

7/3/58

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET

July 3, 1958


2903

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 3, 1958 -- 11:28 AM (after NSC)

Others present: Secretary Dulles
Mr. Gerard Smith
Mr. Elbrick
Mr. Farley
Mr. Allen Dulles
Deputy Secretary Quarles
General Goodpaster



Secretary Dulles said the group was meeting to review some of the problems he foresaw in his meeting in Paris with De Gaulle. As a general policy, he felt we should assist De Gaulle. There is some reason to think that he is all that stands between France and chaos, or a popular front at least. He thought we should give some public sense that we are supporting De Gaulle. However, it is clear we must limit our support in two respects which touch on De Gaulle's pride and sense of French grandeur. This was shown clearly during Macmillan's talk with De Gaulle. The first is our attitude toward France as a nuclear power and the second is as to his proposal for a US-UK-France triumvirate to run the world.



1995/2903

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case # E9301645
NLE Case # MR 93-25941
By bc NLE Data/Books

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- 2 -

..... He did not know if he could obtain De Gaulle's agreement to this, since there are ample indications that what De Gaulle wants is a Western atomic "standing group" consisting of the US, UK, and France.

Mr. Quarles said he thought we should consider where we would go if forced beyond the stand outlined by Mr. Dulles. The President stated strongly that he has always personally favored giving our allies information as to these weapons.

.....

The Secretary then summarized other matters likely to arise: our respective evaluation of the Soviet threat; European security plans (De Gaulle was initially drawn to the Rapacki plan); disarmament (De Gaulle has linked cessation of testing to cutoff of weapons production); attitudes toward a Summit meeting; the French nuclear weapons program; command structure in Europe (Mr. Dulles will leave this to the military people); IRBMs (this depends on what is done regarding nuclear weapons); European integration moves (here the British are asking us to help them in their "free trade area" pitch to De Gaulle, but we will not get far into this); Lebanon (the French want to avoid military intervention since they can't take part, and wouldn't want to be omitted); Nasser; Israel (De Gaulle will probably dilute this relationship somewhat); Algeria (De Gaulle may not talk about this, but if he does, Mr. Dulles will simply listen); trade with Communist China.

There was agreement that any idea of a US-UK-French triumvirate along the lines mentioned was completely unrealistic and to be avoided.

In concluding, the President said he thought the nuclear question should be attacked by laying out very frankly with De Gaulle what we would be in a position to do, and expressing readiness to explore beyond this to see what could be done by liberal interpretation of existing authority.




[Signature]
A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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7/3/58

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Suggest omission of this word as raising question of your desire for amendments.



United States law does not permit the United States


Government to promote the international spreading of the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.



This reflects a hope that international disarmament agreements will shortly end, everywhere, the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

In the event, however, of armed attack, the President of the United States would possess the right to make possible the use of nuclear weapons by United States and allied forces acting in accordance with the concept of the North Atlantic Treaty that an attack on one is an attack on all.


DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case *State 8908-16*
NLE Case *MA 87-194 JEL*
By *hc* NLE Date *11/10/08*



SECRET SYSTEM PAPERS 1951-59
Box 7
Meeting with the President
7/11-12/31/58 (11)

Walter / WFM / 7 / 11

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France and the USA, as potential or actual producers of nuclear weapons, recognize that each nation must decide for itself whether or not to be a producer of nuclear weapons. Their governments believe, however, that there should be developed a common doctrine, and practices thereunder, with respect to the availability and use of nuclear weapons so as to assume that, so long as these weapons are a part of the arsenal of any nation, such weapons as are possessed by NATO countries shall ^{be used in the common defense} (serve the common interest), so that no one of the allies need feel that its security, or its voice in international councils, is measured by its own national nuclear weapons

Personal and Private
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


stockpile or production capacity. The two governments will, in concert with their allies, seek to find practical expressions of these ideas.

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Suggest omission of this word as raising question of your desire for amendments

Obviously: "Current" or "existing" or "present"




United States law does not permit the United States

Government to promote the international spreading of the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.



This reflects a hope that international disarmament agreements will shortly end, everywhere, the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. *Also implies: a futile hope*


In the event, however, of armed attack, the President of the United States would possess the right to make possible the use of nuclear weapons by United States and allied forces acting in accordance with the concept of the North Atlantic Treaty that an attack on one is an attack on all.



DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case State 8206-1-6
NLE Case CIA 87-194 del
By [signature] NLE Date 11/11/88

Box 7
Meeting with the President
7/1-12/31/57 (11)

*Alkes p/7
Mvad*



France and the USA, as potential or actual producers of nuclear weapons, recognize that each nation must decide for itself whether or not to be a producer of nuclear weapons. Their governments believe, however, that there should be developed a common doctrine, and practices thereunder, with respect to the availability and use of nuclear weapons so as to assume ^{it} that, so long as these weapons are a part of the arsenal of any nation, such weapons as are possessed by NATO countries shall ^{be used in the common interest} (serve the common interest) so that no one of the allies need feel that its security, or its voice in international councils, is measured by its own national nuclear weapons

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stockpile or production capacity. The two governments will, in concert with their allies, seek to find practical expressions of these ideas.

7/27/58

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action
S/S

Classification

Control: 18888

Rec'd: JULY 27, 1958
5:53 PM

2697
Info

FROM: LONDON

#2

TO: Secretary of State

ADVANCE COPY

NO: DULTE 2, JULY 27, 9 PM.

NIACT

FOR ACTING SECRETARY FOR THE PRESIDENT.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MY EXPECTATIONS OF THE PACE AT WHICH THIS TRIP WOULD MOVE ARE BEING FULFILLED. YESTERDAY AFTERNOON I HAD A GOOD TALK WITH THE CHANCELLOR. HE MET ME AT THE AIRPORT AND DROVE ME THERE FOR MY TAKEOFF. WE HAD PLENTY OF CHANCE FOR PRIVATE TALK. ADDITIONALLY WE HAD TWO HOURS WITH OUR ADVISERS. THE CHANCELLOR SEEMED IN EXCELLENT HEALTH AND SPIRITS. HE WAS MUCH PLEASED WITH YOUR LETTER WHICH I GAVE HIM AND SENT YOU HIS WARM BEST WISHES.

MUCH OF OUR CONVERSATION CONCERNED THE MIDDLE EAST. WHILE THE CHANCELLOR IS MUCH INTERESTED, HE IS NOT REALLY WELL INFORMED.

WE ALSO TALKED ABOUT FRANCE AND DE GAULLE. I MADE THE POINT WE DISCUSSED ON FRIDAY, THAT THE CHANCELLOR NEED NOT FEEL THAT HIS OWN STATURE WOULD IN ANY WISE BE DIMINISHED IF HE WENT TO SEE DE GAULLE. THE CHANCELLOR IS, HOWEVER, HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF FRENCH INTENTIONS, NOT THE LEAST BECAUSE REPORTS HAVE REACHED HIM THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE OFFERED THE FRENCH ENRICHED URANIUM FOR THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM AND, PERHAPS COINCIDENTALLY, THE FRENCH HAVE CANCELED OUT THE AGREEMENT REACHED BY PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS FOR A COOPERATIVE



FRENCH, ITALIAN,
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Division of Establishments Foreign
President of the United States
1953-61 (Ann Whitman File)
60610, Dulles, July 1958

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Authority: MR 94-8841
By: JKS NLE Date: 7/14/96

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ADVANCE COPY

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-2- DULTE 1, JULY 27, 9 PM, FROM LONDON.



FRENCH, ITALIAN, GERMAN -- NUCLEAR RESEARCH PROGRAM.
I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY THE SOVIETS
WOULD HELP THE FRENCH MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THUS
EXPOSE THMSSELVES TO DEMANDS FROM CHINA, ETC.

THIS MORNING I SAW EBAN BRIEFLY AND, HOPE, SECRETLY,
ALTHOUGH WORD MAY GET OUT. HE TOLD ME BEN-GURION MUCH
APPRECIATED YOUR LETTER OF FRIDAY. HE ALSO TOLD ME MORE
OF SOME OF THE QUIET CONTACTS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE
ESTABLISHED WITH THE TURKS, IRANIANS, SUDANESE AND OTHERS.
HE WANTS US TO ENCOURAGE THEIR DEVELOPMENT.

THEN WITH MY ADVISERS I HAD A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH HAROLD
MACMILLAN AND SELWYN LLOYD AND THEIR ADVISERS. WE
CANVASSED THE PROSPECTS FOR THE BAGHDAD PACT MEETING,
INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING ANOTHER NAME AND A
NEW FORM IN WHICH TO EXPRESS THE MUTUAL SECURITY COMMIT-
MENTS FOR WHICH ALL THE NORTHERN TIER COUNTRIES ARE
EAGER. OUR EXPERTS ARE STUDYING THIS FURTHER AND WE
MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME INTERIM PROGRESS BEFORE I LEAVE.

JOCK AND I HAD AN INTIMATE AND INFORMAL LUNCH WITH HAROLD
AND SELWYN AND WE TALKED A GOOD DEAL ABOUT THE PROSPECTS
IF THERE IS TO BE A MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND
ABOUT THE DANGERS THAT WILL ENSUE IF KHRUSHCHEV NOW
DUCKS OUT. WE ARE SETTING UP A WORKING PARTY AT WASHINGTON
TO TRY TO CRYSTALLIZE SOME IDEAS IN PREPARATION FOR A
MEETING AND HAVE AGREED THAT OUR JOINT PLANNING SHOULD
CONTINUE ON A MOST URGENT BASIS IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

I FOUND THAT HAROLD SHARED MY CONCERN THAT IF THE SOVIETS
NOW BACK AWAY FROM A HEAD OF GOVERNMENT MEETING,
ON WHATEVER EXCUSE, WE WILL BE FACED WITH A PERIOD OF
INCREASED DIFFICULTY AND DANGER, ESPECIALLY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST. WE BOTH FELT THAT THE SOVIETS MAY STEP

UP EFFORTS TO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- DULTE 1, 27 JULY, 9 PM, FROM LONDON.

UP EFFORTS TO HIT US AT OUR WEAK POINTS WITH THE THOUGHT OF "TEACHING US A LESSON" ON THE THEORY THAT KHRUSHCHEV OFFERED US A CHANCE TO TALK, WE DID NOT ACCEPT ON HIS TERMS, AND NOW WE MUST FACE THE CONSEQUENCES.

THIS LEADS ME, AND I BELIEVE HAROLD AS WELL, TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE NEED URGENTLY TO FIND MORE EFFECTIVE MACHINERY FOR JOINT PLANNING -- MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL -- TO FACE THIS RISK, IF THE SOVIETS REJECT OUR UNSC PROPOSALS. HAROLD SEVERAL TIMES DURING OUR CONVERSATION REFERRED WITH APPROVAL TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CCS IN THE LAST WAR. WHILE I DO NOT THINK EITHER OF US FEELS THAT THAT PARTICULAR MECHANISM NEED BE RE-INSTITATED, THERE IS NO DOUBT OF OUR AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR SOMETHING. I WOULD HOPE TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH YOU WHEN I GET HOME.

THE UK GREATLY DEPLORES THE FRENCH SPLITTING AWAY FROM US ON MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV AT UN.

HAROLD IS IN GOOD SPIRITS AND SENDS YOU HIS WARMEST GREETINGS.

DURING THE AFTERNOON I SAW THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR BRIEFLY AND THEN CALLED ON THE IRANIAN AND PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTERS. I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE PRIME MINISTERS' CALM AND SOBER ATTITUDE.

I AM SHORTLY TO JOIN THEM AND MENDERES AT A SMALL DINNER HAROLD IS GIVING FOR THE HEADS OF ALL THE DELEGATIONS.

TOMORROW THE FORMAL SESSIONS BEGIN AND I LOOK FORWARD TO KEEPING MY DATE WITH YOU AND FANFANI ON TUESDAY.

I HAVE GREATLY ENJOYED BOTH THE LUXURY AND PRESTIGE OF COLUMBINE III.

FAITHFULLY YOURS,

FOSTER"

DULLES

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1985, 1539

9/4/58


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September 4, 1958

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TOP SECRET



Dear Harold:

The President asked me to thank you for your letter to him of September 3 with reference to the Far East and to reply to it, as you suggested. I dictate this reply en route to Washington after seeing the President at Newport.

You will by now have received through normal channels the statement which the President authorized me to make at Newport following conference with him. That statement in itself goes a considerable distance in answering your letter. However, I should like to add some further thoughts which the President wanted me to convey to you in strict confidence.

It is no doubt regrettable that so much should now seem to hang upon two small islands such as Quemoy and Matsu which are so close to the China mainland that they are not readily defensible. We have in the past made serious efforts to bring about disengagement of the Chinese Nationalists from these islands. We have, however, never pushed these efforts to the point of attempted coercion because we have come up against realization of the hard fact that the ability to keep Formosa in friendly hands has not been separable from the National Government holding on to these islands. If we forced their surrender, or if we allowed the Chinese Communists to force their surrender, there would, we estimate, be a rapid deterioration of the situation on Formosa.

We have had a very careful study of the situation made by our Intelligence community, by the State Department officials, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they are unanimous to the effect that if Quemoy were lost either through assault or surrender, this would have a serious impact

DECLASSIFIED

The Right Honorable
Harold Macmillan, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

Authority: [unclear]
Date: [unclear]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-2-



upon the authority and military capacity of the present government on Formosa; that it would be exposed to subversive and military action which would probably bring about a government which would eventually advocate union with Communist China; that if this occurred it would seriously jeopardize the anti-Communist barrier, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam; that other governments in Southeast Asia such as those of Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos and Burma would probably come fully under Communist influence; that Japan with its great industrial potential would probably fall within the Sino-Soviet orbit, and Australia and New Zealand would become strategically isolated.

For example, I have, only today, received a cable from our Ambassador to Vietnam which indicated that opinion there was that if the United States abandoned the offshore islands "confidence in the United States would be shaken, the entire psychological alignment in Asia would alter in favor of Communism, and Peking's prestige would reach new heights".

It was in the light of all of this that the President authorized the statement which I made today. It does not involve any final commitment but does go far to indicate that the President would probably act if there were an effort to take Quemoy and Matsu which was beyond the capacity of the Chinese Nationalists to resist.

This capacity is by no means negligible. There are 80,000 of the best Chinese Nationalist forces on Quemoy. We are helping them logistically, with equipment and with conveying on the high seas, i. e., up to within 3 miles of Quemoy. They and their artillery are well dug in and to take them would be quite an operation, particularly if there were no aerial bombardments. So far the Communists have refrained from using their air bases to bombard the offshore islands, perhaps desiring to avoid retaliatory action against these bases which might in turn involve their retaliating against Formosa bases and thus surely bringing us in. Or perhaps they may merely be holding this back for an unpleasant surprise.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-8-



There is also a question as to whether if we did intervene we could do so effectively without at least some use of atomic weapons; I hope no more than small air bursts without fallout. That is of course an unpleasant prospect but one I think we must face up to because our entire military establishment assumes more and more that the use of nuclear weapons will become normal in the event of hostilities. If this is not to be the case, then we face a very grave situation indeed in the face of the massive manpower of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

I must admit that we are not entirely happy about the world situation. It seems that the Sino-Soviet strategy is designed to put strains upon us at many separate places and our various commitments to NATO, in Korea, to individual allies, are spreading our forces too thin for comfort - certainly unless atomic weapons are to be used. Our JCS feel that this spreading of our strength is an integral part of the Communist strategy. They also express anxiety over what the JCS, in a report which the President considered at Newport, called "the apparent apathy or lack of information or understanding on the part of the United States public and allies and the world at large".

The President hopes that the statement which he authorized me to make will help to some degree in this respect. We have also, as you know, reported on the situation to the North Atlantic Council and also to the NATO Ambassadors in Washington.

The President and I hope very much that you will, as you suggest, be able to steer your public opinion so that if the worst should happen we could be together. Anything different would be a great catastrophe for both of us.

(4) We continue to believe that the firm position we are taking will in fact deter reckless Communist action. But we also recognize that Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung can be reckless and may miscalculate, and that therefore our position does involve serious risks. But as we said in relation to the Near East situation, it is a case where while acting strongly involves serious risks; these risks seemed less serious than the risks of inaction.

Faithfully yours,

S:JFD:cjp

John Foster Dulles

Clearance: EUR - Elbrick
E - Robertson

Cleared with the President by phone

TOP SECRET

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1984/2760

50-342

9/4/58

(6)

Document to

September 4, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
September 4, 1958, 10:30 AM.

Others present: Secretary Dulles
Mr. Greene
Captain Aurand
Mr. Hagerty
General Goodpaster



The Secretary first gave to the President a memorandum summarizing factors involved in the Taiwan Straits situation, prepared following consultation with State, Defense and intelligence officials. The President edited this statement and commented upon it. Mr. Dulles directed attention to the point regarding atomic weapons, recalling that we have geared our defense to the use of these in case of hostilities of any size, and stating that, if we will not use them when the chips are down because of adverse world opinion, we must revise our defense setup. The memorandum undertook to bring out this point.

The President said one problem on his mind is that if the Chinese Communists were to use fields well back from the coast, following intervention by us, to conduct night bombardment of Formosa, we would be in a difficult spot, somewhat similar to that of the Germans in the last war, who set loose strategic bombardment which was then returned against their rather confined homeland from bases very widely dispersed. However, that is simply an inherent element of the situation.

The Secretary next gave the President a statement proposed to be issued to the public clarifying our view regarding the offshore islands, and having as its object to deter the Chinese Communists from attack which might bring us into the hostilities. He and the President initially started to edit it so that the statement might be made by the President, but after further consideration the President decided to have it put out as a statement by the Secretary, approved by himself.

DECLASSIFIED
BY ML 80-342716
F.W. Date 6-9-82

Dwight D. Eisenhower
President of the United States
1953-61
DUE DIARIES
Box 36, Staff Notes
Sept 58

546

SECRET

-2-

We would then see what the reaction might be, and the President would be in position to follow it up on Saturday, as might seem desirable.


Mr. Dulles then showed the President a copy of the Chinese Communist statement made public today on the extent of their coastal waters, the last paragraph of which seemed to soften the Chinese Communist threat against Taiwan. There was agreement that the territorial limit asserted by the Chinese Communists would not be accepted.


At this point I gave the President a brief report regarding one of our reconnaissance aircraft reportedly shot down near the Soviet-Turkish border on Tuesday. Mr. Dulles reported to the President that the Soviets have sent us a note protesting the violation of their air space by three U. S. balloons.

Secretary Dulles said that General Hull had found it necessary to withdraw from serving on the Surprise Attack Panel, because of the late start the study will make and the longer duration than that on which his acceptance had depended. Now it looks as though the negotiations might not begin until November, so that the possibility of getting General Gruenther now looks more attractive. The President agreed that the Secretary might try to get General Gruenther to head the project, after approximately November 10th.

The Secretary next showed the President a proposed note accepting the favorable Russian response on commencing negotiations for suspension of atomic testing on 31 October.

Finally, the Secretary showed the President a memorandum having to do with the possibility of making available to the Egyptians the services of the Corps of Engineer dredge "Essayons." The President gave his approval to the proposal.


A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



762

This document consists of 2 pages
Number 1 of 2 copies, Series 2

~~TOP SECRET~~
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September 11, 1958

MEMORANDUM

Secretary McElroy had three matters he wished to discuss with the Secretary:

1. Implications of British defense policy. The Joint Chiefs had just completed an estimate of the near term over-all military capabilities of the United Kingdom which revealed that the British were reducing their forces to the point where they could no longer be considered a major reliance in dealing with problems around the world.

There was a discussion of the consequences of the White Paper and the demonstrations of dwindling British capability in the Suez and Jordanian affairs.

The Secretary expressed the conviction that we faced a difficult period and that although he was confident we would get over the present crisis in the Far East, there would be others. The Soviets appeared to believe they had intimidated our allies. In the past the British had been our most dependable ally. Now there was the danger of our becoming isolated not through our own desires. The Secretary thought we needed a new stock-taking to determine which of our allies was willing and able to do what.

Secretary McElroy said he was not circulating the Chiefs' paper, it was so bad, but he wanted the Secretary to have a copy and with the latter's concurrence proposed to give one to the President.

Mr. Sprague referred to the British proposal to give up development of their Blue Streak missile and purchase 60 Thors, in addition to the present agreement. Defense had requested and was awaiting the Department's political views on the proposal.

2. Quemoy and Matsu. Secretary McElroy said the Chiefs were doing a reassessment of the importance of Quemoy and Matsu to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. They would probably conclude that the islands were not required. He would appreciate the Secretary's views, particularly in the light of Tuesday's press conference, which contained the inference that some accommodation might be possible.

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	mR 17-208 #1
By	Hls 11/20/88
	NLE Date

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Kreinhardt



GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE AND MEMORANDA SERIES
Box 1, Memos of Conversation - General - X through M (3)

100-762

sl.
L.D.
J.B.

The Secretary discussed the background of the problem and suggested that some form of demilitarization of the islands with the GRC in control would be acceptable. The problem was how to get Chiang Kai-shek to disengage without fatal implications on Formosa. The Secretary believed that in the talks soon to begin in Warsaw, we should pursue this line short of bringing about the collapse of the Government in Formosa.

General Twining reported Admiral Smoots' concern that the Chinese Nationalists were so inept at unloading that they would soon want to dive bomb Communist gun positions.

The Secretary expressed the view that the reconnaissance flights over the mainland approved by the President should be called off for the time being. Secretary McElroy and General Twining concurred and undertook to issue the necessary orders.

3. Problem of Press in Cold and Limited War Situation.

Secretary McElroy voiced his concern that we did not have the kind of organized relationship with the press to make possible the proper handling of such problems as the present Taiwan situation. There was a real danger that our success would be impaired.

There followed a discussion of recent examples of inaccurate and irresponsible press stories and of the problems posed by a free press which was unwilling to exercise any self restraint. The Secretary stressed the danger of war arising through the miscalculations of others based on a misinterpretation of the American press.

Secretary McElroy suggested that this problem be worked on among ourselves and with Mr. Hagerty with a view to determining what might be done to improve the situation. He believed this should be done urgently since more could be accomplished at a time of crisis than otherwise.

(Present at the meeting, in addition to Secretary Dulles and Secretary McElroy, were Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague, General Twining and Frederick Reinhardt.)

C:GFR Reinhardt:aa

9/15/58
SECRET

Handwritten signatures and initials

September 15, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
September 11, 1958 - 3:15 PM

Others present: Secretary McElroy
General Goodpaster



Mr. McElroy first handed the President a JCS paper on British military capabilities, prepared in response to his request for an appraisal, which discloses a combination of major weaknesses in British strength. He said he and the Chiefs were surprised at how far down hill the British strength had gone. The paper had received very limited distribution. Earlier in the day, he had talked with Secretary Dulles, and they were agreed on the need for reevaluation of the allied "lineup." The President recalled that he and Secretary Dulles had discussed this matter several times, following which Secretary Dulles tried to convince the British that, if we give them atomic weapons, we could save them the necessity of cutting their forces. He commented that it is harder for the British to pay their forces in Germany than to finance atomic development in the U. K., because of the foreign exchange problem. He realized they had reduced their level of effort in a great many places, in order to get the funds for atomic development. Mr. McElroy commented that they have only a very minor atomic capability in sight. He said that this review explains in good part why they fumbled the operation at Suez, and the weaknesses in support operations shown in Jordan recently.

Mr. McElroy next said that Defense is trying to avoid another "Girard case" in Japan. A man named Longpre killed a Japanese; on the recommendation of his Commanding Officer, we are not filing a certificate to withhold him from the Japanese.

Mr. McElroy next said that he is looking hard for the best possible man for Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He had talked with several outstanding men as consultants, and said he had come to the view he would like to ask William Foster to take the job. Although not a scientist, he is a highly regarded administrator, and has served in the past as a Deputy Secretary of Defense. The President said that while he had met him, he did not know him well in the sense of knowing his qualifications.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-304

MR 76-49 #116
By *DJH* Date *4/17/01*

Handwritten notes at bottom: All seen / sub / [initials] / [initials] / [initials] (2) [Sep 1 1958]

Mr. McElroy said that Mr. Lovett gives him a very strong endorsement. The President expressed agreement with trying to get him, and on Mr. McElroy's request, said he would be glad to help by making a call, or having Mr. Foster visit him in Newport.

The President then asked Mr. McElroy what he thought the views of the Chiefs were regarding the Chinat forces on Quemoy and Matsu, from a military standpoint. Mr. McElroy said it is quite clear that they feel that, from the standpoint of military considerations alone, the islands should be vacated. The President said he agreed that it is a military debit to hold them. Accordingly, he said that in his speech, while stressing that he will not yield them under attack, he was trying not to be intransigent with regard to getting out of them through negotiation. He recognized the difficulties, and realized it is because of them that the Secretary of State tends to take a somewhat stiffer view than he holds. Mr. McElroy said he had been wondering whether, if we cannot persuade Chiang to get off the islands without losing control in Formosa, there isn't someone else who could step into the position. He commented that Chiang's only hope is to provoke a big fight, with the idea of getting back into China during the aftermath. The President said he was trying to find a way in which a strong country can conciliate. It is not adequate simply to say that we will stand on Quemoy and Matsu. We must move beyond that.



A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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22 SEP 1958
SM-693-58

9/22/58

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE US REPRESENTATIVE, STANDING GROUP,
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**

Subject: Planning Assumptions on Atomic Weapons (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 2 May 1958, subject as above.

2. In response to the request in the reference, in paragraph 1 above, the figures set forth below relative to the availability of atomic weapons for SACEUR and SACLANT during the period 1958 - 1959, may be provided to them for use as planning assumptions:

	<u>SACEUR</u>	<u>SACLANT</u>
Kiloton weapons	2500	800 ^{1/}
Megaton weapons	50	100

1/ Included approximately 400 ASW weapons

3. The above information may be released to the allied members of the Standing Group, NATO, and of SACEUR and SACLANT staffs on a strictly "need-to-know" basis.

