

~~TOP SECRET~~



TEXT OF MESSAGE

Dear Foster,

I saw Selwyn last night and found him better but he is still not back at work. In his absence, I have been reading the accounts of the discussions which our officials have been having both with and without the French. I am bound to say I think we have got a little bogged down by the old question of which comes first - the egg or the chicken, the making of a plan or the decision to carry it out. In my view we ought to study the implications of all kinds of military plans without necessarily deciding upon them. In this country a decision cannot be taken without a full Cabinet. However, I think the firm line that the great Powers and NATO took has clearly had some effect upon the Russians and I am all for a strong posture in public.

All the same I do not think that it has been the Russian intention to impose a blockade at the end of the six months. Their intention has been to make us choose between imposing a blockade on ourselves or dealing with the East Germans, whether as their successors or their agents. But they now seem to be a little alarmed that their Note should appear to the Western world as having directly threatened a blockade. I was most grateful to you for sending me such a long account of what Mikoyan said to you.

A strong posture in public and the study of plans to support it is a good thing, but you and I should be seriously considering how we can get, as I believe we may, two advantages:

- (a) [An apparent Russian retreat because the world believes they have threatened us with blockade and the more we talk about plans to overcome it the better it will be outwardly.]
- (b) Being able to force the Russians by negotiation, or at any conference, to accept responsibility to see that the West's military and civil supplies do in fact get through. In other words, if they hand over to the D. D. R., as successors or agents, they must still see to it that the D. D. R. behaves properly. In the Note I think they threatened that they would support the D. D. R. if we attacked them. But if they stand behind the D. D. R. in this way, the corollary surely is that the Russians should see to

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-



It that the D. D. R. carry out their obligations including those which the Russians purport to hand over to them.

I should be very grateful for your views.

[Meanwhile, I am all for military planning to meet any situation but the decision whether to take action either in actual use of force or in the preliminary mobilisation is one which we could not take without a full exploration of all its implications.]

As ever,

Harold

This letter was sent under cover of a letter from Chargé d'Affairs Hood dated January 8, 1959.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1/8/59

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
TOP SECRET



TEXT OF MESSAGE


Dear Foster,

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All the same I do not think that it has been the Russian intention to impose a blockade at the end of the six months. Their intention has been to make us choose between imposing a blockade on ourselves or dealing with the East Germans, whether as their successors or their agents. But they now seem to be a little alarmed that their Note should appear to the Western world as having directly threatened a blockade. I was most grateful to you for sending me such a long account of what Mikoyan said to you.

A strong posture in public and the study of plans to support it is a good thing, but you and I should be seriously considering how we can get, as I believe we may, two advantages:

(a)



- (b) Being able to force the Russians by negotiation, or at any conference, to accept responsibility to see that the West's military and civil supplies do in fact get through. In other words, if they hand over to the D. D. R., as successors or agents, they must still see to it that the D. D. R. behaves properly. In the Note I think they threatened that they would support the D. D. R. if we attacked them. But if they stand behind the D. D. R. in this way, the corollary surely is that the Russians should see to

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC F88-1262
NLE Case	88-2594
By	416
NLE Date	12/22/50

Staff Secy / Int / 6 / Berlin - Vol I (2)


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-2-

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As ever,

Harold

This letter was sent under cover
of a letter from Chargé d'Affairs Hood
dated January 8, 1959.

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1925

88-403

1/4/59

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TOP SECRET

IRBM--Germany

Jan 9, 1959

FROM: WASHINGTON

NO: 2379, January 8, 5PM

PARIS FOR THURSTON: PASS USRO.

REF: A. PARIS EMBTEL 2425, RPTD BONN 229, LONDON 526
B.G. BONN'S 1402 RPTD-INFO PARIS 434 LONDON 308

1. Department notes that SACEUR does not rpt not perceive any significant military reasons from NATO standpoint that would require deployment of IRBM's in Germany at present time. Department does not rpt not consider that there are any significant political factors which would require reconsideration of this military judgment. In fact department considers that on balance political factors would argue against such deployment at present time (or announcement now that such deployment would be undertaken in future). Department therefore perceives no rpt no objection to SACEUR conveying his military judgment in this matter to Fedrep government through appropriate channels subject to comments contained in following paragraph regarding timing such notification.

2. * * *

DULLES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 88-403-7By 24 Date 3/10/89

1/17/59

WEDNESDAY
January 13, 1959
9:18 a.m.

MB

TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE PRESIDENT

The Pres asked if we would be against the establishment of a free city if it were all inclusive - East and West Germany. If that were agreeable to the Germans he supposes we would not object. The Sec said if it were agreeable but he is sure West Germany would not agree to anything that would take our troops out. That is the only thing that keeps it from being engulfed. Once they go the paper agreements are no good. The Pres would say that would be a new problem. The Sec said to be careful about implying anything about taking our troops out of Berlin. They agreed they are more rigid than we are.

pdb

Dr. Ken Pp / Telephone Calls / 13 / Memo. of Tel. Conv. - WH / Jan 4, 1959 to April 15, 1959

11/13/59
C. J. ...
216 D. ...
L. M. ...

The Pres just got the translation of Adenauer's message. He does not feel anything is to be done about it. He thinks ~~Buce~~ should see him and say the Sec brought message to Pres directly and unfortunately we made the commitment and while we agree no good will probably come of it and they may take propaganda advantage there is no way of getting out of it. The Sec does not think the message was well thought out - the Pres could not avoid seeing him. Also A saw him in Germany. The Sec said A is nervous about the situation and he thinks we should reassure him as best we can. The Pres said he read that from Macmillan. They want to handle it with a soft hand. The Sec said too soft for safety.

The Sec said he got the Pres' notes. The Pres said one or two went into substance because he was not sure of meaning. He wanted to get the tone of firmness without ~~xxxxx~~ name-calling. The Sec did not think he did. The Pres said everything is put on the Communists - it seemed good to have a change of pace. They are suggestions. The Pres said you can talk with these guys and have fun doing it. They agreed Knowland was a blight on the situation. The Pres thinks things may be a little better.

Dallas, Pg /Telephone Call /13/ Memo of Tel. Conv - WVI - Jan 4, 1959 to Mr

SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSIONS

STATE-JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING
HELD IN ROOM 2C923, THE PENTAGON BUILDING
ON WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1959, AT 11:00 A.M.

EXCISE

General Twining, USAF
General Taylor, USA
Admiral Burke, USN
General White, USAF
General Pate, USMC
Lt. General Picher, USAF
Lt. General Moore, USA
Vice Admiral Dennison, USN
Lt. General Gerhart, USAF
Major General Roberts, USMC
Brig. General Hillyard, USA
Captain Cobb, USN
Rear Admiral Wellings, USN
Major General Terrill, USAF
Rear Admiral Dudley, USN
Major General Johnson, USA
Brig. General Fields, USMC
Brig. General Whisenand, USAF

Mr. Robert Murphy
Mr. Frederick Meinhardt
Mr. Foy Kohler
Mr. Albert Mathews
Mr. Martin Hillenbrand
Mr. Robert McFarlane
Mr. Dwight Porter

Mr. Robert Knight

1. Barlin
2. C-130 Case
3. DeGaulle Proposals for Tripartite Action

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

1. Berlin

Mr. Murphy opened the meeting by referring to the tripartite talks which had been held with the British and French on the question of Paragraph D of the paper on Berlin contingency planning. He quoted Paragraph D of the U.S. aide-memoire of December 11, 1958, as follows:

[

B1

]

He mentioned that Mr. Irwin and General Johnson had been participating in the talks and that he assumed the JCS was currently informed.

Mr. Murphy discussed the British position [

B1

[The U.S. position is that the principle should be decided upon and agreed by the three powers before detailed military planning is entered into. [

B1

[He said that the purpose of the meeting was to arrive at a coordinated U.S. point of view and to assure that the military judgment of the JCS was in consonance with the political judgment of the Department on this matter.

General Twining indicated that the Joint Chiefs had approved on January 13 a planning paper on the military preparations for action in the Berlin situation as required by Paragraph D. The paper is now

before the Secretary of Defense, who has expressed his desire to give it further consideration and perhaps to make some amendments but it represents the basic JCS thinking on the matter. The paper is for U.S. use only (copies of the draft JCS paper were provided to Mr. Murphy for the Department's study and information on the understanding that it would not be considered a final document until cleared by the Secretary of Defense). General Twining went on to describe the paper as the Joint Chiefs idea of all the steps that must be taken to prepare for possible action in the Berlin situation. He felt that it was important the Department understand what the military requirements of the situation are.

General White then intervened to inquire if the Department had taken a firm political decision to press for the action envisioned in Paragraph D. Mr. Murphy replied that the decision was taken in principle by the Department to take all possible measures to secure our right of land access to Berlin [

[In response to a further question from General White asking clarification of our policy, Mr. Murphy stated specifically that the Department was supporting the language of Paragraph D. Paragraph D must, of course, be considered in the context of the entire paper on contingency planning, including the later section which discusses the

[He then quoted the last paragraph, Section .., as follows:

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He pointed out that we were not excluding E or indeed any other possibility but that we felt that the psychological effect of the action proposed under Section D was essential.

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Admiral Burke indicated his full concurrence with the Department's position. He pointed out that the decision involved not only plan, but the taking of many preparatory steps ahead of the time of action. If we sent an armed force into East Germany, we must be prepared to follow through. E

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General White then asked again if the State Department was prepared to support the statement in Paragraph D. Mr. Murphy answered yes but pointed out the purpose of the meeting was to be sure that "he whose ox may be gored" is also in agreement.

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There was a general discussion of the JCS paper in which it was pointed out that the planners had attempted to take every possibility into consideration. General Twining pointed out that the concept was summarized in Appendix B of the paper and that this was the most sensitive part. Mr. Murphy asked if a part of the proposal involved notifying the USSR in advance of our intentions. General Taylor responded that such notification was implicit but that the JCS paper represented a "military scenario" and that a "political scenario" was needed as a companion piece. Mr. Murphy responded that we had recently been encouraged by evidence that the Russians desire to negotiate and that this would indicate the desirability of signalling our intentions in advance.

Mr. Murphy then asked if his assumption is correct that the JCS did not wish at this point to engage in joint military planning with the British and French. The consensus of response appeared to be that detailed planning should be conducted in Europe instead of the U.S. and that General Norstad should be in overall charge. In response to Mr. Murphy's question General Taylor indicated that General Norstad's views had already been requested and would be incorporated in the final revision of plans which would be transmitted to Norstad after approval at the governmental level.

Mr. Murphy then commented on the French point of view. B1

Ambassador Alphand attempted to provide new language for Paragraph D which would bridge the gap between U.S. and UK thinking but without success. Mr. Murphy pointed out that recent reports from Paris indicate that General DeGaulle has been highly critical of U.S. policies and actions except as regards Berlin but this support of our firm stand in Berlin does not appear to be reflected in Ambassador Alphand's attitude here.

With regard to the British position, Ambassador Caccia has rigid instructions. Ambassador Whitney has recently reported the softness in the British attitude which he thinks may stem from the influence of

TOP SECRET

Lord Montbatten, who has been reported as saying that Britain cannot afford the risk of annihilation over the Berlin issue. Admiral Burke suggested that he might write Montbatten on the matter and Mr. Murphy agreed it would be useful if Admiral Burke could point out the U.S. view that if every test of strength with the Russians is viewed in terms of the risk of total destruction, there can be no agreement on a firm response in any situation.

Mr. Murphy then discussed the West German attitude and indicated that this must be explored further. One of the problems is Adenauer's detachment as a result of his illness last month. He has just sent Herr Dittman of the Foreign Office to the U.S. to discuss matters with the Department and we are in active consultation with Ambassador Grewe to whom we have put several leading questions designed to stimulate German thinking on possible solutions to the Berlin and German problems. We do not yet know the German reaction on such/as those posed by the proposals for the U.S. response to closure of ground access to Berlin. How far would West Germany like to see us go in our response to the closing off of access to Berlin. The German attitude has been that the U.S. should stand firm. The question is what will they do in support of such a stand and what risks will they be willing to take. Will they furnish West German troops if this is considered desirable.

General Twining asked if there were any State Department objections to placing General Norstad in charge. Mr. Murphy asked if Norstad's role involved both planning and command of actual operations. He indicated that he could not respond to the question without further study since larger issues were involved but that his initial reaction was that there were no other operational commanders who could be assigned to the job. General Taylor indicated that General Hodges (USAREUR) could be given command but that in principle it should be Norstad. It was agreed that the Department would express its views on this matter. Mr. Reinhardt added that the lack of enthusiasm in NATO would create a lot of problems

unil. 17 and Mr. Murphy added that it might be best to have planning conducted on a strictly U.S. basis under Norstad's direction as CINCEUR.

General Twining commented on the conversation with the President on January 13 at which the President had expressed [

B1

] The President mentioned that General Clay was not fully satisfied with the arrangements he was able to make on this matter while in Berlin. Mr. Murphy referred to the Department's recent publication on this point which makes a good case. He pointed out that our legal rights are based not only on the Clay-Zhukov talks but on the European Advisory Commission agreements in London in 1944 and on the Paris communique of 1949 following the end of the Berlin airlift. He added that our primary rights are those of conquest and stem as well from the quid pro quo area which established by U.S. withdrawal from the/ became the Soviet zone in exchange for our position in Berlin.

General Twining requested the Department's views on how we should react [

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General Taylor then stressed the necessity for "domestic education" to prepare the American public for our proposed Berlin plans. Mr. Murphy felt that there has been to date a good emotional reaction in the U.S. as evidenced by the bi-partisan applause in Congress at the mention of Berlin in the State of the Union message. He agreed, however, that the actual issues have not been explained so that there would be clear public understanding and that further education will indeed be necessary. General Twining commented that it would be more difficult if we "go it alone" without support of our allies. Mr. Murphy agreed and pointed out that this was what was so disappointing about the British attitude. He felt that the President would have to intercede with Prime Minister Macmillan if we are unable to make progress at the lower levels. Reference was made to Prime Minister Macmillan's recent letter to Secretary Dulles on this subject and to the Secretary's response which was planned for despatch today.

Mr. Murphy indicated in response to General Twining's question that the Mikoyan discussion with the Secretary on Friday will bear heavily on the problem of Berlin. Mr. Murphy pointed out that Secretary Dulles feels strongly that we must be prepared to meet the Russian challenge.

The discussion on Berlin closed with a strong expression of the JCS view by General Twining that an airlift will not settle the Berlin issue and should be avoided if at all possible.

2. C-130 Incident

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Number 2 of 2 copies, Series M.

(STATE DRAFT. Not cleared with Department of Defense)

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SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSIONS

OF

STATE-JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING

HELD IN ROOM 2C923, THE PENTAGON BUILDING

ON WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1959, AT 11:00 A.M.

PRESENT

Defense

General Twining, USAF
General Taylor, USA
Admiral Burke, USN
General White, USAF
General Pate, USMC
Lt. General Picher, USAF
Lt. General Moore, USA
Vice Admiral Dennison, USN
Lt. General Gerhart, USAF
Major General Roberts, USMC
Brig. General Hillyard, USA
Captain Cobb, USN
Rear Admiral Wellings, USN
Major General Terrill, USAF
Rear Admiral Dudley, USN
Major General Johnson, USA
Brig. General Fields, USMC
Brig. General Whisenand, USAF

State

Mr. Robert Murphy
Mr. Frederick Reinhardt
Mr. Foy Kohler
Mr. Albert Mathews
Mr. Martin Hillenbrand
Mr. Robert McFarlane
Mr. Dwight Porter

ISA

Mr. Robert Knight

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by _____ DATE _____
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DENY () RIGHT-OF-RESPONSE INFO.
FOR EO on CIA exemptions _____
_____ to authority to:
() CLASSIFY AS _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TO () or () OADR

1. Berlin
2. C-130 Case
3. DeGaulle Proposals for Tripartite Action

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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USA - FOIA
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1. Berlin

Mr. Murphy opened the meeting by referring to the tripartite talks which had been held with the British and French on the question of Paragraph D of the paper on Berlin contingency planning. He quoted Paragraph D of the U.S. aide-memoire of December 11, 1958, as follows:

"At this stage of developments [i.e., when Allied surface traffic between Berlin and West Germany are not allowed to transit the Soviet Zone without dealing with East German personnel] and before considering resort to an airlift, an attempt to reopen access through the use of limited military force should be made in order to demonstrate our determination to maintain surface access. In any case, the Soviets and East Germans should not be allowed to entertain doubts as to our determination to do so if need be. Even if force is not resorted to at once we should continue to assert our rights to resume interrupted traffic and our intention to do so by force."

He mentioned that Mr. Irwin and General Johnson had been participating in the talks and that he assumed the JCS was currently informed.

Mr. Murphy discussed the British position [which appeared to be to evade the essential point of making a determination whether or not to respond with military force in the event of denial of allied land access rights to Berlin.] The U.S. position is that the principle should be decided upon and agreed by the three powers before detailed military planning is entered into. [The British wish a joint planning operation which will examine all of the military aspects of the problem - apparently before the decision is rendered on the basic principle.] He said that the purpose of the meeting was to arrive at a coordinated U.S. point of view and to assure that the military judgment of the JCS was in consonance with the political judgment of the Department on this matter.

General Twining indicated that the Joint Chiefs had approved on January 13 a planning paper on the military preparations for action in the Berlin situation as required by Paragraph D. The paper is now

in my file
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before the Secretary of Defense, who has expressed his desire to give it further consideration and perhaps to make some amendments but it represents the basic JCS thinking on the matter. The paper is for U.S. use only (copies of the draft JCS paper were provided to Mr. Murphy for the Department's study and information on the understanding that it would not be considered a final document until cleared by the Secretary of Defense). General Twining went on to describe the paper as the Joint Chiefs idea of all the steps that must be taken to prepare for possible action in the Berlin situation. He felt that it was important the Department understand what the military requirements of the situation are.

General White then intervened to inquire if the Department had taken a firm political decision to press for the action envisioned in Paragraph D. Mr. Murphy replied that the decision was taken in principle by the Department to take all possible measures to secure our right of land access to Berlin and at the same time to make sure that a posture which indicated that we were contemplating an airlift solution be avoided. He felt that if the USSR could be sure that the allies plan to react by instituting an airlift they would know we were "walking away" from Berlin. This evidence of weakness would be extremely important to the Soviets in planning their subsequent moves. He referred in passing to the parallel situation in 1948 and his belief that a firm response on the ground at that time to the blockade would have been successful and would have had a basic influence on subsequent Russian tests of our intentions as in Korea. In response to a further question from General White asking clarification of our policy, Mr. Murphy stated specifically that the Department was supporting the language of Paragraph D. Paragraph D must, of course, be considered in the context of the entire paper on contingency planning, including the later section which discusses the possibility of an airlift. He then quoted the last paragraph, Section A, as follows:

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"As a concomitant to the above course of action, we should consider whether the Three Powers should not take some additional step to guarantee their unrestricted air access to Berlin, which would be essential to maintaining the status and security of the city. The Three Powers might, for example, reformulate and restate their Berlin guarantee, modifying it to add that they will regard any interference with their right and practice of unrestricted access to Berlin by air, including operation of their civil air carriers, as an attack upon their forces and upon themselves. Here the issue of flight in the corridors over 10,000 feet might be solved by a simple Three Power agreement to fly at an altitude appropriate to efficient operation of individual aircraft. Communist harassment of our air access, which would be possible only through patent application of force, would be clear evidence of provocative intent. If it occurred, we could then take such military/political/economic counteraction as necessary to maintain Berlin with assurance that such action would have the support of American, French, British and German public opinion."

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He pointed out that we were not excluding [the possibility of an air...] or indeed any other possibility but that we felt that the psychological effect of the action proposed under Section D was essential.

Admiral Burke indicated his full concurrence with the Department's position. He pointed out that the decision involved not only plan... but the taking of many preparatory steps ahead of the time of action. If we sent an armed force into East Germany, we must be prepared to follow through. [It should only be a matter of minutes before reinforcements were sent in if the probing force were halted.] General White then asked again if the State Department was prepared to support the statement in Paragraph D. Mr. Murphy answered yes but pointed out the purpose of the meeting was to be sure that "he whose ox may be gored" is also in agreement.

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CONFIDENTIAL, GERM

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- 4 -

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Mr. Murphy then asked if his assumption is correct that the JCS did not wish at this point to engage in joint military planning with the British and French. The consensus of response appeared to be that detailed planning should be conducted in Europe instead of the U.S. and that General Norstad should be in overall charge. In response to Mr. Murphy's question General Taylor indicated that General Norstad's views had already been requested and would be incorporated in the final revision of plans which would be transmitted to Norstad after approval at the governmental level.

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With regard to the British position, Ambassador Caccia has rigid instructions. Ambassador Whitney has recently reported the softness in the British attitude which he thinks may stem from the influence of

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- 6 -

and Mr. Murphy added that it might be best to have planning conducted on a strictly U.S. basis under Norstad's direction as CINCEUR.

General Twining commented on the conversation with the President on January 13 at which the President had expressed doubts as to our legal status in Berlin as the basis for military action to reopen ground access. The President mentioned that General Clay was not fully satisfied with the arrangements he was able to make on this matter while in Berlin. Mr. Murphy referred to the Department's recent publication on this point which makes a good case. He pointed out that our legal rights are based not only on the Clay-Zhukov talks but on the European Advisory Commission agreements in London in 1944 and on the Paris communique of 1949 following the end of the Berlin airlift. He added that our primary rights are those of conquest and ^{stem as well from} the quid pro quo ^{area which} established by U.S. withdrawal from the/ became the Soviet zone in exchange for our position in Berlin.

General Twining requested the Department's views on how we should react if the Soviet authorities pulled out of East Germany and turned over their responsibilities to GDR officials, i.e., documentation, travel control, etc. Mr. Murphy indicated that we proposed to refuse to deal with the GDR officials. He felt that the GDR authorities might continue to let us have access to Berlin without recognition of their authority. If they did not do so they would be faced with the difficult decision of attacking us or establishing a blockade. He then discussed the "agency theory" to which Mr. Dulles had earlier referred and which elicited a violent negative reaction from West Germany which the Secretary thought was unjustified. The West Germans are now dealing on a de facto basis with the East Germans in many activities. Despite this they refuse to consider the possibility that we might deal with the East Germans as "agents" of the USSR. Mr. Kohler added that the Secretary's public rejection of the "agency theory" was based on the earlier contingency plan for Berlin and that the situation today makes it clear that the USSR has

Lord Montbatten, who has been reported as saying that Britain cannot afford the risk of annihilation over the Berlin issue. Admiral Burke suggested that he might write Montbatten on the matter and Mr. Murphy agreed it would be useful if Admiral Burke could point out the U.S. view that if every test of strength with the Russians is viewed in terms of the risk of total destruction, there can be no agreement on a firm response in any situation.

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- 7 -

rejected the agency concept but instead proposes to substitute East German for Soviet personnel.

General Taylor then stressed the necessity for "domestic education" to prepare the American public for our proposed Berlin plans. Mr. Murphy felt that there has been to date a good emotional reaction in the U.S. as evidenced by the bi-partisan applause in Congress at the mention of Berlin in the State of the Union message. He agreed, however, that the actual issues have not been explained so that there would be clear public understanding and that further education will indeed be necessary.

General Twining commented that it would be more difficult if we "go it alone" without support of our allies. Mr. Murphy agreed and pointed out that this was what was so disappointing about the British attitude. He felt that the President would have to intercede with Prime Minister Macmillan if we are unable to make progress at the lower levels. Reference was made to Prime Minister Macmillan's recent letter to Secretary Dulles on this subject and to the Secretary's response which was planned for despatch today.

Mr. Murphy indicated in response to General Twining's question that the Mikoyan discussion with the Secretary on Friday will bear heavily on the problem of Berlin. Mr. Murphy pointed out that Secretary Dulles feels strongly that we must be prepared to meet the Russian challenge.

The discussion on Berlin closed with a strong expression of the JCS view by General Twining that an airlift will not settle the Berlin issue and should be avoided if at all possible.

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1/14/59
INCOMING TELEGRAM

502
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ACTION COPY
Department of State

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Action
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Info

(21)

SECRET

Control:
Rec'd:

7172
JANUARY 14, 1959
10:35 AM

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1477, JANUARY 14, 4 PM

Bonn
1477

NIACT

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY FROM BRUCE

ADENAUER SENT FOR ME THIS MORNING. FONMIN ALSO PRESENT. HE SAID HAD JUST HELD CABINET MEETING, AND DISCUSSION LARGELY CONFINED TO DISCUSSION TEXT YOUR PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY.

I VERIFIED FACT HE HAD CORRECT TRANSCRIPT.

HE CONCENTRATED REMARKS ON THAT PORTION CONCERNING FREE ELECTIONS NOT BEING AN ABSOLUTELY EXCLUSIVE METHOD.

HE SAID REPERCUSSIONS IN GERMANY WOULD BE MOMENTOUS, AND DESTRUCTIVE OF HIS LONG ESTABLISHED POLICY THAT REUNIFICATION COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS. ALREADY MOST SPD AND FDP LEADERS HAD FAVORED CONVERSATIONS WITH PANKOW. THIS WAS FOR HIM INADMISSABLE, SINCE WHOLE EAST GERMANY WAS IN EFFECT ONLY AN EXTENSION OF SOVIET UNION, AND IDEA CONFEDERATION IN ANY FORM TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. NOW THOSE NAIVE PEOPLE READ NEGOTIATE WITH PANKOW WOULD BE ENCOURAGED BY INTERPRETATION THEY WOULD GIVE IN THEIR OWN INTERETS TO YOUR HAVING OPENED DOOR TO OTHER POSSIBLE METHODS BRING ABOUT REUNIFICATION.

I WOULD CHARACTERIZE HIS AND BRENTANO'S EXPRESSIONS AS BEING LITTLE SHORT OF VIOLENT. I TRIED TO ASSUAGE THEIR ALARM BY PLACING THE MATTER IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE BUT TO LITTLE AVAIL.

(2) ADENAUER ASKED ME TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU URGENTLY HIS PRE- OCCUPATION, AND TO INQUIRE WHETHER YOU COULD NOT, IN RESPONSE TO A PLANTED QUESTION, ENTER INTO EXPLANATION AS TO WHY YOUR

PERMANENT

SECRET

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SECRET

-2-1477, JANUARY 14, 4 PM FROM BONN

RESPONSE TN THIS REGARD WAS THEORETICAL, AND DID NOT INDICATE ANY INTENTION OF CONSIDERING DEPARTURE FROM LONG ESTABLISHED POLICY. WHEN I SOUGHT CONSTRUCTIVE THOUGHT AS TO SUBSTANCE, THEY WERE UNPRODUCTIVE.

THEY ANTICIPATE SHORTLY VIOLENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST GOVT BASED ON ASSUMPTION U.S. READY TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE TO FREE ELECTIONS, INCLUDING ASSENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN FEDREP AND PANKOW.

IF IT BE PRACTICABLE AND ADVISABLE TO TRY TO COMPLY WITH CHANCELLOR'S REQUEST, SUGGEST YOU MIGHT CONSIDER SOME SUCH LANGUAGE AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE THERE ARE VARIOUS THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR BRINGING ABOUT REUNIFICATION OF DIVIDED PORTIONS OF A FORMERLY UNITED COUNTRY. BUT, IN THE CASE OF GERMANY, SINCE SOVIETS HAVE INVARIABLY DENIED CITIZENS OF SO-CALLED GDR RIGHT TO EXPRESS THEIR WISHES IN A DEMOCRATIC MANNER, NO NEGOTIATIONS COULD SATISFACTORILY RESULT UNLESS THEY HAD AS A PREMISE THE ACCEPTANCE OF FREE ELECTION PROCEDURES IN BOTH PARTS OF GERMANY. UNQUOTE

CHANCELLOR SAID HE WAS MORE CONCERNED THAN EVER ABOUT OUTCOME CONVERSTIONS WITH MIKOYAN. ANY COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING THEM SHOULD BE DRAFTED WITH UTMOST CLARITY SO THAT MIKOYAN AND KHRUSHCHEV COULD NOT DISTORT CONTENTS TO SERVE THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

I AM FOLLOWING THIS IMMEDIATELY WITH ANOTHER TELEGRAM FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION, EXPRESSING CERTAIN GENERAL THOUGHTS ON GERMAN PROBLEMS.

BRUCE

JAK

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1/26/59

1987/1378

Personal and Private


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THINKING OUT LOUD
BY
JOHN FOSTER DULLES

I am particularly concerned at the diagnosis of Western European public opinion. It indicates that this public opinion would not permit the governments to risk launching a land operation merely to keep open the Western access to Berlin.

Perhaps access as of right, rather than at GDR sufferance, seems a "minor" difference. But it is always possible for the Soviet Union to stage its demands and its probing so that each step seems a relatively little step and one for which it is not worthwhile to risk war. That of course means that the very great Soviet gains could be made merely by making them in stages and by degrees.

I wonder whether, if opinion is as represented, Western Europe is really defensible at all.



DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 85-413-7LHC NLE Date 2/18/86

-1-

PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5 a(3)State letter 11/22/85NLE DATE 2/18/86

Box 7, White House Correspondence -
General 1959

The present suggestion relates to the abdication by the Soviet Union of its agreed responsibilities and substituting the GDR under conditions which would compel us, if we acquiesce, to deal with the GDR as a government. (I am not now speaking of possibly dealing with GDR officials as agents of the Soviet Union which would be quite a different matter.) Such acceptance of the GDR would greatly enhance its prestige and shore up the uncertain structure of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. It would dismay and dishearten the population of Berlin and, I would assume, the large majority of the people of the Federal Republic. It would expose the lack of willpower in the Western alliance and encourage further pressures.



I do not believe that this can be treated as a relatively minor gain for the Soviet Union and only a minor loss to the Western world.

In my opinion the risk of war developing is minimized if the Soviet Union



realizes that we are prepared to be strong and to exercise our rights.

I am convinced that the striking power of the United States constitutes a genuine and effective deterrent unless the Soviets would finally calculate that there is not the moral courage to use it when necessary. Another deterring consideration is that the Soviets would not want to stir up the situation in Eastern Europe, where disloyalty and disaffection are rampant.

Of course, no amount of power operates as a deterrent unless there is the will to use it when so compelled by the violation of our rights.

So far as we are concerned, the will is present. If so far as Western Europe is concerned, the will is lacking, then I fear our entire NATO concept and US participation in it will require drastic review.

I would of course agree that there should be an avoidance of preliminary measures which might inaugurate a panic. On the other hand, if it is not possible in a serious situation to take reasonable



preliminary measures without a panic starting, then we are in a bad position.

I note the suggestion that there is a tendency in Europe to think that the United States would like to see a "snowdown" in Europe, from

the hazards of which the United States would be immune.

In the foreseeable

future no aggressive despot is going to allow himself to become involved

in a difficult and dangerous struggle in Europe while the power and resources of the United States remain intact. The Kaiser and Hitler did this, and paid the price. The obvious lesson has now been learned, and if the Soviets started a general European war, the United States would be hit first and hardest.

If a contrary view prevails in Europe, and if the Western European Governments are compelled to act on the assumption the

Woods "not out" saying
back view of it has been
expressed - see att

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Personal and Private

~~TOP SECRET~~

United States wants to get them into a war on the theory that this country would be relatively immune, that again reveals a situation which gravely affects all our common thinking and planning for the security of Western Europe.



I would hope that in these matters the governments which know better would be able to give leadership, rather than be led by the people who you suggest hold false ideas.

I am not sure that the view is widely held in Europe that the United States is trying to provoke European war.

The United States has sent to Europe and maintained there a large part of its own military force, approximately 8 divisions, to say nothing of naval, air and logistic formations. The theory was to make it apparent to all, and not least of all to the people of Western Europe, that this time there could not be a European war without the United States being

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Personal and Private

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
fully involved from the beginning. If our presence there does not serve that purpose, that again raises some questions for the future.

It seems to me that what the United States did with the United Kingdom in the Near East, and what the United States did in the Far East (Formosa), has served to demonstrate to all the world that the United States is not trying to assure that if war comes it will come in Europe, leaving us relatively immune. We are dedicated to peace, and to the conviction that there must be a steady and openly understood determination that as against the designs of International Communism and Soviet Imperialism, only a display of strength and firmness of will can possibly maintain the peace.



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that Mr. Lloyd is "not criticizing such a view if it has been expressed".

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Of course the fact is, as Mr. Lloyd admits,] that in the foreseeable future no aggressive despot is going to allow himself to become involved in a difficult and dangerous struggle in Europe while the power and resources of the United States remain intact. The Kaiser and Hitler did this, and paid the price. The obvious lesson has now been learned, and if the Soviets started a general European war, the United States would be hit first and hardest.

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JFD memo 1/26/59 (re: memo) - Thursday Out Lond
Dikes pp 17 Mudd ~~Added~~ (new stuff)

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9 1986

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~~STRICTLY PERSONAL~~



Thinking aloud by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

I believe that there is a large measure of agreement between us about the basic issues in the German situation:

(a) We must not give in to force or to the threat of force. Once we do that we are sunk, and I fully agree with Mr. Dulles' point that this issue was easier to present with Quemoy and Matsu than it is with Berlin. In the case of Quemoy and Matsu it was the Chinese Communists who had to take the military initiative. In the case of Berlin, if access is denied to the West, it may seem to be the West which is taking the military initiative.

(b) Before a military probe which might result in widespread hostilities, the West would have to take certain preparatory measures, which would be apparent to everyone for a considerable time beforehand. We must take account of the fact that in the modern world pressures can be set up during such a preparatory period that will make it impossible to carry out the operation for which the preparations are being made. My fear is that during the N.A.T.O. preparations which are a condition precedent for the land probe, public opinion in Europe would run out on us and pressures would develop, perhaps in the United Nations or elsewhere, which would make it impossible in fact to launch the operation by land.

(c) However much ~~he~~ ^{we} and I see the necessity of not giving in to the threat of force, it is frankly impossible for us to mobilise public opinion in Britain in favour of a world war to insist that the Russians should remain in occupation of the Eastern sector of Berlin and that they, rather than the East German officials, should stamp the passes of Allied personnel travelling to and from Berlin. I believe that we could mobilise opinion in favour of running great risks to prevent

~~TOP SECRET~~ AND STRICTLY PERSONAL



two and one quarter million people, even though they are Germans, falling under Communist domination. But if the East Germans offer all the facilities for access to Berlin at present being enjoyed under Russian control, whatever the principle involved may be, it is just not possible to put free Europe into the frame of mind in which it was, say, at the time of the fall of Czechoslovakia or the Berlin blockade in 1948.

(d) There is the additional danger to United States relations with Europe that it is widely felt that some people in America would like a showdown in Europe before the United States itself would suffer the same hazards as the countries of Western Europe. I am not criticising such a view if it has been expressed. From the point of view of hard logic, it could be said that the fact that the United States will not suffer as much as Europe is Europe's greatest safeguard against the catastrophe happening i.e. the Russians will never risk it unless they can hit the United States as hard as Europe. That however is the sort of argument which Mr. Dulles and I can well understand, but is extraordinarily difficult to present to public opinion here.

(e) By and large, I believe that our people are robust. They will fight even though it means disaster rather than be subjugated by the Russians. They will not however be willing to be committed to fighting for what will seem to many people to be a technicality.

(f) These general comments on opinion here and in Western Europe lead to the obvious conclusion that we must handle developments with great care. I agree with Mr. Dulles that in many ways the views of Adenauer are the crux of the matter. At present he seems to want to have it both ways: He wants the re-unification of Germany on Western terms which will give complete freedom for a re-united Germany to join N.A.T.O. and

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STRICTLY PERSONAL



dispose of the Communist regime in Eastern Germany. He is even, I am told, doubtful about repeating the guarantees about the West taking no military advantage from the re-unification of Germany. In addition to taking this view about the re-unification of Germany, he says that as long as Germany is divided he will not accept any developments in Central Europe which might reduce tension because in his view such an arrangement would freeze the present position and make re-unification less likely. I think that the latter proposition is very difficult for us to continue to accept. Nor do I believe that this view will necessarily long survive in Germany. I think we should urge the Germans to accept, as Mr. Dulles himself hinted, some drawing together of East and Western Germany in a Confederation or in some other way in the confident belief that Western Germany is the more powerful and would be the magnet (the number of refugees, and what happened in June 1953 are surely proofs of this proposition). Such a Confederation might be possible, still leaving freedom of choice to Western Germany and indeed to Eastern Germany in Foreign Affairs. Although it is not an exact parallel, members of the Commonwealth have vastly different foreign policies and have different defence arrangements.

(g) If the Federal German Republic refuse to entertain this idea then they must be prepared to accept the West offering some limitation of armaments in Central Europe under proper control. I do not believe myself that any such limitation should be permitted to discriminate against the nationality of the forces concerned or against nuclear weapons. But I see no reason why, under proper control, there should be any objection to a limited number of troops with limited quantity of arms in a given area. I admit that this comes close to the Rapacki Plan, but without that plan's discrimination against foreign troops or nuclear weapons.

2. In the light of the above our conception of how the hand



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STRICTLY PERSONAL

should be played is as follows:-

- (a) we would warmly welcome at any time a visit by Mr. Dulles to talk to the Prime Minister and myself and any visit by Mr. Dulles to Bonn and Paris.
- (b) A visit by the Prime Minister to Russia would be just the kind of Western initiative which would be welcomed by those classes of opinion in Europe whose support it is important to have for a firm policy. We have no idea of such a visit being for the purpose of negotiation nor for revealing the United Kingdom position, particularly if it seemed to involve any difference of emphasis from that of the United States, the Federal German Republic or any other of our Western allies.

The visit would be

- (1) a psychological exercise vis-a-vis Western Europe and the uncommitted countries of the world;
- (2) A reconnaissance of the Russian views upon these matters, in the light of which it would be possible for the Prime Minister to have a very frank talk with Adenauer. Before this talk there would be a full exchange of views with Mr. Dulles.
- (c) Although Moscow may seem a long way round to get to Washington, there is, however, the timing to be taken into account. I believe that very important Anglo-American decisions will have to be taken towards the end of March, immediately before the N.A.T.O. meeting. I do not think it is possible to take them until there has been, for the reasons stated above, this psychological gesture and reconnaissance and, perhaps more important, a discussion with the German Chancellor in the light of the visit. In saying this I think it also very important that Mr. Dulles should have his talk with Adenauer.

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STRICTLY PERSONAL

3. Therefore I think the right time-table is for the Prime Minister's visit to the Soviet Union, including travelling, to take place from, say February 20 to March 4: Between March 4 and say, March 20, short visits by the Prime Minister to Bonn, Paris; then about March 20 the effective discussions in Washington between the President, Mr. Dulles, the Prime Minister and myself. I believe that this sequence and timing is what will be of great advantage to us. I also think it is the best way to keep the bulk of opinion in this country and Western Europe resolute and calm. Therefore after taking very careful account of the President's and Mr. Dulles' views, we have decided to sound out the Russians.



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THINKING OUT LOUD
BY
JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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Perhaps access as of right, rather than at GDR sufferance, seems a "minor" difference. But it is always possible for the Soviet Union to stage its demands and its probing so that each step seems a relatively little step and one for which it is not worthwhile to risk war. That of course means that the very great Soviet gains could be made merely by making them in stages and by degrees.



I wonder whether, if opinion is as represented, Western Europe is really defensible at all.

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59

WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDA SERIES
Box 7, White House Correspondence -
General 1959

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Agency Case	State 8702371
NLE Case	87-21041
By	RLK
NLE Date	2/1/88

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The present suggestion relates to the abdication by the Soviet Union of its agreed responsibilities and substituting the GDR under conditions which would compel us, if we acquiesce, to deal with the GDR as a government. (I am not now speaking of possibly dealing with GDR officials as agents of the Soviet Union which would be quite a different matter.) Such acceptance of the GDR would greatly enhance its prestige and shore up the uncertain structure of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. It would dismay and dishearten the population of Berlin and, I would assume, the large majority of the people of the Federal Republic. It would expose the lack of willpower in the Western alliance and encourage further pressures.



I do not believe that this can be treated as a relatively minor gain for the Soviet Union and only a minor loss to the Western world.

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realizes that we are prepared to be strong and to exercise our rights.

I am convinced that the striking power of the United States constitutes

a genuine and effective deterrent unless the Soviets would finally calculate

that there is not the moral courage to use it when necessary. Another

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If a contrary view prevails in Europe, and if the Western European Governments are compelled to act on the assumption the

Personal and Private
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I would hope that in these matters the governments which know better would be able to give leadership, rather than be led by the people who you suggest hold false ideas. And, although I would not set my judgment against Mr. Lloyd's, I am not sure that the view is widely held in Europe that the United States is trying to provoke European war.

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fully involved from the beginning. If our presence there does not

serve that purpose, that again raises some questions for the future.

It seems to me that what the United States did with the United

Kingdom in the Near East, and what the United States did in the Far

East (Formosa), has served to demonstrate to all the world that the

United States is not trying to assure that if war comes it will come in


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
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Imperialism, only a display of strength and firmness of will can possibly

maintain the peace.



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APPENDIX "A"

MILITARY PREPARATIONS*

ACTION


TIME OF
INITIATION

** K-120

(27 January 1959)

2425

1. Tripartite governments reach agreement on a course of action to demonstrate intentions to maintain Allied rights of access to and in Berlin.
2. Seek support of West Germany and the other NATO powers for the tripartitely agreed course of action.
3. Inform appropriate political authorities and military commanders of the agreed tripartite course of action.
4. At the national level, prepare a program of measures to place the U.S. and its Allies in a military posture to undertake military actions up to and including general war.
5. Step up military activities in and adjacent to Berlin, such as:
 - a. Augment the MP detachments on Autobahn check points at Helmstedt and Berlin (U.S. and/or Allied soldiers could be in evidence standing at the barriers instead of sitting at desks inside buildings and leaving the physical passage of vehicles to West Germans and Berlin police).
 - b. Augment military train guards.
 - c. Replace some Labor Service guards around Tempelhof Airfields and substitute military guards therefor at principal posts.



See Def. Cont. No. 33

- * Plans for and implementation of U.S. civil defense measures should parallel military preparations
- ** K-Day is the day when East Germans replace Soviets at the control points and impose GDR restrictions on Allied traffic.

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ACTION

TIME OF
INITIATION

K-120
(27 January 1959)

5. Initiate action to replenish the stockpile in Berlin as necessary.
7. Review adequacy and timeliness of plans to meet emergency situation in Berlin; i.e., air contingency plans, air lift plans, evacuation plans, and plans for use of limited military force on the ground including command arrangements, a composition of force (United States should indicate willingness to provide the commander).
8. Inform appropriate unified and specified commanders of U.S. plans to show determination and increase readiness to meet the Berlin situation.
9. Institute concerted intra- and inter-governmental public information plans to convince Allied, neutral, and satellite populations of legal and moral propriety of Allied stand and to prepare them for possible use of force to protect Berlin and Free World from Soviet aggression.
10. Prepare cover and deception plan for implementation at about K-90 which will enhance impact of Allied actions on Soviet leaders.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED



TIME OF
INITIATION
K-90

(27 February 1959)

ACTION

1. Direct Allied commanders to coordinate plans of action with appropriate local tripartite and West German military commanders.
2. Announce plans to improve the readiness of all active elements of the Services.
3. Step-up military activities in Berlin and West Germany such as:
 - a. Provide motorized MP patrol on the Autobahn on a 24-hour basis. (Present operations call for dispatch of a wrecker after a vehicle is two hours or more overdue at either check point).
 - b. Increase patrolling by Allied forces along the Iron Curtain opposite East Germany.
 - c. Initiate increased tripartite field training by U.S., British, and French Forces augmented by Force "B" of the West German police in Grunewald Forest.
4. Through covert channels and by appropriate cover and deception means indicate to Soviets that US-UK-French-FRG and other NATO Allies as applicable have completed all plans and are ready to activate them on short notice in order to assume a posture of military readiness in Berlin and Western Europe. These plans include measures to:
 - a. Place military forces in field readiness for movement and combat; concurrent de-activation of fixed base housekeeping recreation and logistics support facilities.

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TIME OF
INITIATION

K-90
(27 February 1959)

ACTION

- b. Institute wartime censorship.
- c. Cancel out-of-area leaves, night and week-end passes; curtail passes as to numbers, time and distance from unit.
- d. Double security patrols and personnel on 24-hour alert.
- e. Restrict supplies to military forces from outside readiness zones to POL, field rations, clothing, weapons, ammo, equipment, and other essentials.

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Appendix "A"

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TIME OF
INITIATION

K-60
(27 March 1959)

ACTION

1. Initiate measures to bring U.S. forces in Europe up to authorized T/O&E and reinforce USCINCEUR as appropriate.
2. Step-up military activities in and adjacent to Berlin, such as:
 - a. Intensify field training of the Berlin Garrisons.
 - b. Increase military air traffic to Berlin.
3. Conduct intensified training in Western Europe.
4. Take preliminary measures, to include preparations for deployment of necessary lift, to evacuate U.S. non-combatant personnel.
5. Determine and implement appropriate degree of national mobilization as indicated by the situation (see K-30 and K-Day).

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- 5 -

Appendix "A"

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TIME OF
INITIATION

K-30
(27 April 1959)

ACTION

1. Conduct combat exercises in the air and on the ground to demonstrate readiness and capability of U.S. forces in Europe.
2. Freeze military personnel in Europe; suspend movement of U.S. dependents to Europe.
3. Arrange with the State Department timing of evacuation of U.S. dependents and stopping civilian traffic to Europe.
4. Determine and dispatch to unified and specified commanders warning orders and/or the degree of alert they should assume to meet the existing situation.
5. Arrange for continuation of Free World civil airline flights into Berlin, under military sponsorship if required.
6. Determine and implement appropriate degree of national mobilization, as indicated by the situation, and not inaugurated sooner (see K-50).

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Appendix "A"

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ACTION

TIME OF
INITIATION

K-Day
(23 May 1959)



1. Reiterate publicly Allied determination to maintain our position in Berlin, and the intent to maintain free access thereto, if necessary by force.
2. When GDR restrictions at checkpoints are actually put into effect, deliver formal protest to Soviet Union, and file official complaint with the United Nations.
3. Determine and despatch to unified and specified commanders and civil defense agencies the degree of alert they should assume to meet the existing situation.
4. Determine and implement appropriate degree of national mobilization, as indicated by the situation. (See K-30)
5. Be prepared to counter Soviet or GDR efforts to jam Allied air and ground communications and air navigational aids.
6. Select time and place for initial attempt to re-open surface access to Berlin, and obtain Presidential approval thereof, if not already authorized.
7. Issue instructions to aircraft commanders operating in Berlin corridors regarding action to be taken if threatened or attacked.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Appendix "A"

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UNCLASSIFIED APPENDIX "B"

CONCEPT FOR TEST BY APPLICATION OF LIMITED FORCE

1. In order to demonstrate Allied determination to maintain ~~access to Berlin~~ ~~to Berlin and to avoid accepting loss~~ of access through bluff or obstruction short of the use of major military force, the Allies will use limited military force to test the Soviet and GDR intention.

2. Shortly after taking the K-Day actions enumerated in Appendix "A", the Allies will dispatch a small motor convoy along the access route, preferably from West Germany toward West Berlin. The convoy will include an armed, platoon-size combat escort of appropriate Allied composition equipped with long-range radio. The convoy and its combat escort will push through any opposition encountered, using force until stopped.

~~The established surface route to Berlin will not be violated except if necessary to defend the convoy from GDR or Soviet military action.~~
The established surface route to Berlin will not be violated except if necessary to defend the convoy from GDR or Soviet military action.

3. In the event the convoy and its combat escort are cut off or stopped by force, the Allies will dispatch an Allied formation not to exceed a reinforced division from West Germany toward West Berlin via the access route. The mission of this formation will be to reopen the route to Berlin and assume control thereof, opening fire only if fired upon.

The decision to dispatch this force must be taken in full

~~recognition that it may lead to further major military operations.~~
Prior to this decision, the following conditions should exist:

- a. The noncombatant evacuation order will have been implemented in Berlin. In West Germany its implementation will depend upon existing circumstances.

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- 8 -

Appendix "B"

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SecDef. Cont. No. 85

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- b. NATO will be ready for general war.
- c. The United States will have partially mobilized and be ready to pass to full mobilization.
- d. U.S. forces will have been placed on war alert.
- e.
- f. Appropriate civil defense measures will be in effect in the continental United States.

4. If the ground action in division strength fails to accomplish the mission because of strong resistance, either Soviet or East German, it will then be clear that a blockade has been imposed for the purpose of forcing the Allies to abandon Berlin and that it cannot be lifted by measures short of those which may lead to general war. If West Berlin is not to be lost, a major political decision, pre-determined and agreed in advance of the event, must then be implemented. In case our Allies hold back, the United States must be prepared to take this action alone or with West Germany.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 9 -

Appendix "B"

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~~TOP SECRET~~
~~PERSONAL AND PRIVATE~~


January 29, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONCLUSIONS OF WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE RE BERLIN



1. We do not acquiesce in the substitution of GDR for Soviet officials as regards the Western occupying powers' movements to and from West Berlin.

Mere identification of the vehicles as those of one of the Western occupying powers will be provided to GDR officials on demand, and will not be construed as acquiescence in substitution. However, no stamping of papers or inspection will be acquiesced in.



DULLES, JOHN F. KENNEDY
Box 7, Meetings with the President - 1959 (2)

DECLASSIFIED

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.4

a(5)

Date letter 11/22/85

1/10/86

Authority

MR 85-413-10

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ZKO

NLE Date 9/18/86

~~TOP SECRET~~
Personal and Private



(Consideration would be given to the possibility of the stationing of Western allied inspectors in lieu of the withdrawn Soviet inspectors at the check points.)

5. The decision to apply further military pressures by the use of additional force would be subject to governmental decision in the event that the double barreled effort mentioned above was not successful.

6. Concurrently with the development of the foregoing program an effort would be made to bring about around the middle of April a Foreign Ministers' meeting with the Soviet Union on the various aspects of the

~~TOP SECRET~~

Personal and Private



German question. These talks might provide a cover which would facilitate the indefinite postponement or modification by the Soviet Union of their present "ultimatum" as regards Berlin.

(It is assumed that allied agreement would be obtainable along these lines. If not the question of U.S. action would have to be considered in the light of the allied position.)

S:JFDulles:ma:jm

1/29/59

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Personal and Private~~

January 29, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONCLUSIONS OF WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE RE BERLIN



1. We do not acquiesce in the substitution of GDR for Soviet officials as regards the Western occupying powers' movements to and from West Berlin.

Mere identification of the vehicles as those of one of the Western occupying powers will be provided to GDR officials on demand, and will not be construed as acquiescence in substitution. However, no stamping of papers or inspection will be acquiesced in.

2. Begin promptly quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures in West Germany and Berlin, to be taken during the period between now and May 27, of a kind that would be detectable by Soviet intelligence but which would not create public alarm.

New
3. After the attempted or announced substitution of GDR for USSR, the next unit to go through would be a truck or trucks accompanied by a scout car or some other vehicle with a capability for shooting. This unit, subject to the conditions mentioned in 1 above, would attempt to make the transit from Berlin. If the GDR or the Soviets interposed physical obstructions, then the effort would be discontinued and in no event would the armament be used unless it were fired upon, in which case it would take whatever defensive action seemed necessary

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Authority	MR 90-3/6 ⁴²
By	7/9/91
NLE Date	

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Personal and Private



(Consideration would be given to the possibility of the stationing of Western allied inspectors in lieu of the withdrawn Soviet inspectors at the check points.)

new
4. After the physical obstruction occurred, transit would be suspended for the time being and parallel efforts would be made to increase pressure on the Soviets and the GDR, along the following lines:

a) Seek to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet Union as a violator of agreements, a user of force and a threat to the peace. The situation could be taken to the Security Council and, in the event of veto there, to a special session of the General Assembly. Consideration could also be given to further forms of diplomatic pressure, including withdrawal of our Ambassador from Moscow;

b) Military preparations would be intensified and at this point could include measures which would be observable, as, for example, the evacuation of dependents from West Berlin, and possibly from Germany.

5. The decision to apply further military pressures by the use of additional force would be subject to governmental decision in the event that the double barreled effort mentioned above was not successful.

6. Concurrently with the development of the foregoing program an effort would be made to bring about around the middle of April a Foreign Ministers' meeting with the Soviet Union on the various aspects of the

~~TOP SECRET~~

Personal and Private



German question. These talks might provide a cover which would facilitate the indefinite postponement or modification by the Soviet Union of their present "ultimatum" as regards Berlin.

(It is assumed that allied agreement would be obtainable along these lines. If not the question of U.S. action would have to be considered in the light of the allied position.)

S:JFDulles:ma:jm

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TOP SECRET

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 1, 1959

SUBJECT: Exchange of Views with British Ambassador Prior to
London Visit

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary of State
Sir Harold Caccia, The British Ambassador
Mr. Foy Kohler, Deputy Asst. Secretary, EUR

COPIES TO: S/S-2
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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☒ Declassify ☐ In part and exclude as shown
EO 12356, Sec. 1.2 (a) (1)

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Ambassador Caccia called on the Secretary this afternoon at the former's request.

The Ambassador briefed the Secretary on the conversations which took place in London on January 29 between Herr van Scherpenberg, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. In this connection he handed the Secretary the attached memorandum outlining the points which Herr van Scherpenberg made. The Ambassador requested that we should not disclose that we had been briefed on these talks. Sir Harold indicated that the British view more or less coincided with that of the Germans. The British now agreed that the Washington Working Group should continue on substantive matters, after working out the Western reply to the Soviet note of January 10. However, they felt the Group should limit itself to discussion and refinement of the problems and alternatives, rather than try to develop agreed Governmental positions. Decisions would be left to the Ministers, to be taken at the time of the NATO Council Session here at the beginning of April.

The Secretary brought up the subject of the nuclear test suspension talks in Geneva in the light of a telegram which he was sending to the head of the American Delegation there, Ambassador Wadsworth, directing him not to table the proposed Western article on duration and other articles of

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the treaty draft pending further instructions. In this connection the Secretary cited to the Ambassador the dangers of this procedure in enabling the Soviet Delegation to create issues with respect to the material presented, particularly duration, and deflect attention from the central problem of an effective control system. He cited the opinion of his disarmament advisers and of the Pentagon, as well as members of Congress, that we were in danger of giving away little by little the substantive elements of our position. Clearly the Soviets were seeking an unacceptable veto and other limitations on the operations of the central machinery and this clearly constituted the breaking issue for our side. The Secretary said that he would be discussing this matter further with Prime Minister Macmillan in London.

The Secretary then went on to inform the Ambassador that on the occasion of his forthcoming visit to London he would wish to discuss not only the question of possible negotiations with respect to Germany but also the question of contingency planning which had been under tripartite discussion. In this connection he said that perhaps our original planning had gone somewhat too far. However, we had reviewed our position and he would have some concrete proposals to present with respect to allied action in anticipation and in the event of a Soviet move to turn over to the East Germans. Ambassador Caccia commented that it was essential that we be planning what to do in the event of such a Soviet move. He assumed however that what we had in mind was a fallback position in the event we did not previously come to some understanding with the Russians rather than a maneuver to bring matters to a head. The Secretary confirmed that this was our concept.

In parting the Ambassador mentioned that he was having a visit from the Duke and Duchess of Windsor on February 13 and 14.

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)
EPC/HDR by 10124194

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The following points were made by Herr van Scherpenberg, State Secretary at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the course of private talks with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and the Permanent Under-Secretary in London on January 29th.

1. Scherpenberg agreed that the replies to the Soviet Note of January 10 should be short, should not go into points of substance and should propose a Foreign Ministers' Conference with agenda arising from the recent notes. He thought we should aim at a conference to take place in late April in Vienna or Geneva. He thought June, as suggested by the French, would be too late.
2. He thought that the Washington Working Group should produce in addition to draft replies an analysis of the Western position, identifying the questions for decision by Ministers. The four Foreign Ministers should, he thought, meet in Paris in the week March 16-20. The Four Powers should submit their views to the NATO Council meeting in April.
3. As regards cooperation between the two Germanies, Scherpenberg said that confederation on D.D.R. terms was "nonsense" and generally recognized as such in the Federal Republic. But the Federal Government would not object to increased contacts between representatives of the two Germanies e.g. through association with the Four Power committee originally proposed by the Bundestag provided that such contacts were within a quadripartite framework.
4. He thought that among possible Western initiatives at a conference with the Russians were:
 - (a) A declaration by the Federal Government in some way confirming the Oder-Neisse line
 - (b) Agreement to discuss certain articles of the Soviet draft peace treaty e.g. those dealing with human rights,
 - (c) Some proposals for thinning out and/or denuclearisation provided these did not expressly discriminate against Germany as such.

Scherpenberg emphasized need for strict secrecy in working out fresh proposals and seemed reluctant to envisage much association of NATO with this work.

5. As regards Berlin Scherpenberg said that he thought that the Russians would not do more than hand over Berlin

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EPC/HDR by LS 10/24/94

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-2-

and the control points to the D.D.R. He did not think they would impose an actual blockade. But they might try gradually to integrate the West Berlin economy into that of the D.D.R. by causing difficulties for West Berlin exports to the West and simultaneously offering substantial D.D.R. orders to West Berlin firms.

6. Point D was not referred to except in so far as he said that we must decide what our sticking point was and that it could not be passports.

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (

EPC/HDR by JS 10/24/94

2/4/59

FROM: M J Hillenbrand

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-8

DATE: February 1, 1959

Time: 3:00 p.m.

Place: Emb. Residence, London

SUBJECT: IRBMs for Greece and Turkey

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
General Norstad
Ambassador Whitney
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Barbour
Mr. Greene
Mr. Thurston
Mr. Hillenbrand

ADDRESSES TO:

S/S - 2

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Paris for USRO

The Secretary said that General Norstad should know that some people in the State Department were opposed to IRBMs for Greece and Turkey. General Norstad commented that a year ago, a discussion had occurred in the Pentagon as a system of priorities. Mr. Murphy, representing the State Department, agreed that Turkey could be first. General Norstad said the recent developments had placed him in a difficult position. He had practically announced at the NATO meeting in December that the Turks were going to get IRBMs. They are now upset. We were stalling them off, claiming that technical and budgetary problems were presenting difficulties. As to the Greeks, the Secretary noted, our impression is that they are not pressing the matter at this time for political reasons. Mr. Thurston added that this was the case principally because of the municipal elections in March. General Norstad said that, if people were worried about the Turks misusing IRBMs, we could drag out definitely arrangements under which we would have to keep U. S. personnel present and eliminate thereby any such theoretical risk. The Turks were obviously not ready to move into any situation of full control over the IRBMs immediately.

In response to a remark that some opposed the IRBM program, arguing that it was actually an anti-deterrent rather than a deterrent, General Norstad said it would have positive psychological effects in both Europe and the United States. His own attitude on the military aspect was evidenced by his willingness to

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reduce

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reduce the original proposal of six squadrons to four; but he felt that we should go ahead with the four (ex the UK). He noted that, when he had mentioned the subject of second-generation IRBMs in the presence of Ambassador Blankenhorn, the latter had indulged in an emotional outburst to the effect that the Americans were now pulling out of Europe. The IRBM was obviously not an ultimate weapon, but its introduction into Europe would establish a pattern for a system which could be further developed. As a matter of fact an IRBM in Europe was better than an ICBM in the United States as a military weapon.

There was some discussion of the Italian situation as it affected the capacity of a caretaker government to sign the IRBM agreement. Mr. Thurston noted that the issue was essentially not a legal but a political one.

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Department of State

Noted by Mr. Gray

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42-M
Action

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Rec'd:

FEBRUARY 4, 1959

11:54 PM

EUR

FROM: LONDON

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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SS

NO: SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 4 REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 150, BONN 246, PARIS 621, BERLIN 79.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DURING MEETING LATE THIS AFTERNOON AT FONOFF SECRETARY AND SELWYN LLOYD DISCUSSED PRINCIPALLY BERLIN AND RELATED PROBLEMS. LLOYD SAID IT SEEMED WESTERN POWERS WERE IN STATE OF DISARRAY IN DEVELOPMENT THEIR POSITIONS. HOWEVER VAN SCHERPENBERG ON THURSDAY HAD GIVEN BRITISH IMPRESSION THAT FEDERAL REPUBLIC PREPARED TO SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY ON SUCH ISSUES AS FRONTIERS AND AREAS OF LIMITED ARMAMENT. LLOYD NOTED THAT HE OPPOSED AGREEMENT ON LATTER POINT IF IT INVOLVED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FOREIGN TROOPS, BUT THOUGHT THAT CONCEPT AREA OF CONTROLLED LIMITATION HAD MERIT.

FONSEC OUTLINED BRITISH VIEW THAT MEETING WITH SOVIETS SHOULD TAKE PLACE LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY, THAT NOTE TO SOVIETS SHOULD SUGGEST SPECIFIC TIME AND PLACE, AND THAT FURTHER MEETING 4 FOREIGN MINISTERS (PRESUMABLY AT TIME NATO MEETING) WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE WESTERN SUBSTANTIVE POSITION FORMULATED.

SECRETARY SAID PROBLEM SEEMED TO FALL INTO TWO PARTS; (A) BERLIN AND WHAT WESTERN POWERS SHOULD DO IF SOVIETS PROCEEDED TO HAND CONTROL OF ACCESS OVER TO GDR; (B) WHAT WESTERN POWERS DID ABOUT POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS WITH

SOVIETS

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~~Classification~~

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NLE Case	88-21442
By	8/10/85

OSAN/SA/8/Germany, US Policy Wwa
4/991/1386

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-2- SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM LONDON

SOVIETS AND HOW AND WHEN THEY SHOULD TRY TO BRING THESE ABOUT. RE DATE OF MEETING HE INDICATED IT DESIRABLE TO START BEFORE MAY 27. FRENCH, HOWEVER, DID NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. IN CONVERSATION YESTERDAY SECRETARY WITH AMBASSADOR ALPHAND, LATTER REITERATED POINT THAT ASKING FOR MEETING BEFORE MAY 27 WOULD BE SIGN OF WEAKNESS. SECRETARY SAID HE HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT EITHER NAMING OF DATE IN NOTE TO SOVIETS, OR MERELY SAYING THAT DATE AND PLACE SHOULD BE MUTUALLY AGREED, LEAVING SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS TO AMBASSADORS. ADVANTAGE OF MEETING WITH SOVIETS BEFORE MAY 27, SECRETARY CONTINUED, WAS THAT IT MIGHT PROVIDE SOVIETS WITH WAY OUT OF THEIR EXTREME BERLIN POSITION IF THEY WANTED TO FIND IT. IF MEETING WERE HELD WESTERN POWERS WOULD FACE MANY PROBLEMS, BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL.

