT ON BERLIN.



WE CONSIDER THE FIRST POINT A PRACTICAL NECESSITY. COUVE AGREES BUT SELWYN VERY WOBBLY. ON SECOND POINT, ALL MY ADVISERS HERE AS WELL AS AMBASSADOR BRUCE AND MILITARY, INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER BERLIN, NORSTAD, AND PENTAGON, STRONGLY OPPOSED ANY REDUCTION BEYOND PRESENT LEVELS BUT WILLING TO PLACE CEILING AT THAT POINT. VON BRENTANO AND MAYOR WILLY BRANDT BITTERLY OPPOSED ANY REDUCTION NOT SO MUCH FOR MILITARY REASONS AS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS. I AM PERSONALLY TERRIBLY RELUCTANT TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS THIS POINT. COUVE FEELS WE COULD GET AGREEMENT AT LEVEL SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 8,000 TO 10,000 AND WOULD FAVOR THIS IF IT WERE LAST STICKING POINT TOWARDS AGREEMENT. SELWYN TAKES SAME POSITION AS COUVE BUT

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AWP/D-17/9 mudd

TOP SECRET



-2- CAHTO 183, JULY 30, 9 P.M. FROM GENEVA

INSISTENT THIS BE KEPT AS VERY FINAL CONCESSION. ON THIRD POINT, IMPOSSIBLE ACCEPT ALL-GERMAN COMMITTEE IN FORM PROPOSED BY SOVIETS SINCE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET WEST GERMAN CONCURRENCE AND HENCE PLEDGE BY US NO VALUE. ALL THREE OF US FEEL WE CANNOT GO BEYOND SUBSTITUTE FOUR-POWER COMMITTEE WITH GERMAN ADVISERS WHICH WE HAVE OFFERED AND BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD AS LAST RESORT ACCEPT THIS RATHER THAN NOTHING. ALSO FEEL SOVIETS LIKELY TO DROP LINKAGE IF THEY CAN GET CONCESSION ON POINT 2.

REMEMBERING FOSTER DULLES' OWN FEELING WHICH AS I RECALL YOU SHARED THAT TROOP NUMBERS IN BERLIN WERE NEGOTIABLE POINT, I WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL REACTION ON THIS AND THE OTHER TWO POINTS MENTIONED.

IT IS JUST POSSIBLE OF COURSE THAT WE COULD NOT REACH AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF RIGHTS ISSUE AND THAT TROOP LEVELS MIGHT NOT COME TO DECISION. HOWEVER, WE MUST BE PREPARED ON THIS POINT, SINCE IT MIGHT EVEN BECOME QUID PRO QUO FOR ACCEPTANCE WORDING ASSURING OUR RIGHTS.

FAITHFULLY, SIGNED: CHRIS."

HERTER

PJD-22

TOP SECRET



7/31/59

July 31, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
July 31, 1959 -- 11:15 AM

Others present: Secretary Dillon  
Major Eisenhower

The President read a message from Secretary Herter (CAHTO 183) with regard to three major unresolved points at the Geneva conference, namely: (1) continuation of allied rights in Berlin, (2) reduction in troop levels, and (3) linkage of all-German talks with a time limit to be put on any temporary moratorium.

After reading the message, the President said that as far as military value is concerned, a troop level of 6000 is the equivalent of our present 11,000, that this is a policy question outside the sphere of the Department of Defense. If points (1) and (3) were agreed (favorably to the Western position) and announced, then he felt the allies could announce their readiness to make modest force reductions.

Mr. Dillon said that State's feeling coincides with that of the President. Couve de Murville has stated that if (1) and (3) are agreed, then the psychological impact of reduction of Western forces in Berlin to 8000 or 10,000 would be small. Mr. Dillon visualizes that all three points would be announced together. Our public statement would essentially say that since the allies and the USSR have reached agreement as to satisfactory language regarding the continuation of allied rights in Berlin, and since the Soviets have withdrawn their linkage of direct all-German talks with the time limit, we are therefore ready to make modest force reductions of our garrisons in Berlin. The President agreed and instructed Mr. Dillon to send a message to Mr. Herter over his signature to this effect and to send the President a copy. He authorized reducing forces to the levels proposed by Couve de Murville and asked that Brentano be kept informed of our position. He recognized that this will have a bad short-term effect on German morale, but said we can't do the impossible just to maintain German morale at a high level at all times.

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MB 80-18 2#2  
By JTH Date 5/15/91

Staff Secy / Subj / DRS / 3 / State Dept - (95 9 (May-Sep)) (4)

Mr. Dillon then notified the President that Dr. Killian will go to Britain about August tenth in place of Dr. Bacher to brief on the subject of detection of underground test shots.


John S. D. Eisenhower

8/19/59

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AUG 19 1959

MR Case No. 80-405

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

762

Subject: Your Discussions with  
 Prime Minister Macmillan -  
 European Integration

As you know, short talking papers are being prepared for your use on each of the topics likely to come up during your European trip. Among the economic subjects there is one to which I believe you should give special thought in connection with your talk with Prime Minister Macmillan. This is the question of European Economic integration, with respect to which we and the U.K. have sharply contrasting policies.

British policy, while formally acknowledging the existence of the Six-country integration movement as exemplified by the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the European Economic Community (Common Market), has clearly reflected an underlying hostility.

Macmillan is known to believe that the Common Market, unless absorbed in wider European arrangements, will "split Europe." To prevent this the British first proposed a European-wide Free Trade Area, a much looser economic arrangement than the Common Market. This effort failed, among other reasons, because the dominant element among the continental supporters of the European integration movement strongly felt that a Free Trade Area would jeopardize the objectives and institutions of the Common Market designed to achieve full economic integration. The British have now recently turned to the promotion of a limited Free Trade Area among themselves, the three

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By bc NLE Date 9/23/76

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Box 14  
 Macmillan Vol. II of III (3)

WHITE HOUSE  
 Staff Secretary  
 INTERNATIONAL SERIES  
 1959-61

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They have recently objected to the French proposal for special political consultation among the Six on the ground that this would "divide NATO."

Germans) and the recent limited arrangement among the Outer Seven.

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to be a genuine free-trade arrangement substantially conforming to GATT standards.

Prime Minister Macmillan may, in his discussions with you, again seek to line up the United States behind British economic policy on the continent. I believe we should handle such an approach, carefully but firmly, by replying to Macmillan along the following lines:

1. The United States is firmly committed to the support of the Six-country integration movement, which we are convinced is in the economic, political and security interests of Europe, NATO and the entire Free World. While we agree that the Common Market must be "outward-looking" in trade and must develop in accordance with the liberal principles of GATT and the IMF, we do not believe it will "split Europe" if these conditions are met.
2. Close political relations among the Six are a logical consequence of the economic integration movement. The United States supports political developments of this kind, and expects them to be consistent with NATO objectives.
3. We would, as before, support a Europe-wide Free Trade Area but cannot be expected to press it upon members of the Six who genuinely believe it would jeopardize the Common Market. We do not believe that this opposition within the Six has materially changed. The evidence is not clear that this opposition is likely to change in the near future.
4. We would support an "Outer Seven" arrangement in GATT if it is a genuine free-trade area substantially conforming to GATT. However, for the reasons stated in 3, above, we are doubtful that the Outer Seven

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arrangement will lead to a Europe-wide Free Trade Area.

5. It is our judgment that the best way of dealing with European and world trade problems would be for all of us -- the U.K., the continental European countries outside the Six, the United States, Canada and others -- to accept the Common Market as an accomplished fact and to work together to negotiate downward the external tariff of the Common Market, thus minimizing its discriminatory effect. We believe further that a substantial step in this direction can be taken during the tariff negotiations under GATT in 1960-61 (in which the U.S. will participate under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act).

/S/ DOUGLAS DILLON

Acting Secretary

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8/19/59

U.S. MISSION TO NATO AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
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August 19, 1959 7 PM  
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TO: SECSTATE/WASHINGTON POLTO

file 16 Aug 59.

RPTD INFO: LONDON POLTO 93

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SUBJECT: Conversation with Adenauer at Lake Como on August 16

Upon their return from weekend Lake Como, Ambassador Stikker and General Norstad gave me fill-in interesting three-hour luncheon conversation at Stikker's villa Sunday, August 16. Present were Adenauer, Spaak, Norstad, Stikker, de Staercke.

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Certain aspects of this conversation may have considerable bearing on President's talks in Europe, particularly in Bonn. These are in summary: (1) Views expressed re NATO governments' support of de Gaulle position on Algeria; (2) Adenauer's position, after discussion, on "tripartitem"; (3) Adenauer's views re UK.

Full report follows.

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Agency Case File 9202075

NLE Case 92-207-2

By 710 NLE Date 11/14/92

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Adenauer, near neighbor of Stikker's at Lake Como, accepted luncheon invitation with eagerness, saying he anxious discuss substantive matters. He brought interpreter only. Spaak and de Staercke were vacationing near by, and Norstad flew down with Stikker for weekend with de Staercke. Thus occasion can be described as natural get-together of friends on vacation. Adenauer described as being in zestful mood, vigorous and good-humored.

Conversation first turned to de Gaulle's France. Spaak said in his view President Eisenhower's meeting with President de Gaulle would be perhaps more important than the meetings with Khrushchev, since latter exploratory and educational only, while former might produce immediate results.



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U.S. MESSAGE TO NATO AND EUROPEAN ALLIES

TELEGRAM CONTINUATION

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
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3. East-West Talks. Adenauer had no qualms re Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange of visits, expressing in glowing terms his confidence in President and U.S. He indicated, however, he did not expect much to come out of these exchanges. He thought Khrushchev great actor and opportunist, but felt he based his policy on conviction that West would collapse and placed no time limit on eventual triumph of international communism. Adenauer said that in 1958, during his talks with Khrushchev, latter had said that there were

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only two countries which Russia feared, U. S. and Germany, and had proposed that Germany join Russia against U. S., thus assuring an overwhelming preponderance of power. Adenauer had, of course, turned this proposition down. In speaking briefly of China, Adenauer said Khrushchev had said in 1955 that China was destined under present trends to become a threat to everyone, as much to the U. S. S. R. as to the West.

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4/26/59  
28/18

The President responded by agreeing with Secretary Dillon that we can't always know what use is made of our equipment, but he was against giving the French equipment for use in Algeria. We should make it clear that we are giving assistance for defense against the Communist menace. Every place in the world our military assistance was for this purpose--either for defense against Communist aggression, or for defense against internal subversion. In the whole field of economic help, however, we have had a narrower view than we should have. The real menace here was the one and a half billion hungry people in the world. We haven't been sufficiently alert in meeting this problem. But in the field of military assistance we should continue our present policy of giving aid for defense against Communism.

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CINCSN 068/0681

Mr. Gray then turned to the split in the second sentence of paragraph 46, with respect to providing conventional equipment to France on a reimbursable basis "so far as practicable". The President thought that the United States had stopped providing conventional equipment to France on a grant basis. Mr. Gray responded that there was no clear-cut policy. Mr. Stans pointed out that it was indicated, on page 42 of the Financial Appendix, that no grant military assistance was contemplated for conventional equipment. Mr. Gray stated that State and JCS wished some future flexibility in this matter, whereas the Majority wished a flat prohibition against grant aid for conventional equipment.

Secretary Dillon said that he felt it was important to put as much military assistance as we can on a reimbursable basis for balance of payments reasons. He didn't, however, see any difference in this respect between conventional equipment and advanced weapons. In fact, in the long run, we might be better able to sell advanced weapons than conventional equipment. If the Algerian war ended and the French divisions in Algeria were so run down that re-equipping them with conventional equipment in any reasonable time was beyond French capacity, we might decide that grant assistance for conventional weapons was more in accordance with U. S. interests than grant aid for advanced weapons. He was willing, he said, to put in strong language to indicate that, to the maximum possible extent, military aid of all kinds should be on a reimbursable basis.

The President agreed that, in view of the recent doleful report by Secretary Anderson on the U. S. balance of payments situation, it would be sensible to put all aid on a reimbursable basis. The reserves of many countries were rising, while ours were falling. We should get Europe to pay for its own military equipment

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Secretary Dillon said that State was prepared to agree to a suggestion of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to the effect that "except in unusual circumstances" aid should be on a reimbursable basis. The President agreed to this approach within the context of a general directive along the lines that he had suggested.

Secretary McElroy suggested that one reason for the French reluctance to purchase equipment was the fact that the French were allergic to taxes; it was, in other words, not just a foreign exchange problem in the case of France.

Mr. Gray next referred to the Treasury-Budget proposal in the last sentence of paragraph 46. Mr. Stans immediately withdrew the proposal.

Mr. Gray went on to direct the Council's attention to the split in paragraph 42-a, on nuclear cooperation with France. He summarized paragraph 24 of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1), and described the split between JCS and the Majority.

The President inquired as to the legal situation. He thought that under the law we could provide help to a country only when it has demonstrated a nuclear capability. Were we talking about a change in the law? Mr. Gray said that under the JCS position such a change was clearly contemplated, and might be necessary under either proposal.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that legislation was to be sought under paragraph 24 of the Basic Policy. He argued that we could not ignore the legislative situation. In his opinion the chances were zero that we could get legislation through Congress providing for bilateral assistance to the French. We shouldn't lead De Gaulle to believe that we would be able to do so. Probably the only way that we could get Congressional approval would be through a multilateral approach. Study of a multilateral nuclear authority should have top priority. We had to determine whether such an authority would be acceptable to the United States itself; whether it would impose unacceptable restrictions upon us.

Mr. McCone noted that it had been a problem to get Congressional approval for provision to foreign countries of nuclear fuel for submarines. He also pointed out that the explosion of a bomb would not necessarily qualify France for U. S. assistance under existing law. Secretary Dillon interjected to say that the French have been told this, and the French atomic energy agency understands it, but the French public does not. Mr. McCone went on to say that a multilateral approach was feasible from a legislative viewpoint.

G. W. B. 10/1/54



The President suggested that it was as if we had been fighting wars with bows and arrows and then acquired pistols. Then we refused to give pistols to the people who were our allies even though the common enemy already had them. We got into the strangest inconsistencies under free governments. He felt the Joint Congressional committee was singularly unenlightened. The President thought that we ought to try very hard for a multilateral approach, and inquired whether new legislation would be necessary in that case. Mr. McCone said that legislation would be required. Secretary McElroy said that if a multilateral approach involved establishing an "authority", legislation would be required.

Ambassador Lodge suggested that as a former Congressman he was impressed by the way the President had put the matter; he thought that such an argument would be very effective with Congress.

The President concluded this discussion by saying he thought that he would make a great farewell speech in which he would discuss what we do to ourselves in the name of defending ourselves.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5910; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memoranda of August 13 and 17, 1959.
- b. Tentatively adopted the following amendments in NSC 5910:
  - (1) Page 29, paragraph 41: Delete the bracketed sentence and the footnote thereto.
  - (2) Page 30, paragraph 41-a: Include the Majority version and delete the JCS version.
  - (3) Page 30-A, paragraph 41-c: Delete the bracketed language and the footnote thereto.
  - (4) Page 31, paragraph 41-c-(1), -(2) and -(3): Include the Majority version and delete the JCS-OCDM version.



8/21/59

August 24, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
August 21, 1959

Others present: Secretary Herter, Secretary Murphy,  
Secretary Merchant, Mr. Ivan White,  
General Goodpaster, Major Eisenhower

The President expressed dissatisfaction with the draft reply prepared by State to a letter to him from Mr. Cola Parker criticizing the President's invitation to Khrushchev. He felt the draft was much too defensive and lengthy. After discussion it was agreed that Mr. Robert Murphy would seek to see Mr. Parker while visiting the Mid-West in the near future and set him straight.

The President then turned to questions relating to his trip to Europe. He said he had several things on his mind, starting with the bad deportment of the Russians in rigidly demanding a certain itinerary for Khrushchev while here. He thought they were trying to "bulldoze" us. Mr. Murphy agreed that they were being very arrogant. The President authorized the State Department to tell the Russians that Khrushchev could not go to certain places. On the question of whether Khrushchev should be treated as a Chief of State or Head of Government, the President wanted to wait for Khrushchev's reply. If we find that they are insisting upon unacceptable things, the President is quite ready to tell him that the trips will be cancelled.

The President next said that he had had word indirectly that de Gaulle was arranging for his own interpreter to be the only man with the two of them at the private meeting. So far as he is concerned this is quite unacceptable. He will have Walters at any such meeting.

The President added that in fact he has the impression he is rather being told what he will do by several of these countries,

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E.O. 12055, Sec. 3-204

MR 76-49 #231  
By DJH Date 6/2/80

MR 80-192 #3  
By JTH Date 7/15/81

AWF / DDE diary (43 / 'Staff Notes Aug. 1959 (1)'

and does not plan to accept it. At this point the President told me that he would like me to read and be completely familiar with Kistiakowsky's latest study evaluating the need for further atomic weapons tests.

The President next said that the indications are that Adenauer, after showing reason initially, had since become very inflexible in his attitudes during the last couple of weeks. Mr. Herter said he is both inflexible and deeply suspicious. Fundamentally he is approaching his problems from a domestic political standpoint -- he is fearful of the large Socialist vote in East Germany. In fact, Mr. Herter believed that Adenauer for that reason does not want a reunified Germany even though he continues to call for reunification publicly, as he must.

The President commented that if Adenauer is really fearful of reunification, he should be favorable to steps short of full reunification. Mr. Herter said the West Germans would like to have contact with the East Germans, without recognizing them, limiting contacts to the technical level, and having the Western countries represented in any committee that is set up. The President asked Mr. Herter whether all this means that we are just going to take an adamant and negative stand. He asked what ideas we have.

Mr. Herter said that the crux of the matter is that the Soviets want to destroy our protection of West Berlin. He thought it might be useful for us to tell Khrushchev that we have no desire to stay in West Berlin in perpetuity. That is why we wish to find some solution in Germany. The President asked what can be done that Adenauer will accept. Mr. Herter thought we should try to get an arrangement which would carry us over the German elections in the fall of 1961. Thereafter, contacts between the West Germans and East Germans might prove possible to work out.

Mr. Herter said there are two matters of principle involved. The Soviets are trying by pressure to get us out of our rights in West Berlin. They are also trying by pressure to get us to reduce our troops in West Berlin. The President said that if Khrushchev wants to liquidate the occupation he should agree on free elections in Germany.

The President said he would like to meet with the State Department representatives on Monday or Tuesday and have from them a working paper that he can use for each of the capitals he is going to visit. Behind that there should be a paper indicating just what are the limits to which we can go in talking to Khrushchev. Mr. Herter said he really thought that for the time being the best thing for us to do is to get a two-to-three year modus vivendi. The President said we must have our own position with respect to the Soviets on Germany very clear and with this in mind consider how we can best talk with Adenauer, Macmillan and de Gaulle.


Mr. Herter said that Adenauer will in all likelihood make a plea for the United States to support de Gaulle on Algeria. The President said that we cannot abandon our old principles of supporting a national freedom and self-determination, and we cannot join the colonialists. In his opinion we are deep enough in Europe's troubles now, and must be tough in saying that we do not propose to go deeper. Of course we can say that we are ready to support any scheme that France can work out with the little countries on the basis of mutual agreement.


Mr. Herter said that Hammarskjold had had a talk with de Gaulle regarding Algeria. It is probable that the French are simply going to ask for a "blank check" support for themselves in Algeria. The President said he knows no reason why we should change our course at this time. Mr. Herter pointed out that the French take the stand that the Algerian question is an internal problem. They do not want to fight their own battle in the United Nations but want us to fight it for them. The President said that if a bad resolution were put forward in the U N we could of course help them to fight it. He asked why they did not put in their own resolution. Mr. Murphy said the French policy has been not to fight their own battles. In addition, they have never stated what their policy for Algeria really is. Mr. Herter said that the oil development by the French in the Sahara now makes mandatory an access route. Mr. Murphy suggested that the President might tell Adenauer that, regarding Algeria, he will be hoping to find out just what de Gaulle's policy is. The President recognized that there are dangers in this situation. It could cause the breaking

up of NATO. He was confident, however, that we will not gain strength for the West by letting the French and the Germans walk on us. Mr. Herter thought this was especially true with regard to the matter of colonialism.

He recalled that de Gaulle will also raise the matter of tripartite over-all planning, envisaging some kind of formal committee for this purpose. The President said he had no objection to conversations, discussions, and even planning so long as there is never any agreement that the majority will rule. Mr. Herter thought we might be able to tell him that we will go as far with the French as we do with the British, pointing out that we have no formal institutions for this purpose. The President said that this would not of course apply to NATO (where there would be tremendous opposition to it) but could apply to interests outside of NATO. On these he would be willing to go pretty far in consultations.

As the meeting ended Mr. Herter told the President that he had a proposed announcement to extend the suspension of testing until December 31st, to be made public when a recess of the test suspension talks in Geneva is announced. He said it was an agreed proposal. The President authorized its release when a recess has been agreed upon.

  
A. J. Goodpaster  
Brigadier General, USA



8/24/59 ✓

NOTES ON MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN THE WHITE HOUSE  
AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 24, 1959

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"Marshall Juin never had a thought higher than at the battalion level."

"My entire theme for Khrushchev's visit will be to appeal to his vanity as the one man whom history can later say made the outstanding contribution to a *durable* ~~desirable~~ peace. He is a single ruler whereas his opponents represent a council of allies. History forgets who composes councils but remembers single names. If this appeal fails, then it is very hard to see the future."

"Norstad nearly had a fit this morning when I told him that it was my ambition to start getting U.S. troops back home from Europe."

"I often think that the greatest enemy in the world today is not the Soviet Union but the 1,900,000,000 people who are hungry and with nothing to lose ~~who~~ are ready to throw the world into chaos if the 'have' nations fail to make greater progress in improving the lot of the 'have nots.' "

Merchand 11/Box 5

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8/25/59


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August 25, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
August 24, 1959

Others present: General Norstad  
General Goodpaster

The President said the purpose of his meeting with Khrushchev is to bring about some lessening of tension, try to find some step toward disarmament, and bring some measure of confidence and relief to the minds of our people. Progress in these discussions has been miniscule to date, with only the Austrian Treaty to our credit. Some conflicts have been resolved over the last few years around the world, but generally not through negotiation. The President thought he personally might make an appeal to Khrushchev in terms of his place in history, point out that if he wants to gain such a place through making a change to improve the international climate, the President is confident that something can be worked out. If he does not wish to make such a change, then there is not much use in talking further. The President said by such a discussion he could try to satisfy his own conscience.



The President recalled that he had initially thought the other Western nations would recommend a Western summit, and in fact they did initially. De Gaulle then opposed it, however, saying it would look like a preparation for the President to speak for all of them. As a result he is having to visit the capitals singly. In addition De Gaulle is making his visit to France a State visit, in order to build up French prestige.

General Norstad said that De Gaulle is counting a great deal on this visit. He added that Adenauer wants the United States to give some gesture of support to France. He added that Adenauer's thinking seemed to be confused on the matter of a "tripartite directorate for the free world." Initially Adenauer said he supported De Gaulle's demands. When told that there exists no established joint organization between the United States and the United Kingdom, Adenauer changed his position. The President said he is ready to tell Adenauer and De Gaulle that we are quite ready to have the same consultations with the French as we do with the British. General Norstad expressed

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-204

MR 76-49 #230

By DJH Date 6/12/80

AWF/DDE R. (48) Staff Note Aug 1959 (1)

opposition to a tripartite organization. He felt that de Gaulle would not push this too hard. Norstad said he had had a good talk with Joxe, and had stressed to Joxe that the meeting between the President and de Gaulle should be one of discussion and not demands by de Gaulle.

The President said he intends to stress that we are all partners in this operation, and that no one is trying to dictate to others.

General Norstad suggested a theme that we have two aims -- first to work with France, and second to do this without detracting from our relations with other countries. He said the outstanding item on de Gaulle's list is the Algerian situation. There are indications that de Gaulle is toying with the idea of making an explicit statement of his program for Algeria. He is going there on August 27th to take the pulse of the people and especially the young officers, and also to try to recondition their thinking away from "peace by force" and toward a liberal solution. General Norstad said he hoped that the State Department could find something the United States could say to support the French; however, first we must know what their policy and program are for Algeria. The President recalled that the French want to walk out of the United Nations General Assembly on the grounds that Algeria is an internal affair, but they want us to stay in the Assembly and fight their case for them. General Norstad said there is great bitterness that we are "helping France's enemies" as the French term it, by allowing the presence of Algerian representatives in the United States. He suggested the President might say that the American people have put great effort and expense into strengthening peace in the world, that they support the rule of law and accommodations through negotiation and that the United States is not supporting the use of force in Algeria.

The President recalled that Ambassador Dillon and others have stated that we would support France in anything peacefully agreed with its colonies. However, they must understand the depth of our anti-colonialism. There is the question of how to "square" the actions

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 1-301 (b)(d)

State 3/18/77; NWC 6/4/80

NLE Date 6/12/80

of French troops in Algeria with these statements. It can be said that they are there to maintain peace and order, but that the final solution must be a peaceful one.

General Norstad thought that the French would lay less stress on atomic questions than had earlier seemed likely, perhaps merely expressing regret rather than making demands for such weapons. He said that he personally thought that giving NATO atomic weapons might be a very good step although the French would not be keen on this, since they want them on a national basis.

General Norstad said he understood why the President is not going to NATO on this trip, since Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers would then come in and make a Roman holiday of the meeting. He said the Permanent Council would be most appreciative of a visit, however. The President said he would turn over in his mind the possibility of limiting his talk with Luns and Spaak to about thirty minutes and then going over with them to the Palais de Chaillot. He asked me to talk to Mr. Herter about this. As the President thought about it he said he liked the idea very much but there could be absolutely no advance notice.

The President then commented that we have stocks of soft currencies in many countries, including France, Germany, Belgium and others. He is very anxious to find ways of carrying on our overseas activities without draining our own gold reserves. He asked me to check with Treasury and Défense if they are finding every possible way to use these funds and save a drain on U. S. gold.

The President next told General Norstad that he felt there is strong reason for the United States to start pulling some of its forces out of Europe. We went there in 1951 to cover the period until the Europeans could form forces of their own. .... General Norstad said he hoped this could be started within the next few years, probably in connection with disarmament steps. If effective control and inspection existed we could safely contemplate pulling some forces back. We sent our divisions to Europe to help them over an emergency. Now if we talk about taking out one division they claim we are deserting them. He said we are spending too many billions all around the world

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E.O. 12055, Sec. 1-301 (b)(4)

*State 3/11/77, NLE 6/4/80*

NLE Date 6/12/80



without the Europeans taking a commensurate load. General Norstad thought it would be quite appropriate for the President to stress this to de Gaulle. The President said he intends to talk to Adenauer also as to why the Germans are being so slow. He does not want to wait for disarmament. He thinks some of the countries should take some responsibility. General Norstad agreed with all of this but said it will be a most difficult job to carry out. The President said we must do something along these lines, since the United States lost \$4.3 billion in gold last year.

  
A. J. Goodpaster  
Brigadier General, USA



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PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE  
August-September 1959

US/MC/1

APPROVED: AG 8/28

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

#1



Date : August 27, 1959  
Time : 9:35 a.m.  
Place: Palais Schaumburg

Subject: Private Meeting Between  
President Eisenhower and  
Chancellor Adenauer

Participants:

United States

President Eisenhower  
Martin J. Hillenbrand

Federal Republic of Germany

Chancellor Adenauer  
Heinz Weber (interpreter)

Copies to:

General Goodpaster  
S/S - 2  
G - Mr. Merchant  
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GER - Mr. Hillenbrand  
IO - Mr. Wilcox  
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sador Houghton  
Amembassy London for Amba-  
sador Whitney  
USRO Paris for Ambassador  
Burgess

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In the private meeting lasting approximately ninety minutes between President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer which took place this morning, the Chancellor began by saying that he wanted to give the President a short survey of the situation in Europe and in NATO. He noted that he had recently had a lengthy conversation with General Norstad and Secretary General Spaak at the home of the Netherlands permanent representative, Stikker, at Lake Como. This conversation was between friends and took place, as Spaak had said, as in a family circle. President had seen yesterday evening, Adenauer continued, how the Germans regarded him and the United States. The area between the airport and the bridge over the Rhine entering into Bonn was populated largely by industrial workers. These had evidenced no difference in attitude towards the President than the population of Bonn itself. The Chancellor mentioned that the policy of his Government continued to be supported by a majority of the German electorate according to recent public opinion polls. As a matter of fact, a recent public opinion poll had shown that the CDU had the support of 51 per cent of the population of the Federal Republic. Such a high level of support was

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By	8/14/79

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unique in a period prior to elections. The Chancellor predicted that, unless something quite unexpected happened, the CDU would win the Bundestag elections in 1961. This would mean a continuation of the policy of the present Government.



The Chancellor went on, saying that he would like to make a few remarks about the personality of Khrushchev. He assumed that he could talk as frankly on this subject to the President as he had been able to John Foster Dulles. This would also apply to what he later would have to say about General de Gaulle. In the autumn of 1955, the Chancellor continued, he had spent six days (mornings, afternoons, and evenings) in Moscow speaking to the Soviet leaders. At that time, of course, Bulganin was the head of the Soviet Government, but he had also had ample opportunity to observe Khrushchev. One of the main points made by Khrushchev to Adenauer was that the Germans should help him. Khrushchev expressed fear of the United States and of Communist China, but did not mention any other European countries. As to Red China, he alluded to the rapid rate of population growth, pointing out that the already huge population of 600 million was increasing each year by some 12 million. A good illustration of Khrushchev's character, according to the Chancellor, was provided by the very long letter which he had received a few days ago from the Soviet leader. He (Adenauer) had the impression that this had not been drafted in the Foreign Ministry but largely by Khrushchev himself. The letter stated that, as a realist, Adenauer should recognize the facts of life. The point was emphasized that while, in the past, Russian-German relations had had their good periods and their bad periods, the good periods were obviously of great advantage to both countries. Economic cooperation between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union could only be beneficial to both. In his letter Khrushchev went on to say that ideological differences should play no part between Adenauer and him and that the remains of the last war should be removed and the way opened to harmonious relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. He boasted that the Soviet Union was stronger than the United States and all its Allies counted together. However, although the world was no longer at a point where the Soviets could be threatened, he (Khrushchev) and the Chancellor had witnessed too much horror in their time to want to intimidate each other.

Adenauer noted that Khrushchev's letter did contain a very strong personal and human touch. He had not yet answered it but had himself prepared a draft of a possible reply. As the President knew, it had been agreed between the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn and the German Foreign Ministry that the exchange of correspondence would only be released by common

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agreement. Before sending his reply, Adenauer first wanted to have his discussion with the President. His reply was likewise couched in a reasonable and moderate tone. It made the main point that the tensions in the world are not caused by the remains of the last war, as claimed by Khrushchev, but by competition in armaments. If controlled general disarmament could be achieved, this would be a decisive factor. The atmosphere thereupon would be relaxed, and it would be possible to settle other issues. Adenauer said that he would make the point that he who has the strongest weapons is not necessarily the greatest statesman. The greatest statesman will be the one who liberates the world from the pressure of mounting terror and armaments.

The President said that this was the line which he expected to take with Khrushchev. If he wanted to be the great man of his time, not just another Lenin or Stalin, he should relieve the world of these tensions, thus contributing toward permanent progress. This would be the main theme of what he would say to Khrushchev, the President repeated, with, of course, all sorts of different variations.

Adenauer continued that, in his draft reply, he also made the point that who is strongest in the world is not of interest to him, because if there were war, the victor would not enjoy the fruits of his victory. The President commented that there would be no victor in a future war.

The Chancellor noted that it was typical of Khrushchev that, despite the prior agreement on the subject, he had now published his letter. The President said he would merely suggest to the Chancellor that, in his reply, he note this fact before going on to questions of substance. The Chancellor said that, when Ambassador Smirnov came in yesterday to tell the Foreign Office that the letter of Khrushchev would be published after all, he was obviously very embarrassed when it was pointed out to him that this was in violation of the agreement that the exchange would not be released without mutual consent. This unreliability was typical of Khrushchev, the Chancellor pointed out, together with his deep-seated conviction that Communism will win the world under Soviet leadership.

The President commented that, when someone is deceitful and breaks his word to achieve some specific gain thereby, we can understand his motivation if he is a Communist. But what did Khrushchev gain by conduct of this kind? Adenauer said that the letter from Khrushchev was very cleverly drafted. Its release was obviously intended to influence German public opinion during the visit of the President. In response to the President's query, the Chancellor said that, as far as he

kaew, the communications of Khrushchev to Macmillan and de Gaulle had not so far been published. As a matter of fact, the letter to de Gaulle was in a different form. It seemed to be essentially a memorandum. As to the nature of the communication to Macmillan, the Chancellor was not aware of its contents but knew only that it had been received.

To go on now to the subject of NATO, the Chancellor continued, he wanted to mention that Secretary General Spaak was most deeply concerned about the future of the organization. The threat from Communist infiltration was very great in Italy and in France. Parenthetically, the Chancellor noted that last Saturday M. Segni, an old friend, had called on him at Lake Como. He seemed very much concerned and worried about the future, and spoke quite freely with respect to the situation in Italy and in his own party. On one side stood Segni and his supporters among the Christian Democrats; on the other side were Fanfani and Gronchi.

Therefore, the Chancellor concluded, we must do all we can to hold the Segni government, which tends more to the right, to remain in office. The Chancellor said that he had to tell the President frankly that Segni was concerned regarding the effect which newsreel showings covering the Khrushchev visit to the United States might have in Italy. If the Italian public were to see pictures of enthusiastic receptions being given to the Soviet leader, Segni would find it difficult to explain his own position to the Italian public. The Chancellor said he wanted to repeat that we should therefore do all we could to support this government. It was going to be helpful that the President would see Segni and Pella in Paris.