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MarCorps L/O
Dir J/S

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed
H. L. HILLYARD,
Colonel, USA,
Secretary.

(JCS 2073/1617 - Approved 19 Sep 58)

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 9 Aug 1979

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Handwritten notes on the right margin, including a vertical signature and the number 9-27-58.

Memorandum of Conversation

9/26/58

DATE: September 26, 1958

PLACE: Waldorf Towers, New York

SUBJECT: Current NATO Problems.

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary of State
 General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
 Mr. Ray L. Thurston, SHAPE/L

COPIES TO: S/S, EUR, RA, NEA, WE, Embassy Paris, USRO, Embassy Paris for Thurston

The conversation opened with a review of French problems. The Secretary referred to the communication he had just received from General de Gaulle in which the latter proposes the establishment of a mechanism of consultation between France, the U.S. and the U.K. on problems throughout the world, and the extension of the area to be covered by the NATO Treaty to African and Asian areas as far as the Indian Ocean. The Secretary wondered exactly what General de Gaulle had in mind, particularly since there were no French territories in these regions. General Norstad said that he did not believe that de Gaulle had really given any thought to the implications of his proposal and that, given the kind of relations that existed between de Gaulle and his subordinates, it was doubtful that the latter would be able to throw any real light on how General de Gaulle planned to work this matter out. General Norstad expressed the view that any attempt to extend NATO responsibilities along the lines suggested by General de Gaulle would seriously weaken NATO which, as now constituted, affords a strong community of interest.

There was some discussion of the Secretary's talks with de Gaulle of last July, and the Secretary said he did not think that de Gaulle appreciated the far-reaching character of the proposal he had thrown out regarding the immediate availability of atomic weapons in the NATO framework. General Norstad agreed that de Gaulle did not understand this proposal. The Secretary asked how the Adenauer-de Gaulle conversations had gone, and General Norstad replied that, from the information available to him, they had gone very well indeed.

The Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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 With concurrence of _____
 Declassify In part and excise as shown
 EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) 1

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The Secretary related recent conversations with the British in which they had taken the position that they would maintain their force levels in Germany at the 55,000 level in 1959 with the understanding that in 1960 they would have to reduce to 45,000. The Secretary asked General Norstad's opinion on this question. The General replied that, in his view, to agree to the formula offered by the British would be just as bad from the viewpoint of the NATO military effort as agreeing to an immediate reduction to 45,000 men. The General strongly expressed the hope that we would not make a commitment to the British on this point, and that the question of British troop levels in 1960 be kept open for review at a later date.

General Norstad brought up the subject of Cyprus, and recounted his recent trip to Turkey and Greece and his talks with the military and political leaders there. He said that he thought the Cyprus question had now reached a truly critical stage and hoped that the United States would take a strong hand in reaching a solution. The Secretary alluded to past efforts on the U.S. side to help out in this matter and to our continued willingness to mediate in this problem, if the parties directly concerned would agree to our playing this role. He indicated that uppermost in his mind at this time was the critical importance of our relations with the United Kingdom, and that this had to be taken into account in connection with any U.S. initiatives on the question of Cyprus. While agreeing with the Secretary that whatever was to be done would have to be worked out with cooperation with the British, General Norstad concluded by again expressing the hope that we would move in on this one urgently.

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9/29/58

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)

FPC/HDR by W 10123194

11/19/87

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE AND MEMORANDA SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Box 1

THE SECRETARY

Memos of Conversation - General
L Through M (1) JB

Sunday
October 19, 1958

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
MR. SELWYN LLOYD
LONDON

Following our general talks, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd took me aside and said that their proposal to agree to a suspension of nuclear testing without regard to other aspects of disarmament was primarily motivated by domestic political considerations. He pointed out that Mr. Macmillan felt that this was a very important card to play and that he hoped we would go along with it. He recalled that we had been very helpful in acceding to certain suggestions of Sir Anthony Eden prior to the 1955 elections and he hoped that we would take a similar position of helpfulness at this time.



*Dictated in
Mr. Hunter's presence*

S JFDulles:ma

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Authority <u>MA 87-320 #1</u>
By <u>bc</u> NLE Date <u>5/1/88</u>

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10/20/58

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 20, 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *AND 867400*
By *YCA* Date *2/12/92*

SUBJECT: De Gaulle Letter

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PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Mr. Timmons
General Gruenther Mr. McBride
Mr. McCloy
Mr. Elbrick
Mr. Smith
Mr. Farley

o.k.
NOV 14 1958

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The Secretary said that General de Gaulle had sent a letter to the President on September 25, which he thereupon read. He said knowledge of this letter had leaked to the Germans, Italians and Spaak, at least in a diluted form. They had all rebelled against the French idea of a tripartite world directorate. Macmillan had discussed it with Adenauer, and the Germans had strongly resisted this idea. The Italians had been nearly hysterical. The Chancellor felt that de Gaulle had not been frank with him. The Secretary added that de Gaulle had raised this general concept with him on July 5 and had indicated he would follow this up with an expansion of the thoughts he had expressed at that time. The net result of this memorandum, however, had been to destroy the confidence of the Chancellor and to incur the antagonism of Spaak. De Gaulle had been pushing for the acceptance of his ideas and we might have some preliminary tripartite talks here, with Caccia and Alphand talking to Governor Herter or to Mr. Murphy. There was some truth in de Gaulle's concept that the present regional approach to NATO and to other similar organizations was insufficient. We had long recognized this and the Secretary himself in 1949 had pointed out that the creation of NATO would leave other areas uncovered. partially as a result of this, he believed war had come in Asia shortly thereafter. The Secretary added that at the NATO Heads of Government meeting we had proposed regional pacts should have a closer liaison among themselves. We have also been developing NATO consultation on general threats to peace. But the present set-up he recognized was not entirely adequate.

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The Secretary referred to Spaak's Boston speech which was given after Spaak became aware of the de Gaulle letter. He thought this was a good speech and was directed to some of de Gaulle's proposals. The Secretary added that the problem was how to disengage the elements which were worth pursuing from those which could not be implemented such as the concept of the tripartite world directorate,

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which we must get rid of. He agreed there was a need for some more effective way of organizing the free world. The North Atlantic Council, for example, under current conditions was not useful in coping with problems in Asia. However, de Gaulle's thought of reimposing world hegemony by the three countries was out of the question. The Secretary said we were now engaged in facing up to the situation brought to a head by de Gaulle and that we were in a period of some crisis. He noted the December meeting of NATO would discuss this matter. He said he thought tripartite talks here were probably necessary although this would cause a serious problem with the Germans and Italians.

Mr. McCloy said that the de Gaulle letter had been a divisive element and represented a play by de Gaulle for power. He thought the attempt to reimpose France over the other continental countries was extremely dangerous. The Secretary said that he agreed. The Secretary noted there had been an evolution in NATO in the past two years and that Spaak had paid a deserved tribute to us for the development of political consultation in NATO. He said the North Atlantic Council was quite a different body now than in the past. However, he questioned whether this evolution would satisfy de Gaulle if it does not have as its primary result the building up of France.

General Gruenther said that undoubtedly there was difficulty in France in keeping de Gaulle in line, and he thought that there were few who have real influence with him. He noted de Gaulle wished General Speidel removed from his NATO command. General Gruenther said the French had asked him for his views on these matters recently in France and that he believed the de Gaulle memorandum was a symbol of French desire to obtain a greater share of control in world affairs. The Secretary noted that de Gaulle wrote the letter himself and had not consulted others. He had wished to keep it secret but had given a copy to Spaak and later had briefed the Germans and Italians. Since this had leaked, the fact that tripartite talks were held here would probably leak also. Mr. McCloy indicated that he thought the language of the de Gaulle memorandum was extremely presumptuous. The Secretary said that the de Gaulle idea of amending NATO by extending its area was fantastic. To extend NATO to Africa, Asia or the Near East would require the consent of the countries involved. He said there was a dual problem in extending the NATO area because the northern members of NATO were already concerned over NATO activities in the Middle East. Therefore it would not be acceptable to these countries to extend the area as the French desired, even if this were acceptable to the other countries outside of NATO who are involved.

The Secretary said the de Gaulle memorandum was in fact full of old ideas. He said that the idea of a single free world collective security organization had proved not to be feasible. He referred to the fact that the December Heads of Government meeting of NATO had accepted liaison among the free world pacts. The Organization of American States had later not concurred in this development of closer liaison. The US is the connecting link in this organization and we should keep others informed about the activities of the various regional collective security organizations.

Mr. McCloy

Mr. McCloy said that some of the de Gaulle arguments regarding NATO were true but that the concept of the tripartite world directorate was simply a play for French prestige and a promotional scheme for France. He said France made a very small contribution to NATO and in fact was contributing less and less since her forces were tied down in Algeria. General Gruenther added that General Norstad felt tripartite political direction would be extremely bad for NATO. The Secretary said he thought even knowledge that France had suggested this was bad. Mr. McCloy raised the question of the reply to the de Gaulle letter and the Secretary said that a reply was being sent October 21 and that the British were following the same line as ourselves in attempting to play down the French proposal. General Gruenther said that de Gaulle would certainly make a major effort but that he would find tough opposition to his ideas everywhere. He thought that the letter as it had been delivered to us was much toned down from the original draft.

The Secretary said that the Foreign Office was unhappy about this letter and realized the problems it created with others. He noted that the French had been very aloof on NATO matters since de Gaulle's accession to power. The Secretary added that we must dispose of the idea of rewriting the NATO Treaty and probably make some effort at tripartite talks which had been in abeyance since Suez. The Suez crisis was not the only thing which had caused us to give up tripartite talks at this time, but also German and Italian insistence on a broader framework for free world talks had played a part. If talks were held here with Caccia and Alphanth together, they would be the first tripartite talks in two years at this level. There are of course certain special tripartite responsibilities on questions such as Germany but the French wish to extend these to many other areas as well. The Italians are hostile to tripartite talks even on the subject of Germany. Adenauer is somewhat less sensitive than the Italians.

The Secretary said that we had originally thought we could take our time in coping with the de Gaulle problem but that Macmillan, after talking with the Chancellor, felt that we should meet the problem sooner. Therefore he urged that we go ahead and have tripartite talks in which we would attempt to dispose of the French ideas. The Secretary thought that this might now be necessary.

Mr. McCloy suggested that we reply without proposing tripartite talks but simply pointing out the difficulties of the French approach. General Gruenther said that the French idea of introducing the Standing Group into the talks was not a good one, and that de Gaulle probably did not realize that the Standing Group had changed radically in nature and that the chairman of the Military Committee in Permanent Session (presently a Dutchman) now participated in Standing Group meetings. Therefore he thought this was a naive suggestion. The Secretary thought that the Germans would accept tripartite talks in order to get rid of the de Gaulle memorandum.

General Gruenther thought it would be preferable to meet with the French alone and exchange views with them. This would satisfy Macmillan's desire for action, smoke the French out and at the same time prevent the problem with the Italians.

Mr. McCloy

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Mr. McCloy reiterated his view that it would be preferable simply to meet with the French and point out the difficulties to them. The Secretary agreed that he felt some concern at tripartite meetings and that this would place us on the slippery slope. He noted the Canadians also opposed tripartite talks. If we accepted such talks we would already have moved quite a way in de Gaulle's direction. The British were rather pushing in this direction but he had some doubts. Mr. McCloy repeated his suggestion of simply going back to the French and indicating the doubts which we had on the substance of their views.

The Secretary pointed out that the British were negative on the substance of the memorandum but advocated tripartite talks. They wished to handle the de Gaulle memorandum carefully, and we also were concerned because of the rather delicate relationship which we had with him. We should attempt to give him some degree of satisfaction and the Secretary had thought of preliminary tripartite talks as a step in this direction. However, obviously they can be stopped though the British would not be persuaded easily to give up tripartite talks.

The Secretary concluded that the three could discuss some of the problems raised by de Gaulle for a considerable period of time. Alternately, there could be bilateral talks. He thought he would talk to the British again and perhaps not send a letter from the President at this time but simply ask Alphand to call and discuss these matters with him. Alternatively, the letter from the President could be sent without mentioning tripartite talks. The Secretary concluded that he would consider the matter more fully.

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DECLASSIFIED
Memorandum of Conversation
Authority NN0862400
By Cb NARA, Date 1/24/80
6 1958

XR 711.5611
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DATE: October 23, 1958
Place: Mr. de Lavallette's home

SUBJECT: Independent European Strategic Capability

NOV 6 1958

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Paul de Lavallette, First Secretary, Netherlands Embassy
Mr. Russell Fessenden, Deputy Director, EUR/RA
Mr. Robert N. Magill, NATO Adviser, EUR/RA

COPIES TO: S/P, EUR, RA (3), WE, BNA, Embassy The Hague, Embassy Brussels,
Embassy London, Embassy Rome, Embassy Paris, Embassy Paris for
USRO and Thurston, Embassy Bonn
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14-16

During an after-dinner conversation, Mr. de Lavallette referred to the prospect of nuclear weapons parity between the Soviet Union and the U.S. and to what he affirmed was the growing uncertainty on the part of Western Europeans that, under nuclear parity, the United States would be willing to sacrifice itself by employing SAC against the USSR in the event of some type of limited Soviet aggression against Western Europe. He said that this uncertainty was persuading many officials in the Hague, as well as elsewhere in Western Europe, to believe that at least one country on the Continent should possess an independent nuclear strategic capability which would serve to satisfy Western European doubts and to deter the Soviet Union against such limited aggression. De Lavallette observed that an independent U.K. strategic deterrent would not serve this purpose since U.K. use of the deterrent would be subject to the same uncertainty that applies to the U.S. He said there was a general acceptance on the Continent that France should be the continental nation to possess the independent strategic deterrent. Mr. Fessenden and I indicated that we believed there was no basis in fact for the uncertainties regarding U.S. retaliation. However, de Lavallette reiterated his point two or three times with considerable emphasis and without any qualification.

NOTE: I understand from Mr. Fessenden that de Lavallette made the same observations again to him in a subsequent conversation, indicating that he was not speaking for his Government in this regard, but that these views were held by a considerable number of officials in the Netherlands Foreign Office.

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11/6/58

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

November 6, 1958
3:35 p.m.


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Personal and Private

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ANDERSON

Following our conversation with Messrs. Reinhardt and Leddy, Secretary Anderson and I talked for a few minutes privately. I told him that I was meeting with Secretary McElroy and Deputy Secretary Quarles on Saturday afternoon to discuss what I thought was required in the way of a defense establishment in order adequately to support foreign policy. I indicated to Secretary Anderson that I felt that we needed at least our present conventional weapons establishment, but I thought that we could cut down on the nuclear effort on the theory that all we needed there was enough to deter; that we did not need to be superior at every point. I felt that some important cuts could be made and that we could in certain respects get world advantage from doing so. Secretary Anderson indicated his general concurrence.

He then spoke of his talk with Pope Pius XII which was perhaps his last audience and that the Pope had indicated his strong approval of the position that we were taking in the Far East. Secretary Anderson said he would make two memoranda of this conversation, giving one to the President and one to me.

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By JFD NLE Date 6/10/13

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
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11/6/58

November 6, 1958



MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
(11:45 a.m., November 5, 1958)

Present were members of the U. S. delegation to the surprise attack technical military discussions in Geneva beginning November 10, (Mr. William C. Foster, General Otto P. Weyland, and Dr. George B. Kistlaskowsky), and the undersigned.

The President opened the meeting by inquiring about the departure time of the delegation. Mr. Foster responded indicating that they would depart in the early afternoon of November 5 and there ensued a brief exchange about travel conditions and the weather.

Mr. Foster pointed out to the President that the delegation was to meet with the experts of the other four powers on the Western "side" (UK, France, Canada, and Italy) on Friday in Geneva, after having spent a week in consultations with their representatives in Washington. He described the consultations here as quite satisfactory.

The President indicated that he had expected a searching inquiry at his press conference earlier in the morning about the surprise attack conference but it was not forthcoming. Mr. Foster said to the President that an explanation might lie in the fact that he had had on November 2nd, at the request of the State Department, an off-the-record press conference which was attended by 50 people and lasted 50 minutes; and this may have accounted for the lack of interest in the question at the President's press conference. Mr. Foster said that he had emphasized the technical-military nature of the impending discussions and described our approach to the conference as being objective and serious. He then indicated that he would like, following the meeting with the President, to make a statement to the press in the same vein expressing the President's interest in the conference and its purposes.

The President agreed that such a statement should be made saying that he felt it was well to publicize this effort.

Mr. Foster then reported to the President that he and his group had had fine support from the scientists in government, the military, the

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Central Intelligence Agency, and the State Department. He felt that an excellent team had been put together for the assignment. The preparation, he pointed out, had been difficult and massive, inasmuch as the whole spectrum of weapons and detection, inspection, and control techniques had necessarily been examined.

The President said that he understood because the problem was how to establish techniques to eliminate or minimize the chances of surprise attack; and that this is a very difficult task. He observed that following the rejection of his open skies proposal at the Geneva Conference in 1955, he himself would have had great difficulty in knowing how to go about the undertaking.

Mr. Foster said that if now the Soviets were willing to discuss open skies, his delegation was prepared to suggest photographic measures in real technical detail. Indeed, he felt that the delegation was prepared to discuss in detail and with clarity almost any problem which would arise in the discussions at Geneva. He also indicated that if the Soviets were not willing initially or at any point to get down to the business of the conference, the delegation was also prepared to argue questions of agenda, etc.

The President said that in his own experience this kind of discussion requires a great deal of patience. He said that talking with the Russians necessitated on occasions patience to the degree of wearing one's self thin, because there have been occasions when, almost at the last moment, the Soviets have arrived at something acceptable to us. He said that the inherent problem was that of people who are characterized by honesty and good intentions combatting people who are dishonest and whose intentions are not good. Thus we will take and agree only to those things that we can prove.

The President then adverted to his press conference in the earlier morning saying that with respect to such phrases as "spending radicals," he had made it crystal clear that he was not talking about the Democratic Party as such, but the "radical free spenders" in the Democratic Party. He emphasized that he said at the press conference that we must find some way to balance the budget and that this means scrutinizing expenditures everywhere, from Defense on down. He said that the United States is losing gold reserves and that we have a situation which will be intolerable unless we are able to bring expenditures in line with receipts.

Mr. Foster responded that in his opinion, the very thing that he and his delegation were about to engage in was the basis for hope for the future -- that successful disarmament would make our budget problems easily manageable.

The President agreed, saying that we should think of all the things we might do if we had a Defense budget of only \$25 billion, for example.

Mr. Foster then said that it should be understood that in the forthcoming conference we can only begin to shape the tools which may be used in the future, but that he was hopeful for progress and success in this effort.

The President then said that he would like to make one particular request of the delegation: he indicated that it is entirely possible that the Russians might become freely talkative, and he would be most eager to have their views toward Communist China. He wondered if the Soviets were not really becoming concerned about Communist China as a possible threat to them in the future.

Mr. Foster indicated that they would actively bear this request in mind. He said that it had occurred to him that there may be some chance that an exchange of views of this sort was one of the things the Soviets had in mind when they agreed to the discussions, expressing his view that if the Soviet Union were not worried, they certainly should be.

The President then said that somehow we must find a mechanism which will disclose and assist in the elimination of duplicating weapons systems and weapons systems of purely an interim nature, and which would identify those areas in which we had too much procurement. He felt, he said, that if we could ever succeed in getting the position of Director of Research and Engineering in the Defense Department filled, this would be a big step toward accomplishment of this requirement.

Mr. Foster recalled that he had said something along this line to the President a year ago.

At this point the President said that he understood that it was desired that pictures be taken of the delegation with him, and asked me to get the photographers in.

Gordon Gray

cc: Mrs. Whitman
General Goodpaster

11/16/58
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1052, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 190, BONN 109, PARIS 176, BERLIN 46.

FOLLOWING ARE MY PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO KHRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON GERMAN QUESTION, WHICH MAY WISH MODIFY AFTER STUDY EAST GERMAN DOCUMENT WHICH I HAVE NOT YET SEEN.

THREAT TO END QUADRIPARTITE STATUS BERLIN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY STATED IN EQUIVOCAL MANNER AND MAY BE ONLY TRIAL BALLOON. DIFFICULT TO SEE, HOWEVER, HOW SOVIETS COULD SIMPLY LET MATTER DROP PARTICULARLY IN VIEW COORDINATED ACTION OF EAST GERMAN NOTE AND MEMORANDUM. I THEREFORE CONSIDER THAT SPEECH REPRESENTS A MOST DANGEROUS MOVE ON PART OF KHRUSHCHEV. IT IS TRUE THAT THIS IS ONLY ONE OF A NUMBER OF RECENT INDICATIONS OF HARDENING OF SOVIET POLICY WHICH APPEARS TO BE AIMING AT DELIBERATE INCREASE OF TENSION AND IN THAT RESPECT MAY BE LESS SERIOUS THAN IF GERMAN QUESTION ALONE WERE SINGLED OUT FOR MAXIMUM PRESSURE.

IT IS PROBABLE THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAS SEVERAL MOTIVES IN PURSUING THIS GENERAL HARD LINE. ONE MAY BE THAT HAVING FAILED TO BY SECURE SUMMIT MEETING BY SOFT APPROACH HE INTENDS TO FORCE MEETING BY BUILDING UP TENSION TO ALMOST INTOLERABLE PITCH. IF THIS IS PRIMARY MOTIVE, HOWEVER, GERMAN PROBLEM IS ILL CHOSEN SINCE THIS IS THE ONE OF TWO PROBLEMS SOVIETS REFUSE TO DISCUSS WITH US. I BELIEVE THAT MORE LIKELY EXPLANATION OF GENERAL SOVIET POLICY IS THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAS CONCLUDED THAT HE CANNOT ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES BY

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-2- 1052, NOVEMBER 11, 5 PM, FROM MOSCOW

OBJECTIVES BY TOP LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRESENT AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND THAT HE INTENDS TO SEE WHAT EFFECT STRONG PRESSURE AND HEIGHTENED TENSION WILL HAVE ON COHESION OF WESTERN POWERS. WE MAY EXPECT THAT SUCH PRESSURE WILL AS USUAL ALTERNATE WITH FRIENDLY GESTURES AND DECLARATIONS OF SWEET REASONABLENESS.

A FURTHER REASON FOR DELIBERATE HEIGHTENING OF TENSION MAY BE THAT KHRUSHCHEV CONSIDERS THIS WILL SERVE HIS PERSONAL OBJECTIVES AT 21ST PARTY CONGRESS. GERMAN AMBASSADOR THINKS THIS IS SO BUT THAT KHRUSHCHEV FAILS REALIZE THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF PRESIDUM ARE ALREADY WORRIED BY HIS TENDENCY TO TAKE UNNECESSARY RISKS IN FIELD FOREIGN AFFAIRS. GERMAN AMBASSADOR ALSO BELIEVES THAT WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY BY TAKING A CALCULATED RISK TO BRING ABOUT HIS DOWNFALL. I DO NOT MYSELF THINK OUR POLICY SHOULD BE GUIDED BY SUCH CONSIDERATIONS AND DO NOT BELIEVE WE KNOW SUFFICIENTLY WELL THE WORKINGS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM TO GAUGE THE RISKS OF SUCH TACTICS NOR TO PREDICT THE RESULT. ON THE OTHER HAND I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD BE DETERRED FROM TAKING ANY ACTION WE CONSIDER NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT ON THE FORTUNES OF KHRUSHCHEV.

SO FAR AS THE GERMAN QUESTION ITSELF IS CONCERNED KHRUSHCHEV CLEARLY IS AIMING AT FORCING OUR RECOGNITION IN SOME FORM OF THE EAST GERMAN REGIME. I BELIEVE HE SEES THAT WITH THE COMPLETION IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS OF WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT, INCLUDING THE STATIONING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS THERE, THE POSITION OF THE EAST GERMAN REGIME WILL BECOME EVEN MORE PRECARIOUS AND HE FEARS THAT WEST GERMAN INTERVENTION IN AN EAST GERMAN REVOLT UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT FACE THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE CHOICE OF ALMOST CERTAIN WORLD WAR OR THE LOSS OF EAST GERMANY AND SUBSEQUENTLY OF MOST OR ALL OF HIS SATELLITE EMPIRE. HAVING FAILED TO MANEUVER THE WEST INTO AT LEAST TACIT RECOGNITION OF THE STATUS QUO IN EASTERN EUROPE THROUGH SUMMIT TALKS HE FEELS COMPELLED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE NOW BEFORE WEST GERMAN REARMAMENT IS COMPLETED. AN ADDED FACTOR IS THE FAILURE OF THE EAST GERMAN REGIME TO WIN ANY POPULAR

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-3- 1052, NOVEMBER 11, 5 PM, FROM MOSCOW

WIN ANY POPULAR SUPPORT AND THE DILEMA THE SOVIETS FACE IN ATTEMPTING TO CARRY OUT A STALINIST POLICY IN THE REST OF EASTERN EUROPE, AND IN POLAND IN PARTICULAR, SO LONG AS THE EAST GERMAN SITUATION IS SO UNSTABLE.

GERMAN AMBASSADOR THINKS THAT SPEECH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CHANGE CHARACTER OF GERMAN NOTE TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT BUT DOUBTS THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN SOVIET ACTION. HIS GENERAL CONCLUSION IS THAT WE ARE MOVING FROM A DIPLOMATIC WAR OF POSITION INTO ONE OF MANEUVER AND HE AGREES WITH ME THAT THIS FACES US WITH AN EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS SITUATION.

I SHALL SUBMIT SHORTLY COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE U. S. ACTIONS TO COUNTER LATEST SOVIET MOVES.