RE SUBSTANCE, SECRETARY SAID HE THOUGHT WESTERN POSITION MIGHT BE BASICALLY SAME AS THAT OF NOVEMBER 1955, THOUGH IT COULD BE EMBELLISHED TO SOME EXTENT. ACTUALLY WESTERN POWERS HAD NEVER BEEN ABLE TO GET ACROSS MERITS THEIR POSITION. MOLOTOV HAD CLEVERLY PUT THEM ON DEFENSIVE BY MISREPRESENTING PROPOSALS AT OUTSET. US WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THINNING OUT OF FORCES, GIVING CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO MILITARY VIEWS AS TO DESIRABILITY, BUT AGREED THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION EITHER AS TO FOREIGN TROOPS OR AS TO COUNTRY COVERED. OUR THESIS IS THAT NO NATION TODAY IS STRONG ENOUGH TO PROTECT ITS OWN SECURITY: COUNTRIES MUST HELP EACH OTHER. IF WE ADMIT THAT FOREIGN TROOPS IN GERMANY ARE PER SE EVIL, THEN THE WHOLE CONCEPT WOULD BE UNDERMINED. THINNING OUT COULD THEREFORE BE CONSIDERED, BUT NOT ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN FORCES. IN GENERAL IF DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS WERE APPLIED TO GERMANY IN ANY SETTLEMENT, WE WOULD AGAIN REAP CONSEQUENCES SIMILAR TO THOSE OF VERSAILLES. SOME FORMULATION WHICH STILL KEPT PORTION OF OUR FORCES IN GERMANY AND WHICH WAS BROADER THAN GERMANY IN APPLICATION PREFERABLY BROADER THAN POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS WELL, MIGHT BE CONSIDERED.

AFTER LLOYD

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-3- SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM LONDON

AFTER LLOYD HAD STATED THAT ONE OF BASIC QUESTIONS WAS WHETHER GERMANS REALLY WANTED REUNIFICATION OR NOT, SECRETARY REFERRED TO LETTER HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM ADENAUER. HE DESCRIBED IT AS ESSENTIALLY DEVOTED TO LENGTHY ARGUMENT AS TO WHY WESTERN POWERS SHOULD NOT CONCENTRATE ON REUNIFICATION.

SECRETARY NOTED THAT REASONING WAS QUITE FALLACIOUS. POINT EMPHASIZED THAT PARTITION OF GERMANY WAS NOT CAUSE BUT EFFECT OF PRESENT TENSIONS. IT WAS SCARCELY NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE THIS TO WESTERN POWERS. HOWEVER CHANCELLOR DREW CONCLUSION THAT BECAUSE THEY ALLEGEDLY HELD THIS VIEW THEY WERE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO PAY TOO BIG PRICE FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION WHICH THEORETICALLY WOULD SOLVE ALL WORLD PROBLEMS. LLOYD COMMENTED THAT, OUT OF LOYALTY TO ADENAUER, WESTERN POWERS HAD BEEN SAYING, [REDACTED] THAT DIVISION OF GERMANY IS BASIC CAUSE OF TENSIONS. SECRETARY NOTED THAT ADENAUER TOOK POSITION THAT WE SHOULD ALMOST DROP GERMAN QUESTION AND CONCENTRATE ON DISARMAMENT. AFTER OUR TWO RECENT EXPERIENCES AT GENEVA WE DO NOT FEEL THAT THIS IS A PARTICULARLY FRUITFUL FIELD AT PRESENT TIME. ATTEMPT TO SHIFT ENTIRE ATTENTION TO DISARMAMENT FIELD WOULD BE FUTILE. WE COULD NOT GET AWAY FROM PROBLEM WHICH SOVIETS WERE POSING, MAKING GERMANY AND BERLIN FOCAL POINT.

LLOYD COMMENTED THAT THIS CONSONANT WITH WHAT SCHERPENBERG SAID. LATTER SAID RE REUNIFICATION THAT ALL THAT WAS NEEDED WAS A LITTLE LIGHT AT END OF LONG TUNNEL. HOWEVER ANY NEUTRALIZATION FORMULA WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND MOST GERMANS SAW THIS.

DULLES

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MINING TELEGRAM

Department of State

Noted by Mr. Gray

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Action

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Control: 2569

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 5, 1959

12:03 AM

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FROM: LONDON

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT SECTO 4, REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 150,
BONN 246, PARIS 621, BERLIN 79



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AFTER LLOYD HAD NOTED THAT SCHERPENBERG HAD INDICATED SOME UN INTEREST IN BERLIN MIGHT BE USEFUL SECRETARY SAID HE BELIEVED THAT ONCE TROOPS OF THREE WESTERN POWERS LEFT BERLIN GAME WOULD BE UP. AT LEAST PEOPLE OF WEST BERLIN FELT THAT WAY. HE MENTIONED THAT BRANDT WAS ARRIVING IN US NEXT WEEK, AND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE EFFECT ON AMERICAN OPINION. SECRETARY SAID THAT TALK ABOUT UN INVOLVED RESORT TO VAGUE FORMULA. IT WAS NOT CORPORATE BODY WITH FORCES OF ITS OWN. IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED THAT UN WOULD DESIGNATE THREE WESTERN POWERS TO ACT FOR IT IN BERLIN, THAT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY, BUT SOVIETS COULD HARDLY ACCEPT. HE ADDED THAT ONE COULD CONCEIVABLY FIND UN TROOPS TO REPLACE WESTERN FORCES. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE. BERLINERS MIGHT HAVE SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE IF THESE FORCES HAD ADEQUATE STRENGTH WITH CLEAR MANDATE, BUT EXPERIENCE PROVED UN FORCES TENDED TO DISINTEGRATE.

LLOYD SAID HE REGARDED UN ASPECT AS ESSENTIALLY MOVE IN GAME. HE COULD NOT SEE IT AS EFFECTIVE, BUT IDEA THAT WHOLE OF BERLIN MIGHT BE UNDER UN TUTELAGE WITH GUARANTEE OF ACCESS HAD APPEAL. SOVIETS PROBABLY COULD NOT ACCEPT. DURING DISCUSSION POSSIBILITY UN GUARANTEE, SECRETARY NOTED THAT UN AS SUCH COULD NOT GIVE GUARANTEE.

JEBB WHO

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
-2- SECTO 4, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM, FROM LONDON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

JEBB WHO ALSO PRESENT NOTED THAT UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF CHARTER MEMBERS WOULD BE IN POSITION TO TAKE SUCH ACTION AS DEEMED DESIRABLE. SECRETARY REITERATED THAT HE DID NOT SEE ANY REAL PRACTICAL SUBSTITUTE TO HAVING OUR TROOPS IN BERLIN. MIKOYAN HAD EMPHASIZED THAT EAST BERLIN BELONGED TO GDR AND COULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN ANY PLAN. BEST TO HOPE FOR WAS THAT SOVIETS WOULD ALLOW THEIR BERLIN PROPOSALS TO LAPSE.

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-3- SECTO 4. FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM, FROM LONDON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)



SECRETARY SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEE PURPOSE BEHIND SOVIET MOVES. THEY WISHED MINIMIZE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF FREE BERLIN. HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED ON VISIT LAST MAY WITH DYNAMIC NATURE WEST SECTORS. THIS WAS CONTRAST WITH UNPOPULAR REGIME IN EAST GERMANY. DISCUSSION BERLIN ENDED WITH REMARK BY HOYER MILLAR WHO ALSO PRESENT THAT ONE CONCESSION WEST MIGHT MAKE WOULD BE TO CUT DOWN PROPAGANDA AND RELATED ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2/4/59

Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-2

DATE: February 4, 1959
Time: 3:00 P.M.
Place: Embassy Residence,
London

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conclusions to White House
Conference Re Berlin

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Dulles Minister Barbour
General Norstad Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Jr.
Ambassador Whitney Mr. Raymond Thurston
Mr. Livingston Merchant Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand

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H - Show only - to 5131 2/12/59

Dist Made 2/12/59
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2/12/59
After reading the "Memorandum of Conclusions to White House Conference Re Berlin", General Norstad said he thought the UK and France could accept the plan of action proposed. He believed that the Western powers had to be firm but deliberate. All possibility of misconception should be avoided by letting the Soviets know precisely what we were thinking. His concern about the old paragraph 4D had been that it contemplated taking the ultimate action too fast.

In response to Mr. Thurston's question as to whether the first convoy, assuming it got through, should be followed by others, the Secretary said it would seem a good idea to continue sending through convoys until some sort of a pattern were established, perhaps for a period of two weeks or so.

(11)(1)
The Secretary asked whether the establishment of an atomic stockpile in Germany fitted into the formula under point 2 of the "Memorandum of Conclusions to White House Conference Re Berlin". General Norstad said he believed it went beyond point 2 since this was an "extraordinary" not an "ordinary" step. He believed this fitted more into the second stage. Mr. Merchant queried whether the NAC should not be specifically informed regarding the proposed German atomic stockpile. General Norstad argued against this since this would merely invite objections from some countries. The action had been agreed in principle, and General Norstad as SACEUR had turned specifically to the US and to the UK for advice. He was now prepared to move ahead. Mr. Merchant noted that the Canadians feel that the Rubicon with the Soviets will be crossed when the Germans

get atomic

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- 2 -

get atomic weapons. General Norstad commented that Foreign Minister Smith, although he had agreed in principle to the action contemplated, would never specifically agree but would always find some reason for delay.

The Secretary mentioned that a new paper had been received yesterday from the JCS, filling in some of the paragraphs in the Memorandum of Conclusions.

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245/59

10 Downing Street
London
February 5, 1969

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MEMORANDUM OF PRIVATE CONVERSATION
WITH PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN

At the suggestion of the Ambassador, I referred to stories indicating that the Prime Minister's projected trip to Moscow had been discussed in advance with me and approved by me. I said I thought that it was undesirable that his statement to the House should contain such implications since, as he knew, I had considerable reservations about the wisdom of the trip at this time. Also it would create embarrassments with our other allies. The Prime Minister said that he would merely state that we, with others, had been informed in advance and not indicate that we had been earlier informed in advance.

With reference to the Berlin situation, I indicated that the program of contingency reaction which I had outlined represented in my opinion the most moderate program that the United States would find acceptable. I pointed out that it fell considerably short of what the Defense Department and the JCS had recommended. I said that if American public opinion got the impression that the Soviet Union had gained a considerable victory in Berlin as a result of pressures upon us by our allies, I thought the reaction on our European policy would be serious and it might affect our NATO posture.

John Foster Dulles



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By LB NLE Date 6/10/83

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Dulles App / Gen Cor & Mem / 1 / 'Memorandum of Conversation - General - 2 Dec 1968 (2)'

2/6/59
CM:WRBurgess:llw;mj

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

974
SVE/MC-13

4:00 P.M.

DATE: February 6, 1959

U. S. Embassy Residence

SUBJECT: Berlin and Related Problems

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Secretary of State Dulles

APPROVED - JNG 2/11/59

Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess

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Dist Made - 2/12/59
Mr. Spaak opened the conversations by reporting information given him by Ambassador Blankenhorn indicating that Chancellor Adenauer was taking a new approach to the German problem.

The Chancellor, very greatly impressed by the difficulty of the situation in Berlin, believes it may be necessary to make certain concessions in order to meet that situation. These concessions might include the recognition of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the recognition of the Oder-Niesse Line, some possible form of confederation with East Germany, and renunciation by Germany of some forms of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Spaak pointed out that this was of course a report from Blankenhorn and was subject to verification.

Secretary Dulles indicated that a letter he had received from Chancellor Adenauer, written apparently after the conversations reported by Secretary Spaak, contained some of the same ideas but did not refer to a confederation or renunciation of nuclear weapons. In addition it did give indication of a shift of emphasis from the consideration of German questions to disarmament.

Mr. Spaak then set forth his general ideas about the negotiations as to Germany.

He said that the esprit of NATO was good and that the NATO countries generally

were firm

①
CM:W.R. Burgess
SECRET - LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

were firm as to retaining the position in Berlin and discussing the Berlin situation only in relation to the German problem generally.

The position of NATO was embarrassed by the fact that no new proposals had been placed before it, but the journalists were constantly launching new ideas ascribed to different statesmen, which were not confirmed.

Also there was some concern about the Macmillan trip to Russia.

Spaak then developed his own idea further, pointing out that the positions of the East and the West were as far apart as the poles; so it seemed difficult to conceive any compromise. This made it incumbent on the West to seek, without yielding in principle, to make a new approach to the problem.

His belief was that we needed to spell out to the public the possible favorable consequences that could derive from a reunification of Germany. These benefits could include some limited form of disengagement, pacts of nonaggression with the Eastern satellite countries, the recognition of Poland and Czechoslovakia, a solution of the Berlin question, and a great enlargement of human liberties.

Secretary Dulles expressed great appreciation of Spaak's thinking on these matters over a period, which had proved very helpful.

Secretary Dulles then reviewed certain recent events including the present status of the drafting of notes in reply to the Soviet letter of January 10, indicating that he hoped it would be possible to submit drafts to NATO early next week.

He commented briefly on the Macmillan trip, and then discussed the problem of the instructions which the Powers in Germany might give their representatives in Berlin with respect to possible interference with access. He pointed out that as a necessary background for negotiation it was essential to have a firm and agreed position to meet the Soviet threats. The general principle of this position was contained in the Resolution of the Four Powers which was endorsed in December by the NATO Council meeting.

In keeping with this Resolution the point where the line should be drawn is the substitution of East German guards for those of the Soviet and their attempt to go beyond identification in their supervision of traffic.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that we all hoped that the occasion would never arise for the exercise of these rules. The hope is that if we are firm, the Soviets will yield, but there is no reason to expect that they would do so in advance.

Secretary Dulles then outlined the general position of the West as he saw it, which was to start from the 1955 program for German reunification and European security. At that time it was not well understood and was undermined by the Soviet. It was necessary to do a public relations job in interpreting this

program to

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program to the public, particularly along the lines pointed out by Mr. Spaak. Reunification would open the way for a very substantial easing of the European situation.

With respect to atomic weapons, Secretary Dulles pointed out that he was sure American opinion would require that U. S. troops in Europe would always have as good weapons as the other side, but that the distinction could be drawn perhaps between tactical and strategic weapons.

There ensued an interchange of views as to what might be meant by the word "confederation" and whether it might provide a step toward reunification or, on the contrary, might tend to freeze the present division. Secretary Dulles pointed out that in dealing with the Communists it was essential to have agreements in very specific form as a statement of general principles was too easily violated. The success in Austria may be ascribed in substantial measure to the fact that agreements in the Austrian Treaty were made very specific.

There was also an exchange of views as to certain advantages which were attached to maintenance of the status quo in Germany. Any radical change involved a revamping of the present satisfactory arrangements in European cooperation and in German participation in the alliance as well as in economic affairs. This was said in a mood of nostalgia rather than ^{as} a program, but in recognition that even the best of efforts may not result in making any significant forward progress.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-13

974

4:00 P.M.

DATE: February 6, 1959

U. S. Embassy Residence

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (

EPIC/HDR by 05 10124190

APPROVED - JNG 2/11/59

SUBJECT: Berlin and Related Problems

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Secretary of State Dulles

Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess

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- 3 -

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (

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MEMORANDUM

Paris

February 6, 1959

THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION
AT THE PROSPECTIVE CONFERENCE THIS
SPRING WITH THE SOVIETS

I believe we should start from the premise that the essential elements of the Western 1955 Geneva position were sound and that any appreciable departure from them imperils our security. The integrated whole of that position comprised the following elements:

1. Reunification of Germany by free elections with a resultant free choice of a reunified Germany with respect to its external obligations and associations;
2. Treaty assurances to the Soviets, the details and character of which would depend on the choice of reunited Germany; and,
3. Certain "practical measures" involving demilitarization of what is now East Germany, control and limitation of armaments and numbers of soldiers in Germany with attendant control and inspection rights including the illustrative example of forward radar screens. It was implicit at Geneva that the end of the road was a peace treaty, a draft of which we had in hand but never tabled. The text in any event was deficient in that it ducked the key questions, the most important being the Oder-Neisse line.

216(59)
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The package comprehended the essentials for Western security. We contemplated removing the creeping risk of a divided Germany; we contemplated full satisfaction of legitimate Soviet concerns over its fears of a powerful reunited and ultimately militaristic Germany; we provided for military restraints on Germany which took into account practical and historical risks and equally

took.../

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manuscript by J. D. 5

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took into account the lessons of Versailles; we set the stage for, but did not require the economic, military and political integration of the new Germany with its Western European neighbors and, in particular, France; and finally, we assured that this intertwined complex of arrangements were endorsed by a freely voting all-German populace.

There was a certain failure on our part adequately to present this logical and comprehensive position to public opinion in the Western World. This failure on our part, however, was not decisive. For one thing, in retrospect, I think we failed to focus on a peace treaty which, of course, is the end of the road. It has a psychological and intrinsic value as the final, definitive and legal end of an era which had its origins in the Versailles Peace Conference but which became an active threat to the West with the rise of Hitler. Our marketing failure, however, was not decisive. More important in my judgment was the complete and total intransigence of the Soviets, supported by their effective use of the technique of the constantly reiterated big lie and the attendant malaise of the intellectuals in the West who have wearied of the cold war.

Our problem, as I see it today, is partly, but only partly, a matter of improvement in presentation. My thought is that this time we should start at the other end and focus attention on the ultimate objective which is a prospective firmly established and legal position in Europe with Germany reunited, freely accepting the conditions under which its reunity was achieved and Russia, in the eyes of any reasonable man, obviously insured against any real risk. A concomitant result would be that Germany's neighbors, both East and West, were equally insured with the US the underwriter in fact as well as theory.

In the process of reformulating our position, I think there are other modifications in details and in timing which can be made apart from the focus of attention on the peace treaty with Germany as our ultimate objective. The timing of free elections through all Germany I think can be pushed back in time so that the initial stages of the negotiation of the treaty and the coming into effect pari passu of both practical measures and treaty assurances, so that free elections might be held at a stipulated period, for example,

three.../

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three years after the operation started. An essential interim prerequisite, I think, would be increased contacts between East and West Germany. We could also refurbish and specify in greater detail the contemplated "practical measures" relying heavily on military advice and drawing on our experience in the last three years in such phases of the problem as our surprise attack talks.

The foregoing deals with giving more sex appeal to our 1955 package.

The essential point, however, which I think we must keep in mind is that we must not permit cold war weariness to lead us into arrangements damaging to our national security, of which the unity of Western Europe is a part. Accordingly, a corollary action, which we must take during the course of the preparation of our presentation to the Russians at the conference is an active effort to destroy the arguments of the Western proponents of disengagement. We cannot, for example, permit ourselves to be led into a situation where we give something up in the field of "European security arrangements" without obtaining in return a political quid pro quo merely for the sake of contributing to "an easing of tensions". Our political object of course is a reunified Germany tied to the West with the resultant loosening of the bonds between Moscow and the European satellites.

We may not want to talk too much publicly about the unassailable virtue of our Geneva position, but we do want to keep firmly fixed in our minds the inseparability of all the elements which went into it.

In summary, I think for presentation purposes our focus should be on the peace treaty. We should be prepared to table our own draft (which should not have too many blank articles or thorny problems left to undescribed annexes). This should be our opening and major gambit at the conference with the Soviets. In the process we can ridicule the latest Soviet draft treaty, which is really a monstrosity. We should then develop the thesis that in the process of achieving this definitive objective, certain predecessor actions and agreements necessarily flow. As I have suggested above, one is the selection of Germans, both from

East.... /

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East and West, competent to negotiate. Next would be step-by-step provisions for "thinning out" and the giving of assurances geared to progress toward the peace treaty. Finally, would come the stage where all Germans were given the right of recording freely and without fear of reprisal their acceptance of the web of arrangements which would come into full flower with the coming into effect of the peace treaty and the attendant reunification of Germany in freedom.

LW

EUR:LTMerchant:jj

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12055, Sec. 1-301 (d)

State Letter 1/21/82

NLE Date 3/12/82

W

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Action

Classification

Control: 4076

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 6, 1959

SS

6:20 P.M.

Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DULTE 8, FEBRUARY 6, 9 P.M.

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

WE HAD A SURPRISINGLY GOOD DAY HERE WITH THE FRENCH. WE FIRST MET WITH COUVE DE MURVILLE AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY. I OUTLINED OUR GENERAL THINKING ABOUT HANDLING THE BERLIN SITUATION AND MY VIEWS SEEMED TO COINCIDE LARGELY WITH THOSE OF THE FRENCH. THEN WE WENT TO THE ELYSEE AND MET WITH GENERAL DE GAULLE, PRIMEMINISTER DEBRE AND COUVE. WITH ONLY DEBRE, COUVE AND JOXE, WE WERE FOUR ON THE SIDE AND SAT AROUND INFORMALLY IN CHAIRS IN THE LIVING-ROOM INSTEAD OF SITTING ACROSS A TABLE. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS RELAXED AND THE GENERAL SEEMED TO BE IN GOOD SPIRITS. WE DEVELOPED AGAIN OUR GERMAN THESIS AND FOUND ACCEPTANCE. THE FRENCH, UNLIKE THE U.K., SEEMED QUITE SPECIFIC THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A SUBSTITUTION OF THE GDR FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN THE EXERCISE OF OUR RESERVED RIGHTS IN BERLIN AS VICTORS IN THE WAR. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE COULD NOT PERMIT ROLES TO BE REVERSED AND THE VANQUISHED IN EFFECT RULE THE VICTORS. THIS APPEALED TO THE GENERAL AND WAS STRONGLY REINFORCED BY COUVE.



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NLE Date 3/12/82



SECRET

-2- DULTE 8, FEBRUARY 6, 9 P.M., FROM PARIS

..... THERE WAS A SLIGHT
DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AS TO THE DESIRABILITY AT THIS
JUNCTURE OF GOING TO THE UNITED NATIONS. THE FRENCH
ARE PRETTY GUNSHY ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS. I SAID OF
COURSE WE WOULD NOT ADVOCATE GOING UNLESS WE FELT CONFIDENT
THAT WE COULD GET A SOLID VOTE TO SUPPORT OUR POSITION.
DE GAULLE IS FEARFUL THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD
BE IN A MOOD TO COMPROMISE AND MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE,
CALL ON HAMMARSKJOLD TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT. I THINK
THERE IS NO DOUBT BUT WHAT THERE IS GROUND FOR APPREHENSION
ON THIS SCORE AND WE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A CAREFUL COUNT
OF VOTES BEFORE GOING TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

TOWARD THE CLOSE OF OUR MEETING I TOOK THE INITIATIVE
IN ASKING GENERAL DE GAULLE WHETHER HE FELT THAT SOME
PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN CARRYING OUT HIS WISHES TO
HAVE TRIPARTITE POLICY DISCUSSIONS AT WASHINGTON COVERING
AN AREA LARGER THAN NATO. HE INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT
PROGRESS WAS IN FACT BEING MADE, AND WHILE HE OBVIOUSLY
THOUGHT THERE WAS ROOM FOR MORE PROGRESS HE MADE NO
COMPLAINT. I THEN SAID THAT WE WERE SYMPATHETIC TOWARD
HIS VIEW THAT THE FRENCH INTERESTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
WERE SUCH THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
THEIR FLEET AS AGAINST OUR SIXTH FLEET. I SAID, SO FAR
AS WE WERE CONCERNED, THIS WAS A MATTER WHICH COULD
BE RENEGOTIATED WITH NATO WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING
PARITY. DE GAULLE SAID THAT THIS WAS A "VERY IMPORTANT"
STATEMENT AND IT OBVIOUSLY GRATIFIED HIM.

AT THIS POINT THE ONLY SOUR NOTE WAS STRUCK BY DEBRE,
WHO SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE GREATER FREEDOM
OF ACTION FOR THEIR FLEET "BECAUSE THE ALLIES WERE NOT
STANDING TOGETHER IN BACKING FRANCE IN ALGERIA." THE
GENERAL HIMSELF DID NOT HOWEVER RAISE THE ALGERIAN MATTER

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-3- DULTE 8, FEBRUARY 6, 9 P.M., FROM PARIS

AND THIS WAS THE ONLY REFERENCE MADE TO IT. THIS WAS CONTRARY TO FORECASTS WHICH HAD INDICATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A STRONG DEMAND UPON US TO SUPPORT THEM MORE VIGOROUSLY IN ALGERIA WHERE THEIR TROUBLES ARE STILL SERIOUS AND FOR THE TIME BEING MOUNTING.

THIS AFTERNOON I HAD A MEETING WITH SPAAK. I BROUGHT HIM PRETTY WELL UP TO DATE AS TO OUR THINKING. HE HIMSELF HAS BEEN DOING QUITE A LOT OF THINKING, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE GERMAN PROBLEM AS A WHOLE. HE HAS NOT COME UPWITH ANYTHING VERY NEW OR BRILLIANT BUT I URGED HIM TO CONTINUE STUDYING THE MATTER AS WE NEEDED HIS KIND OF MIND APPLIED TO THIS PROBLEM AND HE HAD SOME ADVANTAGES OVER GOVERNMENTS.

TOMORROW MORNING I GO ON TO BONN. THERE SEEMS TO BE AGREEMENT BOTH IN LONDON AND IN PARIS THAT THE CHANCELLOR IS PRETTY MUCH OUT OF TOUCH WITH HIS ADVISERS AND WITH CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, AND BOTH THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH AND SPAAK ARE HOPEFUL THAT I MAY BE ABLE TO BRING HIM TO SEE POSSIBILITIES IN THE SITUATION TO WHICH HE IS NOW BLIND. HOWEVER, THESE POSSIBILITIES ARE NOT SO BRILLIANT AND THAT I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT THEY HAVE MUCH PENETRATING POWER. AS SPAAK SAID, A GREAT DEAL IS TO BE SAID IN FAVOR OF THE STATUS QUO. ALMOST ANY CHANGE WOULD BE A CHANGE FOR THE WORSE AND WOULD OPEN UP SERIOUS PROBLEMS. I DO NOT THINK, HOWEVER, NOR DOES HE, THAT THAT IS A POSITION WHICH WE CAN TAKE PUBLICLY AND COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC OPINION.

FAITHFULLY YOURS,
FOSTER
UE/23

~~SECRET~~

DULLES



EUR

POL:David Klein:hp:ls

(Drafting Office and Officer)

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

SVE/MC-20

DATE: February 7, 1959

Time: 4:30-6:30 p.m.

Place: Schaumburg Palace,
Bonn.

APPROVED JNG 2/24/59

IMT

SUBJECT: Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS: US
The Secretary
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Berding
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Klein

Germany
Chancellor Adenauer
For. Min. von Brentano
State Secretary Globke
State Secretary van Scherpenberg
State Secretary von Eckardt
Dep. State Secretary Dittmann
Dr. Ruete
Herr Heber

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The Chancellor thanked the Secretary for coming to see him and said now that the Secretary had been to London and Paris he would like to get his overall impression of the situation.

The Secretary said that in London and Paris the discussions followed two principal lines -- the technical problems to meet the Soviet threat to Berlin, and the possibility of having discussions with the Soviet Union on the broader German problem, including reunification and European Security.

In his talks in London and Paris, the Secretary said he had expressed the view that we could not accept the substitution of the GDR for the Soviet Union in clearing our military traffic to and from Berlin. The French accepted this view. The British did so haltingly. M. Spaak apparently had not been thinking along these lines, but after his talk with the Secretary seemed convinced of the correctness of this view. The Secretary had pointed out that as far as the East Germans were concerned our relationship to them in Berlin was as victors who had won certain rights and it would be intolerable to permit defeated East Germans, with whom we have no treaty relations and do not recognize, to exercise control over our troops who are in Berlin by virtue of rights we won in the war.

The Secretary said it was his view that while we might be prepared to identify our traffic to the East Germans, we would not permit them to stamp our documents or exercise the right of inspection over our traffic. However, if any effort were made to prevent our passage either by destroying bridges, erecting road blocks or using force, that would create a grave situation which

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FEB 24 1959

would justify serious military preparations. In such an event, we might take the matter to the United Nations, but only if we were certain of overwhelming support for our position in the United Nations, and provided that such an approach would not bog down the measures we intended to take.

Insofar as a meeting with the Soviet Union was concerned, the Secretary said he found differences between the British and the French concerning the date for such a meeting. Prime Minister Macmillan was extremely anxious to have such a meeting in advance of May 27 to insure that we would be conferring on that date. The French, however, felt that if the West proposed that such a meeting take place prior to May 27, the Soviets would interpret this as a sign of weakness and assume we were prepared to make concessions to forestall the threatened Soviet measures.

The Secretary said the British and French accepted his compromise proposal that such a meeting take place at a time and place mutually acceptable to the Four Powers. This would force the Soviet Union to share with us the responsibility for setting the date for the meeting and obviate the danger envisaged by the French.

Turning to the question of the substantive matters to be discussed at a meeting with the Soviet Union, the Secretary said it was generally assumed that the subject for such a meeting would be Germany. However, there probably would not be a specific agenda so that all sides would be free to introduce any aspect of the problem. With reference to specific proposals which the West might make, the Secretary said he found general agreement in London and Paris that these should be based on those which we tabled at the November 1955 Conference. These proposals were sound then; they are sound now. The difficulty then was that they were too complicated and never adequately presented. They now needed a new setting, perhaps with a greater emphasis on the aspects of a German peace treaty, and less exclusive concern with the problem of reunification.

The Secretary went on to say there sometimes is a tendency on the part of the Western Powers to minimize or not adequately appraise the achievements obtained in West Germany since the end of the war, particularly under the leadership of Chancellor Adenauer. Actually these achievements have been tremendous. For the first time in history, Germany has genuinely friendly relations with France. Great progress has been made in European military, economic and even to some degree, political integration, i.e., NATO, WEU, Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, Common Market. These represent immense gains and are precisely what the Soviet Union wants destroyed. It is therefore important not to give the Soviet Union or public opinion the impression that we are prepared to buy reunification at a price requiring the sacrifice of these gains, which would result in leaving Germany alone in Central Europe in a position to play the East against the West. The Secretary added he thought we could and should show at a conference that these gains can be preserved with a reunified Germany without endangering the Soviet Union. In fact, as the United States sees it, this would be one of the principal purposes of our meeting with the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said

The Secretary said he himself did not expect the Soviet Union to agree to any measures which did not involve as a probable and necessary consequence the collapse of the structure of European integration. But the task of the Western Powers, he said, was to make clear to the world that the Soviet Union was responsible for the failure to reach agreement and that the Western Powers are prepared to pursue a sound and constructive course that carries no threat to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the Federal Republic would contribute to that presentation along the lines suggested in the Chancellor's recent message to the Secretary (i.e., establishment of German relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia and a statement on the Oder-Neisse problem) and by expanding de facto relations with the GDR to make the attractive influence of the Federal Republic felt in the Soviet Zone.

The Secretary stressed that although these ideas had been generally accepted by the British, the French and M. Spaak, they were still tentative. He therefore thought it might be useful to hold a Western Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris, possibly in mid-March, to develop the Western position more concretely. To emphasize Four Power responsibility with the Soviet Union on the solution of the German question, he thought it might be desirable for the Three Foreign Ministers to meet once as such and have this followed by a Four Power Foreign Ministers' meeting, with the Federal Republic participating fully. To prepare for these meetings, the Secretary said he supposed a Four Power Working Group of technical experts would prepare a report for the Ministers to examine.

The Secretary cautioned that there was no reason to expect that the Soviet Union would accept a meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level for the purpose and at the time we are suggesting. There were some indications that the Soviet Union would rather have a meeting at the Heads of Government level. That position may in part reflect the fact that Mr. Gromyko does not have the same authority or discretion as Western Foreign Ministers. But this, he remarked, was only speculative. The Secretary said he expected Mr. Macmillan would probably make soundings on this question while in Moscow, although the Secretary emphasized that the United States had not authorized or encouraged Mr. Macmillan to do so.

The Chancellor expressed his gratitude for the Secretary's frank comments and said he had some observations of his own to make. Recently, he said, the German Ambassador in Moscow had two talks with Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Mikoyan which in themselves were not important. However, they did indicate that thus far there has been no softening in the Soviet position. (He said he would give Ambassador Bruce copies of Ambassador Kroll's reports for the Secretary's use.)

The Chancellor then replied to the Secretary's earlier remark that in formulating the Western position it seemed desirable to follow the basic lines of November 1955 with some emphasis on the peace treaty question. If this were done, the Chancellor observed, the question would inevitably be raised with whom such a treaty would be concluded.

The Chancellor said

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The Chancellor said he fully agreed with the Secretary that reunification should not be bought at the price of freedom and the national and international gains of the last decade. Moreover, he was certain this was the feeling of the overwhelming majority of the German people, including the majority of those who voted for the SPD in 1957.

The Chancellor then made several remarks about the views of George Kennan. He said he was astounded by the unrealistic proposals which Kennan was putting forth and surprised at the amount of public attention they seemed to command. (The Secretary remarked that they seemed to command greater attention in Germany than in the United States.)

The Chancellor then turned to the Secretary's suggestion concerning the possibility of expanding West Germany's de facto relations with the Soviet Zone. On this score, the Chancellor insisted, the Federal Republic had done as much as it could, but there was always the question of the barriers raised by the GDR. The Federal Government, for example, had always given the Evangelical and Catholic Churches in the Soviet Zone its fullest support since they represented the strongest bulwarks against Communism. But now the Churches' position in the Zone had become so precarious it was no longer certain how much they could do. The Federal Government also tried to further personal contacts between the peoples of both parts of Germany, but the East Zone passport and travel regulations were making it impossible even for families to get together.

At this point, the Chancellor turned to the subject of security. He said that in the draft reply to the Soviet note of January 10 worked out by the Working Group in Washington, he noted references to "peace in Europe" and "peace in the world". The two concepts, he said, were inseparable, for there could be no peace in Europe without peace in the world. Unfortunately, however, the myriad regional security plans of the Rapacki type, which were being tossed about in many quarters, created considerable confusion and sight was lost of the more important considerations. The fact of the matter is, the Chancellor said, there can be no peace until there is nuclear disarmament. Therefore, it was essential for the West to make it clear that until disarmament was a distinct possibility, it would do nothing to weaken Germany's ties with the West or upset NATO and European integration. *WNY*

The Chancellor then said he wanted to speak about the Soviet aims and objectives as he saw them. The Soviets, he said, still adhere to their old thesis that Capitalism is doomed and Communism, under Soviet leadership, will dominate the world. The only real obstacle to the Soviet Union's achieving this goal is the United States. Therefore, one had to expect that the Soviets would try to isolate and destroy the United States. The Chancellor brushed aside Khrushchev's claims of Soviet economic achievements as "grossly exaggerated". However, he added, it was his opinion that one of the principal reasons the Soviet Union wanted to undermine European integration and get control of Germany's economic potential was to strengthen its position in its economic war against the United States.

The Chancellor dismissed.

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The Chancellor dismissed talk about Soviet fears of Germany and German rearmament as sheer nonsense. He said both Khrushchev and Mikoyan told him personally that there were only two real powers in the world today -- the Soviet Union and the United States. But as long as the United States was as strong as the Soviet Union in the nuclear field, the Chancellor said he felt there probably would not be an all-out war. However, on the other hand, any indication of a breakdown in Western unity would be certain to encourage the Soviets to follow a more provocative policy. The Chancellor therefore hoped that in the future the Western Powers would do everything possible to present an unshakable united front.

At this point the Chancellor said Foreign Minister Brentano had some remarks to make, which he did along the following lines: He said he was in complete agreement with the Secretary on the nature of the tasks ahead. There was no harm in repeating sound proposals. They merely had to be pulled together, polished and presented in a more comprehensible form for the man in the street. The alleged Soviet initiatives were merely a repetition of unacceptable proposals. The Foreign Minister went on to say that he hoped the Western Powers would include their London disarmament proposal in the package they finally present. *10/11/54*

At this point the Chancellor interjected that he hoped the disarmament negotiations could be resumed soon but preferably "without the cooperation of Mr. Stassen". Brentano then continued. He said as far as the German Government was concerned, there were certain limits in negotiations beyond which it could not be expected to go. He said the Federal Government, for example, could not accept any proposals requiring it to give up its ties with the West. Nor could it be expected to accept the Soviet Union's peace treaty proposals which would give the Soviet Union the right of intervention.

With regard to Berlin, the Foreign Minister wanted to make these observations: the Berlin problem cannot be solved in isolation. It had to be dealt with in a broader context. However, if a conference were arranged to discuss the broader German problem, an interim solution might possibly be found; but any solution to be acceptable would have to protect the basic rights of Berlin. It was admittedly too early to try to envisage how negotiations might develop. But, as the Secretary indicated, it was important to make clear to the Soviet Union that any attempt by it to tamper with Berlin on a unilateral basis would be met by the resistance of the free world.

Returning to the Chancellor's earlier question - with whom a German peace treaty would be signed - the Secretary said it would have to be a reunified Germany.

As far as Soviet policy was concerned, the Secretary remarked that the Chancellor's thesis was generally accepted in the United States. The Secretary said we recognize that the Soviet Union considers the United States its primary enemy and ultimate target. Its purpose is to encircle the United States, picking up one country after another, adding to its economic strength and military capability so that it would ultimately be in a position to strangle us. Therefore, West Germany with its great industrial potential is the great prize

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prize in Europe just as Japan is its target in Asia. It is because the United States realized this that it abandoned its traditional policy and made collective security arrangements with almost fifty countries.

Referring to the Chancellor's recent letter to him, the Secretary said the Chancellor had indicated that he was afraid some people in the United States and the United Kingdom felt that if reunification could be accomplished on Soviet terms, then the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union could be resolved. This, the Secretary said emphatically, was not the thinking of responsible people in the United States. Recalling his recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Secretary said the Soviets talk about ending the cold war but they make no concrete proposals. The only proposals they make are calculated to help them win the cold war. And the majority of American public agrees with this view.

The problem, the Secretary said, is not one of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union. That is difficult at this time. Our main problem is to keep the support of free world opinion, by indicating our willingness to do what is decent and fair and demonstrating that the reason the cold war continues is that the Soviets will not make or keep agreements unless these help them win the cold war. The nuclear test talks now going on in Geneva have demonstrated this. The Soviet Union has continually talked about wanting to help humanity by ending nuclear tests and has tried to create the impression that it is willing to accept the principle of controls. But when confronted with concrete proposals, this turned out to be nothing but sham.

The Secretary said he felt the handling of the Geneva meeting on nuclear testing had been sound. The outcome could have been foreseen. However, the Secretary added, it would have been unfortunate from a public opinion point of view to have refused to meet with the Soviet Union. Moreover, by negotiating with them, they have amply demonstrated their bad faith.

There was no question, the Secretary said, but that the West had a strong case to make. The principal job, however, was to marshal the case effectively.

The Chancellor agreed, and remarked that it was too bad NATO had not proved to be a more effective instrument for this purpose. The Secretary then commented the truth was that many governments did not want to say unkind things about the Soviet Union. That, however, was a weakness of which he, the Secretary, could not be accused -- and the Chancellor added nor could he.

The meeting concluded on this note, and it was agreed that the Chancellor and the Secretary would meet again the following morning.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Schaumburg Palace, Bonn

DATE: February 8, 1959
10:30 - 12:00 a.m.

SUBJECT:

FEB 11 1959

PARTICIPANTS:

Chancellor Adenauer

Dr. von Brentano, Foreign Minister

Dr. von Scherpenberg, Secretary of State in the Foreign Office

Mr. Weber, Interpreter for the Chancellor

The Secretary

Ambassador Bruce

Mr. Merchant

Not made

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American Embassy, Bonn

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Prior to meeting with the larger group as planned, the Chancellor indicated that he would like to have a short discussion with the Secretary in the presence of only a few advisers. Ambassador Bruce will obtain from Mr. Weber and forward to the Department the verbatim record of the conversation which was kept by Mr. Weber as interpreter. The following is dictated from my own notes to provide an earlier though less complete record.

The Chancellor opened by saying that he desired to discuss further and in greater detail the critical situation of Berlin. He agreed that it was wise to bury the Berlin crisis under a layer of broader problems in a conference with the Russians. If the conference failed, however, then the Berlin crisis was likely to become more acute. In consequence he thought there might be need for an interim or provisional solution of the problem of Berlin. If force were used the crisis would indeed become acute. Hence his thought of the provisional solution. He said that he had no answer to the problem himself but could describe in negative terms the boundaries which any such solution should not transgress. First, he said he attached the utmost importance to the maintenance of Western unity. (Later questions of the Secretary indicated that he was thinking of the French, British and US and that he was fearful that the British would show weakness. The Secretary agreed on the importance of

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EO 12856, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)

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maintaining unity and said that he believed that we had it but that it was equally important that the Federal Republic should act in full agreement with the three Western powers since it was obviously most intimately involved.) Secondly, the Chancellor said we should not advance to any position which would require later withdrawal because of the damage it would do to Western prestige. (Under a question from the Secretary he said that he meant retreat from any physical position.) Thirdly, the Chancellor said the situation should not be permitted to develop to any use of nuclear weapons.

In response the Secretary said that it was essential that we employ the necessary counter force if we found ourselves opposed by force. This required that we must face up to the possibility of a general nuclear war in which he noted the United States would prove to be the main target. He said that it would be disastrous for us to be committed to a conventional war in Europe. Surely this would please the Soviets with their great superiority in manpower and conventional weapons.

The Chancellor said that possibly he had been misunderstood. His nuclear point was addressed to the avoidance of using non-conventional weapons against the GDR alone.

The Secretary then reviewed in detail the program for dealing with a substitution of the GDR for the Soviets on May 27 or earlier. When he came to the later stages after physical obstructions had been encountered and we had concurrently launched a political, propaganda offensive against the Soviets and serious military preparations such as partial mobilization, he said we should, if this political offensive brought no change in the Soviet-GDR attitude and obstruction of our forces, send in an armored division to open up the land route. If this division encountered resistance then obviously a general war had started in which we obviously would not forego the use of nuclear weapons. The Secretary concluded by saying that he was absolutely convinced that if we in the West were united and willing to take the risk of such general war then the Soviets will withdraw from their present position. We must, however, have the will (which he could assure the Chancellor the United States possessed) to use those elements of force in which we are superior. To fail to do so would be to invite defeat on a purely conventional battleground.

The Chancellor said that the unity of the British, French and United States was even more important than atomic bombs. (He did not elaborate his thought but I construed it as meaning

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that he considered such unity even more effective as a deterrent to the Soviets than our possession of nuclear weapons.) He again hinted at his fear of British softness by citing the contrast in attitudes between the US truck drivers in the Marienborn incident who had stayed with their trucks more than fifty hours resolutely refusing inspection whereas the British truck driver in a similar incident at about the same time had protested but permitted inspection and been allowed to pass through.

The Secretary then said that the prime purpose of his present trip was further to cement Western unity and that he believed it existed. He emphasized that it was equally necessary that the Federal Republic be with us. He said that if the Federal Republic was not willing to pursue as strong a policy as we proposed, now was the time that we should be so informed.

The Chancellor said that his government was prepared to follow the program which the Secretary had outlined but that he feared a world war over Berlin would not have behind it public support in France, the UK, Germany or the United States.

The Secretary said that he could assure the Chancellor that the policy he had outlined would have public support in the United States and that he was equally sure that the Governments of France and Great Britain were in favor of a strong stand. In fact he said the only difference among the three powers was that the French were inclined to be more truculent.

The Chancellor reiterated that he supported the two-stage contingency plan proposed by the Secretary. He thought it was correct and that his government would support it.

The Secretary then asked what the Chancellor had in mind when he spoke of a provisional solution for Berlin.

The Chancellor said that the best provisional solution, which he was not sure we could get, would be an indefinite deferral of the May 27 date when the Soviets had promised they would turn over their rights to the GDR. He said that he was concerned over the very real possibility of growing nervousness and even an exodus from West Berlin as the date approached.

The Chancellor then raised (as he had at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in 1957) the question of extending the life of the North Atlantic Treaty beyond the 20-year period which ended in 1968.

The Secretary

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)

EPC/HDR by PL 10/29/94

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The Secretary reminded him that we had stated thereafter, responsive to his request, that we in the United States felt that the North Atlantic Treaty should be regarded as of indefinite duration.

The Chancellor thought this was not good enough.

The Secretary said that we would bear in mind this proposal and would not oppose an amendment to the Treaty extending it say for 20 years (as the Chancellor subsequently suggested) but that he felt strongly the present was not timely for any such action in light of de Gaulle's dissatisfaction with the terms and breadth of the Treaty. He feared that any opening up of the Treaty for extension would invite French amendments which would be undesirable. With the passage of time, however, de Gaulle would no doubt become more familiar with and fonder of NATO.

The Chancellor then suggested that they join the larger group which was waiting in the conference room.

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EPC/HDR by WJ 10/24/99

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Authority: *HR 10/10/40*
By: *HR 10/10/40*, Date: *4/18/91*

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Copy 1 of 8 - series A
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Memorandum of Conversation

Schaumburg Palace, Bonn

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DATE: February 8, 1959
10:30 - 12:00 a.m.

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 11652: XGDS ① 2 ③ 4

SUBJECT:

Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

FEB 11 1959

PARTICIPANTS:

Chancellor Adenauer

Dr. von Brentano, Foreign Minister

Dr. von Scherpenberg, Secretary of State in the Foreign Office

Mr. Weber, Interpreter for the Chancellor

The Secretary

Ambassador Bruce

Mr. Merchant

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American Embassy, Bonn

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The Chancellor said that his government was prepared to follow the program which the Secretary had outlined but that he feared a world war over Berlin would not have behind it public support in France, the UK, Germany or the United States.

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The Chancellor reiterated that he supported the two-stage contingency plan proposed by the Secretary. He thought it was correct and that his government would support it.

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The Chancellor said that the best provisional solution, which he was not sure we could get, would be an indefinite deferral of the May 27 date when the Soviets had promised they would turn over their rights to the GDR. He said that he was concerned over the very real possibility of growing nervousness and even an exodus from West Berlin as the date approached.

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The Secretary

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page 1

VERBATIM RECORD FROM WEST GERMAN SOURCES

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On 2 February 1959, at 10:30, the Federal Chancellor received the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Bulles, for a conversation in which participated the Minister for Foreign Affairs, State Secretary van der Meer, Ambassador Kruse, and Assistant Secretary of State for German Affairs, Mr. Livingston Merchant.

The Federal Chancellor began by saying that Mr. Blankenhorn had informed him that in the view of both Mr. Couve de Murville and Mr. Spaak negotiations on the big questions must include Berlin. Everything must be done to do away with the date of May 27 since otherwise negotiations would be conducted under pressure of the Berlin question. If results were negative--and he considered this a probability--everything would be much more complicated and the situation still more tense. It would have an extremely favorable effect on the negotiations if it were possible to achieve in time a preliminary settlement for Berlin.

He wished to invite attention to the fact that Khrushchev, in his address before the Party Congress, had introduced, in his statements concerning Berlin, certain nuances which deviated somewhat from the spirit of the Note of 27 November. It could not be said whether it would be possible to find such a solution without doing harm to the prestige of the three Western Powers or without shaking the trust of the Germans. One would have to wait first for the exact wording of the statements made by Khrushchev.

The Chancellor then said when Herr Krapf delivered the Memorandum to Washington, the American Foreign Minister had inquired as to what the United States should do if the bridges on the roads of access to Berlin in the GDR were blown up. To this he wished to reply that a very serious situation would be created if it should come to the use of force in not too strong a form. He had, therefore, a moment ago talked about a preliminary settlement of the Berlin question; for if that could be achieved such critical situation could not at all arise. However, if it should be impossible to find such a solution and if the situation should come to a critical point, one cannot find an answer to every conceivable contingency. He only wished to stress three general principles of a negative character. There are three things which must not happen. First, there must be no development which would lead to evident disunity among the three Western Powers. Secondly, the three Western Powers, particularly the United States, must not let themselves be forced into a position in which they cannot retreat from their position once taken.

The American Foreign Minister interjected the question whether the Chancellor was thinking of a territorial position or of a position in a purely administrative sense, for instance in a legal sense.

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1)

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Page 2

The Chancellor replied that it was not a territorial position which was in mind. Thirdly, under no circumstances should atomic weapons be used.

The Chancellor furthermore pointed out that according to information available to him the Soviets at this moment have stationed in the Soviet zone twenty highly armed divisions. He could add nothing further to the questions asked by the Foreign Minister since developments cannot be foreseen.

The American Foreign Minister stated that, if the Soviets should attempt, either directly or through the GDR, to interfere with access to Berlin by force he thought the West should be prepared to use force, if necessary, in order to overcome the force used by the adversary. This might mean that one ought to be prepared to envisage the possibility of a nuclear war. In such a war--he thought he could say that--the United States would be the primary target of the enemy. He could think of nothing more disastrous than to bind one's self in Europe to a war with conventional weapons since precisely in this field the enemy is more powerful. Nothing could be more agreeable to the Soviets than an intention to use only conventional weapons.

The Chancellor said that there was a misunderstanding. Of course, atomic weapons would also have to be used if this should become necessary. Whether it would be worthwhile using such weapons in the event of difficulties were made by the GDR, that was something else again. He had thought only of this particular case.

The American Foreign Minister said that nobody thought that the Americans would from the outset use atomic weapons. At the meeting on the previous day he had already explained the program which he had in mind. If at the zonal crossing points the Soviet control posts should be replaced by those of the GDR, the American vehicles would attempt to reach Berlin without submitting to inspection or control by GDR authorities. If the vehicles should be stopped on their way by blown-up bridges or road blocks they would not attempt to force their way through with arms. In such a case there would be started, on one hand, a political and propaganda offensive against the Soviet Union as the party which had violated agreements and which, as the first country, had resorted to force; on the other hand, serious military preparations would be made. These would consist of extensive mobilization and evacuation of dependents. If the propaganda and political efforts were not successful, one would attempt advances to Berlin and from Berlin into the Federal Republic by committing at first stronger forces, for instance, an armored division, in order to probe whether the other side will offer resistance. If this should to a considerable degree the United States would then take the position that a general war had commenced.

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page 3

He was firmly convinced that if everyone was prepared in unison to travel this road the Soviets would certainly find a way to retreat from the position which they had taken. The only way, however, to achieve this was readiness to use, in case of need, the strength in which one knows one has the edge over the enemy. If one tells the Soviets that one will not use these weapons and that one will risk a clash only in a field where the Soviets are superior over the West, then the Soviets would have no reason to yield anything.

The Chancellor emphasized that unity of the three Western Powers was more important than nuclear weapons. He called attention to the fact that the American drivers at the zonal frontier did not permit inspection but waited for 50 hours. The British, however, submitted to inspection.

The American Foreign Minister said that it was the purpose of his trip to achieve agreement among the three Western Powers with respect to the program which he had set forth. He said that he was convinced the three Western Powers will hold the same views. It was, however, equally important to talk about the unity of the four Western Powers to which the Federal Republic belongs. The Federal Republic must also be prepared to participate in this program. After all, the Federal Republic is also involved and it is its territory which is affected above all. If the Federal Republic does not wish a strong policy then it would be a good thing if the United States would know this from the outset so that it would not commit itself and its prestige.

The Federal Chancellor said if the American Foreign Minister would read what he (the Chancellor) had said, then he thought he would not have the impression that the Federal Republic lacked readiness to support such policy. He wanted, however, to tell him what he was afraid of. He was afraid that a war which would break out because of the question of access to Berlin would find the necessary echo and understanding neither in America nor in England, France, nor in any other NATO country.

The American Foreign Minister thought that he could assure the Chancellor that the United States was prepared to support such course. In England and France at least the Governments would likewise be ready for that. So long as one is not willing to assume the risk of a war one would have to suffer one defeat after another in view of the Russian-Chinese superiority. However, if one is prepared to assume that risk and if one possesses the strength to conduct such war, then one would not need to wage it.

The only difference of opinion which he had been able to discover up to now in Great Britain and France consists in this, that the French thought one should react immediately with full strength if access to Berlin should be interrupted by road blocks or blown-up bridges. He himself, however, envisaged two stages. First of all it must be ascertained

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THE WHITE HOUSE
COMMUNICATION CENTER
THOMASVILLE, GA

FEBRUARY 8, 1959

FROM SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES

TO MRS ANN WHITMAN FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GEN GOODPASTER

CITE WHOM 5

SECRET - EYES ONLY

"DEAR MR PRESIDENT:

WE LEFT PARIS THIS MORNING.

HE INDICATED THAT THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT POINT OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US SEEMED TO BE IN THE FACT THAT THE FRENCH BELIEVED THAT IF THERE WAS ANY INTERFERENCE WITH OUR ACCESS TO BERLIN, WE SHOULD INSTANTLY MOVE WITH MILITARY FORCE RATHER THAN GO THROUGH THE PREPARATORY STAGE WHICH WE ENVISAGE.

HE RECALLED 1936 AND THE FAILURE THEN TO REACT PROMPTLY WHEN HITLER MOVED INTO THE DEMILITARIZED AREA OF GERMANY. HE SAID THEN THE MILITARY PEOPLE HAD FELT THAT THEY COULD NOT ACT WITHOUT PRIOR MOBILIZATION AND LIKE MEASURES, BUT

THEY HAD BEEN WRONG. SO NOW THE FRENCH ARE DISPOSED TO ACT AT ONCE BUT WITHOUT ANY PRELIMINARY STEPS SUCH AS TOTAL OR PARTIAL MOBILIZATION, EVACUATION OF

PAGE ONE OF 3 PAGES

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Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File)

DULLES-WERTER SER
Box 8, Dulles -
Feb. 1959

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 1.301 (b)

12/10/81

NLE Date 12/10/81

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NLE Date 12/11/81

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DEPENDENTS, ETC..

PERHAPS THEIR ZEAL IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT IS WE RATHER THAN THEY WHO WOULD HAVE TO MAKE MOST OF THE MILITARY EFFORT AS, I UNDERSTAND, THEY HAVE VERY LITTLE MILITARY POTENTIAL LEFT IN GERMANY.

WE ARRIVED AT THE WAHN AIRPORT ABOUT NOON AND THE CHANCELLOR, VON BRENTANO AND OTHERS WERE THERE TO MEET ME. THE CHANCELLOR AND I DROVE BACK TOGETHER TO BONN, AND SINCE IT IS A DRIVE OF ABOUT AN HOUR, WE HAD A GOOD CHANCE TO HAVE AN INITIAL REALLY PRIVATE TALK, WHICH IS WHAT THE CHANCELLOR LIKES. THEN THIS AFTERNOON WE MET AT THE PALAIS SCHAUMBURG WITH THE CHANCELLOR AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, FIRST HAVING A SEMI-PRIVATE TALK WITH THE CHANCELLOR AND VON BRENTANO ON THE ONE SIDE AND DAVID BRUCE AND ME ON THE OTHER. THE BURDEN OF THIS WAS THE CHANCELLOR'S CONCERN ABOUT THE BRITISH IN GENERAL, ABOUT MACMILLAN'S TRIP TO MOSCOW IN PARTICULAR AND A RECENT STATEMENT MADE HERE BY THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT IT WOULD BE INEVITABLE TO RECOGNIZE THE GDR.

THEN WE WENT INTO A LARGER MEETING AND I REPORTED QUITE FULLY ON MY TALKS AT LONDON AND AT PARIS WITH THE FRENCH

PAGE TWO OF THREE PAGES

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GOVERNMENT AND WITH SPAAK. THEN THE CHANCELLOR AND MORE BRIEFLY VON BRENTANO EXPOUNDED THEIR VIEWS.

THEY SEEM TO BE SATISFIED WITH WHAT I HAVE TOLD THEM ABOUT "CONTINGENCY PLANNING" IN RELATION TO BERLIN. I DID NOT HOWEVER GO INTO MUCH DETAIL. WITH RESPECT TO A CONFERENCE ON GERMANY, THERE SEEMED TO BE ACQUIESCENCE, ALTHOUGH CHIEFLY DISCERNIBLE ON THE THEORY THAT "SILENCE GIVES CONSENT". I HOPE TO DEVELOPE THEIR ATTITUDE MORE DEFINITELY TOMORROW WHEN WE MEET AGAIN.

FAITHFULLY YOURS,
FOSTER DULLES"

DTG:



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Translation

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VERBATIM RECORD FROM WEST GERMAN SOURCES

MEMORANDUM

115-12/59

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)
FPC/HDR by WJ 10/24/94

On 7 February 1959, shortly after 16:00 hours, the Federal Chancellor received the American Foreign Minister, Mr. Dulles, for a conversation in which participated also the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the American Ambassador in Bonn.

First of all, the Chancellor informed Mr. Dulles of certain remarks made by the British Ambassador in Bonn when he delivered a letter from Macmillan concerning the latter's forthcoming journey to Moscow. In the course of the conversation, the Ambassador pointed out that, in the opinion of the British Government, the world was not aware of the danger it faces. The public underestimates the gravity of the decisions we face. The world is not aware that it might perhaps be necessary to wage war for the freedom of Berlin. Therefore, in the view of the British Government, the situation as a whole requires very careful examination. Above all, one needs to know what to do if communications with Berlin are interrupted. The existence of the GDR is an undeniable fact. An ever-increasing number of States enter into diplomatic relations with the GDR; even the Federal Government negotiates in a certain way with the GDR. Everyone knows that the Soviet Zone Government consists only of stooges of Communism. Just the same, one negotiates with them. The Western Powers, on their part, must consider whether they want to negotiate with that Government. Whatever the Governments may say, the public is concerned about the question whether it would be worth going to war for the recognition or non-recognition of the existence of the GDR. The Governments must take public opinion into account.

The American Foreign Minister termed these remarks rather disturbing and said they were more disturbing than anything else he had learned in London. There, he said, he had discovered certain tendencies pointing into this direction. However, they had not been stated so openly as here. One says that public opinion must be taken into consideration when measures should be taken which perhaps might lead to war. This means that if the risk of war exists one must balance, on the one hand, the concrete question which is at stake against the possible losses and the destruction of war on the other hand. In reality, however, something much more fundamental is at stake. Once one starts to make concessions because the Soviets threaten war, one would have to go on and on and one would have to make one concession

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after the other. The principle which here is at stake is that one must never make a concession for the sole reason that the Soviets threaten war. Any road that deviates from that must lead to catastrophe.

The American Foreign Minister continued with the remark that he is frequently assailed by the Soviets because of his determination to go to the brink of war (brinkmanship). Yet, he believed, one must not retreat merely because the Soviets or Red China threaten war. In all similar cases which had occurred in the Far East, the United States had always remained firm, had not yielded to threats, and had been prepared in case of need to fight. There is danger that the Soviets perhaps believe that the West is prepared to make concessions. It would be very bad if Macmillan should leave this impression behind him in Moscow.

The Chancellor pointed out that the Ambassador, with reference to the negotiations on the technical level, for instance with respect to postal matters and matters affecting interzonal traffic, twice remarked that the Western Powers should examine the question of a recognition of the GDR.

This would, in a moment of such great danger, constitute a complete reversal of the political line heretofore followed and would lead the Soviet Union to become convinced that the West is in disagreement on important matters.

The Chancellor said that he did not reply to the remarks made twice (by the Ambassador) since he wanted first to wait for his talk with the American Foreign Minister. The Chancellor asked whether Macmillan or Lloyd had given any hint.

The American Foreign Minister answered this question in the negative. In supplementing his first statement he said that, while the question of the recognition of the GDR was not raised, he gathered from certain indications in London that the British were prepared to agree to the turn-over of the control functions from the Soviets to the authorities of the GDR.

In this connection the American Foreign Minister referred to a British paper in which, about six weeks ago, certain British thoughts had been expounded. He himself distinguishes between negotiations on a de facto basis with respect to a limited number of items of negotiations, on the one hand, and a general diplomatic recognition on the other hand. As regards Red China, American policy is absolutely opposed to diplomatic recognition. This, however, does not exclude negotiating with the Red Chinese in Geneva and Warsaw.

The Chancellor suggested that he might himself soon write a letter to Macmillan.

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)
EPC/HDR by CJ 10124194

The American Foreign Minister agreed to that and said that the Chancellor should write an unmistakable letter to Macmillan. It would have disastrous consequences if Macmillan should give the impression in Moscow that England was prepared to make concessions.

As late as December, during the Paris Conferences, the British were not prepared to accept replacement of the Soviets by the Volkspolizei. Selwyn Lloyd had stated this clearly.

The American Foreign Minister added that he clearly stated in London that the United States could not agree to replacing the Soviets with the GDR. He had told Macmillan that he would take this position also in Paris and in Bonn and had asked him whether he agreed. If he should have different views he should say so. Macmillan had replied that he believed he was, generally speaking, of the same opinion as the American Foreign Minister.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs likewise called it surprising that the British indulged in such speculations since Selwyn Lloyd at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Paris, and also in the NATO Council, after all had taken a very clear position. Duncan Sandys also had expressed the same opinion in the NATO Council.

The American Foreign Minister expressed confidence that in the end everything would be straightened out. Such change would materially affect the entire American policy vis-a-vis Europe and NATO. If the United States should determine that its Allies feel compelled to make concessions to the Soviet Union in order thereby to maintain peace, the United States would have to practice a certain kind of disengagement. He did not believe that Great Britain would wish to see this to happen.

While the attitude in London at the moment appears a bit confused, final decision rests with the nation which holds the greatest power. If the weakness of the United Kingdom or of other Allies should result in making concessions to the Soviet Union which the United States considers dangerous to peace, then the United States would express its views very clearly and he was certain that they would prevail.

The Chancellor expressed his appreciation for this gratifying statement.

The American Foreign Minister, in concluding, stated that Mikoyan during his discussions with him and President Eisenhower strongly pleaded for a recognition of the GDR. There is no doubt that this is precisely one of the aims which the Soviets are pursuing with their present action.

/s/ Weber

Bonn, February 13, 1959.

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1)
EPC/HDR by RJ 10/24/94

VERBATIM RECORD FROM WEST GERMAN SOURCES

Copy No. 3

On 8 February 1959, at 10:30, the Federal Chancellor received the American Foreign Minister, Mr. Dulles, for a conversation in which participated the Minister for Foreign Affairs, State Secretary van Scherpenberg, Ambassador Bruce, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Mr. Livingstone Merchant.

The Federal Chancellor began by saying that Mr. Blankenhorn had told him that in the view of both Mr. Couve de Murville and Mr. Spaak all negotiations on the big questions must include Berlin. Everything should be done to do away with the date of May 27 since otherwise negotiations would be conducted under pressure of the Berlin question. If the results were negative--and he considered this a probability--everything would be much more complicated and the situation still more tense. It would have an extremely favorable effect on the negotiations if it were possible to achieve in time a preliminary settlement for Berlin.

He wished to invite attention to the fact that Khrushchev, in his final address before the Party Congress, had introduced, in his statements concerning Berlin, certain nuances which deviated somewhat from the contents of the Note of 27 November. It could not be said whether it would be possible to find such a solution without doing harm to the prestige of the three Western Powers or without shaking the trust of the Berliners. One would have to wait first for the exact wording of the statements made by Khrushchev.

The Chancellor then said when Herr Krapf delivered the Memorandum in Washington, the American Foreign Minister had inquired as to what the United States should do if the bridges on the roads of access to Berlin in the GDR were blown up. To this he wished to reply that a very critical situation would be created if it should come to the use of force in not too strong a form. He had, therefore, a moment ago talked about a preliminary settlement of the Berlin question; for if that could be achieved such critical situation could not at all arise. However, if it should be impossible to find such a solution and if the situation should come to a critical point, one cannot find an answer today to every conceivable contingency. He only wished to stress three general principles of a negative character. There are three things which must not happen. First, there must be no development which would make evident disunity among the three Western Powers. Secondly, the three Western Powers, particularly the United States, must not let themselves be forced into a position in which they cannot retreat from a position once taken.

The American Foreign Minister interjected the question whether the Chancellor was thinking of a territorial position or of a position in a figurative sense, for instance, in a legal sense.