As to France, the Chancellor continued, Spaak believed that the President's forthcoming conversations with de Gaulle will be of critical importance to the future of NATO. In a letter to him which the Chancellor received the day before yesterday, Spaak expressed the fear that, on the French side inadequate preparations had been made for the talks with the President. The Chancellor noted that the President was of course familiar with the concern caused by lack of governmental stability in France up to May of 1958. The situation at that time, according to the Adenauer's old friend, Pflimlin, had led to a situation where the alternative was either civil war or de Gaulle. Pflimlin was not a Gaullist, but since he was against war, he had had to be for de Gaulle. During the summer of 1958 some friends of de Gaulle had come to Adenauer and asked him to visit the General in Paris. Adenauer took the position that, while Macmillan or Secretary Dulles could go to Paris,

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it did not seem appropriate for him to do so as the representative of a vanquished nation. De Gaulle subsequently asked whether the Chancellor could not visit him at his private residence at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises. The Chancellor accordingly agreed to make such a visit on his way back from his vacation last fall. The Chancellor noted that he had gone there with a heavy heart. He had never seen de Gaulle before but shared the general idea of him as an extremely difficult person, and was deeply concerned. De Gaulle had sent all of his advisers away, including the French Foreign Minister, and had engaged in a private talk with the Chancellor lasting from four to five hours. This conversation, the Chancellor went on, caused him great surprise. He had told de Gaulle frankly that he had had quite a different idea of the man. De Gaulle had impressed him as a wise and far-seeing person, not at all an extreme nationalist. De Gaulle had actually said that his most difficult task was to prevent French nationalism from becoming too extreme. He had also explained to the Chancellor why, after World War II, he had taken the position vis-a-vis the Soviets which he had, and why this position was now changed. At that time he had feared German revanchism, but he now recognized that the new Germany was different, a neighbor with many common interests with France making for good mutual relations between the two countries. ✓

Adenauer noted that de Gaulle had lived twelve years in lonely isolation at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises. This was a lonely, poor neighborhood. In Adenauer's opinion, these twelve years had completely changed the man. To sum up, the Chancellor added, de Gaulle was a man of integrity; he will not lie. What he now does in a nationalistic sense, he does only to strengthen France. The Chancellor said he wanted to point out that he had never discussed with de Gaulle either the Eisenhower visit, the French position in NATO, or for that matter the United States.

The Chancellor said that, based on his personal impressions, he would judge that de Gaulle would probably refer to his letter of September, 1958, and proceed from this to the various steps which he believed should be taken in NATO. The Chancellor would not go into technical details of this subject. General Norstad could provide these. The essential point for de Gaulle was that France appear as a power equal to the United Kingdom and the United States. The Chancellor noted parenthetically that General Norstad had told him that the institutional arrangements which had grown up during the war, between the United Kingdom and the United States, had gradually diminished in the post-war period. The President commented that they had completely disappeared. The Chancellor

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said that this depended on what one meant by "completely." The President said that if we see a problem coming up in which we have a common interest with the United Kingdom, for example, in Iran, Iraq, or Egypt, we get our staffs together on an ad hoc basis and tell them to get busy.

He would have no objection to letting de Gaulle participate in this sort of exercise, but these arrangements between us and the United Kingdom were completely ad hoc. We do, as an exception, have standing arrangements with Canada with respect to common air defense. The President continued that he was one of those who had wanted to keep the combined Chief of Staff arrangements with the British going after the end of World War II, even if it were necessary to do this secretly. However, the political decision (at this time the President was serving as a General) was to bring them to an end.

What troubles de Gaulle very much at the present time, the Chancellor went on, is the forthcoming vote in the United Nations on Algeria. While he had received nothing on the subject directly from the French government or from de Gaulle, the Chancellor had received a letter from a common friend of Pinay with whom he was very close. The Chancellor believed that the views in this letter were expressed with the consent of de Gaulle. As the President knew, Pinay was not a Gaullist. He was an intelligent man whose judgment the Chancellor respected. He was in conflict with Debre, than whom he had a much more reasonable position and over whom he had recently won a considerable victory. Pinay was in the position of a free man who had been asked and had not himself asked to participate in the Cabinet. In this letter from Pinay's friend received some two months ago, the opinion had been expressed that, if the vote in the United Nations on Algeria showed a two-thirds majority against France, then a great danger would exist that there would be a mutiny of the French army in Algeria against de Gaulle. This would mean civil war in France--a terrible prospect for Europe and for the United States. He had heard, the Chancellor commented, that the French army in Algeria is a completely different army than the old French army. It had served in Indo-China and subsequently in Algeria for a long time and was a strongly united body. The United Nations vote therefore would be of critical importance for France, Europe, and NATO.

After his original meeting with de Gaulle, the Chancellor continued, he had had two subsequent meetings with the General, one at Bad Kreuznach, and then in Marly this spring. De Gaulle had always impressed him as open-minded and not at all in blinkers. If, as certain American newspapers were

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now demanding, General de Gaulle should state his Algerian policy in detail, this would lead to an impossible situation in the light of the actual circumstances. His ability to carry out a program would depend in part on the United Nations vote. Moreover, as Spaak had pointed out, de Gaulle could not now make a detailed offer to the Algerians, since they would immediately bank this and go on from there. The conversation between the President and de Gaulle will therefore be of the greatest significance, the Chancellor once again stressed. Much will depend on the atmosphere in which these talks are conducted.

The President said that in World War II de Gaulle had generally been considered by the Allies as a very difficult person. The attitude of both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had become so pronounced on this, that he (General Eisenhower) had been given the job of getting along with General de Gaulle in view of the importance of obtaining his cooperation in implementing Allied plans. In this endeavor the President had established friendly relations, had gotten along with de Gaulle, and liked him. He believed that the forthcoming conversations would continue in the same atmosphere. He had talked with de Gaulle after the war while at SHAPE, and had had a serious, open, and satisfactory discussion with him at that time. The Chancellor interjected that he was pleased to hear this. The President said that he would like to have the Secretary of State present in discussing the United Nations resolution question, since his representatives had to deal with the specific problem. However, he wanted to point out that there were two relevant principles which are approved by the entire American people: (a) We do not settle any quarrels by force but believe in negotiations and peaceful means of settlement; (b) We are very anti-colonialist. These principles make it very difficult to write a blank check for de Gaulle in Algeria. We did not know whether he intended to put down the rebellion by force. After all, there were some 600,000 French troops there. Despite French protests that Algeria was an internal problem, the world thought of it as essentially a colonial problem. Last year in the United Nations the French walked out and asked us to carry the burden of defending their position. We, in effect, said that France would not defend itself. We were not in a position to lead. Hence we abstained in the vote. He understood, the President continued, that de Gaulle could not give all the details of his plans in advance. However, he must set forth the principle at the heart of his plans, which would make it possible to obtain the support of other countries as long as France took the lead in defending itself in the United Nations on a basis which could not be interpreted essentially as a case of colonial domination. The Chancellor



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agreed it would be a good idea to discuss this problem in the presence of the Secretary of State but said that he wanted to add two points. The Algerian problem is a European problem. If Algeria comes under Communist domination--and the rebels now obtain a good part of their weapons from Communist sources--then the Communists would obtain a foothold in the Mediterranean area. This would have a serious effect. Italy and France would go Communist. After all, the Communist Party in Italy under Togliatti was the strongest in Europe. It was the instrumentality through which instructions were given to the Communists in North Africa. If the Mediterranean area goes Communist, that will mean the end of Europe. Togliatti was a university professor, the Chancellor further commented, a gifted and clever politician and an exceedingly dangerous one. The President said that no one in the world had given more thought than he to the evils of Communism. Since the early days of the last war, the President had become convinced that Communism was going to be the major enemy. However, here the problem is one of supporting too strongly a country with a colonial history against the Arab world. The victory might be won for the moment in Algeria but in the long run the entire Arab world would be lost. Under such circumstances the Mediterranean area would likewise be lost. This, as the Chancellor had observed, could not be tolerated.

The Chancellor said he agreed that the Arab world could not be lost. This had been the basis of his policy ever since Nasser had come into power. He had told Mr. Eugene Black of the World Bank that he must help the Egyptians to improve living conditions in their country, especially with the Aswan Dam project. However, the Chancellor was confident that the Arab world would not be lost if we treated it properly and quoted the German proverb that one's shirt is nearer to one than an overcoat. If de Gaulle falls, the loss would be irreparable- he was the only barrier to French civil war. The Chancellor wanted good relations with France because she was a neighbor but also because of the strategic importance of the country.

The President stated that he agreed, but that he was confident that de Gaulle had become a sufficiently experienced political leader so that he would propose a plan which the civilized world could accept wholeheartedly. An impossible situation would be created, however, if he said nothing specific but merely demanded unqualified support on Algeria.

The Chancellor noted that the word "support" had many meanings. The Federal Republic also did not propose to "support" the French forces in Algeria.

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The President said this was the case, but he was speaking specifically about the United Nations problem. He was confident that de Gaulle would propose a good plan and would instruct his United Nations delegation to fight for France's own interests.

The Chancellor observed that de Gaulle's greatest enemies were the French settlers in Algeria. The President agreed but added that this also applied to much of the army. All he could say was that we were going to support the French if they came up with a plan we could support, as Mr. Dillon had told them. The President wanted to do nothing which would wreck NATO. This was the important thing which should not be forgotten. Adenauer said that he fully subscribed to this.

The Chancellor said he wanted to add a word about the British. He would say nothing about Macmillan, who is a fine man, but the British papers, and what was called public opinion as represented by these papers, were a problem. There was perhaps only one substantive difference between the British Prime Minister and the Chancellor and that was on disengagement. In the Chancellor's view, proposals for a controlled demilitarized zone which did not stretch from the Urals to the Atlantic but included only Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany were a military absurdity, destructive of NATO and discriminatory to Germany. The Chancellor could never agree to such an arrangement. This position was also shared by General Norstad from the military point of view as well as by military leaders of the Federal Republic. Although he was not an expert, the Chancellor said that to him as a layman such proposals made no sense in the light of modern weapons. As a matter of fact, the Chancellor pointed out, General Norstad had indicated that British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd agreed with the Chancellor's view. The Chancellor hoped to see Macmillan soon and would have frank talks with him on this problem as well as that of the free trade zone. European integration must move forward and is the only hope for Europe, the Chancellor continued. The countries of Europe are too small and weak by themselves to withstand Soviet influence. They must integrate to be strong. This was more a political than an economic problem. The Chancellor said he had made these points in a previous conversation with Secretary of State Herter, pointing out the dangers which a failure to integrate in Europe would involve. Among these would be possible Soviet domination of the Federal Republic. If such domination were to occur, the Soviets would be in a strong position to wage economic warfare against the United States. The Chancellor noted that he had had a long talk recently with Professor Kissinger of Harvard

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University who agreed fully with him regarding the economic danger from the Soviets. The President commented that he was fully in accord.

In closing, the Chancellor said he would like to note that in a recent talk with him, Pinay had said that de Gaulle had now become a good European but not Debre. However, the latter would do what he was told to do. The President commented that Pinay was one of the best men in France.

At this point, the President and the Chancellor terminated their private discussion and proceeded to a nearby room to resume their conversations in the presence of their principal advisers.

MJHillenbrand

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(Record prepared  
by Dr. Weber and  
translated by  
Embassy Bonn)

PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE  
August-September 1959

8/27/59  
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**US/MC/3**

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: August 27, 1959

Time: 3:00 p.m.

Place: Palais  
Schaumburg

Approved for distribution  
by AG 8/30



PARTICIPANTS: United States

Federal Republic of Germany

President Eisenhower    Chancellor Adenauer  
Dr. Heinz Weber  
(interpreter)

SUBJECT:    Berlin and Germany, Algeria,  
German Relations with Eastern Europe

COPIES TO:    General Goodpaster  
                  S/S - 2  
                  G - Mr. Merchant  
                  EUR - Mr. Kohler (2)  
                  GER - Mr. Hillenbrand  
                  S/AE - Mr. Farley

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Bruce  
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Houghton

The Chancellor received President Eisenhower at 3:00 p.m.  
August 27, 1959 for a second private conversation.

The President then indicated that he had been questioned again and again at his Press Conference about new possibilities the West or Germany were thinking about to better their position with respect to Berlin and reunification. To this question, the President had repeatedly replied that this had to do with a matter which mostly affected the Germans. He asked the Chancellor if he had any new ideas which could be studied, pursued, and offered in order to bring about a better situation, guarantee protection to Berlin, and make progress in reunification.

The Chancellor said he would answer this question most frankly.

For him, this matter was really a human and not a national problem. He would like to see the people in the Soviet Zone lead a freer life. This he had publicly declared many times and he took it seriously. For him, it was a matter of human beings and not one of frontiers. He hoped the President would understand that on the last mentioned matter (frontiers) he could only speak publicly with the greatest caution as refugees and other groups in the Federal Republic put nationalistic feelings above human problems.

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NLE Case	87-444-5
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NLE Date	8/14/88

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The Chancellor noted that the USSR had signed the Human Rights Convention but paid no heed to these rights. He had spoken personally to many people who had fled the Soviet Zone and, although much was over-exaggerated, it could nevertheless be said that conditions in the Soviet Zone did not reflect the provisions of the Convention. He wondered if he should approach the three Western Powers with carefully-studied material asking them to make an effort to see that human rights be respected in the Soviet Zone. Thereby people in the Soviet Zone might be helped and moreover a political goal achieved. He doubted that the population would in the long run be in a position to withstand constant pressure used and wondered whether it might not capitulate one day.

In Berlin the situation was very different. The USSR has recognized that the Three Powers have occupation rights there. Therefore, he requested the Three Powers to stand on their international rights in Berlin. These measures could only be successful when we should succeed in achieving universal relaxation of tension through disarmament.

President Eisenhower had given to understand in their morning meeting that he was skeptical about Soviet readiness to bring about successful disarmament. A certain skepticism was not out of place but he thought it not completely out of the question that the Soviets too were ready for a relaxation of tension. He did not believe the Soviets would begin a war, for they too according to his interpretation wanted a peaceful settlement of problems. Therefore, the West on its side needed very great patience but must simultaneously remain strong too.

President Eisenhower then stated that, in the disarmament question, there has been one decisive consideration for the US-- mutual and effective inspection. Only in this way could real confidence exist that an agreement would really be maintained. Up to now, all efforts on this question had come to naught. He was not skeptical about Soviet willingness to talk about this question but he had serious doubt that it would be possible soon to reach agreement on inspection.

The Chancellor said Khrushchev is serious about his seven year plan. When Mikoyan was in Bonn in spring 1958, he spoke to him about the apparent contradiction in the Soviet economy. Mikoyan replied that Stalin in his last years would not consider any changes or other plans, and in this period everything had remained as before. Now, this situation had to be overhauled. With this reply, Mikoyan had tacitly admitted economic difficulties.


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The Chancellor said he followed the development in the USSR well as he could and had gained the impression that the Soviets up to now had not overcome their economic difficulties. These must be overcome; otherwise the system could not maintain itself. The solution of this task would be easier for the Soviets if they did not spend so much money for armament.

Regarding control, he had spoken many times with Secretary Dulles but was not always in complete agreement. He wanted to emphasize that he knew nothing about nuclear disarmament but he had certain conceptions about conventional disarmament. Secretary Dulles had always thought it would be extraordinarily hard to control whether the Soviets really kept the agreed maximum of 2.5 million troops as they actually had 3.5 million. In his opinion, this was not the decisive consideration. He thought it more important to control factories where heavy weapons, munitions therefore, and airplanes were manufactured. Such control, in his view, would not be easy to carry out. If the Russians wanted to have another million soldiers running around with weapons, this was not bad.

The Soviets feared the U.S. A dictator simply cannot understand that someone who possesses power will not use it. Therefore he fears being attacked someday by the U.S. The Germans lived 12 years under a dictatorship and experienced how much a dictatorship can change human mentality. The London negotiations of the UN Disarmament Commission had gone along very well until the Soviets suddenly brought negotiations to the breaking point because in the meantime they had developed their Sputnik.



When he combined all these different factors--the necessity before which Khrushchev saw himself of doing more to improve the USSR living standard, the indispensable unity of the West, and finally the possibility of a technically feasible control--then he came to have a certain optimism which was supported moreover in that Khrushchev possesses enough sound human understanding to propose another way when he sees he cannot advance on his originally chosen way.



Khrushchev would get out of his difficulties, however, if he should succeed in getting the Federal Republic or Western Europe under his control and make European economic potential his own. With it, he could improve living conditions in the USSR (with a low living standard even a small advance meant much) and then Khrushchev would also incline to the idea that over time the U.S. would become tired, the tax burden would become too great, and at last the U.S. would give up.

The President said he agreed fully with the Chancellor's statement and a lengthy analysis of developments disclosed certain factors which could lead to a gradual change. But he thought more about the immediate future and especially about the two parts of Germany and Berlin. In this connection, he wished to ask the Chancellor a specific question. He asked if the Chancellor thought it politically and practically feasible and if it would be in harmony with his general conception if contacts with the Soviet Zone, i.e., with the Germans in the Soviet Zone, were to be increased so that without the Soviets being aware centripetal instead of centrifugal forces would be at work. He knew there were certain limits. The Federal Republic did not wish to recognize the Soviet Zone, which also was not politically bearable and in the public mind would seem to be capitulation. If it succeeded in awakening forces of the kind described in both parts of Germany, then this might demonstrate a new way of handling the problem in the immediate future.

To this, the Chancellor remarked he had discussed this question with Mr. Dulles when the latter was last in Bonn. It had then developed that Secretary Dulles and the gentlemen with him were not sufficiently informed about the actual situation in the Soviet Zone. Had they really known how things really looked there, they never would have posed the question. The Chancellor emphasized that it is not that contacts do not exist because one does not want to have anything to do with these people. If he were convinced one could do something to help the population of the Soviet Zone, he would immediately consider taking up contacts, but this would not do any good. What the Federal Government can do is being done. For example, means are given to Catholic and Evangelical churches to maintain their churches. For the people in the East Zone, however, it is exceedingly difficult and dangerous to maintain contacts or accept gifts. The Chancellor again assured that the Federal Government does what it can. Mr. Dulles was not fully familiar with the situation. When he told Mr. Dulles that people from the Soviet Zone could not legally enter the Federal Republic, he had referred to the agreement made with the Soviets in Paris after ending the blockade according to which free travel should be unhindered between both parts of Germany. It was



probable that enough was not done to put these provisions into effect and make full use of our rights. Then U.S. and British patrols watched the roads to Berlin and for this purpose watch-towers were erected along the roads. Gradually, however, this (system) went to sleep and is wholly forgotten. The Chancellor again promised to do everything which the Federal Republic is in a position to do. For him, this is not a prestige matter. But he had no great hopes. Therefore, as heretofore, great patience was required.

As for Berlin, the city is very strongly supported by the Federal Republic and, for example, there is no more unemployment there. As soon as the Soviets wish to begin something new with Berlin, the answer of the Three Western Powers must be a decisive "No". He did not believe that the Soviets would let it come to war over Berlin. For the most extreme emergency, but only for it, there is still another possibility. In his November 1958 note, Khrushchev made an alternative proposal to change Berlin to a free city under four power and UN guarantee. But then the three powers would give up their rights in Berlin.

President Eisenhower asked if Khrushchev, when he spoke of free access to West Berlin, could not have thought of giving up a corridor ten or two miles wide to the Federal Republic so that, so to say, this corridor would belong to the Federal Republic. The Chancellor said no. President Eisenhower repeated that it would have then to concern the right of access and not the right of ownership of this corridor. The Chancellor agreed with this view but pointed out that the right of access would be guaranteed by the Four Powers and the UN.

President Eisenhower renewed his proposal of contacts. In Geneva the USSR proposed the establishment of an all-German Commission which was rejected by the Three Western Powers. The Chancellor had now spoken of difficulties in establishing contacts. Perhaps there is another possibility to draw out the marionette government of the Soviet Zone in one way or another. He thought for example of exchanging certain groups for three months. Especially he thought in this connection of factory managers, farmers, professors, school principals, or doctors and lawyers too. If such a proposal were made, people in the Soviet Zone would have to show their colors, and on the other hand, the West through its handling of this matter would display greater flexibility. At his reception by the populace, banners were displayed asking help to liberate the seventeen million people in the East Zone. Seventeen million people there and fifty in the Federal Republic, however, must also make their influence felt. The Chancellor said he would gladly have this proposal studied and therefore at the moment would reserve his position.



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President Eisenhower pointed out that the Communists, in choosing their people for exchange groups of this kind, would select only 100 percent party-line people who were then to pursue subversive activity during their stay in the Federal Republic. In the further course of this exchange program certainly, however, people would also come over here who did not stick to the line. These people would then be a channel through which truth would enter the East Zone. He could of course not guarantee full success of this suggestion, but one would thereby show somewhat more flexibility. The West must show more activity. The Soviet Zone regime should be placed continually before decisions so that the powers there must say "Yes" or "No" to different proposals. The basic idea is that one should say to these people: "We are ready to show ourselves; you show yourselves".

The Chancellor said he had spoken with young people who were sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment and then after an early release had come to the Federal Republic. When one heard what these people have experienced, one wishes to avoid anything which might expose anyone to such danger. He would have the President's proposal thoroughly examined as to its feasibility. The Chancellor informed the President then of a telegram he had received from the German Embassy in Washington. It reported on a conversation of an Embassy member with a member of the French Embassy. According to this conversation, de Gaulle intended to concentrate in his upcoming conversations with the President on the Algerian question. Questions affecting NATO, for example, tripartite directorate and atomic weapons, were not to be raised unless the President himself brought them up. In the telegram, the trip of de Gaulle to Algeria was reported as well as the necessity to support France in the UN vote. Finally, reference was made to the serious dangers resulting from France's defeat in the vote. The Chancellor then said he thought it right to send de Gaulle a letter to inform him he had spoken with the President about Algeria and believed that in a quiet and objective conversation de Gaulle and the President could reach an understanding. Details of his conversation with the President would not be disclosed.

President Eisenhower said that the Algerian problem had been studied for a long time. The American Ambassador in Paris had spoken thereof to de Gaulle and earlier Mr. Dulles had. He was aware of the seriousness particularly of this question and knew what it meant for de Gaulle and France. It was a serious and ticklish matter. He had no objections if the Chancellor wrote such a letter and said he believed the Chancellor knew that he would listen carefully and wish goodwill to French views. There were difficulties, however, that must be put aside.

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These questions will be the substance of de Gaulle's and the President's talks. The President suggested that the Chancellor emphasize the extraordinary great interest of the U.S. in NATO and point out that with respect to NATO the Algerian question must be solved. The Chancellor said de Gaulle was above all a psychological problem. He had spent 12 years out of things as had the Chancellor. For this reason, the Chancellor believed he understood him. He had the impression he could help de Gaulle jump his own shadows.

President Eisenhower recalled that he had taken the viewpoint that progress had to be made before he would be prepared to go to a Summit Conference. He asked the Chancellor if his was the right posture. The Chancellor replied affirmatively.

President Eisenhower then introduced the question of establishing diplomatic relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Chancellor said Czechoslovakia was not interesting but Poland was. He had declared on various occasions that any future German Government must have good relations with Poland. But he and the Cabinet were of the opinion that establishing relations during the Geneva Conference was impossible since then this would have been the only result of the Conference, provided that the Poles really would have wanted this. In the course of his last visit with de Gaulle, he asked him for his views on this matter as good relations exist between Poland and France. In de Gaulle's view, establishing such relations would scarcely influence Gomulka as he was completely under Moscow's thumb, but it would have a good effect with the Polish people. He was seeking now an opportunity to send the President of the German Red Cross, who was in Poland a year ago, to Poland again perhaps in connection with the indemnification for injustices done in the invasion of Poland. He hoped he would soon be able successfully to find such an occasion.

President Eisenhower asked if the Chancellor was satisfied with the tempo and type of the German forces buildup. The Chancellor said "Yes" and that what had been promised would be accomplished--12 divisions as planned would be established by 1961.

President Eisenhower remarked that American forces were stationed all over the world and this had major financial effects, especially through heavy requirements for foreign exchange balances. The U.S. hoped some countries would be in position to equip their own military forces to a greater extent, especially "immobile forces" so the U.S. could be relieved of

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some of the burden. At the establishment of NATO, one started with the idea that U.S. divisions should only remain in Europe until European military forces existed. Events had taken a different course. The President referred in this connection to questions which are again and again raised by the Congress.

The Chancellor said that expenditures during the last stage of the German buildup are especially high--for budget year 1959/60 they are 15 billion Deutsche marks--but he was prepared to study what can be done in this matter after 1961.

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PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

August-September 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

US/MC/2

APPROVED AG 8/28



DATE: August 27, 1959

TIME: 11:05 a.m.

PLACE: Palais Schanberg.

#1

SUBJECT: Meeting between President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer, with Senior Advisors Present.

PARTICIPANTS: United States

Federal Republic of Germany

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Mr. Merchant  
Ambassador Bruce  
General Goodpaster  
Mr. Berding  
Mr. Hillenbrand

Chancellor Adenauer  
Foreign Minister Von Brentano  
Dr. Van Scharpenberg  
Ambassador Grews  
Dr. Grotke  
Graf von Daudissin  
Dr. Harbst  
Dr. Lindbourg  
Herr Krapf  
Dr. Von Eckhardt

COPIES TO: General Goodpaster  
S/S - 2  
G - Mr. Merchant  
EUR - Mr. Kohler (2)  
GER - Mr. Hillenbrand  
IO - Mr. Wilcox  
AF - Mr. Satterthwaite

Ambassy Bonn for Ambassador Bruce  
Ambassy Paris for Ambassador Houghton  
Ambassy London for Ambassador Whitney

USRO Paris for Ambassador Burgess

At the suggestion of the Chancellor, the President and he went over the draft communique which had been prepared by State Department and Foreign Office representatives. The President said that he would like to suggest a change in the wording which, in the draft, might seem to imply that there was some doubt about the Western position on Berlin. The Chancellor agreed with this suggestion and said that he also wished to attach great importance to disarmament. The President indicated that he too would like to attach a great deal of importance to it but was not too optimistic on the subject.

Referring to the earlier discussion of his forthcoming conversations with de Gaulle which he had had with the Chancellor, the President said that the preservation of NATO must be the framework within which problems must be discussed with de Gaulle and solved. He would like to get the French to acknowledge this. The de Gaulle government constituted a new regime in France and had never conceded this point. The Chancellor noted his agreement.

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Authority MR 87-444#3

By LK 7/26/89  
NLE Date

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The President said that, with the permission of the Chancellor, he would like to ask the Secretary to discuss the problem of supporting the French position in the UN debate on Algeria. Our hope was that we could give some support to the French; however, there was also the question to be considered of the problems which this would create for us. The Chancellor interjected that he would like to note that the question was not one of supporting French policy in Algeria but of how the vote of censure could be prevented in the UN. The President assented.

The Secretary said there was a real difficulty in the Algerian debate, both from a procedural and substantive point of view. On the procedural side, during the debate of last year the resolution was presented to the Political Committee first and then reported to the General Assembly as a whole. The voting order in the General Assembly was determined by lot, and as it so happened we were the last to vote. As is known, we abstained. By this abstention France won by one vote, that is the two-thirds majority was not obtained. If we had abstained at an earlier point in the process, other countries might also have abstained and France would have been defeated. This year essentially the same resolution is being filed by the Arab countries. Last year France did not participate in the discussion and let her friends carry the fight for her. Due to the accident of the voting order which he had mentioned, she had squeezed through. We are negotiating with the French over the procedural problem presented this year. We do not know yet whether the French intend to speak themselves in the debate or to continue adhering to the view that this is a domestic matter not within the competency of the United Nations. We believe that she will probably agree to participate in the discussion.

With respect to substance, the Secretary continued, we have been confidentially but not specifically advised that de Gaulle will discuss with the President a somewhat new and different approach to the Algerian problem. We do not know the details but we have been told that it will be somewhat liberal in nature. If this approach is announced before the UN debate, it may alter its entire course. There is therefore a considerable element of uncertainty in the picture at the moment, the Secretary concluded.

The Chancellor said that some days ago he had had a conversation with Spaak and yesterday he had received a letter from him. In this letter Spaak wrote that, in his estimate, the conversations with the President had not been well prepared for by the French. Spaak feels, as he told the Chancellor at their Lake Como meeting, that these discussions with de Gaulle are of great importance, more important in his opinion than the forthcoming talks with Khrushchev. Speaking as both a German and a European, the Chancellor said that he felt that, while the problem of Algeria may in one sense be called a Mediterranean and North African problem, it was also clear that if the Algerian rebellion had not been supported by the Soviets it would long ago have been brought to an end. If the Algerian situation should take an unpleasant turn as a result of the President's talks with de Gaulle on the subject, that is, if the talks were not successful, the position of the French regime would be endangered.

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With respect to Italy, the Chancellor went on, Segni had told him last Saturday about the Communist problem in his country, about which the Chancellor had, of course, been long aware. Segni said that the Italian Communists were the best organized in Europe and were the means through which the activities of North African Communists were controlled. Togliatti enjoyed the full confidence of the Soviet leaders.

Coming back to Algeria, the Chancellor said that if Algeria went, then Tunisia, Morocco and the entire Mediterranean would be lost to Communism. This would mean the end of Western Europe and was why he personally put such emphasis on the problem.

The President stated that, as far as the talks between himself and de Gaulle were concerned, he anticipated no great difficulty. He expected that de Gaulle would advance some general plan for Algeria, though not the details, which would seem reasonable to us. But what he (the President) would like to focus on is the problem in the UN. If the French follow the same procedure as last year and refuse to defend themselves, how would the French react to our failure to take the lead in fighting for their cause as they apparently expect us to do? De Gaulle and he are good old friends and he expected that they would have good talks together. The problem was now, if the French consider the UN aspect as important as the Chancellor said they did, to deal with it.

The Chancellor indicated that he believed the question was as important to the French as they said. As he had indicated, it was closely tied to the whole future of North Africa and the Mediterranean area. He did not know if it would be wise for the French to present their plan during the UN debate; during this debate there would undoubtedly be strong attacks on the French army in Algeria. These might perhaps have some basis in fact, but the great majority of the charges against the army would certainly be exaggerated. Should such charges be made, what should be the position of the French representative in the United Nations? If in the eyes of the Army its honor were being attacked, a delicate situation would arise if the French representative to the United Nations engaged in a debate involving the honor of the Army. After all, the French Army in Algeria had strong views of its own which de Gaulle had so far managed to keep under control. Under such circumstances it might be best if the French representative were absent from the debate. In answer to the President's question as to what could be done, the Chancellor continued, the only solution lies in the vote itself. If a two-thirds majority is not obtained, then the problem will be solved. The Chancellor said he wanted to make one additional point. He knew that de Gaulle wanted a liberal solution for Algeria, more liberal than anyone else in France. After all, in his approach to colonial problems, de Gaulle had shown himself to be a great statesman and had achieved considerable success.

The President said that he would like to make one observation. If nothing were to be done except to permit presentation by the Arab countries of the same old resolution as last year, he did not believe that anything which we could do would prevent an adverse vote. But if the French representative made a positive presentation of a reasonable program on Algeria, the

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the civilized world would react favorably and we would be in a different situation to which a good resolution might be expected.

In response to the Chancellor's query as to whether he had understood the President to be referring to the outline of a program and not its details, the President said he meant only the broad program since the details would obviously be disputed and attacked. If the issue were limited to Algeria that would be one thing, but the French are also drawing away from Tunisia and Morocco and deepening opposition to them in the entire Arab world. It was a problem for all of us to avoid antagonizing the whole Arab world on the Algerian issue, which was arousing opposition not only to the French but to us.

Even at the risk of being considered a Gaullist, Adenauer said, he wanted to emphasize that during his last talk with de Gaulle, the latter had indicated his hope for an acceptable solution of the Moroccan and Tunisian problems. He had been expecting a visit from the Sultan of Morocco. This had been delayed but the Chancellor felt it would eventually take place. If we look at what de Gaulle did with respect to the French colonial empire, we can only conclude that he acted in an unusually skillful manner. Algeria is a special problem. After all the last war waged by free Algeria was in 1830 (sic) against the United States. Since then Algeria has fought with no other country. The Chancellor could only say that de Gaulle was in effect now doing penance for the previous mistakes of other French regimes.

The meeting terminated at this point to enable the President to attend his scheduled press conference.



# TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the  
United States of America

91-56 OUTGOING

AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON

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HECTO 21

PASS DEFENSE--OSD FOR SECRETARY McILROY, OSD/ISA FOR KNIGHT

AND BARRINGER, JCS FOR GENERALS TWining AND Picher FROM

SECRETARY GATES



Memorandum of conversation Secretaries Gates and Irwin with Defense Minister Strauss, 1100-1300 hours, August 27. Mr. Strauss carried the conversation for the first hour or more outlining his views on Berlin, disengagement, disarmament and general German problems. He opened the discussion with Berlin. He felt the Soviets would claim they had guaranteed status quo for Berlin and would then seek a price from the Western Allies. He feels Mr. Khrushchev understands he cannot adhere to his original demand. Believes British will seek a new approach. Mr. Strauss firmly opposed to a Soviet free city plan or to establishing a Joint Committee with equal vote. He felt the equal vote procedure meant eventual defeat for the West since democratic representatives would not present a uniform position as compared to the disciplined Communist representatives. He was apprehensive that either the free city or Joint Committee approach would create uncertainty in Germany leading to a soft German line, neutrality, anti-NATO propaganda, etc.