THOMPSON

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11/16/58
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Department of State

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OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
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Action
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9:47 PM

Info
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FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1799, NOVEMBER 17, NOON

Downgraded To: SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EO 11652: XGDS (2) (S)
Authorized By: H. D. ...
August 4, 1975 *mas*

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1799, REPEATED INFORMATION BONN 143, BERLIN 21.
DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE
NOFORN FROM THURSTON

IN MESSAGE TO MCELROY AND TWINING SENT LAST NIGHT (EC 9-6071) GENERAL NORSTAD CONCURS WITH GENERAL HODES THAT WE MUST REACT PROMPTLY TO NOVEMBER 14 INCIDENT INVOLVING SOVIET DETENTION U.S. MILITARY TRUCK CONVOY NEAR BERLIN (USCOB'S UNNUMBERED TO DA NOVEMBER 15). HE ADDS THAT UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED HE WILL INFORM HODES AT NOON NOVEMBER 18 THAT LATTER IS TO PROCEED WITH DESPATCH NORMAL CONVOY BERLIN-HELMSTAD WITH AUTHORITY "EXTRICATE U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT BY MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY IF SOVIETS AGAIN DETAIN AND PROMPT PROTEST DOES NOT RPT NOT EFFECT EARLY RELEASE". WITHIN LIMITS OF PROMPT REACTION AS DEFINED BY NORSTAD, I.E., FOUR OR FIVE DAYS, PROPOSED ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN EITHER NOVEMBER 18 OR 19.

IN AUTHORIZING USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN CONTINGENCY STATED, NORSTAD PROCEEDING ON ASSUMPTION THAT IN CONTEXT CURRENT SOVIET PRESSURE NOVEMBER 14 INCIDENT REPRESENTS DELIBERATE PROBE AND THAT IF WE WAIT TOO LONG TO REACT, WE TIE OUR HANDS AND RUN DANGER OF SEEMING TO RECOGNIZE A DE FACTO STATE OF BLOCKADE FURTHER, HE FEELS THAT BY MAINTAINING ATMOSPHERE OF IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WE DO NOT RPT NOT EXAGGERATE SIGNIFICANCE OF EITHER ACTION OR REACTION AND TEND TO KEEP PROBLEM WITHIN LIMITS OF A LOCAL INCIDENT.

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-2- 1799, NOON, NOVEMBER 16, FROM PARIS

A SECOND IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IS NEED AT THIS TIME TO IMPRESS SOVIETS, ALLIES AND PARTICULARLY WEST BERLIN POPULACE WITH RESOLUTENESS OF OUR POSITION.

NORSTAD BELIEVES THAT PRIOR TO PROPOSED ACTION CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO TAKING FOLLOWING PREPARATORY STEPS URGENTLY:

1. INFORM PUBLIC RE NOVEMBER 14 INCIDENT WITH CLEAR EXPRESSION OF OUR POSITION AND RIGHTS VIOLATED BY SOVIET ACTION. HODES PROTEST LETTER OF NOVEMBER 15 TO ZAKHAROV WOULD APPEAR SUITABLE VEHICLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. STATEMENT MIGHT WELL INCLUDE WARNING TO SOVIETS FORESHADOWING INTENDED ACTION. THIS MIGHT BE DONE AT BERLIN LEVEL.
2. COORDINATION WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH MILITARY AUTHORITIES BERLIN AND PARALLEL DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH ELSEWHERE. DISCUSSION SHOULD INCLUDE UNDERSTANDING RE LEVEL OF PROTEST TO BE MADE IF CONVOY AGAIN DETAINED AND TIME TO BE ALLOWED TO ELAPSE PRIOR TO ACTION (NORSTAD THINKING IN TERMS OF LOCAL PROTEST AS IN FIRST INCIDENT AND OF TIME INTERVAL OF ONLY TWO OR THREE HOURS).
3. INFORM GERMAN FEDREP AUTHORITIES (CHANCELLOR, IF POSSIBLE) BEFOREHAND.
4. SINCE BERLIN IS ON AGENDA NAC MEETING TOMORROW, THIS WOULD AFFORD U.S. REP TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO NOVEMBER 14 INCIDENT AS EXAMPLE SOVIET PROBING TACTICS AND TO INFORM OTHER PERMREPS OF HODES PROTEST TO ZAKHAROV. AM IN TOUCH WITH USRO ON THIS AND WILL GIVE THEM NECESSARY FACTUAL INFORMATION FOR USE IN EVENT DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZES AMBASSADOR BURGESS TO REFER TO INCIDENT. IT MAY ALSO BE ADVISABLE TO BRING NAC INTO PICTURE MORE FULLY AT LATER STAGE.

NORSTAD ADDRESSING

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-3- 1799, NOON, NOVEMBER 16, FROM PARIS

NORSTAD ADDRESSING NATO PARLIAMENTARY GROUP TOMORROW MORNING AND ANTICIPATES QUESTIONS ON BERLIN. IF IN LIGHT FOREGOING AND OTHER CURRENT ASPECTS BERLIN PROBLEM DEPARTMENT HAS ANY SPECIAL GUIDANCE TO OFFER (HE WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE SEEN CIRCULAR 622 AND POLTO 1313), HE WOULD BE PLEASED MAKE USE OF IT ON THIS OCCASION.

LYON

DWF-2

NOTE: MR. BYRNS: EUR DUTY OFFICER NOTIFIED 10:35 PM 11-16-58
CWO-JSW

NOTE: PASSED OSD, ARMY, NAVY, AIR 11-16-58, 11:30 PM JW

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Personal Sec. C

Box 7
White House - Meetings
with the President
July 1, 1958 - Dec. 31, 1958
THE SECRETARY
(3)

November 18, 1958
10:45 a. m.

Personal and Private

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
THE PRESIDENT



1. We discussed the Geneva talks about suspension of testing. I reported that I had seen Senator Gore and that as the President had indicated, the substance of his suggestions were not far removed from our own suggestion as to what we would do if the talks broke down. The President said he recognized that we could not adopt the Gore thesis about the danger of contaminating the atmosphere as this was contrary to the thesis we had often expounded. The President said, however, that he had been struck by the phrase of Senator Gore that we would not have "atmospheric" explosions; thus leaving the way open to underground explosions and very high explosions.

2. I reported on the Berlin situation and that it had eased somewhat. I said that the rather extreme views advocated yesterday and the day before by General Norstad and the JCS had been moderated by better understanding of the facts and recognition that we needed to have a better understanding with the British, the French and the Germans before we took a position that might lead to shooting.

The President reviewed at some length his recollection of the history of the Berlin arrangements;

However, he recognized that we were where we were and had to stand firm. The President emphasized, however, that we needed to have understanding with the British, the French and the Germans on this matter.

3. I submitted a suggested revised letter to Eric Johnston which the President indicated he would approve.

4. I spoke of Senator Smith's desire to be appointed by the President rather than by me because of fiscal problems. The President indicated his doubt as to the desirability of this. It was agreed that the decision should await the return of Persons and possibly of some of the Republican Leadershi

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5. I reported that Sir Robert Scott, who had been studying the Far East situation, had conferred with me yesterday and had indicated his conclusion that he saw no better policies for the Far East than those that we were pursuing.

6. At this point the President discoursed at some length upon our policy of holding firm until changes would occur within the Sino-Soviet bloc. He felt that these were inevitable but realized that the policy we were following might not be popular. There were some who wanted to give in; others who wanted to attack. The policy that required patience was rarely popular.

7. The President read the paper prepared on spiritual stimulation. He thought this a very excellent paper. We agreed that the problem of a forum was difficult. The President indicated he might like to do it as a State of the Union message, although probably this would not be practicable.

8. I reported to the President that Livie Merchant was back on the job as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and the President expressed his great satisfaction and his confidence in Mr. Merchant.



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Personal and Private

November 20, 1958

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 387th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, November 20, 1958

Present at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the meeting were the U.S. Ambassador to NATO; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Acting Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Acting Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. The following members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff also attended the meeting: General Gerald C. Thomas, Director; Brig. General Willard W. Smith, Deputy Director; Lt. General Thomas F. Hickey, Director Designate; Colonel Charles L. Granger, USMC, Colonel James O. Beckwith, USAF, Colonel William R. Calhoun, USA, Colonel Lloyd D. Chapman, USAF, Captain Edward L. Dashiell, USN, Colonel Kenneth R. Dyer, USA, Captain David L. Whelchel, USN, DR. R. J. Smith, CIA, and Colonel S. J. West, USAF. Also attending the meeting were the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; Major John Eisenhower for the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. REPORT BY THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
(NSC Actions Nos. 1260, 1330, 1430, 1463, 1532, 1641 and 1815;
NSC 5816)

Mr. Gordon Gray introduced General Thomas, the Director of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff, and explained the general purpose

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC 5819-297
NLE Case	MR 20-111-114
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of the meeting. (A copy of Mr. Gray's remarks are included in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

General Thomas summarized the methodology of the report that was about to be given. He pointed out the change which had been made last year by the President in the directive to the Subcommittee and also referred to the use made by the Subcommittee of the current National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities. General Thomas also pointed out the assumptions under which this year's evaluation had been developed and noted the participation in the evaluation of representatives from all four of the military services as well as representatives of each of the other responsible Government agencies.

General Thomas then introduced Brig. General Willard W. Smith, Deputy Director of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff, who discussed the basic assumptions concerning the assumed Soviet attack on the U.S. which was mounted by the Soviets in mid-1961 with strategic surprise. This was followed by General Smith's discussion of the detailed assumptions made by the U.S.S.R. with respect to the nature of the attack which it made on the continental U.S. General Smith followed with a discussion of the detailed assumptions underlying the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union.

Upon the conclusion of General Smith's portion of the report, Colonel William R. Calhoun, USA, described the Soviet attack on the continental U.S. Captain Edward L. Dashiell, USN, subsequently described the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union as well as the U.S. military posture after the attack on the U.S. by the Soviet Union.

Colonel Calhoun next expounded the estimate of the damage inflicted on the U.S. by the Soviet attack and Captain Dashiell described the damage inflicted on the Soviet Union by the U.S. retaliatory attack. Dr. R. J. Smith of the Central Intelligence Agency, also a member of the Subcommittee Staff, discussed the potentialities of the Soviet clandestine attack on the U.S. which concluded the formal presentation.

In his concluding statement General Thomas emphasized the difficulties involved in attempting to achieve realistic assumptions with regard to the evaluation as a whole. There were obviously many uncertainties with respect to the military capabilities of the U.S. at a period as distant as mid-1961 and of course even more uncertainty as to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union at the same time. Despite these uncertainties, General Thomas believed the assumptions were sufficiently realistic to bear out the essential validity of the evaluation.

General Thomas also invited the Council to take a backward look at the previous reports of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee in relation to the findings of the report just rendered. There was, he pointed out, an essential similarity in the findings of all the reports since the first one was delivered in 1954. These findings were listed in a chart described as "Recurrent Conclusions".

Mr. Gray reminded the President and the Council that this was General Thomas' last appearance as Director of the Subcommittee Staff, and that his successor, General Thomas F. Hickey, was present this morning. Thereafter, Mr. Gray presented a recommendation in substantially the following language:

"You will recall that the 1957 report involved a retaliatory attack confining itself to a primarily military target system. For 1958, the President directed that the exercise concern itself with the retaliatory objective of immediately

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"A central aim of our policy is to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the U.S. There has been no suggestion from any quarter as to a change in this basic policy. However, as you know, NSC 5410/1, the so-called 'war objectives' paper is in the process of review. These matters are inextricably interwoven.

"In the light of these facts, it seems to me that it is important for you, Mr. President, to have before you, for your consideration, an appraisal of the relative merits, from the point of view of effective deterrence,

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"Such appraisal should also take into account the requirements of a counter-force capacity which might conceivably be called upon in the case of unequivocal strategic warning of impending Soviet attack on the U.S. The question here might be whether the character and composition of such a force would be adequate to the purposes of 1 or 2 above, and vice versa.

"These matters have been under intensive study in the Department of Defense. If it is agreeable to you I shall be glad to work with Mr. McElroy and General Twining to determine the best way to accomplish such an appraisal, relating it as necessary to the review of the so-called War Objectives paper, bearing in mind that the knowledge and views of the State Department and other Federal agencies would be importantly involved."

When Mr. Gray had concluded his suggested Council action, the President said he was convinced that what Mr. Gray proposed to have done was essential for the obvious reason that in today's presentation of the U.S. retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union,

Turning to General Twining and addressing him and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President said that he could remember well when the military used to have no more than 70 targets in the Soviet Union and believed that destruction of these 70 targets would be sufficient. Now, however, a great many more targets had been added. He accordingly expressed his approval of the suggested action by Mr. Gray.

If in the first thirty hours of the nuclear exchange

the U.S. succeeded in accomplishing the degree of devastation in the Soviet Union that had been outlined in this morning's presentation, we would already have accomplished our purpose.

Secretary McElroy expressed his agreement to the action recommended by Mr. Gray and the President brought the meeting to a conclusion with an expression of warm congratulations to General Thomas and his associates and also a welcome to General Hickey who would be taking over henceforth from General Thomas.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the Annual Report for 1958 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5816, as presented orally by the Director and other members of the Subcommittee Staff.
- b. Noted the President's request for an appraisal of the relative merits, from the point of view of effective deterrence, of alternative retaliatory efforts directed toward: (1) Primarily a military target system, or (2) an optimum mix of a combined military-urban industrial target system. Such an appraisal is to take into account the requirements of a counter-force capacity and whether such a counter-force capacity would be adequate for (1) or (2) above and vice versa. The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs are to determine the best means of defining and accomplishing such an appraisal, relating it as necessary to the current review of NSC 5410/1 and the interests of the Department of State and other Executive agencies.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for appropriate implementation.


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Mr. Gray

You will recall that the 1957 report involved a retaliatory attack confining itself to a primarily military target system. For 1958, the



A central aim of our policy is to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the United States. There has been no suggestion from any quarters as to a change in this basic policy. However, as you know, NSC 5410/1, the so-called "war objectives" paper is in the process of review. These matters are inextricably interwoven.

In the light of these facts, it seems to me that it is important for you, Mr. President, to have before you, for your consideration, an appraisal of the relative merits, from the point of view of effective deterrence, of retaliatory efforts directed toward:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 20, 1958

SUBJECT: Berlin

ok C. R. H.

PARTICIPANTS: The Acting Secretary
M. Joxe, Secretary-General, French Foreign Office
Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy
M. Lucat, French Minister, French Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, EUR
Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

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G GER " " Bonn
S/P BNA " " London
C INR (2) " " Moscow
EUR (2) H USRO Paris
WE USBER Berlin

M. Joxe said that the French position on the Berlin crisis was based firmly on respect for the existing treaties and that the French felt our juridical position should be fully maintained. He said French relations with Germany remained extremely close and he believed the two countries saw eye-to-eye on this issue. He said France was opposed to recognition of the GDR and to any action which placed us on a toboggan slide, since to take such a step would be playing the Soviet game. He said present Soviet moves were carefully orchestrated and included the "new" Rapacki Plan as well as the November 10 speech of Khrushchev. Their objectives were to create a state of constant tension tending to weaken German resolve and bring about a desire for neutralism in Germany. In addition the Soviets wished to create a vacuum in Central Europe and if possible effect the departure of US forces. Eventually he thought the Soviets would again propose the reunification of a neutralized Germany. In the light of this analysis, the French believed in great firmness, and in not dealing with the GDR. They took an extremely serious view of the present crisis. He expressed the fear that the British were already compromising the Western position in their memorandum.

The Acting Secretary said there did not appear to be much difference of appreciation between the French and ourselves. He thought the UK position had also been somewhat misinterpreted. He said the three Western Ambassadors met in Bonn today with the Germans but we did not yet have the results of this meeting. He thought the UK position had been misunderstood because they had proposed only recognition of certain de facto acts of the GDR and not recognition of the East German regime itself. He added it was difficult to know

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exactly what physical actions we would take to meet the many varying situations that might arise. He agreed entirely with the French analysis of the juridical situation and reiterated that we did not wish to recognize the GDR, but said we simply could not visualize exactly how the Berlin situation would develop.

Mr. Merchant said that on first reading the British paper seems needlessly defeatist as it implies recognition of the GDR, but that this first analysis might be mistaken. He added we had received further reports from London which would tend to confirm that this initial reading might not be accurate. The Acting Secretary noted again that we did not know how the matter of substituting GDR officials for Soviets would develop. Since the first convoy had been stopped, the only development had been the presence of certain GDR observers at the checkpoints. They might be learning the procedures in order to take over duties there. He wondered what would happen if the GDR took over these functions and we attempted to ignore them.

It was agreed that the three Ambassadors in Bonn should remain in close touch and also confer with the Germans. Joxe agreed we could blueprint plans now but that the important thing was to maintain a firm spirit, remain in close coordination, and maintain the fullest tripartite solidarity as well as solidarity with the Germans. The Acting Secretary said we interpreted Soviet moves in a way very similar to the French, and added he thought the question of preventing German possession of nuclear weapons was a key to the present Soviet attitude. Joxe agreed this was the most important single reason, probably, for present Soviet actions.

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Box 10

Presidential telephone
calls 1958 (11)

Saturday, November 22, 1958
6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT

On Saturday, November 22, at 6:30 p.m., I called the President to get his approval to a suggested note to the Russians, copy attached, which we hoped to coordinate with the British and French so that similar notes from the three powers could be delivered in Moscow on Monday morning, November 24.

I explained to the President that there had been numerous press speculations in regard to a split among the three powers. In addition, Chancellor Adenauer had written a letter to DeGaulle and to Macmillan and to the Secretary of State which outlined, though in reasonably moderate terms, his own anxiety in regard to the situation and which, in the case of Macmillan, asked the latter to send a personal message to Khrushchev requesting him to hold off on his proposed unilateral action in Berlin.



I read to the President the message which Macmillan had sent to Adenauer and explained that this had been sent without consultation because Macmillan felt that the time element was important, and that I also felt this had been done with the possible view of counteracting the impression that the British were somewhat wobbly in the whole situation as reflected in a lower level statement of British views which had been circulated to the three powers and Germany.

I then told the President that neither we nor our Allies had received any message from the Russians and that our knowledge of projected acts came entirely from press reports and Adenauer's conference with the Russian Ambassador in Bonn. For that reason, it occurred to us that we might take the initiative both in showing solidarity and in getting our views with respect to Russian responsibility with regard to the Quadripartite Agreements affecting Berlin out publicly before any Russian note was received by us. I then read him the text of the suggested note, and he approved it with the understanding that we would plan to coordinate it at once with the British and French.

His final

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His final comment with respect to the Berlin situation was that he had been thinking about it for the last few days and that his then instinct was to make a very simple statement to the effect that if the Russians want war over the Berlin issue, they can have it. However, in a lighter vein, he said he would certainly hold off any such statement awaiting further developments.

Christian A. Herter

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 24, 1958

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SUBJECT: Berlin

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PARTICIPANTS: The German Ambassador, Mr. Grewe
Mr. Rolf Pauls, Counselor, German Embassy
G - Mr. Murphy
EUR - Mr. Kohler
GER - Mr. Lampson

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	GER - Mr. Hillenbrand (cc)			

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Mr. Murphy opened the conversation with some reminiscences about the Berlin Blockade. He said he shared General Clay's view that we should have met the issue of the blockade squarely on the ground. General Clay had urged the dispatch of a combat team to force its way to Berlin. The fact that we did not do this but evaded the issue, in Mr. Murphy's opinion, led to Korea. Mr. Murphy said he felt we must stand firm and move if necessary with force.

Mr. Murphy then asked the German Ambassador for an explanation about the exact nature of the Federal Republic's relations with East Germany. He was not altogether clear about them and recent newspaper reports had confused the subject.

Ambassador Grewe replied that the news reports of the conclusion of a trade agreement between the Federal Republic and East Germany had created a false impression of the situation. The agreement which had been concluded on the 20th was not a significant new development. It was merely the technical renewal of a trade agreement which was renegotiated on an annual basis. It was not an inter-governmental agreement as had been suggested in the American press. The negotiators on the West German side were not officials of a government ministry. They were representatives of the Treuhandstelle which was set up as a clearing agency for interzonal trade but had no official or governmental status. This was done purposely to avoid any impression that the agreements reached with the East German negotiators, who were of course officials of the East German regime, had any implications that the Federal Government was recognizing the GDR. The Ambassador then summarized some of the provisions of the agreement mentioning

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amounts fixed for various lists of commodities.

The Ambassador then went on to say that the rumor in the newspapers about the existence of a special clause in the agreement regarding traffic to and from Berlin was without basis. There was no specific traffic clause. He had received a telegram from the Foreign Office clarifying this point. According to the interpretation of the West Germans (and they hoped this was also the understanding of the East Germans) one clause in the agreement had referred back to a traffic clause which had been included in the earlier agreements of 1951 and 1952. This clause in the present agreement provided that deliveries of steel should be carried out on condition that the previous conditions were complied with. This was a sort of rebus sic stantibus clause and it did not contain any new element or implication.

Mr. Murphy then pointed out some of the technical difficulties involved in our position on Berlin. It was a little awkward to find ourselves in a position of seeming to insist that the Russians remain in Berlin. To the man in the street this seemed to go against common sense. He could imagine that the Russkies at a later time might throw this in our faces.

Mr. Murphy then asked for the Ambassador's opinion on the philosophy of the present Soviet operation. Smirnov had been very vague in his interview with Chancellor Adenauer. He had spoken of the discontinuance of certain functions. Had he meant all or only some of them? He then went on to say that we do not want to sit statically like wooden images only responding to Soviet initiatives. We had been considering sending a note to the Soviet Union putting them clearly on notice that we would not relinquish our position in Berlin and that we would continue to come and go as before. He said the French had had some reservations about taking such a step arguing that we did not want to seem panicky. They thought we should wait to see whether the Soviets were going to allow the tension to relax, in other words to await their next move. We on the contrary felt strongly that we should take such a step now. The note was a good initiative; it was correct to lay it right on the line.

Mr. Kohler then outlined a thought which he and Mr. Murphy had been discussing before the Ambassador came in. It might be more adroit to state our position on Berlin in the form of a note to the Federal Republic than to the Soviet Union. We have not yet received any direct message on Berlin from Moscow. The Soviets are therefore not thoroughly committed to any course of action. It may be unwise to write them a note which would have the effect of making them freeze their position. For this reason it might be better to address a note to the Federal Republic which would make all the points we wanted to register in Moscow -- a note which the Soviet Union would be informed of --. We could take as a peg the report the Federal Republic made to us about the Smirnov meeting with Adenauer. This visit is the only official diplomatic step which the Kremlin has taken so far. We could reply to the German report with a note informing them of our position on the matter and incorporate in this note all the substance of the note which had been prepared on Friday for possible delivery in Moscow.

Mr. Kohler then went on to say that the Soviets may have overreached themselves a little on Berlin. Khrushchev may have improvised a bit without having

thought through all the implications of his action. It is possible, for example, that he is experiencing a little difficulty with the Poles who may have been troubled by the Soviet repudiation of the Potsdam Agreement which is the basis for their claim to the Oder-Neisse territory.

Mr. Murphy then added that he had a feeling that the Soviet Union may have wished to stir up confusion and tension in Europe because they have been unable to achieve as much in the Middle and Far East as they had hoped but might not want to push things to extremes.

Ambassador Grewe commented that the sending of a note to the Federal Republic would have the advantage of leaving the way open for the Soviet Union to withdraw without great loss of face.

In commenting on the delivery of a message from Prime Minister Macmillan to Khrushchev, Mr. Murphy said he thought Macmillan might be a little embarrassed to find himself isolated in this approach. He thought himself that it was far better for the four Western Powers to coordinate their actions closely so as to give an appearance of complete solidarity. The Soviet Union was continually trying to divide the Western countries and any suggestion of differences between the West could not fail to encourage them. It was for this reason that he had regretted the impression given by newspaper reports on the interzonal trade agreement. It had made it seem that the Federal Republic was following an independent line. He urged the Ambassador to impress upon his Minister the importance which he placed upon the close association and the complete solidarity of the Four Powers in this situation. He said he believed that in the light of all the circumstances it was important for the West to take some positive action. The French might see some advantage to delivering a tripartite note to the Federal Republic on the eve of the De Gaulle visit. This would create a favorable atmosphere for the meeting. He also pointed out that sending a note to the Federal Republic would have the advantage of bringing the Federal Republic into the picture and demonstrating Western solidarity.

Ambassador Grewe then asked whether they had received any indication of what the Secretary thought of the proposal in the Chancellor's letter for a Western Four-Power meeting. Mr. Murphy explained that the Secretary had not yet returned. Mr. Kohler added that we had asked Ambassador Bruce to tell the Chancellor that the Secretary would not be back until Monday afternoon so that an answer could not be expected immediately.

Mr. Murphy then explained his thinking on the subject of a Four Power meeting. He believed it premature to call a meeting at the Foreign Minister level and would personally favor a meeting at the ambassadorial level as a first step. The meeting might be held to advantage in Berlin.

Ambassador Grewe then handed Mr. Murphy a copy of a German memorandum (a translation of which is attached). He drew his attention particularly to Part III after explaining that the earlier parts consisted of a legal study of the Western position in Berlin prepared by the Foreign Office Legal Adviser.

After looking over the memorandum Mr. Murphy said he hoped that the Ambassador would impress upon the Foreign Minister that there was no weakness, shakiness or nervousness in Washington. All the talk about indecision was newspaper speculation. We are not thinking along the lines of compromise at all. These press stories do not represent government thinking. If the Foreign Minister has any doubts on this score the Ambassador should reassure him.

Ambassador Grewe then raised some questions of Mr. Murphy. He referred to his conversation with the Secretary during which Mr. Dulles had mentioned the idea of dealing with GDR personnel as agents of the Soviet Union. He also mentioned the Secretary's reference to Ambassador Beam's talks with the Chinese Ambassador to Poland as carrying with them no element of recognition. Grewe had reported this to Bonn but in doing so had emphasized that this did not represent final U.S. policy but merely the Secretary's thinking out loud. Grewe added that Bonn does not like the idea of recognizing GDR officials as agents.

Mr. Kohler said that we were now reviewing our contingency plans. Our view of the present situation is that the Soviets or the GDR will move against military lines of communication but will not interfere with civilian traffic to Berlin. In 1954 when the agency theory had been accepted this had been on the assumption that the situation we would be faced with would involve a total blockade and the feeding of two and a half million people.