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FPC/HDR by N 10/24/94

The Chancellor replied that it was not a territorial position which he had in mind. Thirdly, under no circumstances should atomic weapons be used.

The Chancellor furthermore pointed out that according to information available to him the Soviets at this moment have stationed in the Soviet Zone twenty highly armed divisions. He could add nothing further to the questions asked by the Foreign Minister since developments cannot be foreseen.

The American Foreign Minister stated that, if the Soviets should attempt, either directly or through the GDR, to interfere with access to Berlin by force he thought the West should be prepared to use force, if necessary, in order to overcome the force used by the adversary. This might mean that one ought to be prepared to envisage the possibility of a nuclear war. In such a war--he thought he could say that--the United States would be the primary target of the enemy. He could think of nothing more disastrous than to bind one's self in Europe to a war with conventional weapons since precisely in this field the enemy is more powerful. Nothing could be more agreeable to the Soviets than an intention to use only conventional weapons.

The Chancellor said that there was a misunderstanding. Of course, atomic weapons would also have to be used if this should become necessary. Whether it would be worthwhile using such weapons in the event that difficulties were made by the GDR, that was something else again. He had thought only of this particular case.

The American Foreign Minister said that nobody thought that the Americans would from the outset use atomic weapons. At the meeting on the previous day he had already explained the program which he had in mind. If at the zonal crossing points the Soviet control posts should be replaced by those of the GDR, the American vehicles would attempt to reach Berlin without submitting to inspection or control by GDR authorities. If the vehicles should be stopped on their way by blown-up bridges or road blocks they would not attempt to force their way through with arms. In such a case there would be started, on one hand, a political and propaganda offensive against the Soviet Union as the party which had violated agreements and which, as the first country, had resorted to force; on the other hand, serious military preparations would be made. These would consist of extensive mobilization and evacuation of dependents. If the propaganda and political efforts were not successful, one would attempt to advance to Berlin and from Berlin into the Federal Republic by committing at first stronger forces, for instance, an armored division, in order to probe whether the other side will offer resistance. If this happens to a considerable degree the United States would then take the position that a general war had commenced.

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He was firmly convinced that if everyone was prepared in unison to travel this road the Soviets would certainly find a way to retreat from the position which they had taken. The only way, however, to achieve this was readiness to use, in case of need, the strength in which one knows one has the edge over the enemy. If one tells the Soviets that one will not use these weapons and that one will risk a clash only in a field where the Soviets are superior over the West, then the Soviets would have no reason to yield anything.

The Chancellor emphasized that unity of the three Western Powers was more important than nuclear weapons. He called attention to the fact that the American drivers at the zonal frontier did not permit inspection but waited for 50 hours. The British, however, submitted to inspection.

The American Foreign Minister said that it was the purpose of his trip to achieve agreement among the three Western Powers with respect to the program which he had set forth. He said that he was convinced the three Western Powers will hold the same views. It was, however, equally important to talk about the unity of the four Western Powers to which the Federal Republic belongs. The Federal Republic must also be prepared to participate in this program. After all, the Federal Republic is also involved and it is its territory which is affected above all. If the Federal Republic does not wish a strong policy then it would be a good thing if the United States would know this from the outset so that it would not commit itself and its prestige.

The Federal Chancellor said if the American Foreign Minister would read what he (the Chancellor) had said, then he thought he would not have the impression that the Federal Republic lacked readiness to support such policy. He wanted, however, to tell him what he was afraid of. He was afraid that a war which would break out because of the question of access to Berlin would find the necessary echo and understanding neither in America nor in England, France, nor in any other NATO country.

The American Foreign Minister thought that he could assure the Chancellor that the United States was prepared to support such course. In England and France at least the Governments would likewise be ready for that. So long as one is not willing to assume the risk of a war one would have to suffer one defeat after another in view of the Russian-Chinese superiority. However, if one is prepared to assume that risk and if one possesses the strength to conduct such war, then one would not need to wage it.

The only difference of opinion which he had been able to discover up to now in Great Britain and France consists in this, that the French thought one should react immediately with full strength if access to Berlin should be interrupted by road blocks or blown-up bridges. He himself, however, envisaged two stages. First of all it must be ascertained

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (

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whether force shall be used. Then, and this was the second stage, the West should, besides military preparations, start a political and propaganda offensive. Then, in view of the military preparations of the West, there might perhaps exist a possibility of finding an acceptable solution. The French, on the other hand, wish to take countermeasures immediately. Couve de Murville had told him the greatest mistake which the French had ever committed was that they did not act immediately in 1936. He himself considered proceeding in two stages better and he thought that also the British would follow this view. The French preferred more rapid action, perhaps also because they themselves have no armed forces here. However, in order to remain fair one must say that the French do not rely entirely on others.

The Federal Chancellor agreed to this. The French are so deeply engaged in Africa that they can hardly move in Europe.

As regards the two stages he considered such procedure right.

The Chancellor replied in the affirmative to the question of the American Foreign Minister whether the Federal Republic would support such procedure.

The Chancellor remarked that in 1968 the NATO Treaty is subject to denunciation. He had talked about this with the Foreign Minister as early as December 1957. He considered it would be a good thing if this date could be put off far into the future. One should talk about this during the next few years. He was certain that the Soviets had included into their calculations this possibility which exists as of 1968.

The American Foreign Minister pointed out that, in reply to this apprehension of the Chancellor, President Eisenhower and he himself had publicly stated that the United States considered the treaty to be an agreement of unlimited duration. He asked the Chancellor for how many years the treaty should be extended.

The Chancellor talked of 20 years beginning in 1968. He emphasized in particular the moral strength which all European States derive from this treaty which, after all, constitutes the link with the United States. In the event of a dissolution of NATO this moral strength would be lost. He is at present worried about the development in Italy. In France de Gaulle has been elected for seven years. Yet one does not know what will come afterwards. In the Federal Republic elections take place every four years and while the present government enjoys a good majority the opposition is very foolish. The closer 1968 approaches the greater his worries are. He therefore requests that this question be examined because it depended ultimately on the United States.

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EPC/HDR by CS 10124194

The American Foreign Minister said he had never thought one could force a nation effectively to continue adhering to an international treaty which is based on international cooperation unless this is also the wish of the State concerned. If the Government wished to withdraw from a treaty relationship, it would always do so even if, in a technical sense, it would perhaps not withdraw completely. He was thinking, for example, of Iraq, which, while technically still a member of the Baghdad Pact could hardly be called so in practice. Some time ago Greece had threatened to leave NATO because of the Cyprus conflict and if this had been her earnest desire Greece would not have let anyone interfere with her action even if the treaty had ten more years to run. The value of an agreement depends upon the willing cooperation of its members. If this is lacking no legal technical language can replace it. The treaties which he himself had negotiated were animated by this spirit. If a State wishes to withdraw from a treaty, paper shackles will not prevent it from doing so. He himself therefore did not attribute to the problem raised by the Chancellor the same importance. Perhaps his views were a bit uncommon inasmuch as he lays greater stress on the spirit of a treaty than on its letter. On the other hand, he was not opposed to efforts to have the treaty extended. He questioned, however, whether now was the opportune moment to raise this point. Ten years are a long time and furthermore the views of de Gaulle would make it appear extremely difficult to obtain French approval to an extension. If the question were raised now he was certain that de Gaulle would submit counterproposals which would have a dividing rather than a unifying effect. He would therefore prefer if more States would make a declaration such as made by the United States in 1957. Perhaps the French attitude may change in one or two years.

The Federal Chancellor recognized the difficulties which the French might raise. He said, however, that he could not agree with the general principle. If treaties are concluded and periods of time are provided, one should not let everyone do as he pleases. Certainly, one can not force anyone to continue a treaty relationship. It makes a difference, however, whether a government scraps an agreement or whether it makes use of its right of denunciation as embodied in the treaty. He would take the liberty of returning to this question from time to time.

The American Foreign Minister conceded that his views perhaps would not necessarily be applicable to NATO in view of what it had become. In contradistinction to mere alliances with definite treaty obligations, NATO had become a political institution of its own. The United States hopes that this development continues even stronger. Such institution differs certainly from a mere juridical treaty system and therefore, in this case, perhaps more could be said in favor of an extension of its duration.

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In conclusion the American Foreign Minister once again spoke about the difficulties which the French are likely to raise. He expressed the hope that de Gaulle may still be able to learn something. However, he had not gained a favorable impression of Debre'.

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)

EPC/HDR by PS 10/24/94

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UNCLASSIFIED

February 12, 1959

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 396th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, February 12, 1959

Present at the 396th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; and the Secretary of Commerce (participating in Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretaries of State Livingston T. Merchant and Gerard C. Smith; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA
(NSC 5902; NSC 5613/1; OCB Report, November 23, 1958, on NSC 5613/1; NSC Action No. 1930; NIE 80/90-58)

Mr. Gray requested the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the Council now with that portion of his regular intelligence briefing which dealt with Latin America.

Mr. Allen Dulles in agreeing with this suggestion pointed out to the President that his run-down of developments in Latin America would naturally tend to be gloomy since he would be touching upon trouble spots rather than upon those areas of Latin America where conditions were favorable from the point of view of the United States.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	<u>NSC 589-720</u>
NLE Case	<u>MR 78-93421</u>
By	<u>DDH</u> NLE Date <u>12/6/89</u>

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Of these trouble spots Mr. Dulles indicated that Cuba was the most worrisome. In Cuba, he pointed out, we were threatened with a partial breakdown of the machinery of government. Thanks to the thoroughness of Castro's recent revolution, there were very few trained government personnel remaining to undertake the routine tasks of administration. While President Urrutia was a good man, he was indecisive. Accordingly, Castro who was only thirty-two years old and had no previous experience in government, was obliged to make all the important decisions. Meanwhile labor unrest in Cuba was spreading and this might affect the current sugar harvest. There were also evidences of growing unemployment, a fact which the Communist Party, which was now in the open, would seek to take advantage of. Finally, Castro considers himself the man on horseback, destined not only to liberate Cuba but to liberate all the other dictatorships in Latin America, including Puerto Rico. However Betancourt in Venezuela and Munoz Marin apparently exerted considerable influence on Castro.

Secretary Anderson interrupted at this point to state that a group of officials from the new Cuban Government were coming to the Treasury Department this afternoon to talk with him about a stabilization fund. These officials apparently wanted \$100 million for this purpose from the United States. Secretary Anderson said that he and his associates merely proposed to listen to the Cuban delegation at this afternoon's meeting but he pointed out that a decision would have to be made in the next few days as to how far the U.S. Government was going to go in support of the Castro Government.

The President commented that he found it difficult to comprehend how we could do anything to stabilize the Cuban currency until the government of Cuba itself had become stabilized. Secretary Anderson replied that as far as we knew in the Treasury Department, Cuban finances were not in particularly bad shape if we could rely on their figures. On the other hand, he felt that the President was right as to the requirement for a stabilized government prior to a stabilized currency.

Secretary Dillon expressed the opinion that such matters as Secretary Anderson had brought up could not be decided quickly. They must be gone into very thoroughly. He warned that a financial blow-up in Cuba could very well lead to a blow-up of the new Cuban Government. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the new Cuban officials had to be treated more or less like children. They had to be led rather than rebuffed. If they were rebuffed, like children, they were capable of doing almost anything.

Turning to the conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras, Mr. Dulles stated that the regime in Honduras was threatened by a revolt which

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had been started on Nicaraguan soil. The American Ambassadors in Honduras and Nicaragua were working on the problem. As a result Nicaragua may deport the Honduran rebels working on Nicaraguan soil. If this occurred, the revolt might abruptly end.

In Panama Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Administration was being threatened by political opponents who were preparing for the 1960 elections in Panama. While the opposition to the present Administration was divided, there could be trouble.

From Mexico, continued Mr. Dulles, came certain reports to the effect that Leftists and labor groups might organize demonstrations against the President when he made his forthcoming visit to Mexico. Mr. Dulles doubted whether such demonstrations, if carried out, would amount to very much. The President said that he doubted that he need anticipate any trouble in Mexico. No American visitors have encountered significant trouble in Mexico in the recent past.

In Venezuela Mr. Dulles suggested that there might be some agitation and riots tomorrow when the new President, Betancourt, was to be inaugurated. While Betancourt was very popular in the country as a whole, he was not well thought of by the majority in the city of Caracas.

Mr. Dulles felt that President Frondizi had returned to Argentina strengthened by his recent visit to the United States. While Frondizi is threatened by enemies of his austerity program for Argentina - the only program that can save the country - Mr. Dulles predicted that Frondizi would nevertheless do his best to carry out this program.

Chile was still beset by its traditional problems. It had nevertheless at the present time one of the best governments in the history of the country.

At the conclusion of Mr. Allen Dulles's run-down of recent developments in Latin America, Mr. Gray began to brief the National Security Council on the new draft statement of policy which had been prepared by the NSC Planning Board (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). He pointed out in his briefing note that the Vice President, who was unable to be present at this morning's meeting, found the new draft generally acceptable. The draft had also been submitted to Dr. Milton Eisenhower who had likewise generally approved of it but had made certain specific suggestions for revision. Several of these suggestions had been agreed to by the NSC Planning Board. Other suggestions of Dr. Eisenhower had not found favor with the Planning Board although Mr. Gray stated he would nevertheless in the course of his briefing indicate these revisions as proposed by Dr. Eisenhower.

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After briefly noting the main characteristics of NSC 5902 and indicating the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the paper as a whole, Mr. Gray suggested that the Council withhold judgment as to the wisdom of the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the paper be returned to the Planning Board for revision, until the Council had had an opportunity to go through the main provisions of the new draft paper. After noting a number of specific new points contained in NSC 5902, many of which followed recommendations by the Vice President or Dr. Eisenhower, Mr. Gray said he wished to call attention to two split views in the paper which the Planning Board had been unable to resolve and on which he hoped the Council could come to a decision today. The first of these occurred in Paragraph 27-c on Page 13 reading as follows:

"To the extent feasible [taking into account the need to maintain a spirit of partnership and equality, and also the U.S. policy of expanding U.S.-Soviet bloc exchanges and encouraging the selective expansion of Free World-Soviet bloc exchanges,] encourage individual and collective action by the other American Republics against Sino-Soviet bloc influence and Communist or other anti-U.S. subversion, including: "

After explaining to the best of his ability the nature of the disagreement about the above-mentioned sub-paragraph and noting that the bracketed language had been proposed for insertion by the representatives of Treasury, Budget, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Gray called on Secretary Anderson to elaborate, if he wished, on the reasons why the Treasury felt it desirable to include the bracketed language.

Secretary Anderson commenced by stating that he realized that the problem set forth in this paragraph was essentially a matter falling under the jurisdiction of the State Department. He nevertheless wanted to explain the Treasury point of view. He called attention to the fact that the U.S. Government, in dealing with this problem, was in the habit of differentiating between what we say for propaganda purposes and what we actually do in the matter of encouraging exchanges and trade between the U.S. and the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Whatever we may say for propaganda purposes, we decide on exchanges and trade with the Bloc on a case by case basis. However, as long as we continue to take this kind of propaganda stance and at the same time try to dissuade our Latin American friends from similarly engaging in exchanges with the Soviet Bloc, they will inevitably feel that we are talking down to them. Moreover, there are occasions when, for instance, the Russian offer to take Brazilian coffee (even though the Russians do not drink much coffee) such transactions take a burden off of the United States.

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Secretary Dillon said he still believed it would be best if the bracketed language proposed by Treasury, Budget, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were deleted. We in the State Department did recognize that there was some inconsistency with respect to our policy on exchanges between Latin American countries and the countries of the Soviet Bloc. Nevertheless, ever since the Caracas meeting it has been basic U.S. policy to stress the danger of Communism in the Latin American countries. We have always felt that Latin Americans were insufficiently aware of the dangers of international Communism so that if we were to let down all barriers to exchanges between the Latin American countries and countries of the Soviet Bloc, the Latin American countries would go far beyond our own restrained program governing such exchanges. For these reasons we in the State Department feel that we should continue to discourage too free a policy of exchanges by the Latin American Republics.

There was yet another reason, said Secretary Dillon, which supported the deletion of the proposed language; namely, the existence in the earlier portions of the paper of language stressing the desire of the U.S. for an expression of partnership and equality among the Latin American Republics. Secretary Dillon felt that this kind of guidance belonged where it was found under the section headed General Guidance rather than in the specific guidance concerning the threat of Communism in Latin America.

Turning to the matter of trade between the Latin American Republics and the Soviet Bloc, Secretary Dillon emphasized that the present paper already contains a considerable revision of our previously more stringent objective of preventing such trade as dangerous (Paragraph 27-a-(7)). In addition to this revision in favor of encouraging larger trade between the Latin American countries and the Sino-Soviet Bloc proposed by the Planning Board there had been a further revision in the same direction as a result of suggestions made by Dr. Eisenhower. Thus while we may have gone too far in the past in trying to prevent trade in such surplus Latin American products as coffee and cocoa, these restrictions have been considerably eased in NSC 5902. Accordingly, this matter no longer seemed to Secretary Dillon to be a real issue. Still more to the point was the fact that the U.S.S.R. had only three embassies in Latin America; namely, in Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Mexico City. All three of these were lively centers of espionage and propaganda and we hope that we can prevent the establishment of Soviet embassies in any other Latin American countries. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that a Soviet embassy might well be re-established in Cuba.

With respect to the problem raised by Paragraph 27-c and the proposal of the Treasury, Budget, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include the bracketed language, the President observed that the problem seemed to be related chiefly to methods of operation and implementation. He

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matter

felt that it would be a pretty slick and sensitive/ to carry out the injunction in Paragraph c to try to encourage action by the other American Republics against Communist or Sino-Soviet Bloc influence. It could be successfully done if the operators knew how to operate but the U.S. has often been criticized in the past for taking on a superior attitude on such matters. It is this, said the President, that worried him.

Mr. George Allen said there was yet another aspect of the problem of restricting the influence of Communism in the Latin American Republics which had not yet been mentioned. In a number of instances when Latin American musicians, scientists and the like were invited to visit the Soviet Union, they came to us and asked us whether they should accept such invitations. Moreover, they went further and asked whether, if they accepted a Soviet invitation, the U.S. would subsequently refuse to provide them with a visa to visit the U.S. Indeed, one of the main reasons for Latin American anger against the U.S. was the feeling that we treated Latin Americans with condescension. Accordingly, Mr. George Allen said, he was inclined to go along with Secretary Anderson's suggestion that the U.S. should not continue to have a double standard with respect to exchanges between Free World countries and the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

The President said that he understood Mr. Allen's remarks and added that we flatter ourselves that we are more sophisticated than our Latin American neighbors which of course presented a problem as to how we can discourage exchanges between Latin American countries and the Sino-Soviet Bloc without seeming to assume a superior attitude. For these reasons, the President said he believed that we should insert in this part of the paper a clear directive which would state that efforts to encourage action by the other American Republics against Communist influence would have to be approved by the Latin American desk in the State Department. In fact, continued the President, this whole matter was so tricky that it almost required a handbook of directions in order to be successfully carried out. Secretary Dillon stated his agreement with the President's point. The President added that the essence of the problem was how we carried out the guidance against Communism in Paragraph 27-c without giving offense to our Latin American friends and without doing more harm than good to ourselves.

Mr. Allen Dulles commented that the language seemed to him a little strong and indicated that President Frondizi had personally asked Mr. Allen Dulles what he, Frondizi, should do about Communism in Argentina. The President again called for a statement containing very precise guidance on procedures for encouraging action by the other Latin American Republics against Soviet and Communist influence. Mr. Allen Dulles added the point that we had in the past very often given very detailed guidance to Latin American Governments on this point.

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The Director of the Bureau of the Budget then suggested that he might have a solution. Could we not drop the present bracketed language in Paragraph 27-c and substitute for it more general language such as "taking into account other related U.S. policies"? This might avoid the risk of alienating our Latin American friends by too much rigidity or too great pressure. The President, however, felt that the language proposed by Mr. Stans was still somewhat too weak and suggested instead language to the effect that we should encourage action by the other American Republics against Sino-Soviet Bloc and Communist influence under methods of procedure which would be prescribed by the State Departments for operations in this field. The President again stressed the need for the opinions of experts and specialists in dealing with this problem.

Secretary Dillon said that the State Department would agree to such an approach as this and insisted that we did not wish to be in a position of preaching to our Latin American neighbors. On the other hand, he thought the problem which was being discussed was essentially a matter of operations rather than of policy although he could see no objection to putting in a directive along the lines suggested by the President to insure the compliance of the operators. The President cited various past experiences in support of his argument and again stressed the vital necessity to avoid giving rise to injured feelings by the other American Republics. Mr. Gray pointed out that in due course the Operations Coordinating Board would prepare an operational plan to carry out the policies agreed to by the Council on Latin America and that perhaps this OCB operational plan would be the best place to cover the President's point about a directive to the operators with respect to the problem of Paragraph 27-c. The President, however, still insisted that the problem was primarily a matter for the State Department and he wanted the responsibility clearly placed on the Department of State. Mr. Gray indicated that he would work out language which would meet the President's point.

At this juncture Secretary Anderson asked permission to have the floor. He stated that almost from the beginning of its existence the Export-Import Bank had as a matter of policy steadfastly declined to make loans to newspapers, radio stations, television stations, and other opinion-forming enterprises in Latin America. Secretary Anderson said he felt that was an incorrect policy on the part of the Export-Import Bank and as a result of it very few American nationals were now engaged in publishing newspapers or other such activities in any of the Latin American countries. The vacuum had been filled by the nationals of other countries. He therefore asked whether we should not change the policies of the Export-Import Bank to permit the Bank to lend money to U.S. nationals desiring to enter into the newspaper or radio field in Latin America.

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The President said that he agreed with the view expressed by Secretary Anderson. Secretary Dillon added the view that if policy-makers are in agreement on the desirability of loans to such enterprises, the policies of the Export-Import Bank should not stand in the way.

At this stage Mr. Gordon Gray asked the President's permission to quote Scripture illustrating the dilemma which had been posed by the problem of the U.S. desire on the one hand to treat other American Republics on a basis of partnership and equality in the matter of exchanges with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and on the other hand the U.S. desire to encourage the other American Republics to take action against Communist influence. He then read St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, Chapter 14:21 reading as follows: "It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby they brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak."

Thereafter, Mr. Gray asked permission to turn to the second split view in NSC 5902 occurring in Paragraph 53 on Page 27 and reading as follows:

"53. Provide adequate quotas for qualified personnel for training in U.S. armed forces schools and training centers.

Majority

Budget

"Seek appropriate legislative authority to permit the military assistance program to bear the complete cost of training military personnel of all Latin American countries in U.S. armed forces schools and training centers.

"Seek, as appropriate, new legislative authority to facilitate provision of the training authorized by para. 45-a.

"Encourage Latin American states to fill their authorized quotas at the three Service Academies."

He explained that the Majority opinion believed that such legislation was necessary to cover situations where there was no bilateral agreement with a country which we may desire to assist with training so that a special Presidential determination was necessary. On the other hand, the Budget Representative had pointed out that while this problem affected Latin America primarily, it also applied to certain other situations such as Burma and might be better treated in our statement of Basic National Security Policy. He then called on Mr. Stans who said that the essential issue was simple and that this

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particular Latin American paper was the wrong forum for handling such matters. They should instead be handled by the Mutual Security Steering Group. He therefore favored deletion of both the Majority and the Budget version although if some language still seemed to be needed he would prefer the Budget version.

The President inquired whether it had not long been our practice to provide special inducements to Latin American officers to study at our U.S. Service Academies and training centers. If this were not the case the President thought that we should certainly provide such special inducements and privileges.

Secretary Dillon said that the State Department's only objection to the Budget version of Paragraph 53 was that it limited the provision of training of Latin American military personnel to the kind of training prescribed in Paragraph 45-a; namely, the training necessary to assist the Latin American armed forces to carry out measures related to hemispheric defense. Secretary Dillon, on the other hand, believed that the criteria for training Latin American military personnel in the U.S. Service schools should be broader than that suggested in Paragraph 45-a. Such training might well be offered for political rather than for strictly defense reasons. Mr. Stans said he did not disagree with the point made by Secretary Dillon.

After further discussion the President turned to General Twining and asked how the expense for the training of Latin American personnel in U.S. Service schools was absorbed. The President said he would like to see the several U.S. Military Services take all of this in hand, and pay for everything except the board bills and the transportation of the Latin American personnel. He would ask for funds to accomplish this in authorization bills for the Department of Defense.

Mr. Gray then proposed substitute language for the two versions of Paragraph 53 running as follows: "Seek, as appropriate, new legislative authority to facilitate such training." The Council agreed to accept Mr. Gray's proposal.

Mr. Gray then asked the President's permission to run through briefly the suggestions for changes in NSC 5902 which had been proposed by Dr. Milton Eisenhower but which the NSC Planning Board had found it impossible to accept. The first of these, he said, related to the problem of non-intervention with particular respect to Paragraphs 21-a and -b on Page 8 reading as follows:

"21. Exceptions to Non-Intervention

a. In the event of threatened or actual domination of any American state by Communism, promote and cooperate through

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the OAS in the application of measures available under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro to the extent necessary to remove the threat to the security of the hemisphere.

The President indicated his acceptance of language of the sort proposed by Secretary Anderson. General Twining also signified his agreement and said that Paragraphs 20 and 21 of NSC 5902 illustrated some of the "inconsistencies" which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had found fault with in their comments on this report. After further brief discussion the President suggested the

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language which seemed to be appropriate to him to cover Paragraphs 21-a and -b which language is set forth in the action which followed the Council consideration of this paper.

Mr. Gray then turned to the second of the suggestions made by Dr. Eisenhower which the Planning Board had felt unable to accept. This was Dr. Eisenhower's feeling that the U.S. should do everything that it could to encourage Latin American countries to divert every available resource to economic development except for the minimum sums needed to maintain military forces for internal security purposes only.

Mr. Gray indicated that the Planning Board, while generally sympathetic to the substance of Dr. Eisenhower's view, felt that his language was too restrictive and therefore preferred the language of the paper as set forth in Paragraph 44 Page 24. This latter paragraph reflected the view that Latin American countries would have a role to play in hemisphere defense and that in any case they will maintain military forces whatever representations the U.S. made to them.

The President said he believed that the most satisfactory solution would be maintenance by the Latin American Republics of the minimum levels of military forces agreed upon by the U.S. and the Latin American Republics which sought our assistance in maintaining military forces. He again expressed the view that this was likewise an example of an excess of caution by his brother and that no revision was really required to meet his point.

Mr. Gray next turned to Dr. Eisenhower's belief that if there were to be U.S. military assistance to Latin American states, such military assistance should not be extended to dictatorships. Mr. Gray pointed out that the majority of the Planning Board, while again sympathetic to the motives underlying this comment, felt that such a policy could not be applied solely to Latin America and that it would create serious problems if this were applied world-wide. For this and for other reasons the Planning Board favored the existing language.

The President commented that in respect to this problem, the policy statement should at least contain a word of caution with regard to the extension of U.S. military assistance to Latin American dictatorships. We could at least drag our feet in extending such assistance and besides considering the effect in Latin America of extending U.S. military assistance to dictatorships, we have to consider the effect of such action on our American domestic opinion. Mr. Gray read other portions of the paper, particularly Paragraph 22-b

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which the majority of the Planning Board believed sought to meet the point raised by Dr. Eisenhower and to counter any impression that the U.S. favored dictatorships, whether of the Right or Left. Mr. Gray went on to point out and to cite figures indicating that at the present time the U.S. was giving only negligible military assistance to the two or three dictatorships still in existence; namely, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and perhaps Nicaragua. Mr. Gray pointed out that we were providing such assistance to the Dominican Republic because we had a missile-tracking station in that country and the military assistance was essentially (as was the case in Brazil) a quid pro quo for permission to maintain a missile-tracking station.

The President asked why it was essential that a missile-tracking station be maintained in the Dominican Republic. Could we not construct such stations in the Virgin Islands, in Puerto Rico, or in other such areas? Secretary Quarles replied that the missile-tracking site in the Dominican Republic had been very carefully surveyed before it was built and that there were sound technical reasons for the construction of the station in the Dominican Republic. The other areas noted by the President as suitable for such stations were also being used.

Secretary Dillon brought the discussion back to the general point and explained that the State Department felt that in the matter of dealing with dictatorships, it was important for the U. S. to maintain an adequate degree of flexibility, inasmuch as many of the governments of many of the Latin American countries were subject to frequent change. While he did not want a hard and fast prohibition against providing military assistance to any dictatorship in Latin America, he would have no objection to cautionary language with respect to such deals. Mr. George Allen commented that it was often thought that there were both good and bad dictatorships in the world.

After agreement on the introduction of a cautionary statement in the matter of extension of U.S. military assistance to dictatorships, Mr. Gray briefly summarized the remaining points on which Dr. Eisenhower had made suggestions. He indicated that the Planning Board had taken account of certain of these suggestions but that it believed that in the matter of providing for additional flow of external private and public capital, the Planning Board believed that the language set forth in Paragraph 38 on Pages 19-21 provided adequate guidance to U.S. Government agencies. As to Dr. Eisenhower's doubts as to whether the amounts of economic assistance of various types, projected in the Financial Appendix, were of sufficient magnitude, the Planning Board had pointed out that the proposed Inter-American Development Banking Institution, would provide a new and additional means for increased economic development in the hemisphere. The President did not press for the inclusion of Dr. Eisenhower's views on these issues.

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Mr. Gray stated that these were all the points which he felt it necessary to raise and asked if Secretary Dillon or General Twining had any other points to make. Secretary Dillon said he thought the language in the paper was adequate while General Twining expressed the opinion that many of the revisions made in the paper during the course of the discussion had met the complaints of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their written views. The Joint Chiefs he said had called for U.S. competition with the U.S.S.R. in Latin America. They believed that our attitude toward Communism in Latin America was too negative as apparently Dr. Eisenhower had also thought.

At the end of the discussion Mr. Gray announced that he would undertake to make certain revisions in the text of NSC 5902 as suggested at the meeting after which it would be possible to determine whether or not the paper as a whole needed to come back to the Council for another look.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5902, and revisions thereto subsequently proposed by the NSC Planning Board in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, as presented at the meeting, and an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on current developments in certain Latin American countries.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5902, subject to the following amendments:
 - (1) Page 8, paragraph 21-a: Place a period after the word "hemisphere" and add the following sentence:
 - (2) Page 8, paragraph 21-b: Revise to read as follows:
 - (3) Page 11, paragraph 25-a: Add the following words:

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"; seeking positive means of diverting Panamanian attention from the Canal problem to economic development."

- (4) Page 13, paragraph 27-c: Delete the bracketed words and the footnote thereto and insert in place thereof the words "and under methods and procedures that are prescribed by the Department of State to guide personnel operating in the field,".
- (5) Page 14, paragraph 27-c(7): Add the following sentence: "Within these limitations, normally refrain from discouraging Latin American countries from trading non-strategic surplus commodities to the European Soviet bloc for consumer goods or other products they can use."
- (6) Page 25, paragraph 45: Add the following sub-paragraph:

"d. In making military equipment and training available to Latin American countries, take into account the provisions of paragraph 22-b relative to the type of Government involved, exercising caution in the provision of such assistance to dictatorships."
- (7) Page 27, paragraph 53: Delete the alternative versions of the second sentence and substitute therefor the following: "Seek, as appropriate, new legislative authority to facilitate provision of such training to personnel from all Latin American countries."

- c. Requested the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, to undertake in coordination with other interested agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense, a special study to identify the potential contribution of Latin American resources, production and skills to U.S. recovery following a nuclear attack; reporting to the Council any policy recommendations found appropriate or necessary.

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NOTE: NSC 5902, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5902/1 for implementation by all departments and agencies of the U. S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, for implementation.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

The Director of Central Intelligence stated that a Soviet delegation had been in Iran for some two weeks to negotiate an agreement on a non-aggression pact. The membership of the Soviet delegation was potent. At first the Iranians had not told us much about the negotiations although the Shah may have originally encouraged the Soviet delegation to come to Iran. He may have believed that this would construct a good bargaining position vis-a-vis the U.S. In any event the Soviet-Iranian negotiations had ended very abruptly on February 10. The cause of the break was the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept an agreement with Iran which would permit

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that country to remain a member of the Baghdad Pact and to sign a bilateral agreement with the U.S. In the final session of the negotiations the Soviets had been insulting, abusive and even threatening. This may presage a breach of diplomatic relations with Iran. We should not take such a possibility, warned Mr. Dulles, too lightly.

Secretary Dillon commented that the signing of the bilaterals between the U.S. on the one hand and Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan on the other might be delayed for some little time. He thought that the signature of the bilaterals might occur in two weeks time, the signatures being affixed separately in the capitals of the three countries.

In any event, continued Mr. Allen Dulles, the Soviets are not likely to take lying down the refusal of the government of Iran to sign a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R. Iran has always been a sensitive area to the Soviet Union and we will do well to consider what actions the Soviet Union might take as a result of the breakdown of the negotiations and prepare to counter whatever steps the Soviets take. We will undoubtedly get strong pressure for support from the Iranian government. In outlining possible moves that the Soviet Union might take against Iran, Mr. Allen Dulles said that he did not expect them to undertake direct military action against Iran. Secretary Dillon said he would like to discuss the situation in Iran as a result of the departure of the Soviet delegation with Mr. Dulles and his associates.

Turning to the situation in Iraq, Mr. Dulles said that the recent changes in the make-up of the Cabinet in that country had not come as a surprise despite the selection of ten new Cabinet ministers. There were, he said, differing views as to the significance of the change.

In Kuwait Mr. Dulles said that the Iraqi developments had caused consternation and that some riots may well occur.

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Mr. Dulles concluded his intelligence briefing by providing the National Security Council with a summary of the developments of the recently concluded 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Iran, Iraq and Kuwait, and a summary of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

3. U.S. POLICY TOWARD GERMANY
(NSC 5803; NSC Actions Nos. 1858 and 1932)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject by noting that continuing study of alternatives to existing policy on the unification of Germany was called for by NSC action. He expressed the hope that in the absence of Secretary Dulles, it would still be possible to have a report on Secretary Dulles's recent trip to London, Paris, and Bonn. He then called on Secretary Dillon who indicated that Assistant Secretary Merchant would provide the report.

Secretary Merchant stated that the purpose of Secretary Dulles's trip had been primarily to see whether our allies were thinking along the same lines as ourselves with respect to Berlin and the German problem generally. He added that Secretary Dulles had had long and intimate talks with the leaders of the U.K., France, and Germany during his visits to the capitals of these three countries. Secretary Dulles had expressed himself as completely satisfied with the results of his trip.

Secretary Merchant said that Secretary Dulles had found general agreement between himself and the leaders of the other three countries on proposals for dealing with the Soviets in the event of any attempt to impede allied military access to Berlin.

With regard to the problem of preparing for a possible meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., U.K., France and the Soviet Union, Secretary Dulles had encountered few differences of opinion and even these were relatively minor and relatively easily adjusted. An agreed reply to the Soviet note of January 10 was now being considered by the NATO Council. Secretary Merchant briefly characterized what this note would probably contain.

Thereafter Secretary Merchant described briefly the agreement reached by Secretary Dulles on procedural preparations for a Foreign Ministers' meeting. There had been discussion in all three capitals of the general problems of the Berlin situation, the unification of

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Germany, European security, and a German peace treaty. All had agreed that as the substantive basis for our position at such a meeting of Foreign Ministers, the President's proposal at the Geneva Conference of 1955 should be used. This did not mean that there could not be certain adjustments in form and manner of presentation which might make this basis more palatable to the Soviets and to public opinion. In all three capitals Secretary Dulles had encountered a willingness to examine all the elements of such a package proposal. There was also a willingness to try to make such a package more palatable from the point of view of public opinion. There was not much optimism, however, on its acceptability to the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Merchant then turned to the general atmosphere which the Secretary had encountered on his trip. In London he had found the Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd much preoccupied with domestic politics. While their position on Berlin was firm, it was not as truculent on this subject as had been the attitude in Paris. The British were open-minded in the matter of the review and presentation of the package proposal at a Foreign Ministers' Conference.

In Paris Secretary Dulles had noticed a great change in De Gaulle since his last meeting with him in December 1958. De Gaulle appeared much more friendly and much more relaxed.

In Bonn Chancellor Adenauer had appeared somewhat more flexible in his views than in the past with particular respect to the German contribution to the package proposal.

In conclusion Secretary Merchant said that he felt it desirable for him to state that despite Secretary Dulles's physical discomfort, he had never seen him so effective and so forceful as he had been in these meetings in London, Paris, and Bonn. Mr. Merchant repeated that Secretary Dulles was extremely satisfied with the progress that had been made.

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral report by Assistant Secretary of State Merchant on the recent trip by the Secretary of State to London, Paris and Bonn, and his conversations with respect to the Berlin situation, German unification, European security and a German Peace Treaty.



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*Attache 4
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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

International Security Affairs

11 February 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5902)

Transmitted herewith, for the information of the members
of the National Security Council, are the views of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with respect to the above subject.

(Signed)

Robert M. B. Wads
Director, Office of NSC Affairs

Incl a/s

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington 25, D. C.

JCSM-52-57

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5902) (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft statement of policy toward Latin America (NSC 5902), prepared by the NSC Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 12 February 1959. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it to contain inconsistencies among its several sections, and thus subject to misinterpretation. However, the draft policy is acceptable from a military point of view and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend adoption of the majority position shown in paragraph 53, page 27.

2. In general, the draft statement of policy does not reflect the developing trend among small independent nations toward a greater degree of independence in international affairs, particularly in their positions toward the basic East-West conflict. In addition, the draft policy does not adequately reflect the fact that the United States is no longer the sole source of major financial, economic, and military aid, and that the United States must be prepared to meet or counter Soviet competition.

3. The entire section on Communism (Paragraphs 27 and 28, pages 12-14) is a negative approach to a major problem facing the United States today, namely how to maintain support for its stand against Communism. Whenever the Communist problem is touched on in this paper, it is from a negative viewpoint, i.e., be against Communism because the United States says Communism is bad. The facts are beginning to make that argument appear rather shopworn. The time has arrived when a positive attitude must be adopted by the United States, i.e., that the United States has some things to offer, extending from the abstractions of human dignity, justice, good government and personal freedom, through economic and material success, all of which are better than the Sino-Soviet Bloc products.

4. If this approach is accepted, it is recommended that the draft statement of policy be referred to the Planning Board for revision.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

W. F. TWining
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Briefing Note for
NSC Mtg, 2-12-59

Mr. Gleason
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PJH/gb
February 11, 1959
2nd Draft

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

I. The draft statement of policy before you replaces the old policy paper (NSC 5613/1, approved September 25, 1956). The Planning Board has had the benefit of a special national intelligence estimate (SNIE 80/90-58, December 2, 1958), a special report by the OCB dated November 26, 1958, a full background report by the Department of State, and the views of several expert consultants, including Mr. Henry Holland, Amb. Walter J. Donnelly, Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Mr. Milo Perkins. The Vice President found the paper to be generally acceptable. The Board carefully considered the Report on United States-Latin American Relations submitted to the President by Dr. Milton Eisenhower on December 27, 1958. A few days ago Dr. Eisenhower reviewed this paper and I shall refer subsequently to his comments.

II. The new paper may be characterized as follows:

(1) As recommended by the Vice President, Dr. Eisenhower and others, it seeks to impart a greater sense of urgency and importance to our relations with Latin America, although Dr. Eisenhower questions whether it goes far enough in that direction.

(2) It points up the importance of economic problems of the area (para. 2, page 1) and sets forth policy guide lines by which the U.S. can assist its Latin American neighbors in attempting to overcome those problems.

(3) It stresses the importance of the psychological aspect of US-Latin American relations and of wise and discreet U.S. leadership in hemisphere affairs (Paras. 3-4, pages 2-3).

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(4) The paper concerns itself with the threat of more intensive Sino-Soviet Bloc political and economic efforts in Latin America (para. 6, page 4).

(5) At the same time, it notes the great, almost unique opportunities which the U.S. has to achieve its objectives in Latin America through assisting the countries of the area in the constructive strengthening of their economies and democratic political institutions (para. 5, pages 3-4).

XIII. The statement of Objectives (pages 5-6) reflect the foregoing points. I should like to read several of them which are particularly pertinent:

"7. Greater friendship, mutual respect and sense of interdependence among governments and peoples of the American Republics."

....

"9. Sound and growing economies capable of providing rising living standards within the general framework of a free enterprise system."

....

"11. Evolutionary development of democratic governments supported by stable political, economic and social institutions compatible with, though not necessarily identical with, those of the United States."

....

"15. Emergence of Latin America as a strong component part of the Western community of nations.

"16. Further development of Western Hemisphere regional cooperation for the maintenance of peace, regional security and economic and social advancement." X

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At this point I should like to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff comments, which were received only in time to permit us to make a distribution at the meeting this morning, while finding the paper acceptable from a military point of view, nevertheless recommend -- for reasons which I am sure General Twining is prepared to give us -- that the paper be returned to the Planning Board for revision. It seems to me, Mr. President, that it would be well for me to review the principal points in the paper before asking for a judgment on the JCS' proposal and in any event for guidance for the Planning Board in the event it is sent back.

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IV. In addition, the paper contains a number of specific new points, which I should like to mention briefly:

(1) As recommended by the Vice President and Dr. Milton Eisenhower, it clearly distinguishes between the attitude to be adopted in our relationships with democratic governments and with dictatorships, either of the right or of the left. (Para. 22-b, page 9.)

(2) As a means of strengthening hemispheric solidarity, it provides, when feasible, for bringing Canada, Puerto Rico, and eventually the West Indian Federation into closer relationship with the inter-American system. (Para. 23-g, page 10.)

(3) It introduces new language concerning U.S. rights in the Panama Canal Zone and with respect to maintenance of the U.S. position regarding the three-mile limit. (Para. 25, page 11.)

In view of the importance of the Canal to the U.S. and in consideration of rising nationalist sentiment in Panama, the Planning Board -- as you can see from the change sheet which has been handed out -- recommends adoption of a suggestion by Dr. Eisenhower to seek "positive means of diverting Panamanian attention from the Canal problem to economic development".

(4) The new paper stresses the necessity for making increased efforts to influence various categories of national leaders (such as present and potential political, military and labor leaders, journalists and radio commentators, educators) (para. 29, page 14); moderate anti-Communist leftists and nationalists (para. 30, page 14); opposition elements, under appropriate safeguards (para. 31, page 15); and, students and intellectuals (para. 32, page 15).

(5) It also provides for appropriate encouragement of and activities with respect to non-Communist labor organizations.

(Para. 32, page 15.)

(6) The paper would encourage the use in peacetime of selected Latin American military personnel, such as engineer units, in construction activities, where such work will contribute to economic development through construction of public service projects and not interfere with their military mission. (Para. 40, page 22.)

(7) In connection with increased informational and cultural activities, the paper would seek Latin American cooperation in promoting better understanding through such means as establishment of national commissions of distinguished citizens to work for better understanding. (Para. 41-d, page 23.)

(8) The paper directs that a special study be made of the potential contribution of Latin American resources, production and skills to U.S. recovery in the event of a nuclear attack. (Para. 14, page 6 and Para. 55, page 27).

V. I should now like to call attention to two splits which the Planning Board was unable to resolve.

The first is found in Para. 27-g on page 13 under the heading of Communism. Without the bracketed language this paragraph clearly seeks to restrict exchanges between Latin American countries and Bloc countries. Those who wish to insert the bracketed language feel that our own policy of expanding such exchanges in conjunction with the admonitions found elsewhere in the paper to treat Latin Americans as partners present a contradiction which must be recognized.

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
The second split, which is even more technical, deals with the manner of allocating the cost of military training programs for Latin America. In para. 53 on page 27 the majority, in response to a suggestion by the military, agreed that we should "Seek appropriate legislative authority to permit the military assistance program to bear the complete cost of training military personnel of all Latin American countries in U.S. armed forces schools and training centers". Such legislation is necessary to cover situations where there is no bilateral agreement, with a country which we may desire to assist with training, so that a Presidential Determination is necessary. While this appeared to a majority of the Board to be a reasonable proposition, the Budget representative pointed out that while this problem affects Latin America primarily, it also applies to certain other situations, such as Burma, and might better be treated in our Basic Policy. The Budget alternative language was "Seek, as appropriate, new legislative authority to facilitate provision of the training authorized by para. 45-a". I should like to call on the Director of the Budget to discuss this matter.

CALL ON MR. STANS

VI. Turning now to Dr. Eisenhower's reactions, while the paper reflects the majority of his recommendations to the President, I must say in all candor that the Planning Board did not accept all of his specific comments.

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On another point, Dr. Eisenhower feels we should do everything we can to encourage the Latin American countries to devote every available resource to economic development, except for minimum sums needed to maintain military forces for internal security purposes only. The Planning Board, after lengthy discussion and while generally sympathetic to the substance of Dr. Eisenhower's comments, felt that they were too restrictive and preferred the language of the paper as written. This language reflects the views of the military adviser and Defense that Latin American countries have a role to play in hemisphere defense and that they will maintain military forces whatever representations we make to them. (See Para. 44, page 24.) For these reasons, most Board members did not wish to reject this military advice. It is also believed that such aid gives the U.S. some influence in limiting Latin American military programs, which might otherwise be set at even higher levels by some governments. The increase in U.S. military aid to Brazil, presently valued at about \$87 million, is a special case resulting from U.S. use of a missile tracking station, and indeed Brazil has made military contributions outside the hemisphere in previous emergencies. (Financial Appendix, pages 34-35.) It was further pointed out that total U.S./^{military} assistance to Latin America is relatively small, being projected at \$223 million for FY 1959-62 (Financial Appendix, Table I, page 29).

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Dr. Eisenhower further believes that if there is to be military assistance, it should not be extended to dictators.* The majority of the Planning Board, while again sympathetic to this comment, felt that such a policy should not be applied solely to Latin America, but would create serious problems if applied world wide and that in some cases the only alternative to giving assistance to a dictator would be the creation of a vacuum favoring the Communists. Finally, it was pointed out that in some cases military requirements could only be met by assisting dictators as a quid pro quo, such as our missile tracking station in the Dominican Republic. However, with respect to grant aid, of the few remaining dictatorships, the Dominican Republic will continue to be a grant aid recipient for Navy training programs only and the nine aircraft originally intended for the Dominican Republic will be reprogrammed for Chile. Nicaragua is receiving support for only one infantry battalion and Paraguay no grant military assistance. (Financial Appendix, page 35.)

VII. As you all know, the problem of surplus commodities is the number one economic problem in most Latin American countries. This is recognized in the policy guidance section of the paper (Trading Policies, Para. 36, pages 18-19). However, as a result of Dr. Milton Eisenhower's comments the Planning Board now suggests an amendment to the language in Para. 27-c-(7), page 14,

*Remaining dictators in Latin America are generally regarded as Generalissimo Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, President Stroessner of Paraguay, and possibly President Somoza of Nicaragua.

which looks to the possibility of Latin American nations increasing non-strategic trade in commodities with selected Bloc countries as a means of reducing such crushing surpluses as the one in Brazilian coffee. The language to be added, as shown on the change sheet, would read: "Within these limitations, normally refrain from discouraging Latin American countries from trading non-strategic surplus commodities to the European Soviet Bloc for consumer goods or other products they can use."

Our consultants have pointed out that the free enterprise system does not always operate with as wide benefits to the general public in Latin America as it does in the U.S. and other countries. In recognition of this fact, the Planning Board suggests the addition of the language in Para. 37-b on page 19: "To base their economies on a system of free private enterprise adapted to local conditions [.] and to have such enterprise benefit the masses of the people."

I should like to mention one final point in connection with economic development in Latin America. It has been suggested by Dr. Milton Eisenhower that we should recognize Latin America's unique relationship to the U.S. and its importance to the U.S. in deeds, as well as in words. This principle applies particularly in the field of assisting in Latin American economic development through an additional flow of external private and public capital. The Planning Board believes the language in para. 38 on pages 19-21 provides adequate guidance to the various U.S. Government agencies which will have to deal with this problem from an operational and fiscal standpoint. Doubts have been expressed by Dr. Eisenhower as to whether the amounts of economic assistance of various types projected in the Financial Appendix (Table I, page 29) are of sufficient magnitude. It was pointed out in the Planning

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Board, however, that the proposed Inter-American Development Banking Institution, the establishment of which is now under active negotiation in Washington, will provide a new, additional vehicle through which the U.S. and Latin America can work together for increased economic development in the hemisphere through the use of both public and private funds.

(Financial Appendix, page 47.)

CALL ON ACTING SECRETARY DILLON

CALL ON GENERAL TWINING

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Proposed Record of Action

February 11, 1959

U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA
(NSC 5902)

- _____. Requested the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, to undertake in coordination with other interested agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense, a special study to identify the potential contribution of Latin American resources, production and skills to U.S. recovery following a nuclear attack; and reporting to the Council any policy recommendations found appropriate or necessary.

Possible participants:

OCDM
State
USIA
CIA
Commerce
Defense
AEC

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February 12, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
February 12, 1959 - 10:40 AM (After NSC)

Others present: Secretary McElroy
Secretary Quarles
General Twining
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

The President called this meeting to discuss the 1968 projection of our atomic weapons requirements. In particular, he is concerned, in making our long-term estimates, over the use of the actual term "requirements." He feels that when we deal with numbers in these circumstances we should call them "estimates under bad conditions."



The President stated that he is not addressing right now the matter of \$145 million for a plutonium reactor with a convertible feature. We are far enough down the road now that he is not going to fight that project. He dislikes, however, the process in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff state so-called "requirements" to the Congress, causing the figures so listed to practically govern our future actions.

The President emphasized that in this meeting he is merely desirous of expressing his doubts and is not issuing a directive. He fears that we have developed a shibboleth which we are then required to live by. In short, we are not being governed by common sense.

Mr. McElroy agreed that the difference between "requirement" and "estimate" is a technical question. However, the President pointed out that the use of the term "requirement" invites demagogues to treat these figures with the sanctity of the psalms and parables.

Mr. McElroy expressed general agreement with this approach and pointed out that the figures ultimately used in this connection were greatly reduced from the original service submissions and were indeed considerably reduced from the requirements as stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President, however, continued by recalling to mind a graph on our 1968 atomic weapons figures which indicated a stockpile which he considered astronomical. These figures, as the President recalled, would be attained by July 1, 1958, if a certain new plant were installed. Without that plant, the figures would be reached by January 1, 1969. Some of these days, in

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MR 80-195 #7

By DJH Date 5/12/82

Staff Secy / Subj / Doc / 1 / '600, Vol III (4) [Jan - Feb 1959]

his view, we are going to realize how ridiculous we have been and at that time we will try to retrench. In particular, the President pointed out that the Executive Branch itself has been fairly sensible, but has been pushed by demagogues and special interests.

The President expressed understanding of the problems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in testifying before a hostile Congress. He agreed with Mr. McElroy that the best way for a hostile Congress under these circumstances to attack the Administration is to attack it for not fulfilling its military requirements. Mr. McElroy pointed out that the concept of efficiency in government represents the "hard sell" rather than the "easy sell."

Mr. Quarles then offered certain background in this area. He stated that the Department of Defense had resisted the AEC on the matter of forecast of requirements so far in advance as ten years. The AEC feels, however, that it is necessary to forecast requirements this far in order to plan efficiently the construction of our production capacity. Mr. Quarles and Admiral Radford had taken the initial position that our plutonium supply is adequate. However, this position had been overtaken by service requirements for the DAVY CROCKETT and for small nuclear warheads for air defense. These two programs require much plutonium. The second position then taken by Mr. Quarles and Admiral Radford had been that a certain amount of additional plutonium was needed, but not in large quantity since we would have the opportunity to increase efficiency by continued testing. Upon the implementation of the current test suspension, the Department of Defense could not see any further position beyond that of moderate increases in plutonium.

Mr. McElroy then outlined the tack which the Department of Defense follows on these matters. Since the estimated requirements of the Department of Defense always exceed the amount of available plutonium by large amounts, the Secretary of Defense had estimated that in order to obtain a small bite we must raise our estimated requirements considerably. He pointed out the relationship between requirements and time. If we are given a few more years, our annual production can be considerably reduced. He added, however, he realizes that the term "requirements" is a poor word.

The President again focused on the term "requirements" with a thought that the number of weapons actually required in 1968 is probably required



in 1961. Therefore, a statement of figures as 1968 requirements would invite an emergency mobilization in order to produce them quickly.

Mr. Quarles, in this connection, pointed out that the progression from 1963 to 1968 does not represent significant increase in the number of weapons or in yield; what it does represent is an increase in tactical weapons. This progression is more expensive in terms of plutonium. He admits we would like to reach these levels in 1963 but reasonable production rates require a stretch-out to 1968.



In connection with small weapons, Mr. Quarles continued, the military has stated before Congress that we need a figure much higher than that submitted by the Department of Defense. This has made the Joint Committee highly critical of us.

The President again repeated his concern with the impact on Congress. If we state that we have a requirement now which will not become available until 1968, Congress will be tempted to spend \$20 billion this year in this field alone. The President understands the need for small weapons in air defense and missile defense, although he pointed out that the three scientists who had visited him the day before (Drs. Land, Purcell and Killian) had shown less enthusiasm than he has heard at other times in this area. The President continued that when we come to supplying small yield weapons for the Infantry and the Marines we are getting into the area of marginal utility. He does not visualize great stockpiles of these weapons around the periphery of the USSR. He pointed out further that our total current megaton capability is estimated so high that if we should employ this quantity of atomic weapons, the fallout from our own weapons could destroy our own country, and indeed the entire Northern Hemisphere. He further expressed the view that we are taking council of our fears. He reiterated that we should push atomic weapons for air defense but be more moderate in development of tactical atomic weapons. He suggested that we indoctrinate ourselves that there is such a thing as common sense. Mr. McElroy agreed and stated that the Department of Defense had fought this line of reasoning when they cut service requests.

The discussion then turned to the subject of military experts, with the President expressing the view that if you try to fight a war with a Board of Political Directors, you will soon find all military commanders being

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told by Congress exactly what they need. Mr. McElroy also pointed out the number of military "experts" available in Congress. The President illustrated the types of difficulties under which the military works in wartime, citing anecdotes from his own experiences in the Operations Division of the War Department right after Pearl Harbor.



John S. D. Eisenhower

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2/18/59

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1959



MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
(Monday, February 16, 1959 at 10:00 a.m.)

1. At the outset of the meeting, I discussed briefly with the President the situation arising out of Secretary Dulles' illness. I said to the President that in view of many difficulties we faced, I thought he should bear in mind the possible frequent use of special meetings of the NSC. His reaction was that we would probably have to carry on as usual although he saw some merit in making more use of the Council machinery.

2. The first item I took up with the President was a proposed communication to the Secretary of Defense (a copy of the final version is attached).

I reminded the President of the presentation some months ago in the National Security Council by Admiral Sides and of the questions prepared by Dr. Killian in connection with issues in the 1960 budget. I also reminded the President that at the time of the Sides presentation he had asked for a study which might lead to the elimination of obsolescent, antithetical, and duplicating weapons systems. I told him that the major policy questions remained unanswered.

I expressed the view that our difficulty in the past had been largely because we frequently, if not normally, approached these problems in the light of a budget discussion. The President responded that all Defense policy had to be considered in the light of available resources. I said that I did not intend in suggesting this new approach to by-pass budget procedures but to seek to get decisions on their merits from the point of view of our defense posture.

I told the President that I had discussed this approach in a long meeting with Mr. McElroy, Mr. Quarles and General Twining, all of whom agreed to it, with one exception, which I would refer to later. I also said that it had been discussed with Dr. Killian and General Goodpaster.

The proposal was that the Defense Department would make, at special meetings of the NSC, presentations on four general areas which might or might not require more than one meeting for each area. The areas

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By DVF Date 7/3/81

OSIA NSA / Spec Assts 8 / Pres 4 / 1 meeting w/ Mr. - 1959 (6)

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I described to the President as follows:

- (1) Strategic nuclear striking force requirements and capabilities, including the "optimum mix" both of weapons systems and of targets. (References: NSC Actions Nos. 1846, 1994, 2009)
- (2) Continental defense against aircraft and missiles (excluding antisubmarine warfare). (References: NSC 5802/1; NSC Action No. 2009)
- (3) Control of the seas, with particular reference to antisubmarine warfare. (References: Report by the Panel on Antisubmarine Warfare of the President's Science Advisory Committee dated December 1, 1958; Study being prepared for the President by the Comparative Evaluations Group, pursuant to NSC 5815)
- (4) Tactical forces and requirements for tactical weapons systems. (References: Paragraph 14, NSC 5810/1; NSC Action No. 1934)



I pointed out to the President that Defense was reluctant about area #4 and would prefer not to have it included. The President said that area #4 required some further refining or defining. He was not sure that a broad study of "the role of tactical forces" would be manageable. There were, however, some things he was interested in. For example, he wondered at the necessity of putting atomic weapons throughout ground forces and into the hands even of battalion commanders. He felt that some attention should be given to area #4 but was not clear as to its scope and nature.

I then reported to the President the substance of my conversation with the Defense officials as to staffing for the studies which would be presented. I pointed out to him that I had recommended against the use of the Planning Board and that there seemed to be some real question about WSEG. Certainly I felt no outside group should be involved. Mr. McElroy proposed that the staffing be done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, after all, are the most competent people in the military field in any event, and he was not disturbed about split views if they were clearly stated and substantially documented. The President agreed that the JCS could do the work but wondered what I had in mind about splits.

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I replied that following the President's directive that a study be organized with respect to targeting systems I had agreed with Secretary McElroy and General Twining that the JCS should try their hand at terms of reference for the study. The result was not a terms of reference, even with a split, but three separate papers from the Chiefs. The President observed that he did not think it would be too difficult to reach agreement on a targeting system. I then explained to him the views on the one hand of the Air Force which contemplated, as a priority capability, the ability to knock out all Soviet military installations, and of the views of the Navy and the Army on the other hand which were substantially, though not precisely in accord, that the targeting system should include urban and industrial complexes and control centers and a relatively few military installations. I suggested that it was possible that the real truth lay between these extremes.



I then discussed with the President the question of attendance at such special meetings. I pointed out to him that Mr. McElroy was firm in his conviction that the meetings should be very limited in character and that my suggestion was that they include the statutory members and advisers of the Council, plus Dr. Killian, Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster, Major Eisenhower and Mr. Lay. I also raised specific questions about General Persons and Secretary Anderson.

The President felt that these meetings need not necessarily be NSC meetings although some of the issues which would be discussed in these meetings would later be presented to the NSC. Therefore, he thought that attendance should be confined to the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dr. Killian, Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster, Major Eisenhower and Mr. Lay. He felt that General Goodpaster's presence would suffice for the White House staff organization, and also that it was not necessary to have Secretary Anderson. With respect to the Director of Central Intelligence he saw no necessity for his attendance. However, I pointed out to the President that he had real contributions to make in area #1, and the President then agreed that he should be invited for the discussions on this topic only.

I then suggested to the President that he might wish to read my draft letter to Secretary McElroy and the attached list of illustrative questions; he indicated that he would do so (the draft and list of questions are attached, containing the President's pencil notations).

In adverting to the question of targeting systems, the President said

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that if our plans contemplate targets in the thousands, this would involve tremendous numbers of weapons of megaton size. He said, for example, that if we were planning a thousand or more weapons averaging 3.5 megatons or even greater numbers of weapons he wondered what would be the cumulative effect of ground bursts of such a magnitude of megatonage on the Northern Hemisphere. He asked me to seek to ascertain an AEC conclusion on this point. Also, he wondered what would be the effect if such megatonage were exploded, say at 10,000 feet or whatever the optimum air burst altitude might be. An approach, he said, might be to base the study on what we have and immediately contemplate that we will have in stockpile, whether it be 5,000 or 7,000 weapons or what not. He expressed his concern that there just might be nothing left of the Northern Hemisphere. He felt that such a study might be useful in arriving at some of the major decisions.

3. I then turned to the Record of Actions of the NSC meeting of February 12 and took up with the President the changes that had been made in the Latin America paper as a result of Council discussion. I pointed out to him that the Treasury was still unhappy about paragraph but the President felt that the language should be retained as amended. I also said that it appeared that all members of the Council would accept the paper as now written although we had not heard further from the Chairman of the JCS as to whether he would press his recommendation for further revision. He indicated that if the JCS went along, I should approve the paper in his behalf.

4. I then discussed the question of "Hot Pursuit." I pointed out to the President that this expression appeared in both the Far East paper and in the paper dealing with reactions to Chinese Communist attack. I indicated that it had been felt by the JCS, among others, that because the term "Hot Pursuit" had a meaning in international law which was quite apart from the meaning involved in the policy paper, confusion resulted and the recommendation was that the phrase "Immediate Pursuit" be substituted. I told the President that this has the specific approval of the Council by vote slip as well as the approval of The Attorney General, who felt that the change was almost altogether technical. The President approved the change.



Gordon Gray

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State



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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1649, FEBRUARY 19, 5 PM. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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1. STIMULATED BY BONN TELEGRAMS 207 AND 208 VENTURE
SUBMIT FOLLOWING REFLECTIONS ON GERMAN PROBLEM.
SHOULD SOVIETS ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS
MEETING, IT IS POSSIBLE THEY WOULD REPLACE GROMYKO WITH
SOMEONE LIKE MIKOYAN, IN WHICH CASE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED
FOR SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON BOTH BERLIN AND
GERMANY AS A WHOLE. IF THEY ARE REPRESENTED BY GROMYDO,
WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR WHAT ON GENERAL GERMAN QUESTION
WOULD BE LARGELY PROPAGANDA EXERCISE, ALTHOUGH THERE
MIGHT BE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN PROBLEM.
I SUSPECT THEY WILL SO PLAY MATTER AS TO LEAD TO IMPASSE
AND CALL FOR SUMMIT MEETING. IF ANY MAJOR SETTLEMENT IS
TO BE REACHED KHRUSHCHEV WILL CERTAINLY WISH OBTAIN
FULL CREDIT FOR IT HIMSELF AND I DO NOT BELIEVE HE WILL
REVEAL THROUGH GROMYKO CONCESSIONS HE MIGHT BE WILLING
MAKE TO SETTLE GERMAN PROBLEM. I SUGGEST THEREFORE WE
SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO A SUMMIT CONFERENCE
EITHER IN EVENT SOVIETS REJECT OUR PRESENT PROPOSAL
OR FOLLOWING FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING WHICH BOGS DOWN.

IF SOVIETS CARRY OUT THEIR THREAT OF CONCLUDING SEPARATE
PEACE TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY, AND I AM INCLINED THINK
THEY WILL, WE MAY NOT HAVE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE
SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO SETTLE GERMAN PROBLEM WITH THEM BY
NEGOTIATION. ALTERNATIVELY I SUGGEST WE SHOULD BE
PREPARED ENGAGE IN BILATERAL TALKS (NOT NEGOTIATIONS)
WITH OBJECTIVE

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Authority MB 80-142 #2

By bc Date 11/25/80

SECRET

-2- 1649, FEBRUARY 19, 5 PM., FROM MOSCOW (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

WITH OBJECTIVE OF ASCERTAINING WHETHER SUMMIT MEETING COULD SUCCESSFULLY BE HELD. DESPITE ALARM THIS MIGHT CAUSE OUR ALLIES I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ONE OF THEM WHO WOULD NOT HAVE DONE SO ALREADY WERE THEY IN OUR PLACE AND I BELIEVE THAT IF PROPERLY EXPLAINED THEY WOULD NOT SERIOUSLY OPPOSE SUCH A STEP. IT APPEARS TO ME THERE IS LESS DANGER IN SUCH TOP-LEVEL TALKS WITHOUT AGENDA THAN THERE IS IN LOWER-LEVEL MEETINGS SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 BONN'S 207, SINCE DANGER OF LOW-LEVEL MEETINGS IS THAT WITHOUT CAREFULLY PREPARED AND AGREED POSITIONS ONE OR MORE OF OUR ALLIES ARE LIKELY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND OUR POSITION GRADUALLY BE WHITTLED AWAY.