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He thought the United Kingdom would propose some form of disengagement.

Disengagement appears senseless to him, regardless of what form it takes. He believes any effort toward disengagement would lead to German neutrality and the neutrality of Europe and Berlin would be forfeited as a by-product.

Mr. Irwin outlined our firm Geneva position that there could be no treaty with a divided Germany. He questioned Strauss regarding his view on disengagement and its relation to the question of inspection.

Mr. Strauss responded that inspection is not the same as disengagement. He volunteered that Germany would never be an obstacle to a realistic general disarmament proposal. Disarmament must be on the basis of forfeiting "military equivalence" on both sides. This does not mean necessarily equal areas but military capability. Regarding inspection he could not accept a Western area of inspection whose boundaries coincided with the frontiers of West Germany. In addition, the Eastern inspection area must include some part of the USSR. Inspection of a satellite area alone as Poland, Czechoslovakia would not suffice. Germany would be destroyed by bombers from the USSR.

Switching to a discussion of nuclear weapons, Mr. Strauss said that Germany had met NATO requirements and had overcome many problems in relation to nuclear storage for the U.S., U.K., Canada, Germany, etc. He now requested that the execution of U.S.-German nuclear stockpile and technical agreements not be delayed nor discontinued to meet any Soviet demands or negotiating gambits. If delayed this may become a bargaining point in the East-West negotiations. He felt during

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Presidential discussions either the U.K. or Mr. Khrushchev might attempt to block the atomic agreements. He feels prompt implementation is the best response. Mr. Strauss said he is most anxious that the West not fall into some disarmament trap. There was plenty of area for negotiations if the USSR were really sincere, but under present circumstances negotiations were dangerous.

Mr. Irwin assured him that we feel the greatest danger is lack of firmness.

Mr. Gates pointed out that statements by the Vice President reaffirmed there was no change in our determination nor intention.

Mr. Strauss then pointed out improvement on the German military front. The firm platform of the FRG was to meet its military commitments. This program has popular support. He quoted statistics regarding German polls on support of present government and its policies which show significant improvement. In this year's current poll, 71 percent in favor. The problem of conscription has disappeared. These gains could only be destroyed if an East-West agreement were developed at German expense.

Mr. Irwin asked if this improved political position would permit the extension of conscription beyond the 12-month period.

Strauss responded that after the elections in 1961 he favored extending the 12-month conscription to 18 months. At the present time a longer period was not alone a political problem but one of billeting additional forces and of attempting to train the large reserve of untapped manpower.

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There was then a discussion by General Heusinger outlining German Army plans for 36 brigades of 5-6,000 men organized into 12 divisions. Seven divisions will be ready this year and all 12 divisions at somewhat reduced strength by end 1960. Two major requirements were long service volunteers and the difficulty of training areas which is chronic in Germany. At war strength with reserve formations furnishing necessary support, he visualized the Armed Forces at 800,000.

Mr. Irwin asked what would be optimum proportion of long-term volunteers to conscripts when the Army is at full strength. The General felt a 50-50 division <sup>be</sup> would/proper proportion. This would permit necessary conscript training. The manning problem is somewhat more difficult for the Navy and Air Force because of the technical training requirement.

Mr. Strauss discussing Air Force problems stated he wanted two types of aircraft, a light tactical fighter, perhaps the G-91 for close air support and reconnaissance and a more sophisticated aircraft, the F-104, for a fighter-bomber. He feels manned air defense makes no sense, for Germany. Aircraft reaction time will be too late. For air defense he is interested in the NIKE and the HAWK. He will purchase and build some 200 F-104s, may later lift this total to 350.

Strauss stressed strong desire to have U.S. F-104 units stationed in Europe on a rotational basis, if original U.S. plan to permanently station F-104 units in Europe cannot be implemented. These units, rotated to Germany, would be invaluable in speeding training and insuring quality of German units. Strauss referred to the tremendous assistance U.S. F-84 units had proven in training German Air Force.

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Mr. Gates stated the Air Force does not intend to base 104s in Europe but he will look into the problem of rotating 104 units.

Mr. Irwin explained that the problem would be difficult for the Air Force due to maintenance, spare parts, etc. Mr. Strauss developed at some length the advantages that would accrue if the 104 could be standardized in Europe with Canada, Germany, perhaps Belgium and the Netherlands operating one aircraft. He is opposed to the H-150, states the Belgian military are also opposed to it.

Strauss requested TARTARS for Baltic destroyers (stated useless in Baltic otherwise). Requested equipment for four destroyers during 1960-61 and four additional destroyers during 1962-63. Germany would consider possibility of TARTAR production if this schedule proves impractical from a U.S. standpoint. Gates stated we would review this.

Strauss made following additional requests: increase delivery of F-84F spare parts, particularly most commonly required spares. Germans also require more spares for M-47 tanks. Made a point that readiness was impaired.

General Heusinger stated his primary requirements were anti-tank weapons, defense against low flying aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft. He is interested in U.S. Army development of reconnaissance drones and would appreciate information. He mentioned a U.S. Army unit scheduled for Europe which we understood is equipped with drones in a user test stage.

Finally, Strauss requested U.S. assistance in lifting restrictions on German production although he recognizes we are not a member of WEU.

S/S - Mr. Carson

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

August 28, 1959

TO: General Goodpaster

FROM: John A. Calhoun *JAC*



Enclosed is a memorandum prepared by Mr. Hillenbrand regarding the second private meeting between the President and the Chancellor at Bonn. As you will see, a full memorandum will eventually be provided by Dr. Weber but there will probably be about a week's delay. We have given this only a very limited distribution in view of its preliminary and second-hand nature. Copies have gone to the Secretary, Mr. Merchant, Mr. White, and informally to Tom McElhiney in the Department.

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Agency Case	NSC F88-107
NLE Case	87-444-4
By	<i>JAC</i> NLE Date 8/14/89

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION


August 27, 1959

Participants: Dr. Heinz Weber  
Mr. Hillenbrand

Subject: Private Meeting Between President and Chancellor  
Adenauer after lunch, August 27, 1959

During a conversation between Mr. Hillenbrand and Dr. Heinz Weber (German Foreign Office interpreter, who was present during the private meeting of the President and Chancellor Adenauer after lunch), the latter said that, after he had transcribed his notes of the meeting, he would have to send them to Chancellor Adenauer at Lake Como for approval before they could be transmitted to us. Hence some delay must be anticipated. He did, however, provide Mr. Hillenbrand with a quick rundown of some of the principal points covered. This memorandum is intended to provide a partial and provisional record of the meeting until the more detailed account is available.

On the subject of Berlin, the Chancellor took the position that the U.S. should stand firm against the Soviets as far as Western rights in the City were concerned. [.....]



On the subject of disarmament, the Chancellor queried the President about his statement during their pre-luncheon meeting, with senior advisers present, that while he too would like to attach a great deal of importance to disarmament in the communique to be issued in Bonn, he was not too optimistic about possibilities in this field. The Chancellor apparently indicated that he was somewhat more optimistic about the prospects in view of certain basic trends which he detected in the Soviet Union. This led to a lengthy analysis on his

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part of such trends, with particular reference to the Soviet Seven-Year plan and the need generated by it for diversion of investments from armaments to other fields. He cited in this connection his conversations with Mikoyan in Bonn. The President, according to Weber, distinguished between long-range and short-range trends in the Soviet Union, and indicated that, with respect to the latter, one could not be too optimistic about Soviet intentions in the disarmament field.

There was considerable discussion of possible contacts between East and West Germany. The President queried the Chancellor about his thoughts as to prospects in this field. The Chancellor took a generally pessimistic line, but said his government would make efforts to take advantage of any possibilities. He stressed the difficulties inherent in making any sort of arrangements with a Communist-dominated area, but said the Federal Republic would not let considerations of prestige dominate its approach. However, nothing could be done which would needlessly expose residents of East Germany to punitive action by the Communist leadership. In this connection he cited several cases of cruel and unusual punishment allotted to individuals for actions of the type which might be involved in expansion of exchanges between East and West Germany. In response to the President's query as to whether some sort of exchange of leaders in various fields could not be arranged, the Chancellor indicated that, while this might be possible, at least the initial exchangees from the GDR would all be carefully selected on the basis of their reliability as convinced Communists. Perhaps at a later stage occasional individuals might be allowed to come who would be susceptible to Western influences. Mr. Hillenbrand did not get the impression from Weber's report that this is an area of activity which is likely to have the enthusiastic sponsorship of the Chancellor.

As to the establishment of closer relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, in response to the President's query, the Chancellor said the Germans had no particular reason for or interest in establishing diplomatic relations with the Czechs. As far as the Poles were concerned, he felt that, in time, the Federal Republic's interests made establishment of relations desirable. However, he thought that any such action at the time of the Geneva Conference would have been premature.

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In addition to the foregoing, the Chancellor and the President also agreed on the text of a communique, and Mr. Hillenbrand gathered from Dr. Weber that the conversation went back again to certain aspects of the French problem, but time did not permit the latter to give any further details. It is also possible that certain other subjects were touched upon.

*MNK*  
MJHillenbrand/1h

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US/MC/26

PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPEAugust-September 1959MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONApproved by AG - 9/8  
Approved by S - 9/4

DATE: September 2, 1959

TIME: 4:00 p.m.

PLACE: Palais de l'Elysée

PARTICIPANTS: United States

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Ambassador Houghton  
Mr. Gates  
Mr. Merchant  
General Goodpaster  
Major Eisenhower  
Colonel Walters (interpreter)  
Mr. McBride

France

President de Gaulle  
Prime Minister Debré  
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville  
Ambassador Alphand  
M. de Carbonnel  
M. de Courcel  
M. Lebel (interpreter)  
M. Boegner

SUBJECT: Algeria; Tripartite Consultations; NATO and Problems of Nuclear  
Warfare; Berlin, Khrushchev Visit and Summit Meeting

## COPIES TO: USDel

General Goodpaster  
Ambassador Houghton  
Ambassador Burgess

Washington: S/S - 2  
G - Mr. Merchant  
EUR - Mr. Kohler - 2  
C - Mr. Reinhardt

## STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

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☒ Declassify ☐ with concurrence of \_\_\_\_\_  
☐ after \_\_\_\_\_

EO 12958, 25X

FPO/HDR by

Withdrawal No

Date: 4/23/96

After welcoming the President, President de Gaulle said he would very much appreciate the President's views on problems of current interest. After expressing his own gratification at being here, the President said there were three main topics of concern. First, there was Algeria in general and the specific problem of what tactics and procedure to follow in the UN debate. Second, there was the need to make sure that we were together on the Berlin question; while third, there was the general question of NATO affairs and what role we believed it should play in our common defense and security mission. He noted he had talked about these matters with General de Gaulle this morning but would be happy to continue discussing them more in detail this afternoon. De Gaulle said he would like to have the President's views on all of these subjects.

The President discussed Algeria first, saying that he very much hoped, if the French developed their program as de Gaulle had expounded it during the morning meeting, it would make the United States position easier. We of course wanted to support our French friends and he hoped the French were taking a

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necessity to make worthwhile the future of Franco-American relations. The President said he had discussed this with President de Gaulle earlier in the day, and that there should be cooperation in helping new nations and those about to be free. There should be technical and economic aid to assist these nations in keeping the values of freedom and in resisting the blandishments of Communism.



The President then passed to a discussion of NATO. He said he should make it clear that we were firmly dedicated to NATO as a means of ensuring collective security. It is because of this that we have put treasure, soldiers and military support into Western Europe, and expect to continue to do so. The President noted that when he came to Europe in 1951 as SACEUR, six United States divisions had been committed to NATO in Europe as a sort of stop-gap measure; however, we had never asked to reduce these forces, both because of our general desire to contribute to European solidarity and also because French forces had unfortunately been withdrawn from NATO for Algeria. Therefore, the questions of NATO and Algeria were linked. Prime Minister Debré agreed that Algeria and the Mediterranean were part of the European security concept.

The President continued that it is important in this context to feel that we are all united in the maximum support of NATO and European security. If this situation obtained, then he felt sure other problems could be solved fairly easily.

De Gaulle said that, with regard to the Atlantic Alliance generally, we must of course maintain it, make it live and further develop it. NATO as now constituted was, however, not entirely satisfactory for two reasons. First, there was the question of integration. This had been all right in 1949 when there was a question of urgency, and he could understand this had seemed a good idea. Now, however, a country like France felt that it was no longer responsible for the defense of its own territory but that this had been entrusted to a collective organization about which little was known and for which it was not responsible. Second, NATO had been created in 1949 when the menace hardly existed except in Europe, but now there was a menace in both the political and strategic fields in the East, and in Africa, so a purely European and North American organization did not correspond to the nature of the present danger and was insufficient for this new threat. Of course we wanted NATO to continue and France did not wish to separate herself from her allies, but there were certain inconveniences in NATO now. At present an outbreak of nuclear war, which would almost certainly devastate France, could occur in such a manner that France could be crushed without ever having had the opportunity of expressing its views and without having any role. De Gaulle said that he supported the idea of consultations with the British and ourselves on worldwide problems and on nuclear matters. He hoped that, through such tripartite consultations, a way could be found for the expression of the views of France in the case of atomic warfare.

The President said that, with regard to tripartite consultations, we were happy to confer in this framework, informally, as we had always consulted with the British, regarding matters beyond the NATO area. We were quite ready to

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discuss world problems with the other two countries having worldwide responsibilities, and we could establish ad hoc tripartite staff committees to discuss individual problems, for example. We could consult as seems fit on any matter brought up by one of the three. We should not formalize these arrangements as this would cause trouble with our other allies. Likewise, our arrangements should not affect NATO.

Passing to de Gaulle's point regarding integrated forces destroying national morale, the President said he did not believe we could conduct a war, or win a war, without an integrated command. Furthermore, if we all put forces in Europe, some effective form of control was required. It would be a mistake to have a series of national forces. Under this concept, where would United States forces fit into the picture? Would they not have to go home? The President thought that integrated forces should obviously only be used after approval by all, through consultation in the North Atlantic Council or some other appropriate channel. He concluded there must be some form of integrated command.

With regard to nuclear warfare, the President continued, President de Gaulle would recall that we had attempted to have the UN accept responsibility for the atomic bomb, but this had not been possible. The first responsibility of the United States in world security was to keep its deterrent strong. Nuclear weapons, unfortunately, were no longer special but had permeated down to the battalion level, and were being spread even further. The President said that the United States would never, except in the case of defense against complete surprise, launch a nuclear war without consultation. In view of the possibility of emergency, he suggested to President de Gaulle that he furnish the President of France with certain specialized communications equipment, which had already been given to Mr. Macmillan, to permit instant communication in the case of emergency. The President continued, saying that nuclear weapons now were like the air force used to be. It was unfortunate that they pervaded our entire defense concept but this was true and we could not help it.

The President also said that there must be some way of obtaining national spirit in support of NATO. Consultation on problems of the NATO area should take place in the North Atlantic Council, while he agreed there could be close tripartite consultation of problems outside the NATO area. General de Gaulle agreed that tripartite consultation on world problems was essential. The President said he thought we would easily work out methods for doing this.

In response to de Gaulle's request for his views on other problems, the President first apologized for the length of his presentation on NATO problems, to which de Gaulle said he had found this intensely interesting. The President then said it was hardly necessary to reopen discussion of the Berlin question since there was no difference of view on this subject. He said we were not going to desert over two million Berliners. We were ready to discuss Berlin with anyone, even Khrushchev, but these discussions would have to take place within the framework of the maintenance of our existing rights in Berlin.

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APPROVED BY:  
AG 9/11  
S 9/10

PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE  
August-September 1959

9/3/59  
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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION  
US/MC/30

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: September 3, 1959  
Time: 9:30 a.m.  
Place: Embassy  
Residence

Participants:

5

U.S.

The President  
The Secretary  
Ambassador Burgess  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Nolting, Reporting Officer  
Col. Walters, Interpreter

NATO

Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary  
General of NATO  
J. M. A. H. Luns, Dutch Foreign  
Minister, in capacity as  
President of the North Atlantic Council



Subject: President Eisenhower's meeting with Foreign Minister Luns and  
Monsieur Spaak

Copies to: General Goodpaster  
S/S-2  
G - Mr. Merchant  
C - Mr. Reinhardt

EUR - Mr. Kohler - 2

USRO Paris - Ambassador Burgess

The President opened by referring to his talks with President de Gaulle, saying that the most important thing from NATO's point of view was the warm endorsement given to NATO by de Gaulle. De Gaulle had said he had no intention of weakening the Alliance. The President remarked that that's good as far as it goes; but of course they would have more conversations on this subject.

Concerning Algeria, the President said the US position conveyed to de Gaulle was that we would look at the program when it is made precise by de Gaulle and see if we could support it. The President remarked that heads of other French Community governments were apparently influencing de Gaulle towards a more liberal policy in Algeria. Later on, he said that he had suggested to de Gaulle that French Community leaders could be very helpful to him in popularizing a liberal program for Algeria, inasmuch as they could view such a program from an objective point of view and some of them had certain ties with the Arabs. De Gaulle thought this suggestion an interesting one. Re the UN aspect of the Algerian problem, the President said de Gaulle had stated he would not allow French representatives to participate in the UN debate, but he will outline his plan and program for Algeria and say what he has done there already. The President characterized this as a move in the right direction.

Touching upon conversations in Bonn, the President said there was nothing new to report, that everything went fine

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On London talks, the President said Macmillan is inclined to the position that, regardless of substantive progress or lack of it, there must be a summit meeting. The President said that Adenauer and de Gaulle agree with him that there must be some prospect of substantive achievement at a summit meeting before such a meeting should be laid on. He said that other problems discussed in the UK were mainly "local", but that of course both the UK and Germany support NATO strongly.



The President said his trips had given him an opportunity to say again that he was not intending to negotiate with Khrushchev, but that he was frankly trying to "soften him up a little". He emphasized that the exchange of visits did not indicate any new US policy.

The President said that Adenauer seemed vague on what to do next concerning German reunification and Berlin problems. The President said that he felt it necessary at some point to find ways to eliminate the need for occupation forces in Berlin, but as of now the US is going to stand firm.

Reverting to his talks with de Gaulle, the President said he personally thinks de Gaulle's program for Africa and his Community plan are good and deserve US support. De Gaulle had talked about the principles of the French Community as: (a) self-government (excluding foreign affairs and defense); (b) economic and social improvement; (c) a "fixed commitment" concerning the right to independence. He had said that he would see whether the same principles could not be applied to Algeria after pacification. The President added that he was not given further details as to how de Gaulle expected to do this, and appreciated his political difficulties in spelling out his program.

Foreign Minister Luns said it was necessary to agree on what Spaak and he could tell NATO Council regarding the President's talks with others as summarized above.

Secretary Harter thought that no specifics should be given. Mr. Spaak agreed that he and Luns should be very cautious in informing the Council of what the President had told them.

Luns said that the Netherlands were worried lest the French links with North Africa should be cut as a result of a failure to solve the Algerian problem and were looking for ways to help.

The President said that the US, he believes, will be in a better position in the next two or three weeks to evaluate the French program for Algeria. He can't be sure as to how this will evolve but feels better about the problem as a result of his meetings with de Gaulle. He said that if the US sees a reasonable proposition of the French, we will support.

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Luns said he does not see how, given the political situation and the position of the army in France, de Gaulle can spell out his program. The President said if de Gaulle can lay out a reasonable plan before the UNGA opens, friends of France can do much to support. That's as far as he can go as of now.

On the Khrushchev visit, Luns said the vast majority of NATO countries endorse the President's position that there must be clear signs of progress before a summit meeting should be laid on. The President said that he was frankly not optimistic about what he would get out of Khrushchev. He remarked that Khrushchev himself had said that in a war both sides would be destroyed, and that this marked a recognition of the facts which in itself was something. The President further remarked that Khrushchev was bringing most of his family with him, and he supposed that a man who was intent on making trouble would not bring his family along.

Spaak, reverting to NATO, said that the only serious problem in NATO is the French problem. The French Government has taken a very difficult attitude and has blocked many things, mostly in the military field, which the other members consider necessary. It is difficult to know what the French want. On Algeria, Spaak said that it was impossible and unreasonable to expect the US to give the French a blank check. Mr. Luns indicated his agreement. Both Mr. Luns and Mr. Spaak emphasized the importance of having the French program for Algeria set forth in specific terms. But Spaak stressed his view that it will continue to be very difficult in NATO if NATO members cannot give the French "some support" on the Algerian problem. De Gaulle is the only man who can bring off a liberal solution, but he has a difficult political situation and Spaak was not sure that he would make a clear statement of liberal policy. Spaak said that on the general question of handling relations between the East and West, NATO's attitude was good and solid. Spaak stressed, however, that a clash in the UN on Algeria will be a very bad thing for NATO.

The President said that de Gaulle had brought up the subject of the NATO command, saying that the NATO command structure was "amorphous" and not good for instilling a national patriotic spirit in the people and troops. The President had told him that he had foreseen this point of view many years before, and had said at the outset of NATO that he believed the greatest patriot was the greatest supporter of NATO; further that de Gaulle's thought if pushed to a logical conclusion would fracture all alliances. The President said de Gaulle understood but apparently did not agree. On this point the President said de Gaulle said that "for a country such as ours" his diagnosis was correct. The President replied that "we are talking about Western Europe", implying that strictly national defense is impossible. The President said he had pointed out to de Gaulle that he was supporting European integration in economic fields; why not in the military as well?

Luns interjected that integration means to the French France's leadership. This is true in the economic field, and he believes the same would be true in the military; i. e., if the French have a great share of NATO leadership things will

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be okay from their point of view. Spaak said that he felt we shouldn't get into a battle of semantics between "close cooperation" and integration". The President agreed but pointed out that it was de Gaulle who had raised the problem.

The President said the discussion of NATO led to a discussion regarding the nuclear position. He described to de Gaulle how US forces are built around nuclear power but said it was a false assumption that any fight would start a nuclear war. The President repeated that de Gaulle seemed to him vague on what he wants concerning global strategy. The President said he told de Gaulle that the only basis for keeping US divisions in Europe is NATO. The main purpose of NATO strategy is to deter war. The President said that while in his view de Gaulle hasn't thought through the problem clearly, he undoubtedly wants a bigger voice. The President said he thinks these difficulties can be ironed out. Algeria is the main problem. Spaak asked what de Gaulle means when he asks for a bigger voice. The President replied that he meant a bigger voice in the formation of global policy. He said he had told de Gaulle that we are perfectly willing to discuss, but will not "talk NATO affairs outside NATO". We would talk Africa or New Caledonia, but not NATO affairs. The President said de Gaulle first wanted an institution, an organization, to direct global strategy, but that now he seems to have abandoned this idea. The Secretary agreed that the French position on a tripartite directorate has shifted. Luns hit at a three-power directorate as unacceptable to NATO, and returned to Algeria as the main point where satisfaction might be given to the French, stressing Debré's strong view in this matter.

The Secretary gave clear warning against giving details of the Eisenhower-de Gaulle conversations to the North Atlantic Council. He added that de Gaulle's problem on Algeria was how to translate his broad principles into a program.

The President summed up by saying that he was encouraged by his talks with de Gaulle. He had thought de Gaulle would make great demands upon him, but he hasn't done so as yet.

The President then said he wanted very much to make his "bow" to the North Atlantic Council; and that he was going to assure them that there was no inner circle or coalition trying to run NATO.

It was agreed between Spaak and Luns that they should report this conversation to NAC only in general terms, leaving the impression no great or insuperable difficulties have been encountered by President Eisenhower on this trip.

Drafted by: FE - Mr. Melting

Cleared by: Mr. Merchant

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Khrushchev:

and "your Communist Party". It was not necessary to discuss this in detail now, but during the later talks he would want to rectify the views which the President had expressed. He had read many speeches by members of Congress alleging that Moscow controls the Communist parties throughout the world. Such allegations are certainly in error. However, he would not go into details now.

The President had also mentioned that he wanted to discuss Berlin and he would also like to say a few words on that subject now. He wanted to make clear that the Soviets had not raised the issue of Berlin as such, but rather the question of the conclusion of a peace treaty in order to terminate the state of war with Germany. Thus the status of West Berlin would also be settled. He too wanted to discuss this question. He would give a sincere exposition of Soviet views and would be glad to hear the President's views. It would be desirable if we could work out common language, recognizing the fact of the existence of two German states, and confirming that neither side would try to bring about either a Socialist or a Capitalist solution by force. If we could make that point clear, then we would remove the danger from the situation. If we were to speak of our sympathies, then we both knew where the sympathies of each other lie. American sympathies lie with West Germany and the system existing there. Soviet sympathies are with East Germany and the system prevailing on that side. It would be well to recognize the facts. That doesn't mean that the United States would accord juridical recognition to the GDR, but would accept the state of fact as it exists. "Believe me," he said, "we would like to come to terms on Germany and thereby on Berlin too. We do not contemplate taking unilateral action, though on your side you took unilateral action in Japan in which we were deprived of rights we should have had. We had to accept that." However, he continued that he realized the problems of Germany have been hanging for 14 years. We must find a way out which would not leave an unpleasant residue in our relationship. Rather, we should seek a solution allowing us to revert to the friendly relationship on the subject of Germany we had enjoyed during World War II. The Soviets were prepared to try to find a way out which would not do injury either to United States prestige or to their own. He felt that if we worked hard enough, we could find such a way out. He would repeat to the President a compliment which he had made publicly about him by citing the very high esteem the Soviets had felt for him as an allied leader during the war. Stalin had had the highest opinion of the President's integrity with regard to the USSR during World War II, and the Soviet leadership all share this high regard.

Continuing, Mr. Khrushchev said, "You must recognize that we are Communists, that we and you have different systems. You must recognize that there are these two different worlds. If we ignore these realities, then we cannot come to terms."



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9/15/59

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1953-61 (C). Reading Material / Memo of Conversation  
9/15/59 [Camp David Summit]

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Khrushchev:

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Approved: WH

10/12/59

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 27, 1959  
12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: President's Report of His Private Session with  
Khrushchev

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Secretary of State  
Mr. Dillon  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Gates  
Mr. Kohler

Gen. Goodpaster  
Mr. Hagerty  
Mr. Berding

COPIES TO: S/S  
C - Mr. Merchant  
C - Mr. Reinhardt  
EUR - Mr. Kohler

P - Mr. Berding  
Amembassy Moscow, Amb. Thompson  
Defense - Mr. McElroy  
The White House - Gen. Goodpast  
ISA - Mr. Irwin  
JCS - General Twining

Following a private session with Chairman Khrushchev the President came into Secretary Herter's room where most of the American group was gathered and reported on the results of this conversation.

The President said that Khrushchev wanted a communique. He said this should be item by item as respects Berlin. We would not say that we would make permanent the occupation status in Berlin. We were both ready to negotiate on a Berlin settlement which would be acceptable to West Berlin, to East and West Germany and to the European countries. The President said it had been made clear that there would be no summit meeting under any kind of duress. He simply would not participate under such conditions. He had agreed with the Chairman that disarmament was the most important single problem. He said that Mr. Khrushchev had explained that the two governments had understood differently the Soviet initiative in Berlin last November. The U. S. had mistakenly thought that Khrushchev was delivering an ultimatum. The President reported that he had said he would not go to a summit meeting if what he and the Chairman said, at least among themselves if not publicly, did not make clear that there was no aspect of duress. He said that he added that he could not comment for or commit his associates. The President said Khrushchev had replied that without regard to a date the

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By <i>mhm</i>	NARS, Date <i>6/15/82</i>

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Soviets would negotiate to get a solution to Berlin which would be acceptable to all concerned. Khrushchev had added that the Soviets regarded a peace treaty as the "right way". The President commented that he saw no choice but to resume negotiations so long as we in fact say we do not seek a perpetuation of the situation in Berlin; clearly we did not contemplate 50 years in occupation there.

The President said he had told Khrushchev that he would rather have a summit meeting for negotiations on the subject of disarmament if we were both ready to negotiate on this question. In this sense he had made Berlin a catalyst.

Finally the President reported that he and Mr. Khrushchev had agreed that his visit to the Soviet Union would take place in May or June.

There was some general discussion as to the broad lines of a communique indicating the President and Secretary's views that this should cover the following lines:

1. General disarmament is the primary problem.
2. On Berlin we would seek a solution acceptable to all the people concerned.
3. There had been no agreements of substance.
4. Our understanding on the negotiations that they should be honestly and earnestly free of threat.
5. The Moscow visit will take place next spring.

communiqué on their talks.

The President <sup>(Eisenhower)</sup> said that he had been told at Gettysburg about the hundreds of correspondents down there, including not only Americans and Russians but British, French and many others. This indicated the great world interest in these talks he and the Chairman were having. Despite the fact that everyone had been told that no negotiations would take place, he thought it might be desirable that he and Mr. Khrushchev have another private talk.

Mr. Khrushchev nodded assent to the President's statement, but said he first wanted to mention another subject. He said he had no brief to speak on behalf of the Chinese Government and that, even if such authority had been offered, he would not have taken the responsibility on himself. However, he would be visiting China in the near future and he would not want to be in the position of saying he had lost the Chinese needle in a haystack. He would like, therefore, to inquire about U.S. policy toward the Chinese Government and what the future course of our policy might be.

The President replied that the Chinese Communists by their own actions have made it practically impossible for us to talk with them except in a very sketchy way through the occasional ambassadorial talks. These had taken place first in Geneva and now were continuing in Warsaw but related mainly to such questions as that of the American personnel imprisoned or detained in Communist China. The Chinese Communists are engaged in aggressive actions and have defied the United Nations. Until they purged themselves, there was not much prospect of any change in our position. In fact, there was not much we could do in the circumstances. We were basically in a position of waiting.

Secretary Herter interjected that the Chinese Communists were still threatening to use force against Taiwan and the islands in the Formosa Straits. They were still holding five American prisoners and were refusing to release them, although they had promised to do so in writing. Communist China was still an outlaw as far as the United Nations was concerned because of its aggression in Korea.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviets regard it as too bad that the United States takes the position that it does with regard to the Chinese Communist Government and believes that this position does not contribute to a good overall international atmosphere. With respect to the question of the Americans detained in China, Mr. Khrushchev said he knew nothing about this and he could not comment on the subject.

communiqué on their talks.

[Eisenhower]  
The President said that he had been told at Gettysburg about the hundreds of correspondents down there, including not only Americans and Russians but British, French and many others. This indicated the great world interest in these talks he and the Chairman were having. Despite the fact that everyone had been told that no negotiations would take place, he thought it might be desirable that he and Mr. Khrushchev have another private talk.

Mr. Khrushchev nodded assent to the President's statement, but said he first wanted to mention another subject. He said he had no brief to speak on behalf of the Chinese Government and that, even if such authority had been offered, he would not have taken the responsibility on himself. However, he would be visiting China in the near future and he would not want to be in the position of saying he had lost the Chinese needle in a haystack. He would like, therefore, to inquire about U.S. policy toward the Chinese Government and what the future course of our policy might be.

The President replied that the Chinese Communists by their own actions have made it practically impossible for us to talk with them except in a very sketchy way through the occasional ambassadorial talks. These had taken place first in Geneva and now were continuing in Warsaw but related mainly to such questions as that of the American personnel imprisoned or detained in Communist China. The Chinese Communists are engaged in aggressive actions and have defied the United Nations. Until they purged themselves, there was not much prospect of any change in our position. In fact, there was not much we could do in the circumstances. We were basically in a position of waiting.

Secretary Herter interjected that the Chinese Communists were still threatening to use force against Taiwan and the islands in the Formosa Straits. They were still holding five American prisoners and were refusing to release them, although they had promised to do so in writing. Communist China was still an outlaw as far as the United Nations was concerned because of its aggression in Korea.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that the Soviets regard it as too bad that the United States takes the position that it does with regard to the Chinese Communist Government and believes that this position does not contribute to a good overall international atmosphere. With respect to the question of the Americans detained in China, Mr. Khrushchev said he knew nothing about this and he could not comment on the subject.

However, when he goes to Peiping in the near future he thought he might ask the Chinese leadership about the question. With respect to the question of Taiwan, the Soviets agree with the Chinese Communists. Taiwan is a province of China and what goes on with respect to the island is part of the process of the Chinese revolution and the Soviet Union fully understands China's aspirations in that respect. The United States is to blame for the fact that the Chinese Communists are not in the United Nations. In opposing the Chinese Communists, the United States has taken advantage of its temporary majority in the United Nations and has pursued a policy which is in fact detrimental to the United Nations. It would be better if the United States would do away with all this and thus contribute to the general peace. He said the President should realize that if some islands were detached from the United States by a mutinous general and the USSR should support that general, the United States would not like it. Taiwan is a part of China and Chiang Kai-shek is comparable to Kerensky, though the latter has no territory at the moment. Essentially, however, the United States concluding a treaty with Chiang is like the United States concluding a treaty with Kerensky. He understood, however, that Kerensky had recently married a rich American lady, so maybe Kerensky would not be interested and would not now need U.S. Government support.

The Secretary said he wanted to stress that the Chairman had made an important statement in saying that the USSR supports the Chinese Communist use of force against Taiwan.

Mr. Khrushchev said he believed that the Chinese Communists have the right to liberate Taiwan from a Chinese general who has mutinied against the Government. In that respect the Soviet Union supports Communist China.