Mr. Murphy then said that in the past we had accepted the theory that in the case of unavoidable police contacts which inevitably occur from time to time we should maintain that the GDR personnel were Soviet agents in order to avoid any question of recognition. He pointed out that the Federal Government went even further in the matter of technical contacts and referred to the Treuhandstelle. Mr. Pauls then expressed the view that making military supply lines subject to GDR inspection was quite a different matter. Mr. Murphy then said we are brought into inevitable contacts with the GDR by virtue of passing through their territory. For example, the personnel on the military trains, the engineer and the trainmen ~~when the trains are crossing into the Zone~~ are GDR personnel when the trains are running in the Zone.

Grewe then tried to envisage what would occur in a practical situation. If a military train crosses the interzonal border and the GDR officials ask to inspect the train papers the commander of the train has several choices. He can pay no attention and go on. Or he can give his paper to the GDR official protesting that he considers him an agent of the Soviet Union. In the latter case Grewe anticipated that the GDR would soon develop a stamp which would be stamped on the papers stating that the GDR official is not an agent of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Soviet Union will undoubtedly state that the GDR officials are not agents and such an assertion on the part of the person who is alleged to be the principal will be awkward to deal with. The third possibility will be for the train commander to return to West Germany. In this case it may be necessary to resort to an airlift.

Mr. Murphy said that we didn't like to speculate in too much detail about hypothetical situations. However, he explained that U.S. thinking was not running along the lines of mounting an airlift. Our thinking has not taken final shape

but we do not want to find ourselves again in an airlift situation. We would prefer to push through a convoy along the ground. Grewe asked what would happen if bridges along the route were blown up. Mr. Murphy replied that we would have to move in troops and maintain the highway. This might call for several divisions. Mr. Murphy concluded that we are trying to get away from talking about an airlift. He also said we don't think that the Soviet Union wants to blockade the civilian population. Such a course would run counter to their present efforts to promote German peace treaty negotiations. He also said that he thought it unlikely that the Soviets would be willing to give up their participation in the Berlin Air Safety Center. He thought they were attempting to distract, confuse and divide the West.

The German Ambassador then summarized the conversation as follows:

1. The Department was considering sending a note to the Federal Republic.
2. The Department was inclined to wait for an official Soviet step before holding a Western Four Power conference. (Mr. Murphy said he considered it was premature to hold a conference now. The Secretary's views were not yet known. Murphy favored having it on the ambassadorial level. Grewe expressed the view a meeting in Berlin would be very helpful.)
3. Regarding the memorandum, Grewe had submitted, Mr. Murphy said it seemed to harmonize with our thinking.
4. The U.S. was not thinking along the lines of mounting an airlift but of being firm on land if necessary using force.
5. The U.S. did envisage the possibility of dealings with the GDR under certain circumstances but they would not let them control (i.e. inspect) allied military traffic. Mr. Murphy said we were studying these questions and we could not give any government positions on hypothetical cases. In reply to a question from Grewe whether we would be willing to submit papers to a GDR man at a checkpoint, Mr. Murphy said it was difficult to give a definitive answer to a hypothetical question. It was his personal opinion that if it was quite clear that the GDR person was acting as a Soviet agent it would probably be permissible. It was important however that we make it clear that we have the right of ingress and egress and that we will maintain it.

Attachment:

As stated.

11/24/58

11/24(58)(2)

MONDAY
November 24, 1958
6:14 p.m.

JTB

TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT IN AUGUSTA

The Sec read the proposed letter to Adenauer. The Pres thinks it is very guarded - at the same time letting him know the mere fact the Russians pull out - if their retreat from ~~there~~^{their} obligations puts us in a hole - what they do by omission makes us to by commission.... He went on and suggested saying but of course if the Russians abandon their responsibilities then I suppose in this kind of low level business we would have to go along if we were going to keep things straightened out - the Pres then said he does not know if the Sec should say it - as long as he understands if that is done peaceably we have not really a cause.... They agreed it is implied in the letter as is. The Pres suggested Bruce might say something like this to show there is both a juridical and ethical position as well as a practical one.

~~pd~~ The Sec said everyone is stirred up - the JCS want to do something fast and quick and Norstad wants us to fight our way through - the Pres thinks it is true but if the others go out and the East Germans try to stop convoys we say we can't have that - if they want to do normal checking and searching for contrabands etc....

pd

Dukes Pp / Telephono Calls 9/13/58 13/

Memoranda of Fed. Conv. - W/N Aug 1, 1958 to Dec. 5, 1958 (1)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

11/24/58 (18)
1953 NOV 24 PM 10 24
11100 R

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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NLE MR Case No. 80-137

Document No. 20



59-52

SENT TO: Amembassy BONN PRIORITY 108484

SS

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

~~xxxxxx~~ Ambassador by 9:00 a.m.

RMR

Deliver ~~xxxxxx~~ Nov. 25.

G

Following reply from Secretary should be delivered to Tuesday

SP

Chancellor ~~xxxxxx~~ morning.

C

INR

BEGIN TEXT

EUR

QTE

My dear Friend:

On my returning this morning to Washington, I find your letter of November 20. It deals with problems of the utmost gravity which, as you know, have been receiving the consideration of the President and myself as well as of the officers of the government. The presence here of Ambassador Bruce a few days ago gave us the opportunity to talk over the Berlin problem.

Of course, the situation that we face is still hypothetical. The Soviets have given some indications as to their intentions but have not yet made these intentions precise or operative.

I am sure that our two Governments start from a common premise, often reiterated, that the abandonment of the free part of the city of Berlin is totally unacceptable, and this includes

Dist. Desired
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Drafted by:

S - The Secretary 11/24/58

Telegraphic transmission and

Approval approved by:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Foy D. Kohler

Clearance:

EUR - Mr. Kohler

S/S - Mr. Carson

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Authority

MR 80-137 #201

By

sc NLE Date 7/9/81

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
the rights of transit to and from the Federal Republic to Western Berlin. Our rights were won in the war, they are reflected in the Protocol of September 12, 1944 and were reexpressed by the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in Paris in June 1949. It was there agreed that qte as regards the movement of persons and goods and communications between the Eastern and the Western Zones and between the Zones in Berlin and also in regard to transit, the occupation authorities, each in his own zone, will have an obligation to take the measures necessary unqte, etc. Surely such an obligation, jointly agreed to, cannot be terminated by unilateral action.

I also recall that the directive agreed to at the Geneva Summit meeting of 1955 stipulated that qte the Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question unqte, etc., ~~surely~~ Surely the question of Berlin is part of this qte German ~~question~~ question unqte, for which there is an agreed qte common responsibility unqte on the part of the four powers. This again is something from which the Soviet Union cannot unilaterally disengage itself.

I would myself have thought that it might be possible to hold the Soviet Union to its obligations and at the same time deal on a de facto basis with minor functionaries of the GDR, so long as they merely

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carried out perfunctorily the present arrangements. That, in our opinion, would not and should not involve any diplomatic recognition of the GDR or any waiver of our rights vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. I believe that the Federal Republic, itself, without this implying diplomatic recognition, deals in a number of respects with minor functionaries of the GDR.

On the other hand, we recognize that there are psychological as well as purely juridical factors to be taken into account. Certainly we should not allow anyone to get the impression that there is any lack of firmness and dependability in the policies of the Western allies. Your views as to how best to ~~display~~ ^{display} that firmness will carry great weight with us. The President and I have full confidence in your steadfastness and your judgment and your dedication to the cause of freedom.

So far, as we both recognize, the Soviet has not made known precisely what measures it will take. You consider it necessary that without delay there be a meeting of the four Governments when the Soviet Union makes its measures known. The United States would be glad to participate in such a meeting, although I cannot say in advance of knowing the date, at what level we could participate with the necessary promptness. But whoever speaks for us will have the full confidence and authority of the President and myself, if indeed I do not personally participate, which would be my preference if the timing permits.

With best regards, I am
Faithfully yours,

~~John~~ Foster Dulles

END TEXT.

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DULLES

7-1-41

The Council noted that since its last meeting the Soviet leaders have launched a campaign which, while throwing the cloak of oblivion over Soviet repression in Hungary, is designed to induce public opinion in various member countries to oppose the modernisation of defence forces, and to weaken the principle of collective security in NATO.

The Council agreed that one of the objects of this campaign was to ensure for Soviet forces a monopoly of nuclear weapons on the European continent. Such a situation clearly could not be accepted. It was with satisfaction that the Council noted the firm replies given to these Soviet manoeuvres.

The Atlantic Alliance must be in a position to use all available means to meet any attack which might be launched against it. It is the availability of the most modern weapons of defence which will discourage attempts to launch any such attack on the Alliance. Pending an acceptable agreement on disarmament, no power can claim the right to deny to the Alliance the possession of the modern arms needed for its defence. If, however, the fears professed by the Soviet Union are sincere, they could be readily dissipated. All that is needed is for the Soviet Union to accept a general disarmament agreement embodying effective measures of control and inspection within the framework of the proposals made on numerous occasions by the Western powers, which remain an essential basis of their policy.

18. The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the USSR should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age.

19. As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defences. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

20. To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.


11/25/58

November 25, 1958

Briefing on Status of Berlin Crisis




1. Developments, 18 Nov. - 25 Nov.



*Much of this was
left in in 1988!*


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NLE Case 87-21645
By Alc NLE Date 30/92


NSA-FOIA agreement - makes no sense



d. Chancellor Adenauer addressed a letter to the Secretary of State, received November 21, pointing to the gravity of the situation, observing that the first Allied concession will not be the last, and suggesting talks between the governments of the UK, France, the Federal Republic, and the US as soon as the details of the Soviet position on Berlin become known.

e. An ad hoc committee has been established including representatives of State, Defense and other interested agencies, plus the British and French, to consider the Berlin problem.





g. On 22 November (Saturday) the State Department instructed Embassy Bonn to submit to the UK and France there the proposed text of a note to be delivered in Moscow ostensibly on 24 November (Monday). This message, noting the announced intentions of the USSR with regard to Berlin, emphasizes that the proposed Soviet action would be invalid in international law and would be hardly consistent with the Soviet Government's protestations of a desire to relax international tensions. Embassy London has since notified State that the Foreign Office approved the tripartite demarche, subject to possible suggestions from legal advisers. The French, however (Couve de Murville), feel that delivery this soon would be premature; and, since the Soviets have not yet taken action, would give the impression that we are "nervous." Accordingly, the sending of the note has been delayed.

h. An offshoot of the proposed tripartite note to the Soviets is the matter of publication of such a note. The Ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, favors publication because of its effect on the Germans. Whitney and the British Foreign Office feel that a note not published would have a greater deterrent effect.


2. Reactions of the Countries Concerned




a. Germany

Official German as well as press reaction unanimously supports a firm stand on Berlin now. The Foreign Minister summarized his views on German opinion to Ambassador Bruce as follows: There is universal belief that any concessions to the GDR by the Allies (specifically the showing of documents even under protest in order to maintain access to Berlin) will start an avalanche which nothing can stop and which will have catastrophic consequences for Europe and the Free World. Thereby "The West will have lost the first bloodless blow of World War Three." A firm stand now will cause the Soviets to back down. He referred to Berlin Mayor Brandt's recent statements and to Bundestag President Gerstenmaier's mention of the possibility of the Federal Republic breaking off relations with Moscow as evidence of undoubted solid German support for firm Allied reaction.

Other West German sources bear out the same view.





The views of the Germans are well summarized by the message from Adenauer to Secretary Dulles which is being appended for your information.

b. UK



*Not in
CIA
NLE 89-260-18*

As evidenced by the British working-level paper, preliminary British official reactions to the Berlin crisis have not been firm. Embassy London reports, however, a desire for firmness on the part of certain Conservative MP's and a good deal of press comment, both pro and con on the GDR recognition question. The conflict in British statements is over the question of whether recognition would affect the Allied occupation, not as to whether we should abandon our position in Berlin. Prime Minister Macmillan has stated that he expects the Berlin crisis to be settled peacefully.

On Friday (21 Nov.) the Foreign Office seriously questioned

the US policy of non-recognition of East Germany. In this connection the Foreign Office informed Embassy London that its legal experts "unanimously rejected" our position that non-recognition of the East German regime was essential to the Western legal position in Berlin.

There are indications, however, that the working-level attitude in the Foreign Office is not necessarily Mr. Macmillan's attitude. This possibility is suggested by the note which he sent to Khrushchev on 22 November (mentioned above) and by the fact of the British support for the proposed tripartite demarche.


c. France


Earlier in the week Embassy Paris reported that the working-level in the French Foreign Office had recommended to Couve that the Allies adopt a policy of firmness in the face of Soviet threats, [even to the extent of refusing to accept GDR personnel at checkpoints. However, a final Foreign Office position has not yet been reached.]



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Couve is,


as has been mentioned, the principal apparent stumbling block in the submission of a tripartite note to the Soviets.



3. Views of Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, in Moscow

The "Afternoon Summary," Department of State, dated 21 Nov., included the following:


"Prompt, Forceful Stand on Berlin Advocated - Thompson in Moscow believes that while the USSR would refrain from any action which it was convinced would cause us to use force, once it had turned its functions in Berlin over to the East German regime it would take great risks rather than back down in the face of our counteraction. In this circumstance he thinks our worst policy would be one in which there is any uncertainty as to what to do.




Thompson suggests we start by trying to get an agreed evaluation of what the Soviet objectives are, and then try to get from the UK a commitment as to how and under what circumstances it would agree to the use of force to maintain our position in Berlin. He recommends we attempt to reach an agreement with the UK and France that we will be prepared to use force to maintain road and air communications with Berlin, and that we so inform the USSR and West Germany promptly but confidentially."

2/85

4. Views of General Norstad



left in USSR!



(Mr. Murphy met with the JCS

later in the week.)

On 24 November, Houghton (France) advised the State Department that he and Norstad agree that there is considerable merit in suggestions for Western initiative in proposing a four-power conference on the German question. He reports that Whitney, who was in Paris Saturday, supports Norstad's view that we should take a forthright stand and make clear our determination to remain in Berlin.




(This has been done, it would appear, by both your statement and that of Mr. Nixon on 25 November.)

Houghton finally points out that a conference would assist in preventing our being maneuvered into a position of appearing to oppose Soviet withdrawal from East Berlin.

5. Developments on 26 November

a.



b. Talk of tripartite positions shifted from possible note to Soviets to a possible note to the Federal Republic of Germany. A copy of the draft note to Germany is available. Again, the French are reticent to join. The British are willing to join a tripartite statement but feel that if the French demur, a unilateral U.S. note would be better.

c. Adenauer and De Gaulle are to meet today and Berlin will be an important item on their agenda.

d. An unconfirmed radio report this morning stated that a covered convoy was permitted to pass the guards without interference. This will be checked into further.

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6. Summary

In summary, the following points stand out in all the discussions:

a. None of the Western governments nor members thereof advocate pulling out of Berlin.

b. The main issues of discussion are: (1) the degree with which the Western powers can deal with the East German government without undue loss of prestige or undue damage to Adenauer, (2) the procedures to be followed (including the degree of force to be used) in the event of serious harassment by East German police, and (3) timing of Western moves, such as the proposed tripartite demarche to the Soviets or the proposed message to the Federal Republic.

c. Of the nations concerned, West Germany has taken the firmest and most unequivocal position; the British working level appears the most conciliatory. France is uncommitted. Apparently De Gaulle prefers to wait a little longer before moving.

4/88



TOP SECRET



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c. 

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
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November 25, 1958

Briefing on Status of Berlin Crisis

1. Developments, 18 Nov. - 25 Nov.



b. Ambassador Smirnov on November 20 informed Chancellor Adenauer of Soviet plans to abolish the "Occupation Statute" for Berlin. The Chancellor stated emphatically that the action proposed by the Soviets would not contribute to the relaxation of tension but, on the contrary, would heighten it. He felt that the reaction of the Three Western Powers would be negative and that the move would be adversely


DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
Agency Case Wato 8803091
NLE Case 88-260-8
By ALG NLE Date 8/14/89

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received by the German public and would undoubtedly lead to a further deterioration of German-Soviet relations.



d. Chancellor Adenauer addressed a letter to the Secretary of State, received November 21, pointing to the gravity of the situation, observing that the first Allied concession will not be the last, and suggesting talks between the governments of the UK, France, the Federal Republic, and the US as soon as the details of the Soviet position on Berlin become known.

e. An ad hoc committee has been established including representatives of State, Defense and other interested agencies, plus the British and French, to consider the Berlin problem.

f. On 22 November, in response to the urging of Adenauer, Macmillan sent the following message to Khrushchev:

"I am sending you this personal message to tell you of the anxiety which your recent statements on Berlin have caused me. I must tell you frankly that I find

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those statements difficult to reconcile with your many previous expressions of the desire to reduce tension in the world. The British Government have every intention of upholding their rights in Berlin which are soundly based.

"That also I believe to be the position of our Allies as is well known to you. At the moment discussions are taking place in Geneva. I still profoundly hope that fruitful results will come both from the political conference on nuclear tests and from the technical conference on measures against surprise attack. I cannot imagine anything more calculated to increase tension at a moment of opportunity for an improvement in our relations than the kind of action which your statements appear to foreshadow. I hope therefore that you will seriously consider what I say before deciding to proceed to such action."

g. On 22 November (Saturday) the State Department instructed Embassy Bonn to submit to the UK and France there the proposed text of a note to be delivered in Moscow ostensibly on 24 November (Monday). This message, noting the announced intentions of the USSR with regard to Berlin, emphasizes that the proposed Soviet action would be invalid in international law and would be hardly consistent with the Soviet Government's protestations of a desire to relax international tensions. Embassy London has since notified State that the Foreign Office approved the tripartite demarche, subject to possible suggestions from legal advisers. The French, however (Couve de Murville), feel that delivery this soon would be premature; and, since the Soviets have not yet taken action, would give the impression that we are "nervous." Accordingly, the sending of the note has been delayed.



h. An offshoot of the proposed tripartite note to the Soviets is the matter of publication of such a note. The Ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, favors publication because of its effect on the Germans. Whitney and the British Foreign Office feel that a note not published would have a greater deterrent effect.

2. Reactions of the Countries Concerned

a. Germany

Official German as well as press reaction unanimously supports a firm stand on Berlin now. The Foreign Minister summarized his views on German opinion to Ambassador Bruce as follows: There is universal belief that any concessions to the GDR by the Allies (specifically the showing of documents even under protest in order to maintain access to Berlin) will start an avalanche which nothing can stop and which will have catastrophic consequences for Europe and the Free World. Thereby "The West will have lost the first bloodless blow of World War Three." A firm stand now will cause the Soviets to back down. He referred to Berlin Mayor Brandt's recent statements and to Bundestag President Gerstenmaier's mention of the possibility of the Federal Republic breaking off relations with Moscow as evidence of undoubted solid German support for firm Allied reaction.

Other West German sources bear out the same view. On 25 November the State Department reported that Mayor Brandt of


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
Berlin has made it plain to the deputy commandants of Berlin that the West Berliners expect the allied occupying powers to maintain their right to be in Berlin as conquerors, subject in no sense to control by any German officials or agencies. Alluding to reports that the allies might submit to control by Soviet Zone German officials as agents of the USSR, Brandt asserted that submission to any such controls would destroy the western allied position in Berlin.

The views of the Germans are well summarized by the message from Adenauer to Secretary Dulles which is being appended for your information.

b. UK





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c. France

Earlier in the week Embassy Paris reported that the working-level in the French Foreign Office had recommended to Couve that the Allies adopt a policy of firmness in the face of Soviet threats,






3. Views of Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, in Moscow

The "Afternoon Summary," Department of State, dated 21 Nov., included the following:

"Prompt, Forceful Stand on Berlin Advocated - Thompson in Moscow believes that while the USSR would refrain from any action which it was convinced would cause us to use force, once it had turned its functions in Berlin over to the East German regime it would take great risks rather than back down in the face of our counteraction. In this circumstance he thinks our worst policy would be one in which there is any uncertainty as to what to do.



4. Views of General Norstad

On 16 November, General Norstad informed Secretary McElroy and General Twining that unless directed otherwise, he will order

the dispatch of a normal Berlin-Helmstad convoy with authority to "extricate US military personnel and equipment by minimum force necessary if the Soviets again detain and prompt protest does not effect early release" (2-3 hours). This stand was overtaken by the suspension of convoys by the JCS on 18 November [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (Mr. Murphy met with the JCS later in the week.)

On 24 November, Houghton (France) advised the State Department that he and Norstad agree that there is considerable merit in suggestions for Western initiative in proposing a four-power conference on the German question. He reports that Whitney, who was in Paris Saturday, supports Norstad's view that we should take a forthright stand and make clear our determination to remain in Berlin.


(This has been done, it would appear, by both your statement and that of Mr. Nixon on 25 November.)

Houghton finally points out that a conference would assist in preventing our being maneuvered into a position of appearing to oppose Soviet withdrawal from East Berlin.



5. Developments on 26 November

a. Discussions on 26 November seem to center chiefly on the way to approach a possible administrative harassment of the land lines to Berlin on the part of the GDR.



b. Talk of tripartite positions shifted from possible note to Soviets to a possible note to the Federal Republic of Germany. A copy of the draft note to Germany is available. Again, the French are reticent to join. The British are willing to join a tripartite statement but feel that if the French demur, a unilateral U.S. note would be better.

c. Adenauer and De Gaulle are to meet today and Berlin will be an important item on their agenda.

d. An unconfirmed radio report this morning stated that a covered convoy was permitted to pass the guards without interference. This will be checked into further.

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6. Summary

In summary, the following points stand out in all the discussions:

a. None of the Western governments nor members thereof advocate pulling out of Berlin.

b. The main issues of discussion are: (1) the degree with which the Western powers can deal with the East German government without undue loss of prestige or undue damage to Adenauer, (2) the procedures to be followed (including the degree of force to be used) in the event of serious harassment by East German police, and (3) timing of Western moves, such as the proposed tripartite demarche to the Soviets or the proposed message to the Federal Republic.

c. [Redacted area]

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DBEL

WHO office of still security
International Series box 6

Berlin, vol I (1)

Europe 3

November 26, 1958

Plans for the NATO Ministerial Meeting

A. General Approach and Emphasis

We might see this occasion, nearly at the end of a full decade of NATO and the beginning of a new one, as a time for assessing the past and appraising future needs and developments.

Recalling the original purpose of NATO, to meet the threat of Soviet military aggression in Europe, we can note certain facts. This threat, or this aspect of it, remains and NATO must cope with it. But there are now evident two new factors. For half a decade the Soviets have been developing a second broad aspect of their threat, not only to NATO but to the whole free world. This is their combined economic, political and psychological offensive directed at wooing or suborning other peoples in strategically important areas, in many of which NATO countries have vital interests at stake. Also, NATO itself has become more conscious of itself as an interdependent union of like-minded peoples having much in common quite aside from the Soviet threat. The sense - and to some extent, the reality - of an Atlantic Community has been developing.

Today,

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copy sent
to Reinhardt*

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PDS 745X (67 D 548) / 151 / Europe (25)
(prob)*

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1. Western achievements in development of missiles and artificial earth satellites (in contrast, current estimates of Soviet ICBM development indicate it moving more slowly than we thought a year ago);
2. Great invulnerability of our retaliatory force;
3. Beginnings of defense against ballistic missiles;
4. Scientific coordination within NATO;
5. Amendment and more liberal interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act to permit strengthening of NATO collective defense;
6. Demonstration of readiness and will to use limited force if necessary (Lebanon and Jordan, Quemoy, Berlin);
7. Initial steps toward arms control now being undertaken;
8. Ending of US recession, and European immunity thereto;
9. Progress toward building a European economic community.

What we need is patience, determination and sustained effort in attacking NATO's basic problems. This will require faith in ourselves and in the future, combined with the capacity to adjust our plans flexibly to rapidly changing conditions.


B. Military Matters

1. Nuclear stockpile

we could indicate our willingness to move ahead with

this so

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Cont.
W. J. Jones

W. J. Jones

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-4-

this so as to insure ready availability of nuclear components when and where needed. Negotiations with certain countries are now under way. The "joint control and use" formula should satisfy country of location and NATO requirements, but needs to be clarified in greater detail. A statement on this might be made, and details further worked out in current and future negotiations. We should be aware that the stockpile concept alone, however, is not likely to hold NATO in line or ward off 4th country problems indefinitely.

2. IRBM's

Certain developments - lessened likelihood of early Soviet ICBM capabilities, rapid obsolescence of Thor and Jupiter, and imminent development of "second generation" missiles - are decreasing the urgency of IRBM deployment on the continent. The military are already reviewing current plans for IRBM production. We need not, then, press for rapid implementation of a program that will almost certainly require adjustment at an early date to new weapons developments.

3. NACNA and national nuclear capabilities

It is assumed that inter-agency negotiations on NACNA will be protracted, so that it will not be possible to make any specific proposal concerning it at this meeting.

However, the issue of immediate availability of nuclear weapons for NATO use is a vital one. Europeans should


be given

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limited military actions. A balanced deterrent requires a greater measure of conventional force as one of its essential components.

Therefore we should this year, as compared with last, place special emphasis on the need for a reasonable build-up of NATO conventional forces. We should support, as against possible UK and other opposition, the concept that a strong shield force - certainly 30 divisions and perhaps more - is required in the central NATO area to re-enforce the deterrent, bolster morale, and deal with eventualities short of general war. This force should be strong enough to represent a formidable risk to the Soviets if they are pre-meditating an attack with conventional forces.

6. Atomic armament of Germans

 Current Soviet behavior seems motivated in part by the fear that West Germans will soon possess, or have access to, atomic weapons.

We might do well, then, to make clear and to publicize the fact that we have no intent, under present plans, to make such weapons available to the German forces, but only to hold such weapons in readiness for retaliatory action in an emergency in accordance with agreed NATO strategy.