2. I PERSONALLY ATTACH MORE IMPORTANCE TO OUR PROPAGANDA POSITION THAN APPEARS INDICATED BY BONN'S REFTELS. IN MY OPINION IF WE CAN PUT FORWARD REASONABLE-APPEARING PROPOSALS IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR KHRUSHCHEV TO CARRY HIS ASSOCIATES WITH HIM ON HIS PRESENT LINE OF POLICY WITH REAL RISK OF WAR WHICH THIS INVOLVES. MOREOVER SUCH PROPOSALS, SINCE THEY WOULD APPEAL TO PUBLIC OPINION OF OUR ALLIES, SHOULD ASSIST US IN HOLDING OUR ALLIES TOGETHER AND IN MAINTAINING OUR UNITY IN WHAT THREATENS TO BE VERY SEVERE TEST OF NERVES. I WOULD QUITE AGREE WITH BONN THAT WE SHOULD NOT ABANDON SOUND POSITIONS FOR TRANSIENT PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE AND ANY PROPOSALS WE PUT FORWARD SHOULD BE SUCH AS WE COULD LIVE WITH SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED BY OTHER SIDE. THERE WOULD APPEAR, HOWEVER, TO BE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE BY SOVIETS BUT WHICH WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHENED OUR POSITION BEFORE WORLD OPINION.

GREATEST WEAKNESS OUR PRESENT POSITION IN MY OPINION IS THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC FOR US TO EXPECT SOVIETS EITHER NOW OR IN FUTURE TO AGREE TO REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY ON BASIS PRIOR

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-3- 1649, FEBRUARY 19, 5 PM., FROM MOSCOW (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

BASIS PRIOR FREE ELECTIONS, SINCE SUCH ELECTIONS WOULD CERTAINLY RESULT IN RESOUNDING SLAP IN FACE TO THEM AND WOULD HAVE REPERCUSSIONS IN COMMUNIST BLOC, PARTICULARLY IN POLAND, WHICH WE CANNOT EXPECT THEM TO ACCEPT. EVEN IF GERMANS HAD COMPLETELY FREE HAND TO REUNITE THEIR COUNTRY THEY WOULD BE OBLIGED MAINTAIN FOR TRANSITIONAL PERIOD MUCH OF ECONOMIC SYSTEM PREVAILING IN EAST GERMANY AND SOME CHANGES (SUCH AS DIVISION OF LARGE ESTATES) WOULD DOUBTLESS HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED AS PERMANENT.

IT SEEMS TO ME, THEREFORE, THAT OUR PROPOSALS COULD PROVIDE FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF FROM THREE TO FIVE YEARS AND PERHAPS FOR SEPARATE REFERENDUM IN EAST GERMANY ON QUESTION WHETHER THEY DESIRED AN AUTONOMOUS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEM IN A UNITED GERMANY. MIKOYAN INDICATED SOVIET BELIEF THAT IN TWO OR THREE YEARS THEY COULD RAISE LIVING STANDARDS IN EAST GERMANY TO SOMETHING APPROACHING THOSE OF WEST GERMANY. WHILE I DOUBT THAT EVEN IF THEY ARE SUCCESSFUL IN THIS THEY COULD MAKE THE PRESENT REGIME ACCEPTABLE TO MANY MORE OF EAST GERMAN PEOPLE, THEY PROBABLY BELIEVE THEY COULD STRENGTHEN POSITION OF COMMUNIST PARTY AND POSSIBILITY OF SOCIALIST COOPERATION WITH IT IN AN EVENTUAL REUNITED GERMANY AND COULD IN SOME SUCH PERIOD OF TIME REDUCE DAMAGING EFFECT WHICH REUNIFICATION WOULD HAVE ON COMMUNIST BLOC.

3. APART FROM CHAIN REACTION EFFECT ON COMMUNIST BLOC PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF SETTLEMENT GERMAN PROBLEM IS STRATEGIC. HERE AGAIN I QUESTION WHETHER OUR PRESENT PROPOSALS ARE REALISTIC OR REPRESENT GOOD PROPAGANDA POSITION. WHILE WE STATE WE DO NOT SEEK MILITARY ADVANTAGE FROM REUNIFICATION, FACT REMAINS THAT IF OUR PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTED COMMUNIST BLOC WOULD NOT ONLY LOSE MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND EAST GERMAN TROOPOS BUT MOST OF THESE WOULD EVENTUALLY BE

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-4-1649, FEBRUARY 19, 5 PM, FROM MOSCOW

ADDED TO WESTERN STRENGTH. MOREOVER THEY WOULD BE DEPRIVED OF CERTAINTY OF THEIR ACCESS TO EAST GERMAN INDUSTRY FOR MILITARY NOT TO SPEAK OF ORDINARY ECONOMIC PRODUCTION AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY THEIR PRESTIGE WOULD HAVE BEEN GREATLY DIMINISHED.

WHILE I CONFESS IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL THAT WE COULD DEVISE SETTLEMENT SATISFACTORY TO US WHICH SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT AT PRESENT TIME, THERE IS MUCH THAT IN THEORY AT LEAST WE COULD OFFER WHICH WOULD BE TEMPTING TO THEM. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE WHAT KIND OF SOLUTION US COULD ACCEPT WITH SAFETY BUT WISH TO SUGGEST WHAT SOVIETS MIGHT BUY. I DO NOT BELIEVE SOVIET MILITARY WOULD NOW SUPPORT KHRUSHCHEV IN ACCEPTING SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD LEAVE GERMANY MEMBER OF NATO. WE CONCEIVABLY COULD PUT FORWARD A STEP BY STEP PLAN WHICH WOULD ENVISAGE GERMANY'S EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO PROVIDED WE MADE IT CLEAR GERMANY WOULD BE FREE TO PARTICIPATE IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ORGANIZATIONS OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL OR SOCIAL NATURE SUCH AS COMMON MARKET AND COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY. A PROVISION AGAINST MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY ALLIANCES AND AGAINST FOREIGN BASES ALONG LINES OF AUSTRIAN TREATY PROVISION WOULD, I THINK, BE ACCEPTABLE TO SOVIETS. ANOTHER PROPOSAL TO WHICH SOVIETS WOULD ATTACH IMPORTANCE WOULD BE SETTLEMENT OF GERMAN-POLISH FRONTIER PROBLEM.

THOMPSON

UE/23

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State



53-M 926

SECRET

Action

Control: 11608

EUR

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 19, 1959

Info

5 PM

RMR

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1649, FEBRUARY 19, 5 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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THEY WOULD ALSO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ANY PROPOSALS FOR THINNING OUT OR WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED TROOPS FROM GERMANY AND TO PROHIBITION ON GERMANY'S POSSESSION OF ATOMIC ARMAMENTS. ANY SETTLEMENT THAT INVOLVED THESE FACTORS AND BY A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PROVIDED AGAINST A SUDDEN SHOCK TO COMMUNIST BLOC WOULD, I BELIEVE, HAVE REAL CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE BY SOVIET UNION. THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SIMILAR ATOMIC LIMITATIONS ON POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BE PREPARED WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM GERMANY TO SOVIET UNION IN STEP WITH OUR WITHDRAWAL. IF THESE MILITARY STEPS WERE PHASED WITH STEPS LEADING TO REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY I SHOULD THINK RISKS INVOLVED, WHEN CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO ALTERNATIVES, MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US. AS TO WHETHER WEST GERMANS COULD BE BROUGHT TO AGREE AND WHETHER SUCH PROPOSALS COULD EVEN BE SUGGESTED TO ADENAUER WITHOUT SHAKING HIS CONFIDENCE IN US I HAVE NO OPINION. ASSUME FRENCH WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULT.

4. WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN QUESTION I BELIEVE THAT IF WE AND OUR ALLIES CAN MAINTAIN FIRM AND UNITED FRONT KHRUSHCHEV WOULD ACCEPT ANY SOLUTION ENABLING HIM TO CLAIM TO EAST GERMANS AND HIS OWN PEOPLE THAT SOMETHING HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY HIS MOVE. GREAT DANGER LIES IN

POSSIBILITY

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Agency Case 88-103091

NLE Case 88-26049

NLE Date 8/14/82

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-2- 1649, FEBRUARY 19, 5 PM, (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW.

POSSIBILITY OF MISJUDGMENT ON HIS PART AS TO WHAT OUR INTENTIONS ACTUALLY ARE. IN THIS CONNECTION MACMILLAN VISIT WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT.

5. IF WE EXPECT SOVIETS TO DISCUSS SERIOUSLY REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY, BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED DISCUSS GERMAN PEACE TREATY. WE MIGHT CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE WORTH WHILE ATTEMPTING AT PROPOSED CONFERENCE TO NEGOTIATE TERMS OF PEACE TREATY FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE WITH THOUGHT THIS WOULD INFLUENCE TERMS OF PROBABLE SEPARATE SOVIET-EAST GERMAN TREATY IF CONFERENCE FAILS. IN ANY EVENT, SUGGEST WE SHOULD GO TO CONFERENCE PREPARED WITH TEXT OF PEACE TREATY ACCEPTABLE TO US.

6. IT IS TRUE THAT KHRUSHCHEV, MERELY BY PUTTING HIS BERLIN PROPOSAL FORWARD, APPEARS TO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SHAKING OUR CONFIDENCE IN OUR POSITION, AND HAS GAINED AT LEAST A TEMPORARY ADVANTAGE. ON THE OTHER HAND, I QUESTION WHETHER THAT POSITION, HOWEVER JUST IT MAY HAVE BEEN, WAS EVER NEGOTIABLE. TODAY WHEN WEST MAY BE FACED WITH DECISION INVOLVING REAL RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR, IT DOES NOT SEEM TO ME WE CAN GO TO CONFERENCE OFFERING AS ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO RUSSIAN ROULETTE IN WHICH KHRUSHCHEV THREATENS TO ENGAGE US, A RESTATEMENT OF PROPOSALS WHICH WE KNOW SOVIETS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY REFUSE. IF WE ARE SUFFICIENTLY SURE OUR ALLIES WILL STAY WITH US AND WILL MAKE OUR POSITION UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO SOVIETS IN ADVANCE, PERHAPS WE CAN RUN RISKS OF SUCH A DEADLY GAME. IF NOT AND IF WE DO NOT HAVE REALISTIC NEW PROPOSALS TO PUT FORWARD FOR SETTLEMENT OF GERMAN PROBLEM AS WHOLE, THEN I BELIEVE WE SHOULD HAVE READY A

COMPROMISE

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-3- 1649, FEBRUARY 19, 5 PM. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW.

COMPROMISE SOLUTION FOR BERLIN QUESTION. IF WE WERE ABLE
TO ADVANCE CLEAR AND REASONABLE PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT
OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM, WE WOULD BE IN STRONG POSITION
TO STAND FIRM ON BERLIN ISSUE.

THOMPSON

SLS/2

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 21, 1955

SUBJECT: Conversation Between Ambassadors Kroll and Thompson in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Wilhelm G. Grewe, German Ambassador
Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy
Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand - GER

COPIES TO: U - 2
G - 2
EUR - 2
GER - 2

During a lengthy conversation between Ambassador Grewe and Mr. Murphy (the major portion of which is reported in a separate memorandum of conversation), the former referred to a discussion which had taken place in Moscow on December 31 between Hans Kroll, Ambassador of the Federal Republic to the Soviet Union, and American Ambassador Thompson. Kroll had reported this conversation in detail, and Grewe read selections from his telegram. Kroll had noted that Thompson was inclined to broaden the scope of negotiations with the Soviets. He seemed to favor including discussion of such issues as German membership in NATO, the atomic armament of Germany, and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany and the Eastern European states, all of these subject, of course, to obtaining counter-concessions from the Soviets. Thompson apparently believed that this would not satisfy the Soviets, but such an offer would convince public opinion of the sincerity of Western proposals.

Mr. Murphy commented that, for years, people have been telling us that we must demonstrate our good will, although the basic tensions of today are caused by the Soviets. In response to Mr. Murphy's query, Ambassador Grewe said that he did not know if Ambassador Kroll agreed with the views expressed. He also noted that Ambassador Thompson had indicated that his views were personal, and that he did not know if they would be acceptable to his Government. The implication was, however, that Kroll's report might have caused some uneasiness in Berlin.

Mr. Murphy said

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FILE

MAY 29 1955

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- 2 -

Mr. Murphy said that it would be best for the Federal Republic to rely on the recent discussions in Bonn between the Secretary of State and Chancellor Adenauer, and not on off-the-cuff remarks made by the American Ambassador in Moscow. When important changes of policy are to be made, the United States Government will inform the Federal Republic directly. Mr. Murphy indicated that we might query our Ambassador in Moscow about this conversation. Of course, Mr. Murphy added, if there were to be an entirely new mentality in the Soviet Union, some sort of a complete European settlement might be possible, but there were no signs of this.

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2/23/59

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By DoD DA 5200.1
NARS, Date 2/8/88

MESSAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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26245 (JCS CF 1459 / 9172/9105 Berlin)
(21 Feb 1459)

FROM: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE

TO : JCS WASH DC

NR : EC 9-10240

SGD NORSTAD

Reference: JCS 955369 *attached*

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 5 Dec 1980

231148Z FEB 59

1. On 18 Feb, after my return from US I directed the establishment at Hq US EUCOM of a small concealed US-only group, to be a nucleus for any tripartite staffs I might have to form, and meanwhile to consider military problems concerned with access to Berlin.

2. On 19 Feb, in conversation with Sir Frank Roberts, the British NATO Ambassador, I broached to him the subject of above. I asked him to give this information to Selwyn Lloyd, and to tell him:

(1) That I would welcome participation of one or more British Officers in the group being formed at US EUCOM, as either members or observers; and

(2) That I was quite willing to move forward in this area without formal instructions provided I was sure the Governments wished me to do so.

3. I would prefer to await the British response to the foregoing before approaching the French.

4. Will respond separately to your other question in ref msg.

ACTION: JCS

INFO : CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC

DA IN 192842

(23 Feb 59)

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CICS	2
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J-6	1
JMAAD	1
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JSSC	1
JFO	1
Records	1
MO File	6

5172 Berlin/9105
ACTION J-3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

February 27, 1959

Downgraded To: SECRET

EO 11652: XGDS (1) 2 (3) 4

Authorized By: H. D. [Signature]
August 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

European Site

Yesterday afternoon in our meeting with the Secretary he reaffirmed his conviction that we are entering a test of nerve and will with the Soviets and that they can be expected to hold to their position right up until the last minute before giving way.

The Secretary also expressed a great interest in going ahead with the quiet moves of increased military preparedness in Europe along the lines he had discussed with General Norstad. Specifically he said that he was anxious to have atomic weapons moved into Germany as promptly as possible, believing that this would be picked up by Soviet intelligence but not by the general public.

LJM
Livingston T. Merchant

Orig. - Mr. Murphy through S/S *[Signature]*

cc - Mr. Kohler, Mr. Hillenbrand, Mr. Timmons

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EUR:LTMerchant:mt

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Authority

NND 887404

By

AL

NARA, Date *1-8-70*

2/27/59

February 27, 1959.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

I have directed the Acting Secretary of State to confer with Gordon Gray with a view of calling together a special meeting of the statutory members of the National Security Council and including the Acting Secretary of State and the Attorney General. The meeting will not be listed as a formal one of the Security Council.

The purpose will be to review all of the measures and actions we propose to take in the event that the Soviets actually go through, on May 27th, with their threat to leave East Germany and decline thereafter to take any responsibility with respect to Berlin.

These steps have been fairly well thought out, but we must review them to see that our thinking is up-to-date with respect to them. Moreover, and even more important, we need to go a step further and consider what action might be required in an emergency, in the event that during any period of excess tension either before or after the specified date there were brought about unexpected developments either through miscalculation or muddling.

It seems to me that a number of questions ought to be examined specifically, such as:

- (a) What measures should we take to keep Congressional leaders informed of developments in the situation?
- (b) What would be our logical reaction to any unforeseen crisis brought about by a Soviet statement that could take the form of an ultimatum.
- (c) How could we be sure of the necessary support from Congress even though we might suddenly face a critical emergency and would be under a compulsion to act quickly so as to avoid any unnecessary damage to ourselves.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

NLE 76-46, #43

By C. M. Date 5-12-79

ACW/Adm 5/7/ "Berlin Payer"

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- (d) How can we preserve, throughout, the necessary secrecy?
- (e) Should we be taking any specific steps to warn the American people and the West of the potential gravity of the situation, but at the same time not unnecessarily alarming them?
- (f) How do we keep coordination with our NATO allies, and more particularly, Britain, Germany and France.

In such a meeting innumerable other questions will arise. The big thing is that we do not neglect any point that deserves attention.

This paper will be kept in the secret files and must, for the moment, be known only to General Goodpaster and Major Eisenhower. Both of them will be required to read it, but will not have a copy of it.

General Goodpaster is charged with keeping in touch with Mr. Gray to determine when such a meeting could be held. Any questions that Mr. Gray has respecting time, personnel to be present, and subjects to be discussed should be brought to my attention.

D.D.E.



12.
JSDK

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

7/2/59



32 36

Action

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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1899, MARCH 2, 1 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1899; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY LONDON 455, PARIS 644, MOSCOW 220, BERLIN 638, PRIORITY USAREUR 471, PARIS PASS USCINCEUR, USRO, SHAPE.

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FROM BRUCE

UNLESS WORKING GROUP PREPARING WESTERN POSITION REACHES REALISTIC ESTIMATE VALUE TO SOVIETS PRESENT CONTROL EAST GERMANY, I ANTICIPATE IT MAY ADVOCATE DANGEROUS COMPROMISES IN ILLUSORY HOPE TEMPTING SOVIETS ACCEPT SOME REUNIFICATION PLAN.

IT MAY BE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS WILL BRING OUT HARD CHOICE THAT MAY BE CONFRONTING US; EITHER RETENTION FEDREP IN ATLANTIC COMPLEX, OR GERMAN REUNIFICATION ON TERMS EXPOSING FEDREP TO COMMUNIST DOMINATION BY WEAKENING WESTERN SECURITY POSITION. UNLIKELY SOVIETS WOULD PERMIT US SHELTER IN HALF-WAY HOUSE. IF SUCH CHOICE HAD TO BE MADE, I WOULD UNHESITATINGLY SELECT FORMER ALTERNATIVE, EVEN THOUGH PRICE PAID FOR IT MIGHT WELL BE PROVISIONAL RENUNCIATION OF HOPE OR EXPECTATION OF A REUNITED GERMANY.

WE SHOULD GROUND US POLICY ON REFUSAL TO ADMIT ANY IMPAIRMENT OF ATTACHMENT OF FEDREP TO NATO AND OTHER WESTERN INSTITUTIONS, AND PERMIT NO DIMINUTION OF ITS EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN RELATION THERETO. FOR BETTER OR WORSE, FEDREP MUST BE TREATED

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By bc NLE Date 11/25/80

Authority MR 88-260 #15

By JH NLE Date 8/11/85

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-2- 1899, MARCH 2, 1 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE), FROM BONN.

BY US WITH FULL CONFIDENCE; TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST IT AND REDUCE IT TO SECOND-RATE AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP WOULD BE TO INVITE LATER INFIDELITY.

MONOLITHIC ADENAUER WILL, I BELIEVE, UNTIL DYING BREATH, DEMAND CONTINUED INCORPORATION OF HIS REPUBLIC IN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, NO MATTER WHAT COST IN FRUSTRATION ELSEWHERE. BUT IN HIS OWN PARTY, AND TO GREATER EXTENT IN THE OPPOSITION, ARE MANY WHO, FEARFUL, UNEASY, MIGHT BARTER AWAY PRESENT FEDREP INDEPENDENCE, AS AN EQUAL AMONGST EQUALS IN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, FOR WHAT MIGHT PROVE TO BE ONLY TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION WITH SOVIETS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN THEY ARE AGITATED OVER WHAT MAY RESULT FROM BERLIN CRISIS.

IF ABOVE ANALYSIS IS EVEN HALF CORRECT, WE MUST BE ARMED AGAINST SURPRISES, AND READY TO ESTABLISH OUR OWN MINIMUM CONDITIONS IN ANY INTERCHANGES WITH SOVIETS. I, FOR ONE, WOULD CONCEDE THEM NOTHING IN THE WAY OF RETREATING FROM OUR EXISTING, AND NOT UNFAVORABLE OR UNTENABLE, STATUS IN EUROPE. IF THEY UNDERTAKE TO DISLODGE US FROM IT AT RISK OF GENERAL WAR, I SHOULD RATHER ACCEPT THAT RISK NOW THAN LATER. IT MAY BE WEST GERMANS AND OTHER ALLIES WILL SEEK TO UNDERMINE OUR DETERMINATION, BY ADVOCATING (THOUGH UNLIKELY ON PART OF FEDREP WHILE ADENAUER LIVES) FEDREP DEPARTURE FROM NATO AS A CONCESSION TO SOVIETS ON REUNIFICATION.

AS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSALS, WE SHOULD BE READY TO DEBATE THEM, BUT REMAIN RESOLVED TO PRESERVE AT ALL COSTS FEDREP'S FULL ASSOCIATION WITH THE WEST. THE ONLY PERMISSIBLE EXCEPTION MIGHT BE LIMITATIONS IN MILITARY FIELD IF, AFTER PROFOUND EXAMINATION, WE DECIDE THAT SUCH MEASURES ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF A SECURITY POSITION IN EUROPE AT LEAST AS FAVORABLE TO US AS PRESENT ONE, AND IF SIMILAR LIMITATIONS APPLY TO CERTAIN OTHER NATO AND WARSAW PACT POWERS, SO THAT FEDREP IS NOT SINGLED OUT FOR DISCRIMINATION.

HOWEVER,

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special studies
has been found
does not exist
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-3- 1899, MARCH 2, 1 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE), FROM BONN.

HOWEVER, IMPORTANT BEAR IN MIND POSSIBLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS AGREEMENT BETWEEN SOVIETS AND OURSELVES INVOLVING LIMITATIONS ON OR CHANGES IN DISPOSITION OF, WESTERN TROOPS, PARTICULARLY AMERICAN. ANY SUCH AGREEMENT LIKELY BE PUBLICIZED BY SOVIETS, AS WELL AS WESTERN PRESS, AS PROMISING FIRST STEP ON ROAD RELAXATION OF TENSIONS, THUS ENCOURAGING WESTERN PUBLIC ASSUME AND EXPECT CORRESPONDING PROGRESS POLITICAL FIELD. UNLESS EVEN LIMITED MEASURES MILITARY AGREEMENTS REFLECT AT LEAST SOME DEGREE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD SOLUTION POLITICAL ISSUES, THEY MAY UNLEASH PREMATURELY UNJUSTIFIED OPTIMISM AND HARMFUL DIMINUTION OF WILL RESISTANCE WESTERN PEOPLES.

IT IS, I IMAGINE, LIKELY THAT OUR POSITION IN BERLIN IS SUCH THAT BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR THERE (AND THEN ONLY IN LIGHT DETERMINATION IF NECESSARY, TO RESORT TO NUCLEAR WAR) IS TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO, WITH CONSTANT THREAT OF HAVING SOVIETS OR GDR PERSEVERE IN THEIR HARASSMENT. OUR PRESENT POSITION IS ONE WE MAY ONLY BE ABLE SUSTAIN BY UNILATERAL ACTION. FOR THOUGH GENERAL DE GAULLE, A MAN OF FIXED PRINCIPLES, SEEMS UNYIELDING IN HIS ATTITUDE, FORCES HE CAN DEVOTE TO WORLD CONFLICT ARE DEFICIENT IN MODERN ARMAMENTS AND, AS CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT, UNLIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO OUR STRENGTH. AS FOR BRITISH, THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND NATIONAL HABITS, THEIR PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, PERSUADE THEM TO DEAL WITH FACTS, NOT HYPOTHESES, AND OFTEN TO MAKE PLANS ONLY AFTER THE EVENT. HOWEVER, ONCE THE WERE CAST, IF WAR ENSUED, THEY WOULD, AS ALWAYS, BE MOST DEPENDABLE OF ALLIES.

SO, IF WE GO IT ALONE, IN THE DIRECTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, WE CAN CERTAINLY NOT COUNT ON FULL SUPPORT UNTIL AFTER OUR OWN FORCES ARE ABOUT TO BE COMMITTED. IN CASE OF WEST GERMANS, EVEN SO STOUT A FRIEND AS THE CHANCELLOR HAS REVEALED DECIDED HESITATION OVER AWFUL PROSPECT OF RECOURSE TO TOTAL WAR.

IF KHRUSHCHEV

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-4- 1899, MARCH 2, 1 PM(SECTION TWO OF THREE), FROM BONN.

IF KHRUSHCHEV REJECTS OUR PROPOSAL FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE, THINK WE WOULD FIND OUR ALLIES UNWILLING TO AVOID SUMMIT CONFERENCE. IN SUCH CASE, WOULD DEEM BETTER TO HAVE SUCH CONFERENCE TAKE FORM OF MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE IN NEW YORK, UNDER AUSPICES OF SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED FOR PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND KHRUSHCHEV (UN TELS TO DEPT CIRCULAR 998, 999, 1000)

BRUCE

VF/20

Note: Advance copies to SS and GER. 2/3/59, 1:35 p.m. MG

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Action

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MARCH 2, 1959

12:13 PM

EUR
Info

FROM: BONN

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1899, MARCH 2, 1 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE)

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FROM BRUCE

IF THIS DOES NOT TAKE PLACE, OR FAILS TO ESTABLISH AGREEMENT,
AND THERE IS NO BLUFF ON EITHER SIDE, SOVIET OR AMERICAN, THE
ISSUE MAY BE JOINTED, NOT INADVERTENTLY, BUT BECAUSE BOTH SIDES
HAVE GONE TOO FAR TO BEAT RETREAT. AT THIS POINT, LAST CHANCE
WOULD BE TO HAVE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, EITHER BY PERSONAL MESSAGE
TO KHRUSHCHEV, OR IN HASTILY ARRANGED MEETING WITH HIM, EMPHASIZE
SHATTERING EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO SOLVE BERLIN PROBLEM.

JT HOW CAN BERLIN PROBLEM BE SOLVED IN ANY FORUM WITHOUT
ACRIFICING FREEDOM OF WEST BERLINERS, OR, EVEN GRAVER IN LONG
UN, LEADING TO DETACHMENT OF FEDREP FROM WEST? THE ABANDONMENT
Y US OF BERLINERS WOULD DESTROY CONFIDENCE IN OUR ENGAGEMENTS
VERYWHERE, EVEN IN THOSE UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES THAT PRESENTLY
CRITICIZE OUR ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS AND
PROTECT THOSE WHO RELY ON US.

I HAD HOPED BERLIN PROBLEM NEED NOT BE TREATED IN ISOLATION,
BUT COULD

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BUT COULD BE DEALT WITH IN CONNECTION WITH CONSIDERATION OF LARGER AFFAIRS, IN WHICH IT COULD BE SOFTENED AND ABSORBED. THIS MAY NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE IF KHRUSHCHEV HOLDS TO HIS RECENT UTTERANCES. THEREFORE, AT LEAST FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, WE MUST PREPARE FOR SITUATION WHERE FATE OF BERLIN WILL DEPEND ON UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN USSR AND OURSELVES BEING REACHED.

IF ANY UNDERSTANDING BE POSSIBLE, WHAT CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD GOVERN OUR CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS? FIRST OF ALL, HONOR. WE ARE PLEDGED NOT TO ABANDON PEOPLE OF WEST BERLIN. BUT EVEN IF ACTUAL UNSATISFACTORY STATUS QUO WERE CONTINUED, PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ARE DIM, FOR WHETHER IT BE SOVIETS OR GDR WHO GIVE TURN OF THE SCREW, WE WILL STILL BE VULNERABLE. OUR POSITION IS MINIMAL, WE HAVE NOTHING TO TRADE EXCEPT OUT OF OUR FLESH AND BLOOD. TO YIELD LITTLE IS TO YEILD EVERYTHING. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS OR GDR WOULD REGARD, AS HAS SOMETIMES BEEN SUGGESTED, THE CLOSING DOWN OF RIAS, OR THE CURTAILMENT OF OUR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, AS REALLY SIGNIFICANT. WHAT THEY WANT IS THE WHOLE HOG. AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF OUR UNSHAKEN WILL TO PLUNGE, IF REQUIRED, INTO A NUCLEAR CONFLICT, THEY ARE IN POSITION AT WORST TO SUBJECT WESTERN OCCUPANTS OF BERLIN TO ALMOST UNBEARABLE STRAINS OR, AT BEST, TO DRIVE THEM FROM IT, DENUDED OF HONOR AND PRESTIGE, AND EXPOSE US PARTICUPARLY AS PAPER TIGER.

HOW CAN WE MAKE SUCCESSFUL SORTIE OUT OF THIS BELEAGUERED FORTRESS? WE MUST FIRST CONSIDER PSYCHOLOGY OF WEST BERLINERS. THEY ARE ALMOST BLITHELY CONFIDENT OF OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT AND WILL TO STAND BY THEM, AND OF FAITH IN OUR GUARANTEES TO DO SO. NO ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO THEM UNLESS THEY FELT IT PROVIDED A DEGREE OF SECURITY EQUIVALENT TO THAT REPRESENTED BY OUR PRESENT COMMITMENT, WHICH IMPLIES OUR WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE PERHAPS TENS OF MILLIONS OF AMERICAN LIVES RATHER THAN GIVE UP BERLIN.

IS THERE ANY SUCH EQUIVALENT? ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT WITHDRAWAL OF OUR

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CORRECTED PAGE 3

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OF OUR GARRISON, AND REPLACEMENT OF ITS FUNCTIONS AND OUR
GUARANTEES BY UNITED NATIONS POLICE FORCE, AND SOME VAGUE SUPER-
VISION BY UN OF INVIOABILITY OF THE CITY. NEVERTHELESS, STUDY
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO VARIANTS OF UN PRESENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY.

IT WOULD NOT BE IN INTEREST OF FREE WORLD, AS I HAVE EARLIER
ARGUED, TO GIVE THE QUID OF DISCARDING FEDREP AS WESTERN COLLEAGUE
FOR A DOUBTFUL QUO WHICH MIGHT NOT SUCCEED IN PRESERVING ACTUAL
STATUS IN BERLIN. WHAT THEN MIGHT BE THE BASIS FOR POSSIBLE
DEAL?

*German at various
with above.*

IS THERE COMMON
GROUND ON WHICH WE COULD MEET? PERHAPS BY REMOVING BERLIN
ENTIRELY FROM THE ARENA OF POLITICAL CONFLICT, THUS ELIMINATING
IT AS A PRIZE, SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS ACCEPTABLE TO ITS CITIZENS
AND TO GERMAN OPINION. OF ALL SCHEMES PROPOSED, THE SPAATZ
PLAN, IN THIS RESPECT, APPEARS TO ME THE MOST APPEALING.
INTERNATIONALIZE THE AREA, PREFERABLY INCLUDING ALSO EAST BERLIN,
BY MAKING IT SEAT OF UNITED NATIONS AND CONVERTING IT INTO UNITED
NATIONS TERRITORY. THIS MAY SOUND IMPRACTICABLE, BUT GOVERNMENTS
MIGHT DO UNEXPECTED THINGS, IF ALTERNATIVE APPEARED TO BE
DESTRUCTION OF MOST OF HUMAN RACE.

IF THIS WERE ACCOMPLISHED, WEST BERLINERS MIGHT FEEL SECURE.
PRESENCE OF THOUSANDS OF FOREIGNERS, DERIVED FROM EVERY COUNTRY,
MIGHT CONSTITUTE AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, IF THEY WERE THEMSELVES
CONVINCED IT PROVIDED A GUARANTEE OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND
FREEDOM, AT LEAST EQUIVALENT TO THAT REPRESENTED BY OUR PRESENT
COMMITMENTS. INDEED, TO THE SKEPTICAL, IT MIGHT BE MORE RE-
ASSURING THAN DEPENDENCE, YEAR AFTER YEAR, DECADE AFTER DECADE,
ON ALMOST INCREDIBLE RESOLUTION OF THEIR ERSTWHILE WESTERN
ENEMIES, WHOM THEY HAD SO GRIEVOUSLY WRONGED, TO PROTECT THEM

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INDEFINITELY AT SUCH POTENTIAL SACRIFICES.


INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM BERLIN SEEM INDICATE SETTLED SOVIET INTENTION TURN OVER THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO GDR. SINCE THEY CAN REVERSE THEIR POSITION OVERNIGHT, IT WOULD BE PART OF WISDOM FOR US TO ANTICIPATE THIS MIGHT HAPPEN AT ANY TIME, EVEN BEFORE THE DATE OF MAY 27.

BRUCE

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Note: Advance copies to SS and GER 2 p.m., 3/2/59. CWO-M.

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March 5, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
March 5, 1959 - 10:17 AM (Special Meeting after regular NSC Meeting)


Others present: Vice President Nixon
Secretary Herter
Secretary Anderson
Secretary McElroy
Attorney General Rogers
General Twining
Mr. Allen Dulles
Mr. Merchant
Mr. George Allen
Governor Hoegh
Mr. Gordon Gray
Mr. James Lay
General Persons
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower



The purpose of this meeting was to discuss contingency planning in the Berlin crisis. At the meeting of January 29th an initial plan had been formulated which included measures which might be taken up to and including the eventuality of a small probe between Helmstedt and Berlin. In the event that this probe were stopped by force, it had then been decided that we should marshal world opinion on preparing for general war.

The President opened this meeting by expressing the view that our courses of action to implement this general design to marshal public opinion and prepare for war have not been sufficiently clarified. Specifically, he is suspicious of the capability of the United Nations to afford positive action commensurate with the dire situation once one of our convoys has been stopped by the GDR. He felt that we have not placed enough thought on ways to make the Soviets the aggressor in this case. The President asked the Departments of State and Defense how far the question has been thought through.

Secretary Herter, in response, referred to the January 29th contingency paper and stated that our tripartite working group in Bonn is refining it. There are, in his view, some doubtful points, as brought up by the



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President, namely:

(1) The British position relative to the permissibility of GDR officials placing a "date stamp" on convoy identification papers. He feels the British would not be willing to go to war over the principle of paper stamping. However, the Germans have pointed out that such an act, insignificant in itself, would be the beginning of a "slippery slope."

(2) The utility of the United Nations in this connection. The working group at Bonn has asked our delegation in New York to canvass the United Nations for its attitude. In this connection, Ambassador Lodge has pointed out the great utility of the United Nations for maintaining any status quo.

The President agreed as to the usefulness of the United Nations maintaining a status quo situation but specified that its usefulness would be confined to the period between now and the termination of the ultimatum rather than to the period in which the crisis had become acute. The President went on to refer to a paper submitted to him this morning suggesting a naval blockade of the North Sea as a countermeasure against stopping of Berlin convoys. He expressed disagreement with the concept, primarily because it would allow time to continue working on the side of the Soviets. In other words, if we took no action other than a blockade, we would be applying pressure which would be effective only after a considerable time, whereas Berlin would very quickly shrivel. Secretary Herter pointed out that this paper had represented only a request for a study, and not a policy determination.

The President then questioned the recognition status of the GDR in the neutralist world. Specifically, he desired to compare the status of the GDR with that of the Federal Republic. To this Secretary Herter answered that Yugoslavia is the only nation which has recognized the GDR other than the Soviets, and further pointed out that talk of a peace treaty with the GDR on the part of the Soviets is invalid. A peace treaty between the USSR and the GDR already exists; any action to which Khrushchev might refer would be merely the relinquishment of certain rights which have been reserved in their current treaty.

Secretary Herter then referred to a report over the ticker tape of a statement by Khrushchev on possible extension of the May 27th deadline; but the President dismissed this statement largely as propaganda.

Secretary Herter then brought up the question of the extent and the timing of a conscious effort to be made to impress the American people with the

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fact that the situation in Berlin is more serious than public reaction to it would indicate. On this question two opposing considerations manifest themselves. One, expressed by Secretary McElroy, was that excessive efforts in this direction might cause an excess of concern on the part of the public. This viewpoint was reinforced later by Secretary Anderson who is of the opinion that the public is more concerned about this crisis than we might realize. The other consideration is that actions to prepare the public for possible dire possibilities must be expedited. In this connection, Secretary Dulles has previously expressed the view that the public realization is not adequate.

The matter of indicating the concern of the government over this crisis brought up two specific problems. One was the announcement of this meeting itself with the objective of indicating to the public that the matter is being considered by members of the National Security Council. After discussion, the President agreed that an announcement should be made that he had called a special National Security Council meeting to address the Berlin crisis. In connection with this, he requested Mr. Gordon Gray to explain the matter to Mr. Stans and Dr. Libby, the two members absent.

The other matter growing out of the question of publicity was that of Congressional relations. This matter was brought up by General Persons and was reinforced by Mr. Nixon. In Mr. Nixon's view, the objective which the President has been following as to his public position is to appear firm without being provocative. Mr. Nixon cited the rejection of immediate mobilization as a sign of the President's desire not to be provocative. In Mr. Nixon's view, however, there is a segment in Congress and in the press which will criticize an alleged lack of firmness. He feels, therefore, that meetings such as the Leadership meeting proposed by General Persons and announcement of today's meeting would be useful in this respect. With relation to the Congressional Leaders, Mr. Nixon pointed out that some of these people have shown great restraint. He feels that the bipartisan atmosphere would be increased by any meeting in which Congressional Leaders were made to feel a greater share in this matter.

The President agreed to the principle of a meeting with Congressional Leaders, but explained his reticence to hold such a meeting on the basis of Mr. Macmillan's impending visit to the United States later this month. He pointed out the changeability of the positions of various leaders in the allied world. Specifically, he referred to that of Adenauer. Adenauer has shown considerable evidence of weakening his initial position on such matters as stamping of papers by the GDR. The main reason why the

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United States has taken a firm if not rigid position on the inadmissibility of stamping of documents by the GDR is to support Adenauer. In recent meetings it has been reported that Adenauer has given assent to a fall-back position of permitting such activities by GDR officials. (Secretary Herter noted that Adenauer is in poor physical condition at the moment, and is sustaining serious defections within his own party.) The President's purpose in referring to the change in Adenauer's position is that he visualizes the possibility of some change in his own position after the Macmillan visit. Essentially, he feels that Macmillan's visit will not bring forth much of a substantive nature, but he considers the possibility sufficient to make him hesitant about prematurely disclosing plans to Members of Congress.

At the urging of the Vice President and General Persons, the President decided to hold a meeting with Congressional Leaders both before and after the Macmillan visit. Considerable discussion then ensued relative to the details. The President's decision in this matter was to meet with Congressional Leaders on Friday, March 6th, inviting Senators Johnson and Dirksen, and Representatives Rayburn and Halleck. He feels that he can see Senator Fulbright informally later on. Present from the Executive Branch should be Secretary Herter, Mr. McElroy, and the Vice President. The purpose of the meeting should be primarily to allow the Members of Congress to express their views on the Berlin situation and to outline to them the general tack and the general posture that the United States desires to present before the world on this matter. During the discussion, Secretary Herter pointed out the danger of too much discussion of diplomatic tactics. Not only are these tactics not yet firm, but any matters which might leak as the result of such a meeting would have a serious effect on our flexibility in dealing with the Soviets.

Other matters brought up in the meeting were:

- (1) Military actions which are being or have been taken.

This was given to the meeting by General Twining and included primarily actions to reinforce our security situation in the short run as well as to indicate preparations to the Soviets. The President issued one caution on these matters: that nothing should be attempted which could be detected as a phony. General Twining also outlined other proposals such as a slight buildup in Army forces, the movement of the Second Fleet to the

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North Atlantic, and positioning of an additional TAC rotational unit at Adana. The President approved the principle of implementing such actions for psychological purposes, but evidenced some shock at the idea of moving an additional division to Europe. These actions are all included in the enclosure to this memorandum.)

(2) The size of force necessary to hold open ground access routes to Berlin.

The President pointed out in this connection that any military operation to open ground accesses will be a major operation which he estimates as three to four corps. He pointed out the infeasibility of holding one highway open without considerable territory on either side of it. In his view, it is nearly a matter of general war once military action of any sort is opened.

(3) The question of movement of dependents to Berlin.

This matter was brought up by General Persons. General Twining expressed the view that we should stop all flow of dependents to Berlin as of now. While not fully committing himself, the President did admit that such an action would reduce the numbers that might have to be evacuated at a future date.

(4) Difficulties which might be encountered with the attitude of the allies.

The President again pointed out the absolute necessity for concurrence of the French and the Germans in our actions, in that we cannot fight a battle without a line of communication. He further touched on the difficulties which would accrue from a marked softening of attitude on the part of Willy Brandt. Willy Brandt has been somewhat receptive to the idea of internationalizing Berlin and has been inconsistent in his positions. The President pointed out that it would be untenable for us to be placed in a position where we are saving people who do not desire to be saved.



John S. D. Eisenhower
John S. D. Eisenhower

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March 5, 1959

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 398th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, March 5, 1959

Present at the 398th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy, for National Security Affairs, and for Security Operations Coordination; the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

(The President was not present at the opening of the meeting and the Vice President presided in his absence).

The Director of Central Intelligence described the situation in Iraq as developing "uneasily". Events seem to be moving in the direction of ultimate Communist control. We have had a recent report

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indicating that]

Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that the U.S. bilaterals with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan had been signed this morning. He said that mention should be made of this fact because the signature of the bilaterals would undoubtedly increase tension. He believed that the U.S. must be very much on the alert and pointed out that Soviet policy in Iraq and in Iran was closely connected, particularly with respect to the Kurds whom the Soviets desire to use as a wedge to gain access to the Middle East.

Mr. Dulles said that the situation in Bolivia had quieted down. The supply of tear gas used against the rioters had been exhausted and we were supplying additional amounts. He believed that the Bolivian police had done a good job in protecting the U.S. Embassy in La Paz and U.S. personnel in the capital. Moreover, communications had been maintained through the Ambassador's personal residence. There was some apprehension of further unrest but Mr. Dulles did not think that this was likely.

Secretary Herter commented that the protest parade of the Bolivians against the U.S. had been kept under control because the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had had the courage to head the parade.

Turning to the situation in the Sudan, Mr. Dulles said that the Abboud government had not proved satisfactory to the Military Council. The latter body is now engaged in deciding on the composition of a new government. There were two conflicting groups in the Military Council - one pro-Egyptian and the other more or less pro-West. Mr. Dulles thought that while there would be some new faces in the new government the transition was likely to be peaceful.

The National Security Council:


Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situation in Iraq; the signing of the bilaterals with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan; and the most recent developments in Bolivia and in the Sudan.

2. MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES 1958-1959
(NIE 11-4-58) and ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION (NIE 100-59)
and PRESENT TRENDS IN COMMUNIST CHINA (NIE 13-2-59)


(Copies of the briefing note used by Mr. Gray are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum)

(The President joined the meeting in the course of Mr. Allen Dulles's briefing on this subject).

The Director of Central Intelligence reminded the National Security Council that it was customary in the intelligence community at the end of each calendar year to prepare or revise certain basic Intelligence Estimates, particularly the three which he was summarizing this morning. Thereafter Mr. Dulles summarized and commented on the major conclusions reached in the three National Intelligence Estimates in order, as he said, to provide a basis for Council discussion this morning.



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The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the subject National Intelligence Estimates, in the light of summaries thereof by the Director of Central Intelligence.

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3. NSC 5904
 (NSC 5410/1; NSC 5810/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1077, 1102 and 2039;
 Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated
 January 7 and March 3, 1959)

(A copy of the briefing note used by Mr. Gordon Gray to describe NSC 5904 to the Council is included in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

In dealing with the paper Mr. Gray pointed out that there had been no disagreement on the first Objective in NSC 5904 with respect to general war with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This Objective read as follows:

- "1. To prevail, and survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny."

On the other hand he pointed out that the Objective in Paragraph 2 of NSC 5904 was a subject of considerable disagreement. He read Paragraph 2 as follows:

- "2. To reduce, by military and other measures, the capabilities of:

"a. The USSR;

"b. And Communist China [if involved in the hostilities]/*

"c. And European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities]/*

"d. And non-European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities]/*

to the point where they have lost their will or ability to wage war against the United States and its allies."

"*Defense, Treasury, and JCS propose deletion."

After explaining his understanding of the disagreement among the Planning Board members on the appropriate content of Paragraph 2, Mr. Gray invited the comment of the Acting Secretary of State.

Secretary Herter pointed out initially that the issue in disagreement appeared both in Paragraph 2 of the Objectives and in Paragraph 6 of the Policy Guidance of NSC 5904. He said that of course there could be no doubt that in the event of general war with the U.S.S.R. it would be our objective to reduce by the means mentioned above the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. The State Department, however, felt that an automatic

decision likewise to reduce by military and other measures the capabilities of Communist China and other Bloc countries would tie the hands of the U.S. in advance and would result in war on Communist China and the Bloc countries whether or not these Bloc countries actually engaged in hostilities against the U.S. on the side of the Soviet Union. In fact some of these Bloc countries might actually take the opportunity of general war to rebel against Soviet domination in the event of a war in which they are not attacked by the U.S. The same reasoning, continued Secretary Herter, applied to the similar statement in Paragraph 6 of the Policy Guidance.

The President immediately expressed disagreement with Secretary Herter and invited him once again to consider carefully what Paragraph 2 actually said. Particularly insofar as Communist China is concerned, the President did not think that Secretary Herter's case for including the bracketed language was at all a good case. If the U.S., said the President, got into a disastrous nuclear war with the Soviet Union and in the course of the war simply ignored Communist China, we would end up in a "hell of a fix." The President added that he was inclined to agree with Secretary Herter that we should not attack the European Bloc countries if they were not involved in the hostilities but this proviso should certainly not apply to Communist China. With respect to Secretary Herter's point that Paragraph 2 without the bracketed language would involve automatic attack on Communist China, the President pointed out that the language in Paragraph 2 stated that we should reduce by military and other measures. Accordingly, there was no directive in Paragraph 2 which compelled an automatic military attack on Communist China once the U.S. was involved in general war with the U.S.S.R.

In the same connection Mr. Gray pointed out the significance of the phrase "all requisite forces" which occurred in Paragraph 6. According to Mr. Gray's interpretation, he said, this language in Paragraph 6 indicated that a U.S. attack on Communist China or other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries would not be an indiscriminate attack. Mr. Gray also reminded the Council of views expressed on the general subject of U.S. Policy in the Event of General War at earlier Council discussions of the problem. At this earlier meeting a clear distinction had been made between the manner in which we would deal with Communist China in the event of general war and the manner in which we would deal with other European or non-European Bloc countries.

The President indicated that he recalled this distinction and still strongly agreed with it. He said he simply could not envisage the U.S. becoming involved in an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union while at the same time permitting Communist China to stay on the sidelines and develop, after perhaps forty years, into another Soviet Union.

Secretary Herter said he heartily agreed on this last point but that the question which bothered him was whether we wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan now to strike Communist China automatically if the U.S. became involved in a general war with the U.S.S.R.

The President said he saw the problem in this fashion. Our real enemy in the world is International Communism. Communist China was certainly a willing partner in this International Communist grouping thus occupying a different position from the European Bloc countries which had been compelled by the U.S.S.R. to join in the International Communist grouping. The President again repeated his view that even a U.S. attack on Communist China need not necessarily be indiscriminate.

Secretary Herter said that it would be helpful if Defense or the Joint Chiefs could speak to this problem but it still seemed to him that if the bracketed language in Paragraphs 2 and 6 were deleted, the U.S. would automatically hit Communist China in the event that the U.S. became involved in general war with the U.S.S.R. The President still insisted that such a course of action was not automatic and that pressure on China could involve other than military measures.

In responding to Secretary Herter's invitation, General Twining stated that targets in Communist China were certainly on our list for attack in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. but the question whether we would actually attack these targets in Communist China would depend on circumstances existing at the time. Obviously, however, the U.S. must be prepared to attack such targets in Communist China. The President commented that in the event of general war the U.S. would obviously attack its worse enemy first; that is, it would put all the weight of its attack on the U.S.S.R. In illustrating his point he reminded the Council that in the Second World War Germany was the first priority enemy and Japan the second.

General Twining pointed out that one of the difficult aspects of this problem was our ignorance of what the Soviets would do with regard to Communist China in the event that the Soviets became involved in war against the U.S. We simply had to be prepared for all eventualities. Secretary Herter replied that so far as he could see the issue in question here was whether or not Communist China participated in the war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Turning to General Twining he said that General Twining concluded that Chinese participation with the U.S.S.R. was a virtual certainty. To Secretary Herter, however, it was not absolutely certain.

The President suggested that we assume that a general war has occurred and we have succeeded in defeating Soviet Russia. Throughout the war China has, let us assume, remained quiescent. In this

assumed situation the President added that we would certainly take political measures to disarm and remove the threat of Communist China. We simply could not just ignore a Communist China which remained untouched and intact after a terrible war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. To do so would be unrealistic in the extreme.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget suggested that the dilemma might be solved if the phrase "by military and other measures" were changed to read "by military or other measures." However, Secretary McElroy stated that such a change would gravely weaken the statement of Objectives and that such a change had been considered in the Department of Defense and had been rejected. After the President had again repeated his argument with respect to the inclusion of Communist China, Secretary McElroy went on to say that in his view the U.S. must be prepared to make use of military measures against Communist China. The President commented that it was virtually certain that in general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Communist China would be an ally of the U.S.S.R. The same could not be said for other Bloc countries but it certainly could be said about Communist China. Agreeing with the President, Secretary McElroy said that while he would greatly prefer to drop all the bracketed language in Paragraphs 2 and 6, he would be willing to settle for retaining the bracketed language as it applied to the Bloc countries other than Communist China.

The President then enunciated clearly the distinction between objectives and tactics in the Council discussion and repeated his views on Communist China. He illustrated his point by reference to the role of Italy in World War I, noting that after an interval, Italy joined with Germany's enemies. He also reiterated the necessity that the policy statement now under consideration should see to it that both the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are incapable of further harming the U.S. after the end of hostilities. The Vice President agreed with the President and said that the U.S. should undertake to see to this by all necessary means. The President continued by stating that the point he was making was the objective of the policy and that the objective was very clear.

Turning to General Twining he indicated that our military plans ought not to indicate that we must hit China in the very first hours and days of the war with the Soviet Union. We should concentrate our initial attacks on the U.S.S.R.

General Twining agreed with the President's last point and said that presumably our intelligence information would tell us what the precise situation was between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China and whether the Soviets had deployed weapons for use against the U.S. in Communist China. He insisted that there was no military intention to strike Communist China at once and automatically in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

At this point Secretary Herter suggested that the problem of Communist China might be settled to everyone's satisfaction if the phrase "as necessary" were inserted before the words "Communist China" in

Paragraphs 2 and 6 and the bracketed language removed. The President said he could perceive no objection to this proposal as regards Paragraph 6 and Secretary McElroy likewise found it acceptable.*

The President then suggested that in his view the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than Communist China actually constituted a weakness for the U.S.S.R. They would like nothing better than to have the opportunity to revolt against the U.S.S.R. if an opportunity were provided by the outbreak of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Secretary McElroy expressed agreement with this point made by the President but warned of the likelihood that the U.S.S.R. would have created missile batteries and sites within the Bloc countries. Secretary Herter agreed with Secretary McElroy that we would have to destroy such targets in the Bloc countries.

The President referred to our experience in World War II with respect to bombing targets in France even though that country was an enemy of the Axis Powers. He would therefore suggest the inclusion of the term "military targets" in Paragraphs 2-c and 2-d. Obviously while we might have to attack military targets in Poland, the U.S. certainly did not want to fight the Poles as a nation.

Mr. Gray then suggested appropriate language for changing Paragraph 6 to which the Council responded favorably. The President said that he would suggest the elimination of subparagraphs 2-c and 2-d inasmuch as guidance for the European Bloc and the non-European Bloc countries was covered by Paragraph 6 and also because these countries were under the control of the Soviet Union. General Twining stated that he would just as soon see Paragraphs 2-c and 2-d eliminated because he thought the only real problem was presented by the involvement of Communist China. Both Secretary McElroy and the Vice President agreed in turn with the proposal to drop subparagraphs 2-c and 2-d.

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 3 as follows:

- "3. To render ineffective the control structure by which the enemy regimes have been able to exert ideological and disciplinary authority over their own peoples and over individual citizens or groups of citizens in other countries."

He pointed out that the only change in this paragraph from the statement on the same subject in the previous policy paper consisted of the insertion of the phrase "over their own peoples."

*Subsequent to the meeting a difference of interpretation arose as to whether the President's approval of the insertion of the phrase "as necessary" applied only to Paragraph 6 or to Paragraphs 2 and 6. The issue will be decided at a subsequent NSC meeting.

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 5 as follows:

"5. So far as consistent with the above objectives, to avoid unnecessary destruction and casualties in all countries not involved in the war."

The President asked at once why it had been thought desirable to include the term "unnecessary" in Paragraph 5. Obviously we would avoid unnecessary destruction in the countries not involved in the war. The Council agreed with the President that the word should be deleted.

Mr. Gray then invited the Council's attention to Paragraph 7 reading as follows"

"[7. Since ultimate victory in all-out nuclear war will go to the nation which retains the greater residual power and the greater capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault, the United States should develop and maintain such a capacity.]**

"**State-OCDM proposal"

He pointed out that there was no particular difference of view in the Planning Board as to the actual substance of Paragraph 7. On the other hand, most of the Planning Board had questioned whether such a paragraph belonged in a policy dealing with what the U.S. should do after general war broke out. It seemed to them that retaining residual power and capacity for quick recovery belonged in a policy paper, such as our Basic Policy, which concerned itself with what the U.S. should do prior to the outbreak of war.

The President said that wherever it belonged, he was sure that the substance of Paragraph 7 belonged somewhere in our policy. It seemed perfectly clear to him, he said, that the U.S. must have this kind of residual power and capacity for quick recovery. Governor Hoegh then proposed new and simplified language for Paragraph 7 which he said might appeal to the Council. His language was "the U.S. should maintain a capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault."

Secretary Herter said that he and his colleagues were perfectly willing to have the substance of Paragraph 7 contained in our Basic National Security Policy paper. Mr. Gray also expressed the opinion that the Basic Policy was the best place for such a statement although he professed no objection to Governor Hoegh's suggested new language. Mr. Stans said that the Bureau of the Budget believed likewise that the question ought to be debated in a different context from a paper such as this dealing with our policy in the event of war. The President again said he rather liked Governor Hoegh's suggestion and thought it made very good sense. Secretary Herter also approved the language suggested by the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization but suggested that it be included in the section of the paper dealing with Objectives rather than as now set forth, in a section dealing with Policy Guidance. Secretary McElroy agreed with this

suggestion of Secretary Herter. Mr. Gray then suggested that Governor Hoegh's proposed new language be inserted as a new Paragraph 6 at the end of the present section entitled Objectives. The President gave his consent to this change and insisted that if the U.S. did not have such a capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault, the U.S. would have lost the war.

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 8 as follows:

"8. If, in the course of the hostilities, an enemy country asks the United States for peace terms, the United States should not accept any terms unless they remove the threat to U.S. security posed by such country."

He noted that this paragraph was a new paragraph which had no counterpart in the earlier policy paper on "U.S. Objectives in General War." It was put in, he said, to reflect discussion at the prior Council meeting on the subject of our war objectives. The President expressed the view that the new Paragraph 8 was just about as useful as the fifth wheel on a wagon even though the statements it made were perfectly true. On the other hand, he thought that the inclusion of Paragraph 8 would do no harm. To the President it simply meant, he said, if you get into a fight you try to shoot your enemy before he shoots you. At this point the President also repeated his dislike of the formula and concept of unconditional surrender and Mr. Gray pointed out that Paragraph 8 had been included in part to avoid adherence by the U.S. to a concept of unconditional surrender in a future war.

There being no difficulties about the paragraphs on Post-War Objectives, Mr. Gray asked the Council to turn to Section B of NSC 5904 which set forth Objectives and Policy Guidance for limited war as opposed to general war. He pointed out that the first disagreement in this Section applied to the very title of Section B. The majority preferred the title: "U.S. Policy in the Event of War with a Sino-Soviet Bloc State (or States) other than the USSR*." The JCS preferred the following version on the right hand of the page: "U.S. Policy in the Event of a War in which the USSR does not Participate*." ("*Present U.S. policy is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war. The validity of the foregoing assumption is not an issue in this paper, but will be susceptible of re-examination in the course of the review of Basic Policy (NSC 5810/1).

Mr. Gray pointed out in explanation that the Joint Chiefs felt that the title of Section B proposed by the majority was not wholly acceptable because it did not cover limited wars with states which were not in the Sino-Soviet Bloc as for example a war with Egypt. Mr. Gray said he would come back to the problem of the title later.

With respect to Paragraph 13 Mr. Gray pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had agreed to its deletion and also pointed out that there was no problem with respect to the first three sentences of Paragraph 15 since the Joint Chiefs had likewise withdrawn their proposal for the inclusion of the bracketed language in Paragraph 15 which paragraph Mr. Gray proceeded to read. After explaining to the best of his ability the three different versions of the latter portion of Paragraph 15 as set forth on Page 5, Mr. Gray pointed out that we now had in hand a further alternative which had been agreed to between Defense and the Joint Chiefs and copies of which had just been handed to members of the Council. Mr. Gray expressed the view that the new Defense-JCS alternative had much to recommend it in comparison with the others.

The President said that he was frankly very confused by these differing versions. If we think, he said, of some course of action that is necessary to gain our war objectives and take such action, we would certainly in the course of so doing have considered the possibility that the Soviets would come into the war. We have gone into this course of action with our eyes open and we would certainly have to take the consequences. Citing South Korea as a further example, the President insisted that we could not retreat from our objectives in that area once our forces were actually committed.

In response to the President General Twining defended the new Defense-JCS version of the latter portion of Paragraph 15 (a copy of the Defense-JCS version is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). General Twining suggested that if in the course of limited hostilities general war with the Soviet Union became clearly probable, we might have to decide to change our objectives in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. The President said that this was all right with him if our purpose was to change our objectives but he was strongly opposed to abandoning our objectives under Soviet pressure, a thought which seemed to him to be suggested by the new Defense-JCS proposal for the latter portion of Paragraph 15. General Twining assured the President that such was not the intent of the new version. Secretary Herter on the other hand suggested the willingness of the State Department to buy the original version of the latter part of Paragraph 15 suggested by the Department of Defense and included on Page 5 of NSC 5904.

Certain suggestions for language were next made by the President who explained them by stating that he was afraid of a war in which we would be sticking our toe into the water and if we found the water cold would pull it out again. Secretary McElroy commented that all the difficulties of trying to reach an agreed version of Paragraph 15

both in the Planning Board and at the Council meeting simply illustrated the difficulty of trying to write policy guidance for limited wars. He queried whether we really wanted or needed or indeed could write a reasonable policy paper on limited wars in view of all the possible combinations and permutations of possible limited wars in the future. In response to Secretary McElroy's point, Mr. Gray stressed that certain members of the Planning Board felt that it was not possible or right to confine ourselves in this paper to the problem of general war alone.

General Twining then stated that if the Joint Chiefs could have exactly what they wanted, what they really wished was their own original alternative set forth in NSC 5904. At this point Secretary Herter suggested that perhaps the most sensible solution was to strike all of Paragraph 15 which was in dispute and which appeared on Page 5, contenting ourselves with that portion of Paragraph 15 which appeared on Page 4. Mr. Gray suggested that if the portions of Paragraph 15 on Page 5 were left out, the remainder of the paragraph on Page 4 seemed to him pretty well to cover the situation. Secretary McElroy expressed himself as being extremely happy with this proposal as did Secretary Anderson who said that the guidance in the earlier portion of Paragraph 15 was what was going to happen anyway. Secretary Herter, however, expressed some concern as to whether his suggestion would mean that we would pursue our objectives "come hell or high water". Would there be a danger of tying the President's hands? The Vice President did not think so in view of the statement in the earlier part of Paragraph 15 as to the risk of general war. The President finally stated that he was willing to delete that portion of Paragraph 15 which was set forth on Page 5 of NSC 5904. To Secretary Herter's expression of concern about the view which historians might later take if this paper seemed to tie the President's hand, the President said that he was not concerned and again suggested the deletion of the language on Page 5.

Mr. Gray then reverted to the problem of the title of Section B which he had stated earlier he would have to come back to. He again repeated the anxiety of the Joint Chiefs that the majority title was too restricted and deprived the military of policy guidance to be followed in the event of hostilities with countries which were not members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. After a brief discussion Secretary Herter agreed with the version of the title to Section B which was proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject, contained in NSC 5904, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2039-b and in the light of the discussion at the 394th NSC Meeting; in the light of the

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views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 3, 1959.

- b. Tentatively adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5904, subject to certain amendments.

NOTE: Subsequent to this Council meeting, the Departments of State and Defense proposed further revisions in the draft statement of policy in NSC 5904 of a substantive nature which had not been discussed at this meeting. The President, after reviewing these proposals, authorized further consideration at the next Council meeting of NSC 5904 as tentatively adopted in b above, in the light of the State and Defense proposed revisions.

NOTE: Following the above regular NSC meeting, the President held in his office a special meeting of the National Security Council, with the Attorney General participating, to discuss the evolving situation in Berlin and the broader question of Germany.

S. Everett Gleason

S. EVERETT GLEASON

Briefing Note for NSC
Meeting of March 5, 1959

CAHaskins:vsp:rlk
Revised 3/4/59

NSC 5904

At its meeting on January 22, the Council discussed NSC 5410/1, "U. S. Objectives in the Event of General War with the Soviet Bloc", in the light of a series of questions sent forward by the Planning Board. With the guidance from the Council discussion, the Planning Board has drafted a new statement of policy, NSC 5904, which is before you today. The new paper is entitled, "U. S. Policy in the Event of War", and is divided into two separate sections: a first section (Section A) deals with general war; then, because some Planning Board members felt that the paper should also give policy guidance for limited war, a second section (Section B) was written addressed to other kinds of war than general war.

Taking up Section A, then, there was general agreement as to the first objective.

(READ Para 1)

There was also agreement as to the second objective and the policy guidance to carry it out, insofar as the USSR is concerned.

(READ Para 2a with last 2 lines,
Para 6a with last line)

There was a split as to whether the same objective and guidance that apply to the USSR should automatically apply to Communist China; the European Bloc countries, such as Albania or Poland; and the non-European Bloc countries, such as North Viet Nam, North Korea or Outer Mongolia. - As indicated by the bracketed clauses in Paragraph 2

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and Paragraph 6, some members of the Planning Board believed that the guidance should apply to those other Bloc countries only if they were "involved in the hostilities."