The President said that it was clear that our views were so divergent on this subject that there was really no point in discussing the question in detail. However, if his memory served him right, in the later stages of World War II, the United States, the USSR and Britain had all agreed to support Chiang, who had fought the Japanese so valiantly during the entire war, as the legitimate government of China. Since then the Soviet position had become different. It was the belief of the United States that there had been a great cataclysm in China and as a result, Chiang Kai-shek had been driven to Formosa. He could not be considered a mutinous general. The President would repeat that our positions were now diametrically opposed and that there would appear to be no use in discussing the question further.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he agreed that there was not

much point in further discussion of this question. It was true that during the war the Soviet Government had had good relations with Chiang. General Chuikov, who later was the famous defender of Stalingrad, had been a military adviser to Chiang. In fact, many other Russian generals also advised Chiang. However, a revolution is a revolution. It turns everything upside down. If one could suppose that some Soviet general should have mutinied, seized Sakhalin and concluded a treaty of support with the United States, the Soviet Government would have had to hit him and hit him hard. In the reverse case, the United States would take the same action if one of our generals seized an island and secured Soviet support. Therefore, he could not understand why Communist China should act differently. However, he agreed the question did not seem ripe for discussion.

The President replied that he did not agree with the comparison which the Chairman had made. These were not valid analogies. President Chiang Kai-shek headed the legitimate government of China. It was true that he had been defeated on the mainland but he had decided to hang on where he could, that is, on Taiwan. In no way could he be compared to a mutineer.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that there could not be two legal governments in one country. The question arises as to which will be the legitimate government in China - Formosa or Peiping. The only possible answer to this question is Peiping, as the government established in the Chinese capital. He said the President prefers Chiang. This was a matter of taste. He prefers Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai.

The President replied that it was not a matter of taste. The U. S. has obligations toward the government of the Republic of China which it respects and intends to fulfill.

Mr. Khrushchev retorted that these were obligations which we took on ourselves voluntarily. They were not given to us by an act of God. Therefore, they could be changed. Furthermore, the Soviet Union also had undertaken certain obligations.

The President said he certainly did not claim perfection with respect to the many decisions he was called upon to make. He simply sought to do the right thing.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he had to respect the President's statement. He merely would point out that he considered that there was a lack of consistency in our policy. The President said that if the two German states remained, they would be an indefinite hot bed of conflict. If this statement was true with respect to Germany, then it was true with respect to China, too. In fact, it was more serious with respect to

-6-

China because in Germany the two states had respectively 18,000,000 and 50,000,000 inhabitants. In China the Chinese Communists had 650,000,000 to 7 - 9,000,000 on Taiwan.

The President agreed that it was possible to make such a comparison. However, he commented that human affairs got very badly tangled at times and that we would simply have to try to straighten them out.

Mr. Khrushchev replied that he realized this but that he had just wanted to point out the inconsistency of our policy. He then quoted a Russian proverb which turned out to be untranslatable as related to the conversation, to the effect that "policy is like a wagon tongue between two horses".

The President said he wanted to add that while he admitted the comparison between the German and Chinese situations, he wished to point out that the U.S. seeks peaceful settlements in both instances.

The Secretary added also in Korea and Viet Nam.

Mr. Khrushchev said that he did not insist on a military solution in China. There could be a peaceful settlement, he continued, if the U.S. did not give military support to Chiang. In turn, he continued, the USSR also gave military aid to the Chinese Communists. Chiang was our ally, Mao was their ally. However, he agreed that this subject had been exhausted.

The President commented that it would remain a problem for some time.

Mr. Khrushchev agreed with this, saying he meant that the subject had been exhausted only insofar as the present exchange of views was concerned.

The President then referred to the suggestion that he and the Chairman have a private talk as to whether they wanted to say anything at the conclusion of their talks. They could then turn over to their aides the necessary drafting.

Thereupon the President and Chairman Khrushchev entered private discussions at approximately 11:45 a.m.



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China because in Germany the two states had respectively 18,000,000 and 50,000,000 inhabitants. In China the Chinese Communists had 650,000,000 to 7 - 9,000,000 on Taiwan.

[The President agreed that it was possible to make such a comparison. However, he commented that human affairs got very badly tangled at times and that we would simply have to try to straighten them out.]

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The President then referred to the suggestion that he and the Chairman have a private talk as to whether they wanted to say anything at the conclusion of their talks. They could then turn over to their aides the necessary drafting.

Thereupon the President and Chairman Khrushchev entered private discussions at approximately 11:45 a.m.

## Memorandum of Conversation

Approved: WH  
10/12/59

DATE: Sept. 27, 1959  
11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT: Joint Communique

PARTICIPANTS: US                      USSR  
The President                      Mr. Khrushchev  
Mr. Akalovsky                      Mr. Troyanovsky

COPIES TO:                      S/S                      The White House - Gen. Goodpast  
C - Mr. Reinhardt                      Ambassador Thompson, Moscow  
G - Mr. Merchant                      Defense - Mr. McElroy  
EUR - Mr. Kohler                      ISA - Mr. Irwin  
JCS - General Twining

The President, referring to the question of a joint communique, stated that in view of the fact that Mr. K was to have a press conference in the afternoon, he believed that a joint communique would not be necessary, unless, of course, the Chairman thought that it would be useful to have one. He said that if Mr. K preferred to have a communique he would be willing to discuss it.

Mr. K replied that he believed it to be useful to have a joint communique. His press conference statement, he said, would be in the spirit that had been mentioned last evening in their conversation. Yet this was only one aspect of the situation, and a joint communique would have a soothing effect on world public opinion at large.

The President said that, since the talks had been very informal and had covered a variety of subjects without any specific order, he would not object to having a short statement as to what had been accomplished. Such a statement could be made public at the time preferred by Mr. K - before his speech, before his departure, or at any other time.

Mr. K agreed that the statement should be short and in general terms, since no specifics had been discussed. As a

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By <u>WAM</u>	NARS, Date <u>6/15/82</u>

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matter of fact, the respective positions on certain points had not been clarified. For instance, he said, he did not know what the President's position was on disarmament. As to the time of publication, he believed that perhaps it would be best if he could read the communique at his press conference.

The President said that yesterday he had stated that the US was not trying to perpetuate the situation in Berlin while Mr. K had agreed not to force the Western Powers out of Berlin. Mr. K had also agreed to have more frequent meetings between himself and the President or between the respective Foreign Ministers. Thus, a general improvement of the atmosphere could be reported, which would be conducive to more useful negotiations.

Mr. K replied that this was correct. Yet there was one point he wanted to make clear. As far as Berlin was concerned, the statement should be such as could not be understood to mean that the Soviet Union and the US were in favor of prolonging the occupation status there and that the two countries were giving up the idea of a peace treaty. He said that he wanted to reiterate the Soviet position once again: the Soviet Union wanted to do everything in a friendly manner with the US, its allies and the allies of the Soviet Union in order to find a solution to the German problem. The settlement of the German problem would be brought about by a peace treaty and by doing away with the vestiges of war. If the Soviet Union should encounter no understanding on the part of the United States, it would have to seek unilateral action with its allies. He said that he also wanted to reiterate that the question of a time limit was not one of principle. Yet it was clear that some day a settlement would have to be reached. If the solution of the German problem were connected with the unification of Germany, this would be an unrealistic approach and would indicate a lack of desire to reach a settlement, since, in that case, it would be put off indefinitely. The two sides should not wait for German unification and should join their efforts to reach a settlement as soon as possible. Mr. K then said that without a thorough exposition of the US positions on the German problem and disarmament, it would be difficult for him to report to his Government and say where the barometer pointed - to clear, changing, or stormy.

The President replied that he did not see any reason for assuming that the needle was pointing at "stormy". As far as German unification was concerned, the President stated that he had no formula for it and that he did not know when it could be brought about. He said he realized that the situation in Berlin was uneasy, but his and Mr. K's predecessors had set it, perhaps unwisely, and now it was necessary to cope with it. The United States was prepared to seek a solution which would be satisfactory to everyone - to the Soviet Union, to its allies,

and to the people of Europe in general. However, this was very difficult to do and required great patience. The President pointed out that he was not talking of a long distant future. Efforts should be exerted to bring about a solution as soon as possible, and if no fixed date were set, this could be done. Referring to the question of disarmament, the President said that the Soviet plan was still under study. Although this problem had been discussed at many previous conferences, the United States was willing to study the Soviet plan thoroughly and also to study any other plans, including its own. The US would be willing to apply new efforts in order to make progress in this field, because it believed that no real solution of any problem could be reached so long as there was not some progress in general disarmament.

Mr. K agreed and said that he believed that the prospects for moving forward were greater in the field of disarmament than in any other field, especially because the respective positions on Germany had become rigid as a result of the various commitments undertaken by the two sides, while in the field of disarmament there were no such barriers. However, Mr. K said, he wanted to point out again that the words "peace treaty" meant the same thing in all languages.

The President then suggested that the respective staffs start working on the text of the communique.

Mr. K agreed, but said that there was one additional point he wanted to raise, namely, that of the President's return visit to the USSR. He stated that he had thought about this and had come to the conclusion that it would perhaps be better to have a heads of state meeting in the second half of November or early December with the President going to the USSR either late in May or early in June next year. He thought that the President, as well as his family, would enjoy their trip much more when the weather was good and everything was in full bloom. The beautiful scenery and the wonderful scent of blooming trees might help the President and himself in their talks.

The President replied that spring might be better for him since that would enable him to have some rest in the interim. As far as a heads of government meeting was concerned, the President said that he could not commit anyone except himself. As he had repeatedly stated, he would be willing to go to such a meeting if there was some progress which offered prospects for certain results. He said that a situation where he would not have to act under duress could be regarded as progress. His feeling now was that duress no longer existed.

Mr. K inquired what the President meant by duress.

The President replied that duress was a situation where one party intended to take unilateral actions without regard to the other countries concerned. He said that he did not want to conjure any fears, but that this had been the feeling of our people and of our Government until now. Yet, on the basis of the understanding reached between Mr. K and himself, he felt that duress no longer existed and therefore he would be willing to go to a meeting at the highest level.

Mr. K said that this was not the way the Soviet Government had understood the situation and that it had never intended to create a situation of duress.

The President replied that it was this way that the American Government and the American people had understood the situation. Perhaps it had been just one of the misunderstandings which had to be cleared up. The President suggested that, on the basis of what the two sides had said in these talks, they should consider the situation changed at least that much.

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KHV/R/AA-5

REPORT ON KHRUSHCHEV VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 15-27, 1959

Khrushchev's Treatment of the Issues of Berlin and Germany



In his public statements and in the discussions he had with various groups during his tour, Khrushchev did not make significant innovations in the Soviet position on Germany and Berlin. Indeed, these subjects did not figure very prominently in what he had to say. His chief purpose seemed to be to give an exposition in broad terms of the Soviet position while holding back possible modifications for subsequent negotiations.

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The burden of what Khrushchev had to say while in the US was set forth in his Foreign Affairs article, published September 3, twelve days before he arrived in the US. He reiterated the view that a peace treaty should be concluded with the two German states, arguing that after 14 years an end should finally be put to the "aftermath of World War II," especially since the absence of a "peaceful settlement" had "afforded wide scope for the renewed activities of the West German militarists and revanchists." He further reiterated the Soviet line that it had become "unrealistic" to speak of German unification prior to a peace treaty and that, in any event, this matter should not be subject to "outside interference."

As regards Berlin, Khrushchev denied any Soviet intentions of seizing or infringing upon the rights of the population of West Berlin and reiterated, without significant elaboration, the Soviet proposal for establishing a "free city" in West Berlin. In his speech to the National Press Club, Khrushchev added a general statement to the effect that the independence of West Berlin should be ensured by the "most reliable guarantees known in international relations with or without the participation of the United Nations."

As noted, these delineations of the Soviet position were not materially embellished by Khrushchev in his subsequent statements. Khrushchev did suggest to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the USSR might be prepared to withdraw its forces from East Germany if the West withdrew its forces from the Federal Republic, a proposition occasionally advanced in informal Soviet statements before and embodied in the Soviet draft for a German peace treaty of January 19, 1959.

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WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, Office of the  
Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-61

Authority MR 82-29 # 9

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Box 9



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In a private conversation with Ambassador Lodge, Khrushchev asserted that there were no Soviet missile bases of nuclear weapons in East Germany, again points that he had made previously.

Subsequent to the Camp David talks, at his National Press Club press conference, Khrushchev refused to be drawn out on the line he had taken with the President regarding Germany and Berlin. He did assert that the two had "found much in common." He further stated that he saw "no other way" than to sign a peace treaty with the two German states, though he invited "other suggestions" which would equally further the bringing of peace to Germany.

In his speech at the Luzhniki Sports Palace on returning to Moscow, Khrushchev omitted all references to Berlin, but repeated Soviet advocacy of a peace treaty and denied that there was any ultimatum attached to it. On September 28, however, Khrushchev used the vehicle of a TASS interview to confirm the understanding reached at Camp David and announced by the President at his press conference on September 27 that negotiations on "the Berlin issue" should be resumed, that there should be no time limit to them, but that they should not be indefinitely protracted. Khrushchev added that the interested parties should strive toward a solution of the "problem of West Berlin" without delay.

The Soviet objective of a "free city" was reiterated in the October Revolution slogans issued by the CPSU Central Committee October 3, as was the need for a peace treaty. Both objectives were cited by First Deputy Chairman Kozlov during his speeches in East Germany in connection with the GDR's tenth anniversary celebrations, as was the agreement regarding the resumption of negotiations. Khrushchev himself has not referred to Berlin or Germany in his speeches since his statements in Moscow on September 27-28.

It will be noted that although Khrushchev in the US several times averred that the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference had produced some good in that there had been frank exchanges and the two sides had brought their positions closer on a number of points, at no time in his public and semi-public statements in the US did he discuss a possible "interim" arrangement. That is, he in effect at all times stated the maximum Soviet position. He did, however, convey an impression of flexibility when he told Austrian President Schaerf on October 13 that "absorption by West Germany" was the only solution of the West Berlin problem acceptable to the USSR and that any other solution could be worked out.

In sum, the substantive Soviet position respecting Berlin and

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Germany (and Gromyko at one point remarked that for the USSR the question of Germany means the question of a peace treaty), did not undergo any change as a result of what Khrushchev said in the US, and subsequently, except that he is now clearly on record as agreeing that future negotiations should not be conducted under a time limit. At the same time, the other part of the understanding -- that negotiations should not be protracted indefinitely -- is clearly subject to varying interpretations. It remains to be seen whether and when the USSR will be disposed to invoke it in the event negotiations should be deadlocked. It thus appears that the threat of unilateral Soviet action respecting Berlin has been removed as long as negotiations are impending or under way. But on the face of it, the USSR remains uncommitted about extending a moratorium on unilateral action indefinitely, and particularly beyond the point at which talks might deadlock or rupture. In the negotiations themselves, the USSR remains committed to seek an "end to the occupation status" and to the "abnormal" situation in West Berlin. This commitment appears to be unaffected by any of the statements that Khrushchev made while in the US.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

September 17, 1955

Participants: Ambassador Lodge, Mr. Khrushchev  
Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Gromyko  
Mr. Pedersen, Ambassador Menshikov  
Mr. Malovsky, Mr. Sushkevich


Subject: Train trip between Washington, D.C. and New York City

Distribution: 3/3 Mr.  
The White House  
Secretary  
U  
M  
EUR  
SCV  
USUN (2 copies), New York  
Mr. Kohler



During a general conversation with Khrushchev on the train to New York I recalled an incident of my childhood - being taken to see Henry Adams in 1910 - and that he had predicted that by the 1950's the two great powers of the world would be the Soviet Union and the United States. That seemed to interest Mr. Khrushchev.

He used it as occasion to bring up the subject of nuclear tests, which he said he hadn't followed. I said I thought the Soviet Union and the United States have the same interest in bringing about an orderly world in view of the fact that the bi-polar world was not a realistic idea even now and that there are five or six countries approaching technological and economic maturity and that the time when we would be the only two great powers was not going to last forever.



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E.O. 12356 SEC. 1.3 (b)(3)  
DSC Little 8/29/83  
NLE DATE 12/14/83

Authority INK 82-496 # 11  
By LKJ NLE Date 12/14/83



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- 3 -

He then shifted to less serious subjects. We were just outside of Philadelphia. There were a lot of old two-story houses through the right window (next to which he was sitting). He said they had some old houses in the USSR but did not build like that any more. I said I would like for him to look at the ones on the left, where there were new houses, as well as the right. He said this was fair - we have a lot more bad housing than you have. He had not come here to look at bad things, of which they had enough at home. He then said his advisers had told him last night he should watch out for me because I would twist him around my little finger. They told him I would show him only the good things and he should insist on seeing some of the bad ones too. He said he had told them that he did not want to see anything that I did not want to show him. I said I thought if anyone were twisted around a little finger it would not be him around mine and that I wanted him to see anything he wanted, both good and bad.

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Khrushchev then told the old story about two Jewish merchants, each of whom wanted to know where the other was going. One of them asked the other where he was going. The second one, who was going to Cherkasky, figured that if he said he was going to Cherkasky the first one would then think he was not going there. The second Jewish merchant, when he heard the first one say he was going to Cherkasky, reasoned that he said he was going to Cherkasky so he would think he was not and therefore knew he was going to Cherkasky. Khrushchev laughed heartily at this joke and said that although he preferred to talk directly he supposed this was the way diplomats had to talk to each other. He pointed at Gromyko and me and asked which one of us was going to Cherkasky.

After a few more jokes and inconsequential talk I excused myself to allow him to finish his speech (and to find time to write this up).

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IRBM 8597

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(39) M-515

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

EUR:RA:RMMagill:adm

Date: September 25, 1959  
11:30 a.m.  
Dept of State

198

Subject: Second-Generation IRBMs for Europe.

Approved CDD 10/1/59

Participants:

Department of State

The Under Secretary;  
Robert Murphy, Under Secretary for Political Affairs;  
Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs;  
G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor;  
Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning;  
Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs;  
James Wilson, U/MSC;  
John W. Tuthill, EUR/RA;  
Robert H. Magill, EUR/RA;  
Raymond Courtney, S/AE;  
Graham Martin, U.

Department of Defense

John M. Irwin, II, Assistant Secretary for ISA;  
Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary for ISA;  
Brig. General James F. Whicomb, Special Assistant to Chairman, JCS;  
Brig. General James H. Polk, ISA;  
Major General John A. Dabney, ISA;  
William M. Leffingwell, ISA;  
Alvin G. Waggoner, Special Assistant for Guided Missiles and Space Operations;  
Colonel Charles Billingslea, Deputy Director, European Region, ISA.

Copies to:

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O S/AE  
C OSD/ISA (8)  
S/P American Embassy London  
EUR American Embassy Bonn  
HNA DESO, Paris (3)  
OER American Embassy Paris  
WE American Embassy Paris for Mr. Thurston, (SNAPE/L) (2)  
RA (3)

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Mr. Irwin cited the President's offer at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in December 1957 to provide United States assistance for coordinated NATO development and production of IRMs. He observed that this offer represented a United States commitment and that an early decision was needed as to how we should go about implementing this commitment. Mr. Irwin set forth the range of political questions involved in this decision. These included the question of NATO versus independent national control of the IRMs.

Mr. Irwin referred to the recent conversation that he and Secretary Gates had had in London with Sir Richard Powell on this subject, and said that Powell had expressed various

Powell had indicated that the UK would be satisfied, on the other hand, with a dual control over IRMs in Europe similar to that obtaining with respect to the Thors in the UK. When Mr. Irwin had suggested that the UK might help by placing their Thors under NATO, Powell had said that, while the position of the Thors was negotiable, such a move would raise questions about the status of the UK V-bomber force and that there could be no question of assigning this force to NATO. Mr. Irwin described the Germans as (a) being willing to participate in an IRM program, but (b) reserving their position on the question of deployment in Germany. He observed that a German requirement for deployment would undoubtedly develop in due course and he thought General Norstad probably had German deployment in mind for second-generation IRMs. Mr. Irwin said the French quite clearly were determined to proceed independently, if not within NATO, on an IRM program, and that they, along with the British, would be insistent on having an independent IRM capability in addition to whatever IRMs might be placed under SACEUR's control.

Mr. Irwin then pointed out that, leaving aside the political questions, there were three concrete approaches available to us. The first was the Meili plan, which called for U.S. technical assistance for a long-term, indigenous European development and production program, under which the first increment of IRMs (estimated by Meili but not confirmed by Norstad at approximately 100) would be assigned to NATO, with production over and above that figure for independent national requirements. Such a program would probably take from 8 to 10 years. Mr. Waggoner said that if such a program were not based on an existing U.S. missile design, the development cost to the Europeans would range between \$500,000,000 and \$1,000,000,000, depending on the extent to which they undertook to develop a new type of missile and on the extent of U.S. technical assistance. The second approach would be to sell or grant Polaris missiles solely for the purpose of meeting SACEUR's 1961 requirements, with the Europeans to produce the ground support equipment.

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indicated that he would not support a long-term European production program geared to the French range requirements of 2,500 to 3,000 nautical miles, ..... The third approach would be a variation on the first two. Mr. Irwin indicated that this might be accomplished along the lines of a proposal which he has been informed will be made shortly by the NATO International Staff. This proposal reportedly will provide for meeting SACEUR's requirements through U.S. provision of 30 to 50 Polaris missiles and technical assistance, with the balance of requirements, both NATO and national, to be met from European production.

Mr. Waggoner estimated that \$100 million would cover the cost of U.S. technical assistance and 30 to 40 missiles, while the cost to the Europeans for achieving an initial operational capability would be on the order of \$400-\$500 million (exclusive of production costs). He indicated that such a program could meet SACEUR's requirements in the time frame from 1963 to 1965. In response to Mr. Dillon's questions, Mr. Waggoner said that this assured European production of Polaris without significant modification. He said any significant European modification of Polaris would involve time slippage and increased cost to the Europeans. U.S. provision of full technical assistance, special tooling and a few sample missiles for a European Polaris production program (without providing any missiles for deployment), would cost about \$50,000,000, and the program could be completed by 1966 or 1967. If we did not provide some portion of the Polaris missiles for deployment, the Europeans might be expected to modify the design somewhat rather than to produce a "chinese copy" of Polaris. Mr. Waggoner indicated that the scope of U.S. technical assistance could be varied considerably and that the cost to the Europeans would depend on the scope of this assistance. He emphasized that the estimates he had cited were "in the ball park".

Mr. Dillon asked how the question of country deployment would be handled, and Mr. Irwin said that he thought this should be worked out by SACEUR on the basis of a prior general commitment by the participating countries to accept deployment. Mr. Dillon observed that he thought this was a question that might have to be worked out carefully in advance, with reference also to non-participating countries in which deployment might be desirable. He also asked whether any consideration had been given, in consultation with General Norstad, to the impact that the various approaches might have on the meeting of MC 70 requirements. Mr. Irwin observed that either a long-term, indigenous European program or a Polaris program would undoubtedly involve some diversion of resources and consequent cut-backs in the achievement of MC 70. He added that he thought General Norstad would be willing to accept some delays in achieving MC 70 goals if the IREM program were developed to meet his time-phased requirements.

Mr. Dillon observed that our decision should take into account the prospects for reaching a disarmament agreement and the question of whether the building of independent strategic nuclear

forces



process would prejudice the possibility, or the implementation, of such an agreement.

Mr. Smith asked what consideration had been given to hard sites versus mobility in deployment of the IRBMs, and was informed that any early deployment would probably have to be with hard sites. Mobility would be more expensive and could only be developed for later deployment; the cost and time scale of mobile deployment would depend on whether it involved railroads, or barges, or was designed for general cross-country mobility.

Mr. Dillon asked what position Defense would like to have the Department take, and Mr. Irwin said that he would like State approval of an offer of U.S. technical assistance for the NATO program. He said that such an offer would honor our commitment and would enable progress to be made in practical arrangements. Mr. Dillon asked what the timing should be and what procedure would be used in making the offer. Mr. Irwin thought the offer should be made as soon as possible and through NATO Assistant Secretary General Fiske to the Working Group. Mr. Dillon suggested that there were a number of political conditions that would have to be attached to the offer.

Mr. Irwin observed that implementation of our technical assistance could be used as an effective lever in the development of acceptable political arrangements, and Mr. Dillon added that the extent of our political leverage would depend on the magnitude of our aid. Mr. Merchant asked whether a failure by the U.S. to provide technical assistance would be regarded by the Europeans as defaulting on our December 1957 offer. Mr. Irwin said he thought the French in particular would consider this to be a major policy reversal.

Mr. Dillon concluded the discussion by saying that the Department would make every effort to reach an early decision, but that he thought whatever United States Defense position was worked out should probably be reviewed by the President.

Mr. Irwin said that meanwhile Defense would undertake to draft a telegram indicating their views on what the instructions to USRO should be.



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**Memorandum of Conversation**

PSV/MC/1

SEgni VISIT

September 30 - October 3, 1959

Washington, D. C.

DATE: Sept. 30, 1959

The White House

SUBJECT: Khrushchev and Germany

**PARTICIPANTS: US**

The President  
Secretary of State Herter  
Mr. Kohler  
Col. Walters, interpreting

**ITALY**

Prime Minister Segni  
Foreign Minister Pella  
Mr. Straneo  
Ambassador Brosio


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Amembassy Rome, Amb. Zellerbach



After the usual greetings and complimentary exchanges, the President invited Signor Segni to open the conversation. Mr. Segni said he was happy to be the first to visit the President on the heels of a very notable other visit.

The President laughed and said that the Italian visit was certainly much easier. Segni then said that he would be very glad to have the President's impressions of the Khrushchev visit and his conversations with him.

The President said that Mr. Khrushchev was a very extraordinary personality. He was able to shift from a lively show of opposition to a friendly and cordial attitude in a matter of ten seconds or so. If Mr. Khrushchev had to accept a position against his will, he was capable during the next twenty minutes or more of expressing his displeasure - the President would not say, by bad manners, - but at least by needling remarks. The President said he was sure that Khrushchev wants a real program of disarmament but he was not sure that the Chairman was ready to pay the price of effective inspection. However, he certainly wants some relief in the disarmament field. Most of Khrushchev's conversations on disarmament had focused on the high cost of arms, particularly the advanced nuclear and missile types, and in the field of

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Agency Case NSC F 90-1052

NLE Case 90-311 #1

By WCO

NLE Date 7/15/91

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AWP / DDE Diary / 44 / Staff Note Sept 1959 (1)

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exploration of outer space. The President said that Khrushchev felt he must reduce his arms expenditures so that he could use the money to benefit the Soviet people. As the communique had revealed, not much substantive discussion took place. The President had certainly not undertaken to talk for his allies. However, he felt that some progress had been made in creating a situation in which further discussions could take place in a more reasonable fashion. In the end the important fact was that Khrushchev had taken off the ultimatum.

The President said Khrushchev knew very well that he, the President, would say that we are prepared to negotiate with respect to Berlin on a friendly basis. He had agreed with Khrushchev that such negotiations should be expeditious while Khrushchev had agreed that there would be no time limit. The President noted that Khrushchev had promptly confirmed the President's press conference remarks about this agreement which he thought showed some readiness on the part of Khrushchev to go along and keep his word.

The President had thought at first that Khrushchev had the notion that he could separate the American people from the US government as respects foreign affairs. However, Khrushchev had told the President that he had changed his mind on this. The President thought that at least one reason was that so many Democrats had affirmed to Khrushchev approval of the President's policies.

Mr. Herter intervened at this time to say he thought the President was underestimating his own efforts in influencing Khrushchev, to which the President commented that - "well, we were all working on it."

Mr. Segni said that in Turkey he had found considerable concern on the part of the President and Prime Minister with respect to the Khrushchev visit. The Turks distrusted the Russians, especially now that Russia is also Communist. He thought that we must place a high value on the Turkish opinions, since they well knew the Russians and the Russian Communists. The Italians themselves had some Communist disciples in Italy. The Italian Government shared the Turkish distrust of Moscow.

The President agreed with Mr. Segni's statement, saying we must always have proof of good faith.

Mr. Segni resumed to say that the Turks felt that Khrushchev's visit to the US was not undertaken in good faith. They thought there was an attempt to split the allies. The Italians had reassured the Turks that President Eisenhower would not fall for this Soviet divisive maneuver. In saying this, they

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had known that they could count on the confidence and friendship between the President and themselves. Of course Italy, like France and Germany, he continued, has Communists inside the walls. Also, the Russians were trying to use the relaxation of tensions for their own political purposes.

The Italians favor high level discussions but think it essential that these not be allowed to be presented as a Communist victory, which the Communists can exploit for their own political ends. He thought it important that all members of the NATO alliance get together and decide on what proposals the West put forward.

The President commented that we in the West had been trying for years and have already put forward many proposals. Mr. Segni said it would be well to recall this publicly. The President agreed, but added that he feared the Communist propaganda was stronger than ours.

Mr. Segni repeated that it was important to avoid giving the Communists material which they could exploit for their own moral rehabilitation. He cited Togliatti as saying recently that the "barbarism of anti-Communism" should disappear from the scene. He felt it was important not to let the Communists get away with this kind of thing.

The President said in his talks with Khrushchev he had stressed the extent of the actual Western disarmament which had been undertaken after World War II. This course had been reversed, he had told Khrushchev, only as a result of Communist aggression in Korea, Berlin, Czechoslovakia and VietNam. These hostile moves had alarmed the American people. Consequently our armed forces budget, which had been below 12 billion dollars in 1949, was now four times that amount. The President pointed out that there was a large array of historical fact to show that the Western readiness to disarm was genuine and antedated the Soviet proposals.

Mr. Segni replied that this was correct. The Italians had favored these measures even before the President had gone to Geneva in 1955. He then inquired what the President thought Khrushchev seeks with respect to Berlin.

The President replied that in his talks Khrushchev had demanded that what he called the Remnants of World War II be eliminated. What Khrushchev really wants is to get our garri- sons out of West Berlin. Khrushchev realizes that they are not important militarily in case of war but also that their



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presence means that any attempt to use force would precipitate war. The President said that we must admit that we are in a bad spot in Berlin, and that the situation is abnormal, with some two million West Berliners a hundred kilometres away from the borders of West Germany, to which they are related. Khrushchev had repeated his threat of concluding a peace treaty to which the President had replied that this could not affect our rights or lessen US determination to protect the freedom and security of the people of West Berlin. The President said of course Mr. Segni knew the nature of Mr. Khrushchev's proposals of last November. The President said he had asked his own people to make a new study as to how it might be possible to meet the needs of the West Berliners and the European countries concerned in general and still achieve some relaxation in the situation. He felt that we must all put our heads together and see what we could accept in the way of a solution. It was clear to him that East and West Germany were not going to be reunified for a long time. It was good to talk about reunification, but this was clearly not in the realm of immediate possibility. Consequently, to tie the question of Berlin to reunification of Germany was not a realistic approach. However, we must, of course, make sure that whatever we carry out with respect to West Berlin did not lose the freedom or security of the West Berliners and that they be protected in their communications with West Germany. It was possible that reduced garrisons attached in some way to the UN might be something that would be acceptable. He wanted to say, however, that he was thinking aloud in offering these suggestions, which he had not yet even discussed with his Secretary of State. However, he felt that there must be some method of securing a modus vivendi in Berlin between the extremes of war or surrender.

Mr. Segni said that Berlin was an important question, particularly for West German opinion. It was essential that we maintain hope in West Germany. Otherwise we would risk undermining the foundations of democracy in the Federal Republic.

.....the  
..... Had any discussion taken place as to possibility of a "free city" which would include all of Berlin?

The President replied that we had proposed such a solution but it had been rejected.

Mr. Segni continued that the Italians agreed that it was not normal that a great city like Berlin should be divided. They shared the President's feeling that West Berlin with its freely elected and democratic government was really a part of

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West Germany. If the Soviets could say that East Berlin were really a part of East Germany, then West Berlin was certainly a part of the German Federal Republic.

The President agreed with Mr. Segni, then turned to Secretary Herter to inquire as to the exact situation. The Secretary explained that while West Berlin was in fact under the German basic law a part of the German Federal Republic, this particular provision of the basic law was suspended by allied directive.

Mr. Segni repeated that he felt that the President had made an important statement in emphasizing the connection between West Berlin and West Germany.



The President commented that he had insisted in his talks with Khrushchev that any Berlin solution must be acceptable to the West Berliners and to the West Germans, and that this was in fact confirmed in the communique and in his press conference.

Mr. Segni said the Italians feel that if forces in Berlin were placed under the UN, it would in fact take away some of this concept of the basic unity between West Berlin and West Germany.

The President said he did not disagree with Mr. Segni's statement. He was merely seeking methods by which we could assure some new arrangement with respect to Berlin which still would insure that any attack on the freedom of Berlin was an attack on all of us. We had had experience with the UN presence in other situations and had found that it was not necessarily a derogation of sovereignty. The West, he said, must try to find a way out of the dilemma.

Mr. Segni commented that this must be a way which did not break the spirit of the West Germans. He then went on to ask how the President saw the re-opening of negotiations - did he contemplate a resumption of the Geneva talks?

The President replied that he didn't know. He was just mulling over how we could avoid a sacrifice of the rights of the West Berliners and the West Germans and still remove the challenge of war from the situation. He commented that the Soviets had the theme of simply seeking a peace treaty. However, they made it clear that the conclusion of a peace treaty would result in a cutting off of communications and they thus sought to make us the aggressors in protecting these communications. He said it was a complicated situation - a real can of worms.

Mr. Segni referred to the President's previous statements

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that he would not attend a summit conference unless there was real hope of progress. How did the President feel on this subject now after his talks with Khrushchev?