C. Non-Military Aspects of NATO

1. Reorganization of NATO

This issue may be to the fore because of recent
criticisms

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALLS
November 27, 1958

The President called the Secretary of State. The President said until John came down this morning he had not known that there had been a working level paper from the British which said in effect that they were ready to say to the Russians "we will do what you want." He was also astonished at Courve de Murville's message. The Secretary said he did not yet know what gave as a result of the de Gaulle - Adenauer meeting yesterday. He also said that the working level paper had now been repudiated. Both he and the President agreed that Macmillan's statement had been fine.

The Secretary told the President about a note that was delivered in Moscow this morning. Translation is not available but from the wires it seems to say there will be no change for six months, but during that six months negotiations as to status should take place. They propose to make Berlin a Free City under United Nations auspices -- will withdraw all forces from Berlin. If an agreement not reached at the end of six months, they will go ahead with their program.

The President said if the city was made a "Free City" there must be an avenue to it also under the jurisdiction of the UN. He indicated that somewhere along the line we have to find a way to say that we are going to do what we want to do.

He said that he had been worrying late at night as to what the eventual fate of Berlin would be. He said that in the days when Berlin was divided, when he was not a politician, that he had done his best to make the Americans and British see what a trouble the thing was going to be -- but that the political leaders, naming Roosevelt and Churchill had said, "Oh, we can get along with Uncle Joe." He said at the time he knew better and that everything he had feared had come to pass.

Dulles said that probably decision could wait until Sunday. The President urged a four-power conference on subject.

AWP / D DE Biangis / 33 / Telephone - Nov. 1958'

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNCLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY
Personal and Private

Augusta
November 30, 1958
11:30 a.m.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
THE PRESIDENT

Also Present: Dr. Milton Eisenhower
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Greene

WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDA SERIES

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER, PAPERS, 1951-59

Box 7, Meetings with President 7/1/58 - 12/21/58 (2)

Correct by
Telegram

1. We discussed the draft of a statement that I might read to the press following our talk; Mr. Hagerty was present for this part of the conversation. The President suggested I introduce the statement with appropriate references to my trip to Mexico and with these additions he agreed that I should make the statement.

2. I referred to the Soviet note of November 27 on Germany and Berlin and suggested that despite its hostile tone we need be in no hurry to reply. I thought that the occasion called for a thorough review of our whole policy on German reunification, and that in our reply to this Soviet note we should not only reject it but also advance some constructive proposals of our own. The President agreed.

I referred to the importance of Berlin as an outpost and show-place of freedom. The President agreed but expressed unhappiness that here is another instance in which our political posture requires us to assume military positions that are wholly illogical.

I said that there is in prospect a meeting in Paris on December 15 of the Foreign Ministers of the US, Britain, France and the Federal Republic. It has been suggested that this might be followed by a meeting of the Heads of the same Governments thereafter. I thought this would have little point, although it might develop that at a later stage a meeting with the Russians at Head of Government level would be desirable. I said that I would in any event try to submit to the President new constructive proposals about Germany prior to the December 15 meeting.

3. We noted that these references to Heads of Government meetings reflect once again the differing concepts of the function of Head of Government as between ourselves and our Western European allies. The President referred to his idea that we might try to establish the position of a "First Secretary of the Government". He

Advised to
He & from
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11/27/58/7/2

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Authority MR 93-170 #1
8/6/93

Personal and Private
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11/30/58

762.00 / 11-2958

prelim. anal of Sov Berlin @ note, done at working level -
'approved a gen'l by Secy' - used for briefing Pres by
Asst Secy Movement 11/30/58

Sov agenda -

'strengthening + legitimization of the E Ger regime
as a step toward recovery of the status quo
in E. Eur' - also - 'inhibit the rise
and movement of the Fed Rep.' - but
K's 11th pres conf says W Ger
resume of its arm. program would not
alter Sov pos on Berlin, so secondary.

12/2/58

MEXICO CITY- TUESDAY 12/2
December 2, 1958
9:24 a. m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO GOV HERTER

The Sec said he read these papers about Guinea - he thought the French statement pretty terrible. H agreed. I couldn't hear H well but I think he said someone talked with the ~~E~~ representative from Guinea who arrived. Someone thought the French were putting the squeeze on from a budgetary point of view and they may want a quick loan. They have something from Ghana but nothing precise. Someone met with the British and Canadians to see about their position on admission to the UN. If they vote for admission we should go along. If not then reconsider together. The Sec asked when it will come up and H said not immediately. The Sec said if the French had said Guinea is part of France is they are working it out but arrangements are not complete then we have something to go on but this business which is largely based on making a union with Ghana - that is no reason at all. They talked with him (said H) about Ghana - he said it is a loose type of alliance - not a federation. They have talked secretly with the Liberians about the same thing but we did not raise it because we are not to know they have done it. The Sec reiterated we have no choice if the Br and Cans vote for it.



The Sec said the Nasser business is unpleasant. H said it was a shame. It is hard to put the finger on anyone though he would like to - it was given distribution. Something happened three weeks ago. The Sec said he has the feeling it is in line with Nasser's practice of wanting to find a pretext to do something he wants to do - the Canal. They agreed it is a bad leak.

Authority MR 80-418 #18
by bc
Date 7/23/86

Writer P. / Tel. Calls / Mem. Fed. Conv. - from - NOV 2 1958 - Dec 27, 1958 (1)

H said in this connection we had reports from our cousins yesterday to the effect something in the North is pro-Communist. They agreed it is shocking. H said it is a touchy situation. Obviously I did not get this.

The Sec said he is going to the formal visitation on the new Pres. The talk last night was cordial and nice. Then to Palm Springs to spend the night.

H said the speech is in good shape. He said something re sending it to Palm Springs. The Sec said he will not be able to put in what WSR suggested. There is no room to just add.

H replied the studies are going ahead on Berlin. The Sec told Becker to look up the parallel and see ^{if the} ~~what~~ positions the Russians are now taking would not have disastrous effect on them in the Pacific.

pdb

12/3/58

PALM SPRINGS
WEDNESDAY
December 3, 1958
12:21 p. m.

AC
11
gt

TELEPHONE CALL FROM SEC ANDERSON

The Sec returned the call and replied he does not think it is essential for A to be at NATO. A always adds weight and dignity to the Del and his judgment is awfully good on all these problems. Actually the most significant thing we will be talking about will be the political problems of Berlin and Germany and the Sec values A's judgment not as Sec of Treas but as someone who has good judgment. So he would like to have A there but does not think from the standpoint of the Del to NATO it is essential. He thinks there is a lot of merit to A's being here - he is going to need some supporting cast. The Sec will be sorry personally but thinks perhaps on balance it is in the general interest A should be here with the Pres on this. The Sec is sorry not to be in Washington for the NSC mtgs - will they be discussing the military budget? The Sec said he spoke to the Pres about it in Augusta. The real place he thinks to make savings is in terms of new weapons where there is certainly a terrific amount of overlapping and he told the Pres if they hold it down he hopes they won't shove the whole burden on conventional forces which we use everyday in our business. We have to maintain this. If we have to make cuts in Korea and Germany and if there were no forces for places like Lebanon and Taiwan and if we have nothing but nuclear warfare we will be in a bad spot. Each armed service thinks ~~its~~



calls Ap/del calls/a/ Mem-Tel Conv - Gen - 11/2/58 - 12/57/58 (1)

it has the ability to destroy Russia. The Sec knows it is difficult to avoid duplication and overlapping but from where the Sec sits at least he just does not think it is likely that events will be pushed to a point where we will have to do that as long as we have reasonably adequate power to destroy Russia but he knows if we don't have some ground forces we will be in trouble right away. The Sec expressed that view to the Pres. He mentioned the carrier business which is technical and which he does not know anything about. The necessity for forces such as were necessary in Lebanon and Taiwan will be recurrent every few months probably and if we don't have that then we will have a problem.

The Secretary said Anderson said he agreed fully.

pdb

12/3/58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Control: 1933

Rec'd: DECEMBER 3, 1958
1:12 PM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1208, DECEMBER 3, 2 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

BECAUSE OF IMPORTANCE SUBJECT SENDING VERBATIM MEMORANDUM DICTATED BY SENATOR HUMPHREY ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH KHRUSHCHEV WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN QUESTION. SENATOR IS CONVINCED THAT CHIEF PURPOSE IN KHRUSHCHEV'S MIND IN HOLDING THIS LONG CONFERENCE WAS TO IMPRESS HIM WITH SOVIET POSITION ON BERLIN AND TO CONVEY HIS WORDS AND THOUGHTS TO PRESIDENT.

"ON BERLIN. I MAY BE VERY SKETCHY ON THIS BECAUSE IT WAS TALKED ABOUT SO OFTEN AND INTERRUPTED BY OTHER THOUGHTS.

"THE BERLIN QUESTION WAS OPENED BY MYSELF AFTER A HINT OR TWO FROM KHRUSHCHEV. AT LEAST THREE TIMES DURING CONVERSATION I TOLD HIM MY VIEWS MUST NOT BE INTERPRETED AS EVEN VIEWS OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY, MUCH LESS THOSE OF GOVERNMENT. I WAS SPEAKING SIMPLY AS A SENATOR HAVING AN INFORMAL TALK WITH LEADER OF A GREAT COUNTRY. KHRUSHCHEV HAD MENTIONED BERLIN AS BEING THORN IN RELATIONSHIPS OF FOUR POWERS. HE CALLED IT A CANCER. I TOLD HIM THAT I HOPED USSR UNDERSTANDS SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE IN BERLIN AND THAT OUR POSITION IS FIRM AND FULLY SUPPORTED BY BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES AND BY OUR PEOPLE. HE KNEW OF MY VISIT TO BERLIN AND WHAT I HAD SAID. HE SAID, "I UNDERSTAND THIS BUT YOU MUST DEMONSTRATE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE REAL SITUATION." HE REFERRED TO POTSDAM AGREEMENT AND US VIOLATIONS. IN VIEW OF VIOLATIONS, HE FELT THERE WAS NO REASON TO KEEP AGREEMENT OF FOUR POWERS ON BERLIN. THIS WAS HIS EXCUSE. HE SAID HE HAS LONG BEEN CONCERNED OVER BERLIN. THAT IT IS OF NO USE TO WEST MILITARILY. THAT THE 25,000 TROOPS IN BERLIN SURELY CAN'T HAVE ANY MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE UNLESS WE SEEK TO WAGE AN AGGRESSIVE WAR.

THAT BERLIN

31
in
Mt
126 / USSR - Vienna

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State (WUK 83-1)
By [signature] NARS, Date 21 2/83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

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-2- 1208, DECEMBER 3, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

THAT BERLIN TO HIM MEANT NOTHING WHEN THE SOVIET BLOC HAD 900 MILLION PEOPLE IN IT ALREADY. HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN MANY MONTHS OF THOUGHT TO BERLIN SITUATION AND HAD FINALLY COME UP WITH HIS PROPOSAL OF A SO-CALLED FREE CITY. HE SAID, "I DON'T WANT TO DO ANYTHING DETRIMENTAL TO THE OTHER THREE COUNTRIES." HE SAID HE FELT HIS PROPOSALS WERE REASONABLE BUT IF ANYONE HAD ANYTHING ELSE TO SUGGEST HE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO CONSIDER IT. IN FACT HE WANTED SUGGESTIONS. "BUT IF YOU TRY TO TALK ABOUT GERMAN REUNIFICATION THE ANSWER IS NO. THERE ARE TWO GERMAN STATES AND THEY WILL HAVE TO SETTLE REUNIFICATION BY THEMSELVES." HE WILL NEVER AGREE TO LIQUIDATION OF SOCIALIST SYSTEM IN EAST GERMANY NOR WOULD WEST AGREE TO LIQUIDATION OF FEDERAL GERMAN REPUBLIC AND ITS SYSTEM, SO WHY SHOULD FOUR POWERS USE CITY OF BERLIN AS BARGAINING POINT. BERLIN OUGHT TO STAND ALONE, SEPARATE FROM REUNIFICATION. HE STANDS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A FREE CITY. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT OBSERVERS FROM UN TO GUARANTEE NON-INTERFERENCE AND FULFILLMENT OF COMMITMENTS. HE TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT AUSTRIAN QUESTION AND SAID SOVIETS HAD SUGGESTED WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND NEUTRALITY. HE TOLD ME AT LENGTH HOW MOLOTOV HAD OPPOSED THIS AND HE HAD RESPONDED TO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND TO MOLOTOV THAT RUSSIAN TROOPS IN AUSTRIA WERE ONLY WORTH WHILE IF RUSSIA INTENDED TO EXPAND WESTWARD AND HE DIDN'T WANT TO DO THAT. HE WANTED PEACE, NOT WAR, SO WHY TROOPS IN AUSTRIA? A NEUTRAL AUSTRIA WAS ESTABLISHED AND A SOURCE OF CONFLICT WAS REMOVED. HIS PROPOSALS ON BERLIN HAVE SIMILARITY, EXCEPT THAT BERLIN IS SURROUNDED BY EAST GERMAN REPUBLIC AND THAT BEST PROPOSAL WAS FREE CITY WITH NO TROOPS BECAUSE TROOPS REPRESENTED SOURCE OF CONFLICT, AS HE PUT IT, AND ALWAYS OFFERED ELEMENT OF DANGER. HE SAID, "NOW THE THREE POWERS WANT TO MAINTAIN TROOPS IN BERLIN, BUT WHY? 25,000 TROOPS IN BERLIN ARE OF NO IMPORTANCE UNLESS YOU WANT TO MAKE WAR. WHY DO YOU MAINTAIN THIS THORN? A FREE CITY, A FREE BERLIN, COULD LEAD TO THE BREAKING OF THE ICE BETWEEN USSR AND USA." AT THIS POINT HE BECAME VERY FIRM AND HIS VOICE ROSE". SOME OF YOUR MILITARY MEN HAVE MADE STUPID STATEMENTS LATELY -- STATEMENTS TO EFFECT THAT US WILL BREAK THROUGH WITH TANKS IF EAST GERMAN REPUBLIC TRIES TO GET IN THE WAY.

SOVIETS HAVE

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-3- 1208, DECEMBER 3, 2 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

SOVIETS HAVE TANKS TOO, LOTS OF THEM, AND I WARN YOU WE WILL USE THEM. WE HAVE ROCKETS, TOO, AND WE DON'T EVEN HAVE TO FIRE THEM FROM EAST GERMANY. WE CAN SEND THEM FROM USSR. SO DON'T THREATEN ME BY TALKING ABOUT BREAKING THROUGH WITH TANKS. MIGHT DOES NOT MAKE RIGHT. RIGHT MAKES MIGHT. MILITARY ARGUMENT IS NO ANSWER. OUR TROOPS REMAIN THERE (SPEAKING OF BERLIN AND EAST GERMAN REPUBLIC BOTH) NOT TO PLAY CARDS. WE MEAN BUSINESS. UNLESS THERE IS AN AGREEMENT SOVIETS WILL CARRY THROUGH AS SUGGESTED. THIS IS TERRITORY OF GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC." I REMINDED HIM THAT IT WAS NOT, THAT IT WAS A SEPARATE ARRANGEMENT AND HE REMINDED ME THAT IT WAS IN HEART OF GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND OBVIOUSLY SHOULD BELONG TO GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, BUT HE WAS NOT PROPOSING THIS, IN FACT HE WAS PREPARING TO GIVE SOVIET GUARANTEES OF ITS COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE. "WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING ANYTHING OFFENSIVE TO US. YOU CONSTANTLY TALK OF ASSURING FREEDOM OF TWO MILLION BERLINERS. THIS IS MERE PRETENSE FOR YOU TO KEEP YOUR TROOPS THERE. I WARN YOU THIS IS VERY SERIOUS. GIVE US A COUNTER PROPOSAL. WE WANT TO DO AWAY WITH THIS THORN OF TROOPS IN THE AREA AND THE SOVIET IS VERY SUSPICIOUS THAT WEST GERMANY IS BEING ARMED WITH THESE WEAPONS TO MAKE WAR ON EAST GERMANY. I KNOW THAT YOU DO NOT DECIDE THESE AFFAIRS, BUT YOU WILL PLAY A PART. YOU ARE A MEMBER OF THE DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY AND A MEMBER OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE." I ASKED, IF BERLIN IS TO BE A FREE CITY, WHAT WILL SOVIETS DO TO GUARANTEE ACCESS TO BERLIN, TO GUARANTEE FREEDOM IN FACT, AND TO PREVENT IT FROM BEING STARVED OUT.

THOMPSON

PK

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DAYING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control:

Rec'd:

1915

DECEMBER 3, 1958

12:41 PM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1208, DECEMBER 3, 1 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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KHRUSHCHEV SAID, "WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANYTHING REASONABLE, WHAT DO YOU SUGGEST?" I REPEATED MY QUESTION, "WHAT WILL YOU DO TO GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF CITY -- BY THIS I MEAN ACCESS. WE REMEMBER BLOCKADE OF 1948 AND AIRLIFT, AND WE DON'T WANT TO SEE THE CITY STRANGLERED." KHRUSHCHEV SAID WE COULD ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT TO GUARANTEE ACCESS REGISTERED WITH UN. HE IS READY TO SIGN TREATY WITH US, FRANCE AND UK. HE REPEATED HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO HAVE PERMANENT UN OBSERVERS THERE. "WE WANT TO CUT THIS NOT WHICH SPOILS RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FOUR POWERS." I ASKED, "DID I UNDERSTAND YOU TO SAY THAT GERMAN REUNIFICATION COULD ONLY COME AS A RESULT OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN WHAT YOU CALL THE TWO GERMANY?" KHRUSHCHEV SAID, "ABSOLUTELY." HE WOULD NOT TAKE PART IN ANY DISCUSSION RELATING TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION. HE SEEKS A PEACE TREATY ON THE QUESTION OF GERMANY. THERE ARE TWO GERMANY'S FOR TIME BEING. HE MENTIONED PHRASE "FOR TIME BEING" FOUR TIMES. "ANY OTHER SETTLEMENT BUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANY'S WILL COME ONLY THROUGH FORCE. AN ATTACK ON GDR IS WAR AND WE WILL SUPPORT OUR PARTNER IN THAT WAR." I ASKED, "DO YOU SEE ANY HOPE FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION IN THE FUTURE?" KHRUSHCHEV REPLIED "YES. A KIND OF CONFEDERATION WITH AN ALL-GERMAN GOVERNMENT." BY THAT HE MEANT A GOVERNMENT THAT INCLUDED BOTH EAST AND WEST GERMANY. HE SAID THEN, "THERE OUGHT TO BE A WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS, MAYBE SLOWLY." I ASKED, "DOES THIS MEAN THAT WEST GERMANY WOULD HAVE TO BE OUT OF NATO?" HE SAID, "I DON'T ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THIS." THEN HE MADE A SNIDE COMMENT THAT NATO WOULD DISAPPEAR ANYHOW. I SAID "HOW ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT - WILL IT DISAPPEAR?" HE SAID "YES, ANY TIME NOW." THEN HE

WENT ON

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-2- 1208, DECEMBER 3, 1 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

WENT ON TO GIVE ME AN EXAMPLE OF HOW PLANS GO WRONG - HOW PLANS FOR DEFENSE OR ATTACK SOMETIMES HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO REAL SITUATION. THIS WAS EFFORT ON HIS PART TO SHOW THAT NATO HAD OUTLIVED ANY USEFULNESS IT EVER HAD FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW, AND THAT WHILE WE WERE PUTTING OUR FAITH IN NATO SOVIETS WERE WINNING THE ECONOMIC WAR IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS. HE MENTIONED AGAIN THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT MAKE WAR ON WESTERN EUROPE. "WHY SHOULD WE? WE ARE WAGING ECONOMIC COMPETITION." HE WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT WESTERN EUROPE WAS REALISTIC AND WHEN THEY SAW SOVIET ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS THEY WOULD WANT TO DO BUSINESS WITH SOVIET UNION. HE DIDN'T DEVELOP THIS MUCH MORE. I GATHERED HIS INFERENCE WAS THAT WESTERN EUROPE LOOKED TOO GOOD TO BE DESTROYED. HE WOULD RATHER PICK IT UP THROUGH ECONOMIC ATTRITION OR BY CONTROL OVER MARKETS AND RAW MATERIALS, THEREBY FORCING WESTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES TO BEND TOWARD SOVIET UNION. THAT IS JUST MY PERSONAL ANALYSIS OF WHAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT. HIS REFERENCE TO NATO BEING OUTMODED OR THE WRONG KIND OF DEFENSE RELATED TO HIS PARTICIPATION IN DEFENSE OF KHARKOV, WHERE RUSSIANS HAD PREPARED SERIES OF DEFENSE LINES AGAINST FORTHCOMING GERMAN ATTACK, BUT GERMANS DIDN'T ATTACK WHERE DEFENSE LINES WERE, IN FACT, THEY WENT IN COMPLETELY DIFFERENT DIRECTION AND TOOK DEFENSE LINES WITH HARDLY A SHOT. "WE WILL ADVANCE WITH OUR ECONOMY, SO WITH YOUR NATO MAYBE YOU HAVE PREPARED FOR THE WRONG ATTACK. WE WILL FIGHT YOU ECONOMICALLY AND YOU SHOULD WELCOME IT." ALL DURING ENTIRE CONFERENCE HE WENT ON ABOUT ECONOMIC COMPETITION.

"KHRUSHCHEV SAID THAT IF WE SETTLE THIS QUESTION OF BERLIN EVERYTHING WILL BE BETTER. "IT IS A BONE IN MY THROAT." AGAIN HE WENT BACK TO AUSTRIA AND TO VISIT OF CHANCELLOR RAAB. HE SAID IF BERLIN IS SETTLED HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT RELATIONS WITH ALL NATO COUNTRIES WOULD IMPROVE. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE WERE REASONABLE BUT THAT WE HAD PROMISED BERLIN FREEDOM AND WE WANTED NO POLITICAL STRANGULATION AND WOULD NOT LEND

OURSELVES

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-3- 1208, DECEMBER 3, 1 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM MOSCOW

OURSELVES TO ANY DEAL THAT WOULD RESULT IN SUCH STRANGULATION. KHRUSHCHEV SAID, "WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH YOU. IT WOULD MEAN MUCH TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FOR THEM TO KEEP THEIR WORD. A GOOD REPUTATION IS IMPORTANT." THEN HE WENT ON TO SAY ABOUT SOVIET UNION, "OUR FIRM IS A GOOD ONE AND WE WANT A GOOD REPUTATION. IT WOULD WEAKEN US IF WE VIOLATED OUR WORD OR IF WE LET OTHERS DO SO." (I IMAGINE REFERRING TO EAST GERMANY BECAUSE I HAD TOLD KHRUSHCHEV WE WERE OF OPINION HIS WORD WOULD BE FINAL SO FAR AS EAST GERMANY WAS CONCERNED AND WE WANTED TO NEGOTIATE WITH RUSSIANS AND NOT WITH EAST GERMANS.) "IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO PROVE THAT WE WOULD NOT STRANGLE THE CITY -- THAT WE WOULD KEEP OUR WORD TO GUARANTEE EQUAL ACCESS TO WEST BERLIN OF ALL COUNTRIES." HE ASKED ME TO TELL PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ABOUT THIS AND AGAIN BECAME VERY SERIOUS AND SAID BERLIN SITUATION HAD TO BE SETTLED -- HE WAS NOT GOING TO BACK DOWN. HE AGAIN ASKED ME "WHAT ARE YOUR COUNTER PROPOSALS, WHAT DO YOUR SECRETARY OF STATE AND YOUR PRESIDENT SUGGEST?" HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES "DON'T THREATEN ME." I TOLD HIM I WOULD BE HAPPY TO TALK THIS OVER WITH SECRETARY DULLES AND THE PRESIDENT AND ASKED HIM IF I MIGHT REPEAT CONVERSATION IN DETAIL, AND HE SAID "OF COURSE." AT THIS POINT HE SHOWED SENTIMENTALITY. "I HAVE THE DEEPEST RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER. I LIKE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER. WE WANT NO EVIL TO THE US OR TO FREE BERLIN. YOU MUST ASSURE THE PRESIDENT OF THIS." HE SAID, "YOU MUST REMEMBER THAT MANY OF YOUR FRIENDS, THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH, DO NOT REALLY WANT A REUNITED GERMANY. THEY ARE AFRAID OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION. USSR IS NOT AFRAID. SITUATION ISN'T LIKE IT WAS BEFORE WAR. US AND SOVIETS NEED HAVE NO FEAR OF A REUNITED GERMANY." THEN HE SAID, "LET'S TEST OUR MUTUAL STRENGTH BY ECONOMIC COMPETITION. IF USSR AND USA ARE ON SAME SIDE ON THIS BERLIN ISSUE OR ANY OTHER THERE WILL BE NO WAR -- ONLY MADMAN OR FOOL WOULD THINK OF SUCH A THING."

SENATOR MADE CLEAR THAT IN FOREGOING WHEN KHRUSHCHEV USED WORD BERLIN HE WAS REFERRING TO WEST BERLIN.

THOMPSON

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INFORMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 2476
Rec'd: DECEMBER 4, 1958
7:02 AM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

SANITIZED

NO: 1216, DECEMBER 4, NOON

Dept. of State (NW-83-1)
BY MSM NARS, DATE 2/3/83

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SENATOR HUMPHREY EXPECTS TO GIVE SECRETARY FULL REPORT HIS CONVERSATION WITH KHRUSHCHEV UPON HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON BUT FOLLOWING MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS WHICH HE MENTIONED IN CONVERSATION WITH ME MAY BE OF INTEREST TO DEPT. HUMPHREY SAID HE HAD TAKEN NO NOTES DURING LATTER PART HIS CONVERSATION WHICH WAS OF PERSONAL NATURE AND HAD INDICATED TO KHRUSHCHEV HE WOULD NOT REPORT ON IT. THIS PART CONVERSATION INCLUDED PERSONAL HISTORY AND DISCUSSION SUCH SUBJECTS AS RELIGION.