Other members of the Planning Board pointed out the difficulty of determining whether a Bloc country was "involved in the hostilities" once general war was upon us. There was a strong feeling that whether or not we were "at war" with Country A or Country B in the classical sense would be academic; and that the purpose of the policy guidance was to authorize, in advance, the use of requisite military force against selected targets in the country or countries listed.

(CALL ON: GOVERNOR HERTER
GENERAL TWINDO
SECRETARY McELROY
and attempt to resolve splits)

The objective in Paragraph 3 follows generally the language of the old paper except that the language "over their own peoples" is an addition.

(READ Para 3)

The objective in Para. 4 is the same as in the old paper except that the word "effective" before allies has been omitted.

(READ Para 4)

Paragraph 5 is new and provides:

(READ Para 5)

The other split in Section A is a proposal by State and OCDM for a Paragraph 7 of the Policy Guidance to read:

(READ Para 7)

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The remainder of the Planning Board felt that guidance on developing a recovery capacity was out of place in a paper on policy in the event of general war, that is, after general war has started, and believed that the proposal should be advanced in connection with the review of Basic National Security Policy.

(CALL ON: GOVERNOR HEINTER
GOVERNOR HOECH)

Paragraph 8 is new.

(Read Para 8)

There are four paragraphs (Paras 9-12) on Post-War Objectives. These are necessarily stated in the most general terms, but could serve as a basis for forward planning by the responsible agencies.

Turning next to Section B, the majority of the Planning Board would entitle the section, "U. S. Policy in the Event of War With a Sino-Soviet Bloc State (or States) Other Than the USSR." I call particular attention to the footnote at the bottom of page 4 which reads:

(READ Footnote)

The JCS propose a different title, on the grounds that Section B should cover any limited war and not be restricted to limited war with a Sino-Soviet Bloc state. I shall later call on General Twining to explain their position.

In their written comments, the JCS withdraw their proposal for a Paragraph 13.

There is agreement on the rather general objective in Paragraph 14:

(READ Para 14)

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There is also agreement on the first part of the Policy Guidance in Paragraph 15, the JCS in their written comments having withdrawn the bracketed phrase.

(READ first 3 sentences, Para 15)

A real difference of opinion developed as to our policy after U. S. forces are once committed, as indicated in the splits at the end of Paragraph 15 (Page 5). The majority proposal is:

(READ Majority Proposal)

The JCS have an alternative which would say:

(READ JCS Alternative)

Defense proposed still a third alternative, which I shall ask Mr. McElroy to explain in a moment. Since the paper was written, the JCS have prepared language for a fourth alternative (Appendix B, JCS comments). But first let us hear an explanation of the JCS splits, beginning with the title.

(CALL ON: GENERAL TWining
GOVERNOR HEHTER
SECRETARY McELROY)

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D. Gleason

Briefing Note for NSC
Meeting Of March 5, 1959

CAHaskins:vsp
3/2/59

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1958-1963

AND

ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

As ~~you will know~~, ^{now} in the Planning Board we are starting upon the annual review of Basic Policy. As a first step, and by way of background, we have been discussing two National Intelligence Estimates - Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-1963 (NIE 11-4-58) and Estimate of the World Situation (NIE 100-59).

This morning Mr. Allen Dulles is going to summarize the two estimates for the Council, after which there will be an opportunity for questions and discussion. No policy issues are being put forward for decision at this time.

(CALL ON: ALLEN DULLES)

(Note: To the extent that Allen Dulles does not cover or adequately highlight them, you may wish to mention the following 5 points which were identified in the P/B)

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Paragraph 15, Defense-JCS Proposal

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Recognizing that the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat local aggression is the best means to keep such hostilities from broadening into general war and that any decision to commit U.S. forces to war would be taken only after consideration of all factors, including probable Soviet reaction, the United States should, with clear determination, utilize all requisite force to attain its objectives. If, however, during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the U.S. will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to alter its original objectives.

(Distribution at Council Meeting)

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Notes of Discussion at a Special Meeting
of the National Security Council in the
President's Office immediately following the
Regular NSC Meeting on March 5, 1959

In attendance:

The President
The Vice President
The Acting Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, U. S. Information Agency
Assistant Secretary of State, Livingston Merchant
The Assistant to the President
The Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House Staff Secretary
The Assistant White House Staff Secretary
The Executive Secretary, NSC

The President referred initially to various suggestions as to the use of the United Nations in connection with the Berlin situation. The President commented that the big problem was how to make it clear that the other side is the real aggressor, while what we wish to do is to go on with the peaceful supply of West Berlin. He said that the main purpose of this meeting was to find out how urgently planning is going on regarding what we may have to do in connection with the Berlin situation.

Secretary Herter said that, on the Three-Power contingency planning regarding the actions to be taken if access to Berlin is denied, our planning was generally along the lines discussed in the previous meeting (held on December 11, 1958). The British, however, think that we should not risk world war because the East Germans insist on stamping papers for Allied access. Mr. Herter said this issue was still in dispute, as well as the question of the possible utility of the United Nations. On the latter question, the United Nations representatives have been asked to study it and make suggestions. Ambassador Lodge tentatively thinks that the U.N. should be used before the initiation of any provocative acts.

The President said that he would not object to possible use of the U.N. now. However, after our access to Berlin has been stopped, if we then put the issue in the U.N., the Soviets will be able simply to sit still, and then what would we do about Berlin?

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The President also commented that the papers he had seen about a blockade left him rather cold. He thought that the Soviets could stand a blockade for at least 12 months, whereas West Berlin might be choked off within 2 weeks. The President then commented that he understood that the Russians and one or two other countries recognize the East German regime. He asked what is the difference between West and East Germany as far as neutral countries are concerned. Mr. Allen pointed out that very few countries (one of which was Yugoslavia) recognize East Germany. The President then asked whether under international law there was not a great difference between East and West Germany. Secretary Herter pointed out that the Russians already have a peace treaty with East Germany. Therefore, when the Russians now talk about signing a peace treaty with East Germany, what they are really threatening is to relinquish to the East Germans Soviet rights regarding Berlin and the corridors there-to.

Secretary Herter commented that the report just received from Allen Dulles of Khrushchev's remarks in Leipzig indicating that May 27 was not an absolute deadline, was not very important. The President commented that Khrushchev would probably say something else tomorrow.

Mr. Gray then raised the question of a public announcement regarding this Special Meeting and read a proposed draft statement (attached hereto). The President said that he had called this meeting in order to keep it to the fewest possible people. He said that if he thought it would be announced publicly, he would have wished to tell the other people who were in the regular NSC Meeting. Secretary McElroy thought the public announcement might indicate over-anxiety regarding Berlin. The President remarked that Secretary Dulles thought that the public was not yet aware of the gravity of the situation. The problem was how not to get hysterical. In this connection, the President reiterated that there would be nothing worse than for us to mobilize, which would in effect constitute a victory for the Russians.

In answer to a question by General Persons regarding Congressional leaders, the President noted that we now have the problem of concerting our views in preparation for Mr. Macmillan's visit. The President expressed concern that Chancellor Adenauer may be weakening his views on the situation. The President said that since 1955 we have insisted that reunification of Germany can occur only through free elections. Until recently Adenauer has said that to bring up any different approach would in fact open a can of worms. However, the President understood that Adenauer now says that we might bring up other approaches during a course of negotiations with the Soviets.

Secretary Herter reported that the State Department had prepared a working paper on the elements of a U. S. position regarding negotiations

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with the Soviets. He said that this paper was now being coordinated with Defense, in preparation for the International Working Group meetings with our Allies which will begin next Monday. The President referred to the British willingness to let East Germans stamp Allied papers. The President said that we have stood firmly behind Adenauer in resisting this procedure. There are indications now, however, that Adenauer might be willing to let the East Germans stamp Allied papers and inspect loads in open vessels. If this is so, it is difficult where we stand now. The President believed that the decision as to the critical point is Adenauer's.

Mr. Merchant noted that Ambassador Bruce Selt that Adenauer may have taken a weaker position in the recent conversations with Secretary Dulles in order to draw us out as to how firm we were. Mr. Merchant noted that Adenauer was firmer in the later meetings with Secretary Dulles.

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unhappily*

The President again noted that it was very difficult to work out what constitutes the critical point in the denial of the access to Berlin, and what we would do next if that point had been reached.

Secretary Herter noted that Adenauer is not well. He has been vacillating recently, and has defections within his own party.

The Vice President commented that the President's objective has been to maintain firmness without being provocative. The Vice President noted, however, that there is a considerable segment of Congress and the Press who point up that the Administration is not going along with such steps as mobilization and, therefore, say that the President's determination is not strong. The Vice President thought that announcing this meeting to the Press would be consistent with the President's middle ground, and would help to counter such Congressional and Press criticism.

The President said that on balance he thought the announcement should be made, and requested Mr. Gray to call the people who had attended the regular NSC Meeting, but not this Special Meeting, and tell them that the President would have invited them if he had known that this meeting was to be made public. The President then authorized a Press announcement consisting of the first sentence of the draft proposed by Mr. Gray with some modifications.

The Vice President then expressed the belief that a meeting with Congressional leaders would be very good. He pointed out that some Members of the Congress have shown considerable restraint regarding Berlin, and that more will if they feel that they are in on the know. The President said that he planned to meet with Congressional leaders, but did not want to have to change his position after meeting with Macmillan. The Vice President thought it would be helpful to meet with Congressional leaders both before and after the Macmillan visit. General Twining raised the point as to whether the public had been told the magnitude of the danger. The President commented that the difficulty is we would then be accused of threatening war with Russia.

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After considerable discussion as to possible attendance, timing and nature of a meeting with the Congressional leaders, the President decided to have a meeting with the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate and the House on the next day, March 6, 1959, at 10:30 a.m.

General Twining then gave a report on the small military actions being taken which Soviet intelligence might pick up. General Twining also reported that a Communications Plan in support of Berlin was being prepared. He also said that the Joint Chiefs felt that we can handle a garrison airlift to Berlin with only a small augmentation, even in the face of efforts to jam our communications. The President interjected that Khrushchev says that an effort on our part to supply Berlin after an effort has been made to deny us access would be an act of war.

General Twining then stated that General Norstad had asked that we discontinue the reduction of Army forces in Europe, and increase those forces by about 7,000 from the U. S. Strategic Reserve. General Twining said that the contemplated reduction of Army forces of Europe totalled 11,000, and that about 3,000 reduction was about to take place. The President commented that carrying out General Norstad's recommendations would have a psychological effect only since it would not constitute a significant increase in military strength.

Secretary McElroy thought that General Norstad's proposal was OK, but that it had better be announced publicly. Secretary McElroy also said that this would not change the plans for the overall size of the Army. The President approved General Norstad's recommendation, but stated that there should only be a routine announcement about it.

General Twining said that as regards Air Force and Navy plans, no decisions were needed now. However, if Norstad had to move large forces from southern to northern Europe, it might be necessary to supply up to 1 additional division from the United States. The President asked whether the JCS plan to conduct a large scale campaign to Berlin. He understood that what we planned to do was to make the other fellow stop us by force. Secretary Herter said we planned to keep moving until the other side shoots at us.

The President said that war would be certain if we tried to make a real campaign into Berlin with, for example, 3 or 4 Corps. Secretary Herter remarked that this is the determination we have to make. The President thought that at that point we would then be retaliating, and that the next step would have to be against Moscow.

General Twining questioned whether we should not now stop additional dependents going into Berlin. The President agreed that this would be desirable.

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The Vice President noted that Khrushchev says his objective is to eliminate the simmering kettle of Berlin. The Vice President thought we should get this situation out of the context of East German recognition and into the concept of saving West Germany. The President noted that Macmillan says we should not go to war if the East Germans want to stamp Allied cards. We say that this would not only approve the denial of Russian responsibility under treaty, but that it would constitute a recognition of the East Germans. The Vice President thought that we might have Mayor Brandt indicate forcefully that this would be the end of West Berlin. Secretary Herter said that Brandt is about halfway between Adenauer and his opposition. The Vice President said that people cannot get excited over the recognition of East Germany, but that they will if it involves the freedom of 2 or 3 million Berliners.

The President thought that we should get the sentiment of the Berliners as to whether they are willing to be a free city. Secretary Herter thought we would have to determine whether we would go to war without our Allies.

Secretary Anderson thought that the vacillation of our Allies suggested Congressional consultation before Macmillan arrives. Secretary Anderson thought the country was more concerned with the situation than we give it credit for.

Following further brief discussion regarding Congressional consultation, the President stated that he thought our military moves at this time should be seen but not talked about.

Secretary Herter said that the basic question is whether we are prepared to use all force necessary to reopen access to Berlin, even at the risk of general war.

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The President commented that if the French and Germans are not with us he did not see how we could successfully use force in Germany to reopen access to Berlin. He did not agree with the theory that we could go it all alone with our Allies opposing us. He questioned whether we could move without support of the British, French and Germans. In fact, he thought that the NATO group must stand firm, or we cannot.

Secretary Herter said it might be necessary to postpone the decision until after the NATO meeting.

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The President said that the only other solution if our access

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to Berlin is stopped would be to decide if we were going to put bombs on Moscow. On the other hand, if we say we are going to withdraw from Europe, that would be doing just what the Russians want.

Allen Dulles suggested that Macmillan's position would be considerably dependent upon the President's position.

The President thought that this was all that could be usefully discussed at this meeting, and the meeting adjourned.

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March 12, 1959

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 399th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, March 12, 1959

Present at the 399th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and Mr. John S. Patterson for the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; The Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. NSC 5904
(NSC 5410/1; NSC 5810/1; NSC 5904; NSC Actions Nos. 1077, 1102, 2039 and 2056; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary dated January 7 and March 3, 9 and 10, 1959)

Mr. Gray explained that after discussion of the draft report on "U.S. Policy in the Event of War" (NSC 5904) at the Council meeting last week (March 5), the usual Draft Record of Action was circulated to the Planning Board for checking with each of their principals. In commenting upon the Draft Record the State and Defense Departments proposed certain revisions. Because of the importance of the subject, the President had authorized further consideration of these revisions by the Council as a whole at this morning's meeting.

Using the enclosure to the Memorandum of March 9, 1959, a copy of which is attached to this Memorandum, Mr. Gray pointed out that the first proposal for a change in the prior text of NSC 5904 came from the Department of State which desired to omit the phrase

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"with the Sino-Soviet Bloc" so that the title of Section A would read simply: "U.S. Policy in the Event of General War." Mr. Gray explained that the State position on the title, as he understood it, was that general war with the U.S.S.R. would not necessarily mean general war with Communist China and that the assumption should not be made in the title. On the other hand Mr. Gray pointed out that this involved one of the most fundamental issues in NSC 5904 and that it had been his view that the two previous Council meetings gave clear guidance to the effect that in a general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., Communist China would inevitably be involved.

The President commented that as he understood the previous Council guidance, the U.S. would attack Communist China in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., only as necessary. The President said he agreed that the U.S. would have to be prepared to attack Communist China in the event of general war with the U.S.S.R. but would not automatically attack Communist China if that country could be isolated from the hostilities. As a historical precedent for this position, the President cited the fact of the long delay before the Soviet Union finally declared war and attacked Japan in World War II.

Mr. Gray pointed out his understanding that the language "as necessary" with respect to a U.S. attack on Communist China had been inserted at the Council's direction in the text of Paragraph 7 which provided the Policy Guidance. The words "as necessary" may perhaps also have been suggested for inclusion in Paragraph 2 of the Objectives although this was another point which was in dispute and where there was a difference of recollection as to whether the Council had agreed on the insertion in Paragraph 2. Indeed this was one of the splits which must be resolved.

The President said that it was his memory of the discussion of the problem of what the U.S. would do in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that the Council had decided to put the nations of the European Soviet Bloc in a special category. Selected targets in these European Bloc nations might have to be hit but we hoped to be able to avoid doing any more damage than necessary.

Mr. Gray then stated that it was his understanding that the Department of Defense would go along with the proposal of the State Department to change the title of Section A of NSC 5904 but that the Defense Department could not agree to the insertion of the words "as necessary" in Paragraph 2 of the Objectives. Secretary McElroy

confirmed Mr. Gray's understanding and explained the position of the Defense Department that the objectives should be to reduce the capabilities of Communist China to wage war against the U.S. and its allies but that a distinction should be made between the treatment accorded to Communist China and the treatment accorded to the U.S.S.R. in the event of general war.

Secretary Herter said that the State Department was prepared to accept the elimination of the words "as necessary" from Paragraph 2 if it was made crystal clear elsewhere in the paper that in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the U.S. would not automatically attack Communist China.

The President commented that our overall objective with respect to Communist China in the event of such a general war was to assure ourselves that we would not be in a situation of being attacked afresh by Communist China after we had defeated the Soviet Union in a general war. With respect to targets the President said he assumed that the targets we attacked would always be selected and not indiscriminate.

Secretary Herter repeated again his concern that NSC 5904 should not seem to indicate that a U.S. attack on Communist China would be automatic. He said that he was willing to see the words "as necessary" dropped from Paragraph 2 if Paragraph 7, where it had been agreed that these two words should be inserted, also stated that it was to be the controlling Policy Guidance. Mr. Gray suggested the wording of a footnote which would make clear that Paragraph 7 was indeed the controlling Policy Guidance and Secretary McElroy suggested that this language be placed in a footnote to Paragraph 7. The President gave his approval to this solution.

Mr. Gray then invited the attention of the Council to the additional change the State Department was now proposing to Paragraph 7 reading as follows:

- "7. The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR [;]* and as necessary in Communist China [European Bloc and non-European Bloc countries;]* to attain the above objectives. Military targets in other Bloc countries will be attacked as necessary. It is assumed that the peoples of these countries are not responsible for the acts of their governments and accordingly so far as consistent with military objectives military action against these countries should avoid non-military destruction and casualties.*

"*State proposals."

Mr. Gray pointed out that the State Department wished to add the underlined language to Paragraph 7 because it desired to make a distinction between the application of "all requisite force" against targets in the U.S.S.R., Communist China, and other Bloc countries.

With respect to the underlined language the President observed that it contained a view which he had himself stated and which he meant but he was not clear that the statement had to be included in the Policy Guidance.

Mr. Gray pointed out that there was another issue not so apparent to the naked eye which was involved in the bracketed language in Paragraph 7 which the State Department proposed that we should delete. Mr. Gray explained that if the language in brackets was left in the paragraph as the Department of Defense desired, it would provide the basis for action to carry out Paragraph 3 of the Objectives because it would permit the U.S. to destroy the puppet regimes in the Bloc countries by force if necessary. On the other hand, if the bracketed language was left out as the State Department desired, no Policy Guidance would be provided as to the destruction of the puppet regimes in the Bloc states.

Secretary Herter countered with the argument that the guidance which Defense sought, in this context, was actually provided in the next sentence which if the underlined language were accepted would read: "Limited targets in other Bloc countries will be attacked as necessary." The President said that he could not understand why if it was agreed to put in this particular sentence the State Department would also wish to delete the bracketed language. Secretary Herter then agreed to the inclusion of the language in brackets. It was then proposed to change the first of the underlined additional sentences to read as follows: "Military targets in Bloc countries other than the U.S.S.R. and Communist China will be attacked as necessary."

Secretary McElroy thought that the inclusion of this statement was redundant if the bracketed language were included. The President however said that he thought this was not case although perhaps the additional language proposed by the State Department to be added to Paragraph 7 was the result of some excess of caution. The President then suggested that perhaps this cautionary language could be inserted as a footnote or as a parenthetical note in the text. Secretary McElroy thought this to be a distinct improvement because after all what we were dealing with was an assumption and so described in the proposed text. The Council thereupon agreed to this solution.

Mr. Gray then invited the Council's attention to the last split view; namely, Paragraph 14 in Section B. He recalled that there had been a considerable number of versions proposed for acceptance as the Policy Guidance in Paragraph 14. Secretary Herter indicated that he had yet another version of Paragraph 14 which he would like the Council to look at and which read as follows:

"14. The United States should be prepared to utilize such force as is requisite to attain its objectives. If during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the U.S. will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to alter its original objectives."

After a short conference between Secretary Herter and Secretary McElroy, the latter stated that the language of this version proposed by the State Department appeared quite acceptable both to the Defense Department and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President said that the proposed language was also acceptable to him but warned that we could not make too many detailed military plans in advance of a war.

Mr. Gray then stated that he understood that the shorter version for the title of Section A had also been approved. There was no contrary view.

At this point General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were worried about the present title of Section B reading as follows: "U.S. Policy in the Event of War in which the U.S.S.R. does not Participate." In view of the kind of assistance and participation which the U.S.S.R. could actually offer without necessarily participating as a belligerent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest the desirability of changing the title to read: "U.S. Policy in the Event of a War in which the U.S.S.R. does not Participate as a Belligerent."

Secretary Herter stated that this proposal involved no difficulty for the State Department. The President also agreed to the change in a slightly modified form.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the statement of policy contained in NSC 5904, as revised in the last Council meeting; in the light of the suggestions proposed subsequently by the Departments

of State and Defense as indicated in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 9, 1959.

b. Adopted the draft statement of policy in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 9, 1959, subject to the following amendments:

- (1) Page 1, title of Section A: Delete the bracketed words and the footnotes thereto.
- (2) Page 1, paragraph 2: Delete the underlined words "as necessary" and the footnote thereto.
- (3) Page 2, paragraph 7: Revise to read as follows:

"*7. The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR--and as necessary in Communist China, European Bloc and non-European Bloc countries--to attain the above objectives. Military targets in Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China will be attacked as necessary. (NOTE: It is assumed that the peoples of the Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China are not responsible for the acts of their governments and accordingly so far as consistent with military objectives military action against these countries should avoid non-military destruction and casualties.)

"* Paragraph 7 contains the controlling policy guidance with respect to military action to attain the foregoing objectives."

- (4) Page 4, title to Section B: Reword as follows: "U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF A WAR IN WHICH THE USSR IS NOT A BELLIGERENT*"
- (5) Page 4, paragraph 14: Revise to read as follows:

"Policy Guidance

"14. The United States should be prepared to utilize such force as is requisite to attain its objectives. If during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the United States will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to alter its original objectives."

NOTE: The statement of policy, as adopted in b above, subsequently approved by the President, circulated as NSC 5904/1 as a planning guide for all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, subject to the understanding that it will be reviewed annually.

DRAFT STATEMENT OF
U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF WAR

SECTION A: U. S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL
WAR /WITH THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC*/**

Special Note: This section of the policy statement addresses itself only to the contingency of general war; it does not apply to situations of local aggression or so-called "limited war".

Objectives

1. To prevail, and survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny.
2. To reduce, by military and other measures, the capabilities of the USSR and as necessary*** Communist China to the point where they have lost their will and ability to wage war against the United States and its allies.
3. To render ineffective the control structure by which the enemy regimes have been able to exert ideological and disciplinary authority over their own peoples and over individual citizens or groups of citizens in other countries.
4. To preserve and retain as many of our allies as possible.
5. So far as consistent with the above objectives, to avoid destruction and casualties in all countries not involved in the war.

/* The Sino-Soviet Bloc includes the USSR, Communist China, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, North Korea, North Viet Nam and Outer Mongolia.

** State would delete the bracketed words and the footnote thereto.

*** State proposal.

6. To retain in the United States a capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault.

Policy Guidance

7. The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR [;]* and as necessary in Communist China, [European Bloc and non-European Bloc countries;]* to attain the above objectives. Military targets in other Bloc countries will be attacked as necessary. It is assumed that the peoples of these countries are not responsible for the acts of their governments and accordingly so far as consistent with military objectives military action against these countries should avoid non-military destruction and casualties.*

8. If, in the course of the hostilities, an enemy country asks the United States for peace terms, the United States should not accept any terms unless they remove the threat to U. S. security posed by such country.

Post-War Objectives

9. To prevent, so far as practicable, the formation or retention after the war of military power in potentially hostile states sufficient to threaten the security of the United States.

* State proposals.

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10. To seek the eventual establishment in nations of the Sino-Soviet Bloc of friendly governments founded upon broad-based, popular support.

11. To maintain after the cessation of hostilities sufficient U. S. and allied military strength to deter aggression and to accomplish other post-war objectives.

12. To establish effective international arrangements for the preservation of peace.

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Notes of Discussion at a Meeting in the
Office of Acting Secretary of State Herter
at 10:00 a.m., on March 14, 1959



In attendance:

- Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of State
- Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense
- Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
- G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor, Department of State
- Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
- Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
- Loftus E. Becker, Legal Adviser, Department of State
- John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense
- Rear Adm. C. O. Triebel, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary
- James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC
- And Other Staff officers.

Inter

Secretary Herter opened the meeting by reading points which he understood had been agreed upon by the Departmental working group on the Berlin situation. The first point was that all of the actions contemplated in a discussion paper which had been circulated depended to a greater or lesser degree upon cooperation and support of our allies, U.K., France and West Germany. It was agreed that there should not be any added public opinion drive at this time. Also that the President should not be asked to rescind his decision on the 30,000 man reduction in the Armed Forces, but that strength in Europe should be restored. The desirability of referring the question of the Soviets turning over to the Germans control of allied access to Berlin to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion should be examined. While noting the President's opinion that we should not accept East German credentials, the working group pointed out that K-Day would actually occur when allied access to Berlin is forcibly blocked and we have to mount a probe, rather than automatically on May 27. If the East German officials attempt to exercise sovereignty by stamping documents,

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MR 91-84#2
BY *JW* DATE 12/10/96

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We will not accede, but will then move ahead until forcibly blocked.

Mr. Gray cited the importance of determining what we mean when we say "forcibly blocked".

Herter a little dumb

Secretary Herter continued the list of agreed working group points, the next of which was that in no event would the U. S. initiate general war. Even if negotiations are still under way and our access forcibly blocked, we would still want to try a probe. It was agreed that we should take the problem to the United Nations after we have been forcibly blocked and tried a probe. Secretary McElroy questioned when general war would happen; for example, suppose our people had been subjected to military action by the Soviets in connection with Berlin. Secretary Herter said that then the Soviets would have been the ones who had initiated general war. Secretary Quarles thought that the working group's statement was not referring to initiating general war, but rather to *preventive* war. Secretary Herter thought that this point was already clearly covered in existing approved policy.

Secretary Herter said the next point agreed by the working group was that general mobilization should be deferred until after K-Day. Then we would probably go into general mobilization, although it might be only partial mobilization. Secretary Herter cautioned that whatever was put in writing on this subject and submitted to the President was liable to leak. He, therefore, felt that any such written documentation should be looked at from the point of view of what would happen if it got out publicly. Secretary Herter thought that after various points were agreed by the President we should then look at what the Russians should know.

Secretary Herter said that there would be many variables which could not now be foreseen, especially when K-Day occurs. He thought K-Day was unlikely before May 27, but from there on we might have to deal with the East Germans. From then on we would have to make clear our response. One of the questions would be what we do if a single East German sentry refuses us access. Would we then go immediately to the United Nations. There is also a question of whether, following our initial probe, we try a second probe of considerable force. Secretary McElroy said he did not think much of the latter idea. Secretary Herter said he did not either. Secretary McElroy thought that we must assume that if we get into a fight it will be a big one.

General Twining then read a list of actions which the Joint Chiefs were now taking. Concerning the types of convoy, both General Twining and Secretary McElroy felt that we should do the same thing after the Soviets turn over to the East Germans as we did the day before. Secretary Quarles thought it might be



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build
desirable to ~~board~~ ^{in the} up the type of convoy before such a turn over, although not necessarily including a scout car/convoy. Secretary Quarles noted that our military planning was based upon the assumption that we would not negotiate with the East Germans as Soviet agents.

Secretary Herter said that this assumption was correct, but that it was possible we might be able to negotiate an acceptable settlement before the turnover takes place. Secretary Herter said that it would be all right for the East Germans to request identity papers but any inspection or blocking by them would not be accepted. 2

Secretary McElroy thought that it was necessary that we send some people (preferably someone who understands the problem fully) to go up and down the corridor with convoys. He said it is extremely important to avoid the appearance of being very aggressive on what may be construed publicly as a technicality. Secretary Quarles said we must distinguish between policing of traffic and control of access. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs would send someone from the Joint Staff. Secretary McElroy questioned whether someone from State should also go, probably from Mr. Becker's office. ✓

Mr. Herter said that Secretary Dulles feels that what the Soviets will try to do is to force us to negotiate with the East Germans. That in itself would constitute a recognition that the Soviets have the right to turnover to the East Germans. Secretary Herter thought that it was very important to have clear instructions for the first convoy after such a turnover.

Secretary McElroy asked whether acceptance of the stamping of papers by the East Germans would constitute recognition. Mr. Murphy said that if we accepted such stamping, we would then be on a slippery slope, with the danger of losing our entire rights in Berlin. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the right of the East Germans to regulate civilian traffic has already been recognized. We were prepared, therefore, to accept an East German request for identification to distinguish ^{can} allied convoy from civilian traffic.

Secretary Herter said that if we do not recognize East German rights, they must then be forced to stop us. Secretary Quarles said that the trouble is if the East Germans gave one of our convoys a mark of identity, the next convoy would be required to have such a mark. Mr. Irwin said that if we accept East German identification, we are then saying that the East Germans have a right to question such identification. ✓ 2



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Secretary Herter thought that this problem involves two inter-related steps. First, if the Soviets turn over to the East Germans; we will protest and say that it does not affect our rights. If the East Germans then say they have the right to question our free access, the minutiae regarding clearance procedures will have assumed new proportions. If the East Germans say nothing, but then move to control our traffic, that will constitute K-Day.

Mr. Wilcox said that the problem of refusing to accept East German stamps would be difficult to explain in the United Nations. He pointed out that we must be able to get support in the United Nations that what we are doing is right. Secretary Herter said that is why we are considering referring the question of credentials to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Mr. Becker said that we must have someone check as to whether any East German ~~stand~~ ^{stamp} would constitute control of access. Secretary McElroy pointed out that such questions testify to the need for a thorough understanding of convoy procedures. He thought we should not reach any final decisions regarding these procedures until after people have been sent to study the existing procedures. Secretary Herter thought that we could agree now that we would not accept any forcible denial. Then later we could determine what constitutes denial in terms of the minutiae ^{of} clearance procedures.

Secretary Quarles thought that the study of the convoy procedures should also include the following points: First, a careful study ~~of the procedure~~ of the existing forms of Soviet access to West Germany, and how important such access was; secondly, what is done on the railroads where there is customs control when it passes from East to West Germany; third, a study of the procedures for access by air.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that we have now been flying in the corridors above 2,500 feet and below 10,000 feet. He said that if we have to start an airlift to Berlin, we would want to use new aircraft at higher altitudes. Defense, therefore, thought that they might start now using C-130's at around 25,000 feet. Secretary Herter said that they had discussed this question in the State Department and that they did not feel that they were savvy enough to make the military judgment involved. He felt that if Defense needed to do this, then they should. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Russians had said that if we fly over 10,000 feet they cannot give assurance of air safety. Mr. Murphy questioned why we could not start flying above 10,000 feet with the type of aircraft now in use. He suggested that this would not give away that we were contemplating the use of an airlift.

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Secretary Herter pointed out that the NATO defines an attack on one as an attack on all. Therefore, the British and French are in the same position as the U.S. Secretary McElroy said that this was why he felt we should have a solid position before Mr. Macmillan arrives.

General Twining referred back to the question of airlift and said that a plane flying between 25 ^{hundred} and 10 thousand feet was very vulnerable to ground fire. Secretary Quarles said he thought that the 10 to 20 thousand-foot altitude was reserved for civilian traffic control, and that this is why we wished to fly at 25,000 feet and above. Mr. Murphy said this problem also raises the question of whether the Russians will pull out of the Berlin air control center.

Secretary McElroy proposed that the question of flying at higher altitudes be put up to the President. Secretary McElroy also said that Defense will send people to get a specific report on ground rail, air, and canal procedures for access to Berlin. Secretary Herter said that the State Department would also have someone from Mr. Becker's office go over to study these procedures. Secretary Quarles again recommended that we not overlook the reciprocal aspects of Soviet access into West Germany. Mr. Merchant suggested that when the people come back from their study of access procedures, it would also be desirable to bring back a U. S. official from the Three-power working group on Berlin contingency planning.

Secretary Herter pointed out that Mr. Reinhardt was coordinator within State in preparing for the Macmillan visit. He suggested that Defense let Mr. Reinhardt know anything that they wanted on the agenda.

Mr. Irwin returned to the question of what actually constitutes obstruction of our access. Mr. Murphy said that there has got to be an element of force used in stopping us. Mr. Reinhardt said that we would not be able to get on the Berlin road without some form of action, because there is a bar at the East German checkpoint. Secretary Herter said that we would try to get through without shooting so that they would be the ones who would have to shoot first.

Secretary Quarles pointed out that if they stop us to check identity then there is a question of what they will accept. If they do not accept our identification, Mr. Quarles said he understood we would not then attempt to raise the bar. Mr. Irwin questioned what we would do if the East Germans do the same as the previous Russian pattern. Mr. Murphy said we would deny the East Germans right to do so. Mr. Wilcox pointed out that how we denied that right is very important for U.N. purposes.



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Mr. Smith suggested, and it was agreed, that we should have a full photographic record of what happens to convoys going through.

In answer to Mr. Gray, Secretary Herter said that they would have to decide whether to break off diplomatic relations with the Soviets at the time that the turn over takes place. Secretary Herter said they are also looking at the possibility of a limited blockade of the USSR, even though he realizes that the President is not enthusiastic about this idea.

Mr. Murphy asked why we should not take photographs of the present convoy operations, and Secretary McElroy agreed that we would.

General Twining then enumerated various things that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought should be done. First, he said that the JCS were unhappy about the situation. This was that military action should now go beyond those which could be picked up by Soviet intelligence. The second was that we have a firm U.S. position before Macmillan arrives, and a clear decision as to whether we would go all the way down the line to war.

Secretary McElroy asked whether the British questioned this latter decision. Mr. Murphy said the British do not disagree with our basic position, but may want to drag out negotiations for a long time. Secretary McElroy thought we should be prepared to adjust some positions with the British, but not our basic decision.

Mr. Irwin said that the problem may arise with the British as to whether, if we are forcibly blocked, we decide now that we would use force. Mr. Murphy said the British maintain they cannot accept that decision as a matter of principle without joint planning.

Secretary Herter said that if you assume we are stopped and take the problem to the U.N., we are in effect imposing a blockade upon ourselves. He questioned how long we would wait for U.N. action. Secretary McElroy thought that we should test our access each day. General Twining believed that we should use whatever force was needed progressively.

At Secretary McElroy's request, General Twining then outlined the following steps which the JCS proposed before K-Day: First, one involved added Sixth Fleet activity; second was to be prepared to deploy elements of the First Fleet to the Persian Gulf area; the third was to be prepared to add squadrons to airbases in Turkey and Germany; the fourth was to be prepared to deploy 3 additional squadrons of fighters to bases in Central Europe; fifth was to expedite delivery of undelivered military assistance shipments with priority to NATO, and to expedite delivery of arms purchases by the West Germans; sixth



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would be to add to our capability to ~~attack~~ submarines in the Far East around Vladivostok; seventh was to defer the reduction of forces in Europe (which the discussion indicated is being done); also, to bring the combat logistic support in Europe to full ~~point~~ strength; eighth would be to accelerate training and equipment ~~of~~ the Third and Fourth Armored Divisions; ninth was to be prepared to establish an anti-submarine barrier in the North Atlantic.

Secretary Herter interjected that it appeared to him that these proposed moves were all in the nature of cautionary measures.

Continuing, General Twining said that the tenth step proposed by the JCS was to deploy the Second Fleet to the North Atlantic at an appropriate time. The eleventh proposal was that if General Norstad had to add forces in Central Europe, we replace one Division from the United States. Secretary McElroy said that he was not much in favor of this latter proposal, and thought it should be put up to the President. Both Mr. Murphy and Secretary McElroy suggested that these moves when made should either be allowed to leak or be made known. General Twining said that each move involving combat forces would be checked out with the Secretary of Defense and with the State Department before being made.

Secretary Quarles commented that the arrangements for Berlin were created at a time when the Soviets were supposed to be our friends and the Germans our enemies. Today the situation is the opposite. He thought that we should make clear that the issue is not a question of whether the Soviets transfer their rights to the East Germans, but whether they abridge our rights. He thought we were not sufficiently cultivating the attitude of the German people on this question. Mr. Murphy said that the Germans were the ones who put steel into the details of our position, especially regarding East Germans stamping documents. Secretary Quarles felt that we should not be strapped by the West Germans who themselves accept many forms of relations with the East Germans.

Mr. Irwin felt that further efforts should be made to try to clarify the points of issue in the public's mind, even though there was not a major campaign. Mr. Herter said that the President's Monday talk would be designed to provide such clarification. He expressed his view that not everybody in Government should get in on the act of clarifying our position. He said that Mr. Merchant was working on the drafts of the President's talk.

Mr. Merchant said that he agreed that we should reexamine our whole position in detail before Macmillan's arrival, and be prepared to hold a solid line. He said that Secretary Dulles believed that he came back from Europe with a firm agreement with the British, French and German that we would not accept a blockade of our access to Berlin. Mr. Merchant thought that the British differ

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with us on two points. First, they have doubts as to whether we should refuse to accept East Germans stamping documents; second, they contemplated a longer negotiating period before more force is applied. However, Mr. Merchant said that there was a basic agreement with our allies and, in fact, with NATO. 2

Secretary Herter said the problem was mainly one of hashing out the details of our position. Mr. McElroy commented that the French seem to be taking a tough position with our troops.

Mr. Gray asked whether there was anything which the Joint Chiefs wanted to do, to which the British and French could contribute. General Twining said that some of the steps would involve or be taken by our allies. Mr. Murphy commented that the British have long urged joint plans but we have been opposed. Secretary Quarles differed with Mr. Murphy's statement, saying that we have only declined joint planning in Washington but that such planning had been done in Europe.

Mr. Gray reported that he has set aside on the President's calendar the time from 9 to 10:30 a.m. on Thursday morning for the regular NSC meeting. This time would, therefore, be available if it was needed for other purposes.

a - ground
b - air { Mr. Smith said that if we assume that we have failed in a diplomatic solution to forcible denial of our access to Berlin, we will then be faced with three choices: One would be further military action to gain entry to Berlin; the second would be a possible blockade of the USSR; and the third would be general war. Mr. Smith suggested that there should be a joint State-Defense study of these alternatives in the same manner that had been done regarding possible action in Korea. ✓

Mr. Irwin said it was his understanding that the Joint Chiefs are planning that, if our diplomacy fails, we will attempt to force access to Berlin. He said that what was puzzling is what would happen if our allies do not go along with us on that. Secretary McElroy thought we should say that we are going to maintain access to Berlin.

Secretary Herter said that there will be probing as to the actions we are going to take from all sides. He proposed, and it was agreed, that Mr. Smith and Mr. Irwin would prepare recommendations to the President along the lines discussed in this meeting, including the question of a possible joint State-Defense study of alternatives.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: March 14, 1959

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning

PARTICIPANTS: State
 Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary
 Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
 G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
 Loftus E. Becker, Legal Adviser
 Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secy-European Affairs
 Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secy-International Organization Affairs
 Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secy-Policy Planning

COPIES TO:

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W - Defense
 G. Neil McElroy, Secretary
 C. Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary
 S/P - General N. F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 EUR - John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secy for ISA
 L - Robert H. Knight, Deputy Asst Secy for ISA
 IO - General John S. Guthrie
 Admiral Charles O. Triebel
 Admiral F. O. Beirne
 Col. C. B. Billingslea

White House
 Gordon Gray
 James S. Lay, Jr.
 General Goodpaster

Governor Herter opened the meeting by reading the memorandum of March 14 outlining the results of the State Department meeting of March 13 held in his office. [See Tab A].

Secretary McElroy said that there were two things the Defense Department people wanted to discuss which Governor Herter's reading had raised--

- The question of the cut-off point; and
- The question of the statement Governor Herter had read to the effect that in no circumstances should the US initiate general war.

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The latter point was resolved by general agreement at the meeting that the conclusion against the initiation of general war did not mean that the US would not expand the hostilities, if necessary, in the event of a blockage over Berlin access.

Governor Herter emphasized that there were a great many variables in this situation which prevented any very detailed contingency planning. He mentioned especially the question of when K Day would be reached. He pointed out that we have been focusing on May 27 which was all right for general planning purposes, but he warned that, in the event, K Day might arrive earlier or later than May 27. We should make clear in advance to the Soviets our firm intent to exercise our rights of access to Berlin.

Governor Herter said that there was some fuzziness in regard to our planning about a second resort to force (that is, after a symbolic probe followed further political negotiations).

General Twining and Secretary McElroy said that the military did not think highly of a limited resort to force because the communists are capable of stopping such a move. General Twining noted that we have the capability to lick the East Germans. It was noted, however, that any ground action in East Germany would put Western forces into immediate contact with the Russians. Secretary McElroy expressed concern about the possibility of fighting satellites in a ground battle in Europe.

On the suggestion of K Day procedures, Secretary McElroy suggested that our traffic should be just the same as on any pre-K Day rather than to introduce an armed scout car as is contemplated in present contingency planning. There appeared to be agreement for this proposed change. General Twining then read a list of steps which we are now taking quietly to let the Soviets know of our determination, e.g., setting up a communications center at Helmstadt, radio cars, etc.

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On the question of "no substitution" doctrine, Mr. Quarles asked if our position would be the same whether or not the Soviets had purported merely to assign their control functions to the East Germans as their agents. Governor Herter expressed the opinion that the situation might be different if the Soviet action took this form.

Secretary McElroy said he lacked direct information as to the procedure presently being followed at the control points and suggested that steps be taken to obtain this information through individuals who were acquainted with the present talks in Washington. Mr. Quarles agreed, and said that the individuals who might be sent to obtain this information should clearly distinguish between different functions, such as traffic control, tariff and passport type controls. General Twining thought it would be useful to have representatives from the Joint Staff observe traffic procedures for several weeks.

Governor Herter said that the Soviets were trying to force us to negotiate with the East Germans who might take the position that the slate had been wiped clean and that it was now up to the Western powers to negotiate a new deal with the East German government.

Secretary McElroy said that on the subject of Western powers not submitting to document stamping by the East Germans, he wanted to be very certain before agreeing to this procedure that such stamping would constitute recognition of the GDR in some way detrimental to the US security interests. Mr. Murphy pointed out that stamping was not only bad per se, but was dangerous as the first step down a slippery slope. He pointed out that after we had acceded to stamping we would be met with demands for inspection. Secretary McElroy asked why if this was the case we would even go so far as to accept the GDR's right to require identification. Mr. Merchant pointed out that our rationale for submitting to identification was that as victors in the war we had the right to use the access routes subject only to our identifying our personnel as representatives of the victorious Western powers.

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Secretary McElroy felt that our "no stamping" policy would be very difficult for public opinion to understand.

Governor Herter pointed out that the central point was forceable stopping of our traffic. We should try to focus on this aspect and not focus so much on the "no stamping" aspect.

Mr. Quarles asked what our position should be if the East Germans in proposing to stamp our papers said that the stamp was merely for identification purposes. Mr. Murphy pointed out that this would be unacceptable.

Governor Herter pointed out that a difficult decision would face us if the stamp was presented as merely a device for fixing the time on which we entered East Germany. However, Governor Herter said that in this event he thought the issue would be presented to us on a much broader basis and not on the minutiae of stamping. The East Germans would more likely take a position that the Western powers must deal with them on a number of procedural matters if they wanted to continue access to Berlin. Governor Herter pointed out that if the Soviets and East Germans sign a peace treaty we should assert our access rights promptly.

Mr. Wilcox pointed out that it would be difficult to present a convincing case to the UN if the issue came up on a "no stamping" point. Governor Herter pointed out that that was one of the reasons why we were considering the reference of the problem to the International Court of Justice.

Mr. Becker said that stamping could be considered merely as an identification function and he fully endorsed the idea of on the spot checking of the procedures now being used by the Soviets. Secretary McElroy suggested that the present procedures should be carefully photographed.

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Mr. Quarles said he would like to see a study made of the reciprocal controls placed by West Germans on Soviet personnel. He would also like to see a study of the control techniques covering railroad traffic by the East and West Germans. He said he understood that some of our military cargo is handled by rail and he asked what stamping by East Germans have we submitted to in regard to this cargo.

Secretary McElroy raised the point about a test of our right to fly aircraft into and from Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet. He said that if we needed a substantial airlift we would want to use large new planes which operate best at higher altitudes. The practice now is to fly between 2,500 feet and 10,000 feet, but we have never waived our right to fly at higher altitudes. He felt that it would be well to establish our right by precedent now rather than later when the tension might be higher.

Governor Herter said that this was largely a military matter in which the State Department did not have a strong position. If it was militarily important, he felt that it would be all right to go ahead. It was decided to put this proposal to the President.

Governor Herter said that the three Western powers were in the same position on Berlin access and stressed the need to concert our positions. The communists may well test one of our Allies rather than us in the first instance.

There was some discussion about the possibility of the Soviet controller leaving the air control at Tempelhof. Mr. Murphy said that we doubt that the Soviets would do this.

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General Twining then listed a number of pre-K Day moves that the Joint Chiefs would like to plan for:

1. Be prepared to deploy elements of the First Fleet to the Persian Gulf if the situation in the Middle East requires stabilization.
2. Be prepared to position one additional TAC rotational squadron at Adana and one at Ramstein, both squadrons to be equipped with SIDEWINDER.
3. Be prepared to deploy three squadrons of TAC to bases in Central Europe.
4. Expedite delivery of: (1) The undelivered portions of approved Mutual Security Programs with priority to NATO Allies; (2) Mutual Security military sales equipment to West Germany.
5. Station submarines for optimum capability for detection of Chinese and Soviet submarine egress from normal bases at Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok and Shanghai.
6. Defer directed USAREUR military strength reductions and bring combat and logistics elements up to full strength.
7. Accelerate training and movement of personnel replacement packets for Third and Fourth Armored Divisions in Europe.
8. Prepare to establish A/S barrier between Greenland-Iceland-and United Kingdom, and position nuclear submarines in N. Cape-Murmansk area to obtain early warning of Soviet submarine deployments. Expedite collection of reports from the fixed surveillance system in Baltic exits. (These are Danish loops in Great Belt.)
9. Deploy the Second Fleet and associated forces to North Atlantic at an appropriate time.

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10. Maintain maximum practicable number of Sixth Fleet units at sea and conduct surveillance of Soviet and Egyptian submarine departures from Vlonas, Albania and Alexandria.
11. Provide for immediate compensatory replacement of major USAREUR forces moved to North Germany in the event of activation of plans to reopen ground access to Berlin.

Secretary McElroy expressed a dissenting opinion to the proposal [numbered 6 above] calling for deployment of 7,000 additional troops to Europe.

Mr. Quarles expressed concern that in our thinking we still reflected remnants of the thinking in 1945 when the Soviets were our presumed friends and the Germans our enemies. We should avoid insistence on the status quo which involves retention of the Soviet Berlin position. We should try to cultivate the adverse interest of the East German people and the GDR.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that it is the German pressure which is strongest for the "no substitution" doctrine.

Mr. Quarles expressed the hope that we could avoid "being trapped". He pointed out that the West Germans had defacto dealings with the East Germans.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Bonn working group was considering "identification" procedures and that a man from this group should work with any team sent over from Washington to observe and report on current practices.

Mr. Irwin reverted to the question of what would constitute "obstruction" of our access. Would it be a physical blockage; a thrust of a gun in the face of an American? Mr. Murphy stated that there must be some element of force.

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There was then additional discussion about the possibility of breaking through the barrier, exchanging shots, identification procedures, etc.

Mr. Quarles expressed the opinion that we should not physically raise the barrier if the East Germans would not accept our identification.

Mr. Irwin asked what our policy would be if the East Germans permitted open convoys to pass but not closed convoys. Mr. Murphy thought this would be unacceptable as an attempt to exercise inspection rights which the GDR did not possess.

Mr. Smith pointed out the desirability of television coverage for any Western effort to exercise access rights so that a clear public case could be made.

Mr. Gray asked about the possibility of breaking off diplomatic relations in the event of blockage of access. Governor Herter said that was being looked at but that a decision on this could be deferred.

Governor Herter said that he hoped the military was studying the question of a counter-blockade which had been raised in a Policy Planning Staff memorandum. General Twining said that the Chiefs were studying the general question of possible "heckling" of the communists by the Western powers.

General Twining stated that the Joint Chiefs were unhappy about our present state of preparations. They were concerned about the prospect of Prime Minister Macmillan persuading us away from our firm position of Berlin access. General Twining felt that we should take a position now that if necessary to keep Berlin we would risk all-out war. For tactical purposes, this position should be stated by the President to Macmillan before Macmillan had any opportunity to present British views.

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Mr. Irwin pointed out the difficulty arising from the absence of any decision in connection with paragraph D of the contingency planning paper of February 18. In effect, the decision as to resort to force was being held in abeyance.

There was discussion about the British position that they could not decide on resort to force as a matter of principle until there had been combined US-UK planning. It was pointed out that, although the US had objected to this type of planning in Washington, there was some planning going on in Europe.

Governor Herter raised the point as to how long we might continue efforts in the UN after a blockage had occurred. Secretary McElroy suggested that in this period we should be conducting a probe of the East German block each day.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that in regard to the UK Secretary Dulles had returned from his recent European trip with a solid commitment on the "no substitution" doctrine and on the use of force if necessary. The French were more truculent. The UK does differ from us in regard to "stamping" and they seem to favor a longer negotiating period.

Mr. Merchant pointed out that we have a good measure of agreement with our NATO allies, as indicated by the December communique. He felt that we start the allied negotiations from a good firm base.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the President would be able to meet on this matter next Tuesday.

Mr. Smith asked if there was agreement on a proposal to the President that a study by State, Defense, JCS and the CIA be made of possible courses of military action after blockage of access. Governor Herter said that this proposal could be put to the President on Tuesday.

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 By *RLC* *7/14/92*

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FILE MR Case No. *87-216*
 Document No. *10*
 March 6, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
 March 6, 1959, 10:30 AM

Others present: Vice President Nixon
 Secretary Herter
 Secretary McElroy
 Mr. Allen Dulles
 Senator Lyndon Johnson
 Senator Everett Dirksen
 Speaker Rayburn
 Representative Halleck
 General Persons
 Major Eisenhower

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The President opened the meeting by stating its purpose: to talk over the abnormal situation facing us in the Berlin situation and to assure that the Executive and Legislative Branches are thinking together. He did not desire the meeting to be so large as to necessitate undue publicity, and for this reason, he informed the members present that he planned to talk off the record with members of the Foreign Affairs Committees and others this evening.

The President reviewed briefly the policy of the U.S. Government on the Berlin issue. This policy is to warn the Soviets publicly that we will not be threatened or pushed out of Berlin and that we will not desert the 2.2 million free people in that city, but will, rather, execute our rights under existing agreements. At the same time, we will maintain an attitude of readiness to negotiate, to include discussion of a peace treaty. We do admit that other nations have interests in the Berlin crisis and we desire to explore the German situation in an atmosphere off the level of a crisis. There is no point at this time to discussing extreme measures such as mobilization. Mobilization of the entire nation's resources would be the most disastrous thing that could come about. Our situation in the world, vis-a-vis the Soviets, should be one with which we can live for many a year. Otherwise, we must go to a garrison state. Therefore, we are being alert; we are ready to take any decent opportunity to negotiate; and we stand with our allies.

The President finished his opening statement by reiterating his desire to see if the Legislative and Executive are thinking along the same lines.

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He emphasized that he does not desire to require anybody to sign on the dotted line, but desires to get their views.

At this time the President introduced Mr. Allen Dulles.

Mr. Dulles then briefed the Members of Congress by use of a map of East Germany. This indicated Soviet and GDR armed forces. (See summary of Mr. Dulles' briefing, attached.) At the end of this presentation there were brief questions. To Mr. Halleck's question regarding the reliability of GDR troops, Mr. Dulles gave the opinion that these troops are not overly reliable, but the Soviets would not depend on them in any serious action. From this Mr. Halleck concluded that any action of this type would, of necessity, involve participation by the Russians. Senator Dirksen, in confirmation of this point, asked whether the Soviets are patrolling in East Germany. The answer was affirmative. In this connection, the President mentioned that the Soviets are working on their jamming capability to interfere with aircraft as well as their capability to interfere with ground access.

Senator Dirksen questioned the distance from Berlin to Frankfurt, and clarified in his mind the fact that the city is well into the Soviet zone and that air corridors and ground accesses would be through their territory. Secretary Herter confirmed that the autobahn, the railroad, and the three air corridors are being maintained as an obligation of the Russians.

The group then reviewed the history of this current arrangement. This was of special interest to Senator Dirksen, who mentioned that there were two agreements, in February and in July of 1945, with the President pointing out that there had been no change since those dates regarding the status of the four powers in Berlin, but that following the Berlin airlift, the 1948 agreements on access routes had been renegotiated in 1949. He confirmed that these agreements had not specified a termination date.

At this time the President mentioned that he has a document which sets forth the legality of our position in Berlin and he would be willing to issue this document to the Members of Congress present.

In answer to a question by Senator Dirksen, the President clarified the relationship between the Soviets and the GDR. If, as of May 27th, the Soviets have carried through their intention to pass their authority for control of access routes to the GDR, this will make us obey GDR regulations for the transit, and we will be forced to go by their sufferance. It

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will likewise necessitate recognition of the GDR as a nation. We will not accept this eventuality.

Senator Dirksen then asked where the line will be drawn. He pointed out that Berlin is the capital of the GDR and when Khrushchev washes his hands of GDR control, Senator Dirksen presumes we will protest. Here we will undoubtedly have no luck and Khrushchev will then say, "Go ahead and negotiate if you can, but you still occupy the GDR capital." At this time, Senator Dirksen expects the Soviets will use force. This the President clarified by calling attention to the fact that the Soviets do not threaten to force us out of Berlin. They simply state that if we use force to maintain our rights, the Soviets will back up the GDR. Secretary Herter added the point that if we insist on our rights, in the Soviet view, this is an act of war. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the movements necessary to the Soviets to implement their turnover would be negligible. Their troop dispositions will remain the same.

Senator Dirksen then brought up a question of what could be done in the UN between now and May 27th. To this Secretary Herter pointed out the usefulness of the UN as an instrument of maintaining a status quo and added that we are now exchanging notes to set up foreign ministers' talks. If these talks do not bear fruit, then we probably will bring the matter to the UN. The President emphasized, however, that any use of the UN should be made while we are still exercising our rights. In other words, prior to May 27th, we may make use of the UN. After May 27th it will be necessary to make direct protests to the Soviets.

* * *

Senator Dirksen then inquired as to any new developments from Macmillan. The President informed him that Macmillan has accepted an invitation to arrive in Washington on March 19th after a visit to Paris and Bonn. He pointed out the difficulties in the schedule which would result from the conflict with the visit of President O'Kelly of Ireland. He also pointed out that he had requested Macmillan to come here after seeing the others and to allocate a couple of days for discussions.

The briefing being completed, the President gave the floor to the Members of Congress, emphasizing the importance to the Executive to know what Congress thinks on these matters. He took note of the firm statements that had been made by Members of Congress to "delineate" our position that we will not be thrown out of Berlin. Senator Dirksen pointed out quickly that Senator Johnson had been emphatic on this matter.

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The President concluded by pointing out the vast investment we have in strengthening our relationships with Western Europe and the consequent requirement for conscientious negotiation.

Senator Dirksen then inquired as to our courses of action in the case of the worst situation. The President admitted that this decision will not be easy and that we must see what happens. However, the case will be negotiated to its fullest before we go to war. Fundamental in the President's view is that we have at stake 2.2 million free Germans who trust us and upon whom we may not turn our back.

Secretary McElroy, at the President's request, then pointed out some of the military actions which are being taken. He emphasized that much planning is being conducted, both in the Pentagon and in General Norstad's headquarters, on a contingency basis. He pointed out that any effort to bull our way into Berlin with ground forces alone requires more strength than we have available; therefore, no substantial reinforcement of our land forces in Europe is contemplated. For psychological reasons, however, some small reinforcements are being sent primarily to round out units and bring them up to strength. Secretary McElroy emphasized the improbability of moving into Germany without entailing hostilities directly with Russia. Therefore, since we cannot fight this battle on the ground, we are studying the matter of airlift as a fallback action. We are preparing our crews by way of familiarizing them with Tempelhof airfield and we are making electronic jamming studies. The Secretary emphasized that what we are making are normal preparations. He feels that the Congressmen present should know about them, but he requests that talk be avoided to enable us to bring our allies along with us. We are playing on the basis of "not much noise but carry a big stick." We must realize that the Russians will carry their threats "up to the line." We are therefore planning as if we will be required to carry out our contingency plans. We think, however, the country will be better served if we avoid saber rattling. Secretary Herter agreed in the light of coordination difficulties that we must not talk unilaterally.

* * *

Senator Johnson then expressed the view that this is an extremely important meeting from a coordination viewpoint. He admits the infeasibility of fighting this enemy on the ground, but stated that he is interested

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March 6, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
March 6, 1959 10:30 AM

Others present: Vice President Nixon
Secretary Herter
Secretary McElroy
Mr. Allen Dulles
Senator Lyndon Johnson
Senator Everett Dirksen
Speaker Rayburn
Representative Halleck
General Persons
Major Eisenhower

The President opened the meeting by stating its purpose: to talk over the perennial situation facing us in the Berlin situation and to assure that the Executive and Legislative Branches are thinking together. He did not want the meeting to be so large as to necessitate undue publicity, and for that reason, he informed the members present that he planned to talk on the record with members of the Foreign Affairs Committees and others this evening.

The President reviewed briefly the policy of the U.S. Government on the Berlin issue. This policy is to warn the Soviets publicly that we will not be threatened or pushed out of Berlin and that we will not desert the 2.2 million free people in that city, but will, rather, execute our rights under existing agreements. At the same time, we will maintain an attitude of readiness to negotiate, to include discussion of a peace treaty. We admit that other nations have interests in the Berlin crisis and we desire to explore the German situation in an atmosphere off the level of a crisis. There is no point at this time to discussing extreme measures such as mobilization. Mobilization of the entire nation's resources would be the most disastrous thing that could come about. Our situation in the world, vis-a-vis the Soviets, should be one with which we can live for many years. Otherwise, we must go to a garrison state. Therefore, we are ready to take any decent opportunity to negotiate with our allies.

The President finished his opening statement by reiterating his desire that the Legislative and Executive are thinking along the same lines.

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in knowing what other alternatives are available. He questioned the adequacy of our forces. While admitting that he would not desire to get into details, he requested the President's views. Looking at it from his own standpoint, Senator Johnson reiterated that his big desire is to be able to help. Senator Johnson went on to point out some of the difficulties he has in answering questions from constituents. As an example, he mentioned his difficulties in answering questions from constituents on the timing of a final decision on the future status of Secretary Dulles.

Senator Johnson then returned to his question of alternatives to ground action. He asked how Members of Congress can aid the Executive, and whether the forces are adequate. He pointed out the seeming inconsistency of the current force reductions with the crisis atmosphere prevailing with regard to Berlin. To this the President answered that we are placing much money in our defense forces and retaliatory power. He emphasized that it is impossible for the United States to maintain manpower in service comparable to that of the Soviets, in the light of our own wage scale. He pointed out the possibility, therefore, that when we reach the acute crisis period, it will be necessary to engage in general war to protect our rights. He cited examples in the past of Communist tactics in which they have maintained a strong bluff to the last moment and then backed out. These examples included threats of general war with regard to Korea, Viet-Nam, Lebanon and the Taiwan Straits. In the President's view, the question is whether we have the nerve to push our chips into the pot. He is convinced that any appeasement means disaster. Senator Johnson hastily added that the Congress agrees that we shall have no appeasement.

The President admitted the possibility that this firm position could conceivably bring about a miscalculation and therefore general war; however, this is only a possibility. In the event we adopt a policy of appeasement, the President is absolutely certain that we are defeated. On the other hand, this does not mean that we will not negotiate. We will negotiate whenever we can and are making many efforts in that direction. All heartily agreed with this point.

Mr. Halleck then brought up the question of possible measures to condition the people of America to the eventuality that the "Halooin may go up." To this the President asked whether Mr. Halleck was referring to a campaign to scare the population. Mr. Halleck continued by defining

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March 19, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
March 19, 1959 - 9:00 AM

Others present: Secretary Herter
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
Assistant Secretary Merchant
Mr. Reinhardt
Ambassador Whitney
General Goodpaster
Mr. Hagerty
Major Eisenhower

This was the second meeting involving informal briefings for the Macmillan talks. Secretary Herter mentioned that his primary objective in requesting this meeting was to discuss procedural matters. In answer to the President's question, he said there has been no change in the position paper. He visualizes that the two main areas of disagreement between the U.S. and the U.K. will be:

- (1) The broadness of our position with regard to the agenda for a foreign ministers conference, and
- (2) Whether or not a date should be specified for a summit meeting.

On the summit issue, the U.S., Germany and France are pretty much together. The U.K. position, differing from the others, is that the date for a summit meeting should be set forth in our reply.

8181 The President then repeated the view which he had expressed previously with regard to Macmillan's loss of political position. 3/17/59 p2

..... Gromyko will offer nothing constructive at a foreign ministers meeting. The President wonders how long the British public will stand for continued insults at the hands of the Soviets. Mr. Murphy and Ambassador Whitney doubted that the British feel that their faces have been slapped, that on the contrary they tell themselves Macmillan's attitude has mollified


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NLE Case	88-25946
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Some discussion relative to schedules and administrative matters followed. The President approved the list of the permanent U. S. group for the meetings with Macmillan. They are Secretary Herter, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Merchant and General Goodpaster. (The President's secretary, Mrs. Whitman, will accompany General Goodpaster.) On the British side, the permanent group will consist of five people, Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Lloyd, Ambassador Caccia, Mr. Brook and Mr. Milton.

Turning to another item, the President questioned the meaning which we currently attach to the term "European security." On learning from Mr. Murphy that it pertained to proposals for a neutral zone, the President expressed astonishment at the favor which that proposal seems to be gaining in this country.

The President then turned to the subject of an clear inspection. Here he repeated the thoughts which he had expressed in the meeting of March 17th on the subject of development of a practical inspection system. The President is of the opinion that we should desert the scientists, and to some extent the Department of Defense in their insistence on obtaining a perfect system. What the President desires is a workable system which will give a true picture to the extent desired. He holds no brief for the number of inspection stations which must be set up in the USSR, be it 2, 15 or 40; he holds no brief for any one particular degree of tolerance so long as the system is adequate to ensure the criterion agreed upon. Here Secretary Herter pointed out the difficulties which might be anticipated from the Senate in securing ratification of any agreement which allows for a threshold. He expressed the view that an agreement which could be restricted to

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- 3 -



atmospheric tests might be satisfactory. The President agreed emphatically with respect to atomospheric tests. He expressed the opinion that this would, in large measure, reduce the total number of tests, conducted by virtue of the costly nature of conducting underground tests.

Secretary Herter briefly mentioned the fact that the high altitude tests of 1958 had been made public yesterday without approval of the government. This brought a strong reaction from the President, who is of the opinion that some scientist had released the information. General Goodpaster explained the efforts to keep the release in perspective which had been made the day before. Mr. Sullivan, of the New York Times, apparently had notified Karl Harr that they were about to release the information which they had been holding back for some time at the remonstrance of Defense. In General Goodpaster's view, the Times felt it was about to lose a scoop, since the discussion of this test series was becoming prevalent. The President referred to the publication of this matter in strong terms, and deplored any plans for releasing more information on the basis that some had already leaked. General Goodpaster assured him that we have never authorized further disclosure of information. To set the record straight, General Goodpaster advised the President that part of the information which had been released was already available to the scientists through the IGY, due to the radiation readings which had been transmitted from the satellites. The scientists who had made these readings were not under governmental control.