In reply, the President referred to his remarks to the press conference on Monday, in which he had said that most of the objections that he had entertained about a meeting of the heads of government had been removed by the talks. Consequently, if the allies agree, he would personally be prepared to go to a summit meeting. The President said he thought there was no question but that the attitude and the atmosphere had changed quite a bit. There was no telling how long this changed situation would last. It could change back tomorrow. However, he thought there was every sign that Khrushchev really wanted an agreement which would help him at home and which he could get us to accept. He was sure that Khrushchev wants to raise the standards of living of the Soviet people; also that Khrushchev feels that he has some problems with the Chinese. He cited an example of the talks which had been held between Chairman McCone of AEC and Yemelyanov, the head of the Soviet Atomic Energy organization. The latter had told Mr. McCone frankly that he wanted a partnership in peaceful development of atomic energy under the IAEA so that he could reduce the drain on the Soviet budget. The Soviets simply did not have enough money for atomic development. In conclusion the President said he thinks Khrushchev realizes the Soviet Union must be more conciliatory than in the past.

Mr. Segni commented that he felt the USSR really wanted extensive help, since they had even asked Italy, a poor country, for credit.



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT  
(Wednesday, 30 September 1959 at 10:20 a.m.)

1. I indicated to the President that my first item was the so-called "White Paper." I reminded him of our various discussions on the subject and told him that General Goodpaster had informed me about the comment General Twining had made to the President on September 28. I said that I felt that General Twining had in a sense "jumped the gun" because at the Planning Board meeting on 25 September a consensus had developed that no recommendation should be made to issue a public policy statement based on basic national security policy. In response to a question, I explained to the President that the Planning Board interest had been only to excise from the basic policy those portions necessary to make it possible to have a publishable document and that the Planning Board did not contemplate that any document would be issued as a National Security Council paper. The President said that his feeling was that we should in no way put out any document which purported to be or could be inferred to be a National Security Council paper. He therefore wished it understood that the Secretary of State could make any policy statements he wished which of course should be in accord with national security policy but not so identified. I indicated to the President that I would communicate this information to the Secretary of State, and as far as I was concerned I would do no further work on the project and would consider the matter closed as far as the Planning Board was concerned.

2. I then discussed with the President the matter of bringing the Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities dated June 30, 1953, up-to-date. I said that General Goodpaster had reported to me the President's decision that there should be a new committee to study the whole report and its findings, conclusions, and recommendations in the light of changes in the world situation which have occurred or can be anticipated, less organization matters, as dealt with in Chapter 7 of the Report. Also, I understood that the President agreed with my original recommendation that the membership of such a committee be drawn entirely from people now in government. The President indicated his agreement. I asked him, however, if he would not reconsider

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this decision because after further thought I felt the interest of objectivity could be served by having some outside membership. I recalled that as a member of the earlier committee I had felt that the non-government members succeeded in making certain that the committee did not simply end up endorsing existing practices, etc. I said to the President that indeed it seemed to me that even the chairman could be non-governmental and I thought of someone like Sigurd Larmon. After some further discussion he said he would approve of adding to any such committee the names of Sigurd Larmon and C. D. Jackson, adding that he felt that if Mr. Jackson were better informed of what was going on he would be exerting less pressure on the President.

I then asked the President if he wished me to discuss this in the National Security Council and he felt that this should not be done at the present time.

3. I pointed out to the President that there were current problems which the committee should address itself to seriously, such as problems with respect to Radio Free Europe that the Vice President and Dr. Milton Eisenhower had encountered when they visited Warsaw.

At this point the President interrupted to say that he wished me to get immediately in touch with Secretary of State Herter and the Director of USIA, George Allen. He said that in the recent ~~Camp David~~ <sup>Woods</sup> talks Mr. Khrushchev had indicated that the Soviet Union did not jam what he referred to as legitimate broadcasts such as speeches of government officials. Mr. Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet Union would jam broadcasts which were calculated to defy the Soviet government or to reach over the head of the Soviet government to the Soviet people. The President felt that he wished the U.S. now to show some initiative in bringing the Voice of America in line with this kind of prescription. P.B.

4. I then indicated to the President that I had been giving some thought to possible usefulness of the Council and its machinery with respect to issues which may have arisen out of his talks with Mr. Khrushchev. I said that it seemed to me that the only one which at the moment was pertinent was the issue of Berlin and German unification. I reminded him of paragraph 44 of NSC 5803, together with NSC Action 1858.

I said to the President that at least some new ideas might come out of Planning Board discussions and that should this prove to be the case we could prepare a discussion paper which I would clear with him before taking it to the Council.

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
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The President then said that I should discuss this with Secretary Herter and should indicate to him that there were possibly some alternatives. Under present circumstances and as a result of the talks with Mr. Khrushchev we were no longer in a situation with respect to the Russians in which they were saying "take our solution or war." He said [we must remember that Berlin is an abnormal situation; that we had found it necessary to live with it; and that it had come about through some mistakes of our leaders -- Churchill and Roosevelt. However, he felt that there must be some way to develop some kind of a free city which might be somehow a part of West Germany, which might require that the U.N. would become a party to guaranteeing the freedom, safety, and security of the city which would have an unarmed status except for police forces. He reiterated that the time was coming and perhaps soon when we would simply have to get our forces out.] In any event, he thought well of seeking alternatives and authorized me to proceed.

5. I then said to the President that I wanted to mention one agenda item which would be considered in the NSC on Thursday, October 1 in his absence. This had to do with a new definition of the Mobilization Base which would become a paragraph in the Basic National Security Policy. I reminded the President that in 1957 we had gone from a concept of M/36 months to one of M/6 months. The new paragraph now would reduce the period still further and eliminate a reference to M/6 months entirely. Thus, we have made substantial steps towards approaching more realistic planning and the emphasis now and henceforth will be on readiness. The President said he agreed that the emphasis should be on readiness. However, he felt that in addition to military readiness, we should think of civilian readiness that would be necessary to begin to rebuild this country if it suffers an atomic attack. He visualized, for example, that we would probably have to have dispersed stocks of all kinds all around the country. He thought of, in addition to food and medicines, other items for survival and for the beginning of recovery. For example, we might consider what would be required to have on hand to enable the small factories and indeed large ones for that matter if they weren't entirely destroyed, to begin production again.

I told the President that this view was not unanimously shared by his advisors and I suspected that before the Mobilization paragraph were finally adopted, he would be involved in some of the discussions.

In this connection I informed the President that I had authorized the examination of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee studies by the group of staff officers who were making the study he had requested of what our situation would be after an attack on this country.



A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Gordon Gray", is written over the typed name.

Gordon Gray  
Special Assistant to the President

cc: Mr. Lay

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October 6, 1959

A review of the redrafted paragraphs forwarded by the NSC Planning Board Secretariat in its memorandum of October 2, 1959, for consideration at the Planning Board meeting scheduled for October 8, results in the following suggestions which you may wish to bring forward:

2. The second sentence neglects to mention the salient fact that the over-all French effort in Algeria represents not only a drain on French resources and a source of political instability, but is also an effort which greatly reduces France's capability for military action in other possible theatres while the military action continues in Algeria on its present scale. The reference in the draft to "an enormous drain on French resources" is not an adequate or accurate description of the military effects caused by the physical displacement and devotion of a large portion of the French Army to anti-guerrilla warfare in Algeria.

"In particular, these nationalist and rightist elements of the European population in Algeria which played a large role in the events of May 13, 1958 [also] oppose it. While there have been no adverse reactions from the military, it would be unwise to diminish all possibilities thereof."

2. The discussion on page 4 of the revised draft is not clear. The elements involved in both France itself and Algeria are not

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clearly identified. The fourth sentence talks about "both sides" being anxious for a settlement. The seventh sentence, however, points to the problem of a split in the Moslem elements constituting a barrier to a French/FLN accord as difficult as the question of Algeria's formal status itself. Some of the fussiness could be removed from this text by an identification at its very beginning of the principal elements in the political situation. There are on the French side De Gaulle, the French military in Algeria, the population of metropolitan France, and the French "Colon" population of Algeria; on the Moslem side in Algeria there are the FLN, as opposed to the moderate Moslem elements, as well as those Moslem elements now thoroughly under French influence, and in Tunisia there is also the "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic". Also, there is a seeming discrepancy between the statement in the third sentence regarding the importance of a "very few individuals" on both sides, as compared to the references to the conflicts between various major factions involved.



b. It is suggested that the last sentence on page 5 of the redrafted paragraph 10 use the verbal expression "moved forward" instead of "shifted".

3. Proposed revision to replace paragraphs 27 through 31

The statement which ends up at the top of page 7 of the redraft, referring to "almost inevitable request from the FGIAR or its Afro-Asian supporters", would seem predicated on the idea that the United States might accept the role of guarantor of "French good faith". This language points clearly to a most important step on our part which would presumably have a highly adverse reaction in France. Does this language imply our going beyond the position defined by the sentence preceding? How do we now see our response to such requests?

Ridgway B. Knight  
Deputy Executive Officer

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C O P Y

10/7/59  
7th October 1959

TO: Assistant Secretary General for P&L  
From: Missile Section  
Subject: Record of the meeting held on 5th October, 1959 at  
Ministry of Defense, France

PRESENT

FRANCE	:	General Lavaud Ing. Gen. Devenne Col. Leveque
NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF	:	Mr. Fiske Admiral Hines M. Devoisselle

After a statement from Mr. Fiske pointing out the object of his visit to the United States, a statement by General Lavaud and some further discussion, it appeared that the French position on the IRBM programme is the following:

- (a) Emphasis on the fact that the production of an IRBM must be a NATO joint production.
- (b) France is willing to finance the NATO programme with an appropriate share.
- (c) France agrees that to meet the NATO requirements 1961, the first missiles (30) should be provided by the US and the ground support equipment should be developed and provided by the NATO European countries.
- (d) European production will provide missiles and ground equipment to meet all NATO requirements as soon as possible (1964-65).
- (e) The NATO requirements having been met, France will start a production for her own requirements.
- (f) France is willing to have a European participation as large as possible, and envisage sub-contracting in countries possessing sufficient industrial capabilities (Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, for example).
- (g) NATO requirements having been met, with regard to the development of the selected US missile in the US, France, jointly with her partners, will ultimately produce an improved version to have increased range capability in order to meet further requirements. If for some reason, the US cancels the development programme of the selected missiles, France will request technical assistance from the US to go ahead.
- (h) France is anxious to know the US position in this programme should no other nations than France be willing to share such a NATO production programme.

Missile Section

DS-FO/A: 901102-588

10/7/59  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

October 7, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GORDON GRAY

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to France - Financial Implications

REFERENCE: Paragraph 46 and Financial Appendix to NSC 5910; NSC Action No. 2120-b(6)



The NSC Action on military assistance to France, NSC Action No. 2120-b(6), marks a sharp change in our earlier policy. Previously we had not been furnishing grant aid for conventional weapons, but had been programing on a grant basis advanced weapons, plus small amounts of training and PCH&T. The Council action, "Tentatively" taken at its meeting on August 18, provides:

"(6) Page 33, paragraph 46: Delete the second and third sentences and substitute the following therefor: 'In the absence of unusual circumstances, conventional equipment and advanced weapons and training should be made available to France on a reimbursable basis.'"

/Emphasis supplied/

However, as the President took care to point out, this new policy is not to be interpreted as reneging on any commitments we have already entered into.

Treasury has requested, and justifiably, that the Financial Appendix to NSC 5910 be revised to reflect the new policy.

As constructed, the present Financial Appendix assumes an outlay of grant aid for advanced weapons (and small amounts of training and PCH&T) for FY 1959-62 in the following amounts:

	(Millions of dollars)	
	<u>Programs</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>
FY 1959	48.2	111
FY 1960	86	93
FY 1961	55	85
FY 1962	50	98
	<u>239.2</u>	<u>387</u>

As indicated on page 43, the illustrative FY 1959-62 programs contemplate one NIKE battalion (that is doubtless a commitment); plus assorted quantities of BOMARC, TARTAR, LACROSSE, SERGEANT, TERRIER and HONEST JOHN, which amounts may be firm in the minds of the ISA programmers, but in many cases probably run far short of a commitment.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 86-270-4

BY Jib DATE 2/1/91

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**SECRET**

OSANSA/NSC/Briefing MGB/8/France, US RII - Towards

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SECRET

I have asked Defense to be prepared to comment orally in the P/B this Thursday on how the new policy on not furnishing advanced weapons to France on a grant basis will change the Financial Appendix; and then, in the light of P/B discussion at that meeting, to undertake to submit necessary revisions to the Financial Appendix in time for the P/B meeting on Friday, October 16.

CAH  
CHARLES A. HASKINS



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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY  
~~XXXXXXXX~~ AMBASSADOR  
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Ref. Memorandum of Conversation between President and Chancellor  
Adenauer August 27, 3:00 p.m. in which Adenauer said he would  
have President's proposal regarding exchange of certain groups  
between FedRep and East Germany studied. See pages 5-6 reference.  
XX  
Please  
XXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX/inform Department by end of October  
what Germans have done in this respect.

Dist.  
Desired  
(Officers  
Only)

100-443887-1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 88-260-1  
By LIG NLE Date 8/11/89

Drafted by: EUR:GER:GPA:ETLampson:jog

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

GER - Martin J. Hillenbrand

Clearance: General Goodpaster - White House  
(in substance)  
S/S - Mr. Calhoun

S - Mr. Krebs

Mr. Long (by phone)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

10/9/59  
W.H.

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PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Control:  
Rec'd:

6343  
OCTOBER 9, 1959  
4:46 PM

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 714, OCTOBER 9, 8 PM



2

P R E S I D E N T I A L H A N D L I N G

RE DEPARTMENT'S 777.

SUBJECT REFERENCE TELEGRAM DISCUSSED WITH STATE SECRETARY GLOBKE TODAY. HE SAID THAT PRELIMINARY STUDY HAD BEEN PREPARED BY MINISTRY ALL-GERMAN AFFAIRS WHICH CHANCELLOR HAD READ AND FELT NEEDED CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS. GLOBKE PRODUCED COPY WHICH HE SHOWED BUT DID NOT LEAVE WITH EMBASSY OFFICER. GENERAL SENSE DOCUMENT IS THAT INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS DESIRABLE AND ENCOURAGED BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BUT FRUSTRATED IN PRACTICE BY SEVERE GDR RESTRICTIONS INTERZONAL TRAVEL SINCE 1957. DOCUMENT RAISES OBJECTIONS TO CONCEPT ORGANIZED GROUP EXCHANGES WHICH IT TERMS, FOR VARIETY OF REASONS, LIKELY TO BENEFIT GDR RATHER THAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC, WITHOUT PROSPECT GENERATING BENEFICIAL POLITICAL CURRENTS WITH REGARD TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION.

GLOBKE THEN SUMMARIZED CHANCELLOR'S WRITTEN COMMENTS ON THIS REPORT, WHICH CLEARLY SUGGEST THAT ANY CHANGES IT MAY UNDERGO ARE LIKELY TO BE IN SENSE INCREASED OBJECTIONS TO WHOLE IDEA OF EXCHANGE GROUPS.

GLOBKE THEN HELD FORTH ON HIS OWN AND SAID HE UNABLE UNDERSTAND WHAT WE THOUGHT MIGHT BE GAINED BY SUCH EXCHANGES. TAKING VARIOUS CATEGORIES (LISTED IN MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PAGE 5) HE ARGUED THAT SUCH EXCHANGES WOULD BE BOUND TO BE STERILE AT BEST WHILE OFFERING GDR ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES SPYING AND SUBVERSION. HIS WORDS AND ARGUMENTS HAD METALIC RING STRONGLY REMINISCENT OF CHANCELLOR'S OWN FORM OF ORATORY. WITH REGARD SPECIFICALLY TO CATEGORIES OF FACTORY MANAGERS AND LAWYERS, HE SAID HE UNABLE IMAGINE HOW GROUPS

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Authority	MR 88-260 #6
By	216 8/11/89
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-2- 714, OCTOBER 9, 8 PM FROM BONN

OF THESE FROM GDR, PRESUMABLY HAND PICKED FOR THEIR PARTY LOYALTY, COULD SPEND THREE MONTHS IN FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN MANNER PROFITABLE TO CAUSE OF THE WEST, WHILE SAME CATEGORIES SENT TO GDR BY FEDERAL REPUBLIC INSULATED FROM PEOPLE BY GDR AUTHORITIES AND POLICE. HE DWELT AT SOME LENGTH ON DANGERS TO INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT TRY TO UTILIZE SUCH VISITS TO WORK AGAINST COMMUNIST REGIME GDR.

GLOBKE THEN OUT OF BLUE MADE CURIOUS REFERENCE TO REPORT JUST RECEIVED FROM GERMAN AMBASSADOR ATHENS OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER, ACCORDING TO WHICH GREEK GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS ITS INTERNAL POSITION ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY KHRUSHCHEV VISIT UNITED STATES. AUTHORITY GREEK GOVERNMENT, AS MEMBER NATO, ACCORDING TO VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO AVEROFF, RESTED LARGELY ON STRONG ANTI-COMMUNIST SENTIMENT MAJORITY GREEK PEOPLE. GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD TURNED DOWN PREVIOUS PROPOSALS COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS FROM SOVIET UNION INVOLVING IN PARTICULAR DELIVERY LOCOMOTIVES, EVEN THOUGH TERMS OFFERED MORE FAVORABLE THAN CURRENTLY OBTAINABLE FROM WEST, BECAUSE DID NOT WISH GIVE GREEK PEOPLE IMPRESSION NORMALIZATION RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COMMUNIST REGIME. NOW, ACCORDING TO THIS REPORT, GREEK GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED PUBLIC REACTION AND INTERPRETATION KHRUSHCHEV VISIT WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT NOT RECONSIDER SOVIET COMMERCIAL OFFERS. MOREOVER, GREEK GOVERNMENT NOW UNWILLING STATION MISSILE BASES ITS TERRITORY. GLOBKE ADDED THAT SOMETHING OF SAME GENERAL REACTION DETECTABLE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS.

WHILE HE DID NOT EXPLICITLY LINK HIS REFERENCE TO GREEK AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS TO QUESTION UNDER DISCUSSION, CONTEXT IN WHICH REFERENCES INTRODUCED IMPRESSED EMBASSY OFFICER AS CLEAR AND SIGNIFICANT EXPRESSION MISGIVINGS GOING BEYOND HIS OPINION MERITS GROUP EXCHANGES WITH GDR.

IN CONCLUSION, AND IN ANSWER TO OUR SPECIFIC REQUEST, GLOBKE SAID WE WOULD BE GIVEN RESULTS OF STUDY IN FINAL FORM BEFORE END OCTOBER.

BRUCE

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PJD

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING  
Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

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*Germany 10/16/59*  
1959 OCT 16 1PM 10 47  
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Origin  
(SS)  
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SENT TO: *Amembassy BONN 833 233*

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING



Secretary today read to German Charge Krapf letter to Adenauer text of which contained DEPTTEL 820. Noted that in discussion regarding similar letter to Macmillan earlier in afternoon Caccia had pointed out to Secretary that, while he was not entirely clear what Parliament would be doing on precise dates, it would probably be in session after October 20. If this a factor, British would probably prefer meeting on Friday, Saturday and Sunday. If however Parliament not a factor British would probably prefer meeting on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday.

Observe PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

HERTER

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *MR 88-260#3*  
By *JLS* NLE Date *8/11/85*

Drafted by: <i>HNK</i>	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <i>S/S - Mr. McElhiney</i>
EUR:GER:MJHillenbrand:all 10/16/59	
Clearances:	

S - Mr. Krebs

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10/22/59  
10/16/59  
~~SECRET~~  
October 22, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
October 16, 1959

Others present: Secretary Herter, Mr. Reinhardt, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Kohler, General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter said he had brought the group in to discuss summit meetings and trips with the President. He showed the President suggested letters to Adenauer, de Gaulle and Macmillan regarding a summit meeting in December. After reading the drafts the President thought we must stress that, until we know the West has achieved a concerted viewpoint on major problems, we cannot hold a summit meeting to consider these problems. He therefore asked whether we are thinking of making some kind of agreement on Berlin at a summit meeting; he asked what the State Department thinks we should do about Berlin. Mr. Herter thought our main aim should be to get Khrushchev to agree to put a moratorium on this issue for a couple of years. The President said he would have no objection to new measures in Berlin and Germany. He commented that, for example, it is time to pull out some of our forces now located in Europe. He cited the balance of payments difficulty the United States is experiencing at the present time. He thought we should get tough with Britain, Germany and France to get them to take up more of the load. Mr. Herter said there is some indication of British thinking of shifting from emphasis upon missiles and aircraft back toward conventional forces, although he doubted that they would increase their forces on the continent of Europe. The President suggested for example making the Europeans furnish the Commander for the European NATO Command, and simply leaving one of our divisions there. He commented that the United States, after all, paid for most of the air bases and other infrastructure, and has paid the whole cost of atomic weapons. He thought we should put no more military assistance into Europe. They are now able to support themselves.

Mr. Herter commented that Berlin is something of a symbol. It would be practical to cut our force in Berlin, but it should not appear

PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12065, Sec. 1-301 (b) - (e)

NC letter 9/16/81

NLE Date 12/11/81

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3.254

MC 80-19478

By DJH Date 12/14/81

that we are being forced out by the Soviets. He thought that the best time to consider a cutback in forces would be in connection with disarmament talks.

The President asked why we could not, for the Western meeting, go to Geneva a few days ahead of a summit meeting. Mr. Merchant said it would be humiliating for Adenauer to be in Geneva for the Western meeting and then have to leave as the summit began. Paris would be better for the Western meeting.

The President asked again whether the State Department had any ideas concerning the substance of an interim agreement on Berlin. Mr. Herter replied that they think we should simply try to buy time. The President said that if we assume that the Soviets are not going to be so generous as this, we must then consider where we want to be for the next ten years. The East Germans can stop all economic connection with West Berlin. They could make West Berlin a dead weight on us. In his opinion, the Western world made a mistake in 1944 and 1945 and must now find a way to pay for it.

The President next asked as to meeting in Bonn rather than in Paris. Alternatively, he said it might be possible to have General de Gaulle here for his state visit in November, having Adenauer and Macmillan come here at the end of this visit for four-power talks, and having the Geneva meetings follow immediately. I pointed out that one complication is that de Gaulle feels committed to go to England first, and cannot visit there until after the Queen has had her baby next spring. The President suggested that the State Department people get word to Macmillan that the British should tell de Gaulle that, because of the Queen's condition, the British are not pushing their claim to have him visit Britain first. He said that what he really wants to find out is, while Germany is divided, what solution for Berlin would Adenauer accept. Mr. Herter said the Germans believe they might maintain the status quo with us supporting them. Mr. Merchant added that the Germans are showing themselves more and more rigid, with Adenauer less and less accessible, and with a consequent inability to negotiate. The President said this makes clear to him that we should have a Western summit meeting first to review all this and see if we can find any basis for going on to a summit meeting.

cc: to Merchant  
Adenauer  
(W.D. 1/2)

The President said on this basis a period of two days just prior to a summit meeting would not be enough to concert Western views. Mr. Herter said he thought we should start up a working group on summit questions at once. The President agreed, but added that we obviously need to have some period of time between the two meetings, and should have a Western summit meeting as early as possible. He said he is thinking of the next six or seven years. Do we have anything to say concerning disarmament, an interim plan on Berlin, etc. He thinks we are being a little unrealistic and impractical in thinking merely of a moratorium.



Mr. Herter said he thought we could work out some kind of a status for a "guaranteed city" for West Berlin. He added that the Soviets probably will not let West Berlin become a part of West Germany.

In further discussion the President said that we should have a Western summit meeting here in the next week if we are to be ready for a summit meeting in Geneva in December. He added that if we are simply going to stand on the status quo there is no reason for a summit meeting. He commented that he thought that he could strike a bargain on his own with Khrushchev if he were to try to do so, but he knew our allies would not accept his acting unilaterally. He said he thought the Foreign Ministers must come to Washington immediately and we must find out if there is any possibility of going to Geneva with an agreed program. Mr. Merchant said the West could agree quickly on a Berlin position based on a moratorium, but that Khrushchev would not accept it.

The President recalled that he has not rigidly committed himself to a summit meeting. He sees no use in going to a summit meeting if we are simply exposing ourselves to insults by Khrushchev. He added that the U. S. should not have to take the primary part as regards European security measures. The European countries should do so. Mr. Herter said that the Germans want to be able to say that they had to yield to their allies.

The President acknowledged that we are in the situation where we have two million people in the middle of Eastern Germany, with responsibility for them resting right here. He would like to see how this could be resolved.

Mr. Herter said he could try to arrange a Foreign Ministers meeting. The President commented that if this is not done there should be a Western summit, with a prior state visit by de Gaulle if necessary. The shortest way would be to meet in London. In any case, this is the next essential. We would tell our allies that with all the many questions that exist concerning the summit, its timing, agenda, and differing viewpoints on major questions, it is of critical importance that there be a Western summit meeting at the earliest possible date. He said he would go within a week, or anytime thereafter. The only alternative he could see would be for the Foreign Ministers to meet in Bonn so that they would have access to Adenauer. While he would prefer to have the summit meeting here, he was prepared to go to Europe. He did not want to go to Bonn. After further discussion, it was agreed that Paris would be the most suitable spot. The President said this would be a strictly business meeting with no social affairs, no ceremonies, etc. The State Department group undertook to redraft the letters in the foregoing sense.

  
A. J. Goodpaster  
Brigadier General, USA 



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

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No. 3 of 4

PH-EC Files  
Jan R  
10/20/59  
E39

**PRESIDENTIAL  
HANDLING**

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 42583  
T-52/R-III  
French

Paris, October 20, 1959

Dear Mr. President:

I am struck by the urgency of your desire for a relaxation of tension between the East and the West. In this respect, my sentiments are completely in accord with yours. Especially since, in the event of a world war, France would be threatened most directly and immediately with death, in view of her position in Europe, her responsibilities in Africa, and the as yet incomplete state of her military power.

However, allow me to tell you frankly that, considering the purpose you and I want to accomplish and the extreme dangers to which my country is exposed, I have strong reservations about what benefit could be obtained at this time from a summit conference. I should even be afraid that we might compromise many things by plunging into this meeting while, to my knowledge, there is still no chance of a satisfactory agreement among the participants on any of the subjects that might be brought up.

As a matter of fact, among these subjects I see only one that has led to sufficiently explicit negotiations

His Excellency

Dwight D. Eisenhower,

President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D.C.

# 610

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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**PRESIDENTIAL  
HANDLING**

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between the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and France to permit a summit conference to consider it without unfortunate improvisations. That subject is Berlin, as brought up by Mr. Khrushchev, interminably discussed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Geneva, and, you write me, made almost the sole topic of your talks at Camp David. But, however thoroughly the problem has been explored, its solution appears more uncertain than ever. It is true that at the time of the Geneva conference, and later at your insistence, Mr. Khrushchev declared that, without withdrawing any of his demands, he was not fixing any deadline for accepting them. However, he has in no wise changed what he wishes to obtain. The very fact that the West has consented to discuss this so long and on so many occasions can but confirm him in his determination and hope of succeeding.

I wonder what, in this situation, a summit meeting at this time could accomplish besides highlighting a fundamental disagreement between East and West or surrendering more or less to Soviet claims to Berlin. In the first case, the cold war would very likely be aggravated; in the second, the world might consider such a retreat on the part of the West the beginning of a series of retreats, and the firmness of the Atlantic Alliance would suffer grave consequences. In any case, the relaxation of tension would undoubtedly be jeopardized.

On the contrary, since this easing of tension is sought by us, and if it is also desired by the Soviets, it may

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PRESIDENTIAL  
HANDLING

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during the coming months develop in deeds and thoughts -- provided the two camps do not first come face to face on burning questions. No problem is more pressing than that of Berlin. In my opinion, it is only after the world has had a period of relative calm, in which East and West have been on better terms and have promoted contacts without trying to settle in the heat of passion what can only be dealt with calmly, that a summit conference can be held under satisfactory conditions from the psychological, and consequently the political, standpoint.

As regards France, for example, [during] the present United Nations session, at which certain members are desirous of commencing debates on various subjects wherein they plan to display their ill will toward our country, the French Government and people will observe Soviet conduct closely. As for me, I should certainly not participate in a summit conference with Mr. Khrushchev at a time when his representatives in New York were speaking out against my country or joining those who were. On the other hand, if on that occasion the Russians displayed genuinely conciliatory attitudes we on the French side might draw encouraging conclusions therefrom. Likewise, as I have already written you, the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union concerning the affairs of Southeast Asia (India, Quemoy, Laos, etc.) or the Middle East, or Africa, will enable us Western powers to obtain a clearer picture of their intentions. Meanwhile, moreover, contacts of the kind made by Mr. Nixon in Russia or Mr. Khrushchev in the United States may add to our

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CONFIDENTIAL  
HANDLING

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#610

information. Until then, there is really nothing pressing for us in regard to Berlin, for, unless the Soviets deliberately wish to create a crisis the situation during the coming months may very well remain what it has been for the past fourteen years. In conclusion, I propose contemplating the principle of holding a summit conference at the end of May or in June. I shall make the same suggestion to Mr. Harold Macmillan. We should thus have the necessary time to obtain information, and then reach agreement without haste. Furthermore, by that time the paramount question, that of disarmament, could have been studied thoroughly enough to form the subject of a positive examination by the eventual Areopagus. In the event that all three of us should agree on this procedure, we might so inform Moscow and announce it publicly. It would then remain for us to determine whether an improvement in the political climate would gradually provide chances of success. However, we of the West would also have to make serious preparation for the meeting.

In this regard I, like you, am of the opinion that a leisurely preliminary meeting between the Western powers, with Chancellor Adenauer participating would be necessary in order to define precisely our common position on the various problems, particularly that of Berlin. However, I think it would be premature to hold this conference now, in view of the amount of time we should allow ourselves before the summit meeting and our reasons for not provoking hasty conjectures on the part of the public. It seems to me that early spring would be the best time for the Western powers to reach sober

- 5 -

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my very sincere  
friendship.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

10/21/59  
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Classification

Control: 13209  
Rec'd: OCTOBER 21, 1959  
8:40 AM

FROM: BONN

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 782, OCTOBER 21, NOON



2

NIACT

P R E S I D E N T I A L   H A N D L I N G

REFERENCE: EMBASSY TELEGRAM 781.

THERE FOLLOWS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION CHANCELLOR'S REPLY  
DATED OCTOBER 21:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I THANK YOU HEARTILY FOR YOUR LETTER OF  
OCTOBER 16, 1959. I AM VERY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE QUESTION  
OF PREPARATION OF THE PLANNED EAST-WEST SUMMIT CONFERENCE.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT IT IS PRESSINGLY NECESSARY TO WORK OUT  
A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS WESTERN NEGOTIATING PROGRAM WITH OUR  
FRENCH AND BRITISH FRIENDS BEFORE ENTERING INTO DISCUSSION  
WITH THE SOVIET UNION. YOU ARE RIGHT IN SAYING IN YOUR  
LETTER OF OCTOBER 9, 1959 THAT THE WEST WILL FIND ITSELF  
UNDER HEAVY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA PRESSURE IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS. THE DANGER OF MEETING THIS PRESSURE WITH  
CONCESSIONS SEEMS TO ME VERY GREAT IF THE WEST IS NOT PREVIOUSLY  
FULLY AGREED ON ITS NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES AND DOES NOT  
SUPPORT THESE UNITEDLY.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE EAST-WEST SUMMIT CONFERENCE SHOULD,  
AS YOU SUGGEST, BE LIMITED TO THE POWERS WHO PARTICIPATED  
IN THE GENEVA SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF 1955. ONLY IF THIS CAN BE  
ACHIEVED DOES IT SEEM TO ME THAT THERE WILL BE ASSURANCE  
THAT THE REALLY IMPORTANT QUESTIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED AND  
THAT THERE WILL NOT BE ATTEMPTS FROM THE SOVIET SIDE TO PLAY

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-2-782, OCTOBER 21, NOON FROM BONN

UP QUESTIONS OF PRESTIGE FOR THE EAST. NOW AS BEFORE IT IS MY OPINION THAT IT IS DECISIVE FOR THE SOLUTION OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE WHOLE WORLD THAT PROGRESS BE ACHIEVED ON THE QUESTION OF CONTROLLED DISARMAMENT. AS I SAID IN MY LETTER OF OCTOBER 13, 1959 THIS PROBLEM SEEMS TO TAKE SUCH A CENTRAL POSITION THAT WE SHOULD PUT DISARMAMENT AT THE HEAD OF THE AGENDA FOR AN EAST-WEST SUMMIT CONFERENCE" (#).

BRUCE

JAK

(#)OMISSION, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

~~SECRET~~



H INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 13209  
CORRECTION ISSUED:  
10/21/59, 11 AM

action-2-782, OCTOBER 21, NOON FROM BONN-CORRECTED PAGE 2.

SS UP QUESTIONS OF PRESTIGE FOR THE EAST. NOW AS BEFORE IT IS MY OPINION THAT IT IS DECISIVE FOR THE SOLUTION OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE WHOLE WORLD THAT PROGRESS BE ACHIEVED ON THE QUESTION OF CONTROLLED DISARMAMENT. AS I SAID IN MY LETTER OF OCTOBER 13, 1959 THIS PROBLEM SEEMS TO TAKE SUCH A CENTRAL POSITION THAT WE SHOULD PUT DISARMAMENT AT THE HEAD OF THE AGENDA FOR AN EAST-WEST SUMMIT CONFERENCE. 2

I AM ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU WILL UNDERTAKE THE STRAIN OF A SECOND TRIP TO EUROPE IN ORDER TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE, PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN AND ME AT THE END OF THIS MONTH IN PARIS. I GLADLY AGREE THAT FOR REASONS OF SAVING TIME THE PREPARATIONS FOR OUR MEETING BE MADE DIRECTLY BY SECRETARY OF STATE HERTER AND THE AMBASSADORS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN WASHINGTON. I SHALL HOLD MY CALENDAR FREE OF ALL OBLIGATIONS IN THE COMING WEEK SO THAT I CAN TRAVEL TO PARIS AT ANY TIME.