MOST INTERESTING WAS KHRUSHCHEV'S COMMENT ON CHINESE COMMUNES WHICH HE STRONGLY DISPARAGED SAYING THEY WERE IN FACT NOT COMMUNES BUT A METHOD OF USING MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF LABOR IN AGRICULTURE. THIS SYSTEM HAD BEEN ATTEMPTED IN SOVIET UNION AND ABANDONED BECAUSE IT DID NOT WORK. SOVIET UNION HAD GIVEN UP GOAL OF "TO EACH ACCORDING TO HIS NEEDS" BECAUSE THEY HAD FOUND INCENTIVES WERE NECESSARY. HE SAID, HOWEVER, CHINESE WERE DOING EXTREMELY WELL

KHRUSHCHEV REFERRED TO ROLE OF SECRET POLICE UNDER STALIN, ILLUSTRATING THIS BY DIFFICULTY IN OLD DAYS OF GETTING INTO KREMLIN. HE HAD ALREADY REDUCED ROLE OF SECRET POLICE AND INTENDED CARRY THIS FURTHER. FOR EXAMPLE: HE WAS GOING TO SUBSTITUTE MILITIA FOR SECRET POLICE AS KREMLIN GUARDS.

HE REFERRED TO HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR APPROPRIATION BY US FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND ATTRIBUTED HUNGARIAN REVOLT TO WORK OF US AGENTS.

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- 2 - 1216, DECEMBER 4, NOON FROM MOSCOW

HE WAS BITTER ABOUT ATTEMPTS TO USE A MECHANICAL MAJORITY IN UN ASSEMBLY AGAINST SOVIET UNION.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID THAT AT FAMOUS JUNE PRESIDUM THERE HAD BEEN SEVEN TO FOUR AGAINST HIM BUT HE HAD CONVOKED CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND HAD WON OUT. HE SAID HE HAD GOTTEN RID OF BULGANIN BECAUSE HE WAS A STUPID AND INCOMPETENT MAN. SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, NO LONGER LIQUIDATED DEFEATED OPPONENTS. HIS REMARKS ABOUT MARSHAL ZHUKOV INDICATED A SENSE OF RIVALRY.

HUMPHREY DISCUSSED FOREIGN TRADE BOTH WITH KHRUSHCHEV AND MILOYAN, AND YESTERDAY MORNING WITH DEPUTY MINISTER FOREIGN TRADE, AND HELD NUMBER OF DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ON SUBJECT COLLABORATION IN FIELD MEDICAL RESEARCH. PARTICULARLY CANCER AND HEART DISEASE.

KHRUSHEHEV SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY DICTATED MOST OF SOVIET NOTE ON BERLIN.

KHRUSHCHEV TOOK USUAL LINE ON SUBJECT ANTI-SEMITISM, CITING HIS OWN SON-IN-LAW AND VOROSHILOV'S WIFE.

THOMPSON

JYH/23

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Action EUR

Info RMR

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 918, OCTOBER 25, NOON

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FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS TWO-HOUR LIPPMAN INTERVIEW WITH KHRUSHCHEV OCT 24.

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KHRUSHCHEV BLAMED DULLES AND CHURCHILL FOR RETURN TO TACTICS COLD WAR INSTEAD OF RELAXING TENSION ON BASIS STATUS QUO WHEN THEY FOUND FOLLOWING STALIN'S DEATH SOVIETS REFUSED TO TURN AWAY FROM PATH OF SOCIALISM. HE DEFINED STATUS QUO AS RECOGNITION REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN POST-WAR PERIOD IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES. HE TOOK USUAL LINE ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION BUT WARNED OF DANGERS REARMING GERMANY AND THREATENED THAT IF PRESSED SOVIET UNION WOULD ENCOURAGE GERMANY TO EXPAND WESTWARD. KHRUSHCHEV CLAIMED COMMUNISM NOT MILITARY BUT IDEOLOGICAL THREAT AND THAT PRESSURE IN LATTER FIELD WOULD BE MAINTAINED AND EVEN INCREASED BY SOVIET UNION OVERTAKING US IN PRODUCTION PER CAPITA. HE DERIDED ACTIVITIES OF US SIXTH FLEET AND SAID IN REAL WAR SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT LOOK FOR FLEAS LIKE LEBANON BUT GO STRAIGHT FOR ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY AND IRAN. HE BOASTED THAT SOVIET UNION COULD NOT BE BEATEN IN WAR SINCE BALLISTIC MISSILES COULD NOT BE KNOCKED OUT NOR CONTROLLED. HE STATED US HAD PSYCHOSIS OF SUBJECT SURPRISE ATTACK AND REPEATED POSITION THAT CONFIDENCE HAD TO BE CREATED BEFORE CONTROLS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE PREPARED ACCEPT CONTROLS ATOMIC TESTING. WESTERN INSTISTENCE CONTROLS MERELY ADDED THEIR SUSPICIONS OUR PURPOSE. HE THOUGHT CHINA HAD RESOURCES TO FEED ANY AMOUNT OF POPULATION AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO REAL CONFLICT BETWEEN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

Date 11-5-58

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- 2 - 918, OCTOBER 25, NOON FROM MOSCOW

HE LEFT ENTIRELY TO LIPPMAN DECISION WHAT USE MAKE OF INTERVIEW.
FULL TEXT LIPPMAN'S ROUGH NOTES FOLLOWS BY DESPATCH.

THOMPSON

JYH/22

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12/4/58

From written memo on Khrushchev - Humphrey, 12/6/58
POF 1/16/58 - via - (Mtg. CD)

stationed in Moscow, they indicated that this would not be acceptable. The Senator observed that while Khrushchev seemed to be hipped on the subject of trade and trade competition, he frequently asserted that the Soviet Union could get on without trade. He said that the Senator and the US should make up its mind. The Voice of America was always talking about Soviet deficiencies in consumer goods. Khrushchev had decided to expose the hypocrisy of the US in this respect, so he had addressed his trade letter (of June 2) to President Eisenhower. Khrushchev commented that: "You helped me very much. I wanted consumer goods and you said 'No.'" Khrushchev said this enabled him to answer critics effectively. He said the Soviet Union was particularly interested in obtaining petro-chemical industrial equipment and pipe for petroleum pipe lines. On another point Khrushchev had threatened "if you don't want to trade with us, we can use our production to disrupt your markets."

The Senator then commented that Khrushchev was deceptively disarming and superficially convincing. He felt that the Prime Minister suffered from a vast inferiority complex, referring repeatedly to his humble origins and his days as a miner. The Senator said that he had pointed out that most American leaders had similarly originated from poor families but most had worked their way up, including the financing of their own education, and that the possession of wealth was generally considered a handicap in US public life.

When Hungary was mentioned Khrushchev vigorously attacked the Kirsten Amendment accusing the US of having spent \$100 million to promote the counter revolution in Hungary.

In another phase of the discussion Khrushchev said that as long as he was Prime Minister there would be no war. Pointing out that he was 65, he said that he would not see a war in his lifetime. In this connection the Prime Minister reverted to the subject of Germany saying that "frankly, the USSR cannot afford to have a non-Socialist East Germany." It was in this context that he made his remark that there are only two powers which are not afraid of a United Germany. These are the US and the USSR, and the USSR used to be afraid. However, Khrushchev said certainly the British, and the French, the Dutch, the Norwegians, none of the European powers want a united Germany.

note on page 10

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Department of State

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by: **HR-m/Sg** Date: **1/11/91**

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Joint State-Defense Message Re Contingency Plans.

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Berlin's 400, 422; USAREUR's SX 7922; Bonn's 1111, 1161.

It has been agreed contingency plans revised as revised (EMDES 1075, December 18, 1957) not applicable to present situation. Rationale no longer convincing in light position taken by Soviets in their note of November 27. Agency theory, which at best could only have provided interim solution breaks down when both principal (USSR) and QUOTE agent UNQUOTE (GDR) deny such relationship and Soviet Union simply attempting to abandon its responsibilities.

By unilateral withdrawal from position as Occupying Power, USSR will create vacuum in Occupation arrangements. If no interference with our right of access, there no problem. However, in light present practice (in which GDR already controls West German traffic) and announced intentions, harassment may be expected but, at least initially, probably would not involve total blockade

Drafted by:

NR:GER:GPA:JHMcFarland:erk 12/5-8/58

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Christian A. Herter

Clearances:

Defense - Mr. Quarles
Gen. Taylor

Ad Hoc Committee on Berlin-EUR - Mr. Kohler
EUR - Mr. Merchant/S-Mr. Calhoun
G - Mr. Murphy
The President (in substance)

L/EUR - Mr. Kearney
L - Mr. Becker

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as in 1948-49 but could be limited to Allied traffic only. If there is actual or threatened harassment or interference would appear general principles applicable to joint operations would apply. When one party drops out, remaining parties entitled fill vacuum at least to extent necessary protect their rights. Under these circumstances, 3 Powers justified assert their rights take over control Autobahn and railroad and control air traffic between Federal Republic and Berlin to extent necessary ensure their unrestricted access Berlin.

In no event would GDR become beneficiary of attempted relinquishment by USSR of its rights and obligations or attempted voiding by USSR of occupation rights of Western Powers in Berlin, without consent Western Powers. Further, latter cannot be divested of rights as occupying powers without their consent, which presumably would be given only in connection with final settlement in form peace treaty.

In 1954, when Agency theory considered feasible, it was assumed Soviets would only partially and gradually relinquish their controls. If consistent in asserting agency relationship did exist between GDR and USSR, we should have no basis refusing deal with GDR on any other matter involving Soviet responsibility in Germany.

Evident Berlin (Bonn's 1161), Soviet Zone and Federal Republic populace regard any dealing with GDR checkpoint officials as first step, however tentative, toward recognition GDR regime. Federal Republic and Berlin officials would inevitably draw conclusions from such action highly unfavorable to present Allied position on German question and Allied-German relationships. Far greater difficulty likely in mobilizing public opinion for firm stand at some later stage when already part way down QUOTE slippery slope UNQUOTE than at moment first GDR officials appear at checkpoints. Finally, recognition GDR by Allies would make Allied access to Berlin more vulnerable

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with end result our position would become untenable.

Embassy Bonn should raise urgently with British and French reconsideration existing contingency plans with view to eliminating all proposals for dealing with ~~GDR~~ GDR officials at Autobahn and railway checkpoints. After tripartite agreement reached Germans should be fully informed of details.

In place of present plans approved U.S. course of action should be presented to British and French, as follows:

A. Three Ambassadors in Moscow should inform Soviet Government at appropriate time (1) that 3 Powers continue hold USSR fully responsible under quadripartite agreements and arrangements concerning Berlin; (2) that 3 Powers have noted Soviet statements to effect that USSR will withdraw from its remaining occupation functions with respect to Berlin. That they assume this means Soviets intend withdraw Soviet personnel from interzonal Autobahn and railway checkpoints and from BASC; (3) that powers' right unrestricted access would remain unaffected by Soviet withdrawal; (4) that 3 Powers will not tolerate attempt on part of so-called GDR to assert any control over or to interfere with their traffic to and from Berlin via quadripartitely established routes, and would take all measures necessary to protect their rights in this connection; (5) that, if Soviets withdraw, Western Powers will act on assumption (a) that USSR has decided to abolish unnecessary administrative procedures at interzonal borders, and (b) that USSR can and will, without benefit of exchange of flight information in BASC, maintain absolute separation of Soviet aircraft and all other aircraft flying in Soviet Zone from aircraft of 3 Powers flying in Berlin corridors and control zone. (6) that Western Powers will expect their traffic to move freely without any presentation of documents or other formalities at interzonal borders and will assume Soviets have given blanket assurance of safety of all 3 Power aircraft in

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Berlin corridors and control zone.

B. That if Soviet personnel are then withdrawn from checkpoints, we continue the dispatch military trains and military motor convoys on normal schedule and that we instruct commanders as indicated in para C below to refuse present any documentation to GDR checkpoint control officials or comply with any formalities suggested or instructions given by latter.

C. If GDR checkpoint personnel refuse to permit passage our trains and convoys on this basis, procedure in Berlin's 422 and USAREUR's SX 7922 would apply at once.

D. At this stage and before considering resort to airlift, attempt to reopen access through use limited military force will be made in order demonstrate our determination maintain surface access. In any case, Soviets and East Germans should not be allowed entertain doubts as to our determination to do so if need be. Even if force not resorted to at once we should continue assert our rights to resume interrupted traffic and our intention to do so by force if necessary. FYI. Purpose of resort to limited force proposed above, is, beyond that stated, to test Soviet intentions. If British and French refuse to consider the

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limited use of force, matter will be referred to Washington for consideration of possible unilateral action in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. End FYI.

E. As concomitant to above course of action, we should consider whether 3 Powers should not take some additional step to guarantee their unrestricted air access to Berlin, which would be essential to maintaining status and security of city. Three Powers might, for example, reformulate and restate their Berlin guarantee, modifying it to add that they will regard any interference with their right and practice of unrestricted access to Berlin by air, including operation of their civil air carriers, as attack upon their forces and upon themselves. Here issue of flight in corridors over 10,000 feet might be solved by simple Three Power agreement to fly at altitude appropriate to efficient operation of individual aircraft. Communist harassment of our air access, which would be possible only through patent application of force, would be clear evidence of provocative intent. If it occurred we could then take such military/political/economic counteraction as necessary to maintain Berlin with fair assurance such action would have support of American, French, British and German public opinion.

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(Ann. Whitman file)

12-11-58
1997/2686
~~TOP SECRET~~

Notes of Discussion at a Special Meeting in the
President's Office immediately following the
National Security Council Meeting on December 11, 1958

2686 In attendance:

The President of the United States
The Vice President of the United States
Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of State
Donald A. Quarles, Acting Secretary of Defense
Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence
Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State
Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary
Maj. John Eisenhower, Assistant White House Staff Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The President opened the meeting by saying that he wished to discuss two questions. The first was the attitude of Mayor Brandt of West Berlin toward the Soviet proposal for a free city. The second question was what was meant by the proposal for the use of token force to retain allied access to West Berlin.

Secretary Herter said that he would first like to explain current views regarding the acceptance of East Germans as agents of the Russians. He recalled that Secretary Dulles had, a few weeks ago, indicated publicly that the U. S. might so deal with the East Germans on a purely local level without recognizing the East German regime. Two developments since that time have made it undesirable that East Germans be accepted as Soviet agents. In the first place, the recent Russian note makes this position untenable. Secondly, Chancellor Adenauer has reacted violently against this idea.

Secretary Herter further explained that the proposed message to Bonn, which had been submitted for the President's approval, was solely a talking paper with our allies. Mr. Herter said that the British Ambassador to West Germany was very rigid in wishing to maintain the status quo.

The President observed that we see that the Russians are proposing not to carry out their responsibilities with respect to Berlin. This is a very different situation from that when the original agreements regarding Germany and Berlin were reached. Today neither West nor East Germany is considered to be occupied territory. Therefore, the Berlin problem stands out all by itself. This involves not only the right to exercise our control powers in Berlin, but now there are over 2,000,000 people for whom we are responsible in West Berlin. Since the Russians say that East Germany is now an independent country we find ourselves in a difficult international position.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)

MR 91-42-1

BY *[Signature]* DATE 10/17/96

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The President noted that he and Secretary Dulles had previously said that they would look on the East Germans as Soviet agents, but would not recognize them even though other countries did. The President noted that if we go on the basis we have formerly done as an occupying power, we would force our way into Berlin if we were challenged. He concluded by stating that he thought it was a fine thing to put the proposed paper on the table with our allies. He wished next, however, to find out what was meant by the use of token force.

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Secretary Quarles explained that the purpose was not to let the situation degenerate to the point where we need to use major force in order to break down the barriers. If we meet the first indications of a challenge, we will prevent the other side from becoming solidified and entrenched.

The President believed that we should make our position perfectly clear with the Russians — just what we are going to do and that if they challenge us it will not be a minor matter.

Secretary Herter noted the British Foreign Office is suggesting that we look ahead six months and decide what we would do if the other side really cuts off access to Berlin. Secretary Herter felt that we should soon reach a decision on this matter and let the Russians know.

The President said that he understood the problem was complicated by reports that Mayor Brandt was not antagonistic to the idea of a free city. Allen Dulles said that Brandt had made one statement to that effect. Secretary Herter said that we really do not know either Brandt's or Adenauer's views.

Secretary Herter spoke on the matter of timing. He said that the French were in no hurry to reply to the Russian note. Secretary Herter was concerned that the Russians may interpret delay as weakness.

The President stated that we should send an interim reply to the Russians right after the forthcoming Ministers Meeting. He believed that the three powers should stand solidly behind a guarantee of the safety of West Berlin. The President asked what would happen if the proposed token force could not get through. Would we then use an airlift or go to war?

Mr. Merchant said that the key issue was to use limited force to maintain our rights the first time they are challenged. If we accept the East Germans, West Berliners will think we have sealed their doom. Also if we accept the East Germans the first time they challenge us, it will be very hard to take a stand later on. Mr. Merchant felt that if the key decision was made we should warn the Russians in advance as that would constitute the greatest deterrence.

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In answer to the President's question, General Taylor said that it was very hard to specify until the actual event how far we would have to go in the use of force. What we must verify is the fact that the other side is prepared to stop us by force. General Taylor thought we should consider the use of an airlift as a final step.

The President said that Khrushchev had told Senator Humphrey to tell the President that, if the U. S. was considering using tanks in the Berlin situation, it should be remembered that the Russians also have tanks there.

General Taylor explained that we contemplated a reconnaissance in force to determine intent. If such force was turned back we would then go to a garrison airlift.

The Vice President asked Allen Dulles what Khrushchev was after. Mr. Dulles said that he thought Khrushchev wants a conference. Also he wanted to raise a European issue when things in that area were moving in our favor, so that he could have more freedom elsewhere. Mr. Dulles thought that Khrushchev wants a way out of this problem, and does not wish to force it to the point of war.

The Vice President thought that world opinion would be strong for a conference if a major crisis developed over Berlin.

Secretary Herter thought Khrushchev needed to bolster up the East Germans. Allen Dulles noted that in free elections less than ten percent of the East Germans would vote communist.

The President said that he preferred a joint allied presentation to Khrushchev, but in any case that a presentation should be made along the following lines. We are going on the assumption that you want a major war no more than do we. We do not know about the possibilities of German settlement. In the meantime, however, if you deny us our rights in Berlin, different conditions will prevail and we will have to take other kinds of action than have previously been taken.

The President thought we should prepare a message like that, and that our allies should go along. He did not wish to delay such a message too long after the forthcoming meetings. He felt the message should be friendly, recognize that Berlin is a problem for both of us, but clearly say this is what we are going to do.

Secretary Herter said that finding a way out would now be difficult for Khrushchev. We must make clear that the Russians cannot unilaterally repudiate the Berlin agreement.

In answer to Secretary Anderson, Mr. Merchant said that, if we are challenged tomorrow, the orders which are currently in effect direct personnel in the field to deal with East German officials as agents of the USSR. Mr. Merchant felt this must be changed. General Taylor agreed, pointing out that existing orders are the result of Ambassadorial agreements. Mr. Merchant added that they have been in effect since 1954. Secretary Anderson noted that the Russians may pick out a day before next week's meeting to challenge us.

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The fact that existing orders contemplate dealing with the East Germans as Soviet agents came somewhat as a surprise to the President, who stated that he believed he detected a correlation between this fact and the actions of Khrushchev. In the President's view, Khrushchev has probably been counting on this to be our policy. He directed Mr. Herter to get the message off immediately to the Ambassador at Bonn to initiate Ambassadorial meetings with a view to revision of these instructions.

Mr. Gray pointed out that existing policy contemplated a probe of intentions and then the use of force to get through. He thought the proposed cable would telescope those two steps into one. The President disagreed, saying that every convoy constitutes a probe. What we are now considering is probing by force.

Mr. Gray said he would like to raise one other point regarding the means of demonstrating that the other side has applied force. He understood that there was some thinking in the military that taking supplies in by air would provide a better demonstration because the other side would have to come into our air corridors to attack.

General Taylor thought that we should try to demonstrate intent both in the air and on the ground. However, he did not wish to use the term air-lift, but rather talk about supplying allied garrisons by air.

Secretary Quarles thought that it was important publicly to emphasize the 2,000,000 people in West Berlin more than the maintenance of our rights of access. This prompted the President to suggest that Secretary Dulles might make a reasoned and moderate statement on this subject when he leaves the hospital.

Mr. Merchant commented on the questions of timing and content of the reply to the Soviet note. He thought that it should first reject the unilateral renunciation of the Berlin agreement, and secondly say that we are prepared to negotiate on the whole German problem.

The President commented that Khrushchev has made clear that he will not talk about the whole German problem.

Mr. Merchant said that on the question of timing he felt that a draft should be prepared as soon as possible after the NATO meeting. However, the exception to that timing would be if the British oppose any use of force.

The President said that we should get our views in front of the British right now. He thought we should explain our concept that it was exceedingly important that we compel the East Germans to use force to stop us. This is essential to gain world opinion, and we should urge the British to agree. Finally, we should try to devise some way to find out just what Khrushchev wants. The President felt that we should try to find some formula between now and the spring.

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After the above meeting in the President's office, the following met in the Cabinet Room:

Secretary Herter
Mr. Merchant
Secretary Quarles
General Taylor
Mr. Gray
General Goodpaster
Mr. Lay
Major Eisenhower

On the urging of Secretary Herter, it was agreed that no record of the above meeting would be circulated. A note would be placed at the end of the NSC Record of Action simply stating that the President had met with selected officials to discuss further the Berlin situation. A copy of the message to Bonn, as approved by the President at the above meeting, would be filed in the official minutes of the NSC to reflect the decision taken at that meeting. The views expressed by the President at the above meeting as to the timing and content of a reply to the Soviets would be taken into account by the Department of State.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

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12/16/58

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PNM D-9/2

December 11, 1958

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1958

The Soviet Note of November 27 and Berlin Situation

(Bilateral Position Paper)

The attached paper was drafted by GER - Messrs. Lampson and McKiernan and cleared by GER - Mr. Hillenbrand, RA - Mr. Fessenden, EB - Mr. Frears, EUR - Mr. Kohler and L - Mr. Becker. It has not been cleared in Defense. The paper is circulated for your information.

Robert H. Miller
S/S-RO
Room 5274 NS
Ext. 4445

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NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1948

THE SOVIET NOTE OF NOVEMBER 27 AND THE

BERLIN SITUATION

Introduction

The Berlin problem and the Soviet Note of November 27 will be considered by the Foreign Ministers tripartitely and quadripartitely on Sunday December 14. There will be a full Council discussion under Agenda Item II scheduled for December 16.

Suggested U.S. Position *

1. Timing of a Reply to the Soviet Note of November 27.

The Western replies should be sent as soon as it is possible to work out a thoroughly coordinated substantive answer. No interim acknowledgment should be sent. Identical texts -- at least in the substantive portions -- from the Four Powers with a Federal Republic note coordinated in substance would create a greater impression of Western solidarity than varying replies. The Four Foreign Ministers should now agree on a directive for the preparation of a reply.

2. Site for Drafting Work.

We would like to see the preparation of a draft carried out in Bonn which seems the logical place. We all have top flight German experts there. The draft agreed in Bonn should be submitted to governments for approval and then be discussed in the North Atlantic Council.

3. Substance of a Reply.

A. We believe an indispensable element of our reply to be a restatement of our basic position re Germany, including our position re Berlin. Therefore the essential reply should contain:

* The Suggested U.S. Position section of this paper has been organized to fit a series of questions posed by Foreign Minister von Brentano in a quadripartite meeting in Bonn on December 8.

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(1) A restatement of our determination to maintain our rights and position in Berlin and to uphold the existing security and freedom of the city.

(2) A brief refutation of the historical interpretation upon which the Soviets attempt to base a repudiation of Four Power agreements. (We would prefer to leave the detailed correction of Soviet distortions of history to a separate "white paper", which would be given maximum distribution.)

(3) A restatement of our legal argument that the USSR cannot unilaterally abrogate the occupation rights of the three Western Powers or the Four-Power agreements and that we shall continue to hold the USSR responsible under those agreements.

(4) A rejection of the Soviet proposal for a "free city" of West Berlin together with an explanation of the reasons for rejection which will make the issues clear.

(5) A statement that it is the actions of the USSR and the East German puppet regime which have created the existing difficulties in Berlin and have made Berlin the focus of international tension.

(6) A statement that the problem of Berlin is part of the problem of Germany as a whole and that there can be no genuine or lasting solution outside the context of German reunification.

(7) A reference to the notes of September 30, 1958, to which the USSR has not replied, and a statement of our readiness to resume at any time discussions of the German problem broken off after the Geneva conference.

B. While the above represents the minimum which a reply must contain, we believe the reply should also take a constructive tone and not be limited to a mere restatement of our position and a rejection of the Soviet position. In addition to making the underlying issues and our position clear, we believe our reply should recognize the interrelation of the problems of Berlin, German reunification, European security, and disarmament and should seize this opportunity for a new diplomatic offensive on this complex of questions. We further believe our reply should be formulated to offset the influence which the Soviet note may have had on those elements of world opinion which are unfamiliar or unconcerned about the Berlin situation and may thus think the Western position is unduly rigid. Therefore we believe it desirable that our reply contain some or all of the following:

Please substitute the attached page for page 3 of PNM D-9/2 entitled Soviet Note of November 27 and Berlin Situation.

- 3 -

(1) A proposal for a conference of Four Foreign Ministers at a stated time and place to discuss the problem of Germany and/or the security of Berlin within the framework of European security and disarmament problems.

(2) An indication of some superficial, if not substantial, modification of our previous position re German reunification, e.g. an expression of our willingness to permit the participation of German "experts" from either part of the country in Four-Power discussions of the German problem.

(3) Following a reiteration of our position re the responsibility of the Four Powers for Berlin, a statement of our willingness to discuss with the Soviets ways and means of reducing tension in Berlin and improving conditions for the Berlin population.

(4) A summary of the real problems of Berlin which, if the Soviets wished to make a positive contribution, could properly be made subjects for Four-Power discussions. A summary should stress the maintenance of Berlin's unity, freedom, and security; the freedom of Berlin's transport and communications; and the free determination by the population of Berlin both of the political and economic regime within the city and of the city's political relationships with other parts of Germany.