The President then turned away from this subject to continue with his thoughts on a nuclear test ban. For our first step, we should restrict our agreements to refraining from conducting tests in the atmosphere. We should not initially strive for perfection of detection of all shots, including those detonated underground. He recognized that there may be difficulty in securing agreement from the Soviets for any sort of test ban short of complete abolition. He recognized the Soviet position on the veto and their fear of espionage. He stated that he wanted Dr. Killian, Mr. McCone and somebody from Defense available to come to Camp David for these discussions. In view of the fact that

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only the West will adhere to the agreements, and in view also of the fact that very high altitude shots (he mentioned 300-mile altitude) will send almost negligible radiation to the earth, he desired to follow this approach and discuss the matter with the British.

Turning to the economic questions set forth in the briefing book, the President expressed the opinion that the British desire primarily only to complain in this area. He inquired if there had been any movement since the wool import law of 1954. Secretary Herter and Mr. Hagerty informed the President that there is an opinion pending. Secretary Herter recommended a "sympathetic listening" approach. The President expressed the understanding that our code visualizes an import tax on the 36 million pounds of wool which come in. The revenues thus obtained are used to compensate the sheep growers. He directed that Dr. Paariberg be alerted to brief him on the details and status of this 1954 wool act. (See memo of Dr. Paariberg's conference with the President, this date.) Ambassador Whitney offered the recommendation that these economic matters be discussed to some extent, since Macmillan is more sympathetic to our viewpoint than is Lloyd, who normally deals with our economic relationships with Britain.

With regard to recognition of the GDR, the President expressed the view that Adenauer will never come near it. He mentioned the conflicting reports which had come from Paris and Bonn on the subject of the high level talks in those places. Secretary Herter and Ambassador Whitney agreed that we have not as yet found out what really did happen in those conferences.

The President then requested the State Department to begin work on writing up a draft communique. He approved Mr. Merchant's recommendation, which would:

(1) indicate in the communique that the U.S. and Britain had agreed on their position with respect to the Soviet note of March 2nd, and

(2) ensure that the results of the conference would be positions sent to the NATO working group.

The President then made an estimate as to the decision facing the British. The question is whether they are willing to break with Adenauer. This

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- 5 -



is an extremely difficult question. Six months after the war, when the Western allies were in the position of victors over Germany, we could dictate our position. Now it is essential that our position vs. the Soviets be satisfactory to the West Germans. He feels that the British should face up to the issue of what they are willing to do in the face of German objections. He feels that we have been wasting much effort on such vague procedures as "informing each other of our thinking."

The President then mentioned once more the nuclear testing item, in an attempt to place it in the perspective of our overall position in the world. Anything we and the Soviets can do to build confidence in each other's word is a step forward. We of the West are at present in the position of refusing everything brought up. This presents a poor image to the world, regardless of how spurious the Soviet proposals may be.

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In passing, the President mentioned Khrushchev's statement to Macmillan, to the effect that the Soviets have no interest in testing small weapons, and that their thinking is based on weapons of large megaton yield. Secretary Herter said this statement is being evaluated at the State Department.

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The President then addressed the problem of how to handle the visit to Secretary Dulles in the hospital before leaving for Camp David. After a phone call to the Secretary, the President asked Secretary Herter to inform Macmillan of the President's desire to take him (Macmillan) on a friendly visit to see Secretary Dulles. If Macmillan himself desires also to take Selwyn Lloyd, this would be satisfactory.

After discussion of administrative matters, such as press photography and the schedule at Camp David, the meeting came to an end.

John S. D. Eisenhower

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March 20, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
March 17, 1959

Others present: Messrs. Herter, Murphy, Merchant
Gerard Smith, McElroy, Quarles
Twining, Irwin, Persons, G. Gray,
General Goodpaster

Mr. Herter handed the President a memorandum relating to contingency planning. The President asked a number of questions to elarify and sharpen up the significance of some of the points made, for example on the question of flying above 10,000 feet, and on the question of "stamping" documents. The President said that he understood the difficulty of stamping is really Chancellor Adenauer -- that he would be inclined to agree with Defense's de-emphasis on stamping except for Adenauer's position.

The President then asked questions regarding the proposal for the use of force locally. Answers were not completely clear as to the significance of the term "local."

The President also asked regarding the possibility of a program of reprisals such as stopping trading and breaking relations. The key point here is the extent to which our allies would stand with us in this matter. Again the answers were not completely clear, although State representatives indicated that these questions are receiving consideration.

General Twining mentioned the suggestions that have been made for "heckling" operations such as blockade. The President said we should not go into blockade until we have had such provocation that this would be reprisal rather than pressure.

The President next indicated he had a question as to the arming of the first convoy. Mr. Herter indicated the purpose of this is to put the onus on the other side to make the first use of force.

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Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-61

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Mr. McElroy said that the men in the convoy always have side arms. He stressed the need for more factual information as to just what the situation is at the check points. He said it would be planned to send photographic equipment along with the convoy to provide a record of just what happened. The President asked whether members of the press would be sent in. Mr. Merchant thought they might, in correspondents' uniforms.

With regard to the suggestions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. McElroy said he has opposed sending a 7,000 man increase in strength to Europe. General Twining said General Norstad's chief purpose is to stop the cutback now going on in certain support units. Mr. McElroy said he is inclined to think this is a step to have in mind to do when we want to gain some special effect. The President recalled that his thought was that if we keep extra personnel in Europe, we should not ask the Army to make compensatory cuts elsewhere.

The President next noted the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation for compensatory replacement for any USAREUR divisions moved up to North Germany to form a composite force, and returned to his question as to what was meant by "local action." General Twining said it was of the order of one division reinforced, having in mind that if the job can't be done with a force of this size we had better shift to some other mode of action. Mr. McElroy confirmed that when we do that the "fat is in the fire."

Mr. Herter next raised the question of concessions for the sake of unity. The President said that negotiation always implies some flexibility. It is not possible to specify the extent to which we will modify in general terms. Some things can be modified but some cannot.

The President next asked when we will make moves that would be visible, for example the removal of dependents. Governor Herter said that would come the minute we are blocked. There was some doubt as to whether dependents could get out in those circumstances. Mr. Quarles said we have assumed that civilian travel would continue. The President asked that a reference to "political negotiations having

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failed" be changed to something like "political negotiations having failed to resolve the situation."

The President asked Mr. Herter to be ready to review this contingency planning with Macmillan, having additional people present for the discussion as might be required.

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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Walter Reed Hospital
March 20, 1959
11:20 a.m. (1 hour)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION



Participants: Prime Minister Macmillan President Eisenhower
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd Secretary Dulles

At the President's invitation to me to comment on some of the subjects that he would be discussing with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, I said that I would first like to speak of the broad aspects of the situation now confronting us, as I saw them. I said that I thought the free world allies should not give the people of the world the impression that we are frightened of the Soviets or that the Soviets are in the driver's seat. In some parts of the world, notably in Asia, Africa and parts of Latin America, people are watching closely to see whether they think the Soviet Union or the Western Allies are the more powerful. We cannot, of course, prevent Khrushchev from strutting across the stage and making his grandiloquent speeches. But we can avoid the impression that whenever he sounds conciliatory we rejoice and whenever he sounds threatening we are fearful as though he were the Lord of Creation.

As to Berlin, I said that I thought that we should make no concessions nor agree to any changes in the present arrangements except as part of a larger agreement out of which we would get something. I said that I thought our position in Berlin legally and morally impeccable and our sovereignty there sound; the Soviets cannot by their own act deprive us of sovereignty in Berlin nor put the GDR in a position to control our exercise of it. I noted that in such matters we can, as we did in the contractual agreements with the Federal Republic, voluntarily renounce some or all of our sovereign rights when it is expedient to do so; but I thought the assumption that, simply because the Soviets challenge our rights and position, we have to seek a compromise, is all wrong.

As to the possibility of an early Summit meeting, I said that I had not found persuasive the arguments favoring such a meeting, and that I did not think we should now agree to go to one unless we can exact a reasonable

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DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS 1951-59
Box 7, Meetings with the President - 1959(1)

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price in Soviet "deeds not words". I recalled that in 1955, the Soviets had paid such a price by agreeing to the Austrian Treaty. Also they accepted the composition we proposed. I said that I had seen no evidence that Khrushchev now seems prepared to pay a price, but rather to drive us to the Summit by threats. Nor had I been able to think of any acceptable agreement that Khrushchev might now be willing dependably to make with us. I said that I was opposed to the idea of a Summit meeting premised simply on the hope that it might produce something positive, without having any evidence that there is a real prospect of this. I said that at such a meeting there would be almost irresistible pressure upon the leaders of the democracies to reach an agreement. The Soviet leaders would be under no such pressure and we would be at a distinct disadvantage. I asked the Prime Minister whether in his visit to Moscow he had discovered any element in the Soviet thinking which might give hopes of useful negotiation at the Summit.

The Prime Minister did not indicate that he had any basis for believing that a worthwhile, acceptable agreement could be reached with Khrushchev. He did, however, go on to discuss generally the question of German reunification.

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The Prime Minister said that he had the general impression that zeal for German reunification has somewhat abated. He had discussed this with Chancellor Adenauer, and also had tried to elicit the Chancellor's views on dealing with the GDR. The Prime Minister said that somewhat to his surprise Adenauer had indicated that he is prepared to accept the status quo. Mr. Macmillan said that he had commented to the Chancellor that this seemed to be close to what Khrushchev says he wants and Adenauer had replied that the ultimate goal of German reunification could not, of course, be explicitly abandoned and indeed it should be held out as a light at the end of what might be a very long tunnel. In the time that would elapse before this light were reached, ways could, as Mr. Macmillan understood Adenauer's view, be found to lighten some of the human burdens borne by the people of East Germany.

I recalled that I had discussed with Adenauer the possibility of arranging for a long-term negotiation by Foreign Ministers and their Deputies, similar to the negotiations that had eventually led to the Austrian Treaty. I said that I thought this a possibility which ought not to be wholly discarded in the present situation and I cited too the talks that we have been

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having with the Chinese Communists. Such talks can provide a context for avoiding hostilities, even if the substantive content of the talks is relatively inconsequential.

I repeated that to agree now to go to a Summit meeting at a fixed date in the future would be a grave error and would suggest to the world that, we had completely given in to the Soviets, in reversing the attitude we have taken for the past two years, namely that there must be some prospect of fruitful results at a Summit meeting before we could agree to go to one. I thought that it would be most dangerous to ourselves to give such an impression.

I said that if we shall have to face the issue of whether to make prospect of a positive outcome a condition of going to the Summit, I felt that we might as well face it now, while there is still time to find out, free of public pressures. Through a meeting of Foreign Ministers, or privately through diplomatic channels -- or, I said, not necessarily through private channels; after all Mr. Macmillan had talked directly with Mr. Khrushchev -- we could try to ascertain whether Khrushchev is prepared to make an acceptable deal. I said in this connection I agree with the thought that there will probably not be agreement with the Soviets except with Khrushchev; and that in many respects the prospect of talking with Gromyko was a bleak and barren one. But I did believe that ways existed for finding out whether or not there was anything that Khrushchev wanted that we could give and get a quid pro quo; and that the possibility of Deputy talks should not be discouraged.

Mr. Macmillan said that as the British people see the present situation, the Soviets, far from adopting an aggressive posture of advancing on the West, have simply said that all they want to do is go away from where they are. The Prime Minister said that if the Soviets carry out their threat to hand over to the GDR control of our access to Berlin, we shall be faced with very difficult practical problems, not the least of these avoiding appearing to blockade ourselves out of Berlin. Mr. Macmillan said that he saw four possibilities:

1) That the Soviets give in; 2) that we give in; 3) that there be negotiations leading to an agreed solution for Berlin and the broader problems of central Europe, and 4) that there be war. The Prime Minister said that his Government would be quite prepared to mobilize more armed forces if necessary. (Also Macmillan would feel under a duty to try to remove

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all of the young children from the United Kingdom to Canada so as to keep their stock alive as against the total devastation of nuclear war.

Mr. Macmillan said his Government would not have the necessary public support unless they had a publicly comprehensible issue. He thought that negotiations would have to be attempted and would have to fail, before the British public could be convinced of the need for preparations of force.

The President, on Mr. Macmillan's point that the Soviets are not "advancing", observed that they are in fact trying to get us out of Berlin and he wondered whether that were not a sufficiently aggressive issue to be persuasive. I said that I quite disagreed with the Prime Minister's theory that if we are threatened, we must negotiate, lest the public not support our being firm. I said that our present considerable strength is conceived as a deterrent to Communist imperialist aggression. It is a deterrent, and there is not going to be the war of which the Prime Minister spoke. In being firm we have sometimes to take added risks, such as our sending troops to Lebanon and Jordan and holding Quemoy. But in that instance, I felt sure, our show of firmness and determination, coupled with our deterrent power, had avoided war. On Mr. Macmillan's point that the issues now posed in Berlin are so difficult that we should negotiate a new arrangement for the city, I said that I could not agree that there is anything wrong in our present position there. It is the Soviets who are trying to make it wrong, but that does not mean that we have to negotiate with them about it. I asked what is the use of our spending \$40 billion a year or more to create deterrent power if whenever the Soviets threaten us and want to take something from our present positions we feel that we have to buy peace by compromise. If that is going to be our attitude, we had better save our money.

The Prime Minister argued that the premises of our position in Berlin, and particularly the premise of our presence by right of conquest, are fast fading away, and that with their control of the GDR, the Soviets have the upper hand. Hence, he said, we should try to salvage something by negotiation.

The President intervened to suggest that time was growing short and that this discussion could be continued at Camp David. He asked whether I had any thoughts to express on other matters.

I referred to the Geneva negotiations on nuclear test suspension and said that it now seems evident that there would not emerge from that conference

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THE SECRETARY

MVW
USDel MC/1Walter Reed Hospital
March 20, 1959
11:20 a.m. (1 hour)**UNCLASSIFIED**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONParticipants: Prime Minister Macmillan President Eisenhower
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd Secretary Dulles

At the President's invitation to me to comment on some of the subjects that he would be discussing with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, I said that I would first like to speak of the broad aspects of the situation now confronting us, as I saw them. I said that I thought the free world allies should not give the people of the world the impression that we are frightened of the Soviets or that the Soviets are in the driver's seat. In some parts of the world, notably in Asia, Africa and parts of Latin America, people are watching closely to see whether they think the Soviet Union or the Western Allies are the more powerful. We cannot, of course, prevent Khrushchev from strutting across the stage and making his grandiloquent speeches. But we can avoid the impression that whenever he sounds conciliatory we rejoice and whenever he sounds threatening we are fearful as though he were the Lord of Creation.

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As to the possibility of an early Summit meeting, I said that I had not found persuasive the arguments favoring such a meeting, and that I did not think we should now agree to go to one unless we can exact a reasonable

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The Prime Minister did not indicate that he had any basis for believing that a worthwhile, acceptable agreement could be reached with Khrushchev. He did, however, go on to discuss generally the question of German reunification.

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
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I repeated that to agree now to go to a Summit meeting at a fixed date in the future would be a grave error and would suggest to the world that, we had completely given in to the Soviets, in reversing the attitude we have taken for the past two years, namely that there must be some prospect of fruitful results at a Summit meeting before we could agree to go to one. I thought that it would be most dangerous to ourselves to give such an impression.

I said that if we shall have to face the issue of whether to make prospect of a positive outcome a condition of going to the Summit, I felt that we might as well face it now, while there is still time to find out, free of public pressures. Through a meeting of Foreign Ministers, or privately through diplomatic channels -- or, I said, not necessarily through private channels; after all Mr. Macmillan had talked directly with Mr. Khrushchev -- we could try to ascertain whether Khrushchev is prepared to make an acceptable deal. I said in this connection I agree with the thought that there will probably not be agreement with the Soviets except with Khrushchev; and that in many respects the prospect of talking with Gromyko was a bleak and barren one. But I did believe that ways existed for finding out whether or not there was anything that Khrushchev wanted that we could give and get a quid pro quo; and that the possibility of Deputy talks should not be discouraged.



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I asked what is the use of our spending \$40 billion a year or more to create
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If that is going to be our attitude, we had better save our money.

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an agreement including control provisions acceptable to us. I said I saw no prospect that the Soviets will abandon their concept of the veto, which has been borne out in the operations of the United Nations Security Council: that is, unless the Great Powers act in accord, they should not act at all.

I said that I thought that since atmospheric tests are increasingly shown to be injurious to life, we should extend indefinitely our suspension of them and hope that the Soviets would reciprocate. But, I said, I was sure that opinion in the United States would have no confidence in the possibility of a reliable control agreement being reached at Geneva. I recalled..... during my last visit to London the possibility that he and the President might address letters to Khrushchev setting out the proposition on atmospheric testing and the impossibility of an agreement to control specifically underground and high altitude tests unless the Soviets alter their position on the veto in the control system.



..... The President said that it is his understanding that the scientists now find that the originally proposed 180 world-wide stations would be inadequate to detect underground testing of moderate proportions. The President thought, however, that there might be present now elements of an agreement with the Soviets that there would be no atmospheric tests and no underground tests exceeding, say, 100 kilotons. He understood that underground tests larger than this could in any event be detectable. The President emphasized that he would not be willing to enter into an agreement with the Soviets suspending underground tests unless he could be sure that we could detect violations.

I remarked that I did not believe that we could, under any circumstances, get a veto-less control system with Russia.

..... I said that I thought it is perhaps now time to put Soviet intentions in this matter to the stern test by reacting firmly to their extreme position on the veto and showing some sense of outrage at the Soviet proposals. I thought that unless we reacted vigorously against this now, but went on to

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discuss other matters, we would have missed the psychological moment. Unless our reaction evoked better evidence than we now have of honorable intentions, we should not go on with the present conference or set up a successor to it but could exchange views diplomatically.



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S JFDulles:ma

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Memorandum of Conversation

Aspen Lodge
 Camp David


DATE: March 20, 1959
 3:00 - 4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT: Berlin, Summitry, and Reply to Soviet March 2 Note.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 Mr. Herter
 Ambassador Whitney
 General Goodpaster
 Mr. Merchant
 The Prime Minister
 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
 Sir Norman Brook
 Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
 Sir Harold Caccia
 Mr. Bishop

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 W - Mr. Dillon
 G - Mr. Murphy
 C - Mr. Reinhardt
 S/P - Mr. Smith
 EUR - Mr. Merchant
 Ambassador London - Ambassador Whitby
 Ambassador Bonn - Ambassador Bruce



The conversation then turned to Berlin. The President said that we would absolutely refuse "to throw the West Berliners to the wolves."

The President then said that a prolonged summit conference or a series of conferences would be impossible for him by reason of the requirements of our Constitution. It might be possible, however, he said, for him to go for two or

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NIE Case 100-84-36-211

By 65 NIE 0-51413

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 remarks he went to

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NO. 5
 SERIES 8
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Memorandum of Conversation

Aspen Lodge
 Camp David
 DATE: March 20, 1959
 3:00 - 4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT: Berlin, Summitry, and Reply to Soviet March 2 Note.

PARTICIPANTS: The President The Prime Minister
 Mr. Herter Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
 Ambassador Whitney Sir Norman Brook
 General Goodpaster Sir Frederick Hoyar-Millar
 Mr. Merchant Sir Harold Caccia
 Mr. Bishop

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 G - Mr. Murphy
 C - Mr. Reinhardt
 S/P - Mr. Smith
 EUR - Mr. Merchant
 Amembassy London - Ambassador Whitney
 Amembassy Bonn - Ambassador Bruce



The conversation then turned to Berlin. The President said that we would absolutely refuse "to throw the West Berliners to the wolves."

9/14/89 JWW
 The Prime Minister said that as he saw it there were two acceptable solutions for Berlin. First was to deal with the GDR on our access rights on the basis of an acknowledged agency relationship between them and the Soviets. The second was to negotiate a treaty that would be registered with the United Nations which would guarantee our position in Berlin and the rights of access. This he would regard as an improvement over our present situation. There was some brief discussion as to what effect this would have on our fundamental rights acquired by conquest.

Reverting to the question of the relationship between a foreign ministers and a summit conference with the Soviets, the President suggested that Mr. Herter and Mr. Lloyd review the present language of our draft reply and see if there could not be inserted useful quotations from Khrushchev's press release the day before to tie the Soviets to a commitment to genuinely attempt to achieve some progress at the Foreign Ministers level. It was agreed that this would be done though the danger was pointed out of relying on ticker reports of a press conference.

The President then said that a prolonged summit conference or a series of conferences would be impossible for him by reason of the requirements of our Constitution. It might be possible, however, he said, for him to go for two or

three

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three days at the opening and leave Vice President Nixon as his personal representative, returning himself at the conclusion of the conference if the results warranted it.

Mr. Macmillan then said, with general agreement, that we can't afford to have another show of the character of the last Geneva Summit Conference which was little more than an exchange of propaganda speeches. This is no way to approach serious negotiation. He felt that the foreign ministers should sharpen the issues and outline available choices. The Heads of Government could then negotiate in private with very few plenary sessions.

Mr. Herter pointed out that there were really two points at issue in our draft reply. One was the agenda and the other was the matter of a fixed date for the summit.



The President suggested that we stipulate that one of the duties of the Foreign Ministers was to explore opportunities for agreement and that dependent on their progress they could then agree on a date for the summit. He reiterated that he would not agree at this time to a fixed date and said that he thought "justify" was a good word to describe what was required of the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

Mr. Macmillan raised the question as to whether it would be possible to hold the summit conference in the United States presumably as a means of avoiding the constitutional difficulties of a prolonged absence of the President from the country. Specifically, he wondered if Newport wouldn't be a pleasant site.

The President indicated skepticism as to holding such a conference in the United States though he did mention San Francisco might be a possible location in light of its background as the scene of the foundation of the United Nations.

Mr. Herter raised the question of Czechoslovakian and Polish participation in the foreign ministers conference, and the Prime Minister replied that he liked our formula. The meeting thereupon ended at 4:40 p.m.

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
March 23, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
March 20, 1959, 7 PM

Others present: Prime Minister Macmillan, Mr. Selwyn
Lloyd, Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Sir Norman Brook
Ambassador Caccia, Mr. Bishop, Secretary Herter,
Ambassador Whitney, Mr. Merchant, General Goodpaster

There was an informal discussion before dinner, at which there was consideration of drafts prepared by the Foreign Office and the State Department relating to the portion of the response to the Soviets concerned with terms of agreement to hold a Summit Meeting. The American draft called for prior developments, in the context of a Foreign Ministers meeting, justifying such a Summit Meeting. The British draft spelled out the purposes of the Foreign Ministers meeting and indicated that if the Soviets shared this view of the purpose we would agree to holding a Summit Meeting on a certain date.

The point was strongly argued by the President and the Prime Minister, who expressed themselves most powerfully.



The President said the American people must also be considered in this matter. They do, have strong views. He had put the matter to them on the basis of going to a Summit Meeting only if developments

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MR 85-27444

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FOR: JCS, SECDEF, NSC
NSC letter 3/26/86
WLE DATE 6/30/86

LHO 6/30/86

Staff Secy 1 But to 11/6/ Macmillan talks (March 1959) (1)

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so justify and he did not intend to change this position. We also are aware, through specific studies, that we might have casualties in war of the order of 70 million people. While others could talk about going to a Summit Meeting under threat of attack by the Soviets, he for one would not attend and they could hold their Summit Meeting without him.

*an absolute
misleading
in the
present*

The President countered by saying that prior to World War II Neville Chamberlain went to such a meeting and it is not the kind of meeting with which he intends to be associated.

After further exchange, the two agreed to think about the matter further over dinner, sleep on it, and have their diplomatic advisers study the question further.

While the statements were made with great firmness and sharpness, there was no evidence of personal animosity -- in fact just the opposite.

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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EUR:LTMerchant:mt

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MVV

USDEL MC/12

Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David

DATE: March 20, 1959

Time: 6:30-7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Reply to Soviet Note of March 2

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Acting Secretary
Ambassador Whitney
Mr. Merchant

The Prime Minister
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Norman Brook
Sir Derick Hoyer-Millar

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EUR - Mr. Merchant
Ambassador London - Ambassador Whitney



At the conclusion of a prolonged discussion between the Prime Minister and the President (with advisers present) on the form of our reply to the Soviet note, the meeting broke up at 4:40 p.m., with the President and the Prime Minister leaving for a drive. They agreed to return at 6:30 to consider the matter further and suggested that Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Herter continue the discussion.

After a short recess Mr. Herter, Ambassador Whitney and myself met with Mr. Lloyd, Sir Norman Brook and Sir Derick Hoyer-Millar. Each side had in the interval prepared a redraft of the Summit language. We were unable to reach agreement.

Upon the return of the President and the Prime Minister from their drive the lack of progress was reported and the Prime Minister retired to draft personally the passage dealing with a Summit conference and agenda. When this draft was ready the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister (with advisers) resumed. The Prime Minister became exceedingly emotional. He said that we were dealing with a matter which in his judgment affected the whole future of mankind. He said that: "World War I - the war which nobody wanted - came because of the failure of the leaders at that time to meet at the Summit. Grey instead had gone fishing and the war came in which the UK lost two million young men."

The President interjected that there had been meetings at the Summit before the outbreak of World War II and that those meetings had not prevented that war.

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MR 90-3274

By

JND

NLE Date

12/16/92

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The Prime Minister rejoined that at that time "we were dealing with a mad man - Hitler."

The Prime Minister continued that he could not take his people into war without trying the Summit first. If war was to result there was much that he must do. They had no civil defense worthy of the name and this must be rectified. They must mobilize and disperse a substantial part of their people to Australia and Canada. Eight bombs, the Prime Minister said, would mean 20 or 30 million Englishmen dead. Throughout the discussion he kept repeating this reference to eight bombs.

The President said in effect that we cannot consider these problems exclusively in these terms. What we must consider is the alternative of surrendering to blackmail. He reminded the Prime Minister that we would not be immune to punishment. In fact he said that the lowest level of casualties he had seen estimated in event of an all-out thermonuclear attack on this country was 67 million. He emphasized that we don't escape war by surrendering on the installment plan, that the way to prevent war is by willingness to take the risk of standing on ground which is firm and right.

The President then went on to say that he would not "be dragooned to a Summit meeting." He said that if there was even slight progress at the Foreign Ministers meeting then he would go but that he would not commit himself now to go under any and all circumstances.

Mr. Herter pointed out at this juncture that in the event the Foreign Ministers broke up in total failure we would obviously consider all remaining possibilities for further negotiation including a Summit meeting which might be held in the Security Council.

The Prime Minister reverted to his highly emotional mood saying that he was an old man and that he owed a duty to his people; that this question of agreement now to a Summit meeting was probably the most fateful decision he would ever have to take; that he must sleep on the matter and that he was not prepared to discuss it further that night.

The group then at 7:30 went to the table for dinner and there was no further substantive discussion that evening.



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Memorandum of Conversation

MWV
USDEL MC/14

DATE: March 21, 1959

Time: 9:30 a.m.

Place: Camp David

SUBJECT: Reply to Soviet Note of March 2

USUK

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 The Acting Secretary
 General Goodpaster
 Ambassador Whitney
 Mr. Merchant



The Prime Minister
 Mr. Lloyd
 Sir Norman Brook
 Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
 Sir Anthony Rumbold
 Mr. Bishop

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S/P

Amembassy London - Ambassador Whitney

Amembassy Bonn - Ambassador Bruce

Amembassy Paris - Ambassador Houghton

USRO - Ambassador Burgess

Amembassy Moscow - Ambassador Thompson

The group turned at once to the question of the reply to the Soviet note on which agreement had not been reached at the close of the discussion the previous evening. The Prime Minister started by saying that he felt we were close together on a formula for a Summit meeting. There was a difference of opinion as to the effect on the possibility of accomplishment at a Foreign Ministers meeting which would result from a concurrent acceptance of a Summit meeting in the summer. The British wanted to agree to such a Summit meeting and set a date for it in the present reply. They understood, however, our point of view.

The President said that he would repeat to the Prime Minister his past expression of a willingness to look hard for any progress at all at the Foreign Ministers meeting which would justify thereafter holding a Summit conference but that he absolutely refused to promise unconditionally at this point to go to a Summit meeting "come hell or high water."

The Prime Minister then put forward new compromise language for this passage in the note. The President also gave the language which we had considered overnight. Agreement was finally reached on the form of words which was later in the morning telegraphed to our working group representatives in Paris. The British accepted our formulation of the agenda item. They also confirmed their acceptance of our phraseology for handling participation by the Czechs and the Poles. There was some further general discussion subsequent to this by the

President

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- 2 -

President of the actual text of our note which will vary in its preambular and non-operative passages from the British text. A clean draft of the US note reflecting the President's changes and approval was also forwarded to Paris for our representative on the working group. Sir Anthony Rumbold and Mr. Merchant then retired to draft parallel instructions with respect to the handling of the note to our Embassy in Bonn and Paris, it having been agreed that our permanent NATO representatives would be the members of the Four Power working group to handle in Paris the final concerting of our replies with the Germans and the French and thereafter with the NATO Council.



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April 24, 1959
Walter Reed Hospital
4:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants:

Secretary Dulles
Secretary Herter
Mr. Dillon
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Greens

Secretary Dulles said he thought a difficult period lies ahead because it seems that the British have decided to go it alone and the period of intimate collaboration of 1967 and 1958 seems to be over. He expressed his views along the lines of the attached outline.

He speculated that during Macmillan's visit to Moscow, Khrushchev had planted the ideas that the United States may be trying to precipitate trouble, from which Britain would suffer most; that if the British would help the Soviet Government in the Berlin issue, this would be in the interests of Britain's safety; that trade prospects are good if Britain will take advantage of them with the Soviet Union; and that the Soviets might be able to help in the protection of British interests in Iraq and in countering Nasser. There probably had not been any written agreement, but rather a general impression on Macmillan.

In this situation, Secretary Dulles thought, the United States should assume a positive role of leadership with our own proposals, based on the concepts of NATO and the effective deterrent, that our retaliatory power represents. If our allies now reject these concepts, then we may have to jolt them by some "agonizing reappraisal".

Secretary Herter recalled the points he had made to von Brentano on April 4, as being of a nature to impress on the Germans the importance of a clear and dependable policy. He went on to summarize the results

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DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS 1961-69

ASSISTANT'S CHRONOLOGICAL SERIES

See 14 April 1959 (1)

Miles (S.A.C.P.) 17

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-2-

of the Working Group's most recent efforts and the current status of our four-phased program, as well as the difficulties we are likely to have with it in discussion with our allies.

Secretary Dulles recalled his suggestion to the Vice President of a line the latter might take with Khrushchev during his visit to Moscow (see memorandum of April 20 to S/S). He thought that given the improbability of reaching an agreement with the Soviets, even if we can agree with our allies, we might consider how in the next few months to work against the background of showing up Berlin as a test of Soviet pretensions and professions.

Secretary Harter saw the Foreign Ministers meeting beginning on May 11, as a probing operation for us; hence we should not allow the conference to begin by a discussion of the Berlin issue. In response to Secretary Dulles' question, Secretary Harter said that it is not contemplated that any Senators join the U. S. delegation at least in the early stages; with this Senator Fulbright agrees. If events ever get to the point of signing an agreement with the Soviets, it might then be appropriate to include some Senators on the U. S. delegation.

Joseph N. Greene, Jr.



Attachment:
Outline.

S:JNGreene, Jr.:jm

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#1 April 21, 1959

BRITISH AND UNITED STATES VIEWS ON DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION

I. Differences in Philosophy and Approach

A. The British view:

- "Russian problem" today same as in 19th century
- Expansionist goals of Soviet Government akin to those of Tsarist Governments, and hence susceptible of limitation by negotiated deals;
- Hence dependable agreements relieving tension and limiting expansion of Communism are attainable and should be sought.

B. The United States view:

- "Russian problem" today is that International Communism uses Soviet Government as its tool
- Expansion of International Communism is article of faith not susceptible of limitation by negotiation;



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- It can only be limited by denying it opportunities and successes, where necessary by the will to use superior force; and by the dynamic faith of the democracies.
- Soviet Government does not negotiate in good faith; it uses negotiation as a tactic to achieve, or screen to hide, its true objectives; hence dependable agreements are unattainable except as they can be based on the premise that violation would be more costly to the Soviets than observance.

II. Current Ramifications

A. A crisis of confidence?

- Macmillan and his Government not forthcoming with us since about January 1.
- Have not been candid about talks with Khrushchev; viz message to Secretary prior to trip.



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- Were not candid during Secretary's visit to London in February.

- Possible "spheres of influence" deal, affecting Middle East and Europe.

B. Factors in the United Kingdom

Economic - Importance of Middle East, jealousy of United

States relations with West Germany and Japan;

opposition to continental integration;

- Greers Ferry Turbine case

pre-election politics play minor role in UK attitudes

C. Factors in the United States

- Cuz is the "king-pin" of power; therefore our views are in the last analysis compelling on the UK and our other allies.



we had originally worked out the concepts on which we had based the deployment of U.S. Forces in Europe back in 1951, these concepts had been very realistic. Were we still being realistic in our concepts about the role of U.S. Forces or had we diverged? Back at this time it was clear, said the President, that the U.S. had in mind three major missions for U.S. Forces deployed overseas. The first of these missions was the obvious one of deterring Communist aggression. The second was to help friendly nations around the world to keep these outposts defended with their own ground troops. The third mission was to provide for the ground forces of the outpost nations a degree of mobility; that is, U.S. naval and air strength would be used to reinforce local ground forces in the outpost countries.

Specifically, said the President, the six U.S. divisions which we had deployed to the NATO area were originally intended to be our response to an emergency situation. These divisions were sent in order to encourage the European nations to become the first line of their own defense against the Soviet Union. Since that time we seemed to have abandoned this realistic concept. Now these Western European countries and others were calling for more and more U.S. Forces to be deployed. Yet we must not be so dispersed in our military deployments that we cannot act promptly to meet an emergency. What we need for an emergency is not a dispersal of U.S. military forces but on the contrary a concentration of them. We should try to bring pressure all around the world so that the local forces in all these countries constitute the first line of defense, a line of defense which we can assist with our mobile reserve forces. This was the concept that we were all talking about back at the time of the New Look in 1953.

General Twining commented that the MC-70 Plan was a precise illustration of what the President was complaining about. We were now stuck with our role in the MC-70 Plan.

Speaking quite forcefully, the President continued his exposition, noting that General de Gaulle shows no hesitation in telling us what he proposes to do here and there with French military forces. This illustrated, said the President, his point that many of these countries have lost any sense of their own responsibility for the defense of Europe. The President admitted that he did not know how we were going to get out of the responsibility represented by the deployment of our troops abroad but he certainly knew that we had strayed far from our original concept of the purposes our troops abroad were to serve. These U.S. Forces abroad were now looked upon as permanent features of local defense.

PRE: after this business

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RMR Acting Secretary (with Murphy, Merchant, McBride) met with Foreign

SS Minister Couve de Murville (accompanied by Alphand, Beaumarchais, Lucet)
W " March 31.

G this morning/ Conversation mostly related to Germany. Following summary

SP ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ based unclassified memorandum conversation.

C 1) Couve analyzed principal difference between UK and French position

SAE on German problem as contrast between UK willingness to exhibit flexibility

L at outset negotiations with Soviets while French feel West must be tough.

IO Couve also complained that for several months now West had been discussing

INR details of contingency planning for Berlin without having agreed on basic

H policy. He added our policy must be based on manifest will to maintain our

FE rights. He did not repeat not believe UN role should go beyond receiving

NEA report from Western nations concerned. Acting Secretary agreed we should

show manifest will insist on our rights in order prevent any Soviet miscal-

culation." Couve said he thought Soviets unlikely take any drastic action now.

especially with Foreign Ministers' meeting now set for May 11, and with summit

Dated by:

EUR:WE:RHM:McBrid:cal 3/31/59

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Livingston T. Merchant

Clearance:

S/S - Mr. Calhoun

G Mr. Murphy

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meeting increasingly probable. He thought period of maximum danger would come QUOTE after failure of the summit meeting UNQUOTE, when question would arise of what overt measures we should take to show our determination maintain rights in Berlin.


2) Couve and Acting Secretary agreed that concept of disengagement as thus far presented by British seemed vague and unsatisfactory. Couve said it was difficult determine what was in British mind on this subject. Acting Secretary said this point had not repeat not been clarified at Camp David talks. Couve and Acting Secretary agreed British probably had in mind accepting some QUOTE thinning out UNQUOTE or disengagement proposal in trade for maintaining status quo in Berlin. It was agreed we should have some comprehensive package for Soviet which might include some proposal along QUOTE thinning out UNQUOTE lines but that it should be quite clear to Soviets this package was inseparable. In response to question from Alphand, Merchant said British idea for QUOTE new title UNQUOTE to Berlin also seemed unclear except that they apparently intended substitute some contractual arrangement for present Berlin status. It was agreed that this was unsatisfactory as substitute for our present clear rights.

3) Couve also raised Spanish NATO membership saying France QUOTE rather in favor UNQUOTE of admitting Spain and noting Brentano had raised this question with him. Merchant noted most NATO countries now favored admitting Spain and opposition appeared limited to Norway and Denmark. We were talking quietly with Scandinavians but believed it would be embarrassing raise this week in NATO forum. Couve agreed and said French would also talk to Norwegians and Danes.

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4) Acting Secretary expressed our concern at case in COCOM involving ^{projected} French sales of certain types of cable to Soviets. He said this made us extremely nervous and he asked Couve, who was not repeat not well-informed, to look into this matter. Latter agreed.

5) Acting Secretary noted interest of Asian SEATO members in holding next meeting after Wellington session outside treaty area, and said US willing invite SEATO to Washington if UK and French agreed. Couve said he had no repeat no objection and indeed thought this a good idea.

6) Re tripartite talks scheduled for April 15, Couve said deGaulle's principal interest military rather than political. He thought Eisenhower-deGaulle talk would be best way straighten out this situation. Acting Secretary noted deGaulle had open invitation to Washington. Couve said it impossible for him accept now but if summit meeting occurred, Eisenhower-deGaulle meeting could undoubtedly be arranged. Couve said deGaulle had two things in mind: first was tripartite coordination on global problems while second was NATO reorganization. French had not repeat not presented specific ideas on NATO because this was secondary in deGaulle's mind and would be taken care of after problem of global coordination settled.

7) On fleet matter, Couve quoted from deGaulle press conference and said French intent was definitely not repeat not to weaken NATO. He added French were currently undertaking, he believed, conversations on this subject with SHAPE and also with CINCAFMED. On related question of Belleau Wood, Merchant noted French action posed us with legal problem which we attempting find means ^{reach accommodation.} ~~accommodate~~

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He said we would be in touch with French in few days on this.

8) Couve raised question of contacts with FLN and said he pleased by decision conveyed by Merchant to Alphand yesterday (deftel to Paris 3624) to effect we would not repeat not now receive FLN representatives in Department. However he said principal problem was physical presence these men in US. He again asked visas not repeat not be granted or, if already granted, be revoked. Acting Secretary said we had studied this problem exhaustively and did not repeat not see what we could do in absence violation US law. Couve asked if we could not repeat not refuse visas on grounds individuals would engage in undesirable political activity. Acting Secretary referred to difficulties on this score we were already encountering in courts. Couve said this was serious problem which caused undesirable repercussions in Franco-US relations and led to anti-American feeling in France. Murphy reiterated difficulties since individuals concerned are residents of US. Acting Secretary said we could not repeat not do anything unless these men had been convicted of crime in court in country of their origin. Couve did not repeat not know whether Yazid convicted criminal in French court but said would look into matter. Murphy concluded we might also be able take action against Yazid if he had filled our visa questionnaire fraudulently.

(ACTING)

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During tripartite FOREIGN mtg Mar 21 attention principally concentrated on proposed French changes to contingency planning paper (circulated tripartite in Washington by group chaired by Murphy and including French and British Ambassadors) and a FOREIGN's draft report to NATO FOREIGN on Contingency Planning.

Conve declared contingency planning paper must be more positive in expressing our will to take action if our surface access to Berlin interfered with. Suggested wording be changed from "3 Powers will decide... whether further military pressures should be applied" to "3 Gov'ts will make jointly appropriate decision for restoring freedom of passage". Object should be to state clearly (a) we want to maintain communications with Berlin; (b) will take all necessary measures to do so; (c) final decision on what to do will be made on basis (a) and (b) above, in accordance

Drafted by:

EUR:GER:GPA:JHMcFarland:jg 4/1

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

C - Mr. Reinhardt

Clearance:

GER - Mr. Hallenbrand

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Authority

ML 85-27545

LHO

11/6/86

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NSC Letter 8/12/86

FILE DATE

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existing circumstances.

Lloyd agreed with French declaration; suggested dropping reference to Allied "suspension" of traffic, although noting that de facto it would actually be stopped temporarily.

Acting Secretary noted this understood. We would want time for military preparation and to rally public opinion to our side. US had no objection to French formula. Gave stated dropping reference to "suspension" made draft more palatable. Language of paras 9 and 10 generally tightened to eliminate our action as mere passive in ~~XXXXXX~~ blockade and to clarify our rights to react immediately to blockade attempts if appropriate.

Acting Secretary raised problem of Contingency Planning Report to NATO. Noted sensitive nature of subject. Lloyd made special plea for strictest security measures on all agencies Washington Fenton meetings. Proposed depositing report only with NATO SECRET. US and French concurred on need for security and handling of report.

Acting Secretary ~~xxx~~ proposed that British or French make actual presentation before Council of Contingency Planning report and Four Power Working Group report.

There was general agreement that latest Soviet note on May 11 Fenton meeting was satisfactory. Lloyd declared that it best to have only Four Powers with German advisers represented but if Russians insist on observer

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status for Poles and Czechs we must offer same status to Italy, even if this means Soviet counter demand for Rumania. If Poles and Czechs accorded full participation same necessary for Italy. Murphy noted Russians apparently not pressing very hard on this subject. Acting Secretary declared we should avoid discussion this issue again in NATO if possible.

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Signed: Fluten
(next page sanitized)

4/4/59
April 4, 1959
11:30 a.m.

3 distribution often
than as noted in
margin.
MK

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT

The President telephoned and said he had been through the papers on Geneva Nuclear Test negotiations very carefully. The draft letter to Macmillan, the President said, was really what he and Macmillan more or less agreed informally at Camp David so Macmillan may think the letter is a little redundant, but the President said on the other hand since it refers to the note, the President thought it didn't hurt to repeat what they had said verbally.

On the draft to Khrushchev, the President said he made a few little corrections to get a little more conciliatory tone without weakening the letter. The President said the first two paragraphs were all right. In the third paragraph, the President changed the first sentence to read: "...security interests of all parties, and we believe...". The President put a period after the word "confidence", crossing out the remainder of that sentence and adding a new sentence: "Therefore, no basis for agreement is now in sight." The President changed the first sentence of the fourth paragraph to read: "In my view, these negotiations must not be permitted completely to fail." In the second sentence of the fourth paragraph, the President changed it to read: "...., I believe there is a way in which ..."

On the second page of the draft to Khrushchev where the draft read "... then let us take ...", the President changed the language to read: "... then I propose that we take ..."

On the last page of the draft to Khrushchev, in the first sentence of the last paragraph, the President eliminated the word "surely" and substituted: " I trust that one of these ... ".

The President said other than the above, to go ahead and send them both out.

The President then added that in the letter to Macmillan, it should be "Dear Harold" and closed with "With warm regard, as ever, Ike".

The President said he had talked with Secretary Dulles who had some suggestions to make on the President's speech for this morning. Mr. Herter said he planned to call the Secretary a little later to bring him up-to-date on the NATO meetings, and in this connection, Mr. Herter said he hoped to see the President on Monday.

The discussion

Copy of letter to Khrushchev
5/5 v 5/16



Herter 4/10/59 Pres. & Sec. Call 1959 (2)

The discussion then turned to Germany and the necessity of adopting some kind of step-by-step policy leading to the ultimate objective of uniting Germany. Mr. Herter said he had had a very serious talk with von Brentano this morning and von Brentano is very embarrassed. He has cancelled his other engagements here and is going directly back to Germany in order to talk to Adenauer before the latter gets away on leave. Mr. Herter said what von Brentano is going to try to do in the next week is to get us a position which will allow us to make an offer of a step-by-step solution. Mr. Herter said in the meeting with von Brentano we were taking the position that we had more faith than they themselves did. Mr. Herter said it was obvious that what Adenauer and the Christian Democrats were scared of was that in a reunified free election the opposition Socialist party in West Germany would form a coalition with certain East Germany parties and throw the Christian Democrats out of office. The President said if they get a true free reunification, then they have to take their chances on politics.

The President said his own idea is this. We, of course, don't know how long this modus vivendi would exist between the two Germanys not really as a true confederation but working together with a common council. The President said we must never forget that anything we can do that opens up a real avenue between these two sides of Germany sets up a tremendous attraction; they are all the same people and they don't want to be apart; we should do everything we can to let nature take its course. Mr. Herter said he thought the Germans will come up with a scheme for a joint council to serve as a forum for discussion of mutual problems. The President said this council would have no powers at first, but that if they can do something like this, we could he felt go ahead pretty well with some good prospects for progress.



C. A. / L.

Christian A. Herter

4/6/59
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April 6, 1959

1910-

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
April 6, 1959

Others present: Mr. Herter, Mr. Wadsworth

Mr. Herter said he had brought Mr. Wadsworth so that he might have the benefit of the President's thinking before returning to the negotiations in Geneva. The President said that the key elements are as set out in his message to Macmillan and draft message to Khrushchev. Mr. Wadsworth might proceed along those lines. At this point Mr. Wadsworth left the meeting.



Governor Herter said that the NATO meetings had on the whole gone well. The German position complicated the development of a clear line of policy for the allies. He suggested that the President read a summary message, a copy of which he left, reporting national positions as expressed at the NATO sessions. Mr. Herter also said that Selwyn Lloyd had asked him how he visualized the Foreign Ministers meeting proceeding. Mr. Lloyd indicated that he considered his ideas on "thinning out" and on a new regime for Berlin as a fall-back position. He also indicated he was thinking of the possibility of having two Foreign Ministers meetings before the Summit Meeting -- the first for the purpose of laying out of the initial positions, and the second for shifting to the fall-back positions if necessary. The President did not think this a good plan, since it seems to accept the idea of a definite weakening as part of our intention. The President suggested that we should not make sharp delineations between a first position and a fall-back position but should keep the whole matter general. Mr. Herter felt, however, that we should make our first position with the Russians quite firm and clear. He thought we must keep the objective of reunification even if we approach it by phases.

The President thought we should stand on the principle that the German people must be reunited under basic plans which are acceptable both to the nations involved in the war and to the Germans themselves.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as
President of the United States,
1899-61 (Ann Whitman File)

DDE DIARIES

Box 40 Staff Notes
April 1959(3)

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Mr. Herter said that the NATO session had reached several rather clear conclusions -- not to abandon Berlin; to keep our troops in Berlin; to keep the routes to Berlin open; and to make progress toward reunification. There had been some desire to include a policy statement that British and U. S. troops must be maintained on the Continent (the Belgians in particular had desired this) but in the end this provision was omitted, since its inclusion would have indicated it to be a matter of question and debate. The President thought we should take the line that until practical agreements are reached that are acceptable to both East and West, we will not withdraw our troops from the Continent over the opposition of our European allies.

Mr. Herter said that Mr. Spaak had questioned the wisdom of relying on the right of occupation and conquest as the basis of our presence in Berlin. The President said he had always favored resting our presence there on our responsibilities to a conquered people under our protection. Mr. Herter agreed that we should use the formula of responsibility for protection. With regard to the relationship of the Berlin question to the U.N, Mr. Herter said that the matter is quite fuzzy with the French in particular not desiring to go to the United Nations. Mr. Spaak had an interesting suggestion -- to reach agreement with the Soviets and to register that agreement with the United Nations. He added that Mr. Hammarskjold has indicated he wanted to come to Washington to talk to the State Department, and the President indicated agreement to this proposal.

Mr. Herter next discussed certain reconnaissance operations that had been mentioned to the President on Friday. The President was inclined to oppose these because of their "needling" tendency. Also, he doubted the value of the results that are being sought. After discussion and consideration of an intelligence memorandum, the President indicated that he would not interpose an objection to the proposed action. He asked me to take up a question of timing with the responsible officials concerned, and I did so later in the day.

I next raised with the President and the Secretary of State a proposal outlined to me by General White at Secretary McElroy's request for investigations and consultations within the United States looking toward the dispersal of SAC aircraft to a considerable number of civilian fields. Information about these consultations seems likely

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to become public. Neither Mr. Herter nor the President had any objection, on the understanding that the matter will be treated as simply a further step in the dispersal program, and not linked to the Berlin situation.

Mr. Herter next raised with the President the question of Administration action on the recommendations of the Draper Committee. The President said he thought he would have to send up these recommendations. He noted that they are not expenditures in FY-60, but appropriations. He thought the Administration position should be developed within a week or so. I mentioned that Mr. Stans, who has some rather strong views on the matter, was back in town today.

Mr. Herter next recalled that Secretary Dulles had met with an "advisory committee" on disarmament questions several months ago. The membership of the committee was Lovett, McCloy, Gruenther, and Bedell Smith. He asked if he might convene the committee again, and the President approved his doing so.

Mr. Herter then asked when the President is planning to return from Augusta. The President said that it might be as late as April 19th. Mr. Herter said that Fidel Castro will be here on the 16th, and requested that the President consider delaying his return until the afternoon of April 20th. Mr. Herter said he is planning to be away for a few days' rest on 17-19 April and the President approved.

The President next referred to a request from the State Department that he have the President's of the various European community organizations (Coal and Steel Community, EURATOM, Common Market) both to his office and for a luncheon. He thought that it would be more appropriate to have only one session, which he thought should be a meeting in his office. He pointed out to Mr. Herter that these affairs, valuable as they are individually, can mount up and in fact get quite out of hand.

Mr. Herter concluded the meeting by saying that the President's Gettysburg speech had been superb in his opinion. It came at a most fortunate moment in relation to the NATO session and highlighted U. S. responsibilities and undertakings around the world.

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



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4/6/59

es staff summary

-1-

EUROPE:

Germans Cautious on Approaches to USSR - The Acting Secretary expressed his concern to von Brentano on Saturday over the negative nature of German proposals tabled at the quadripartite Ministerial Meeting April 1. Von Brentano contended that West Germany was threatened by the danger of subversion by a monolithic East Germany and, as a portion of the opposition party favors undemocratic socialism, the coalition possibilities between the SPD and the SED could not be risked. He said it would be better to maintain the status quo and seek general disarmament moves to reduce tensions. The Acting Secretary said that it appeared the Federal Republic did not want reunification at this time since under prevailing conditions it was not attractive. He noted that the US has supported the Federal Republic's position and has assumed that the elimination of causes of tension, such as the division of Germany, might help to achieve disarmament.

Meanwhile, Matthews has reported the details of a conversation Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Kreisky had with Adenauer on March 20 in which the latter expressed concern over British ideas to discuss concessions on Berlin to be made from the status quo prior to any multilateral meetings. Adenauer indicated a willingness to expand existing contacts with the East Germans and confidentially expressed the view that reunification on any satisfactory terms for the next few years would be unrealistic to consider. The Chancellor is also reported to have agreed with Kreisky's views that the Soviets first wish greater recognition for East Germany and, most importantly, acceptance of the status quo for all of Eastern Europe. Similarly, Kreisky asserted Adenauer agreed that any disengagement plans would be risky in creating the danger of a military vacuum or disturbing the existing balance of forces.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

Document No. 91-1493 SECRET

NO. CA-8581 April 6, 1959

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning

COPY NO. 37

FILE 4 Apr 59

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TO: American Embassy, Bonn

RPTD INFO: BERLIN, LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, (For Embassy and HERO)

Forwarded herewith is the tripartite paper entitled "Berlin Contingency Planning" agreed on at Washington on April 4, 1959. This paper supersedes the United States aide-memoire of December 11, 1958 and the United States memorandum of December 11, 1959 and should be taken as the basic guidance for detailed planning by the three Embassies at Bonn. Copies are being forwarded to the British and French Embassies at Bonn by the British and French Foreign Offices. The Department of Defense is forwarding copies to the interested American military headquarters.

Explanatory comments about certain parts of the paper are being sent separately.

WERTER, ACTING

Enclosure: 1

"Berlin Contingency Planning" paper dated April 4, 1959. (Five copies to Bonn, one copy to each of other addressees)

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April 4, 1959

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

This paper represents Berlin contingency planning as agreed by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the basis of the United States aide-memoire of December 11, 1958, the United States memorandum of February 18, 1959, the tripartite Ambassadorial Group discussions in Washington on February 18, February 28, March 30, and April 4, 1959, and the tripartite Foreign Ministers' meeting in Washington on March 31, 1959.

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1. Preparatory Military Measures

a. In view of the possibility that the USSR may withdraw from its functions with respect to Berlin and in order to provide evidence of the Three Powers' determination to maintain their free access, the military authorities of the Three Powers will plan quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence. These measures are to be implemented as soon as they have been agreed.

b. The military authorities of the Three Powers will also plan more elaborate military measures in Europe, which would be generally observable, including (1) measures to be implemented after the Soviet Government has turned its functions over to the GDR and (2) measures to be implemented after Allied traffic has been forcibly obstructed.

c. The planning of the measures described in paragraphs 1a and 1b above will be carried out on a tripartite basis under the general supervision of General Harsted in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe. The exact arrangements for the planning will be further concerted between the military authorities of the three countries. These military authorities will also plan measures on a purely national basis in support of the measures referred to above.

2. Notice to Soviet Government

The Three Ambassadors in Moscow should inform the Soviet Government at an appropriate time (1) that the Three Powers continue to hold the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics fully-responsible under quadripartite agreements and arrangements concerning Berlin; (2) that the Three Powers have

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noted Soviet statements to the effect that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will withdraw from its remaining occupation functions with respect to Berlin; that they assume this means the Soviets intend to withdraw Soviet personnel from the Interzonal autobahn and railway checkpoints and from the Berlin Air Safety Center; (3) that the rights of the Three Powers to unrestricted access to Berlin would remain unaffected by such Soviet withdrawal; (4) that the Three Powers will not tolerate any attempt on the part of the "German Democratic Republic" to assert any control over or to interfere with their traffic to and from Berlin via quadripartitely established routes, and that they would take all measures necessary to protect their rights in this connection; (5) that, if the Soviets withdraw, the Western Powers will act on the assumption (a) that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has decided to abolish unnecessary administrative procedures at interzonal borders, and (b) the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can and will, without benefit of exchange of flight information in the Berlin Air Safety Center, maintain absolute separation of Soviet aircraft and all other aircraft flying in the Soviet Zone from aircraft of the Three Powers flying in the Berlin corridors and the Berlin control zone; (6) that the Three Powers will expect their traffic to move freely to and from Berlin and will assume the Soviets have given blanket assurance of safety of all Three Power aircraft in the Berlin corridors and the Berlin Control Zone. 1/

- 1/ The notice to the Soviets contemplated in this paragraph has already been given in part by the Three Powers' notes of December 31, 1958, which read in part as follows:

"As the Soviet Government knows, the French, British, and United States Governments have the right to maintain garrisons in their sectors of Berlin and to have free access thereto. Certain administrative pro-

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cedures have been agreed with the Soviet authorities accordingly and are in operation at the present time. The Government (of the United States) will not accept a unilateral repudiation on the part of the Soviet Government of its obligations with respect of that freedom of access. Nor will it accept the substitution of the regime which the Soviet Government refers to as the German Democratic Republic for the Soviet Government in this respect."

3. Public Statement

There will be drawn up without delay a tripartitely agreed draft of a public statement to be made if and when the Soviet Government announces the imminent turning over of the checkpoints to the GDR. This statement would explain the legal construction which the Allied Governments place upon the Soviet announcement and the procedures they will follow.

4. The "Agency Principle"

The Three Powers cannot deal with GDR personnel as Soviet agents if the USSR denies that such an "Agency" relationship exists. If, however, the USSR should ultimately propose a compromise under which the USSR, as principal, would expressly authorize GDR personnel to function as Soviet agents in performing Soviet functions with relation to the access of the Three Powers to Berlin, the Three Powers should consider the possibility of accepting such a compromise solution, with appropriate safeguards for their own rights.

5. Identification of Allied Vehicles

If Soviet personnel are withdrawn from the checkpoints, there would be no objection to providing more identification of the vehicles of the Three Powers for the information of GDR personnel at the checkpoints.

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6. Continuation of Allied Traffic after Soviet Withdrawal

If and when the Soviet personnel are withdrawn from the checkpoints, the Three Powers will make every effort to continue normal traffic by Autobahn and railroad, except that they will substitute for the procedures followed at present with the Soviet personnel those procedures which the Three Powers themselves have determined to be necessary to identify their trains, convoys, or vehicles as Allied movements entitled to unrestricted access and whatever procedures may be tripartitely agreed to be reasonable to enable the GDR personnel to ensure the orderly progress of traffic on the Autobahn or railroad.

7. Detailed Procedures at Checkpoints

The Three Embassies at Bonn, in consultation with the appropriate military headquarters, should complete the drafting of instructions to the commanders of military trains and convoys and to the drivers of individual vehicles regarding the procedures to be followed at the railroad and Autobahn checkpoints in the event of the withdrawal of Soviet checkpoint personnel. In drafting these instructions, provision will be made for a situation in which the Soviet Government has acknowledged the GDR personnel to be its agents and for a situation in which the Soviet Government has not done so. The Embassies, in consultation with the same military headquarters mentioned above, will also develop appropriate procedures for the identification of Allied movements and draft the above-mentioned instructions to conform with these procedures.

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8. Possible Substitution of Allied for Soviet Personnel

The Three Powers should consider the possibility of substituting their own personnel for the Soviet personnel withdrawn from the Bouwme and Marion-born checkpoints.

9. Initial Probe of Soviet Intentions

If Allied surface access is interrupted as a result of an attempt by GDR personnel to enforce formalities or controls going beyond those which the Three Powers have determined to be acceptable (cf. paragraph 6 above) the Three Powers will then make a probe or probes to determine whether the Soviets are prepared to use force or to permit the use of force to prevent the passage of an Allied movement. The vehicles will be identified to the GDR personnel in accordance with the procedures which the Three Powers have agreed on, but no further inspection or control will be allowed. The movement will proceed until its passage is physically obstructed. It will not fire unless fired upon, but if fired upon will take whatever defensive action seems necessary.

10. Efforts to Increase Pressure on USSR and GDR

If the initial probe or probes as described in paragraph 9 above are physically obstructed, the Three Powers will make parallel efforts along the following lines to increase pressure on the USSR and the GDR:

a. The Three Powers will seek to mobilize world opinion against the USSR as a violator of agreements, as a user of force, and as a threat to the peace. A possibility is that the situation could be taken to the United Nations Security Council and, perhaps in the event of a Soviet veto, to a special session of the General Assembly.

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- 7 -

Consideration would be given to further forms of diplomatic or other pressure, including the withdrawal of the Ambassadors of the Three Powers from Moscow.

b. The Three Powers will intensify their military preparations. At this point the preparations could include measures which would be readily observable.

11. Plan of Military Action

a. The Three Governments will make jointly the appropriate decisions for restoring freedom of passage. The measures required for their implementation should be the object of a study by the tripartite staff in Paris.

b. Supplementing military decisions, consideration might be given to possible economic measures.

12. Air Access to Berlin

a. As a concomitant to the above course of action regarding surface access to Berlin, the Three Powers should, from the start, take steps to maintain their unrestricted air access to Berlin, which would be essential to maintaining the status and security of the city.

b. The Three Ambassadors at Bonn, in consultation with the tripartite staff in Paris or with other military headquarters as appropriate, should review or complete contingency planning to deal with the following aspects of the Berlin air access questions:

(1) Possible Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center;

(2) Possible Soviet or East German threats against the

of the Berlin corridors and related services.

(3) Measures which might be taken to continue civil air services as long as possible in the event of any change in the present situation;

(4) Possible establishment of a "garrison airlift" to transport Allied personnel and material as necessary in the event of an interruption of Allied surface traffic;

(5) The possible substitution of military for civil aircraft to maintain air services to Berlin if civil aircraft cease operations;

(6) Possible direct interference by the Soviets or East Germans with flights in the Berlin corridors or control same; and

(7) Flights in the Berlin corridors above 10,000 feet.

(This issue might be resolved by a simple tripartite agreement to fly at an altitude appropriate to efficient operations of individual aircraft.)

c. Planning regarding b (4) and b (5) above should be conducted on the understanding that no policy decision has been taken on a "garrison airlift" or on the substitution of military for civil aircraft.

13. Planning Responsibilities and Coordination

a. The Tripartite Ambassadorial Group meeting in Washington is responsible for the overall coordination of Berlin contingency planning and for the drafting of the statement mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

b. The Three Embassies at Bonn are primarily responsible for the development of recommendations regarding identification of Allied movements (paragraph 7 above), instructions regarding detailed pro-

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- 9 -

cedures at the checkpoints (paragraph 7 above), and air access planning (paragraph 12 above).

c. The Tripartite Staff in Paris, under the supervision of General Norstad, is responsible for coordinating the preparatory military measures and the planning described in paragraph 1 above, for studying measures which might be taken to restore freedom of access (paragraph 11 above), and for assisting the Three Embassies at Bonn in carrying out their responsibilities as described in paragraph 13 b above.

d. The Ambassadors of the Three Powers to the United Nations are charged with making recommendations to their Governments regarding the basis and timing of a possible approach to the United Nations (cf paragraph 10 a above).

e. The Headquarters of the Three Powers in Berlin will give the Three Embassies at Bonn whatever assistance the latter may require in carrying out their responsibilities as described in paragraph 13 b above.

f. The military authorities in each of the Three Countries are responsible for the planning of measures on a purely national basis, as mentioned in paragraph 1 above, in support of tripartitely planned measures.

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MR 91-83-8
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Mr. Day

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9/10/59
1995/2564

April 10, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Ad Hoc Washington Inter-Agency Committee on Germany

2564
The Inter-Agency Committee met at the State Department today with Deputy Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler presiding. Mr. Kohler invited attention to a cable from Ambassador Thompson (Monroe 2034) which is his analysis of Soviet tactics. (We have requested a copy and expect to receive it Monday.)

Mr. Kohler said that the Department hoped to have a document dealing with security provisions in a German settlement for the Committee's consideration early next week. The Group then proceeded to consider the papers which had been distributed since yesterday's meeting:

1. Principles of a German Treaty.

The State Department officers explained that two versions of this document had been prepared although the difference is largely one of format. Both versions contain highlights from the draft Peace Treaty. As noted above, the Department hopes to provide a draft of paragraph 5 on security provisions next week, although it will be impossible to write final language until agreement is obtained through the London Working Group. In response to my question, Mr. Kohler said that they had not felt it advisable to make mention of the "Bill of Rights" which was attached to the draft Peace Treaty since we would prefer not to table such a document and felt that it belonged more properly in an eventual German constitution.