I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR EARLY MEETING WITH GREAT HAPPINESS AND I AM, WITH WARM GREETINGS, AS ALWAYS YOUR ADENAUER."

BRUCE

JAK

~~SECRET~~

October 26, 1959

Dear Walter:

Having my name linked with Mr. Truman's and Dean Acheson's in your October 22nd column did me honor. A question of fact remains, however. Ever since the raising of the Berlin issue last November, my own view has been that we should go to great lengths to avoid initiating war, general or limited, to hold on in Berlin. To bear witness to the point, I enclose a copy of a speech of mine made eight months ago.

The main questions for us about Berlin are two: (a) Shall we venture war rather than yield? (b) If not, shall we acquiesce through a negotiation? My answer to each is negative. We should not venture a war. If we are to be routed out of a rightful position, we should not legitimize the act through a negotiated agreement.

Perhaps I can explain my views by dwelling for a moment on the meaning of a word that has been made central to the Berlin issue and which recurred in the conversation at the luncheon for Geoffrey Crowther. I refer to the word "abnormal". The word implies a norm. The question here is whether the norm is thought of in relation to rightfulness or to power. Both terms of reference are being implicitly invoked. I think one should be clear about the distinctions.

As I see it, a united Germany represents the norm. The division of Germany -- specifically the Russian occupation of East Germany -- is abnormal. Given that norm, the Western position in Berlin is normal. It is rightful.

Judged against the ratios of power between ours and the Soviet side, however, the Western position in Berlin is seen as abnormal. The Soviet Union does disapprove of the Western presence there and does have the power to foreclose the position.

Mr. Walter Lippmann  
3525 Woodley Road, N.W.  
Washington 8, D. C.

Oct 29, Alden 295, Admin. Papers, 204



October 26, 1959

What is rightful here comes to odds with what is actual. So right may eventually have to yield to the dictates of power. If it comes to that, we must take care to keep clear to ourselves that we shall have suffered our rights to be overridden because of our inability to bring appropriate force to bear in defense of them. We should not dress up the defeat as something else. If we must accept defeat, we can at least avoid the casuist's error of calling the unavoidable ipso facto right. If we cannot hold on in Berlin, we must at least hold on to our sense of proportion.

My principal objection is not to the fact of our entering upon negotiations over Berlin. It is to the obscuring of the premises underlying our case in the negotiations -- to the fact of our having agreed with Mr. Khrushchev on the abnormality of the Berlin situation without making clear to him or to ourselves the sense wherein we see it so.

A specific question remains between us as to the effect upon our rights in Berlin of elements in a hypothetical settlement. Clearly enough, our rights there vis-a-vis the Russians and our obligations to the West Berliners are integral. Terms sustaining those obligations would also sustain those rights and vice versa. Here the effect of terms of settlement on the minds of West Berliners becomes a matter of substance. Terms which the West Berliners would take to amount to a desertion of our obligations would indeed undermine our obligations and overturn our rights.

Your suggestion, as I recall, is that a settlement providing for phased withdrawal of allied forces over a period, say, of five years and the substitution of U.N. observers would give the West Berliners sufficient assurance and thus sustain our rights. I doubt that the West Berliners would respond in that way. With the emergence of a clear prospect that the legitimacy of the East German regime was to be conceded at some future date and the protection of allied forces withdrawn from West Berlin, the West Berliners would perforce feel compelled to accommodate as best they could with the surrounding superior power. The result -- however the language of the agreement might tend to obscure it -- would be a defeat for us and an overturning of our rights.

As ever,

Enclosure:  
cy to Dean Acheson

Paul H. Nitze


10/29/59

3. U.S. POLICY ON FRANCE

(NSC 5721/1; OCB Report on NSC 5721/1, dated April 22, 1959; NSC Action No. 2087; NIE 22-59; NSC 5910; Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 13 and 17, 1959; NSC Action No. 2120; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 19 and 27, 1959)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council as indicated in the attached briefing note. In calling upon Secretary Herter and General Twining to comment on the split in Paragraph 41-a dealing with cooperation with France in the nuclear field, he suggested that they might like to indicate the status of planning for a multilateral nuclear authority.

In response Secretary Herter stated that State had done a great deal of work on the development of a plan for a multilateral authority and that in a few weeks State's plans should be in such shape that they could be discussed with Defense with a view to developing a concerted proposal which could be brought up for decision.



1000 1894 NSC 5721/1 10/29/59

The President responded by saying that we should look far enough ahead to see what the probable situation would be ten years from now. He thought that it was as sure as day follows night that a number of countries would develop nuclear capabilities.

Secretary Gates said that the split was not an important one; in the longer range a multilateral authority was probably the answer. He also pointed out that this question had a bearing on the issue of U.S. deployments in Europe and upon the related matter of IREX weapons and the custody of nuclear warheads for those weapons. It was his opinion that there was no chance at present of obtaining Congressional approval for a bilateral arrangement with France. Therefore, he agreed that we should concentrate on a NATO approach to the problem. Chairman McCone indicated that he did not believe there would be difficulty in getting Congressional approval of multilateral arrangements.

At this point Mr. Gray offered the following alternative version of Paragraph 41-a:

"a. Urgently proceed with the study directed by par.24-c of NSC 5906/1 and, at an appropriate time, seek French support of, and participation in, some form of multilateral European nuclear authority. Study, on a priority basis, whether, if and when France successfully explodes a nuclear device, it is in the U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France through the exchange with it or provision to it as appropriate of (1) information; (2) materials; or (3) nuclear weapons; under control arrangements to be determined.

In response to this proposal Secretary Gates stated that language as such was not important to the Chiefs. After reading his proposal Mr. Gray said that he did not understand that the Chiefs contemplated aid to France until the French had exploded a nuclear device. However, he felt that we should study now what we would say to the French after they explode a device and in the meanwhile that we should go ahead with plans for a NATO authority.

Secretary Herter stated that we ought to take account of the legislative history in this regard. That history indicated that France was excluded from receiving U.S. assistance until it has demonstrated more than a capability for shooting off a single nuclear bomb. A study of bilateral aid was "O.K." but it should be under wraps. Mr. McCone confirmed Secretary Herter's statement with respect to legislative history. Mr. Gray pointed out that his proposal did not call for a "determination" now with respect to bilateral aid but only for a "study". Nonetheless, Mr. McCone said that he did not like the language about explosion by France of a

nuclear device because it implied that such an explosion would put the French in the nuclear club. Secretary Herter stated that the French have no illusions on this point; that they understood that more than the explosion of a nuclear device was necessary before they would become eligible for U.S. assistance. At this point the President suggested that the language of the law with respect to the "demonstration by France of a nuclear capability" be substituted for the phrase in Mr. Gray's proposal "if and when France successfully explodes a nuclear device."

The difficulties were primarily with our own Congress which seem to think that our situation was the same as in 1947 when we had a monopoly of the nuclear secret. The stupidity of Congress in this regard never ceased to amaze him.

Secretary Gates stated that it was his impression that Congress was moving backwards.

Chairman McCone did not agree with this assessment. He felt that recent difficulties with Congress had grown out of their irritation with certain incidents. He reiterated his belief that there would be no problem about getting Congressional approval for a multilateral arrangement. In rejoinder the President suggested that if Admiral Rickover went up to the Hill and indicated that the Russians were behind in certain things, it would cause Congress to "freeze up."

In response to a request by Secretary Herter that he indicate his views on the subject, Ambassador Burgess stated that he liked the emphasis upon a multilateral authority in the first part of Mr. Gray's proposal. He was in complete sympathy with the view that we should



hold back from the French. The French were out of step in NATO. He thought we should work to keep this matter within a multilateral framework. He thought the timing question was very important. If we held back aid from France we would delay the time when they would have a capability. This would give us time to develop controls or to build a multilateral framework within which controls could be developed. He concluded by saying that he thought the last phrase in the paragraph, referring to control arrangements, was very important.

Going back to his proposal, Mr. Gray suggested that, if the language of the statute were incorporated in the paragraph, it would freeze the policy to the language of the statute as it now stands whereas the Basic Policy language contemplated the possibility of obtaining changes in the statute. In response the President suggested that it would be easier to change the NSC policy paper than to change the law. Mr. Gray, however, indicated that he was concerned that the language be sufficiently flexible to permit us to seek changes in the law. Secretary Gates inquired as to the meaning in Mr. Gray's proposal of the statement that we should study "on a priority basis" whether to provide bilateral assistance to France. Mr. Gray explained that he intended that this study should go forward simultaneously with the study of a multilateral authority under the first sentence. The President pointed out that the language was somewhat ambiguous -- the first study was to be done "urgently" and the second "on a priority basis."

Mr. Gray agreed that the clause referring to the successful explosion by France of a nuclear device should be phrased so as to make it clear that we would not help France bilaterally until it had demonstrated a nuclear capability - until it had become eligible for membership in the nuclear club. We were not going to help countries become members of the club, but might help them after they became members. He then indicated that he would revise his proposal in the light of the Council's discussion.

Mr. Gray next read Paragraph 41-c containing the Policy Guidance, dealing with Algeria, and went on to describe the split in Paragraph 46 relating to military assistance. He stated that, while on its face the Treasury and Budget position seemed to indicate that Treasury and Budget did not believe that we should not honor our commitments, that, as he understood it, was not their position. Rather the question that concerned them was the meaning of the word "commitments". They feared that Defense interpreted "commitments" to mean all assistance already programmed by the U.S. It was the Treasury and Budget view that, in the Council discussion last August, it had been intended only to make an exception in those cases involving the good faith of the U.S.

Major Policy Guidelines

4142

a. Urgently proceed with the study directed by paragraph 24-c of NSC 5906/1\* and, at an appropriate time, seek French support of and participation in some form of multilateral European nuclear authority. Urgently study whether and under what circumstances it might be in the U. S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France through the exchange with it or provision to it as appropriate of (1) information; (2) materials; (3) nuclear weapons; under control arrangements to be determined.

b. Continue the tripartite discussions in Washington including parallel military talks, expressing a willingness to discuss all problems on the understanding that the talks will not be institutionalized, that other interested nations will be kept informed, that no attempt will be made to impose decisions on other nations or on pacts in which the United States is a member, and that the talks will not replace or derogate from those taking place within treaty organizations of which the United States is a member. Do not accede to French requests for the establishment of a U. S.-U. K.-French institutional arrangement for developing and coordinating global political and military strategy.

c. In view of the crucial importance of an Algerian settlement to both French and North African stability, take every appropriate opportunity to contribute the weight of U. S. influence toward an early, realistic settlement while minimizing the possibility of U. S. overt involvement as an arbiter. Continue to give support to the general approach outlined by De Gaulle on September 16, but retain sufficient flexibility to allow us discreetly to serve a constructive role in its application. To this end:

(1) Direct U. S. efforts towards encouraging an early settlement of the Algerian problem generally along the lines of the approach outlined by De Gaulle.

(2) Discreetly encourage through appropriate channels discussions between the rebels and the French Government, initially for the purpose of achieving a cease-fire; attempt to have friendly third powers play a similar role and contribute to a broader settlement.

(3) Endeavor to ensure better understanding that the U. S. motivation is its desire for an early, peaceful and equitable solution.

\* Pursuant to paragraph 24-c of NSC 5906/1, plans for the development of NATO arrangements for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons are under urgent consideration within the Executive Branch.

RG 273 / A/LP For NSC 5910/1 11/4/59 VS Pol. on France  
NSC 5910/1 - 13 - "rescinded by memo dated 3/2/62" ~~SECRET~~ 4/85

~~SECRET~~




UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In Reply Refer To: D-13,487/9 (USRO)

OFFICE OF DEFENSE ADVISOR

2 RUE ST. FLORENTIN  
PARIS I, FRANCE

4 November 1959



Dear Randy:

With Fritz's agreement, I am sending you a copy of my personal memorandum to him on his personal memorandum on IRBMs.

As you can see, I want to be sure that Fritz has all the related facts, as well as my own views.

I am concerned, too, because I think there seems to be a lack of complete understanding within parts of the State Department as to all the facts of the military position and the position of some of the countries involved.

Sincerely,

*John*  
John Haskell.

1 Incl.-Cy memo fr  
Haskell to Nolting  
dtd 3 Nov 59.

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at

The Honorable  
W. Randolph Burgess  
U. S. Permanent Representative to NATO  
c/o The Honorable John W. Tuthill  
Director, Office of European Regional Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In Reply Refer To: D-13,464/9 (USRO)

OFFICE OF DEFENSE ADVISOR

2 RUE ST. FLORENTIN  
PARIS 1, FRANCE

3 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable  
Frederick E. Nolting, Jr.  
Acting Chief of Mission, USRO

FROM: John Haskell

SUBJECT: European Production of Medium-Range  
Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs)

Thank you very much for showing me your letter of October 16 to Jack Tuthill, reflecting your personal views on this difficult subject, and Jack's reply of October 23. Until reading this exchange, I had not appreciated that each of us was laboring under quite so many different evaluations of the basic facts and backgrounds. Even if we reach a common understanding of these basic facts, we may not be able to agree as to what is the best policy in the interests of the U. S., but I hope that our views may come closer together.

It is with this hope that I give you the following personal comments on your personal comments, expressed in your letter of October 16. Some of the following points are obviously matters of opinion; others, I believe, are for the purpose of bringing our common understanding of the facts involved into closer accord:

1. I still continue to believe that the Soviet military threat to the U. S. and NATO is a real one, - certainly as great, if not greater, than it was a few years ago. However great may be the risks in helping NATO countries to achieve, either under SACREUR control or independently, nuclear delivery capability, I believe that such risks are inevitable and much less than the threat to the world that failing to assist them - and, in fact, retarding their efforts to meet the more technically-advanced nature of the Soviet military threat.

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2. I do not believe that the hopes and wishful thinking for honest, controlled disarmament at some future date should be allowed to hold back the efforts of our Allies to go forward with the modernization of their defenses, even in the field of middle-range ballistic missiles.

3. No law or existing policy prevents the U.S. from providing know-how and help to our NATO Allies in developing any form of short-range or long-range atomic delivery systems. I think we will find, as time goes on, that the token U.S. control of nuclear warheads will prove unrealistic, but, for the time being, it is our only method of trying to both help our Allies to match the Russian nuclear threat and, at the same time, prevent the use of nuclear warheads unless the U.S. concurs. To attempt to go beyond the law and extend the requirement of a U.S. veto over the use of IRBM delivery means by assigning such delivery means to SACEUR control is, to my mind, not only unproductive but also unrealistic and misleading.

4. I agree with you that it would be better, if we could, to assure that all NATO countries' atomic delivery capacities, - whether short-range, medium-range or long-range, and whether by aircraft or by missile - would be completely dedicated to NATO and SACEUR control. I also believe it would be nice if we could make information available to a NATO research and productive group that would be sealed off from national minds and interests, but this is impossible. We cannot furnish information - even through a NATO governmental and industrial group - with any practical assurance that such know-how and productive capability will not be available to the nations involved for use under their national hats.

5. I do not believe the record of the December, 1957, meeting indicates U.S. commitment to support production of common research and production in advanced weapons, including specifically IRBMs, was in any way linked to SACEUR control. This discussion came out in a different context and at a different time from the discussion of U.S. furnishing IRBMs under SACEUR control. The conditions under which the U.S. provides military equipment under grant aid are quite different from the conditions which have been traditionally followed in the U.K., France and Italy, in the manufacture of military equipment, airplanes, etc. by their own production facilities and financed by their own budgets. All that we have ever asked for - and that is being asked for now - in the numerous data-exchange agreements and other steps toward avoiding duplication of research and development is that the U.S. have a crack at new things developed, and that priority be given to equipping NATO with the end products, and a veto on sales to non-NATO countries be maintained by the U.S. in cases where it has provided significant assistance.

6. SACEUR's military requirements for several hundred IRBMs, beginning at the end of the 1963 period, although not directly listed in MC-70, are part and parcel of SACEUR's high priority urgent military requirements. As late as the 13th of October, SHAPE has submitted to the Standing Group its statement of military requirement for ACE mid-range ballistic weapons system. General Norstad has made it clear on many occasions that, particularly as NATO's atom-carrying mid-range aircraft become technologically obsolete, there is a top military requirement to replace them with IRBMs to take over an increasing number of targets.

7. This requirement is as much a part of the shield as it is a part of the deterrent. SHAPE's mission is not only to provide the shield of atomic armed ground forces, but also to contribute to the deterrent. Looking well into the future, SACEUR has pointed out that, eventually, hundreds of IRBMs, based in NATO countries, will be a military requirement of the highest order. There is thus no choice between IRBMs and MC-70 requirements. SACEUR needs both, and has said that IRBM deserves high priority.

8. To sum up, I believe that the tactic of constantly postponing a hard decision may be good politically and diplomatically speaking in many cases. We have been trying in this problem to find a solution that would permit us to have our cake (modern defense) and eat it (no NATO national delivery capability), too. But, in my opinion, no decision is as bad from the point of view of U.S. and NATO as an adverse decision, because, from the point of view of the Russian, each day of delay in getting started can only strengthen his relative defense position.

I am attaching copies of this memorandum for Randy, Jack Tuthill and Joe Wolf, but, in view of the personal nature of this exchange, I leave it to your judgment as to whether you care to pass them on.

(Signed) John Haskell

John Haskell.

cc.: Ambassador Burgess ✓  
Hon. John W. Tuthill,  
Director, Office of European Regional Affairs  
Mr. Joseph J. Wolf

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S  
11/16/59

# Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 4, 1959

SUBJECT: NATO Matters

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary  
General Norstad  
G - Mr. Merchant  
RA - Mr. Fessenden

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 11652: XGDS 1 2 3 4

Authorized By: H. D. Brewster

August 4, 1975

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Amembassy Paris (for Embassy and USRO)

The Secretary and General Norstad discussed a number of outstanding NATO matters.

1. Western Summit and Its Relation to NATO Meeting - General Norstad stressed the importance which the majority of NATO countries appear to attach to the Spaak plan for "surrounding" the Western Summit with the NAC Ministerial meeting. He emphasized that the views of the other countries are strongly colored by their opposition to French efforts to establish a tripartite group within NATO. Therefore, our opposition to the Spaak plan and our association with the French on this issue are causing us considerable embarrassment with our other NATO Allies. General Norstad also stressed that General de Gaulle's position on NATO matters remains as adamant as ever; the President's views visit seems to have had no effect on his position on substantive matters, but only to have improved the atmosphere somewhat. It is clear that we alone will not be able to alter de Gaulle's position on NATO matters. We, however, with all the other members of NATO together may have some chance of influencing his position. For this reason, it is important that we not be in a position where we seem to be siding with the French against the other members of NATO.

General Norstad said that he had discussed with the President briefly the question of the relation of the Western Summit to the NAC meeting. He said that the President had indicated to him the possibility that he might make a brief appearance before the NAC Ministerial meeting, similar to his appearance before the Permanent Council last September.

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The Secretary commented that it would, of course, be important not to indicate to any of the other Governments that the President might make such an appearance, since it could only increase pressures for all NATO Heads of Government to come to Paris. The Secretary also commented that the Spaak proposal for "surrounding" the Western Summit presented really insuperable practical difficulties for him since he simply would not be able to attend a NAC meeting which took place immediately before the Western Summit.

It was generally agreed, however, that some formula should be possible which would take into account the practical difficulties in meeting immediately before the December 19 Western Summit and at the same time provide for a report to the NAC afterwards which would meet the desires of the majority.

2. Possible Reductions in United States NATO-committed Forces - General Norstad reported that he had discussed this question with both Secretary McElroy and the President. Secretary McElroy had made clear that the budget situation was most serious and had indicated that cuts in United States Air Force units appeared necessary. The Secretary confirmed that Secretary McElroy had told him the day before that he was still thinking in terms of eliminating fourteen USAF squadrons committed to NATO.

General Norstad said, however, that he was completely reassured after talking with the President. The President had been most emphatic in stating his belief that the European countries could and should bear a larger share of the defense burden. He had also said, however, that there was to be no reduction in United States forces until there was a real basis for doing so. The President had emphasized that the British, French and Germans were all capable of doing more, and General Norstad had agreed with the President, saying that much of his own time and effort was devoted to inducing the Europeans to increase their defense efforts. He had added, however, that nothing would be less likely to bring about this result than for the United States to reduce its own forces. Such action by the United States would mean that he, General Norstad, and all other Americans would never again be able to speak with any authority in trying to persuade the Europeans to do more.

The Secretary said that General Norstad's comment on his talk with the President was reassuring. He had had himself a somewhat reassuring conversation with the President last Monday. The Secretary commented that the President's thinking was apparently partly affected by the fact that in 1951 he had made a statement that, if NATO were successful, United States forces might be withdrawn within five years.

General Norstad emphasized that the State position on this issue was crucial and urged that Secretary Herter emphasize particularly the effect on our negotiating position of any United States reductions.

General Norstad also commented that we should take account of the fact that the European countries are in fact making some progress in increasing their defense efforts. Italy has agreed to increase its defense budget 4 per cent of GNP per year for five years. The Belgians have <sup>under</sup> taken a commitment to increase their defense spending 11 per cent. The Danish Government, with which he has

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been consulting closely, is also seeking to increase its effort. There are also signs that the United Kingdom may be putting more emphasis on NATO forces. It was reassuring that they agreed to keep their troop level in Germany at 55,000 for this year at any rate.

The Secretary commented that the British seem to be interested in over-all planning with the United States on the most effective use of our respective defense resources.

The Secretary commented that the Defense Department has recently worked up figures showing the savings if two Army divisions are brought home and maintained in the United States. The figures show that approximately \$265 million would be saved by eliminating the Air Force squadrons. The cost of maintaining the divisions in the United States instead of Europe was found to be roughly the same.

is small

General Norstad commented that the \$265 million saving involved in eliminating the fourteen squadrons in terms of the over-all Defense budget. This small saving should be weighed against the disastrous effects of this action on the defense posture of the Alliance and our negotiating position with the Soviets.

3. Multi-lateral Authority over the Use of Atomic Weapons - General Norstad said he feels a new step may be necessary by which we would in effect cede nuclear weapons to NATO, perhaps a given number for a given period of time. This would in effect be a further development of the present NATO atomic stockpile concept. This might be possible without a change in the Atomic Energy Act, since it would be possible to work out arrangements whereby Americans would have actual custody of the weapons. He indicated that he had discussed this subject with Mr. McCone, who had indicated willingness to seek to change the law if this were necessary.

4. Second Generation ICBM's - General Norstad said that SHAPE had been giving much serious consideration recently to the role of "mid-range" missiles stationed in the European NATO area. SHAPE was coming more and more to the view that stationing a relatively large number of such weapons with ranges between 300 and 1500 miles was perhaps the best way to close the over-all missile gap with the Soviets. Such "mid-range" weapons have certain very important advantages over the bigger ICBM's. Because of the angle of their trajectory, their probable error was much less. They were smaller, simpler, and more mobile, and their lesser cost meant that more of them could be made available. This program, therefore, was assuming increasing importance in General Norstad's thinking. He felt that our contributions should be limited to making the Polaris missile itself available (cost approximately \$750,000 each) plus certain associated equipment produced in the United States, making the United States contribution of somewhere between \$1 and \$1.5 million per missile. Our contribution should be limited strictly to this, with the Europeans called upon to do all the rest. One advantage to this proposal is that everything provided by the United States would be acquired through dollars spent in this country. In reply to Mr. Merchant's question about the impact of this on the other requirements under the Military

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Assistance Program (MAP), General Norstad said that he felt a sum of \$100,000,000 or slightly more, spread over a period of several years, would not be too serious in its annual impact on MAP.

5. Military Assistance Program (MAP) - General Norstad said that we simply cannot continue to cut the MAP as drastically as it has been cut this year. If such drastic reductions continue for Turkey and Greece, for example, the effect will be most serious on our whole relationship with these two countries. Other NATO countries, such as the Dutch, will also be in very serious trouble. News of the greatly reduced MAP for FY 60 is beginning to leak out to the NATO countries already, and the effect can be most serious, as serious as the effect of reductions in United States forces. General Norstad felt that it was essential that the Administration make in the near future a general announcement to the effect that the MAP presently available is wholly inadequate and that a much larger program for next year is essential.

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
UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
(USRO)

Office of the Defense Advisor

2 RUE ST. FLORENTIN  
PARIS 1. FRANCE

In Reply Refer to  
D-13,515/9

6 November 1959



Dear Mr. Burgess:

The attached copy of a letter by Mr. Fiske to Mr. Irwin on the subject of NATO IRBMs is being sent to you at Mr. Fiske's request.

With Mr. Fiske's permission we are also sending a copy to General Norstad.

From all we have heard your trip has been most successful and very beneficial to the cause. We are all looking forward to seeing you again in the near future.

Sincerely,

*Rufus E. Rose*

RUFUS E. ROSE  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Deputy Defense Advisor

1 Incl - a/s

The Honorable W. Randolph Burgess  
U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO  
c/o The Honorable John W. Tuthill  
Director, Office of European Regional Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

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C O P Y

5 November 1959

Honorable John M. Irwin, II  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (IBA)  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear John:

As you may have learned I was laid-up for awhile immediately following my return from the United States and, therefore, have not until now had the opportunity to make good my undertaking to write you a note summarizing the points which I mentioned in our discussions. I am at the same time remiss in not having previously thanked you for being so generous with your time and hospitality and providing me the opportunity to be filled in on so many of the overriding considerations affecting the Defense and State Departments standpoints, the proposed cooperative production of IRMs in Europe.

In the hope that a summary of the points may still serve a useful purpose I would again like to emphasize the following matters:

1. The anticipated reduction in U.S. funds for NATO military purposes will greatly increase the importance of developing European resources for weapons production. In a Washington dispatch dated 29 October to the Paris Herald Tribune, Marguerite Higgins discussed this point in some detail.

2. SACMIR has indicated requirements for 1963 of ballistic missiles of up to 1500 mile range. From discussions in Washington it seems quite clear that to meet such a requirement the land based phase of the POLARIS missile appears to be the only practicable solution.

3. Missiles to meet SACMIR requirements can come from three sources:

- a. U.S. - out of funds increasingly inadequate for overall NATO defense requirements.
- b. European financed production.
- c. A combination of U.S. and European production.

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4. The proposal outlined in the Memorandum summarizing our 5 October meeting in the French Ministry (of which I enclose another copy) suggests a concrete approach to a solution of this problem, subject (among other things) to negotiation of figures involved and terms of deployment. Contrary to previous proposals, this deals with helping to meet SACEUR's first order of requirements, with the program of developing longer-range missiles deferred until this objective is underway. The possibility of delivering missiles to SACEUR over a term of several years makes European production a source worth exploring.

a. The program would be carried out under NATO auspices, with participation of other nations interested and qualified.

b. I understand that a substantial sum allocated in the French budget for missile development is available for this program.

5. If realistic approaches to SACEUR's mid-1960 needs are in fact to be met under the conditions outlined, the possibilities of this program must be explored without delay.

a. In one form or other the problem of U.S. assistance for European missile production has been under discussion for over a year.

b. If France is not soon assured of U.S. willingness to implement President Eisenhower's offer of assistance (as confirmed by Mr. Holaday a year ago), I am convinced it will appropriate funds available for this NATO-sponsored program toward its national requirements. In such a case, the possibility of French participation in an European production to meet NATO requirements will be remote.

c. Funds devoted to developing French national missile needs will certainly be diverted from France's contribution to overall NATO requirements.

6. In the light of the foregoing I would like to make the following recommendations:

a. The U.S. agrees:


(1) To supply now to the existing French, German and U.K. Working Group adequate information to determine their financial capacity to participate in an European production program, and

(2) Later to supply information needed to establish common production, on terms to be worked out, if it develops that adequate European financing is available.

b. The Standing Group expedite its determination of basic military requirements in terms of:

(1) Number of missiles.

(2) Type and number of launching sites required.



901102-586

c. Possible German and U.K. participation be explored through both NATO and U.S. diplomatic circles.

7. While I have not, since my return, had an opportunity to discuss this matter further with General Lavand and his associates I have been advised that they now consider that the next move in this matter is up to the United States.

In view of the very long time that U.S. assistance for a European program has been under consideration, I earnestly urge an early decision, at least to make available the information referred to, and would especially urge that it be communicated to the Defense Department representatives over here as far in advance of the Foreign Ministers Meetings set for mid-December, as possible, if there is any thought of taking advantage of the opportunity to explore the matter in discussions at that time.

I am grateful for the interest and support which you have shown in this project and hope that we may see some tangible progress very soon.

With kind regards.

Sincerely,

/s/

R. B. FINE

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11/10/59  
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Issues of U. S. Policy Regarding  
the Defense Posture of NATO

- REFERENCES: A. NSC 5433/1  
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject:  
"North Atlantic Treaty Organization", dated  
January 22, 1957  
C. NSC Action No. 2017  
D. NIE 20-58; NIE 100-59  
E. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject:  
"Long-Range NATO and Related European Regional  
Problems", dated March 11 and 23, 1959  
F. NSC 5906/1  
G. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject:  
"Issues of U. S. Policy Regarding the Defense  
Posture of NATO", dated November 5, 1959

The enclosed revised Discussion Paper on the subject, prepared by the Department of State as a substitute for the enclosure to Reference G, is transmitted herewith for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on Wednesday, November 11, 1959.

The revised Discussion Paper takes into account NSC Planning Board discussion of the Discussion Paper transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 5, 1959.



*James S. Lay, Jr.*  
JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Executive Secretary

- cc: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

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## ISSUES OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING THE DEFENSE POSTURE OF NATO

### I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of the military posture that should be sought for NATO during the 1960's has become particularly urgent for the U. S. Government in recent months. This has been due to the growing recognition that the U. S. balance of payments deficit and budgetary considerations confront the U. S. Government with difficult decisions on the levels of U. S. forces and military aid for NATO. Since such decisions can affect fundamentally the future of NATO and therefore of East-West relations, it is important at this time that we reappraise the Soviet threat to NATO, the NATO military posture required to counter this threat, and the consequences of alternative U. S. courses of action for NATO and for the Western posture vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. in prospective negotiations.

During the past year, attention has been focused on the U. S. balance of payments deficit, which is resulting in a substantial reduction of U. S. gold reserves and the acquisition of gold and dollar holdings by certain Western European countries. The U. S. might attempt to correct this deficit by means of trade and financial policies, by reduction of U. S. forces abroad, by changes in aid policies, or by some combination of these approaches. Since 40 to 45 per cent of U. S. expenditures entering the balance of payments for U. S. forces abroad derives from the U. S. forces stationed in Europe (\$1.2 billion estimated for FY 1959), a major portion of which are committed to NATO, the question arises as to whether it would be feasible to withdraw any of the U. S. NATO forces from Europe in the near future. It may be that such a withdrawal would also be indicated by the limitations imposed on the Department of Defense budget for FY 1961. The possibility of further reductions in U. S. military aid to Europe in FY 1961 is raised by U. S. budgetary considerations, and to a much lesser extent by the balance of payment deficit.

It is recognized that decisions on these questions must be made on the basis of judgments regarding the total level of resources available to the U. S. Government and the relative priorities for utilization of these resources domestically and in other areas abroad as well as for NATO. However, it is believed that such broader judgments should be facilitated by consideration of the key policy issues regarding NATO's defense posture. This paper attempts to define the relevant issues of U. S. political-military policy toward NATO,\* and to evaluate alternative courses of action with respect to these issues.

\* There are a number of other basic issues of U. S. policy toward NATO and Western Europe which are not presented in this paper.



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C. What should be the U. S. military contribution to the NATO Shield?

1. Basic assumptions regarding the U. S. role.

(a) U. S. military forces in Europe. An essential element of the NATO Shield strategy is the continued presence in Europe of sufficient U. S. forces to demonstrate U. S. determination to help defend Western Europe. Without such evidence of U. S. intentions, the NATO Shield deterrent would have little validity in European eyes.

The President in 1955 stated publicly that the U. S. would "continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while the threat to the area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area." The U. S. advocacy of MC 70, and our formal acceptance of this plan in 1958, has undoubtedly been interpreted by our European Allies to mean that the U. S. considers the U. S. force goals specified in MC 70 as its "fair share" contribution of forces to the NATO Shield for the period covered by MC 70.

However, the continuing commitment expressed by the President can hardly be construed to mean that the U. S. must maintain indefinitely the present magnitude of its NATO forces in Europe. It is only logical that, as the defense potential of NATO Europe increases, these countries should meet a larger portion of the Shield force requirements and the U. S. should be enabled to reduce its contribution. Nevertheless, the President's 1955 statement is probably taken by our European allies to mean that the U. S. would alter the combat strength of U. S. forces deployed in accordance with agreed NATO Shield requirements only as justified by modified NATO defense plans.

(b) U. S. military aid. At the inception of NATO, it was recognized that a "fair share" contribution by the U. S. to achievement of an effective Shield force would also require substantial U. S. military aid to NATO Europe. In view of the increased complexity of weapons technology and because of the magnitude of the over-all military requirements, the provision of substantial U. S. military aid continues to be an essential element of the U. S. role.

2. Could the U. S. objective of an effective NATO Shield force be achieved while reducing the U. S. force contributions and/or military aid?

(a) Short-term possibilities. NATO Europe as a whole has greatly increased its defense contribution since the inception of NATO, and should be able to accelerate its defense build-up further. Germany and the UK have for some time been independent of U. S. military aid for their NATO forces, and certain other countries have been obtaining an

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increasing portion of their military equipment requirements through procurement in Europe or the U. S. rather than through grant military aid.