(5) A statement that we recognize the achievement of reunification may be long and difficult, a proposal that the Ambassadors of the Four Powers in Germany, assisted by German experts, meet regularly to consider interim measures to minimize hardships which the prolonged division of the country imposes on the population, e.g. to study the possibility of assuring freedom of movement from one part of Germany to another, the possibility of improving interzonal transport facilities, etc.

(6) A statement of our readiness to submit the legal dispute with the USSR over the status of Berlin to the International Court of Justice for adjudication.

4. How to React if the Soviets Withdraw from Berlin.

The present contingency plans for Berlin should be revised. They are not applicable to the present situation.

It is evident that the Berlin, Soviet Zone and Federal Republic populations would regard any dealing with GDR checkpoint personnel (as provided for in the present plans) as a first step, however tentative, towards

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recognition of the GDR regime, and as casting serious doubt on the Western resolution to honor our Berlin commitment.

The rationale behind such dealings -- namely the agency theory -- is no longer convincing in the light of the position taken by the Soviets in their note of November 27. The agency theory, which at best could only have provided an interim solution breaks down when both the principal (USSR) and the "agent" (GDR) deny such a relationship. Actually, after the Soviets relinquish their occupation rights, the three western powers would be the sole occupying powers in Germany and if the GDR were acting as agent for anyone, it would be for these three occupying powers. Clearly, we would not appoint the GDR as our agents.

The Four Foreign Ministers should direct their representatives in Bonn to review the contingency plans with a view to eliminating the provisions authorizing Allied military personnel to deal with GDR personnel at check-points on the rail and road routes to Berlin. (For Aide-Memoire on this subject, see Tab C.)

Anticipated German Position

Although we have been given no authoritative expression of German views von Brentano is likely to speak along the lines indicated below on the various aspects of the Berlin problem discussed under the following sub-paragraphs:

1. Timing of Reply to Soviet Note.

He will probably recommend that a preliminary reply be sent early in January, to be followed by a thorough-going refutation of Soviet falsifications at a later date. The Germans believe each of the Western Four should send its own individual answer which should be generally similar in substance but not identical in form to the other western replies.

2. Site for Drafting Work.

He will press for Bonn as the place where the replies to the Soviet Note should be coordinated. He will argue that top flight German experts of the Three Powers are already in Bonn and that the German Foreign Office would find it easier to work there.

3. Substance of a Reply.

We have no clear indication as to what line the Germans want taken in a reply. It seems likely, however, that they will wish the preliminary reply to make it clear that the Soviet Berlin proposal is totally unacceptable and that the USSR will run a serious risk of conflict with the NATO Powers if they attempt to carry it out unilaterally. They will argue that if the Western Powers should enter into any negotiations before this is made clear their negotiating position would be impossibly weak. Although news reports have represented the Chancellor as maintaining that the Western Powers should not enter into negotiations with the USSR over the German problem as a whole under the pressure of a Soviet delayed ultimatum on Berlin, we believe that the Germans, if the initial point mentioned above has been registered, will be willing to consider the possibility of negotiations with the Soviet Union on broader themes, perhaps on a general settlement including the German problem.

The Chancellor's known views on possibilities for a settlement of the German problem will certainly form the frame of reference for any German discussion of negotiating possibilities for a broad settlement. Adenauer considers the only chance for achieving German reunification to lie in making progress in the field of general disarmament. He indicated last summer that he is not prepared to agree to limitations of German armed forces which would apply only to Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. He is strongly opposed to the Rapacki Plan which he believes would result in the neutralisation of Germany. (The Rapacki Plan appeals strongly to German Social Democrats as a point of departure for discussions on German unity; they are prepared to pay the price of renunciation of atomic weapons for reunification.) Adenauer does not consider himself bound by the Geneva proposals on European security; in his view they have been superseded by events. (For a discussion of this problem see Tab A, Enclosure 5.)

It is possible that the Germans will propose a firm rejection of Soviet proposals on Berlin and far-reaching Western counter-demands for Berlin including a control-free highway for vehicles, and an agreement for unhindered air traffic in the three existing air corridors as well as appropriate agreements on canals and rail traffic.

4. How to React if the Soviets Withdraw from Berlin

The Germans will press strongly for a revision of the contingency plans for Berlin so that there will be no possibility of Western military personnel dealing with GDR personnel on the checkpoints. They will probably argue that quite apart from the legal aspects of this question, any such dealings would set off a highly dangerous chain reaction in Germany because it would be interpreted as an indication that the West was prepared to cave in under Communist pressure.

Anticipated British Position

1. Timing of the Reply.

The British believe that the Four Ministers during the Paris meeting should draw up a directive for the preparation of the Western replies.

2. Site for Drafting Work.

They will most certainly support the German position that Bonn would be the best place to work out final drafts pursuant to governmental directives.

3. Substance of a Reply.

The British will favor replying by an offer to negotiate over a broad field, including European security, Germany and disarmament. Selwyn Lloyd has already sketched out in the House of Commons an approach which takes as its point of departure the Geneva zone of limitations concept and which places emphasis on the possibility of agreeing to the neutralization of the Soviet

Zone of Germany and thus creating a situation in which Berlin would be in the center of a neutralized area. (The British Government is under strong pressure from the Labour Party to strike a "reasonable" and tranquilizing attitude. The Labour Party favors using the Rapacki Plan as the point of departure for seeking a solution for the German problem -- presumably in the direction of Labour's own disengagement plan which is less unfavorable to the West -- and believes that the Soviet Union would consider paying the price of German reunification if it could prevent the nuclear armament of Germany.)

4. How to React if the Soviets Withdraw from Berlin.

Although the British favor taking a strong public stance on the defense of Berlin and have sent a useful message to Khrushchev, they are reluctant to face up to the possibility that force may be required for the defense of the Western position in Berlin. There are strong indications that they may even prefer to recognize the East German regime, at least on a de facto basis, if refusal to do so would create a situation in which we could only maintain our position in Berlin by use of force. The British Embassy gave us a preliminary paper on November 18 in which this course of action was recommended. The British are strongly opposed to changing the present contingency plans which authorize allied military personnel to deal to a limited extent under certain circumstances with GDR personnel at check-points on the road and rail routes from West Germany to Berlin.

If the question arises whether to maintain access to our garrisons by use of force on the ground or by an airlift, the British will probably strongly advocate mounting an airlift.

5. A Basic Question -- At What Point are we Really Ready to Fight for Berlin?

The British may argue that it is essential that we begin the six-months period with a clear understanding of how far we are prepared to go in any given situation. They fear that time may be frittered away on non-essentials and that we may find ourselves at the end of the period, if subjected to pressures for which we have not prepared ourselves, making injudicious crash decisions. They may wish to define clearly at the beginning what we consider a casus belli. They may call for a clear definition of their responsibilities. Although they might advocate a cautious policy, they will probably support a commitment to fight for Berlin if it is clear cut and generally agreed to.

Anticipated French Position

We have very little information about General de Gaulle's thinking on the Berlin issue except that he apparently views it as an opportunity to use in advancing his objective of reviving closer US-British-French consultation.

1. Timing of Reply.

The French will probably be in favor of a reply in the near future -- possibly supporting the German view that early January is a reasonable target date.

2. Site for Drafting Work.

They will make a major issue out of the location of the drafting committee and will press for Paris and as second best London or Washington. They will oppose strongly Bonn as a site because they consider such a location will make it more difficult to arrive at what they believe should be agreed tripartite positions before cutting in the Germans.

3. Substance of a Reply.

We have little firm ground on which to anticipate French views on substance. They will wish a fairly short reply with an annex in which Soviet falsifications will be corrected. They will presumably be prepared to make a very strong statement about the unacceptability of the Soviet proposals. It is unlikely that they think there is any reasonable chance that the Soviet note can provide a useful opportunity to propose negotiations on a broad front. Their Soviet experts do not think there is any chance of progress at this time. They are worried about the appeal of the Rapacki Plan in England, the smaller NATO countries and among the uncommitted nations. They fear that a proposal at this time for broad negotiations may provide the Soviets a platform for displaying wares which despite their noxious character appear very appealing to many people. The sweeping losses of the French Socialists and Communists and the overwhelming mandate given to de Gaulle means that the French Government does not feel itself under the same type of popular pressure that the British Foreign Office is conscious of. For these reasons the French may be in favor of a stiff reply.

4. How to Act if the Soviets Withdraw from Berlin.

The French will probably support the British, at least initially, in opposing a revision of the contingency plans. They will probably also prefer using an airlift in case of a blockade.

Anticipated Positions of Other NATO Countries

The Italians will probably favor a strong stand on Berlin but will urge that NATO take a much greater role in formulating policy regarding Berlin. The Dutch, the Belgians and the Turks will probably support a strong line on Berlin. The Danes, Norwegians, and the Canadians will show some sympathy for examining the revised Rapacki Plan or some of the disengagement proposals put forward in the West in an effort to find a possible way out of the Berlin crisis.

Discussion

Detailed papers providing background and analysis in regard to the subjects discussed above are included as attachments as follows:

- TAB A - Soviet Note on Berlin -- Analysis and Comments
- Enclosure 1 - Description and Analysis of Soviet Note
 - Enclosure 2 - Probable Soviet Motivation and Objectives
 - Enclosure 3 - Consequences for Berlin of Acceptance of Soviet "Open City" Proposal
 - Enclosure 4 - Considerations Governing Response to Soviet Note
 - Enclosure 5 - Status of Discussions of German Reunification and European Security

- TAB B - Possible Course of Action on Berlin
- Enclosure 1 - Recommended Course of Action
 - Enclosure 2 - Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel from Railway and Autobahn Checkpoints and Current Contingency Plans
 - Enclosure 3 - Resort to Force to Maintain our Communications with Berlin
 - Enclosure 4 - Little Airlift to Supply Needs of Garrison
 - Enclosure 5 - Legal Aspects of Soviet Renunciation of Responsibility
 - Enclosure 6 - Military Implications of Allied Assumption of Soviet Obligations for Allied Access to Berlin
 - Enclosure 7 - Prospects for Negotiation with the USSR Regarding Germany.

- TAB C - U.S. Aide-Memoire of December 11, 1958 regarding Revision of Berlin Access Contingency Plans.

SECRETProbable Soviet Objectives and Motivations

The present Soviet position in Germany is essentially a combination of political weakness and military strength. On the one hand, the Communist regime in East Germany has signally failed to establish its own authority over the territory it governs and would almost certainly fall were Soviet troops withdrawn. The possibility of remedying this situation in the future is impeded by two major factors: the existence in the midst of East Germany of West Berlin (symbol of an attractive non-Communist alternative, source of uncensored information, asylum for talented East German refugees) and the growing military, economic and political strength and stature of West Germany.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union disposes formidable armed forces in East Germany and their presence there makes it possible for the USSR to block a solution of the German problem not acceptable to the Soviet Union. Also West Berlin's exposed physical position makes it vulnerable to Soviet pressures.

In this situation the priority aim of the Soviet Union is probably to remove the Berlin impediment and strengthen and legitimize the East German regime. It has consistently been the predominant concern of Soviet foreign policy to consolidate and maintain control over Communist-dominated areas and, if necessary, to subordinate expansionist aims to this goal. The failure in the post-Stalin policy toward the satellites, made manifest by the Hungarian uprising and the advent of the Gomulka regime in Poland, have made consolidation of the bloc particularly urgent. That the Soviet

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Union continues to consider this a pressing and unresolved problem was evident during the Soviet campaign for a summit meeting, when one of the few clear Soviet objectives was to obtain Western recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev's flat statement at his unprecedented press conference of November 27 that the Soviet position on Berlin would not be altered even if West Germany should renounce its rearmament program seems clear indication that in the present situation bloc consolidation is the paramount objective and that improvement of the East German position is a necessary step in that consolidation.

The Soviet Union also clearly hopes to inhibit the nuclear armament of the Federal Republic and, if possible, to bring about the withdrawal or reduction of Western troops stationed there. Toward this end it can be expected at some stage to reactivate and perhaps expand some or all of its existing proposals for a German peace treaty drafted with the participation of the two German states, the Rapacki Plan for an atom-free zone, and a non-aggression pact between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Offers of negotiation will probably be accompanied by a propaganda campaign stressing the danger of war inherent in German rearmament and posing alternatives in the form of some or all of the above proposals, possibly accompanied by limited Soviet troop withdrawals and perhaps vague proposals for ultimate withdrawal of all Soviet forces. However, because of the over-riding need to improve the position of East Germany it is considered highly unlikely that the Soviet Union could undertake any unequivocal commitment involving total troop withdrawal and this inability imposes an

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important limiting factor on Soviet initiatives on the broad German problem.

A third Soviet objective is the promotion of disunity among the NATO allies. Soviet leaders probably calculate that the impression of increased Soviet military strength, attending the recent development of Soviet rocket and nuclear capabilities and apparent differences among the NATO members afford new opportunities for testing the resolve and unity of the Western allies in meeting a threat to Western positions in Berlin and Germany.

Khrushchev's remarks to Senator Humphrey and Communist public statements and press treatment suggest strongly that the Soviet Union in the initial stages of the current campaign will try to focus attention on the Berlin question alone and avoid discussion of the broader German problem. Acceptance of Soviet proposals would make West Berlin an isolated outpost without means of self-defense and effective ties with West Germany, dependent for its continued existence on Communist sufferance. While the Soviets almost certainly do not expect Western acceptance of these proposals, they probably plan to go as far as possible toward this isolation of Berlin without risking major hostilities or alternatively to obtain de facto recognition of the GDR. They probably calculate that the West will not employ force in order to challenge GDR control of surface access to Berlin but the Communists are probably prepared to use local and limited force if necessary. In the tactical situation in Germany they probably reason that effective military action to block this access could

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be employed and localized. The USSR will probably suffer airlift support of the Allied garrisons which they might subject to harassment (in the note the Soviet guarantee for the GDR relates to "frontiers," which, if need be, might be interpreted as applicable to land borders only). Steps will also probably be taken to seal West Berlin off from East Berlin and West Germany and pressures exerted to erode the economic position of West Berlin. The Soviets may calculate that if the Western powers do not exercise their claimed right to surface access to Berlin for military traffic, this would make more difficult effective allied action in the event of a blockade of West German-West Berlin traffic. Such a move, which if successful would achieve much of Soviet objectives in Berlin, is not an unlikely development but is probably not contemplated for the immediate future.

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CONSEQUENCES FOR BERLIN OF ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET "OPEN CITY" PROPOSAL

The acceptance of the Soviet proposal for transforming West Berlin into a "free city" would mean the elimination of the protection afforded by the presence of the Three Western Powers and the city's ties with the Federal Republic, which are the very basis of the city's freedom and security. Once these were eliminated, the Soviets would have little difficulty in accomplishing their longer-range objective of incorporating the city fully into the GDR, and the recent East German "elections" make it clear how they envisage the population's expressing its consent to such a development. Stated in blunt terms and seen in the light of known Soviet objectives, the Soviets are proposing:

- a. That the separation of East from West Berlin be formally recognized (until such time as the entire city is incorporated into the GDR).
- b. That the Allied Kommandatura be abolished and that the Western occupation forces be withdrawn. (The reference to the "demilitarization" of West Berlin no doubt indicates that West Berlin would also be deprived of police units (the Bereitschaftspolizei) trained to safeguard its security.)
- c. That West Berlin cover its ties with the Federal Republic. (Except for its formal legal status and questions of its security, West Berlin has to all intents and purposes become a part of the Federal Republic. Severing this tie would have catastrophic effects on the city's political, economic, financial, legal, and social systems.)
- d. That the GDR exercise control over West Berlin's communications with the outside world.
- e. That West Berlin not engage in any activity directed against the GDR. (This phrase no doubt covers not only clandestine intelligence and

propaganda

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propaganda activities but also the free dissemination of information, normal political activities in West Berlin, reception of refugees from the Soviet Zone, etc. This would provide the excuse for endless intervention and police action within West Berlin by GDR or possibly Soviet forces.)

f. That West Berlin's economy be absorbed into that of the Communist bloc.

Acceptance of the proposal, even in a very modified form, by the Western Powers would amount to a repudiation of their Berlin guarantee and a sell-out of the city to the Communists. No action by Western Powers could generate a more adverse reaction in German and world opinion, and the consequences would be incalculable.

Both the Federal and the Berlin Governments have declared that the Soviet proposal for an "open city" of West Berlin is unacceptable.

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CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING RESPONSE TO SOVIET NOTE

The Soviet note does not offer any basis for discussions which could culminate in a solution of the Berlin problem acceptable from our point of view. In fact, the restatement of the known Soviet position, coupled with a proposal which is obviously unacceptable to the Western Powers, a denunciation of the pertinent agreements, and a deadline after which the Soviets will accept no further responsibility for Berlin, gives the note the character of an ultimatum.

Our reply should nonetheless be constructive and not be limited to a flat rejection of the Soviet proposal.

It is quite possible that the Soviet note may have an influence on the uninformed and wishful-thinking elements of world opinion. To those unfamiliar or unconcerned with the Berlin problem, the Soviet proposal, which would liquidate the problem of Berlin (although in a manner quite unacceptable to the population of Berlin and to ourselves) and thus eliminate a major source of tension in international relations, might have a certain appeal. A purely negative reaction by the Western Powers could make it appear to the uninformed that the USSR was forthcoming in making a new proposal but that a solution of the Berlin problem was prevented by the intransigence of the Western Powers.

Our reply might appear more constructive if it avoided polemics about historical interpretations insofar as possible, or at least subordinated this to more substantive aspects. While the various distortions of history and fact contained in the Soviet note must be refuted, it might be preferable

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to separate these detailed corrections from our formal reply and to deal with them instead in a white paper which would be given world-wide circulation. (The drafting of such a white paper has already begun.)

A refutation of the legal position which the USSR is attempting to adopt will, however, be an essential element of our reply. The restatement of our case might be accompanied by a proposal to submit the legal dispute to the International Court of Justice (see Tab G, below).

It is preferable that our reply not be limited to the Berlin question, but rather place the Berlin question in the context of the broader German question, of which it is a part. There can be no separate solution for the question of Berlin; the only real and lasting solution will come through the liquidation of the Berlin problem as a consequence of German reunification.

Our reply could therefore take the form of a new initiative for the solution of the problem of German reunification and the attendant problem of European security. The Khrushchev speech of November 10 and other threats against the status of Berlin had already provoked a crisis of the first magnitude in the relations of the Western Powers and the USSR in Germany. Underlying this crisis is a challenge to the very basis of Western policy on the German question and a supreme test of Western intentions, influence, and power in Germany. We are now in a position where it would be difficult, and probably unwise, for us to content ourselves with an attempt to maintain an illusory normalcy in Berlin. On the other hand, if we accept the challenge implicit in the present crisis and in the Soviet note, we have a chance to wrest the initiative from the Soviets. An additional factor which

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four-power discussions of the German problem; (2) full endorsement of the Federal Republic's proposal for a standing four-power commission to deal with the German question; (3) a suggestion that this commission, with the assistance of German experts from either side, undertake planning which could assist the eventual all-German state in developing compromise solutions to the economic and social problems which it will have to face as a result of the divergent developments within Germany since 1945 (i.e., an indication that the social and economic "accomplishments" of the East German regime will not be entirely obliterated as a result of reunification); and (4) a suggestion that the Four Powers, assisted by German experts, undertake negotiations to alleviate on an interim basis some of the hardships and inconveniences which the continued division of their country has caused for the German population.

Our reply must also take in consideration the question of a negotiating forum. We should not lose sight of the fact that proposals for general preparatory negotiations with the Soviet Union are now on the table in Moscow together with our procedural proposals and the package includes agenda items proposed by both sides relating to Germany. We would have to consider whether we stand on the proposal at the Ambassadorial level or whether we are prepared to offer an immediate CFM or higher level meeting. In this case, we might offer a simple all-inclusive agenda, e.g. "Germany" or "German Problems."

Finally, we must bear in mind that the Soviets' indication that they might wait six months before abandoning their occupation functions with respect

makes this an opportune moment for doing so is the strong support which public opinion, especially in Germany, has given to the idea of the Western Powers' holding firm.

Our reply must contain a negotiating posture. Since the Soviet note makes it clearer than ever that the Soviets will not accept any reunification of Germany in terms acceptable to the Germans and ourselves and that the Soviets are more fully committed than before to the position that reunification is an internal problem to be regulated by the "two German states," a restatement of the known Western position (e.g. some modification of the "Eden Plan") might appear anticlimatic. The Soviet note might, however, provide a springboard for a fresh approach to the German problem which could not only consolidate German opinion (which had shown some signs of wavering before the Berlin crisis) behind us but might also put sufficient pressure on the USSR to induce the latter, if not to yield ground on the question of reunification, at least to allow the status quo to be made more tolerable to the German population and to proceed with greater caution in harassing Berlin and eliminating the last vestiges of freedom in the Soviet Zone.

The dangers of modifying our substantive position on German reunification and European security in the hope of presenting, or appearing to public opinion to present, a proposal which could lead to genuine negotiations with the USSR is obvious. We might, however, be able to develop a few modifications which would represent at least a superficial change in our position. Possible examples are: (1) an expression of our willingness to permit the participation of German "experts" from either part of the country in any

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respect to Berlin does not diminish in the slightest the urgency of our re-
viewing our Berlin contingency planning to better adapt it to existing
situations and likely developments. In the end, before the expiration of
the "period of grace" and after the exhaustion of such peaceable remedies
as appeals to the International Court of Justice and to the Security Council,
we shall probably find it necessary to consider how we would honor our basic
commitment to maintain Berlin's status and security.

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POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION ON BERLIN

DISCUSSION:

Given the present state of our knowledge of Soviet intentions and Allied public opinion, it is necessary to begin with certain basic facts or realistic assumptions in assessing the various possible courses of action available to the Western Allies in meeting the new Soviet threat to Berlin. These are:

1. There is a broad measure of agreement between the three occupying powers and the Federal Republic that we must remain in Berlin to keep the population of the three Western sectors from being starved by blockade or brought under Communist domination.
2. The Soviets will probably move ahead by relinquishing their control functions at the Nowawes and Marienborn checkpoints on the Autobahn and at the Marienborn checkpoint on the rail line used by the military trains going to and from Berlin. They will probably attempt to substitute GDR controllers in the Berlin Air Safety Center, and they will probably close their Kommandatur headquarters in East Berlin thus eliminating the principal Western working level contact with the Soviets. Conversely, at least at the outset, there will probably be no action taken by the GDR to limit or harass German traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic which for years has been subject solely to East German controls. Thus the initial problem is likely to be limited to the supply and travel of the Western military occupation in Berlin, with the exception of civil aircraft operations which would be confronted by the lack of Soviet guarantees of flight safety which
the withdrawal

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the withdrawal of Soviet controllers and the refusal to admit GDR controllers into the Air Safety Center would bring about.

3. Allied contingency plans first formulated in 1954 which contemplate limited dealings with GDR officials at the checkpoints have come in for general criticism from officials of the Federal Republic and our own Embassies in Europe as starting us off on a slide down a slippery slope.

4. Expectancies have been created all over the world that the Allies will launch an airlift on a scale required by the specific needs of the situation. In the absence of a decision to resort to force, any decision not to mount an airlift, even if only a token one, would be interpreted as indicative of Allied unwillingness to make a real expenditure of their resources and effort to remain in Berlin.

5. There will be extreme reluctance on the part of the British and probably the French, as well as among at least some other NATO countries, to approve the use of force to maintain our land communications with Berlin rather than deal with GDR officials at the checkpoints. This is implicit in the British paper submitted to us and the French as a basis for discussion. Ambassadors Whitney and Houghton have jointly (Paris Telegram 1919 to Department) expressed their doubt that British and French opinion would support armed Allied action to force road access as a result of an effort by the GDR to impose acceptance of GDR travel documentation.

6. Sentiment seems to be building up in favor of a proposal for a four-power meeting with the Soviets. (This has been recommended by our Ambassadors in Moscow, London, Paris, and by General Norstad.) Chancellor Adenauer has

also indicated

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also indicated to us that it will be desirable, even necessary, for the three occupying powers in Berlin and the Federal Government to meet at an unspecified level when the Soviets announce their measures against Berlin.

The attached papers discuss in some detail various courses of action open to us, as well as certain other aspects of the Berlin problem:

Enclosure 1 - Recommended Course of Action

Enclosure 2 - Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel from Railway and Autobahn Checkpoints and Current Contingency Plans

Enclosure 3 - Resort to Force to Maintain our Communications with Berlin

Enclosure 4 - Little Airlift to Supply Needs of Garrison

Enclosure 5 - Legal Aspects of Soviet Renunciation of Responsibility

Enclosure 6 - Military Implications of Allied Assumption of Soviet Obligations for Allied Access to Berlin

Enclosure 7 - Prospects for Negotiation with the USSR Regarding Germany.

Recommendations:

1. The United States should make a serious effort to obtain reconsideration by the British and French of outstanding contingency plans with a view to eliminating all dealing with GDR officials at the Autobahn and railway checkpoints. Our Embassy in Bonn should be instructed to raise the subject on an urgent basis with the British and French. (This will require that we have an alternative course of action to propose acceptable to the British and French.)
2. Urgent consideration be given to obtaining agreement within the U.S. Government on an alternative course of action to present contingency

plans

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plans for discussion with the British, French and the Germans. The recommended course of action together with fallback position for use with the British and French initially, and subsequently with the Germans, is set forth in Tab A.

3. At an appropriate point NATO consultation should take place in order to obtain the support of the NATO countries.

(Prepared by State-Defense-JCS Working Group)

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ADDENDUM TO

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION ON BERLIN

Page 1, opening sentence:

In the light of the Soviet Note of November 27 and Khrushchew's speeches and interviews, together with our knowledge of the state of Allied public opinion, it is necessary to begin with certain basic facts in assessing the various possible courses of action available to the Western Allies in meeting the new Soviet threat to Berlin. These are:

Para. No. 1 -- bracket words [starved by blockade or]

Para. No. 2 -- line 1, following word "ahead" insert --
"perhaps in less than 6 months"

Para No. 5 -- add new final sentence:
"German opinion is divided on the question."