2. Tactical Handling of the Problem of German Participation.

A revised version of this paper appropriate for tabling in the London Working Group was handed out. Attention was drawn to the first main paragraph on page 3 under the heading of the Western Position. Sentence 3 of that paragraph points out that in addition to political problems, East German representation at the May 11 meeting may damage the legal position of the West concerning recognition of the GDR. At the conclusion of the meeting the CIA representative referred back to this paper and expressed considerable concern as to the effect of seating both the German delegations at the conference. His remarks were in the nature of a warning.

3. Berlin.

The new Berlin paper has a fall-back annex outlining "Elements of a Limited Interim Agreement on Berlin." Mr. Hillenbrand noted that the Berlin paper ~~might~~ attempts to develop further the position paper for the Acting Secretary's use at the recent Four-Power and NATO meetings. It raises two questions for the Working Group: (1) Whether a package plan should include Berlin. (2) A position concerning Berlin in case its

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By EP 5/9/96

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status has to be discussed alone. State regards the latter as largely a theoretical exercise. The French, and to some extent the UK and the Germans, do not like the idea of Joint Berlin proposals. However, Mr. Kohler felt that we need a Berlin proposal in order to counter the Soviet contention that Berlin is an integral part of East Germany. Mr. Hillenbrand added that on the realistic assumption that agreement on reunification and European security is not a real possibility, we need proposals on Berlin per se. Paragraph 3 of the Berlin paper lists alternatives in descending order of preferences. Subparagraph 3a introduces the Agency concept, which is related to contingency studies. A new element is the fall-back position, attached as Tab A: "Elements of a Limited Interim Agreement on Berlin".

4. Elements of a Limited Interim Agreement on Berlin.

Mr. Henry Owen of the State Department explained that this paper was based on three directives: (1) a Berlin settlement should be on a Four-Power, not a UN basis. (2) It should include keeping our forces in Berlin. (3) It should preserve present occupation rights. In State's view the proposal does not set up a new contractual basis for our presence in Berlin or change our legal position. It was agreed, however, in response to a USIA question, that the paper did contain good material for public consumption. It can be "alogorized" on the basis of the provision of a UN Presence in Berlin and the fact that it is partly based on proposals of our NATO allies.

Defense reserved comment. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that we expect the British to make new Berlin proposals before the London Working Group. It was desirable, however, to have our position agreed as soon as possible so that it can be tabled, otherwise the British, who will be presiding, may beat us to the draw.

Mr. Kohler noted that this Berlin exercise is basically a public relations proposal. Replying to Defense concern about our being maneuvered into a position where our troops would have to leave Berlin before a settlement had been reached, State noted that our Berlin position is based on the assumption that we are there because the people of Berlin want us there and because of the commitments we have given them.

USIA raised a question about paragraph 11, page 5, concerning a possible directive not to carry out inflammatory propaganda. They wondered if this referred to RIAS. State said not necessarily. Any decision would be up to the U.S. Government in the light of the three UN resolutions on the subject.

5. Berlin Contingency Planning.

The meeting ended with a discussion of the Agency theory. As noted in my accompanying memorandum, Defense withheld comment but expressed concern. Mr. Owen pointed out that the President and Secretary of State



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-3-

had both accepted the idea of Agency as a *modus vivendi*. The UK formulation was not accepted by our legal experts and the U.S. counter proposal is included on page 2 of the Berlin contingency planning paper. Mr. Kohler reiterated that he thought the West was basically committed to the Agency theory. Tripartite contingency planning based on the Agency theory had been approved as government policy and agreed at the governmental level and was still on the books.

Philip J. Halla

~~SECRET~~

4/13/59

100-551 #5

NLE Date 9/3/81 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

jsb

THE SECRETARY

Walter Reed
April 13, 1959
11:50 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Personal and Private

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
WITH THE PRESIDENT

I referred to my physical condition and failure to gather strength and my consequent feeling that I ought promptly to resign as Secretary of State, as indicated by the draft letter of which he had a copy. The President said that he faced this development with great regret because he felt that our relationship was unique based on a common appreciation of the issues. He did not want to oppose what seemed inevitable but he did ask that any decision should be deferred for a week or ten days while he thought the matter over further and of the consequential problems that would be involved. I said that I felt that under all the circumstances Herter would be the best successor. He said he was inclined to agree although he had also at one time or another thought of Lodge, Anderson and Allen Dulles. I said that if it were for a long term, I would not recommend Herter, but for the short term and in view of his identification with the urgent problems of the next few months, I thought he was the logical choice. The President felt that his physical condition to some extent disqualified him from being an active negotiator around the world and wondered whether there was some way of bringing Livie Merchant into that role. I said that Livie could of course be made Under Secretary. This might raise problems with Dillon and with Murphy. Perhaps, however, if Bruce were resigning as Ambassador to Bonn, Murphy would be glad to take that job. He would of course be greatly missed in the Department, where he was a very important utility man. The President felt that in view of problems of this kind and of the possibility that a new treatment might produce better results, he would still like to defer a decision, and I said that was acceptable to me although I did not myself see any prospect that the basic decision could usefully be altered. Then a statement was agreed on. The President said he would be away until about Tuesday of next week, but could of course return if there was any reason. I said I foresaw no reason.

John Foster Dulles



S:JFD:pdb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Personal and Private

Dulles / WFM / 5/12

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DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59
Box 7 Meetings with the President - 1959(1)

4/18/59
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UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

OFFICIAL INCOMING MESSAGE

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TOO 181847Z APR 59

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FROM : OSD

TO : US CINCEUR; DEFREPNAME PARIS; USNMR

INFO : CHMAAG BONN

REF NO : DA 950311

TOREPNAME 340

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

18 APR 59

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

FROM OASD (ISA).

Following is summary of discussions held 16 April by German Minister of Defense STRAUSS with Deputy Secretary of Defense QUARLES; DR. Herbert F. YORK, Director of Defense Research and Engineering; Assistant Secretary Defense (ISA) IRWIN and William M. HOLADAY, Special Assistant for Guided Missiles, OSD.

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DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS

Agency Case OSD 88-MOR-145

NLE Case 88-393#2

By 7162 NLE Date 11/16/94

Category B Encryption
which may be found in the DATE-TIME

Norstad Po/Comtry File/2/6er 1988
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REF NO: DA 958311
TOREPNAM 340

18 APR 59

EUCOM IN 149,150,151/13C

QUARLES agreed to work with Germans on possible use of U.S. depots in FRANCE. Germans are to negotiate political details with FRANCE (or any other countries concerned) while U.S. will see if portions of U.S. depots can be made available. Initial actions are to start through the MAAG in BONN.

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
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
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REF NO: DA 953311
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13 APR 50

EUCOM IN 149,150,151,13C

Answers to certain of foregoing items have already been furnished to STRAUSS party during military department briefings 16 and 17 April. Plan to forward comment on others before conclusion of STRAUSS trip in U.S.

ACTION : MAD

INFO : J-3
J-4
R/F
D/CINC
COMPT
POL ADV
USNMR
J-2
CENTRAL FILES

	ACT	INFO
SACEUR		✓
COPS		✓
SECY		✓
ACOFB		✓
AIR L "		✓
AIR C		✓
AIR L		
DCNA		
EX P		
HD		
P L		
INTEL		✓
P L		
LCC		
SiG		
O & T		
EUD & EP		
SPASAC		
AG		
HQ CC		
PRCG	✓	
OSCAR		
SACLAFT (2)		
NAV D:P		
US NMR		
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April 23, 1959

MEMORANDUM

2689

SUBJECT: Discussion at the Special Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, April 23, 1959

Present at this Special Meeting of the NSC were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; and the Director, U.S. Information Agency. Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of State; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

Mr. Gray explained the purpose of this Special NSC meeting and the general nature of the papers to be discussed. He suggested that the members of the Council bear in mind the final question which would be put to them; namely what if any of the contents of these two papers should subsequently be transmitted to our Allies? He also noted that the President had already approved transmission of the studies to General Norstad for his use in preparing preliminary U.S. positions in the Tripartite Staff in Paris (Live Oak). Thereafter, Mr. Gray suggested that the Council take up the so-called military paper entitled: "An Analysis of the Political and Military Implications of Alternative uses of Force to Maintain Access to Berlin". Mr. Gray thought it would be more useful to ask for comment on the main sections of this paper rather than to attempt to go through it paragraph by paragraph. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

Upon completing his introductory remarks, Mr. Gray inquired whether there were any comments on the introductory section of the military paper. Secretary Herter merely stated that the paper

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was an agreed paper. Mr. Gray then inquired if there were any comments to be made on the Third Section entitled: "Preparatory and Supporting Actions" covering Page 4 to 10 of the paper. There being no immediate comment, Mr. Gray pointed out the bracketed phrase in Paragraph 13 suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reading as follows:

"Thus, 'Shield Force' elements in Central Europe which are actually displaced in support of any Berlin operation, should be replaced with units in kind [or the risk of mal-deployment accepted]"

He asked General Twining to explain why the Joint Chiefs had felt it desirable to add this phrase whereas the majority had apparently not felt it necessary to include the phrase.

General Twining, turning to the President, indicated that the President had brought up this question once before. The purpose of the Joint Chiefs was here simply to call attention to the risk of mal-deployment.

The President said he wanted to inquire in the first place what purpose would be served by moving these forces toward the Western end of the Soviet Zone of Germany. General Twining replied that all such forces would be used on the Autobahn to break the Soviet blockade if it were instituted. The President commented that this would mean the Reinforced Battalion. General Twining answered in the affirmative and added "or perhaps a reinforced division." The President said that if we were now getting forces of the size of a reinforced division, it was a pretty serious matter. He added that if we were going to make such significant military moves in, and/or toward the Corridor, such moves must be specifically brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and himself before they were taken. This was especially true of the movement of a force of division size. We are involved here, said the President, with mounting a threat against the Soviet Union without having at our disposal a really great force with which to confront the forces which the Soviet Union would be in a position to confront us with.

Secretary Herter observed that these matters raised the whole question of the timing of these various moves. The timing of these moves had not been specified or agreed to in the paper under discussion. However, if the question of reinforcement of our troops should arise, timing would become a vital matter and we would have to be prepared to go a very long way. Secretary Herter said that this problem could be discussed later. The question of timing was certainly rather fuzzy now.

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does not accept the basic premises behind his own policy!

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The President stated that Section A, covering political action under the general heading of Section Three on "Preparatory and Supporting Actions" bothered him a little. While the political actions to be taken are specifically listed, nothing is said in this section with respect to how these actions are to be carried out. For example, asked the President, would publicity be given to this series of political actions? When Secretary Herter replied that publicity would be given to them, the President asked what kind of publicity? Secretary Herter answered that the publicity would consist of high-level speeches as well as publicity by the U.S. Information Agency and in other forums. Mr. George Allen, the Director of U.S.I.A., reminded the Council that his Agency would have to tie in its work to preliminary public speeches by U.S. officials. U.S.I.A. could not handle the publicity on these political actions independently of the guidance provided by official speeches. Secretary Herter confined himself to stating that a great deal more had to be done on both of these papers by way of detail.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the discussion had now reached the First of the Four Alternative Courses of Action; namely, "A Substantial Effort to Re-Open Ground Access by Local Action." Mr. Gray pointed out on Page 15 a difference in the Intelligence Estimate of the response which we might expect from the Soviets if we undertook this First Alternative. Air Force Intelligence (A-2) believed that this course of action would convince the Soviets that the Western Allies were prepared if necessary to proceed to General War, and that the Soviets would therefore find ways to ease the crisis. Mr. Gray pointed out that this difference of view was one factor to be considered if this paper were to be transmitted to other Allied Governments. In such a case, he asked, should these splits in Intelligence Estimates be reflected at all? If they were to be reflected, should the identity of those who held the differing views be made clear or alternatively should just the Majority Estimate be provided to the other Governments?

*Herter
disagree*

Secretary Herter stressed the very great importance of the Intelligence Estimates in the paper. He added that it was his personal view that if we carried out the First Alternative now under discussion, the Soviets were likely to fight unless they were really prepared to let our military forces, either of battalion or division size, move down the Autobahn into Berlin. General Twining wondered whether it would not be possible to express the Majority view and the Dissent in rather generalized terms. Mr. Allen Dulles thought that General Twining's suggestion was a good one but advised against identifying the source of Dissents in the Intelligence Estimates. He suggested instead that the paper just provide the Minority

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view as one which differed from the Majority Intelligence Estimate. If the paper were to be given to the French, Mr. Allen Dulles urged that it be "sanitized" first.

The President said that he had asked several people about giving such papers such as this to our Allies. It was all right to provide this paper to General Norstad to look into but if the papers were to go any further, should they not be transmitted in rather more general terms than in the detailed fashion in which they were now written?

Secretary Herter expressed the opinion that all such papers would have to be transmitted in a sanitized version. The President expressed his agreement in favor of shorter papers summarizing the contents of the more detailed ones.

Mr. Gray pointed out to the Council that while over the years the British have been very anxious to engage with the U.S. in contingency military planning all over the world, they have been firm in the one exception as to joint contingency planning on Berlin. General Twining confirmed Mr. Gray's statement of the British attitude while Secretary Herter pointed out that we ourselves had not desired at first to join with the British in contingency planning until we had gotten further along in our own plans. Mr. Gray pointed out that the President would want to determine when we should go forward with joint contingency planning on Berlin. He specifically inquired whether the paper under discussion should be transmitted to the Tripartite Staff in Paris (Live Oak). Secretary Herter suggested holding off a decision on this point until further discussion of the Group here. It might be desirable to transmit the paper through diplomatic channels to our Allies.

There being no further discussion of Alternative One, Mr. Gray directed the Council's attention to the Second Alternative; namely, "A Substantial Effort to Re-Open Air Access, if Blocked." As in the case of the First Alternative, he noted that this Alternative also involved a difference in the Intelligence Estimate of the reaction which we might expect from the Soviets if this Alternative were attempted (Page 21). He suggested that the same considerations should apply in the case of this split as applied in the case of the split Estimate as to the First Alternative.

Mr. Gray then referred to the Third Alternative, that is, "Reprisals Against the Communists in Other Areas, e.g., Western Naval Controls on Bloc Shipping". Initially Mr. Gray pointed out that the same problem of timing existed with respect to this Alternative as with the first two Alternatives. Secretary Herter called

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attention to the footnote on Page 26 reading as follows: "There is a serious question as to whether one or more of such actions would constitute retaliation, which is regarded as belligerent action". Secretary Herter said that he himself believed that some of the suggested actions under this Alternative might be called aggressive and belligerent. Secretary McElroy expressed agreement with this view of Secretary Herter.

Mr. Gray proceeded to the Fourth Alternative: "General War Measures". Here again he pointed out that there was a difference of opinion as to the Intelligence Estimate on the reaction to be expected from the NATO Governments if the Fourth Alternative were undertaken (Page 34). Mr. Allen Dulles commented that this time the Dissent came from the State Department rather than from the Military Intelligence Agencies.

Mr. Gray inquired specifically of the Attorney General whether he had any comment to make on this Fourth Alternative, pointing out that when we became involved in General War Measures, we are getting into the business of the duties and prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief vis-a-vis the U.S. Congress. The Attorney General replied that he did not believe that this Alternative presented any great problem. A great deal of contingency planning had already been done - more than had ever been done in our history before this time. This he thought was not really a legal problem so much as a problem of public reaction to undertaking General War Measures. Mr. Gray replied that he thought this matter extremely important from the point of view of the President's approval of these papers. Mr. Rogers promised to review the issue again but stated that he was confident that no severe problems would emerge. Secretary Herter pointed out that of course each move in these papers was subject to the President's approval.

At this point the President brought the discussion back to the Third Alternative, that of reprisals against the Communists in other areas, and said that he felt that the Third Alternative was somewhat out of line. He feared that if we undertook such reprisals as were listed under this Alternative, we would manage to get the whole world peeved at us without actually improving our own situation. He said he was quite convinced that with respect to the First Alternative on ground access that the U.S. must be fully prepared to act. However, through this committee here or by asking Foreign Minister Lloyd we must secure agreement from both the British and the French to "Show the Flag" and make it clear that we were serious. However, if we contemplate going beyond the First Alternative in our military actions as opposed to our political actions, we should realize that the situation will

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be changing day by day. That is, if we undertake military action on a larger scale and at a further stage than that of the Reinforced Battalion, we would encounter new problems and the need for new decisions. In such a contingency we here in the National Security Council would be meeting regularly. In short, said the President, we cannot expect to be able to respond automatically, in these contingencies, to rigid plans of action which we had made in advance. We simply would be unable to see the results. For example, said the President, would we be willing to start a war without the support of our allies? If we do so, the President believed such action would constitute a great Soviet victory. Therefore, said the President, anything we do after we make our first move (Alternative One) is going to have to be played by ear. *He had earlier said this virtually everywhere he was.*

General Twining said that of course CINCEUR was well aware of the points that the President had made. The President went on to say that of course if we undertook the First Alternative, we would reinforce our moves to gain ground access to Berlin with air operations. General Twining observed that the main thing was to stir up the Tripartite Group in Norstad's Headquarters in Paris to get down to work. Secretary Herter commented that of course the military courses of action must be dove-tailed with the political courses of action. He felt reasonably sure, he said that our Allies would go along with our proposed military actions if they are convinced that we had exhausted all the other possibilities.

Mr. Allen Dulles again came back to the problem of reprisals. He pointed out that there was one type of naval reprisal which we might well consider and which might not seem too belligerent. If the Soviets held up one of our Berlin convoys we could retaliate by holding one Soviet merchant vessel, on one pretext or another, in an Allied port. Mr. Dulles was quite sure that the Soviets would deduce the meaning of such an action. Secretary Herter thought this was a useful idea but of reprisals in general, under Alternative Three, he pointed out that the three Allied Governments had definite legal rights with respect to access to Berlin. On the other hand, if we held up Soviet shipping on the high seas, we could not do so on the basis of any clear legal right. The President said that he would not object to limited harassments of the sort suggested by Mr. Allen Dulles.

Mr. Gray next inquired whether the same considerations would not apply to Alternative Two as applied to Alternative One with respect to General Norstad's planning. In reply the President pointed out that obviously we could not conduct an air battle in a ten-mile wide corridor. Mr. Gray, however, pointed out that we could likewise not conduct a ground battle on an autobahn strip. Agreeing, the President pointed out that both contingencies required

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space sufficient for a campaign. Amid considerable laughter, General Twining pointed out that the paper under consideration required us to confine our military action to the Corridor if possible.

Mr. Gray then invited the Council's attention to the final section of the paper: "Reactions within Germany to the Four Courses of Action." There being no comment or discussion on this section, Mr. Gray turned to the President and said he supposed that the President would wish to approve this paper in principle as the basis for further work by the four agencies which had prepared the paper (State, Defense, JCS, and CIA). The President replied in the affirmative and added that he would send the paper to General Norstad. He would not object to General Norstad mentioning these Alternatives in discussions with the Tripartite Group but in so doing he should make clear that as of the present moment these actions are not all practical.

Secretary McElroy inquired whether we should omit Alternative Three in any material which we transmit to our Allies. The President thought it would be a good idea to omit this Alternative but we should get at it by asking our Allies what they could suggest by way of reprisals and harassments.

Mr. Gray reminded the Council that Mr. Robert Murphy in his covering memorandum sending these two studies to the President had asked the President to approve three recommendations. He singled out in particular the third recommendation dealing with the problem of the selection and timing of the general political, economic, and military measures outlined in these studies. Thereafter he asked the President whether he would wish to have progress reports from time to time on this recommendation. The President said he would but added that he did not feel that much effective work could be done at the present time unless a single individual was appointed and given authority to look over the whole range of our contingency planning on Berlin. This range would include also any Allied suggestions because, said the President, we need solid support and agreement from our Allies. The President then suggested that the individual who could most effectively fill this job would be Mr. Robert Murphy of the State Department. If he were not available, some other State Department official should be selected because, as the President said, in the early stages at least much of what we would be doing with respect to counter-measures in the Berlin crisis would be in the realm of political planning and action. Secretary McElroy concurred in the President's view that the individual to have charge of such a group should come from the State Department.

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The President said that the group meeting under Mr. Murphy should convene every day and should as necessary check with the National Security Council. The President added that he was assuming in making this suggestion that Premier Khrushchev had really meant what he said when he stated that he was not going to upset the applecart once negotiations over Berlin had been started between the West and the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Gray indicated that this seemed to conclude the discussion of the first paper and suggested that the Council turn its attention to the second paper, non-military, entitled: "Analysis of Non-Military Measures to Induce the Soviet Union to Remove Obstructions to Western Access to Berlin". He promptly called on Secretary Herter for a summary of the contents of this paper.

Secretary Herter pointed out that the summary and conclusions of the paper were provided in the first four pages. Most of the courses of action presented in the paper were to be studied as possibilities. None of them is necessarily going to change the mind of the Soviet Union but at least they should all be discussed with our Allies. More work was certainly needed on the question of the role of the United Nations in the picture. What precisely, for example, is meant by the phrase "a United Nations presence in Berlin"? This was still a very fuzzy concept. Incidentally, added Secretary Herter, the French attitude toward any United Nations' participation in the Berlin problem was positively psychopathic. Nevertheless from the point of view of world public relations, the role of the United Nations can still be of great importance.

The President said he found the course of action set forth on Page 16 of the paper, that is "Termination of Non-Diplomatic Contacts with the U.S.S.R." quite an interesting problem. The President wondered what the Soviets would infer from a break in relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. They might well consider this break tantamount to a declaration of war. Moreover, such a break, effected by the U.S. alone, would not carry very much weight. With respect to the paper as a whole, the President suggested that we should try to set down our questions and answers in very short and terse form. He said that he had studied this particular paper at considerable length but even so had found it difficult to reach clear and firm conclusions with respect to its content.

9 4 631 [Apropos of the President's complaint, Mr. Allen Dulles said that in great secrecy he was having prepared a supplementary paper dealing with Paragraph 6 which called for an increase, to the extent feasible, of feasible and disruptive activities within the

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Soviet Bloc. Mr. Dulles felt that it was important to remember that the original Soviet move against our position in Berlin was designed in good part to solidify the Soviet's own position throughout Eastern Europe. They regard their status in Eastern Europe as a matter of the greatest importance and they dreaded to see it disrupted. We should therefore constantly remind them of the Hungarian and East German uprisings. This was a kind of Achilles' heel for the Soviet Union. In any case, continued Mr. Dulles, the supplementary paper to which he had just referred was based on the proposition that if the Soviets believed that we would make real efforts to subvert their position in Eastern Europe in the event that they tried to impede our access to Berlin, they would become extremely worried. If this idea of ours is correct, we should attempt to get it through to the Soviets by covert means. If successful, this would constitute a deterrent to Soviet action to deny us access to Berlin.

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by us
The President said that looking at the Berlin crisis as a whole, he felt that one of three eventualities could come to pass. The first would be some kind of a deal through negotiations between the Soviet Bloc and the West. The best we could hope for in such a deal would be Soviet agreement to maintain the status quo for three or four years. The second possibility was a backdown by the U.S.S.R. The third possibility was general war. The President went on to warn that once we resort to the use of military force, as opposed to political action, there are really no limits that can be set to the use of force. This was a fact that the President felt we must look squarely in the face. The President said he was reminded of the circumstances of 1916 when President Wilson would not even permit our little War College to make any studies about what we might do if we became involved in the War. Nor would he permit any contingency war planning by the War or the Navy Departments lest such planning seem to constitute belligerent action by the U.S. Today we are of course taking the opposite course. Certainly there were a number of things we could try to do to change the Soviet mind but we should never forget the possibility of war even though in the President's judgment there would not be war.

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Secretary Herter commented that we were going to have a severe problem shortly with respect to the introduction of atomic weapons into the Federal Republic of Germany and possibly into Turkey and Greece as well. The Administration's decision to do this had been taken as early as the end of the year 1957. While we had not acted on this decision to introduce these weapons into Germany, the whole matter would soon come out into the open when on May 1 our proposal

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goes before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy which must pass on certain aspects of the transaction. Secretary Herter said that the State Department felt that it would be disadvantageous to deploy these weapons only to the Federal Republic. The matter would be less serious if deployment to West Germany was accompanied by deployment of the weapons to other countries at the same time. In any event, he felt that we should proceed to deploy the weapons in Germany. Indeed such a course of action might indicate to the Soviets how serious we were about the Berlin crisis. Secretary McElroy expressed his agreement with these views of Secretary Herter.

The President thought that we should take up the problem of the deployment of atomic weapons to the Federal Republic as a problem by itself. We should attempt to see clearly just what we were gaining and losing by such a move.

Secretary Anderson said he had been wondering whether it would be possible for members of the State Department to approach leaders of both parties of the Congress with suggestions that they make statements on the floor of the House or the Senate with respect to our course of action on Berlin. The statements he had in mind, said Secretary Anderson, would not be cast in a belligerent form but would be designed as an indication of the firm resolution of the U.S. If such statements were carefully prepared and delivered, Secretary Anderson believed that they would constitute a source of strength for the U.S. position at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers' Meeting. They would also serve the purpose of preparing the people of the U.S. for all the eventualities they faced. Lastly, such statements would help Mr. Allen and the U.S.I.A. to mobilize world opinion in defense of the U.S. and the Western position.

Secretary Herter commented that he believed that the President's recent speech had done the best job in explaining the problem of Berlin to the people of the country. Mr. George Allen was unclear as to whether the speeches suggested by Secretary Anderson were to deal with the Berlin crisis or with the problem of deploying atomic weapons in the Federal Republic or other Western European countries. He confessed that he saw no hope whatsoever of getting world public opinion behind a U.S. course of action to deploy these atomic weapons in Western Europe. This was an issue on which we simply could not win over world opinion.

Secretary Herter pointed out that nevertheless NATO had been very staunch in support of the U.S. position on the desirability of deploying these atomic weapons in Europe. Even the British had

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strongly supported the move. Mr. Allen then suggested that perhaps the best way to sell this idea would be for members of the Government of the Federal Republic to make speeches in Bonn indicating that the Germans want these weapons deployed on their soil.

The President pointed out that when he had given instructions in December 1957 for the deployment of these atomic weapons, he had been at great pains to assure that the U.S. would not attempt to dragoon any of our Allies into accepting these weapons on their soil. He had been determined to avoid blackmail and his order had made this point very clear. Secretary Herter assured the President that the Germans were pushing hard to get these atomic weapons and also added that we were now engaged in negotiations with Turkey, Greece, and The Netherlands for deployment of these weapons on their territories.

Reverting to the idea originally suggested by Secretary Anderson, the President said that he did believe that it would be desirable to get Representatives and Senators on both sides of the aisle to make speeches to explain why we were proposing to provide our Allies with these atomic weapons. Such speeches should stress the defensive character of our proposed action.

Secretary Herter pointed out that the Joint Committee would have to approve the agreements by which these deployments were carried out. The President thought that if we made such agreements, there was bound to be a certain amount of revelation of atomic energy information.

Secretary Quarles was invited to clarify the understanding of what was involved in such agreements. Secretary Quarles said that the agreements which would have to be approved by the Joint Committee were not agreements which would allow us to put atomic stockpiles on the soil of our foreign Allies. The agreements which require the approval of the Committee were those which involved the exchange of atomic information which would enable our Allies to do what they have to do with these weapons once they were deployed. The matter of deployment of the weapons was a matter between governments, but as for the agreements necessary to provide our Allies with information essential to the use of these weapons, this was something which required the approval of the Congressional Committee. The Committee can consider such an agreement and hold it up for sixty days although Secretary Quarles did not

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believe that the Committee was required to consider the matter for the full sixty days.*

The Vice President observed that Secretary Anderson had made a good point in suggesting speeches by Congressmen and Senators about our position in the Berlin crisis. Nevertheless, as far as public opinion of this country was concerned, the President's speech on the Berlin crisis had been much the most effective statement thus far. Members of Congress, for example Senator Fulbright, have already talked a great deal about the Berlin crisis. In these circumstances the Vice President believed that Berlin might be the subject of the first public statement by our new Secretary of State. This would be bound to have a very considerable effect - much more effect than any speech by any member of Congress, however distinguished.

The President said he thought very well of the Vice President's proposal. Such a speech by Secretary Herter could well take the form of a talk to the people in a homely fashion. It should be designed to explain the continuity of our policy; it should avoid inciting to fear and instead stress the continuity of our firm policy with regard to Berlin.

Secretary Herter suggested that if he were to make such a speech, it should be made after he returned from the April 29 meetings in Paris but before he went back to Geneva for the Foreign Ministers' Conference opening on May 11. The Vice President commented that he thought well of the proposed timing. Mr. Allen Dulles suggested the Council on Foreign Relations as a good forum. The Vice President commented that his proposal for a speech by Secretary Herter did not of course exclude speeches afterwards on the floor of the House or the Senate.

At this point Mr. Gray summed up what he understood to be the action of the Council on these two papers.

The National Security Council:

1. Noted and discussed the two studies prepared at the direction of the President and enclosed with the reference memorandum for the President.
2. Noted that the President has previously approved the transmission of the studies to General Norstad for his use in

*It is uncertain whether Secretary Quarles' point is correct. It may be mandatory for the Joint Committee to withhold action for a period of sixty days after receipt of a proposed agreement made by the Executive Branch with a foreign government.

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preparing preliminary U.S. positions in the Tripartite Staff in Paris.

3. Noted the President's view that, with respect to the study of military measures, any advance planning regarding the alternative uses of force would necessarily be subject to review and decision in the light of circumstances as they develop.
4. Agreed that the studies in their present form should not be transmitted to our allies, and that any disclosures to our allies with respect to these studies should be deferred pending further study under 6-c below.
5. Noted the President's approval, subject to the above caveats, of the utilization of the study of alternative courses of action regarding use of force by the Department of Defense as a basis for the initial planning of measures to be taken on a national basis.
6. Noted the President's approval in principle of the studies for use in further planning under the coordination of a group to be chaired by Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, with representatives from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and, as necessary on an ad hoc basis, other agencies. Specifically, this group should, in the light of the discussion at this special meeting, coordinate such further planning, including:
 - a. The results of the planning by the Department of Defense pursuant to 5 above.
 - b. The development of general political, economic and military measures as outlined in these studies, with particular reference to selection and timing, referring major decisions for the President's approval as they become necessary.
 - c. Recommendations as to the disclosure to our allies of information contained in the studies.

S. Everett Gleason

S. EVERETT GLEASON

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PROPOSED AGENDA

For Special NSC Meeting,

9:00 a.m., Thursday, April 23, 1959.

1. Analysis of Political and Military Implications of Alternative Uses of Force to Maintain Access to Berlin, prepared by State, Defense, JCS and CIA.
 - a. Ask for questions and comments separately after presenting each of the sections of the paper as follows:
 - (1) The Introduction (p. 1) and the Assumptions (p. 3).
 - (2) Preparatory and Supporting Actions (p.4).
 - (3) Alternative One: A Substantial Effort to Reopen Ground Access by Local Action (p.10). Note Intelligence dissent on p. 15.
 - (4) Alternative Two: A Substantial Effort to Reopen Air Access, if Blocked (p. 18). Note Intelligence dissent on p. 21.
 - (5) Alternative Three: Reprisals Against the Communists in Other Areas, e.g., Western Naval Controls on Bloc Shipping (p. 24).
 - (6) Alternative Four: General War Measures (p.32). Note Intelligence comment on p. 34.
 - (7) Reactions Within Germany to the Four Courses of Action (p. 37).
2. Analysis of Non-Military Measures to Induce the Soviet Union to Remove Obstructions to Western Access to Berlin, prepared by State and CIA.
 - a. Call on Secretary of State to present Summary and Conclusions (p. 1 through 4), with any additional statements he considers desirable.
→ *Then Allen Dulles -*
 - b. Call on General Twining for JCS comments.
 - c. Ask for questions and comments.
3. Covering Memorandum for the President from Robert Murphy, Acting Secretary of State.
 - a. Read (or call attention to) paras. 2 and 3.

ASU new. see 6:02v ref to Mc 265, cheryl G.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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At the NATO Ministerial meeting last December 17, I gave you an interim report on the two extremely important programs which were authorized by the Heads of Government meeting in 1957 for the defense of the Alliance -- the development of an IRBM capability within Allied Command Europe and the establishment of stocks of nuclear warheads which would be available for NATO forces regardless of nationality, should they be needed.

In implementation of these programs, delivery systems, including IRBM's, aircraft, Honest Johns, etc., are now being made available to the various NATO nations and their national units are being trained in their use.


All of these arrangements are being coordinated in accordance with requirements of established NATO defense plans.

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS	
Agency Case	OSD 89-MDX-063/L
NLE Case	89-4243
By	2/65 NLE Date 7/18/91

Marstad 185 / A. L. Jones - NAC Policy
1457-59 (1)

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Last December I commented on the detailed plans set forth in SHAPE document "Allied Command Europe plan for the NATO Special Ammunition Storage Program," giving you an idea of requirements for storage sites to mid-1960 and of our progress toward this goal. That progress has not slackened. For example,



To make such a program fully effective, carefully worked-out bilateral agreements between the United States and the other NATO nations concerned are necessary. Generally speaking, it has been found that two basic types of agreements are adequate for the purpose. First, there is a bilateral accord between the two governments, stating the

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basic principles under which the nuclear weapons will be introduced and maintained in the host or user nation in furtherance of the NATO program.

I am informed that agreements of a similar type are being negotiated by the United States with a number of other NATO governments and there is every indication that these countries desire and intend to proceed rapidly to complete them.

At the same time, a second group of bilateral agreements have been under negotiation to provide for the exchange of atomic energy data. They are required by U.S. law before certain classified information applying to nuclear weapons can be transmitted to other nationals. They do not have to be reached simultaneously with the basic stockpile arrangements mentioned in the last paragraph, but are a necessity in order for national forces to achieve their own full atomic capability.

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As you will remember from the case of the U.S.-U.K. agreement, such agreements must be public, with classified technical annexes, and must lie before the U.S. Congress for 60 days before becoming effective. Now that the program has reached the appropriate stage of development in certain NATO countries, these nations are negotiating agreements of this type with the Government of the United States.

The agreements will be presented to the United States

Congress in the near future to ensure that the 60-day requirement is completed before the Congress adjourns this summer. Others will follow in due course. I feel that it is absolutely necessary that this procedure be completed as soon as possible so that there will be no bar to the steady progress of this Program, which was so stoutly initiated by the Heads of Government in 1957.

At this point I would like to express my satisfaction at the

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promising progress which has been made by the NAC concerning common funding both for technical facilities for custodial storage sites and for support and depot sites. The Council's recent action in this field should go a long way towards reducing what was a considerable barrier to prompt development of our program. I think it only reasonable that the infrastructure for any weapons system which is located and constructed with a view to serving the common defense, as distinguished from the defense of a single nation, should be paid for by the Alliance, particularly where the cost may otherwise fall disproportionately on a NATO country. And, parenthetically, I am hopeful that a similar attitude will be evidenced in support of the financing for NATO's IRBM Program.

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There have, of course, been other discussions which it would be premature to comment upon in detail at this time.

In conclusion, I urge that we not lose sight of the Soviet threat that led the Heads of Government to initiate these bold programs for the defense of NATO. There is no evidence that the threat has diminished. Consequently, I consider it absolutely essential that we continue to move ahead resolutely and promptly. All elements of this NATO effort must be carefully synchronized and must proceed steadily on schedule -- the necessary bilateral agreements -- the delivery of modern delivery systems -- the development of special ammunition storage -- the training of the forces of the NATO nations in their use. Every part of the program

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is necessary. The process must continue so that we can give to the NATO forces the strength which will permit them to accomplish their defensive mission.

**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING
Department of State
UNCLASSIFIED

5/7/59
157 M 7 PM 6 29

03649

1

W SENT TO: Amembassy BONN 2700



Origin
SS
Info:

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Deliver following message from President to
Chancellor Adenauer. Advise date time delivery.

QUOTE May 7, 1959

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I am deeply moved by the heartfelt sentiments you
express in your letter which has just reached me.

Secretary Dulles was always sustained and encouraged
by the valiant way you face your own great responsibilities
in the troubled world in which we live. Indeed, your
firm leadership has been a source of strength to me and
to everyone who cherishes the ideals of freedom and
justice.

With warm personal regard.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower UNQUOTE

Drafted by:

EUR:AVigderman/FKohler

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Calhoun

Clearances:

S/D:JNGreene:jmr

5/7/59

The White House(Major Eisenhower)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4.(b)

MR 87-439#6

BY JMS DATE 2/7/90

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PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

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COPY IS PROHIBITED.

AWP (Int / M / Adenauer, 1959 (9)

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White House does not plan to make message public unless
do so.
Chancellor ~~xxx~~ desires/ In latter case please attempt to give us
24 hours advance notice.

Observe **PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING**

HERTER

CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM
721

Department of State

NLE MR Case No. 87-23
Document No. 14

W

SECRET

Action

SS

Info

FROM: Geneva

TO: Secretary of State

NO: CANTO 5, May 14, 6 p.m.

Control: 8922

Rec'd: May 14, 1959
1:52 p.m.

3

FOR FOSTER DULLES FROM THE SECRETARY

"Dear Foster:

Have hesitated sending you direct message on proceedings here because until now nothing has occurred except procedural sparring of type with which you more familiar than I. Deep underlying purpose Soviets was to force on us greater recognition East German Government. Believe matter now well in hand though can expect further moves same direction in coming days.

So far, three Allied delegations and West Germans working well together. Everyone misses your leadership and speaks of you constantly. British are making strong efforts to allay suspicions in minds of other Foreign Ministers and have so far proved themselves very staunch. Personal relationships Allied side good but of course real tests still to come.

Everyone sends you warmest greetings and best wishes.

SIGNED CHRIS."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *W. B. [signature]* DATE *1/8/82*
HERTER

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE

TS AUTH. REASON(S)

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

DECLASSIFIED ☒ RELEASABLE ☒

RELEASE DENIED ☐

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

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Authority *MR 87-23 #14*

NLE Date *4/24/87*

Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers
President of the United States

DULLES-HERTER SERIES

ROW/7

00115007000



THE JOINT STAFF

5/18/59
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RESTRICTED DATA

Atomic Energy Act 1954

18 May 1959

MB-1 ROCKET

The MB-1 is an air-to-air unguided rocket produced for the U.S. Air Force. It weighs 800 pounds including a 220 pound nuclear warhead. It uses solid propellant propulsion and has a maximum range of 50,000 feet. Its speed is MACH 4.5 and it will operate to a maximum altitude of 80,000 feet. It is now operational in 16 squadrons defending the North American Continent.



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Agency Case OSD-88-MPR-230

NLE Case 88-225-41

By SLB NLE Date 1/26/99

RESTRICTED DATA

Atomic Energy Act 1954

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5/27/59
5/27/59
not ~
(PNU)

CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR ADENAUER, May 27, 1959.

(Note: Chancellor Adenauer saw the President for approximately a half hour "alone" -- that is, with the exception of the needed interpreter. This was done at the Chancellor's request. Later they were joined for some fifteen minutes by the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister von Brentano.)

Chancellor Adenauer, as usual, laid out his general thinking toward the Communist menace. In this he shows no great change -- indeed, if he did I would be greatly disappointed.

He seems to have developed almost a psychopathic fear of what he considers to be "British weakness." I went over with him some of my conversations with Mr. Macmillan and also described in rough fashion some of the British problems in the world. I told him that I am certain that in basic conviction and belief, Harold Macmillan and the Conservative Party leadership stand squarely with the rest of us. On the other hand, Britain has some economic and political problems that are almost unique, at least they are delicate and never ending. Since there is a very sharply divided opinion in that nation affecting such matters, Macmillan has had to tread a very careful path. In spite of this I told the Chancellor that in my opinion in any show-down Macmillan would stand firmly on principle.

The Chancellor discussed the continuing objective of re-uniting Germany. He stated, or implied, that the practicalities of the situation were such that the end would have to be achieved in a step-by-step process in which the two sides of Germany would themselves have to exhibit a clear readiness to be conciliatory and reasonable.

DDE

~~SECRET~~

Declassified by 5/26/82
By the State
under
By BSR

MWF/DDE 10 May/59/ 'May May 1959'

SECRET
May 28, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
May 27, 1959

Others present: Secretary Herter
Secretary Dillon
General Goodpaster

Referring to the Geneva meetings, the President said it has seemed to him that Mr. Herter is succeeding in what we have always wanted to do -- to be firm without being nasty or offensive. Mr. Herter added that he thought we have had a fair measure of success in accomplishing what Foster Dulles had always hoped for -- that is to make clear to the world that our proposals are reasonable and constructive.

The President next mentioned the luncheon he was planning to have for the visiting Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. He asked that the State Department assure each individual invited that there is no obligation whatsoever upon them to stay for the luncheon unless they want to. He said he simply planned to say at the luncheon that he has asked them as a measure of courtesy to their governments and appreciation for their attendance at the funeral services of Mr. Dulles. He would offer a single toast to the memory of Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Dillon said that the State Department had, as the President requested, considered the idea of a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers, and thought that such a meeting would be of very definite value. The President said that what he had in mind was simply to ask them in and tell them that it is, in his judgment, ridiculous that the world is divided into segments facing each other in unending hostility. He felt that decent men should be able to find some way to make progress toward a better state of things. Mr. Dillon thought it would be advantageous to have it known, at least generally, that the President had taken this position. The President stressed that he wanted to make confidential the nature of the specific discussions. Mr. Dillon added that Gromyko had asked if he could call on the President. Mr. Dillon thought that the meeting the President spoke

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-204

MR 76-49 #168

by DJH Date 6/12/80

Staff Secy / Subj / 105 / 3 / State Dept - 1959 (May - Sept) (2)'
also DOE May / 4 /

of would take care of this request. The President said he would bring out that he had been anxious to see the group, but didn't see how he could see them other than all together.

The President then referred to the question regarding the place of a possible summit meeting. His views were by no means fixed on this. He thought our willingness to accept any of several solutions might give us a little trading material. He is somewhat inclined against Geneva because it has a reputation for failure and frustration (he mentioned that one of Napoleon's criteria in selecting an officer for high command was "is he lucky?"). Mr. Herter said that the problem relating to Vienna is that the Russians are planning to have the "youth congress" there and this would preclude its use for anything else during August. The President mentioned his idea of inviting a very large group of Soviet students to attend American colleges for a year, as a one-shot proposition. Mr. Herter mentioned that the exchange of students has been a very sensitive point with the Russians. The President said he realized this, but felt a large scale offer might "break loose something." He said he would like Mr. Herter and Mr. Dillon to think the matter over. At the proper time, talks with key leaders in the Congress on a very discreet basis would be necessary. He added that he had talked with J. Edgar Hoover about this and Mr. Hoover had thought the idea an excellent one and commented that it would not make his work more difficult.

With regard to the Geneva meeting, Mr. Herter said it had been mostly sparring thus far. The Soviets are insistent on two peace treaties for Germany. There is some fear that they are making a play for favor with the satellites by trying to set up the East German Republic. They are sensitive, however, on the issue of two peace treaties, since they try to call their proposal a "peace treaty with Germany" rather than separate treaties with two Germanies. Mr. Herter said that allied unity has been excellent so far, with agreement not to take moves in the conference without prior consultation. He said that Gromyko has maintained a very courteous manner, but is evidently operating under very tight instructions from Moscow. Mr. Herter said he hoped for something effective to come out of the plane trip back to Geneva. There will be no press present. Each person will have one assistant present to make notes. He hopes for candid discussions.

In general, Mr. Herter thought that the Soviets are trying to outwait the West in terms of offering modifications to their initial position. He thought that the time may come when he would want to state a deadline for positive results in the conference. The President agreed but said that we do not want to be too quick in setting such a deadline. Mr. Herter said he is trying to work away from the constant tendency of the press to report the conference in terms of who won and who lost on each particular topic. On the matter of disarmament, he thought that some progress could be made, for example in arranging a forum to consider the matter, and a time and a place for meetings. At present the eighty-two nations of the United Nations constitute a committee on disarmament. His hope is to see if the Soviets can be brought down to something reasonable. At this point he showed the President a letter from Adenauer which the President called "very good." The President went on to comment, however, that Adenauer's statement that only through agreement on disarmament can progress on other problems be made was too restrictive. He agreed as to its importance but he thought that many other measures must and could be taken in the interim.

The President agreed that the status of Berlin cannot be definitively settled except in the context of Germany as a whole. He therefore did not think that an interim agreement on Berlin could be accepted as the price to be paid for the summit meeting by the Soviets. He agreed that we should never be inflexible except on the two or three things that are basic to our whole position, the chief one being the rights and responsibilities in Berlin that we have.

Mr. Herter said that the allies are in complete agreement on the things they are opposed to, such as accepting a reduction of our rights in Berlin. They are not yet clear on the positive aspects however. He is inclined to feel that a temporary solution regarding Berlin may be possible, but he stressed the point of its temporary nature, since we cannot agree, in effect, to have three Germanies (the two now existing plus Berlin). He thought it is possible that we can deal with Berlin with the Soviets. They are pressing for recognition of East Germany. The West Germans are dead set against this, but are keen to make additional contacts with the East Germans. The President thought this was a hopeful sign. Mr. Herter said

the West Germans, however, want us to sit in with them in any committees wherein they meet with East Germans; they are terribly afraid of being left alone with this Communist group, dominated by the Kremlin. Mr. Herter said there is a little something to work on and hoped to get Gromyko on the plane to say more clearly what the Russians have in mind. The President suggested that perhaps as a parallel to the committee, steps could be taken such that the newspapers of both East and West Germany could circulate freely each in the others area.

Mr. Herter next raised the question of time, place and agenda for a summit meeting. The period of July and August he thought was difficult because we do not know what the Congress will do. The President commented that as at Geneva the Foreign Ministers would meet in the morning and the Heads of Government in the afternoon, largely to confirm what they had done. If the meeting continued for a while, he thought he could come back to the United States for a week, with the Vice President sitting in for him. The President added that perhaps it would not be too bad to have the meeting while the Congress is in session. This would tend to keep Congressmen out of Geneva, if that is where it is held. Also some things may come up wherein Congressional backing would be of value. He said he would accept August for the date of the meeting if the meeting seemed to show promise of being meaningful.

Mr. Dillon said that it is possible that de Gaulle and Khrushchev would leave the meeting when the President left, for prestige reasons. The President thought this problem could be eased through his saying that he would return. The President said he could go as early as the first of July. He wished to help Macmillan in the matter, and was therefore willing to rule out September. Finally, the President said that any time consistent with the foregoing that Mr. Herter thought was all right would be acceptable to him.

Mr. Herter raised another point regarding the summit meeting. He had told Gromyko, when he kept pressing for Polish and Czechoslovakian participation, that this raised the question whether the Soviets wanted them to come to the summit. Gromyko replied, saying he was not raising that issue. Such a question would be

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- 5 -

taken up separately. Mr. Herter felt that a summit meeting must be limited to the four Heads of Government. The President agreed.

Mr. Herter said the French are extremely sensitive on the question of having nuclear testing as an agenda item since they are not involved in those negotiations. They would not object to the matter being discussed in "side conversations" by the other three powers, however, so long as it is not on the agenda. The President said that if he could get agreement on the question of testing at the summit he would certainly do so. Mr. Herter added that the British are taking a very stout stand in insisting with us that the quota of inspections that they have proposed must be decided upon on the basis of technical factors.

Mr. Herter returned to the question of "breaking Berlin out of the Western package." He thought we must do so, working for a solution which would be temporary in nature. The President said he agreed and had always thought so. Regarding the link between German reunification and the European security zone, Mr. Herter said the He did not think that we should pay such a price for a Berlin settlement.

The President said his thought has always been to link the European security zone with a larger security arrangement.

Mr. Herter asked how long he should plan to stay in Geneva. The President said it is hard to say; Mr. Herter could stay longer if some little progress was being made. If he comes to a brick wall, however, he thought Mr. Herter should set a day for stopping the discussions since they were getting nowhere and the Ministers might as well go home. The President recalled that both Macmillan and Khrushchev had made statements that if no progress is made in the Foreign Ministers meeting, a summit meeting is all the more necessary. The President said he utterly disagreed with this concept. Mr. Herter said he was in full accord with the President and he suspected that Selwyn Lloyd is, too. Mr. Herter said he hoped he would have something more to report after his plane ride with Gromyko.

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 1-301 (b) (1) (d)

State 108/72, NSC 6/4/80

NLE Date 6/12/80

SECRET

A. J. Goodpaster

Brigadier General, USA



NLE MR Case No. 165

Document No. 5128/159

May 28, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
May 27, 1959

Others present:

Secretary Herter
Secretary Dillon
General Goodpaster



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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MIL 90-309 #5

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BY 216

DATE 7/9/91

of would take care of this request. The President said he would bring out that he had been anxious to see the group, but didn't see how he could see them other than all together.

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- 5 -

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Mr. Herter returned to the question of "breaking Berlin out of the Western package." He thought we must do so, working for a solution which would be temporary in nature. The President said he agreed and had always thought so. Regarding the link between German reunification and the European security zone, Mr. Herter said the French and the Germans had always opposed the latter without reunification. The British may push us very hard on this, however. He did not think that we should pay such a price for a Berlin settlement.

The President said his thought has always been to link the European security zone with a larger security arrangement.

Mr. Herter asked how long he should plan to stay in Geneva. The President said it is hard to say; Mr. Herter could stay longer if some little progress was being made. If he comes to a brick wall, however, he thought Mr. Herter should set a day for stopping the discussions since they were getting nowhere and the Ministers might as well go home. The President recalled that both Macmillan and Khrushchev had made statements that if no progress is made in the Foreign Ministers meeting, a summit meeting is all the more necessary. The President said he utterly disagreed with this concept. Mr. Herter said he was in full accord with the President and he suspected that Selwyn Lloyd is, too. Mr. Herter said he hoped he would have something more to report after his plane ride with Gromyko.

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

n (FRY)

W

SECRET

Action

Classification

Control: 6162

SS

Rec'd: JUNE 9, 1959
6:52 A.M.

Info

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

2

NO: CAHTO 91, JUNE 9, 11 A.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

NIACT

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

QUOTE

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

TODAY MARKS THE OPENING OF THE FIFTH WEEK OF OUR CONFERENCE AND I HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT WE ARE AT A CROSSROADS WHICH REQUIRES A NEW INITIATIVE ON OUR PART. THE SITUATION TODAY, AS I SEE IT, IS THAT WE HAVE PRESENTED THE WESTERN PEACE PLAN AND PERSUASIVELY SUPPORTED IT IN SEMI-PUBLIC PLENARY SESSIONS. WE HAVE ALSO IN SAME FORUM DISPOSED OF SOVIET PACKAGE. FOR PAST TWO WEEKS REAL DIALOGUE HAS BEEN IN PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH SEVERELY RESTRICTED ATTENDANCE.

THESE SESSIONS HAVE CONCENTRATED ON POSSIBLE NATURE OF ARRANGEMENT FOR WEST BERLIN PENDING REUNIFICATION, THE LATTER AND EVENT PROBABLY YEARS DISTANT.

DURING LAST WEEK OF PRIVATE MEETINGS IT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED, I BELIEVE, BY GROMYKO THAT WE WILL NOT CONSIDER HIS FREE CITY PROPOSAL. HE HAS EQUALLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT CONSIDER OUR UNITED BERLIN PROPOSAL. MUCH UNDERBRUSH HAS BEEN CLEARED AWAY. SIGNIFICANTLY GROMYKO HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT OUR PRESENT PRESENCE IN BERLIN IS BY RIGHT. HE CONSISTENTLY REFUSES, HOWEVER, TO CONTEMPLATE ANY REFERENCE TO OUR RIGHTS IN ANY AGREEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE REACHED HERE. HE HAS NOT INSISTED ON THE DDR BEING A PARTY TO SUCH AGREEMENT AND HE HAS ACCEPTED OUR

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Authority: DWR 87-12-11

NLE Date: 11/16/87

Staff Secy / 3h / DWS / 5 / Geneva Cables [Apr-May 1959] (7)'

SECRET

-2- CAHTO 91, JUNE 9, 11 A.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM GENEVA

REITERATED REFUSAL TO ACCORD DDR RECOGNITION. HE AFFIRMS THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED HERE WILL BE SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERED TO BY THE SOVIETS UNTIL REUNIFICATION AND ALSO BY DDR WHO WOULD ACCEPT OBLIGATION IN BILATERAL COLLATERAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN SOVIETS AND DDR OR SOME COMPARABLE METHOD WHICH I THINK COULD BE WORKED OUT SATISFACTORILY TO US.

ESSENCE OF THE POSITION AS I SEE IT TODAY IS THAT AN AGREEMENT REACHED HERE ON BERLIN WITH SOVIETS WHICH LACKED ANY REFERENCE TO OUR RIGHTS (AND TO VARIETY OF AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS BASED ON THEM DURING PAST FOURTEEN YEARS) WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT IN FUTURE TO CONTEST CLAIM BY SOVIETS ON SUCH FUTURE DAY AS THEY CHOOSE TO CONCLUDE SEPARATE PEACE TREATY WITH DDR THAT ALL RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED IN ANY AGREEMENT REACHED AND RECORDED HERE AT GENEVA WOULD FROM THAT DAY FORWARD BE EXTINGUISHED. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT SOME OTHER WAY COULD BE FOUND TO PROTECT US ON THIS POINT, SUCH AS A DECLARATION BY US WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT WITHOUT DENIAL, BUT I AM DUBIOUS, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF KHRUSHCHEV'S RECENT STATEMENT IN BUDAPEST WHICH GROMYKO REFLECTED IN STERILE PRIVATE SESSION.

AS I SAID EARLIER, I BELIEVE A NEW ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IS REQUIRED. TO BE EFFECTIVE WITH THE SOVIETS IT MUST COME FROM THE UNITED STATES. OTHERWISE WE WILL NOT ONLY WASTE TIME FROM NOW ON BUT MORE IMPORTANT RISK MISINTERPRETATION BY THE SOVIETS OF THE SOLIDITY OF OUR BASIC POSITION. ACCORDINGLY I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION WHICH I RECOMMEND. IF APPROVED BY YOU I WOULD THEN SEEK THE AGREEMENT OF SELWYN, COUVE AND VON BRENTANO TO MY TALKING WITHOUT DELAY TO GROMYKO ALONE ALONG THE LINES I AM ABOUT TO SUGGEST.

I WOULD THEN PLAN TO TELL GROMYKO:

(1) THAT THE CONFERENCE IS CLEARLY NOW GETTING NOWHERE THOUGH EACH SIDE HAS USEFULLY OBTAINED A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE

OTHER'S

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SECRET

-3- CAHTO 91, JUNE 9, 11 A.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM
GENEVA

OTHER'S POSITION.

(2) THAT THE ALLIED POSITION ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IS IMMOVABLE
AND NOT OPEN TO NEGOTIATION:

(A) THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED HERE MUST REFLECT THE FACT THAT
IT IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE CONTINUATION IN FORCE OF OUR
RIGHTS OF PRESENCE IN AND ACCESS TO BERLIN.

(B) THAT WE MIGHT OURSELVES CONSIDER IN THE FUTURE SOME MODEST
REDUCTION IN THE STRENGTH OF OUR GARRISONS, DEPENDING ON
CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT THAT WE WILL NOT ADMIT A SOVIET DETACHMENT
TO JOIN THEM IN WEST BERLIN NOR REDUCE THEM TO WHAT HE
APPARENTLY CONSIDERS "SYMBOLIC." IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD
EMPHASIZE THAT GROMYKO HAS AGREED OUR GARRISONS HAVE NO MILITARY
SIGNIFICANCE.

HERTER

VH

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W

SECRET

Action

Classification

Control:

6191

SS

Rec'd:

JUNE 9, 1959

7:26 AM

Info

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

2

NO: CAHTO 91, JUNE 9, 11 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

NIACT

(C) THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF RECOGNIZING THE DDR. HE ACCEPTS THOUGH HE DISAGREES. HENCE PROVISION FOR THE DDR TO RESPECT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WITH SOVIETS IS MATTER TO BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THEM AND DDR IN A FORM ACCEPTABLE TO US.

(D) THAT NO AGREEMENT IS IN ORDER ON PROPAGANDA AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES SINCE SOVIETS STATE THEY ATTACH LITTLE IMPORTANCE TO THIS. EACH SIDE, HOWEVER, MIGHT UNDERTAKE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN COMMON INTEREST OF AVOIDING AGGRAVATION TENSIONS.

(E) THAT CLARIFICATION OF ACCESS PROCEDURES WOULD OF COURSE PROTECT ALL CIVILIAN TRAFFIC AS WELL AS GARRISONS' NEEDS AND IN EFFORT TO MEET SOVIETS' EXPRESSED DESIRES WE COULD ACCEPT TURNOVER BY SOVIET TO DDR OF "FUNCTIONS" RELATING TO MILITARY TRAFFIC ON BASIS IMPLYING NO WESTERN RECOGNITION DDR AND PROVIDING IT ACCEPTED THAT IN CASE OF ANY FUTURE COMPLAINTS ON OUR PART OUR RECOURSE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE TO THE USSR.

(3) I WOULD PLAN TO CONCLUDE BY TELLING GROMYKO THAT IF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED AT THIS CONFERENCE WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE FOREGOING DESIDERATE, THEN I BELIEVE YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO A SUMMIT CONFERENCE THIS SUMMER OR FALL. I WOULD ASK HIM TO CONSIDER MY STATEMENT IN ALL SERIOUSNESS AND ADD THAT I WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A BRIEF RECESS IF HE DESIRED TO CONSULT MOSCOW IN LIGHT OF WHAT I HAD JUST TOLD HIM. FINALLY I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE PROLONGATION OF A STERILE CONFERENCE WOULD SEEM TO ADD LITTLE TO THE

SECRET

-2- CAHTO 91, JUNE 9, 11 AM(SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM GENEVA.

TO THE RELAXATION OF TENSIONS WHICH WE SEEK AND WHICH PURPOSE WE ASSUME SOVIETS SHARE.

A WORD ON THE ATMOSPHERE. GROMYKO REMAINS RELATIVELY MODERATE IN DEBATE BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE. HE AND HIS ENTOURAGE ARE MAKING CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO GIVE IMPRESSION OF FRIENDLY AND SERIOUS EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT, BUT ARE COMPLETELY INFLEXIBLE.

COUVE IS AN EXCELLENT PARTNER, ARTICULATE AND FORCEFUL. RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH DELEGATION WHICH IS LARGE AND WELL STAFFED WITH SOVIET EXPERTS ARE EXCELLENT. THE WEST GERMANS ARE ON THE WHOLE QUIET BUT SOLID. THEY STAY IN THE BACKGROUND AND IN THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE BEEN OBVIOUSLY DISTURBED BY ADENAUER'S REVERSAL OF HIS DECISION ON THE PRESIDENCY.

SELWYN HAS PLAYED THE ALLIED GAME FAITHFULLY. HE REMAINS HIGHLY SENSITIVE BUT I THINK OUR RELATIONS WITH HIM AND HIS DELEGATION ARE VERY GOOD. CERTAINLY THEY ARE FAR BETTER THAN DURING THE OPENING DAYS OF THE CONFERENCE. IN DEBATE HE IS OFTEN TOO READY TO INJECT A MODERATING REMARK AND TO PROFESS TO SEE POINTS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET WHEN IN FACT NONE EXISTS. I NOW EXPECT NO REAL DIFFICULTY WITH SUDDEN BRITISH INITIATIVES. INDEED SELWYN HAS CONSISTENTLY HUNG BACK RATHER THAN TRIED TO ASSUME ANY ROLE OF LEADERSHIP. I SUSPECT BRITISH "FLEXIBILITY" WILL BE HELD IN RESERVE FOR A SUMMIT CONFERENCE. THIS IS NOT TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THEY DO NOT VERY BADLY WANT A SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND IF SIGNS WERE TO MULTIPLY THAT WE WILL BREAK UP HERE WITHOUT AGREEMENT OUR LINES MIGHT NOT HOLD.

IN SUM, AS I HAVE WRITTEN, I THINK THE TIME HAS COME FOR ME TO TAKE A DIRECT INITIATIVE WITH GROMYKO IN THE EFFORT TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. I AM SATISFIED THAT GROMYKO WILL
ACCEPT SERIOUSLY

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
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-3- CHATO 91, JUNE 9, 11 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM GENEVA.

ACCEPT SERIOUSLY WHAT I SAY TO HIM ALONE, WHEREAS THE SAME STATEMENT MADE IN ONE OF OUR PRIVATE QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS IS LIKELY TO BE INTERPRETED BY HIM AS A NEGOTIATING POSITION. THERE IS A RISK, OF COURSE, THAT THIS CONFERENCE WILL END WITH NO ACCOMPLISHMENT AND IN THIS CONNECTION WE ARE WORKING VERY SECRETLY ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS FOR A PUBLIC PRESENTATION AND POSTURE TO COVER OUR DISENGAGEMENT. THIS RISK, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN INHERENT SINCE OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONFERENCE AND I BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME TO PUSH THE ISSUE. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. IN LIGHT OF NEIL MCELROY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE YOU MAY WANT TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE AVAILABLE TO HIM. FAITHFULLY, SIGNED: CHRIS"

HERTER

VI/21



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6/4/59

Department of State

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SENT TO: Amconsul GENEVA TOGAH 90 NIACT

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Origin

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Info:

FOR SECRETARY FROM ACTING SECRETARY

After our telephone conversation I discussed CAHTO 91 and 92 with the President and gave him your brief report on today's meeting. The President asked me to answer your telegrams and to tell you that in view of the rapidly changing circumstances he felt that final decision should be left in your hands.

He agrees with the idea of a private talk with Gromyko provided Couve and Selwyn are agreeable and provided the situation still permits such a conversation. The President was in accord with the general line of your suggested demarche to Gromyko. We talked of the question of our rights and the President indicated that he would be satisfied if we maintained them by any means that you found satisfactory. Specifically he saw no rpt no objection to your thought that it might be possible to preserve them by a unilateral declaration not objected to by the Soviets. The President also indicated his hope that there might be some agreement at Geneva to increase individual contacts.

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

DECLASSIFIED	Authority <i>MB 2722 #5</i>
	By <i>bc</i> NLE Date <i>11/1/87</i>

Drafted by: W:CDDillon:jcs:imc
6/9/59

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Acting Secretary


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S.S - Mr. Calhoun

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contacts between East and West Germany as he feels this could only redound to the advantage of the West.

I then showed the President some excerpts from Khrushchev's speech at Budapest, in particular Khrushchev's remarks regarding a possible Summit conference. The President reacted strongly and said that ~~he~~ we should make clear that we could not allow a break-up of the Foreign Ministers conference without results on any theory that the Ministers lacked authority to reach agreement and that only Heads of Government were competent to make agreements. He pointed out that in the case of the US and the other Western powers the Foreign Ministers are the official representatives of their Governments and can make decisions on their own within the broad outlines of governmental policy. The President suggested that you might tell Gromyko this and in particular say to him that you as Secretary of State have the President's full confidence and are authorized to make agreements which will be backed up by the United States. To imply otherwise and to deny the competence of Foreign Ministers would be to deny the validity of the whole diplomatic process. The President thought you might bring this view out in public at anytime you felt it would be useful.