However, the extent to which NATO Europe (or the U. S.) can reasonably be expected to increase its defense expenditures within a given time period is determined by political as well as by economic considerations. The present per capita GNP and consumption in NATO Europe is less than one-half that in the U. S. and yet the level of taxation is higher. These facts impose limitations on the possibilities for major increases in Western European defense expenditures over the short run.

At the end of 1958 the NATO Military Committee reported to the North Atlantic Council that "unless present unfavorable trends in the building up of NATO forces and support structure are corrected," . . . "the military security of the NATO area will (by 1961) be in serious jeopardy . . .". Some progress has been made during 1959, notably in arrangements for deployment of nuclear-capable weapons and in increased defense expenditures by certain European NATO Governments; but major shortfalls still remain. It is believed, however, that the European NATO countries have the capability of making substantial progress toward their MC 70 goals if they are assisted by a continuation of U. S. military aid to NATO at the average delivery level of recent years, along the lines recommended by the Draper Committee. This would mean that future appropriations for MAP would have to exceed the annual average of the seriously reduced levels of the last three fiscal years.

Given the shortfalls to be overcome by the European NATO governments in the build-ups of their own Shield forces, it would not be possible in the near future to reapportion national force contributions to the NATO Shield, so as to permit a reduction of the U. S. forces committed to NATO, without revising MC 70 requirements downward. In the absence of a convincing rationale for a reduction of MC 70 requirements, the initiation in the near future of a reapportionment of force contributions would be likely to call the entire Shield effort and strategy into question. It might be possible in due course to revise particular MC 70 requirements somewhat without repudiating the Shield strategy. However, this would be a delicate task at best, and it should be weighed against the consideration that adherence to an agreed force requirements plan is essential as a stimulus to maximum defense effort by the European NATO countries. Moreover, although the substantial achievement of MC 70 goals would require an increased effort on the part of the entire alliance, the increase required is within the capability of the U. S. and Western Europe. If shortfalls from MC 70 goals actually materialize despite maximum effort, they should not be so great as to invalidate the underlying strategic concept. Alternatively, however, if adjustments in MC 70 requirements were to be proposed at this time, in the absence of a military justification therefor, the resultant military requirements might not support the Shield strategy, and the new plan itself would be likely to experience shortfalls in implementation, as do most plans for the accomplishment of particular military objectives. It

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would be far preferable to maintain the strategy and goals of MC 70, even though the forces required may not be provided at 100 per cent standards of readiness, than to jeopardize the credibility of the NATO Shield strategy by reducing the agreed requirements for combat force units.

Nevertheless, it may be that those governments with substantially improved economic positions could, in addition to accelerating their own military programs, help to some extent in the provision of military equipment on a grant basis to NATO countries unable to procure their own requirements. This would help to reduce the need for U. S. military assistance. Moreover, to the extent that the European donor governments were to procure such equipment from the U. S., it would alleviate the U. S. balance of payments problem. This problem might also be alleviated by a somewhat greater European contribution to the financing of NATO infrastructure programs, and by the extension, on a cost-sharing basis, of U. S. logistical support systems in Europe to cover certain requirements of European NATO governments.

The extent of increased European defense efforts would be conditioned basically by the nature of U. S. leadership. The Alliance has in the past proven responsive to positive leadership by the U. S. as its most powerful member. For U. S. policy toward NATO to succeed in the future, it must continue to be positive in nature, leading the Europeans at a politically realistic rate to greater effort by its own example.

(b) Longer-term possibilities. When MC 70 goals have been substantially achieved, it should be possible to undertake a reapportionment of national force contributions to the NATO Shield force. The further expansion of Western Europe's economic capacity for defense production and military programs generally should enable the U. S. by 1963 to reduce its force contributions and military aid to NATO. These possibilities would be augmented by continuing U. S. encouragement of, and assistance to, NATO programs for the development and production in Europe of both conventional and advanced weapons.

D. What would be the effects of a reduction in the near future in the combat strength of U. S. NATO-committed forces in Europe?\*

1. On NATO?

The U. S. has taken the lead within NATO in formulating the NATO Political Directive and Strategic Concept, in stressing the great importance of strengthening the NATO Shield, and in exhorting a maximum effort by all to achieve MC 70. Moreover, in accordance with the President's 1955 commitment (see C.1 above), the U. S. has just reaffirmed in the 1959 NATO Annual review that it will maintain its MC 70

\* NIE 100-10-59 - "Special Aspects of the NATO Problem", on this question is in preparation.

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forces in Europe through calendar year 1960, although allowance was made for the possibility of some subsequent adjustments, as in previous years (these have been of a minor nature).

Consequently, an abrupt U. S. reduction in the combat strength of its NATO forces in Europe would be regarded as initiating a major reversal of U. S. policy in the direction of a "Fortress America" concept. It would intensify Western European doubts regarding the firmness of U. S. intentions to defend Europe, tend to destroy their confidence in the NATO Shield, and invite a chain reaction in Western Europe to relax defense efforts. It would also give credence to fears that the U. S. was preparing to settle outstanding East-West issues directly with the U.S.S.R. without regard to the vital interests of our Allies. It would give a strong stimulus to nationalist and anti-NATO attitudes in Europe, particularly those of de Gaulle. The political cohesion of the NATO Alliance would in all probability be seriously threatened.

The recent press reports alleging pending U. S. reductions in Europe have already had a depressing effect on certain European efforts to increase defense budgets and have created grave concern in official West European circles.

## 2. On the Western posture in prospective negotiations with the U.S.S.R.?

Any abrupt U. S. reductions in the combat strength of its NATO-committed forces would, both in itself and through its effect on the defense efforts and political cohesion of other NATO countries, undermine the Western negotiating position in the prospective negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on Berlin and Germany or disarmament. The Soviets would conclude that the relaxation of the NATO defense effort had been brought about by Khrushchev's detente. This would lead them to stiffen their demands on substantive issues while on the other hand fostering the detente atmosphere by continuing to preach peaceful coexistence and disarmament. Furthermore, the effect of significant U. S. reductions on our European allies, especially the French and Germans, would make it far more difficult to develop a unified Western position for negotiation with the Soviets.

On the other hand, the possibility of a reduction of U. S. forces committed to NATO might be used effectively in negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to extract from the Soviets acceptable reciprocal concessions for force limitations in Europe. In preparing for prospective negotiations with the U.S.S.R., consideration is being given to several possible arrangements for reciprocal force reductions and limitations, under adequate safeguards, within variously defined zones in Europe. A clear demonstration of NATO's determination to maintain its defense programs, in the absence of a controlled disarmament agreement with the U.S.S.R., would be indispensable to the successful conclusion of any such arrangement.

11/12/59  
November 12, 1959

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 424th NSC Meeting  
Wednesday, November 11, 1959

Present at the 424th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director (Patterson), Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the meeting were General Thomas D. White for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director (Washburn), U.S. Information Agency; the U.S. Ambassador to NATO (Burgess); the Under Secretary of State (Dillon); the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gates); the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant); Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Security Operations Coordination, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY


Mr. Dulles reported that the Sino-Indian border situation had developed to the point where a solution by quiet negotiations might be possible. Indian public opinion, however, had been stirred up by recent Chinese Communist activities along the disputed border and was now more intransigent than the Indian Government.

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
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Mr. Dulles then warned that events in Poland should be watched carefully. Gomulka had recently changed the economic organization of the country by bringing in officials who in the past had been confirmed Stalinists. As a result, a more rigid and Communist-type organization would probably obtain in economic matters; whether the political sector would be similarly affected remained to be seen. In any event, Poland will continue to have serious economic problems, including a serious food shortage. For the present, the Gomulka government will continue to control the country without definitely committing itself to the Moscow line.

Mr. Dulles said he would mention the situation in Cyprus since a policy paper on that subject was a later item on the agenda. He reported that prospects were bright for a peaceful and successful transition to an independent Cyprus by February 19, 1960. The Constitutional Commission was now working smoothly after breaking a deadlock over the powers of the Turkish Vice President. Some clouds remained on the horizon, however.



The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the Sino-Indian border dispute; developments in the Middle East and Poland; and the Outlook for an Independent Cyprus (NIE 32.5-59).

2. ISSUES OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING THE DEFENSE POSTURE OF NATO (NSC 5433/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "North Atlantic Treaty Organization", dated January 22, 1957; NSC Action No. 2017; NIE 20-58; NIE 100-59; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Long-Range NATO and Related European Regional Problems", dated March 11 and 23, 1959; NSC 5906/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO", dated November 5, 1959)

Mr. Gray said the President had recently indicated that he wanted to have the Council discuss major policy areas from time to time without necessarily attempting to arrive at decisions on specific proposals. In response to an inquiry, the President had agreed that NATO was one of the appropriate policy areas for Council discussion. Accordingly, a Discussion Paper on the defense posture of NATO, prepared by the Department of State, was before the Council this morning. In the interest of getting the subject in front of the Council at the earliest possible time, the Planning Board had agreed to this unilateral submission by State. Mr. Gray then called on Mr. Merchant to summarize the Discussion Paper.

Mr. Merchant said that the Discussion Paper prepared by the Department of State after consideration of the subject by the Planning Board was concerned only with policy issues bearing on the defense posture of NATO. The Paper noted the threat to NATO, discussed the "tip-wire" strategy and the "shield" strategy, took up the U.S. contribution to the NATO Shield, and considered the effects of a reduction in the near future in the combat strength of U.S. NATO-committed forces in Europe. Mr. Merchant felt that our NATO allies, in the light of their improved economic capabilities, could do more than they are doing at the present time. The problem is how to induce them to increase their defense effort, to remedy their own short-falls, and to help the U.S. reduce its contribution to NATO. The Paper before the Council was a discussion of that problem against the background of our own budgetary and balance-of-payments problems. The NATO alliance was in a condition of malaise, as reflected in recent communications regarding the Western Summit Meeting. The causes of this malaise included De Gaulle's attitude and actions, Khrushchev's campaign of sweetness and light, news stories regarding prospective reductions in the U.S. contribution, and the knowledge

that U.S. military aid will be reduced. Mr. Merchant felt that two major considerations were involved in the NATO problem:

- (1) U.S. force commitments for Calendar Year 1960 in relation to the commitments and incentives of our allies;
- (2) The impending negotiations with the USSR on disarmament and Berlin.

Mr. Merchant said the problem was: how can the U.S. effectively exercise leadership without discouraging our allies or causing them to panic? how can the U.S. deal with these matters in a fashion which will not risk dissipating our bargaining position vis-a-vis the USSR? In his view, earnest consideration should be given to reducing U.S. combat forces committed to NATO only in return for Soviet force reductions or withdrawals in Central Europe. Finally, Mr. Merchant noted that the Discussion Paper presented the factors in the NATO problem from the political point of view and that it made no suggestions as to tactics or timing.

Mr. Gray then called on Ambassador Burgess, who said he would make a few remarks to supplement Mr. Merchant's exposition. The Annual Review of NATO force goals, just completed, showed that NATO had made substantial progress in the last year toward achieving its force goals. The German build-up was going forward steadily, although non-commissioned officers were still a limiting factor; German expenditures for defense were rising rapidly; Italian expenditures for defense were increasing at a rate of about four per cent a year; Belgium's defense expenditures had risen some; and it was hoped that Danish expenditures would go up. Progress was being made in connection with training, coordination, and infra-structure. Weapons research was moving ahead promisingly. Mr. Burgess noted that U.S. aid had already been reduced substantially. In his opinion the cuts were too drastic. The U.K. and Germany were on a cash basis; i.e., they were receiving no military or economic aid, and France was practically on a cash basis. In fact, in the European area U.S. aid was going to "the under-developed countries of Europe" - Greece, Turkey and Scandinavia. The European Gross National Product had doubled per capita in the last ten years, but was still only one-half to one-third of the U.S. GNP. A study of European tax rates would show that the European tax burden was heavier than ours. Ambassador Burgess felt that the NATO goals were not completely out of reach; that with some effort on the part of the Europeans and some participation on the part of the U.S., the alliance could come close to achieving its goals. Manpower problems remained serious however. Twelve German divisions were needed and two French divisions should be returned from Algeria at the earliest possible moment; indeed the Algerian conflict should be resolved. In order for NATO goals to be fully achieved, U.S. assistance at the rate

of \$2 billion a year for two years would be required. Action was being taken to induce the European countries to make more rapid progress toward NATO goals; we were attempting to "apply the heat." This, however, was a slow and difficult process. With respect to our balance-of-payments and budgetary problems, we had proposed a number of things the European countries might do, e.g., expanded trade, tourist expenditures, more European aid to underdeveloped countries. It would be necessary for us to select which of these various proposals we were most interested in; the European countries could not attempt them all.

Secretary Herter said he wished to call attention to two facets of the NATO problem:

(1) The concept of the Sword and the Shield appeared to be a generally acceptable concept.

(2) The psychological impact of a withdrawal of U.S. forces and a shift of the burden to European countries would be tremendous. The psychological impact of anything we did with respect to NATO was very important and must be watched with great care.

Secretary Herter then asked whether Mr. Dulles would be willing to summarize the recent Special National Intelligence Estimate on "Special Aspects of the NATO Problem" (SNIE 100-10-59).

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the SNIE was limited to the probable impact of a substantial unilateral reduction within the near future of US NATO forces in the European area on: (a) the political attitudes and defense policies of European NATO members and (b) the overall Western negotiating position on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament. The Estimate was unanimously agreed on by the intelligence community except for Air Force reservations on two points. The Estimate concluded that:

(1) Any substantial unilateral reduction of US NATO forces in Europe within the next few months would be regarded as an abrupt withdrawal from firm commitments to NATO.

(2) Diplomatic preparation could mitigate the bad effects of a unilateral US reduction.

(3) In any event, a U.S. decision to reduce its forces in Europe substantially would be widely interpreted as reflecting growing US preoccupation with domestic economic concerns and a decreased sense of urgency about European security.

(4) A substantial unilateral reduction in US forces would reduce popular willingness in Europe to support contributions to NATO

at their present level and would intensify the underlying strains in the alliance, although not leading to a major split.

(5) A substantial and unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe at this time would weaken the Western bargaining position on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament.

Secretary Anderson said that outstanding in the Discussion Paper was the argument that MC-70 goals require the U.S. to increase rather than decrease aid to NATO in order to hold the alliance together. He felt that no one had supported NATO more strongly than he, but wished to point out that the argument in the Paper was based on certain questionable hypotheses such as: (1) the Soviet threat to NATO has increased; (2) MC-70 is a bare minimum; (3) the Europeans feel we are committed to provide armed forces over a period of some years; (4) Europeans do not have the capability to make progress on MC-70 goals unless we increase our aid; and (5) the withdrawal of U.S. forces would threaten the political cohesion of the alliance.

Over the years, Secretary Anderson continued, it had been agreed in this government that at some time U.S. forces committed to NATO would have to be reduced, but no time seemed to be a good time for this reduction to take place. Some event always stood in the way, e.g. trouble in France, an election in the U.K., or the prospect that Germany would join NATO. It was also generally agreed that there could be no limited war in Europe; if this were so, one might question the size of the Shield. Our allies had indicated an unwillingness to meet MC-70 goals so that we constantly have to "prod" them. If the Europeans believed MC-70 to be essential to their security, we would not have to prod. Secretary Anderson was also worried about the implications in the Paper that we are committed for years to come. He did not wish to weaken Free World security or the cohesion of the alliance, but he asked the Council to remember that every European country has been preoccupied with its own problems constantly, so that the U.S. should not worry overmuch about being preoccupied with its own problems. Balance-of-payments and budgetary problems were troublesome things with which the U.S. could not compromise, and the satisfactory solution of such problems was just as vital to the world as it was to the U.S.

The President felt that there had been too much talk about reduction of U.S. forces committed to NATO. For years we had talked about making our allies see the problem as we see it. When he was first assigned to SHAPE in 1951, he was told by President Truman that the commitment of U.S. forces to Europe was an emergency measure to induce a rise in European morale and to provide land forces to help meet an aggression in Europe. The President had recently been



told that, although he went all over Europe in 1951 representing our commitment of forces to NATO as an emergency measure, no U.S. political authority had ever emphasized the emergency character of the mission. Consequently, the U.S. had maneuvered itself into a greater position of responsibility than was necessary. The President felt we should not ever admit that the 220 million people of Europe could not provide the ground forces necessary for their defense. Nevertheless, we should not talk about reducing our forces committed to NATO until we are able to educate our allies as to the facts of life. When we talk of U.S. troop redeployment, everyone misinterprets our meaning. We must make a political effort to let the people of Europe see that we want to be fair. At present we are bearing a large share of the infra-structure cost, we are bearing almost all the cost of the deterrent, and we are maintaining a large navy to keep the seas free. The President noted incidentally in this connection that Khrushchev was inclined to laugh at the U.S. for having a surface navy, and had recently cancelled construction of some Soviet cruisers even though such construction was rather far advanced. This government, the President continued, must decide what is needed in NATO and must obtain the political agreement of our allies. If responsibility for defending the world is to be imposed upon us, then perhaps we had better rule the world; he was tired of having the whole defense burden placed on U.S. shoulders. In connection with the GNP which had been mentioned a while ago, he would like to say that our GNP was composed of some things we needed no more than a dog needs two tails. The fact is, we are putting money into elements of common defense, such as the deterrent, that our allies must be brought to appreciate. However, nothing could be more fatal than to withdraw our troops from Europe or to say we are about to withdraw them. It was high time that the thinking of Europe was reoriented and made more realistic before the NATO situation is further crystallized; it was high time that the population of Europe did its part with respect to ground forces. However, the U.S. could not initiate a definite scheme for the reduction of U.S. forces, and in the absence of agreement by Europe, say this and only this is what we are going to do.

Mr. Gray said that in its discussion of the subject, the Planning Board had raised some questions about various sections of the Discussion Paper. The Paper, for example, indicated that the Soviet threat to NATO had broadened and increased since 1949.

The President, interrupting, asked Mr. Gray to record one minority vote against that view.

Mr. Gray, resuming his briefing, said that the Planning Board had raised the following questions:

(1) Even though Soviet capabilities have increased since 1959, are not NATO military capabilities also greater?

(2) Isn't it true that Soviet intentions are less threatening than in 1949?

(3) Are all forces committed to MC-70 really necessary to an effective Shield strategy? For example, does every NATO nation have to have army, navy and air forces? Are NATO nations maintaining in Europe national forces which are not part of MC-70 and which could be reduced to help meet MC-70?

(4) Is it true that the U.K. and French Governments maintain that they must have independent nuclear deterrent forces to offset doubts that the U.S. strategic forces would respond to a Soviet offensive in force against Europe?

(5) Is the U.S. morally committed to support MC-70 strategy through 1963?

Mr. Herter said that prior to the adoption of MC-70 goals of 30 divisions by 1963, the force goals for NATO had been 70 divisions. Accordingly, MC-70 was supposed to represent a real reduction in NATO forces. The U.S. was committed to MC-70 to the extent that it took the lead in 1957 to get each NATO country to do its proportionate share in MC-70. The Annual Review provided for under MC-70 is an opportunity for a revision of MC-70, but in the minds of the Europeans we are committed to MC-70 goals to be achieved by 1963.

Mr. Gray asked whether the U.S. must keep 5½ divisions in Europe through 1963. Mr. Herter said the number of divisions we must keep in Europe was a military question which he would not attempt to decide. He could only speak from the psychological point of view; but from that point of view we were committed in the minds of the Europeans.

The President believed that any changes in our commitment to NATO should not be taken up in connection with the Annual Review, but should be agreed to by the NATO Governments in bilateral negotiations. The President asked the Council to look at the 1914-1939 forces maintained in Europe. Western Germany appeared to be having difficulty in raising 12 divisions, but it had had no difficulty in raising a great many more divisions than twelve before World War II. The President thought we would be in bad shape if we did not get a better understanding of our duties and responsibilities on the part of the European countries.

Secretary Herter said the news of our preoccupation with certain economic matters had produced tremendous repercussions in Europe. The Europeans had begun to think of our budgetary and balance-of-payments problems very seriously. The Secretary also felt that before we approached European governments about reducing our forces committed to NATO we should have an understanding with General Norstad, who had worked his heart out on the problem. Any proposal to reduce U.S. forces would mean a new military assessment by all our allies.

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The President felt that a new military assessment was not the gist of the problem. In his view we would not be much stronger or weaker than MC-70. He was arguing that Europe had never done its full duty in connection with NATO.

Secretary Herter said that General Norstad had suggested a "thin-out" of NATO forces, but with a compensatory Russian "thin-out". This suggestion presented difficulties, however, because Germany was fearful of being pushed to the East; any feeling that we are weakening NATO automatically makes Germany uneasy. The President said we were not talking about reducing forces or about withdrawing forces, but about getting the NATO governments to understand our problems. He remarked incidentally that the late Secretary Dulles had always been reluctant to approach the NATO governments with this problem. Moreover, the President continued, he saw no reason why the U.S. should apologize for being preoccupied with its financial situation. The European countries were constantly preoccupied with their own problems and were inclined to say "If you won't, we won't." He liked the suggestion that the Germans might do more. However, this idea would probably be unpopular in Europe, which had been obsessed with the idea that Germany should not have too many armed forces. The French had always been afraid of the German forces; when he was at SHAPE, he had had to go to the French and say "Who is your enemy -Germany or Russia?" The French had never given him a satisfactory reply. The President did not believe that we could possibly take the FY 1961 budget for NATO and reduce it in any way. This, he added, was a blow to him, because he had thought that the Europeans would volunteer to assist us in the light of our budgetary and balance-of-payments problems.

Mr. Gray remarked that the Council had been dealing with matters within the purview of the Department of Defense, but had not yet given Secretary McElroy an opportunity to speak.

Secretary McElroy said that he and his associates had devoted a great deal of thought to the question of the budget. All their work on the FY 1961 military budget made it apparent that if we are to have forces with modern weapons, we must reduce the numerical strength of those forces. It would be possible to increase military expenditures if the national interest required, but a level budget of about \$41 billion would not permit the purchase of modern hardware. Our overseas deployments were an extravagant use of forces compared to the possibility of maintaining our forces in the U. S. Secretary McElroy agreed that a discussion with our NATO partners was needed, but care must be taken to see that such a discussion was not interpreted as a U.S. opinion that the threat had decreased. In his view, in the future, the threat of aggression would be more serious in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East than in Europe. Only the U.S. and the U.K. would be able to oppose aggression in Southeast Asia, for example, and the U.K. was being coy about that. He would not reduce the U.S. overall effort in behalf

of the Free World, but he would be inclined to recognize a shift in the threat away from Europe and toward regions where our allies cannot carry a share of the burden. What, then, should the U. S. continue to contribute to the defense of the NATO countries?

Secretary McElroy felt that our number one contribution to NATO should be the maintenance of our deterrent nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.K. would be able to help us repel local aggression, but would be increasingly unable to help with the deterrent. Our second contribution to the defense of NATO should be an adequate number of troops in Europe - say two divisions - to establish the fact that the U.S. is committed to use its deterrent forces in the event of an attack on the ground in Europe. Secretary McElroy supported the views of the Secretary of State and the President that the present was no time to state that we will reduce our ground forces in Europe. To do so would lead the Europeans to feel that we were reneging on our commitments and would throw away our bargaining position vis-a-vis the USSR. The President could decide on a reduction of our forces committed to NATO, as well as on the creation of a political climate to make reduction possible, without engendering the feeling that we were running away from our responsibilities. This could be accomplished affirmatively without a sacrifice of the Sword or the Shield. On the ground, we should work toward the understanding that Germany, France, and others might each put up another division. Secretary McElroy asked whether General White wished to say anything. General White said he had nothing to add.

Mr. Stans said that the requirements of our NATO forces were a significant budgetary demand but only one among many such demands. He wished to present two sets of figures which had a bearing on the NATO problem. At the present time we had 700,000 men and dependents in the NATO countries, in Spain and in Morocco. The cost of this deployment was \$2½ billion exclusive of construction, pipeline, large equipment, back-up in the U.S., and \$900 million in assistance for NATO. This figure had a \$1,200,000,000 effect on the balance-of-payments. The total cost of our NATO commitment was \$4 billion a year, not including the cost of the Sixth Fleet. Mr. Stans said that the possibility of balancing the FY 1960 budget had now disappeared. A \$1 billion deficit was in prospect and a miracle would be required to bring the budget back into balance. Moreover, the FY 1961 budget will have built-in increases over the FY 1960 budget of about \$2-\$2½ billion. Mr. Stans' second set of figures referred to the savings which could be achieved by eliminating or deploying U.S. divisions now in Europe. \$400 million would be saved the first year and possibly more thereafter by eliminating two U.S. divisions now in Europe. \$200 million would be saved the first year by redeploying to the U.S. two U.S. divisions now in Europe. Mr. Stans concluded that the cost versus the benefits of various levels of strength of U.S. forces committed

to Europe should be compared. Moreover, he believed the arguments presented in the State Department Discussion Paper against the "trip-wire" strategy were not particularly strong. If the arguments against the "trip-wire" strategy are not strong, are the alternative strategies worth what they cost? Referring to the assertion that the tax burden is higher in Europe, Mr. Stans pointed out that governmental expenditures of the European countries are devoted to considerable extent to "cradle to the grave" social benefits and state socialism. The U.S. devotes 60 per cent of its budget to defense as against 30 per cent for its NATO allies. Ten and one-half per cent of the U.S. GNP is devoted to defense against five per cent of the NATO countries' GNP. Mr. Stans felt that if the Council endorsed the conclusions of the State Department Discussion Paper, such endorsement would amount to a budgetary decision which would affect the budgets for Fiscal Years 1961, 1962 and 1963. He associated himself with the points made by the Secretary of Treasury and the questions posed by Mr. Gray, and agreed with Secretary McElroy's suggestions. Finally, Mr. Stans remarked that political and economic considerations govern the amount of money the European countries are willing to spend for defense; our defense expenditures should also be governed by political and economic considerations.

Secretary McElroy asked whether Mr. Stans' figures meant that in order to save \$4 billion or even \$2½ billion all our forces committed to NATO would have to be eliminated. Mr. Stans replied in the affirmative.

The President asked what effect the elimination or redeployment of troops would have on the balance-of-payments.

Secretary McElroy said the variables were so enormous that any estimate was really a guess, but in his view a reduction of three U.S. divisions committed to NATO would give us a \$300 million "pick-up" in the balance-of-payments. Mr. Stans agreed with this estimate.

Secretary Anderson asked whether it would be practicable to modify our dependents policy if it were decided not to reduce U.S. forces committed to NATO.

Secretary McElroy said the dependents policy was being carefully examined, but it should be remembered that if all dependents were brought home, additional cost would be incurred because of the need for more rapid rotation of our forces. He said that if we decided to pursue MC-70 goals without change, then he would take a careful look at our dependents policy; but if redeployment were decided upon, he would wish to keep the present tour of duty in force. Mr. Stans said we had about one dependent overseas for each soldier.

The President said that despite his budgetary anxiety he did not believe that in the NATO field we could make any great move this year, and probably not next year, without losing more than we would gain. However, we must not drift. We should bring our problems to the attention

of Europe more bluntly and clearly, and should perhaps develop a better way of doing so. He was pleased that everyone now believes we ought to do something about our forces committed to NATO. He had been saying for a long time that something should be done, but heretofore had been unable to get anyone else interested.

Secretary Herter said the U.K. was considering our situation and desired to send a mission to the U.S. to talk to the Secretary of Defense about a more effective joint utilization of resources. The President suspected that the British want to be relieved of some of their nuclear expenses. Secretary Herter said that the British were willing to contribute more manpower to joint defense. Apropos of nuclear expenses, the President remarked that General de Gaulle wants to spend a great deal of money in order to produce an insignificant explosion in the Sahara.

Mr. Gray then raised the question of the relationship of the Draper Committee recommendations to NATO. Secretary Herter said he had not covered this question in his remarks because he understood that the Council would be discussing the Mutual Security Program on November 25.

The President said the Draper Committee recommendations could be taken as a Bible if someone were able to suggest how we might reduce expenditures other than those recommended by the Draper Committee, or how we might raise taxes. He would not be a party to financing everything by the issuance of bonds. He felt that the Draper Committee had gone far beyond its charter and should have completed the job by recommending compensatory cuts in the budget.

Ambassador Burgess said that the Draper Report had suggested an increase in military assistance to Europe over actual appropriations, but no increase over the current rate of spending.

Secretary Anderson pointed out in this connection that provision of equipment to foreign countries has as much effect on the budget as the provision of money, but that the balance-of-payments effect of the provision of equipment is not as great.

Secretary McElroy said that 85 per cent of our military assistance did not affect the balance-of-payments.

The President said he would like to see prepared a combined paper indicating how we should approach the NATO countries, what

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our objectives should be, what we would like to emphasize and to de-emphasize. If we could formulate our own policy, we would know how to educate the Europeans.

Mr. Gray said that NSC 5915, "U.S. Policy toward Cyprus", was on the agenda this morning, but that there would not be sufficient time to consider it, inasmuch as a Cabinet meeting was scheduled to begin in five minutes.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject, based upon the Discussion Paper prepared by the Department of State after discussion by the NSC Planning Board (transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 10, 1959), as summarized orally by Deputy Under Secretary of State Merchant; in the light of an oral report by Ambassador Burgess, and an oral summary by the Director of Central Intelligence of SNIE 100-10-59, "Special Aspects of the NATO Problem".

b. Noted the President's request that the Departments of State and Defense prepare for Council consideration a report analyzing and recommending U.S. policy regarding the future roles and contributions of the United States and other NATO nations with respect to the collective defense posture, as a basis for consultation with other NATO governments. The President stated that such a report should provide guidance as to the main factors that should be taken into account, and what aspects should be emphasized or de-emphasized in the future. The President also stressed the importance of recommendations which are plausible to NATO allies as well as sound from the U.S. viewpoint.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate action.

The President decided that there would be no significant cuts in Calendar Year 1960 in the forces committed to NATO for that year, unless agreed to through negotiations.

  
MARION W. BOGGS



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OSD letter, 2/28/79	
By JK	NARS Date 8/13/79

December 2, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
Monday, 16 November 1959, Augusta, Georgia, 8:30 a.m.

Others present: Sec. McElroy  
Mr. Gates  
Gen. Twining  
Mr. Sprague  
Gen. Randall  
Gen. Persons  
Mr. Gordon Gray  
Dr. Kistiakowsky  
Gen. Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy said that Dr. York was ill and unable to make the flight and that Dr. Kistiakowsky had agreed to represent his views. He then reviewed for the President summary figures covering the military budget for FY '61. He said there is a "classified item" (CIA) which has gone up \$75 million and has not been reviewed. The President asked who reviewed the CIA item. Mr. Stans said that the Bureau of the Budget had gone through it thoroughly. After further discussion, Mr. Gray agreed to look into the mechanism for review and make sure it is adequate.

Mr. McElroy then said that an additional item of \$53 million in the budget is the result of the new health legislation for civilian employees of the Defense Department. In addition, military retirement pay has increased \$73 million over the past year. The Defense Department strength is going down 35,000 people. At the same time, there is an increase of \$145 million in personnel pay, since the average age of the force is increased; the average grade is going up and number of dependents is increasing.

Mr. McElroy said that to relieve the budget further, he would like to pull a number of our Air Force units out of NATO. He said this matter had become an issue between the State Department and the Defense Department, centering on the record of action of the last NSC meeting. In view of the fact that the French denied us bases

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.201

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By JK Date 8-23-79

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from which to conduct attack operations with these Air Force units, he thought we were justified in planning to pull them back. The President supported this general view, commenting on the fact that we have in NATO the equivalent of 6 divisions, which we never intended to keep there permanently. The reason we have them there is the NATO allies are almost psychopathic whenever anyone suggests removing them. Gen. Twining commented that the Air Force would like to pull these air units out. Gen. Norstad is vehemently opposed to this idea. The President commented that we cannot pull out committed forces suddenly. We cannot break faith with our allies. Mr. Gray said that we are committed for the calendar year 1960 with respect to these forces but not beyond. Mr. McElroy said he would like not to be rockbound with regard to these forces. The denial of bases in France has obliged us to put our forces in crowded areas in Great Britain. After further discussion of the matter, the President said we should not prepare our budget on the basis of pulling these units back. We must get the word gradually to NATO that we are going to reduce them. He said we must keep them there in the meantime, even if this costs us extra money. Mr. McElroy said the Air Force would try to rework their budget so as to keep these units there.

The President then asked, what about the Sixth Fleet? He said he is getting very doubtful regarding the value of having this Fleet sitting in the Mediterranean. The British and French have strength there, and this has traditionally been an area of their responsibility. In fact, they want to exercise greater influence there now. Our fleet gives us in fact only two groups of aircraft. He is very doubtful regarding its value in a big war. Mr. Gates said that he shared the doubt that the Sixth Fleet should be kept in the Mediterranean. He said the Navy argues that its presence there holds together our cold war allies. Again it would take a lot of political preparation to be able to remove the fleet from the Mediterranean. The President commented that this was an area in which he and Mr. Dulles had divergent views. Mr. Dulles had practically a phobia against raising the question of reduction of these forces. The President said he was certain we should make the Europeans do more. However, he did not see much use talking about the NATO force in relation with the current budget. He recognized that reduction in some fields in NATO might however prove possible. Mr. McElroy asked if it would be acceptable to take these questions up with NATO. The President said it would, adding that we should go to NATO and tell our allies that the time has come for us to backtrack a bit. He added that we should not get this question into an emotional stage before we have had private talks with our major allies one at a time. We should stress that what we are seeking to do is keep our economy strong -- on which

[REDACTED]

all of NATO depends -- and at the same time be faithful to our commitments. He repeated that we cannot make a budget for FY '61 that contemplates a pullout. We must find other ways. Mr. McElroy said this means that we must pay another year of the NATO bill. He thought that work should start at once to change the political base for our known commitment. Mr. Stans said there should be a review of the procedure by which these commitments are made. The present one was made in mid-1959 without Bureau of the Budget and NSC consideration. Mr. McElroy said this should be a matter of authorization by the President before annual commitments are made. The President stated that he would bring this matter up with Macmillan, Adenauer and De Gaulle, and would point out that we have a special burden -- of keeping up the over-all deterrent. He recognized that they would say that we of course have to do this anyway, so it is not a commitment to NATO. Gen. Twining said he did not think the NATO allies would be as surprised as some people visualized. Several have indicated to him that they are surprised that we have stayed as long as we have.