Should

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of telegram to

Iconsul GENEVA

TOCAH

SECRET

Should there be a breakdown we in the Department feel that there is considerable merit in Couve's suggestion of a thirty-day cooling-off period. The President agreed that this might be a practicable course provided you and your British and French associates feel it desirable. The main burden of the President's views were that in view of the rapidly changing situation he thought that you should feel fully free to take whatever action you thought best at tomorrow's Plenary.

Acting

DILLON



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6/9/59
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June 9, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
June 9, 1959 - 2:00 PM

Others present: General Norstad
Major Eisenhower

General Norstad began this informal meeting by giving the President his estimate of the situation in France. In General Norstad's view, the situation shows no improvement. There is nothing new and no signs of a new attitude. The one optimistic note lies in General Norstad's belief that de Gaulle is beginning to learn. He is becoming aware of the effects of his actions on France.

This prompted the letter from de Gaulle to the President, which was written personally by him.

General Norstad believes that de Gaulle will not relax this attitude since it is all part of a long-range plan.

To cope with this situation in France, General Norstad recommended that the U.S. present a calm, pleasant, orderly front. Meanwhile, we should do what we must to provide for our security. Every effort should be taken to avoid an appearance of anger or excitement. We should be considerate and thoughtful, but do what is right. General Norstad concluded that the President might be in for a shock in the event he met with de Gaulle in the near future. The French are counting on such a meeting and this fact could present a considerable problem. The President then discussed his own acquaintance with de Gaulle. He stressed de Gaulle's obsession with the honor, strength and glory

Staff Room/Int'l Trip/M/5/NATO (2) [1959-1960]
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100-100000, SER. 3-2 (2)

MR 85-528 #5

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NSC letter 6/4/59, SER. 10/85

FILE DATE 1/7/86

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- 2 -

of France. All his actions contribute toward the promotion of these goals. Such a small matter as the timing of a call is calculated within this framework. The President then reviewed incidents of the past which threw light on de Gaulle's character, such as the difficulty of arranging a meeting when de Gaulle visited Paris in 1952 and refused, on the basis of his prior position, to visit with the President at SHAPE. He recalled that from early 1944 on, both Churchill and Roosevelt had washed their hands of de Gaulle and had told the President, then Supreme Commander, that he must do the dealings. In fairness to de Gaulle, however, the President pointed out that in many of the issues which are being discussed, we would react very much as de Gaulle does if the shoe were on the other foot.

General Norstad expressed the view that de Gaulle actually wants a veto power over the use of our Strategic Air Command. He does not believe that de Gaulle has the capability of wrecking NATO because of the strong reaction against his policies among the other NATO nations at this time. As an example, General Norstad cited the speech which the French General, Bilotte, had made to the Atlantic Council meeting. His demands that nuclear weapons be made available to France evoked strong negative reaction in that body. The President noted that we are willing to give, to all intents and purposes, control of the weapons. We retain titular possession only. General Norstad agreed and expressed the view that if we decide to give weapons away, we will find ourselves in trouble around the world. He himself had been questioned on this point in Norway. He had thrown the question back to the Norwegians and had asked them whether they recommend the sharing of nuclear capability with other nations on the part of the U.S. After a period of silence, the Norwegians had answered "no." General Norstad regards the whole situation as quite unfortunate. A strong France is absolutely necessary. The confidence of the other nations, however, in France has been seriously damaged. He continued with an assessment of the de Gaulle action in withdrawing the French fleet from NATO command. From a military viewpoint, the forces removed were insignificant. What was harmful was the gesture, obviously an effort at retaliation for our position in Algeria. In the matter of air defense, the French are presenting particular difficulties. Here the French are withholding their air forces from NATO command although the vote is against them by 14 to 1. All this is part of the

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- 3 -

pressures for a tripartite status in the world. It is impossible to satisfy de Gaulle's appetite. General Norstad reiterated his opinion that the answer to this problem is in the education of de Gaulle who is an intelligent man and appears to be learning. He commented favorably on Debre and Ely although he noted that Ely is incapable of even talking to de Gaulle. In such meetings de Gaulle lets forth with a series of pronouncements which do nothing but discourage the conversation.

The President said that de Gaulle merely wants to make France the first nation of the world with himself the first Frenchman. Under the present circumstances de Gaulle would be courteous to the President himself, but would maintain the reservation that any concessions made would be on a personal basis, given by de Gaulle himself. The conversation which Secretary Dulles held with de Gaulle last winter, while most satisfactory, produced very little.

General Norstad pointed out the contradictions in de Gaulle's character. He told of a ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe where de Gaulle had taken special pains to make a grand gesture on Norstad's behalf and gave his best wishes to him and to his country. Norstad feels that de Gaulle harbors a true respect of the U.S. and is fond of the President personally. This fondness, far from being a comforting matter, can be extremely troublesome. In the event of a meeting, he hopes that the President will confine discussion to matters which have been handled by respective staffs and which therefore could promise agreement on some issues. He cautioned that one should not confuse the French people with the personality of de Gaulle. The cabinet has been with us in most of our conversations. In particular, General Norstad singled out Debre and Ely as being friendly to our viewpoints. The President said that the French have been "feeling their oats" ever since they had been making such great economic progress with the help of the International Monetary Fund, primarily since Suez of 1956. The President spoke warmly of Pinay and Pleven, which are two of his favorites. He mentioned an unpleasant incident which had occurred in North Africa when de Gaulle had broken up the meeting between the President and Giraud and himself when Giraud had dared to mention such an internal matter as their replacement problems in the French army.

The primary concern of the President right now, however, is that other NATO nations will finally become weary with de Gaulle's attitude and lose enthusiasm for the organization. Here General

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- 4 -

Norstad expressed hope that such would not be the case. So far the effect of French intransigence is to strengthen the resolution of the other allies. Among other measures being taken is the moving forward right now of a second eighteen fighters from the French airfields to strip alert in Germany. In a couple of weeks another eighteen will be moved forward, making a total of fifty-four aircraft displaced from France to Germany. In addition, General Norstad is discussing the permanent movement of some squadrons into the U. K. In answer to the President's question, General Norstad replied that Holland is not a feasible area for deployment due to the high costs involved.

In essence, General Norstad's redeployment scheme is to move three of the fighter squadrons now located in France forward to Germany. These squadrons will replace other squadrons, since he does not desire to overload Germany. The three reconnaissance squadrons so displaced will be moved to the U. K. In addition, two additional fighter wings, comprising six squadrons total, will also be moved to the U. K., resulting in a total increase in fighter and reconnaissance planes of nine squadrons in the U. K.

The President cautioned General Norstad that he does not desire at this time to present a threatening appearance to the Soviets. He is concerned lest such a front would destroy Geneva, although he expressed the view that Geneva is probably destroyed anyway. He then asked the basis on which we plan to retain possession of the airfields from which these squadrons will be moved. General Norstad answered that we will leave caretakers behind since these airfields are our NATO property. His primary airfields are three bases of wing capacity, each located in the vicinity of Nancy. The nine squadrons are deployed as three wings, one on each of three bases. General Norstad added that he anticipates this move to take six months. The purpose of this deliberate approach is to maintain an atmosphere of calm and to avoid annoyance. The President agreed with this approach. He cited one more experience he had had with de Gaulle, which involved his threat to withdraw French forces from SHAEF command at the time of the threat to Strasbourg during the Bulge. The President's own stated intention to deprive de Gaulle of all supplies had been made in the presence of Churchill, who was apparently dumfounded.

After some informal personal conversation, the meeting ended.

~~SECRET~~

John S. D. Eisenhower

6/9/59

UNCLASSIFIED

June 9, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
3 PM, 9 June 1959

1. Present in addition to the President were: the Vice President, Acting Secretary Dillon, Secretary McElroy, Deputy Secretary Gates, Budget Director Stans, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, General White, Mr. Holaday, General Persons, Dr. Killian, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster.

2. The following summarizes actions taken, and policy positions indicated by the President:

a. The President indicated broad approval of the following programs and planning proposals:

1. NIKE - Continue on a buy-out basis; deploy at sites presently programmed plus certain additional SAC bases.

2. BOMARC - Continue BOMARC A on a buy-out basis; continue BOMARC B on a minimum basis for deployment on the eastern, northern and western segments of the U. S. periphery.

3. SAGE - Strengthen to "high grade" SAGE on the above periphery (cost estimated roughly at \$250 million). Cut back to minimum capability SAGE in interior areas.

4. NIKE-ZEUS - Acceleration through an additional \$150 million under consideration.

b. The above changes are being made because, beyond the point these programs will reach, additions would not be very useful; the threat from Soviet bombers has changed with the reduced estimates of numbers of bombers, and because Soviet long-range missiles are becoming the dominant threat.

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
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- 2 -

c. While adoption of these changes logically tends to imply a firmer commitment to these programs beyond FY-60, it is to be understood that these programs are not frozen. Beyond FY-60, the programs should not be expressed as specific amounts for specific years, but rather as trends. Decisions on future budgetary authorizations are to be left open, and it is to be pointed out that the Administration will continue to watch developments and adjust accordingly.

d. Present action on these proposals is not to prejudice the full study of air defense now under way at the President's request pursuant to action by Gordon Gray. Hardening, concealment, and future role of interceptors are to be included. There is question concerning the F-108; the decision is open at the present time.

e. Continental U. S. air defense forces are to be under a single, strong operational command; this unified command is to have full command authority.



A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



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NATO

Atomic Stockpile

Future

MR Case No. 89-42

DRAFT - June 10, 1959

Document No. 2

RAT

SUBJECT: Control and Handling of Atomic Weapons for NATO

General Norstad instructed General Kinney to work up a study on this subject along the general proposal that the U.S. would turn over to NATO a certain stock of atomic weapons, a substantial number such as 200 - 500 weapons. These would be disposed of and utilized as NATO chooses, remaining under the custody of U.S. element for NATO. They would be the property of the Alliance for the life of NATO and would be utilized by it for its own purposes without further reference to the U.S. Government. The number might be based on a percentage of the total envisaged percentage under NATO planning, ~~or on varying~~ _____. He made clear that he did not wish to get involved in the question of how NATO would use these weapons and how NATO would go to war.

Will do a
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ALL MR CASE NO. 95-37

Document No. 1

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Stark
10/1/56
(E1)

June 19, 1959

2342

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT June 16, 1959

Others present: Secretary Dillon
General Goodpaster

The President said that the more that he thinks about the matter, the more impatient he becomes with the stand Mr. Macmillan has been taking on a summit meeting, and specifically on his message just received. He said he was thinking of some other kind of action he might take, for example inviting Mr. Khrushchev to come over and meet with him bilaterally. He stressed that he mentioned this just as a possibility.



Mr. Dillon handed to the President a draft text of a possible reply to Macmillan. He said Mr. Harter had just told Gromyko that the Western Ministers would give him a paper on the Western position before the meeting on the following day, and had indicated that if he were to receive no better response than heretofore, that fact would mark the end of the conference for the present.

The President said one thing is bothering him a great deal in the present situation, and that is the plan to put IRBMs in Greece. If Mexico or Cuba had been penetrated by the Communists, and then began getting arms and missiles from them, we would be bound to look on such developments with the gravest concern and in fact he thought it would be imperative for us to take positive action, even offensive military action. He could see the reason for Redstone, Corporal or Honest John missiles, which are short-range, but not IRBMs. He wondered if we were not simply being provocative, since Eastern Europe is an area of dispute in a political sense.

The point of this, the President indicated, is that perhaps we can say to Khrushchev that we will not put the IRBMs there, and see what he is willing to do on his side to improve the situation.

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At this point Ambassador Caccia was shown in to the President's office. He said he was most grateful to the President for seeing him. The President said he was glad to have the chance to talk with Caccia since he had been pondering the problem at Geneva very deeply, trying to get behind Prime Minister Macmillan's feeling to understand just what is in his mind. The President said that our Foreign Ministers are not school boys who lack authority to negotiate. They are engaged in a serious effort to find out just where we stand with the Russians and try to develop something that shows some promise for a summit meeting. He said the picture of going hat in hand to see the Russians at a summit meeting is not one that appeals to him or to the American people. He realized that the British do not want that either.

Ambassador Caccia said that the purpose of a summit meeting would be to consider how to get the Foreign Ministers meeting started up again. The President said he believes that Mr. Macmillan thinks that Khrushchev is so much the single boss that there is little use talking with anyone else. However, this delays the whole diplomatic process. So far as we are concerned, we send our Foreign Ministers over to Geneva with authority, within the limits laid down by the President, to conduct negotiations. In effect, the President said, the Foreign Ministers are the governments of their respective countries for such negotiations. The President recalled that he has constantly said we will not be bludgeoned into going to a summit meeting. The President acknowledged that he had no answer to the present situation. What troubles him most is that his greatest friend in the foreign field, Prime Minister Macmillan, seems to disagree with him in this assessment.

Ambassador Caccia said we have the question, "what can we do next if a deadlock occurs?" If we break off he was afraid we would be leaving the initiative to the Russians. The President disagreed, saying we would be simply leaving matters where they have been for the last five years. There are lots of initiatives that are not desirable, one of them being to surrender. Ambassador Caccia said that is not in this situation.

The President said that Ambassador Caccia knows this country very well. He should know that our people do not believe that

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weakness will lead to a solution in circumstances of this kind. He thought we would not try to send a full reply to Mr. Macmillan until he had Khrushchev's reply before him. Ambassador Caccia said he had anticipated that that would be the President's answer but wondered if there was anything he could communicate to Macmillan in the meantime.

The President recalled that Mr. Macmillan had said that if no agreement were reached at the Foreign Ministers meeting, it would be all the more necessary to hold a summit meeting. The President had disagreed and said he would not go under such circumstances. He did recognize, however, some weight to the argument that in a dictatorship no one but the dictator has power to commit the government. He did not feel that we should allow this characteristic to destroy the diplomatic process, however. Conditions are no longer the same as when Alexander and Napoleon met on the "raft in a river" to carve up Prussia. The President did believe, however, that the possibility of his meeting bilaterally with Khrushchev could be examined, if the others wanted him to do so. Ambassador Caccia said he would put this to Mr. Macmillan. The President cautioned that he would want to consider the matter with his advisers. He commented that he has given Khrushchev every chance to have a summit meeting, and is not going to say "please" to him.

Mr. Dillon commented that another alternative is to declare a recess at Geneva and meet again in a month or so. The President recognized that Mr. Macmillan may have a domestic political problem such that a recess might embarrass him if it came at this time. He did think that it would be better to recess than to break off the negotiations. The President commented that it is hard for him to see how the four chiefs of government could meet without their meeting being a summit meeting; an "informal" meeting does not seem realistic. The world would call it a summit regardless of the facade. He commented that de Gaulle seems to be even stiffer in his views than he is himself. Mr. Dillon said that de Gaulle said he would not go to a summit meeting under such circumstances but would send Debre. Ambassador Caccia said he doubted if de Gaulle would refuse to go if the President were there.

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The President said he would send Mr. Macmillan a letter. He has a tremendous regard for him and doesn't want to hurt him, or harm his chances for re-election. He said he thought we had agreed on a position up at Camp David and recalled that Mr. Dulles had brought the matter up when he and the Prime Minister stopped at the hospital on the way back to Washington.

Ambassador Caccia said that Khrushchev may do what he is threatening to do and block our access to Berlin. The President said the real question then is whether we are ready to enforce our rights. He felt that this is what Khrushchev is determined to do -- to make us take a stand showing whether we are prepared to use force. Ambassador Caccia commented that Khrushchev could present the matter in a form making it very difficult to take action. He said the British public finds it difficult to take critically the question who stamps the papers. The President said we still hold the Soviets responsible, no matter what they do. He regretted that Adenauer is so afraid of anything that involves contacts with the East Germans. Mr. Dillon commented that Adenauer had softened on this to a degree at Geneva.

The President said that speaking for himself he would rather be atomised than communitised. If the matter leads from stamping of cards to other things, all our rights can be gradually lost. In the present day, he thought that the only justifiable cause for war is the maintenance of freedom and rights. Summing up, he said that he would send Mr. Macmillan a message. He did not want to go into great detail until he sees what Khrushchev says. He commented that in his message to Khrushchev he had tried to be non-belligerent and added that he has tried to keep the correspondence extremely secret. Ambassador Caccia acknowledged that until the reply is received, it is very difficult to take a position. The President said the reply may simply be a long argument. We think we have been patient and non-belligerent, but this may be non-availing.

Mr. Dillon commented that Kozlov will be here in about two weeks and could perhaps be spoken to. The President said that one possibility might be for Khrushchev himself to come over and open their fair in New York. The President said he would be willing to see him in New York. He anticipated the French, British and Germans



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would not object to his doing so, since he did not imagine they would be fearful that he would betray them. Ambassador Caccia said this was an interesting possibility.

Ambassador Caccia said we are assuming that the Russians do not act in the meantime if the talks recess or break down. The President said that if they challenge us we must then talk about hitting them. At this point Mr. Caccia left the meeting.

Mr. Dillon commented that Mr. Harter had showed copies of the President's letter to Khrushchev to his colleagues in Geneva. The President commented that correspondence between Heads of Government is not something that he values very highly. The only value it does have, however, is if it is kept private. The President and Mr. Dillon then edited the proposed reply to Macmillan. Next Mr. Dillon showed the President a draft message reflecting his discussion of a day or two earlier with the President on the possibility of a Western summit meeting. After some discussion the President edited this message as well. The President indicated that his thought was simply that we have here a situation which could lead to the most damaging results if each of the Western powers began to act separately.

Mr. Dillon pointed out that we cannot be surprised at the intransigence the Soviets have shown if they had Macmillan's agreement in Moscow to a summit meeting no matter what was done concerning a Foreign Ministers meeting. The President said he would be more swayed by Macmillan's stand if it were based on a statement that British interests in the Far East or elsewhere would be harmed if a summit meeting were not held. The President commented that the crux of the difficulty now is that each of the Heads of Government has publicly committed himself to a specific position regarding possible attendance at a summit meeting, and these positions differ in important respects, thus giving the Russians opportunities to divide us.

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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June 19, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
June 16, 1959

Others present:

Secretary Dillon
General Goodpaster



He said he was thinking of some other kind of action he might take, for example inviting Mr. Khrushchev to come over and meet with him bilaterally. He stressed that he mentioned this just as a possibility.

Mr. Dillon handed to the President a draft text of a possible reply to Macmillan. He said Mr. Herter had just told Gromyko that the Western Ministers would give him a paper on the Western position before the meeting on the following day, and had indicated that if he were to receive no better response than heretofore, that fact would mark the end of the conference for the present.

The President said one thing is bothering him a great deal in the present situation, and that is the plan to put IRBMs in Greece. If Mexico or Cuba had been penetrated by the Communists, and then began getting arms and missiles from them, we would be bound to look on such developments with the gravest concern and in fact he thought it would be imperative for us to take positive action, even offensive military action. He could see the reason for Redstone, Corporal or Honest John missiles, which are short-range, but not IRBMs. He wondered if we were not simply being provocative, since Eastern Europe is an area of dispute in a political sense.

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A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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FROM

Embassy Moscow

734

DESP. NO.

June 26, 1959

DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

72 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION EUR REC'D 7/6	DEPT. S/S F E I R C P S/P L I N R R M/R OTHER
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SUBJECT: Conversation Between N. S. Khrushchev and Governor Harriman, June 23, 1959

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Khrushchev received Mr. Harriman at one o'clock in the Kremlin for an interview lasting about 1 1/2 hours prior to going to the country. After the usual pleasantries, the subject turned to corn. Mr. Khrushchev said that the agriculture situation was still very weak, that there were three to four times too many people on the farms. The Soviets have used only one-half of their potentialities.

"The virgin lands have been a complete success. We have recouped all our capital investment and netted a profit of 18 billion rubles not counting machinery and buildings. Even the skeptics are becoming ashamed. We know that the area we have plowed up is what is called in Canada a risky area. However, in the last five years despite two severe droughts we have made a profit. We suppose that this cycle of two bad years in five will be repeated, but the bread grains we harvest are the cheapest in the Soviet Union, that is, 20 to 30 rubles per centner as against 60 elsewhere, and some well-managed farms with good weather conditions have collected grain as cheap as 12 to 15 rubles per centner due to the susceptibility of the virgin lands to mechanization. On the other hand, on some farms we have two to three times as many people as we should. However, many Americans who are good businessmen and rationalizers do not understand the basis of our farming. The average US farmer operates on a purely commercial basis. The Soviet collective farm on the other hand produces for its own needs and sells only what is left over. Hence, we must make a great effort to reduce surplus labor. Some Americans say we lack manpower for the Seven Year Plan. We have plenty of labor for that; we will take them off the farms."

Asked how he was going to do this, he said, "We have no secrets. We revealed all our secrets in 1953. Our chief problem is to change the psychology of the farmers not only by reorganization but by improving management and leadership. Up to now we have given too many directives to farms. From now on farm management must show more initiative. For example, our research centers and experimental farms have hitherto had to operate on our state budgets which they eat up regardless of what they turn out in experiments. From now on they must pay their own way and live on the returns for services they render to our farmers."

Matkevich has told me of the American research centers and their assistance to US farmers. We propose to take a leaf from their book. For example, US commercial farms have profited from our early experiments in artificial insemination and use this method far more than even we who developed it. You

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BY [signature] NARS, DATE 21 3/83

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Desp. No. 734
From Moscow

should hardly be surprised that Communism which was born of capitalism will make the most use of capitalist advances."

Asked whether he really thought that the American economic system was approaching its end, he said that the US was still far from the end but was tending in that direction. Asked what he meant by saying that "the Communist system would bury capitalism," he said he only meant that in an historical sense. Socialism or Communism, he said, was a new and higher form of social organization bound to replace capitalism. The latter must give way. He never meant that Communism would physically bury the capitalist world. The proof of the superiority of the socialist structure is everywhere. During the first Five Year Plan when they constructed the first hydroelectric plant at Dnepropetrovsk, they hired Colonel Hugh Cooper whom they regarded as the highest authority. Yet when you look back, what Cooper did was mere child's play to what is being done today. Another example was a certain American engineer called Morgan who was hired as a consultant to the Metro in its early stages. (Morgan was here four years ago and told Khrushchev he was engaged in housing construction in Turkey. However, being a concrete specialist and an expert in tunnels, it turned out that he was building US military bases and no doubt tunnels in Turkey.)

Mr. Harriman suggested that maybe Soviet achievements were due not so much to the communist or socialist structure but to very vigorous leadership. The system of free enterprise, he suggested, was in its most creative stage. Mr. Khrushchev compared the level of industry in France, Germany, and England of 30 years ago with that of Russia and claimed that the rate of progress and change in the relative positions of these countries was due without doubt to the social structure. Perhaps, Mr. Khrushchev suggested, it was God's will, in which case God seemed to be on the side of the Communists. But, he added, let us not enter into fruitless theological discussions.

Asked about the possibility of coexistence, Khrushchev stated that he had stated his position frequently: no war, disarmament, and the creation of conditions conducive to peace. "There might be a question about the world's future development, but let us leave that to history. The West says that we want to impose our system by war, but this contradicts objective facts." Western ideologists, he fears, do not understand Soviet doctrines. The original Communist theory was that war was inevitable in imperialistic societies and that the working class should make use of the arms in their hands during those periods to throw out the capitalists. Marxism had always taught that no war is useful for workers but that it should be used by them to the best advantage. This was proved after World War I which brought the Bolsheviks to power. Due to exceptional circumstances, the United States capitalist system was favored by both World Wars in which it made much money. Governor Harriman vigorously denied this and pointed out that the US had given at least 11 billion dollars to the USSR and had made no profits. Mr. Khrushchev expressed his appreciation and thanks for this aid but insisted that nevertheless both wars were highly profitable. Mr. Harriman suggested that Mr. Khrushchev misunderstood the stimulating of production due to war as profit making. He pointed out that in the last war, the Sverdlovsk area had greatly expanded and greatly increased its capacity, but this did not mean that Sverdlovsk had made profits. Khrushchev replied that compared to the losses in the Donbas, the additional production in

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the Sverdlovsk area was negligible and asked how many soldiers the US lost in World War II -- 1 1/2 million casualties in the United States against 20 million in the Soviet Union. Governor Harriman suggested that the Soviet people think that US business wants war or at least an arms race in order to make money. This is not true as Mikoyan no doubt learned. Khrushchev said that Mikoyan had learned no such thing and that he too believed that certain circles in the US wanted the cold war and an arms race for money.

Mr. Harriman pointed out that the cold war and the arms race were started by the Soviet Union. After World War II, the Americans had disarmed faster than any nation in all history and had only started to rearm when the Soviets failed to reduce.

Mr. Khrushchev returned to discussion of the Communist attitude toward war. He said that the old theory of the inevitability of war had been redefined at the 20th Party Congress and later reaffirmed at the 21st. At that time it was decided that imperialist war can be avoided though there is no 100 percent guarantee against this. Today the socialist camp is strong, has a firm economic base, and growing manpower. This new force can deter imperialist war and each year it is becoming a stronger influence.

The class war must be settled not by war but by competition. "We can demonstrate," Mr. Khrushchev said, "the advantages of our system and set an example to other countries which they will follow. However, the question of making a revolution in any country is up to the workers of that country. The US is so rich and its standard of living so high that for the time being it can postpone revolution because it is able to buy off or bribe the workers."

Mr. Harriman stated that it should be obvious that the United States would never under any circumstances start a war. Mr. Khrushchev asked if there was any reason one could see why the Soviet Union should start one, and Mr. Harriman replied that only a misunderstanding or a miscalculation might lead to one. The important thing, he said, was disarmament. Mr. Khrushchev said that he wanted to create the "objective conditions" which would make such accidents impossible. "Further," Mr. Khrushchev said, "if one examines Mr. Dulles' statements, he was motivated not by any misunderstanding but by very real objectives which were endangering peace." He stated that Mr. Harriman's criticisms of Mr. Dulles were different than his. In fact, both Governor Harriman's and Dulles' attitudes pointed in the same direction. Mr. Harriman pointed to the need of greater exchanges between the US and the USSR. Fifteen thousand Americans would come to the USSR this year; when would the USSR send as many to the US? Mr. Zhukov stated that a two week tour in the US costs 8,500 rubles, and Mrs. Khrushchev added that while American tourists paid their own way in the Soviet Union, the unions or the Soviet state had to appropriate money for trips abroad that could better be spent for machinery. Nevertheless, appropriations for exchanges were being increased.

He stated that the elimination of discrimination against the Soviet Union in trade matters was of primary importance. The legal obstacles to trade, he said, were discrimination against the Soviet Union, and he accused Mr. Harriman of having a personal role in the setting up of these obstacles. He suggested

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that Mr. Harriman reverse his position and use his influence to increase trade. Mr. Khrushchev said there was one important point to clarify in connection with arms and trade. There was no doubt that American legal obstacles against trade were raised as reprisals, but this policy had been a complete failure.

"Look at our progress in science. We developed the hydrogen bomb before the US. We have an intercontinental bomb which you have not. Perhaps this is the crucial symbol of our position. The Seven Year Plan is based on an absence of trade with the US and the Plan is being consistently overfulfilled." Furthermore, there was nothing that the United States could furnish which the Soviets could not build for themselves. Nevertheless, the Soviets would like exchanges in certain fields of special equipment which they could build but found cheaper to buy abroad. For example, the Soviet Union had recently bought three textile machines not because they could not build them but because it was cheaper to buy them. Suggesting the Soviet Union also needed pipe, Mr. Harriman said that if some progress could be made on disarmament, the trade problem would settle itself. Mr. Khrushchev reacted strongly that this sounded like a condition. The Soviet Union would not sacrifice the security of its country for the few advantages that increased trade would bring.

Turning to another subject, Mr. Khrushchev stated that Stalin had had a great respect for Governor Harriman and confirmed the suggestion by Mr. Harriman that had Roosevelt lived, history might have taken a different course. Stalin, he said, had often told him that there were many cases when Stalin and Roosevelt had opposed Churchill, but there were no cases in which Churchill and Stalin had ganged up on Roosevelt. Truman, however, he said, was a different type and had changed Roosevelt's policies.

"We don't consider Stalin without blame. He had grown old by the end of the war but because of his position in the world, he had a very strong voice which he did not always use in the right way." It was not useful to go into details, but in the last years he had a bad influence both internally and in international affairs. Stalin was distrustful, over-confident, and had lost the power to work himself, and he distrusted others, thereby making it impossible for them to work. After his death, however, Stalin's successors had successfully developed initiative and produced successes which he had opposed. "We think we have been successful, both internally and internationally," Mr. Khrushchev said, "and have greatly improved our international position." He added, "We want to disarm and cease the cold war. You say you want to, too, but we don't seem to agree."

"Eisenhower suggested air reconnaissance throughout our country. This was utterly unacceptable. Air reconnaissance in view of US bases was not realistically fair though juridically it seemed so. Nevertheless, we would agree to air reconnaissance but not as a start."

The Soviet Union had suggested a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. This would lead to a psychological improvement. However, the US objects to such a treaty on the grounds that the UN charter is sufficient. However, the NATO Pact itself is defended on the basis of the Charter. Thus in one case the US makes a defense pact, justifying it by the

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UN Charter, and refuses a non-aggression pact on the ground that the UN Charter is enough. Khrushchev said such a pact would bring an increase in confidence. A second step would be a reduction in forces. The Soviets would welcome the most thorough control with inspection by both armies. He also suggested a control of communications. The US had turned this down. "We have even agreed to nuclear controls," he stated. The US had suggested that some nuclear explosions be permitted. The Soviets had agreed although they would prefer to prohibit all since any explosion would assist in the perfection of weapons. In the negotiations at Geneva, the technical experts had reached an agreement but then new difficulties were raised on the political plane. "We do not believe," Mr. Khrushchev said, "that the US is taking a serious attitude toward the control of nuclear weapons."

Governor Harriman suggested it was a pity that Stalin had not agreed to the 1947 agreement on nuclear controls. Mr. Khrushchev stated that the 1947 proposals were preposterous and designed to give the US a monopoly of nuclear weapons. They could not have agreed to them in 1947 and even less so today.

At this point Mr. Khrushchev suggested that we go to the country for luncheon where the discussion could be continued. With Mr. Zhukov of the Cultural Committee and Mr. Troyanovski as interpreter, we got into one car without the usual bodyguard, Mr. Khrushchev commenting that with a former American diplomat such as Mr. Harriman, he felt safe without his bodyguard.

On the way to the country, Mr. Khrushchev stated that the plenary session of the Central Committee due for tomorrow would reach no decisions but simply check up on the progress of the Seven Year Plan. One measure that he hoped would be taken was a setting up of an exhibit in the Industrial and Agricultural Fair at which inadequate machinery would be exhibited to shame the makers of it into producing better equipment. However, he admitted that there had been some difficulty in collecting the poor machinery. Governor Harriman expressed amazement that there had been such difficulties since he assumed Mr. Khrushchev's word was law. Mr. Khrushchev readily admitted that his word was law. "But," he added, "there is no law you can't get around."

Returning to the international scene, Mr. Khrushchev said that it seemed the West wanted to prolong the cold war. Three times he had already reduced the strength of his forces until his military advisers had told him that further reductions were out of the question.

Mr. Khrushchev said he found many of Mr. George Kennan's ideas expressed in the Reith lectures coincided with his own. He liked particularly the idea of a gradual withdrawal in Central Europe. "Many of Mr. Kennan's ideas would be acceptable to us and should be to the advantage of the US as well." Asked specifically if he was prepared to withdraw his troops from Eastern Europe, Khrushchev said he was, under certain conditions, which, however, he did not specify.

The Geneva summit conference, he said, was failure because Dulles and Eisenhower had entertained the unreal objective of liquidating East Germany. "To this we will never agree," Mr. Khrushchev said.

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While he did not want to criticize the dead, he found Mr. Dulles had an exaggerated idea of his own personal importance and had underestimated the importance of others. Speaking most confidentially, he stated that it was embarrassing if not unpleasant to note the manner in which Mr. Eisenhower had behaved at Geneva, not as a maker of policy but as an executor of Mr. Dulles' policies. Mr. Dulles, sitting on his right during the conference, had simply passed Eisenhower notes which the latter had then read out without contributing anything of his own.

At the dacha which lay beyond Kuntsevo and Rublevo, Messrs. Mikoyan, Kozlov, and Gromyko were awaiting us. For about half an hour we walked about the garden and down to the Moscow River. On the way, we discovered a hedgehog which Mr. Khrushchev picked up and gave to one of his bodyguards to take home to his grandson.

We then started lunch with the usual toasts. The first toast was to Governor Harriman in which his role during the War was praised. Mr. Khrushchev then launched into a review of Soviet international interests. The Soviets, he said, were not interested in expansion anywhere. The Mid-East had only oil and cotton. The Soviet Union had better cotton and oil enough to sell to the United States if it wanted it. India, he said, could take care of its own problems if it were willing to turn its jungles into arable land. Mr. Mendes-France had suggested to Mr. Khrushchev that China with its bursting population was a menace to the Soviet Union. This, he said, was hardly true. The Soviet Union, if it so desired, could turn its Siberian forests into arable land sufficient to feed all of China if necessary.

Nevertheless, he said, the Chinese presented a special and delicate situation since they had their own way of looking on problems and the Soviets did not want to tell them how to run their country. (More on China later.)

Turning to Western Europe, Mr. Khrushchev asked what good Finland with its rocks and swamps was to the Soviet Union. Similarly for the other Scandinavian countries. Germany, however, was a different problem.

The West seemed to forget that a few Russian missiles could destroy all of Europe. One bomb was sufficient for Bonn and three to five would knock out France, England, Spain, and Italy. The US had a winged, pilotless plane whose speed was 1,000 kilometers per hour, which was within easy range of Soviet fighters. US missiles, he said, could carry a warhead of only ten kilograms whereas Russian missiles could carry 1300 kilograms. Under these circumstances, it was unrealistic to threaten the Soviets.

"You may tell anyone you want," Khrushchev said in some heat, "that we will never accept Adenauer as a representative of Germany. He is a zero."

"We will not agree to your taking over Western Germany. We will not agree to a united Germany that is not socialist. In fact, no one wants a united Germany. De Gaulle told us so; the British have told us so; and Adenauer himself

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when he was here said he was not interested in unification. Why, then do you insist on talking about it?

"You state you want to defend the two million people in West Berlin. We are prepared to give any guarantees you desire to perpetuate their present social structure, either under the supervision of neutral countries or under the UN. However, we are absolutely determined to liquidate the state of war with Germany. It is an anachronism. Furthermore, we are determined to liquidate your rights in Western Berlin. What good does it do you to have 11 thousand troops in Berlin? If it came to war, we would swallow them in one gulp. We will agree to your maintaining them for a limited period but not indefinitely. If you do not agree to a termination of the occupation, we will do it unilaterally. Furthermore, we will put an end to your rights in Berlin. If you want to use force to preserve your rights, you can be sure that we will respond with force. You can start a war if you want, but remember it will be you who are starting it, not we. If you want to perpetuate or prolong your rights, this means war. You recognized West Germany on conditions contrary to those agreed upon during the war. We do not recognize the right of Adenauer to determine our position in Germany. If you continue to operate from a position of strength, then you must decide for yourselves. We too are strong and we will decide for ourselves."

Governor Harriman pointed out that this position was appallingly dangerous and suggested that the great achievements and the internal development of the Soviet Union would be sacrificed by any war.

Mr. Khrushchev retorted that this was his position and that Mr. Harriman could tell Mr. Eisenhower. Mr. Harriman replied that he would carry no messages to Mr. Eisenhower as he was a private individual. Mr. Khrushchev retorted that "If I see Mr. Eisenhower, I will tell him just as I have told you." Mr. Harriman expressed a hope that Mr. Gromyko would prove more amenable with the Foreign Ministers' conference reconvened on the 13th of July in Geneva. Mr. Khrushchev retorted that Mr. Gromyko was reflecting the views of the Soviet Government and that if he did not, he would be fired and replaced, and the views of the Soviet Government were what he had just said. "We have had German troops twice in the Soviet Union and we know what it means. This the United States does not know nor has it experienced the tears that the Ukraine suffered under occupation." When it was suggested that Russia brought the Germans on them by the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, Mr. Khrushchev scornfully rejected the argument as a "chaap" question. "We know England and France wanted to turn Hitler against Russia. Stalin did right in making a pact with Hitler and we would do it again. History," he said, "may not repeat itself, but the day may come when Germany will turn against the West." Are you sure, he asked, that they won't? Of course, Adenauer could not, but maybe Strauss or some other German would. West Germany knows that we could destroy it in ten minutes. If Germany faces the question of whether to exist or not, its decision may be different from that of today. When it was suggested that Moscow and Leningrad were equally susceptible to destruction, Khrushchev retorted that Leningrad is not Russia. Irkutsk and other Siberian cities would remain, but "one bomb is sufficient to destroy Bonn and the Ruhr, and that is all of Germany. Paris is all of France; London is all of England. You have surrounded us with bases but our rockets can destroy them. If you start a war, we may die but the rockets will fly automatically."

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Governor Harriman suggested that if the Soviets hindered the legal rights of supply of our troops in Berlin, it would be dangerous.

Mr. Khrushchev replied heatedly that "We would do just that. We would liquidate your rights. We will permit the troops now there to remain but not any troops to enter. If you speak from a position of strength, we will answer with the same strength." Governor Harriman stated that the American determination to support two million Berliners should not be underestimated. "We will never permit their being sacrificed," he stated.

Mr. Khrushchev answered, "Don't think that the Soviet Union is as ill-shod (lapki) as it was when the Czars sold Alaska to you. We are ready to fight. We are not aggressive," Mr. Khrushchev said, "we will let Berlin have its social structure and guarantee it. We don't need West Berlin. What are two million people to a bloc of 900 million people? If we took West Berlin, we would simply have to feed it. We would rather let you feed it." Governor Harriman suggested that Soviet decisions with regard to Berlin should not be taken too lightly. Mr. Khrushchev replied that it had all been carefully thought out. "Don't you think otherwise," he said. "Your generals talk of tanks and guns defending your Berlin position. They would burn," he said. "We don't want war over Berlin. Perhaps you do if you want to prolong the current position." Mr. Harriman stated that West Berliners were now perfectly satisfied. Why change the situation? Mr. Khrushchev replied that he would guarantee the situation in West Berlin in any manner we saw fit, "but we must end the state of war and the consequences of war and not interfere in the internal affairs of Germany." Mr. Khrushchev said, "We cannot tolerate the condition any more and this is a historic fact. Furthermore," he said, "Adenauer is the most unpopular man in Germany." Mr. Harriman pointed out that there had been many possibilities to throw out Adenauer but the Germans had not done so. On the other hand, there had never been any possibility to throw Grotewohl out. Khrushchev retorted, "What you and I think about freedom and slavery is quite different. We, for instance, consider the choice of Rockefeller impossible to understand, but we will let you decide for yourselves in the United States. You may have millions, but I have grandsons."

Calming down, Mr. Khrushchev said that as a great capitalist, Mr. Harriman's opinion was valuable. "In the US the workers have no views. I am a miner by origin, now a Prime Minister, and that is a characteristic of this country." Mikoyan said, "I am a plumber." Kozlov said that he was a homeless waif.

When Mr. Harriman stated that this was not unusual in the United States and that he had many contacts among the working class, Khrushchev retorted that the class struggle was an international question. "Tolstoy," he said, "wanted to till the soil like a peasant, but the peasants called him the stupid count, and said the count had worms in his backside."

A discussion ensued as to whether capitalism could survive. Khrushchev said that if he died and a capitalist came near his grave, he would turn over. "But if you, Mr. Harriman, approach, I won't turn over. We want your friendship but not from weakness. If we doubt from weakness, there would be war. We would like to deal with you because you have authority. You are a master, not a lackey. We don't threaten your capitalism."

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"I will tell you a secret. When the war ended, the question of Petsamo arose. We seized it, but Stalin said we must pay something for the nickel because, he said, Harriman is a part owner." Mr. Harriman said he had never heard of nickel in Petsamo until after the end of the war. Khrushchev stated, "Perhaps Stalin was misinformed, but nevertheless we wanted to avoid war and paid dollars for the nickel."

The conversation turned to Mr. Kozlov. Mr. Khrushchev stated that he and Mikoyan were of the same age, though Mikoyan is one year younger. Kozlov is 15 years younger. He and Mikoyan have one thing in common. They are agreed that Kozlov will follow them. "Despite his white hair, which ladies love, Kozlov is young, a hopeless communist. When we pass on, we will rest easily because we know Kozlov will carry on Lenin's work." Asked what happens if Kozlov dies earlier or what will happen after Kozlov, Khrushchev said, "We have eight million communists." Khrushchev said that after Khrushchev and Kozlov, it won't be any easier for you. "Nevertheless," he said, "I recommend him. He is modest and not such a brute (nakhalni) as we." Harriman asked, "Were you ever modest?" Khrushchev replied, "Perhaps." Harriman asked his opinion of Kirichenko. Khrushchev asked, "Why do you ask of Kirichenko? We have Aristov, Breshnev, Mukhitdinov, Pospelov, and, youngest of all, Polyanski. Don't try to bet on our followers," Khrushchev said. "If you bet on Kirichenko, you will lose. We have plenty of horses in our stable. Bet on our country, not on individuals. You bet on Malenkov and he proved to be "gayno". You bet on Beria; he was also gayno. Then on Molotov. You were against Molotov but I respect Molotov more than all of them. Beria was an adventurer. Malenkov was a yellow chicken and Stalin knew it."

Harriman: "Who did Stalin think would follow him?"

Khrushchev: "Stalin didn't think; he thought he would live forever. I will tell you how Stalin died. We all went out to his dacha on Saturday and had a good dinner. He was in fine spirits. We said goodbye and went home. Usually he called us on Sundays but he did not that day. On Monday night his guards called and said that he was ill. Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov and I (Khrushchev) came out to the dacha and found him unconscious. He lived for several days but did not regain consciousness. He was paralyzed in the arm, the leg, and the tongue from a blood clot in his brain. For one moment before he died, he regained consciousness. He could not speak but he shook hands and he made jokes by gestures, pointing to a picture of a girl feeding a lamb, obviously referring to the fact that he, like the lamb, was being fed with a spoon. Then," said Khrushchev, "he died and I wept. I was his pupil. We are all indebted to him. Like Peter the Great, he combatted barbarism with barbarism, but he was a great man."

"Kozlov will be worthy of us. If you want Kirichenko, he will be worse for you than Kozlov will be." Harriman asked why, then, had Khrushchev turned over Party affairs to Kirichenko. Khrushchev replied, "I am very jealous of my prerogatives and while I live I will run the Party. If you are trying to bury me, you are wish-thinking. Nevertheless, he said, "it is ideas that are important, not people. It is not important who will follow me. Our policy will not change."

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From Moscow

The subject turned to Ambassador Bohlen. Khrushchev said that he was respected but was not honest. He had documentary proof that Bohlen spread the rumor that Khrushchev was a drunkard. "When General Twining was here, we all drank heavily. Bohlen can drink too, but later he told the correspondents that I was a drunk. Some British and Scandinavian journalists protested."

Khrushchev then said, "Please understand we want friendship. Within five to seven years we will be stronger than you. I am giving you a secret of the General Staff which your military can use in competition in ballistic missiles. I am talking seriously now. If we spend 30 billion rubles on ballistic missiles in the next 5-6 years, we can destroy every industrial center in the US and Europe. Thirty billion rubles is no great sum for us. In the Seven Year Plan, we are spending on power, gas, etc., no less than 125 billion rubles. Yet to destroy all Europe and the US would cost us only 30 billion. We have this possibility. If we save 11 billion in one year, if we overfulfill our plan by five percent, this will give us a savings of 55 billions in five years. Yet we only need 30 billion. I am frank because I like you as a frank capitalist. You charm us as a snake charms rabbits. I am talking about potentialities. Of course, we will make some missiles but we won't use them. We know if you use yours, it would be silly. Who would lose more? Let us keep our rockets loaded and if attacked we will launch them."

Discussing the Japanese question, Mr. Khrushchev said, "We helped to defeat Japan at the request of Roosevelt. It is true that we agreed to help Chiang Kai-shek but that was during the period in which Japan was the enemy. Once Japan was defeated, the situation was changed and when another force -- the communists -- arose, naturally we supported them against Chiang and we will continue to support them. What is China, Peking or Formosa? To whom does Formosa belong? Only to China, and China is Peking. At any time we desire, we can destroy Formosa. I will tell you confidentially, we have given the Chinese rockets which are in the Chinese hinterland but within range of Formosa and can destroy it at will. Your Seventh Fleet will be of no avail. Fleets today are made to be destroyed. If the Chinese decide to take Formosa, we will support them even if it means war."

Miscellaneous items

Governor Harriman expressed surprise at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations' estimate that the maximum future industrial growth of the United States was only 2 percent. He said he had told the professors that if they wanted to keep their jobs, they should revise their estimates to 4½ percent. Mr. Khrushchev supported by Mr. Mikoyan stated that they were satisfied with the 2 percent figure because this had been the figure for the last five years.

Mr. Zhukov told Mr. Harriman that the Seven Year Plan contemplated no increase in the rate of production of automobiles. The cheap 8,000 ruble car which was planned would probably not be out for another 15 years.

Mr. Khrushchev stated that while he was the senior member of the Presidium, he had only one vote and that decisions were taken by a majority.

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Repeatedly during the conversation, Mr. Khrushchev referred to the class struggle throughout the world and to "circles in the United States" which wanted cold war and an armaments race.

Mr. Khrushchev was scornful of the suggestion of free elections in Germany as a method of reunification.

Throughout the evening there was much free bantering between Mikoyan and Khrushchev. Mr. Harriman suggested that if Mikoyan became too obstreperous, Khrushchev should send him to the United States rather than Siberia. Mikoyan stated that it was too late to send him to Siberia as that was no longer permitted. Kozlov and Khrushchev, however, stated that between them they could make an exception of Mikoyan. However, Mr. Khrushchev added, what is the good of sending Mikoyan to Siberia? We would merely have to clothe and feed him. It seemed apparent that Mikoyan is the second in a double leadership. Frequently Khrushchev referred to decisions of "nastas and myself", e.g., the selection of Kozlov as successor.

Asked whether in the secret speech at the 20th Party Congress a passage relating to foreign affairs had been omitted from the public published version, Mr. Khrushchev replied, "That speech was written not by me but by Allan Dulles."

However, he admitted later that undoubtedly foreign diplomats dealing with Stalin had shared some of the difficulties in international affairs which Stalin's Soviet subordinates had suffered in internal questions.

Asked whether he found it difficult to make 150 speeches every year, Khrushchev said many are speeches of greetings or farewell. Speeches on developments within the Soviet Union, he said, wrote themselves and were a pleasure rather than a burden to make.

During the last hours of the discussion, Mr. Harriman frequently suggested he leave, knowing that the Soviet leaders were very busy. However, Mr. Khrushchev insisted that he stay on and discuss problems in greater detail. "Our working day is over and we are ready to spend all night talking with you." When eventually Mr. Harriman got up to leave at 10:30, Mr. Khrushchev stood in front of the door for at least 15 minutes preventing him from leaving while he continued his talk.

Despite the roughness of Mr. Khrushchev's language and the toughness of the position he took on many issues, he was most genial throughout the evening, smiling incessantly, proposing toasts frequently -- chiefly in cognac which he drank liberally -- and constantly flattering Mr. Harriman as a great capitalist. "Since workers in the United States have no rights, we like to talk to a great capitalist like yourself, particularly because we know of your good works during the war." Comparing him to Eisenhower, he stated, "You talk with authority and not as a lackey, and that is why we have been so glad to receive you."


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Desp. No. 734
From Moscow

Eventually at 10:45 the party broke up. Mr. Khrushchev stated that he would announce to the press only that the conversation had taken place in a warm and friendly atmosphere. He requested that no mention be made of the hedgehog as hedgehogs had a somewhat special and embarrassing connotation in Russia.

For the Ambassador:



Robert I. Owen,
First Secretary of Embassy.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM
2020

Department of State

6/26/59

(E006) USSR

NLE MR Case No. 89-335

Document No. 6

35-M This document was exempted from
declassification in a previous review, SECRET

Action NLE 85-38241
State 1018/85 (8502771)

Control: 19471

Rec'd: JUNE 26, 1959
10:43 AM

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EUR FROM: MOSCOW

Info

TO: Secretary of State

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2665, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 425, BONN 339,
LONDON 443.

RMR LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

FOLL LUNCHEON FOR HARRIMAN YESTERDAY HE, KHRUSHCHEV,
KOZLOV, MIKOYAN, GROMYKO AND I HAD NEARLY TWO-HOUR
DISCUSSION WHICH CENTERED MOSTLY ON GERMANY AND BERLIN
FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS; FULL TEXT BY DESPATCH.

KHRUSHCHEV WAS SERIOUS BUT GENIAL AND REPEATEDLY ASSERTED
HIS DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DIFFERENCES
WITH US. HE SUGGESTED WE SHOULD DRAW APPROPRIATE LESSONS
FROM HISTORY WHICH US DID NOT APPRECIATE AS MUCH AS
SOVIET UNION WHICH HAD TWICE BEEN INVADED BY GERMANY.
I REPLIED HISTORIC LESSON WE DREW WAS THAT WE SHOULD
NOT REPEAT ERROR FOLLOWING FIRST WORLD WAR OF GIVING
GERMANY GROUNDS FOR THINKING SHE WAS BEING MISTREATED.
KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE WAS NOT IMPRESSED BY THIS ARGUMENT.
HE EXPRESSED HIS CONTEMPT FOR ADENAUER WHO HAD TRIED
TO FLATTER HIM AND WAS TRYING TO STIR UP TROUBLE NOT
ONLY BETWEEN SOVIET UNION AND WEST BUT ALSO BETWEEN
WESTERN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND BRITAIN. I
SAID OUR EXPERIENCE WITH ADENAUER HAD SHOWN THAT HE
GENUINELY WANTED TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF GERMAN
MILITARISM AND HAD WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTED PLANS FOR
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WHICH WOULD PREVENT THIS. HE SAID
WE MUST FACE GERMAN PROBLEM SERIOUSLY AND RECOGNIZE THAT
ULBRICHT AND ADENAUER COULD NEVER AGREE. WEST WOULD
NEVER CONSENT TO A COMMUNIST GERMANY AND HE WOULD NEVER
AGREE TO ADENAUER'S ABSORBING EAST GERMANY. BEST PLAN
WAS TO CONCLUDE A PEACE TREATY AND LIQUIDATE REMAINS
OF WAR. WHEN I POINTED OUT WE HAD RECOGNIZED PRESENT

SITUATION

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Boris, USSR - Vol II (2) [Lapin-June 1959]

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-2-2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW

SITUATION BY PROVIDING FOR A PHASED PLAN HE SAID WE HAD ALLOWED 2 AND ONEHALF YEARS WHEREAS HE WOULD PREFER 250 YEARS. WHEN GROMYKO POINTED OUT OUR PLAN BASED ON ELECTIONS KHRUSHCHEV SAID WEST WOULD NOT ALLOW VIETNAM TO BE ABSORBED THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS AND HOW COULD WE EXPECT SOVIET UNION TO ALLOW ADENAUER TO ABSORB FOR MORE IMPORTANT AREA OF EAST GERMANY. IT WAS CLEAR THAT A REUNITED GERMANY WOULD JOIN NATO. WEST WANTED THEM TO ALLOW GREATER POPULATION OF WEST GERMANY TO DECIDE ISSUE. HE HAD NO GOOD ANSWER TO MY ARGUMENT THAT OUR PLAN PROVIDED FOR POSSIBILITY SEPARATE VOTE IN TWO PARTS OF GERMANY. KHRUSHCHEV ASKED ME IF WE WOULD EVER ALLOW WEST GERMANY TO OPT FOR SOCIALISM. I SAID HE WOULD DOUBTLESS NOT BELIEVE ME BUT I WAS SURE THAT IF WEST GERMANY TOOK SUCH A DECISION IN A SUPERVISED ELECTION THAT WAS NOT UNDER PRESSURE OF THREATS, WE WOULD ABIDE BY THE DECISION. KHRUSHCHEV SAID I HAD BEST BE CAREFUL AND WAS I SO SURE THAT THIS MIGHT NOT ONE DAY HAPPEN AFTER SOVIETS HAD CONTINUED TO IMPROVE THEIR OWN ECONOMIC POSITION AND STANDARD OF LIVING IN EAST GERMANY HAD BEEN RAISED. HE SAID THAT ADENAUER DID NOT WANT GERMAN REUNIFICATION FOR FEAR GERMANY WOULD GO SOCIALIST.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID IT WAS CLEAR GERMAN QUESTION COULD NOT BE SETTLED NOW AND HE HAD THEREFORE PUT FORWARD HIS BERLIN PROPOSAL. HE HAD DEVELOPED THE FREE CITY SOLUTION PERSONALLY ALTHOUGH HIS ASSOCIATES AGREED WITH HIM. HE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE ALMOST ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE FOR THE FREE CITY. HE EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE THAT SOVIET GOVT WHICH CAME TO POWER AFTER DEATH OF STALIN ATTACHED TO KEEPING ITS WORD AND THAT IT WOULD FAITHFULLY FULFILL ANY GUARANTEE GIVEN. WE SHOULD KNOW THAT WHEN DISCUSSIONS WERE RESUMED IN GENEVA WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT CHANGE IN SOVIET POSITION AS THEY COULD NOT GO BEYOND PROPOSALS ALREADY PUT FORWARD. HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION TO BE THAT IF THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT IN GENEVA THERE WOULD BE NO SUMMIT CONFERENCE. IF THIS WERE SO, VERY WELL,

BUT HE

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-3-2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW

BUT HE WOULD THEN CONCLUDE SEPARATE PEACE TREATY AND OUR OCCUPATION RIGHTS WOULD CEASE TO EXIST. HE KEPT HIS TEMPER WHEN I INQUIRED HOW HE COULD RECONCILE THIS STATEMENT WITH HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIET GOVT ATTACHED TO KEEPING ITS WORD. THIS LED TO A LONG AND INCONCLUSIVE ARGUMENT ABOUT WHO WAS TO BLAME FOR BREAKDOWN OF FOUR POWER COOPERATION IN GERMANY. HE POINTED TO OUR CONCLUSION OF SEPARATE TREATY WITH JAPAN. THEN I SAID WE HAD RESERVED SOVIET RIGHTS HE REPLIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN KICKED OUT OF ALLIED COUNCIL AND WE HAD ESTABLISHED MILITARY BASES IN JAPAN. MIKOYAN INTERJECTED THEY WOULD GIVE US SAME DEAL ON GERMANY AS WE HAD GIVEN THEM ON JAPAN.

* THOMPSON

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

35-M

SECRET

Action

Control: 19484

Rec'd: JUNE 26, 1959

10:57 AM

EUR
Info

FROM: MOSCOW

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SP

NO: 2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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PRIORITY

RMP.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2665; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 443,
PARIS 425, BONN 339.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

KHRUSHCHEV ASKED WHAT WAS WRONG WITH SOVIET PROPOSAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT WEST BERLIN AND ITS POPULATION WAS OF NO IMPORTANCE TO SOVIET UNION. I SAID I COULD BELIEVE THIS BUT BERLIN WAS CLEARLY IMPORTANT TO EAST GERMANS WHO WANTED TO ABSORB IT AND SOVIET PROPOSALS SEEMED TO US CLEARLY DESIGNED TO FACILITATE THIS OBJECTIVE.

KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO SECRETARY HERTER'S SPEECH WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS AN INCORRECT STATEMENT OF THE POSITION. GROMYKO HAD NOT INTENDED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT BUT WOULD NOW BE OBLIGED TO PUT RECORD STRAIGHT.

I REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENT THAT SOVIET UNION HAD MADE ITS MAXIMUM OFFER AND SAID I THOUGHT SAME WAS TRUE OF WEST ALTHOUGH VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF OUR OFFER WERE POSSIBLE. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS WE SHOULD CANCEL THE MEETING. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIM BUT MERELY TRYING TO EXPLAIN MY UNDERSTANDING OF MY GOVT'S POSITION. I EXPLAINED THIS IN SOME DETAIL REFERRING TO SOVIET ACTION IN DISPOSING OF EAST BERLIN AND NOW TRYING TO MOVE IN ON WEST BERLIN. WHEN I OUTLINED THE CONCESSIONS WE HAD MADE AND THE DISTANCE WE HAD GONE TO MEET HIS POSITION HE SAID HE HAD CAREFULLY EXAMINED OUR PROPOSAL WHICH DID

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WHICH DID IN FACT CONTAIN MANY CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS. IT WAS NOT BAD EXCEPT FOR ONE FACT AND THAT WAS THAT IT WAS TO OPERATE UNTIL GERMAN REUNIFICATION WHICH WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. IT MIGHT BE ALL RIGHT AS AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT TO OPERATE UNTIL A PEACE TREATY COULD BE DRAWN UP AND CONCLUDED.

I REFERRED TO A REMARK HE HAD MADE THAT OUR TROOPS IN BERLIN HAD NO MILITARY VALUE AND THAT EVEN IF WE HAD 100,000 THERE THEY WOULD BE WIPED OUT IMMEDIATELY IN THE EVENT OF WAR. I ASKED WHY WAS HE THEN SO ANXIOUS TO GET RID OF THEM. HE REPLIED THAT WHILE THEY WOULD HAVE NO MILITARY VALUE IN THE EVENT OF WAR THEY DID HAVE A MILITARY VALUE NOW. GROMYKO EXPLAINED THAT SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN BERLIN OPERATED UNDER THE PROTECTION OF WESTERN TROOPS. IF PEACE TREATY WERE SIGNED THEY COULD NO LONGER FULFILL THIS FUNCTION. I SAID THIS INDICATED THAT SOVIET UNION OR GDR WOULD DECIDE WHICH ORGANIZATIONS WERE LEGITIMATE AND WHICH WERE NOT. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF BERLIN AND SHOWED CLEARLY WHERE SOVIET PROPOSALS WOULD LEAD. KHRUSHCHEV SAID THIS WAS AN EXAGGERATED INTERPRETATION.

I ALSO REFERRED TO THE LACK OF RECIPROCITY IN SOVIET PROPOSALS ON PROPAGANDA ETC. KHRUSHCHEV SAID IT WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL ACTIVITIES IN EAST GERMANY AND ALLOW BONN TO BE FREE TO CONTINUE THEM. I SAID WE RECOGNIZED THIS AND WERE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH IT BUT COULD NOT ACCEPT ARRANGEMENTS ON THIS MATTER THAT APPLIED TO WEST BERLIN BUT NOT EAST BERLIN.

KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO HOLDING OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN WEST BERLIN AS A PROVOCATIVE ACT BUT NOT IN ANY MANNER SUGGESTING SOVIETS INTENDED TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT.

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-3- 2665, JUNE 26, 2 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM MOSCOW.

KHRUSHCHEV THEN TOLD ANECDOTE TO ILLUSTRATE THESE I WAS MERELY REPEATING OLD ARGUMENTS.

HARRIMAN EMPHASIZED STRONGLY THAT BOTH PARTIES IN US SUPPORTED PRESIDENT'S POSITION ON BERLIN. KHRUSHCHEV SUGGESTED THAT WHILE POLITICAL PARTIES MIGHT BE IN AGREEMENT SOME OF OUR PEOPLE WERE NOT BUT HE RECOGNIZED THEY HAD TO DEAL WITH OUR GOVT. KHRUSHCHEV CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY SAYING WE SHOULD WORK OUT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD LEAD TO A PEACE TREATY AND HE SUGGESTED THIS COULD BE DONE IN A WAY TO AVOID ANY ASPECT OF AN ULTIMATUM.

UNLESS DEPT PERCEIVES OBJECTION I PROPOSE INFORM MY FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES OF THIS CONVERSATION.

THOMPSON

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
SACEUR'S REMARKS TO THE NAC 30 Apr 59

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Entire document declassified by the ISCAP
except for portion(s) identified as Restricted
Data or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) by
the Department of Energy, which is outside
jurisdiction of the ISCAP.

At the NATO Ministerial meeting last December 17, I gave
you an interim report on the two extremely important programs which
were authorized by the Heads of Government meeting in 1957 for the
defense of the Alliance -- the development of an IRBM capability
within Allied Command Europe and the establishment of stocks of
nuclear warheads which would be available for NATO forces regardless
of nationality, should they be needed.

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


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All of these arrangements are
being coordinated in accordance with requirements of established NATO
defense plans.

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Last December I commented on the detailed plans set forth in
SHAPE document "Allied Command Europe plan for the NATO Special
Ammunition Storage Program," giving you an idea of requirements for
storage sites to mid-1960 and of our progress toward this goal. That
progress has not slackened. For example,




To make such a program fully effective, carefully worked-out
bilateral agreements between the United States and the other NATO nations
concerned are necessary. Generally speaking, it has been found that
two basic types of agreements are adequate for the purpose. First,
there is a bilateral accord between the two governments, stating the

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basic principles under which the nuclear weapons will be introduced

and maintained in the host or user nation in furtherance of the NATO

program.



I am informed that agreements of a similar type are

being negotiated by the United States with a number of other NATO

governments and there is every indication that these countries desire

and intend to proceed rapidly to complete them.

At the same time, a second group of bilateral agreements have been under negotiation to provide for the exchange of atomic energy data. They are required by U.S. law before certain classified information applying to nuclear weapons can be transmitted to other nationals.


They do not have to be reached simultaneously with the basic stockpile arrangements mentioned in the last paragraph, but are a necessity in order for national forces to achieve their own full atomic capability.

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As you will remember from the case of the U.S.-U.K. agreement, such agreements must be public, with classified technical annexes, and must lie before the U.S. Congress for 60 days before becoming effective.

Now that the program has reached the appropriate stage of development in certain NATO countries, these nations are negotiating agreements

of this type with the Government of the United States



The agreements will be presented to the United States


Congress in the near future to ensure that the 60-day requirement is completed before the Congress adjourns this summer. Others will follow in due course. I feel that it is absolutely necessary that this procedure be completed as soon as possible so that there will be no bar to the steady progress of this Program, which was so stoutly initiated by the Heads of Government in 1957.

At this point I would like to express my satisfaction at the



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promising progress which has been made by the NAC concerning common funding both for technical facilities for custodial storage sites and for support and depot sites. The Council's recent action in this field should go a long way towards reducing what was a considerable barrier to prompt development of our program. I think it only reasonable that the infrastructure for any weapons system which is located and constructed with a view to serving the common defense, as distinguished from the defense of a single nation, should be paid for by the Alliance, particularly where the cost may otherwise fall disproportionately on a NATO country. And, parenthetically, I am hopeful that a similar attitude will be evidenced in support of the financing for NATO's IRBM Program.

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There have, of course, been other discussions which it would be premature to comment upon in detail at this time.  For example, I am

now discussing with the Turkish Government the location of at least one IRBM unit in that country, and the favorable attitude of all interested parties suggests that action to this end may be expected at an early date. 

In conclusion, I urge that we not lose sight of the Soviet threat that led the Heads of Government to initiate these bold programs for the defense of NATO. There is no evidence that the threat has diminished. Consequently, I consider it absolutely essential that we continue to move ahead resolutely and promptly. All elements of this NATO effort must be carefully synchronized and must proceed steadily on schedule -- the necessary bilateral agreements -- the delivery of modern delivery systems -- the development of special ammunition storage -- the training of the forces of the NATO nations in their use. Every part of the program

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is necessary. The process must continue so that we can give to the NATO forces the strength which will permit them to accomplish their defensive mission.