Mr. McElroy next brought up the question of Army Reserves and National Guard. The question is whether to budget them at 700,000 total or decrease to 630,000 -- the figure we have used the last two years. Gen. Twining said the Army has just completed a reorganization on the basis of 700,000 strength, and an attempt to go below this figure would wreck the whole national training plan and structure. Mr. McElroy said he has asked the Joint Chiefs to consider all our Reserve forces and report as to what they think the function of the Reserves should be, as well as the total strength. He recognized that the Reserves and the National Guard reorganization has just been completed and said Gen. Lemnitzer feels the right course of action would be to go for a year without further changes. Another reason to doubt going back with a proposal for 630,000 is that we have been beaten twice on this. Militarily, he thought the figure could be as low as 500,000. The President said he would support such a figure. Gen. Persons commented that if the President thinks 630,000 is the right figure, it would be well to take on the Congress even though the Administration is defeated. The President said this is all part of a trend, with both Regular and Reserve forces strengths coming down. He was sure we should not go above 630,000. In fact, he believed the figure ought to be lower. Mr. Gates said Gen. Lemnitzer agreed with these observations concerning the mission of the Reserves, as well as the cuts, but felt it would not be possible to carry this through this year.

Mr. McElroy next raised the question of the Navy. Their program

[REDACTED]

was considerably in excess of their funding, and a considerable sum of money has been put into the budget merely to make them honest. Even so, cuts are required. They will take out either ship or aircraft elements on the DEW-line. He has told them they should keep whichever is operationally the more important element. The President referred to new developments such as the BMEWS, initially estimated to cost \$100 million, and now funded at \$300 million with no end in sight. In addition, ICBMs and submarine launched missiles are coming into the military force. All in all, technology is going so fast as to reduce the reasons for such things as the DEW-line. Mr. McElroy concurred, stating that within a couple of years he felt sure we would abandon at least one of the warning lines. The President commented that there were probably a few things Khrushchev told him in which he was speaking honestly. One of these was that long range aircraft are no longer of much significance in war, nor are surface ships. The importance of submarines, missiles and conventional ground forces is rising. Our problem is that we are not concentrating simply on the things he says he is stressing, but are trying to defend ourselves against every conceivable type of weapon. He said it will be hard to sell cutbacks in air defense since this is so much a psychological question. Mr. McElroy agreed, noting particularly that we must discuss the matter carefully with the Canadians. The President added that it should be discussed also with Sen. Russell and Congressmen Vinson, Mahon and Ford.

Mr. McElroy then said he wanted to take up certain individual items. He stated that Defense has cancelled the F-108 fighter, and that this action has been well accepted. The budget includes a minimum figure for preparation for a B-52 air alert in case the JCS later say such is needed. We are not increasing the number of crews, but will procure long leadtime items of maintenance, such that we could later keep up to a maximum of 25% of our B-52s in the air at all times should we so decide. In addition, some extra POL will be needed to carry out the training. Mr. Stans asked if these are strictly preparatory expenses. Mr. McElroy said that they are and that he would welcome the Bureau of the Budget going over these figures.

The President said it looks again as though we are trying to protect ourselves in several ways at once. He thought if we are going to do this kind of thing then we should abandon the BMEWS project. Mr. McElroy said we cannot be certain that we will do it. It is important however to take preparatory steps, and to let it be known



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### Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 24, 1959  
8:30 a.m.  
The White House

SUBJECT: NATO Problems

PARTICIPANTS: President Eisenhower  
M. Paul-Henri Spaak  
Secretary Harter  
Ambassador Burgess

COPIES TO:

S/S  
C - Mr. Merchant  
C - Mr. Reinhardt  
S/P - Mr. Smith  
EUR - Mr. Kohler  
USRO - Ambassador Burgess  
Defense - Mr. Irwin  
The White House - General Goodpaster

M. Spaak began by saying that in Europe today there is some hesitation and doubt with respect to our general policies toward the Soviets. The United States must be very firm and clear at the December meeting in explaining the American position. There is a feeling that we are moving toward peaceful coexistence step by step. There is danger that Europe will think all problems have been settled, and therefore the military effort can be reduced.

M. Spaak said that in his view no problems are settled at the present time. The Soviets could return to the cold war, and therefore the American position in the military field is very important. It is right that the United States should say that Europe must bear a fair share of the effort. However, there is a danger that, if Europe thinks the United States wants to diminish its effort, some countries might use this as a pretext for diminishing their own.

The President replied that he has been trying to explain to the larger countries that they are not doing their full duty. When he had visited the NATO capitals in January, 1951, he had thought that, as far as American troop strength was concerned, we were carrying out nothing more than a stop-gap, temporary operation. The Marshall Plan was already working at that time, although its full effect had not yet been felt. We knew, of course, that European military strength could not be instantly increased because those countries had had a hard time, but we thought that in due course they would carry their full weight. After all, there are fifty million people in Italy, something like forty-five million in France, about fifty-five million in West Germany, plus the people of the Low Countries and Scandinavia. That makes a total population of around 175

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to 200 millions, without counting England, and those are skilled, cultured people.

It is true, of course that France has detached 600,000 troops and sent them south, but there are still a great many people in Western Europe. We ought to strengthen NATO and not weaken it, and in this way we can gain the stability and confidence we need. What the European countries seem to feel is that, ten years from now, the same United States strength will be deployed in Europe as exists today. The United States provides the nuclear bombs and the missiles, which are frightfully expensive. It provides much of the air force and the free world's navy, including the submarines. Europe benefits by all this without the expense. Why, therefore, shouldn't Europe get more inspiration from our example? The President said that, in 1951, he had never thought that the United States command of NATO forces would last as long as it has. He had thought that, in eight years' time, an Englishman or a Frenchman would be in command, although he recognized it would be difficult for Europe to agree on the choice of a commander. In any case, the United States plays too big a part in it all. The President said that he certainly did not mean that the troop strength should be reduced, but at the same time we must make absolutely sure that Europe accepts its responsibilities.

M. Spaak said that he agreed completely. Europe is recovering economically, and therefore new discussions of the problem are needed. It would be dangerous, however, if the United States were to take a unilateral decision. The United States has a duty to explain conditions to Europe and to the world. The United States can point out that the United Kingdom is in a good situation, and so is Germany, and the smaller countries. The United States should speak very firmly to some of the smaller countries. M. Spaak said:

..... Their effort is declining year by year. The United States should initiate multilateral discussions on this matter. If the European countries suddenly come to the conclusion that the United States is going to withdraw its troops without discussion, they will think that the world situation is better, and will reduce their forces.

The President said that we must not put the cart before the horse. We must do things in the proper sequence. However, the fact remains that the other countries are not accepting their responsibilities.

M. Spaak said that the United States is too kind, too indulgent. Sometimes it is necessary to speak out with full strength. Otherwise the Europeans will think that the rich, strong United States will always be there to help. If, however, the United States speaks clearly and firmly, saying that this situation cannot go on forever, and that Europe must provide for its own defense, it will be extremely useful.

The President

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- 3 -

The President remarked that he has been using this policy for the past five years, but every year some new crisis arises, and he does think that this is not the year for us to open our mouths.

At first Belgium had a two-year military service, but, when they saw that other countries had only 14 or 16 months' service, they decided to reduce their own. There should be some country besides the United States that is ready to do its full share. There should be a government - not just an individual - which is ready to say: This is what we must do.

M. Spaak asked whether the United States will withdraw all its troops from Europe some day. The President replied that we absolutely would not do this.

M. Spaak noted

The President said that de Gaulle feels that an Army can have no morale unless it is defending its own country, yet in the second World War, when a lot of us were fighting on foreign soil, it seemed to me we had good morale.

The President said that never in our lifetime will all our troops be withdrawn from Europe because it is important to carry the flag. We are contributing about 40 per cent of the infrastructure requirements. Our fleets are in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. There is a question as to the usefulness of the Sixth Fleet in a general war. Perhaps it is exercising a calming influence, but the United Kingdom and France should take on more responsibility in that area.

We must strengthen NATO by making Western Europe more self-dependent, but throughout our lifetime, we shall have token forces over there. We will have some naval strength, some ground installations and missile bases. We will contribute to the infrastructure requirements. But now we ought to say to Europe: You should be ashamed to have our troops over there.

M. Spaak commented that perhaps it would be well to say that in 1949 the situation was such that the United States had to undertake a large share of the effort. That was what was also said later in Lisbon. But since that time the countries of Europe have made great progress, and therefore their share in the defense of NATO must be increased, and this is a problem which requires study.

The President said there is the matter of the way we approach the problem. We must do it diplomatically. We must tell governments that they must do more and give our reasons. Then governments can give instructions to their representatives as to the attitude they should take in NATO. If the representatives in NATO do not understand the situation, there will be complete confusion.

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Secretary Harter said that the Europeans are beginning to understand our position. We must proceed by consultation, and not unilaterally.

The President said that he agreed. He added that one country, Turkey, is strained to the limit. Germany, on the other hand, is holding back. M. Spaak said that Greece and Italy are making an effort. France is a special case. Germany is making slow progress, but is improving. Their position is strong, but the percentage of their income devoted to defense is small.

M. Spaak said

/some have suggested that perhaps it might be a good idea to ask the experts or the "Wise Men" to study the question, as had been done before Lisbon.

The President said that perhaps this could be done. We might present our position to governments, with a Wise Men's report, and then have the NATO Council debate the matter.

M. Spaak returned to the question of the international situation. Some think that a new situation has arisen.

The President said that, with the Indian situation what it is, he had decided to visit India, as he had been wanting to do for the past four or five years. He hoped to awaken the countries that are not members of NATO to the need for unity. This is desirable because we had not merely to keep Moscow in a state of tension, but because we want to defend the same human values as they do, and to obtain coherence. The President hoped that this effort will be well received in NATO, and that NATO, instead of giving way to divisive influences, will be more solidly unified. However, de Gaulle's strong position in France and his antiquated ideas on alliances are not good or healthy because French representatives must reflect de Gaulle's views. We must reach the people. This is a big task, which will remain just as long as the Communist Manifesto remains and just as long as Russia and China pose a threat.

M. Spaak said

The President commented that the problem still remains that de Gaulle is capable of making fantastic decisions. He might say that France would withdraw its forces from NATO and limit its military effort to Algeria.

M. Spaak said

On the general international situation, the President said that, since the very beginning, he has been saying that we cannot negotiate from weakness, but only from a position of strength. There have been no useful negotiations with the Russians yet. There has been no change except that Khrushchev is not so

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Spasowski has informed Kohler. Polish Government will be

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Page 2

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belligerent as he was earlier, or as Stalin was. It is very bad if people are lulled into the belief that the Communist goal has changed just because there is a sweeter smile in the Kremlin. This is something we must counteract. On the other hand, if we are to seek fruitful negotiations with the Soviets, we must not indulge in name-calling. We must observe the normal decencies of diplomatic language. We cannot speak of Khrushchev's hands dripping with Hungarian blood. It is, in fact, true, but we cannot speak about it.

M. Spaak agreed, but added that people are very fond of wishful thinking. In December there must be a firm statement, pointing out that nothing fundamental has changed, but that we must take advantage of the better atmosphere to try to improve our position. We cannot reduce our military effort before success has been achieved.

The President agreed that nothing could be worse. The United States has a two-year military service. It is fair to ask why Western Europe cannot do the same.

M. Spaak said that it is unfortunate that the EDC was rejected because Europe must accept the rule of uniformity. If one country has a two-year period and another only one year, it is hard for the first country to maintain the longer period. Each Government should spend the same percentage of its income for the common effort. There should be standardization. That was the goal of the EDC, and it is a pity that it was rejected.

The President said that, in the spring of 1953, he asked, urged, bludgeoned for the EDC. It was rejected, but after the French Parliament was through with it, there was nothing left.

Americans complain that we have our divisions over there, in addition to our other commitments, and yet Europe does nothing. England has cut down its effort and wants to cut it even more, although she might reconsider her cuts.

M. Spaak

The President said that he agreed with Mr. Spaak. Our problem is how to accomplish this without causing alarm. The Secretary of State has been asked to explain the problem to governments, to explain how they are shirking their duty. Then we can speak of the great need of maintaining our strength. We must reinforce success, and not failure.

M. Spaak said that the NATO countries should be kept informed of what is planned. The arrangements for the December meeting are good, but the countries should be kept informed. The small countries in particular appreciate this sort of thing.

The President commented that you cannot negotiate with the Communists except from a position of strength. They respect you more if you are strong. We do not need to be belligerent or chauvinistic because we are strong. Quite

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Department preparing briefing material which will be ponched Warsaw and Moscow arriving July 29. There will be additional opportunity brief Vice President deMunster.

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the contrary. We can afford to make concessions if we are strong. M. Spaak agreed that there can be no success if little concessions are made to the Communists. We must keep our position very firm on the basic principles. M. Spaak asked if we expect success at the Summit Meeting, on the Berlin question. The President replied that Khrushchev might say that he will do nothing sudden in Berlin, that he will present no ultimatum. This would be a half-way retreat. He may give some pledge on Berlin which will not be wholly satisfactory, but which will allay fears. As far as nuclear tests are concerned, Khrushchev is worried by the cost of armaments. He says he wants to disarm, but that he can't convince the United States to disarm on his terms. He has given much emphasis to "mutual trust," but we will agree only if there is an adequate system of inspection and control.

The President agreed with M. Spaak's comment that, if armaments are so very expensive for the United States, they must be so for the USSR also. The expense to the USSR is about half what it is to us, but the relative effort is about the same. The President stated that all this was foolish. Khrushchev says that there is a lot of talk about peace in the world, but what do the Russians do? Sometimes Khrushchev hints that he might agree to mutual inspection, but then he retreats. It may be agreed that we reduce the armaments burden, the President said, but he recalled what happened in 1922 in the Nine Power Treaty. Under Mr. Coolidge and Mr. Hoover we observed the letter of the law. We did not even elevate our guns, but all the time the Japanese were building ships. We cannot afford to repeat that experience.

The President concluded by agreeing with M. Spaak that we must strengthen NATO. There can be no security in any region unless the people of that region are determined to make the necessary effort. The United States cannot do the job all by itself, even with 40 Divisions. We can import troops, but we cannot import a heart, and people lose heart if they feel that everything depends on us. We must not minimize the overall seriousness of the situation.

M. Spaak agreed that the President must be very severe in NATO.

(The conversation was concluded at 9:10 a.m.).



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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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TO : D/

FROM :

SUBJECT:



TO : The Under Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S  
FROM : EUR - Foy D. Kohler  
SUBJECT: Second Generation IRBM's

*Return room 4-A-195 Vest*

Discussion

199 In a talk with Ambassador Burgess, Assistant Secretary Irwin outlined the proposal now up for final consideration in Defense on second generation IRBM's. This proposal does not yet have Secretary McElroy's approval. It has been formally discussed with the Chiefs, who have indicated favorable reaction. The proposal involves the following elements:

1. Nature of Proposal. The program is tailored to meet General Norstad's military requirement for a large number of mobile mid-range Polaris-type missiles (300 to 1500 miles range) to be deployed in Europe beginning in 1963. The United States would supply under grant aid the first fifty Polaris missiles themselves, and the Europeans would be responsible for providing the ground launch equipment. The next thirty missiles would be provided by European purchase of parts from the United States, with assembly to be done in Europe as a step towards development of a European production capability. The remainder of General Norstad's requirement, which could run to as many as 400 or 500 missiles, would be met from indigenous production in Europe.

2. Cost. The cost for introducing the first fifty missiles would be \$232 million, of which the United States would supply \$87.5 million under MAP and the Europeans, \$144.5 million to develop and produce the ground launch equipment. The Irwin proposals do not have specific figures for the cost of the program after the first fifty. It is estimated, however, that it would cost the Europeans an additional \$100 million for setting up a missile production facility and that the total program would probably cost the Europeans about \$500 million. The total cost to the United States under MAP for the program would be around \$100 million. Both the MAP and the European costs would be spread over a three- or four-year period so that the impact, in Defense's view, on both MAP and on other aspects of the European defense effort would not be great.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.3(b)

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### 3. Military Justification.

4. SACEUR Control. The Defense proposal is concerned solely with European production of the Polaris-type missiles, using United States-type of warheads, deployed by SACEUR and under his control. No mention will be made in the offer of independent national capabilities. The Europeans will not, however, be asked for a specific undertaking not to use the technology developed under this program for production of IRMB's under independent national control.

Defense is thinking in terms of having this program approved and in a form which can be presented to the NATO countries at the December Ministerial meeting. After he obtains final approval from Secretary McElroy and the JCS, Mr. Irwin plans to discuss this proposal with you. He hopes to be able to do this by the middle of this week.

### Conclusion

The Defense proposal will have to be carefully studied, particularly with respect to the impact on MAP and the European defense effort, the question of an independent national capability, and the implications of deploying missiles, particularly in Germany and France. Nevertheless, from what we know of the proposal, it appears to have a very sound military rationale and to be acceptable from the point of view of the Department's interests in the impact on MAP. I also believe that we should give serious consideration to advancing such a proposal at the NATO Ministerial meeting.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)



LS NO. 44147  
T-76/R-XVIII/R-V  
French

709  
GENERAL DE GAULLE

Paris, November 24, 1959

Dear Mr. President:

What you were good enough to write to me in connection with the possible advisability of holding a summit conference, in due time, corresponds to my way of thinking. I am pleased to have the opportunity to discuss the matter with you thoroughly next month.

I should deeply regret it if what I said to the press on November 10 regarding the reasons for France's plans to equip itself with atomic weapons has displeased you. Rest assured that my words expressed no misgivings with respect to the United States and its government, as constituted at the present time. I am entirely convinced that you personally and your country are, to quote your comforting phrase, "deeply attached to your commitments in Europe."

However, France's effort to become a nuclear power--which our country must ensure by its own resources since its Allies do not place sufficient trust in it to help it become such a power--will extend over a long period of time. It is patently impossible to predict with certainty what the evolution of world policy will be throughout such a period, particularly

LNC-58-60/283  
His Excellency

Dwight D. Eisenhower,

President of the United States of America

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with respect to future relations between [the United States of] America and Russia, their respective régimes, and new elements that the development of the other continents now in progress may one day bring.

Moreover, how can one assert that the policy adopted by you at the present time in the event of a world conflict, which policy calls for close solidarity between the United States and Western Europe, would always remain unchanged? The United States, for reasons of its own that were undoubtedly very justified, did not participate in the First World War until 1917. During the Second World War it entered the conflict after France had been occupied by the enemy for eighteen months. You, who know how vulnerable my country is, will certainly agree that in the basic concept and preparation of its national defense it must take into account any unknown elements the future may hold in store for it together with the experience of the past, without however doubting the sincerity and resolution of its American allies.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my sincere friendship.

[Signed] C. de Gaulle



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COMMENTS ON THE ABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES  
TO INCREASE EXPENDITURES TO MEET MC-70 REQUIREMENTS

Belgium

The Belgian Government recently decided to increase its 1960 defense budget by approximately 11 percent.

The Country Team has proposed a cost-sharing modernization program predicated on Belgian commitments to increase its defense effort. We believe that a cost-sharing program of modernization would serve to encourage Belgium to devote increasing effort to meeting its modernization requirements and thus improving its defense capabilities. The Belgian proposal for reassessment of defense roles will require evaluation by SHAPE.

Denmark

From an economic and financial viewpoint the Danish Government is entirely capable of spending more on its NATO forces than it now plans to do. However, political, psychological and historical factors militate against such a larger contribution.

Continued prodding of the Danes in NATO circles as well as bilaterally has, it is believed, at least been of assistance in maintaining the present level of performance on the part of the Danes. In addition, such programs as the cost-sharing shipbuilding arrangement are expected to result in increased Danish defense expenditures.

Continued action along the above lines should result in gradual progress toward meeting Danish MC-70 goals; however, with U.S. aid continuing at the present level, we do not believe that there would be sufficient incentive on the part of the Danes to meet completely their force goals, barring some unexpected event.

France

The French can reasonably be expected to spend more on their NATO forces than they are now doing, and there are a number of indications that French defense expenditures, especially in the advanced weapons field, are likely to increase next year. It might be desirable if the French were encouraged to concentrate their efforts in the non-nuclear field, but in view of established U.S. policy in the matter of Fourth Country nuclear

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (3)

Date of Review: 9/5/85

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(1) This is as good an opportunity as we have had to bring in the whole youth factor. Since we have not yet established a youth movement (at least eleven degrees), and since we missed the President's "Youth Action Week"

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powers, de Gaulle has decided to push ahead on French efforts in this field in the conviction that France must be a nuclear power if she is to be able to increase her influence in Western councils, among other reasons.

Although the French have the financial capability of meeting their MC-70 goals, the problem is the kind of priorities they establish in spending their budgeted funds as between civil and military expenditures and as between MC-70 and non-MC-70 requirements. The overriding consideration at present is the Algerian problem, the continuation of which is the most serious hindrance to greater French contributions to NATO forces.

#### Germany

Over the past several years the Germans have been unable to spend the full 9 billion DM's appropriated for defense, and between 2 and 3 billion DM's a year have been diverted to other German Government purposes. However, in the German fiscal year which ended March 31, 1959, practically the full buildup was spent for military purposes. In view of the faster tempo of German acquisition of military equipment, it is expected that the Ministry of Defense will be able to spend its full budget this fiscal year and in fact that the budget will have to be raised from 9 billion to 11 billion DM's or more in coming years.

The U.S. should encourage the German buildup by making available the most modern weapons and equipment in order to curb the German tendency to "shop around" and await further developments in modern weapons systems. Continuation of modern weapons training for the Germans even at U.S. expense is believed desirable as a means of encouraging the German buildup.

#### Greece

It is generally accepted that the Greeks cannot fairly be expected to spend more on their NATO forces than they now plan to do. Greece is hard put to continue its current effort, and as a matter of fact has asked the U.S. to provide an additional \$30 million of Defense Support and other

materiel

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OUTLINE


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OF STATEMENT BY SACEUR TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON  
IRBM AND SPECIAL AMMUNITION STORAGE

1. December 1957 Heads of Government decision to introduce  
IRBMs and NATO atomic stockpile. Latter now referred to as special  
ammunition storage.
2. Purpose of statement is to report on progress made in these  
two important fields.
3. IRBM Program
  - a. Plans and policy for deployment and control
  - b. Determination of requirements for improved IRBM  
-- second generation -- solid fuel.
4. Status:
  - a. Progress  -- 2 squadrons Jupiters.
  - b. Other countries contacted in time to make deployment  
harmonize with availability.
5. 4 or 6 squadrons: -
6. Special ammunition storage



DOE-FRD

of the delivery forces set forth in MC 70.

minimum number -- doubling up where possible.


b. Over-all SHAPE plan - "Allied Command Europe Plan for NATO Special Ammunition Stockpile" being worked out by SHAPE with the assistance of the major subordinate commands has now been completed as broad guidance and has been sent back to the NATO subordinate commands for their action and to MOD's for information and guidance. Standing Group was, of course, furnished a copy. This is quite a firm proposal through mid-1960 and includes specific numbers, types and locations of delivery units and the storage sites required to support them. the planning in this field is based upon staying two years ahead.

7. Where do we stand?

Base, of course, is the interesting system of storage facility which was designed for the purpose of servicing forces already equipped with a nuclear delivery capability, i.e., essentially U.S. Number at the present time is approximately  within the entire NATO area. Plans call for  to service these units by that time.

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8. Present position: We progress from the original  as


follows:

a. 

to take care of

requirements for a fighter bomber squadron, when this unit may be programmed into the NATO Strike Force.

b. Two nations have been asked to expedite construction

of sites in their countries 

9. Financing:

Both programs have been included in the proposal for common financing under the infrastructure program.

10th Slice has specific requirements of 14 million pounds for the stockpile and 12 million pounds for the IRBMs.



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Text of Remarks by General Nathan F. Twining,  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NATO Military Committee  
in Chiefs of Staff Session, 10 December 1959



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"Since the end of World War II, United States policy has firmly supported the concept of collective security as the basis for defense of the free world. The major collective security arrangement in which the United States is involved is, of course, NATO.

"While great strides have been made, through our past efforts, toward creating an effective NATO defense, there are, at the present time, several obstacles or impediments to further progress. These obstacles can and should be removed. Those countries responsible for the lack of progress in certain critical areas which I shall discuss are weakening the entire defense of NATO and are thereby increasing the possibility of war. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are deeply concerned with respect to several of these issues.

"First, we are concerned with the lack of progress, with respect to certain nations, in necessary arrangements for the accommodation of nuclear weapons and nuclear strike forces. Some NATO nations appear to feel that they are doing the United States a favor in making such arrangements. They desire the security which can be provided only through atomic capable forces, but they want none of the responsibility for accommodating weapons, and in some cases strike forces, on their own soil. From a military viewpoint, our collective defenses are obviously weakened by such governmental attitudes.

"The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are also deeply concerned over the redeployment from France of certain strike forces. The United States investment in manpower, training, and dollars in these squadrons will not now produce the defense dividends which could have been achieved. The congestion of aircraft on a more limited number of air fields is tactically unsound, and the operational difficulties engendered by these moves must force the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to re-examine the future deployment and use of these squadrons.

"The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are also deeply concerned by the failure to make progress in the development of a unified air defense organization for NATO Europe. The resources and assistance granted by the United States government to help establish an effective air defense for NATO cannot be justified or long continued on the basis of the present unsatisfactory situation. It will be militarily unsound to make any United States investment, of any kind, in the air defense of Europe under present circumstances. The resources can be used better in other ways.

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22 July 1976

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"As a last point, the unilateral action which was taken with respect to the French fleet is of great concern to United States military planners. The entire principle of collective security which we have followed--as opposed to a 'Fortress America' concept--seems jeopardized by this action. I would hope that an early solution satisfactory to SACBUI can be arrived at within the near future.

"I know that these are all difficult problems, and I feel that the military authorities of the governments concerned would change some of these circumstances if they were permitted. My only positive suggestion would be that you military representatives insure that your political superiors are aware of the seriousness with which the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff view these problems. Our resources are not unlimited, and, from a military viewpoint, we have a right to expect a maximum return on all defense efforts which we undertake. I recommend that you keep working on these problems vigorously and that you attempt to establish an understanding that, under certain circumstances, political judgements of governments should be modified or changed on the basis of military realities.

"In conclusion, I wish to state that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are firm in their support of NATO. We believe strongly in the NATO concept of unified defense and we shall continue to recommend to our government that we carry our fair share of the burden in our common defense. We feel that many of the NATO nations are also carrying their fair share of responsibility--and we hope that those governments which have policies of no-cooperation, in certain areas, will adjust these policies in the near future."

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12/16/59

Secretary Dillon reported that he had felt it worthwhile to make the trip because differences of opinion were building up between the two trade groups - the Common Market and the Outer Seven. These differences of opinion involved danger to the western alliance, as well as the purely economic danger that as the problem became more serious the Europeans would decide that the best way to settle it would be to conclude bilateral deals discriminating against the U.S. The difference of opinion was a serious split and was extremely complex. Last year the U.K. had emphasized economic problems, but was now relaxed so far as economics was concerned.

The smaller countries among the Outer Seven are concerned about economic matters and want to do something because their trade is largely with the Six. Within the Common Market, there is a similar split in that Germany sees the problem as a political one and wishes to push the Common Market and not submerge it in a wider group. The Six are not prepared to accept a wider free trade area, while the U.K. is not prepared to join the Common Market. Some way must be found to compromise these differences. We think it is best to lower tariffs of the Common Market and use the most-favored nation principle. It is important to us that the political split not continue and that there be no discriminatory deals against us. Secretary Dillon reported he had told the Europeans we were interested in this problem and were willing to take an active part in it. He thought the Summit Meeting might devise a mechanism for "talking out" the problem. During his trip he discovered that the danger of discrimination against the U.S. was more real than any of the European countries would admit publicly. The U.K., for example, had already put forward a suggestion for such discrimination. Secretary Dillon said he had also talked with the Germans about assistance to underdeveloped countries and the Germans had agreed they could do more. Germany felt that more coordination and discussion were required, not for the purpose of allocating amounts, but for the purpose of arriving at general patterns and mobilizing resources. Secretary Dillon reported that discriminations against the dollar are being further relaxed in Europe. France is undertaking a new action to ease such discriminations, while Britain will take similar actions in January and again in July.

Summarizing, Secretary Dillon said the main result of his trip had been to elicit a welcome on the part of the European countries to the idea of an active U.S. role in connection with relations

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between the Common Market and the Outer Seven. All countries realized they were treading on dangerous ground. It was his feeling that continued discussion might result in finding a way out of the difficulties without serious repercussions. However, this problem was an emotional matter so far as the British were concerned. Mr. Dillon regarded the fact that he was able to see all the more important officials during this trip to Europe as an indication of how deeply the European countries felt about the problem.

Mr. Allen inquired about the attitude of Canada on this matter. Secretary Dillon said he had wanted to talk to the Canadians before undertaking his trip, but after first accepting an invitation to consult, the Canadians had declined to talk, probably because they felt the U.K. might think the U.S. was talking for Canada.

The Vice President asked whether Secretary Dillon had noted any reactions to the President's trip. Secretary Dillon said the President's trip received a big play in the European press and on his trip all the officials he had talked to had mentioned it.

Mr. McCone asked whether the Germans had indicated their views on the question of whether the proceeds of any assistance they extended to underdeveloped nations should be expended in Germany. Mr. Dillon said the Germans would probably insist on provision of aid partly on the basis of expenditures of the proceeds in Germany. The Germans were particularly interested in assisting Greece and Turkey and were willing to help with military assistance as well as economic aid. He reported incidentally that the Germans had offered to pay back to the U.S. ahead of time \$200 million on GARIOA. We were not as keen about accepting this offer as we were about getting a German commitment to extend assistance to the underdeveloped countries.

Mr. Dulles asked whether the OEEC was defunct. Secretary Dillon said the OEEC was not defunct, but was identified as a U.K. tool, with a U.K. Secretary-General and a U.K. Chairman. It had lost some of its usefulness in the field after a controversy last

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12/30/59

December 30, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
December 20, 1959 - Chateau de Rambouillet

Present: The President  
General de Gaulle  
Prime Minister Macmillan  
Prime Minister Debre  
Mr. Louis Mayer  
Mr. De Zulueta  
Lieut. Colonel Vernon Walters



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During this conversation General de Gaulle expressed his concern for the need of concerting policy among the powers with worldwide responsibilities, specifically France, the United Kingdom and the United States. He felt that such matters as the action to be taken to counter Soviet moves in Africa, aid to the underdeveloped nations, and matters relating to the defense of the West, together with economic policy among the three countries, require such concerted consideration. He suggested the formation of a small body of a "clandestine" nature to enable the three powers to remain in contact on these subjects.

The President said that he was willing to agree to the creation of such a body, providing it was done on an extremely discreet basis. Many of the NATO Powers were very sensitive to anything that looked like a three-power directorate within the Alliance. He said that in his opinion the best location for such a body would be London. He felt that each country should assign a top diplomatic figure, a top military man and a first class economist. This should be done quietly and they might be attached to the respective Embassies in London. They could either be in London full-time or else be there as required. He was, however, concerned that the existence of this body might become known and give rise to some resentment on the part of nations that were not included.

Mr. Macmillan expressed his agreement to the constitution of such a body and shared the President's thoughts on its composition and location. He was very anxious that this body also devote attention to economic matters as he was very concerned about the economic warfare that might develop between the countries of the common market and the outer seven that might force the United Kingdom to withdraw

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from NATO, as when you had economic warfare the tendency was to draw apart. The President said that he deplored any talk of withdrawal from NATO. The purpose of the creation of this body was to strengthen relationships between them and the Alliance. General de Gaulle then said that every effort should be made to ensure discretion as to the existence of this group which should operate at a very high level to ensure that there was coordination of policy on major matters between the three powers. When this body was set up the French would submit concrete proposals concerning changes that they felt should be made in the structure of the Atlantic Alliance to make it fully able to respond to existing conditions. He did not indicate the nature of these proposals. He said that when France was in possession of nuclear weapons, this would simplify things for her

Mr. Macmillan felt that sooner or later the existence of this group would become known, and if it did, they could say that this was an ad hoc group studying matters of interest to the three powers in other areas of the world.

The President then pointed out that the Standing Group existed in Washington and General de Gaulle said that they could handle the matters of military interest to the Alliance, but that the London body would coordinate matters of general policy at a very high level. The President again emphasized the need for discretion concerning this body and said that he would speak of it only to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan agreed on the need for this discretion. They indicated that they would be in contact with the U.S. on this matter shortly.

At a subsequent conversation on the following day between Mr. Debre and the President, the French Prime Minister indicated that he thought that this London group should be expanded somewhat as there would be a requirement for more detailed coordination of policy than had been previously anticipated. This was particularly true where economic matters were concerned. The President noted this without committing himself one way or the other.

(Prepared by Colonel Walters)