Para No. 6 -- Insert new sentence after General Norstad.
..."The Soviets publicly have hastened to
reject in advance any such proposals."

Insert in next sentence which begins
Chancellor Adenauer,
after for the "foreign ministers of the",
(b) change Government to "Chancellor",
delete everything following to meet and
substitute:

"In conjunction with the Paris NATO meeting
December 14-16 to discuss plans to respond
to the Soviet Note."

TAB A

Para A. -- Delete (1) urgently (if possible and substitute
"at an appropriate time" and (2) Khrushchew's
threat) and substitute "the Soviet Note." for
the latter two words.

Para B. -- Delete some other international body and substitute
"the International Court of Justice".

Para D. -- Add new sentence: "(Details of procedure prescribed
in Berlin's 422 and USAREUR's SX 7922)".

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Recommended Course of Action

A possible alternative which should be considered as a matter of urgency is the following:

A. That the three Ambassadors in Moscow inform the Soviet Government urgently (if possible before concrete steps are taken to implement Khrushchev's threat):

(1) That the Three Powers continue to hold the USSR fully responsible under quadripartite agreements and arrangements concerning Berlin;

(2) That the Three Powers have taken note of Soviet statements to the effect that the USSR will withdraw from its remaining occupation functions with respect to Berlin and that they assume this means the Soviets intend to withdraw Soviet personnel from the interzonal Autobahn and railway checkpoints and from the Berlin Air Safety Center;

(3) That the Three Powers' right of unrestricted access would remain unaffected by the Soviet withdrawal;

(4) That the Three Powers would not tolerate an attempt on the part of the so-called GDR to assert any control over or to interfere with their traffic to and from Berlin via quadripartitely established routes, and would take all measures necessary to protect their rights in this connection.

(5) That, if the Soviets withdraw, Western Powers will act on the assumption that the USSR has decided:

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a. to abolish unnecessary administrative procedures at the interzonal borders, and

b. that it can and will, without the benefit of exchange of flight information in BASC, maintain absolute separation of its aircraft and of all other aircraft flying in the Soviet Zone from the aircraft of Three Powers flying in the Berlin corridors and control zone.

(6) That the Western Powers will expect their traffic to move freely without any presentation of documents or other formalities at the interzonal borders and will assume that the Soviets have given a blanket assurance of the safety of all flights of the aircraft of the Three Powers in the Berlin corridors and control zone.

B. Consideration might be given as to whether recourse should be had to the Security Council or to some other international body.

C. That we attempt, if Soviet personnel are then withdrawn from the checkpoints, to send through both military trains on the normal schedule as well as an uncovered convoy on Autobahn and that we instruct the commanders to refuse to present any documentation to GDR checkpoint control officials or to comply with any formalities suggested or instructions given by the latter. (If the first uncovered convoy goes through, a subsequent attempt could be made to send through a convoy containing some covered vehicles.)

D. If the GDR checkpoint personnel refuse to permit the passage of our trains and convoys on this basis, that we terminate military train and convoy operations and interrupt all other Allied Autobahn traffic.

E. An attempt

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E. An attempt to reopen access through the use of limited military force should be made at this point. (This action would be omitted under the fallback position specified in points F and G, below. However, points F and G might also be applicable in the event that initial action by force failed.)

F. That we arrange to make available on a permanent basis sufficient aircraft to transport all Allied official personnel and also their goods formerly transported via military trains and trucks which could not be procured locally in Berlin or transported by German carriers. (This would mean instituting a "miniature airlift" for the needs of the Berlin occupation forces. - See Tab D.)

G. As a concomitant to the above course of action, we should consider whether the Three Powers should not take some additional step to guarantee their unrestricted air access to Berlin, which would be essential to maintaining the status and security of the city. The Three Powers might, for example, reformulate and restate their Berlin guarantee, modifying it to add that they will regard any interference with their right and practice of unrestricted access to Berlin by air, including the operation of their civil air carriers, as an attack upon their forces and upon themselves. Communist harassment of our air access, which would be possible only through a patent application for force, would be clear evidence of a provocative intent. If it occurred, we could then take drastic counteraction to maintain Berlin, even at the risk of war, with fair assurance that such action would have the support of American, French, British and German public opinion.

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WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM RAILWAY AND AUTOBAHN CHECKPOINTS
AND CURRENT CONTINGENCY PLANS

I. Statement of Problem

An immediate problem which we expect to confront if the Soviets relinquish their occupation functions with respect to Berlin will be created by the withdrawal of Soviet personnel from the railway and autobahn checkpoints and the attempt of GDR personnel to assert control over our movements. Generally speaking, we can react to such a development in one of the following ways:

A. By submitting to GDR controls and attempting to prevent these controls from being made more stringent than those now exercised by the Soviets;

B. By refusing to deal with the GDR, foregoing further use of military trains or of the Autobahn, and putting into operation a "miniature airlift" to transport Allied personnel and those goods required by the occupation forces which cannot be procured in Berlin or brought in by German carriers; or

C. By refusing to deal with the GDR and attempting to maintain our right of unrestricted access via the surface routes without GDR controls by military force.

II. Existing Contingency Planning

Tripartite contingency planning agreed on at the Government level in 1951 and confirmed on the working level in Bonn at the end of 1957 provides that we would act as follows if Soviet personnel removed from the railway and highway checkpoints and our trains and vehicles would not otherwise be allowed to pass:

A. We would deal with GDR officials on the same basis we now deal with the Soviets;

B. We would inform the Soviets we still hold the USSR responsible for our unrestricted access to Berlin;

C. We would refuse to comply with any GDR controls more stringent than those exercised by the Soviets.

(An extract from the enclosure to despatch No. 1075 from Bonn of December 18, 1957, which contains the detailed plans, was distributed to the ad hoc committee November 21.)

III. Rationale of Existing Planning

The rationale of the existing planning was the following:

A. It would provide at least a temporary situation, for our traffic between Berlin and West Germany would continue. We should thus get a "breathing space" to propose for any attempts of the GDR to assert more stringent controls.

B. By continuing to insist on the principle of Soviet responsibility at the same time we dealt with GDR officials in practice, we might be able to maintain that we considered the GDR officials only as agents of the Soviets.

C. Since the Communists can physically stop our traffic, our refusal to deal with GDR officials would lead to an interruption of our surface access. Our approved national policy on Berlin contains the outline of a contingency plan to deal with harassment which seriously impedes our access, a plan which contemplates a series of diplomatic demarches and military preparations culminating in the use of limited military force. The use of force (to which the British and French have in the past refused to commit themselves) involves a risk of general war. In view of this risk, we should have to be certain, before undertaking the steps contemplated for dealing with a blockade, that we would have the support of popular opinion in the U.S., the U.K., France, and Germany. Such support would not be forthcoming, however, in a situation in which we had in effect "blockaded ourselves" over what the public would view and the Communists would represent as a mere "procedural" issue, namely whether we showed our documentation to officials in East German uniforms or to officers in Soviet uniforms.

IV. Weaknesses and Disadvantages of Existing Contingency Planning

Recent developments, and further reflection in the light of these developments, lead to the conclusion that the contingency planning worked out in 1954 is now outdated and that serious difficulties may result if we are obliged to implement it at this time. The arguments which may be raised against implementing this planning may be summarized as follows:

A. The original rationale, as described above, is no longer very convincing.

1. The 1957 revision of the plans no longer refers specifically to the GDR personnel as "agents" of the Soviets. The objections to referring to an "agency principle" are that the USSR, the supposed principal, explicitly denies the existence of any agency relationship and that, if we were consistent in asserting that such a relationship did exist, we should have no basis for refusing to deal with the GDR on any other matter involving Soviet responsibility in Germany, including reunification.

2. The

2. The guidance on dealing with the Berlin access problem contained in our approved national policy was necessarily influenced by the experience of the 1948-49 blockade and anticipated that problems of access would arise as a result of direct harassment of all Berlin traffic. The Soviets' grant of "sovereignty" to the GDR has however created a situation in which harassment can be limited to Allied traffic only and can take a more subtle form. It no longer seems appropriate to discuss the situation which we may soon be facing in terms of a "self-imposed blockade." On the one hand, a "blockade" would not be involved; on the other hand, the political issues underlying the threatened Communist action appear to be fairly clearly recognized by public opinion, which might not regard the interruption of Allied surface traffic as "self-imposed" and unnecessary.

B. Dealing with the GDR to the extent envisaged in our present contingency plans runs counter to our current policy regarding Germany and would tend to undermine the Western position that the USSR remains responsible under four-power agreements concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole. Although a legal case can be made that de facto dealings with GDR checkpoint officials do not connote recognition, the psychological repercussions would be strongly adverse. The GDR has been the "least recognized" of all the entities not accorded recognition by the United States, and we have wherever possible refused to have anything to do with GDR representatives.

C. It would probably not be possible to prevent the GDR from proceeding to exercise increasingly stringent controls over our traffic except by resort to force. We should have to expect a series of additional control measures, no one of which would provide a suitable occasion for a showdown on the basis of the considerations set forth in III, above. We should thus be obliged gradually to make one concession after another, and with each concession the position of the GDR would become more entrenched while our position would become more vulnerable. The thinking of the British, which assumes that we shall eventually have to extend diplomatic recognition to the GDR in response to pressures on our access to Berlin, illustrates the difficulty of attempting to draw a line. The end result could be that our position in Berlin would be untenable or that our remaining in Berlin would become purposeless.

D. Our dealing with the GDR would have a serious adverse effect on German opinion. We have already had expressions of concern on this score from Foreign Minister von Brentano, Bundestag majority leader Krone, and Governing Mayor Brandt of Berlin. Such action on our part would be seen as an abandonment of the established Western position regarding the German question and could trigger dangerous and unpredictable popular opinion trends in anticipation of further departures from the policy which the Western Powers and the Federal Government have followed in the past. The East German population might interpret such dealings as signifying the Western Powers' resignation to the inevitability of Communist rule over East Germany. USCINCEUR, our Embassy at Bonn, and our Mission at Berlin, on the basis of similar considerations, have all expressed the opinion that we should not deal with the GDR personnel at the checkpoints. It is clear from the statements of German officials and the German press, as well as from Ambassador Bruce's personal observations, that the Germans, from the Chancellor to the man in the street, expect the Three Powers to mount an airlift if necessary to overcome serious harassment of Berlin access and that they would be surprised and dismayed if we dealt with the GDR in preference to airlifting our own personnel and supplies.

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Implications of Use of Force to Maintain
Allied Access to Berlin
(prepared by Joint Staff-JCS)

BERLIN SITUATION

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the implications involved should it become necessary to use military force to maintain allied rights and position in Berlin as set forth in current quadripartite agreements.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. The Soviets intend to hand over to the GDR those functions in Berlin which are now reserved for Soviet organs.

3. The United States, United Kingdom and France have agreed that they will not recognize the alleged legal right of the GDR to take over Soviet functions which were mutually agreed to by the occupying powers.

4. Despite allied objections the Soviets may eventually impose through the GDR unacceptable restrictions, or partial, or complete blockade of Berlin directed principally at the Allied garrisons in Berlin.

5. Declarations of allied intentions to use military force will be made to the Soviets prior to the use of military force.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

6. Allied ground forces in Berlin comprise approximately 11,000 men as follows:

United States - two battle groups and a tank company (4200);
United Kingdom - three infantry battalions and a tank company (2700);
French - two infantry battalions (1000); and the West Berlin police force (3000).
Soviet and GDR ground forces in Germany total approximately 501,000 men as follows:

Vicinity of Berlin - 4 Soviet divisions (38,500) and the East Berlin police force (3000);
East Germany - 20 Soviet divisions (315,000) and 7 German divisions (145,000).

DISCUSSION

7. The relative strengths listed in paragraph 6 above clearly indicate that the use of only the allied forces in Berlin to maintain continuous free access to Berlin in face

of determined opposition is not feasible. The military forces available to CINCEUR, together with additional forces which could be made available to him, are adequate to maintain the Allied rights and position in Berlin if opposed only by GDR forces. Such engagement of forces is unlikely, however, in view of the defeat this would entail for overall Soviet objectives, and would therefore probably lead to general war. However, an examination of overall friendly and enemy orders of battle available for early reinforcement of the forces in paragraph 6 reveals no change in relative strengths in favor of the U.S. Therefore, it is not militarily acceptable to commit a large proportion of U.S. forces in Europe to a fight for continuous free access to Berlin if a general war appears probable. This would only lead to maldistribution for general war and to the risk of losing the forces without accomplishing the purpose at hand.

8. In view of the above the allied course of action most likely to succeed is to convince the Soviet that the allies are determined to maintain their position in Berlin to the extent of engaging in general war if required. The courses of action open to the Soviets in face of this allied position are:

- a. Back-down in face of the threat of allied force.
- b. Support the GDR in employing harassing tactics to impede Allied access to Berlin.
- c. Oppose allied forces with GDR forces only, reinforcing them covertly with "volunteers" or Soviet forces.
- d. Engage allied forces with Soviet forces in a general war.

9. It appears probable that the Soviets do not desire general war at this time and therefore would not risk it to attain their objectives in Berlin. Accordingly it seems likely that they would discard the latter two courses of action because either could lead to general war. It should be noted that if the Soviets do not back down and subsequently support determined military opposition the situation could rapidly develop into general war. Appropriate measures should then be taken by the allies to attain a high state of national readiness, to include preparation for mobilization prior to the use of force.

10. Subsequent to our declaration of intent to use force if necessary, but prior to the use of such force, certain

actions should be taken by the allies or by the United States unilaterally to manifest our intentions; for example:

- a. Alert allied forces
- b. Redeploy ground and air units to optimize employment of forces in Germany.
- c. Cancel passes and leaves.
- d. Simulate operational traffic on tactical radio nets where necessary.

11. Allied participation in any military action in this situation is essential. It will also indicate a significant allied solidarity and will offer a greater chance to gain Soviet recognition of allied determination not to relinquish right of access to Berlin. In the event the allies do not support military action in this situation some of the principal effects would be:

- a. Probable requirement for an airlift.
- b. Probable necessity for some form of recognition of the GDR.
- c. Furtherance of Soviet objectives.
- d. Deterioration of the NATO alliance for the long term and increased measures for withdrawal of the allies from Berlin.

12. In summary it is concluded that:

a. A firm declaration should be made now by the United States and allies that we do not intend to recognize or deal with the GDR, that we will not allow the GDR to impede the exercise of any rights we presently hold, that we will not accept any control by the GDR over our movements to and from Berlin, and that we will use force if necessary to enforce our rights.

b. The United States does not have the military capability to enforce continuous access to Berlin or the maintenance of our rights there.

c. A convoy supported by appropriate force should be utilized to test GDR intentions and to force the issue promptly at the time of turn over of control of Berlin to the GDR by the USSR.

d. The use of force will not necessarily insure continued access to Berlin or the maintenance of our rights in Berlin since rail and road communications can otherwise be disrupted.

e. If a decision is made to use continued force beyond that necessary to test intentions, appropriate measures should be taken by the Allies to attain a high state of national readiness to include preparation for the initiation of appropriate mobilization measures.

f. The use of force could possibly result in general war; however, it appears unlikely that the Soviets would risk general war to attain their objectives in Berlin.

g. Allied participation in any military action in this situation is essential.

A MINIATURE AIRLIFT

TAB DI. General Considerations

One course of action, which does not necessarily exclude others, although it would affect the timing and results of such other action, is a miniature airlift.

It is estimated that, because of the stockpiles of food, fuel and other necessities in Berlin, and because, for the present at least, it is probable that access for West German persons and goods will remain unaffected by increases in GDR controls, only a small airlift would be required. Reports from Berlin estimate the total amount required as approximately 100 tons a day, of which only 46 tons would be required for the United States forces. This amount would be less than 1 per cent of the high point of the 1948-49 airlift. Most of the heavy or bulky goods now transported by train could be procured locally.

With an airlift of a few flights a day, which could also bring into the city some supplies for the Berlin population for symbolic reasons, the problem of bad weather flying and radar direction would not apply.

It is possibly assumed that at some stage an airlift by cargo planes might be accompanied by fighter planes.

The arguments in favor of an airlift are mainly:

1. It would provide a breathing spell during which other measures could be developed.
2. It is expected by the Berliners and by most Germans and would therefore be held as a fulfillment of a pledge by the Western Allies - failure to act in this way might result in panic in Berlin unless there were a successful show of force.
3. Even a small airlift would probably be considered as dramatic evidence of Allied determination to remain in Berlin by many in the free and in the Communist world.
4. It has been well prepared and could be put in operation quickly.

5. It is presumed to involve less risk than certain other courses of action, while showing firmness.
6. It can be combined with other measures or be a precursor to other action.

The arguments against an airlift are mainly:

1. It is possible that in some quarters in the free world, and in the Communist world it would be regarded as a sign of defeat or desire to avoid stronger action.
2. There would be considerable risk of an incident involving the same kind of grave dangers as a surface incident.
3. An airlift demands some resources in planes thus reducing resources for other purposes.
4. An airlift can only be terminated by recourse to other measures such as a test incident, a conference, or other solutions each of which might be considered without an airlift if time permits.

II. Military Aspects (Prepared by Joint Staff - JCS)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the implications of a Berlin Airlift in support of Allied military forces in Berlin.

DISCUSSION

2. Latest information on stock status of supplies in Berlin Command, (U.S.) is as follows:

Class I - 150 days authorized and on hand (except perishables).

Class II and IV - 180 days authorized and on hand

Class III - Mogas - 360 days authorized and on hand.

- Other POL products - 120 days authorized and on hand

- Solid Fuels - 1 year supply
(70,000 tons).

Class V - 20 days supply at combat rates.

3. No significant shortages exist in Berlin Command (U.S.)

4. Best information available on British and French personnel in Berlin is that in numbers their combined total is approximately equal to that of the U.S. forces and that the stockpiles maintained by the British and French forces are equal to or greater than those of the U.S. garrison.

5. CINCUSAREUR has reported+ that the Berlin airlift plan provides for 50 tons daily for U.S. Berlin Military Command which is considered adequate for perishables as well as other emergency requirements. It is estimated that 50 additional tons daily would provide for British and French forces. The above would not include replenishment of stockpiles.

6. During the 1948-1949 Berlin Airlift Operation requirements reached a peak of 763 tons per day to support the U.S., British, and French military. This represents best available information as to total requirements for full resupply of military forces.

7. Headquarters USAFE Operations Plan 5-57 Berlin Airlift (Reduced), dated 18 March 1957, in support of Headquarters US EUCOM Plan (Berlin) 12-55, is based on utilizing theater assigned transport aircraft (1 Wing C-119s; 1 Wing C-130s; 1 Squadron C-124s). This plan is not current as it does not reflect the phase-out of the C-123 aircraft and the introduction of the C-130 aircraft. Otherwise, the plan is valid and establishes L-day as the day flight operations start and provides for the following phased capability into Berlin, which will also meet the outbound requirements. See Annex "A" for Tabulation of Assigned Theater Transport Aircraft Capability.

*CINCUSAREUR Message to Dept of Army Number SX-7752
DTG 191558Z Nov 58, on file in Joint Secretariat

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Average Daily Tons Lifted</u>	<u>Tons per Month</u>
L to L/3	800	
L thru L/30	1,000	30,000
L/31 thru L/60	1,520	45,600

If necessary, augmentation of the transport aircraft in the theater could be made from MATS. For example, the addition of 30 C-124s would provide a homogeneous transport fleet with a capability of lifting 1520 tons per day (45,600 tons per month), and would free the C-130s and C-119s for normal intra-theater use.

8. Capability for interference with this airlift operation could include:

a. Withdrawal of Soviet participation in the Berlin Air Safety center with resultant implication in the safety of Allied air operations in the corridor airspace, i.e., Employment of Soviet fighter aircraft in harassing tactics against Allied transport aircraft within the corridor airspace.

b. Use of communications jamming or electronics countermeasures against navigation and air traffic control.

CONCLUSIONS

9. Present stock status of Allied forces in Berlin is excellent. There are no significant shortages.

10. There is adequate intra-theater airlift immediately available to supply perishable and emergency requirements of Allied forces in Berlin.

11. CINCUSAFE plan which provides for a build-up of tonnage delivered to 1520 tons per day is in excess of the expected requirement for full resupply of the Allied military forces in Berlin.

12. There are no logistical implications which would preclude an airlift resupply of Allied forces in Berlin.

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ANNEX "A"

CAPABILITY* OF USCINCEUR ASSIGNED TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

No	Type	Payload	Daily Capability (Based on Various Utilization Rates)					
			(2 Hrs)		(4 hrs)		(6 hrs)	
			Trips	Tons	Trips	Tons	Trips	Tons
12	C-124	25	7	175	14	350	21	525
48	C-130	17	28	476	56	952	84	1428
48	C-119	8	25	200	50	400	75	600
			<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
			80	851	120	1702	180	2553

* Based on assumption aircraft will operate from the Frankfurt, Wiesbaden Area

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MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ALLIED ASSUMPTION
OF SOVIET OBLIGATIONS FOR ALLIED ACCESS TO BERLIN

J-3 position paper on the military aspects of supporting by military action a legal theory that Soviet rights in Berlin, expressed under quadripartite agreements, would be inherited by the United States, United Kingdom and France in the event of total Soviet relinquishment of these rights to the GDR.

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the practical military aspects of supporting, by military action, a legal theory that Soviet rights in Berlin expressed under Quadripartite agreements would be inherited by the U.S., U.K. and France in the event of total Soviet relinquishment of these rights.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. The U.S., U.K. and France will adhere to the view that they legally inherit all rights and obligations in Berlin if these rights are relinquished by the Soviets to the GDR.

3. The Soviets may consider any military action against GDR forces as an attack on the USSR and back the GDR with military force.

4. Additional assumptions as set forth in Tab C.

DISCUSSION

5. Air Access - Allied rights in Berlin include uninterrupted operation of the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC), located at the Tempelhof Airport in West Berlin. If the Soviets withdraw and GDR representatives attempt to take part in, or hinder, the operation of BASC, simple ejection of the GDR representatives from the center and from West Berlin would probably make continued operation of BASC feasible. Continued Allied air traffic to and from Berlin would depend, however, on no serious effort to disrupt this traffic.

6. Rail Access - Continued operation of the railroads, in the event the GDR seriously attempts to disrupt it, would present a very difficult problem. Rail movements are already under effective East German operational control; if this were challenged by force rails could be cut or rail bridges blown at almost any point in East Germany. Accordingly it is not considered militarily feasible to expend the large military effort required to maintain continuous rail access to Berlin. In addition, any premature action here is undesirable since most of the supplies for the U.S. garrison in Berlin are carried by rail and the chances of success in maintaining this route of access are negligible.

7. Road

7. Road Access - Maintenance of road access to Berlin appears to be the crux of the problem. The following courses of action are possible within the context of this problem to maintain the allied right of road access to Berlin.

- a. Disregard GDR checkpoints and use force if necessary to maintain access to Berlin.
- b. Seize established checkpoints and defend the allied operation thereof.
- c. Establish "symbolic" allied checkpoints adjacent to GDR checkpoints to perform previous Soviet functions and defend them with token forces.
- d. In conjunction with a, b, or c above, outpost bridges, defiles and obstacles on the autobahn, patrol the autobahn, and take any other military action required to protect convoy operation on the autobahn.

8. Consideration of Courses of Action - The courses of action indicated in paragraph 7 above would lend visible support to the legal theory outlined in the problem. However, the courses of action set forth in paragraph 7 above if contested by determined opposition would require the employment of additional allied military forces. As stated previously in Tab C position paper the use of allied force will not necessarily insure continued access to Berlin or the maintenance of our rights in Berlin. The course of action set forth in subparagraph 7c above, may have greater legal or political value in this situation since it does not necessarily involve the employment of allied military force against the GDR. However, the mere establishment of symbolic checkpoints does not guarantee allied access to Berlin.

CONCLUSION

9. The courses of action set forth in paragraph 7 above would lend visible support to the legal theory outlined in the problem.

10. Courses of action set forth in paragraph 7 above are not feasible if resisted by determined forces since they would then involve the use of allied military force which would not necessarily insure continued access to Berlin.

11. Course of action set forth in subparagraph 7c above may have more legal or political value than the other courses of action, but will not insure continued access to Berlin.

12. Each of the courses of action herein, if supported with Allied military force against determined opposition, leads to the situation examined in Tab C and the conclusions therein are applicable here.

13. None of the courses of action herein is suitable as a true test of Soviet intentions from a military point of view.

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SECRET

Prospects for Negotiation with the USSR Regarding GermanyThe Problem

To make an offer to negotiate with the Soviet Union parallel to the adoption of a firm assertion of our rights in Berlin.

Discussion

The desirability of accompanying a demonstration of Western determination to maintain their rights in Berlin by force if necessary by a proposal to the USSR for high level negotiations on the German problem as a whole has been endorsed by Ambassador Thompson, Whitney and Houghton, and General Norstad. At the working level at the Quai d'Orsay it is felt that such a proposal should be made only after the West actually demonstrates willingness to use force.

In considering the desirability of a Western offer to negotiate it is assumed:

- (a) We will demonstrate the will to enforce Western access to Berlin.
- (b) We will not deal with the East German regime.

There appears to be no possibility of profitable negotiations on Berlin access alone. The Soviets would not negotiate to confirm our rights and we will not negotiate with the East Germans. The Government of the German Federal Republic has expressed the view that if the Western Powers decide to negotiate on the status of Berlin, this should be done only in a Four Power context and as a political offensive encompassing far reaching demands.

The alternatives to negotiations concerning Berlin would be:

- (a) Negotiations on the German problem.
- (b) Negotiations on Germany and European security.
- (c) Summit negotiations in which Germany and European security be one general topic.

We have offered to negotiate a settlement of the German problem on the basis of reunification through free elections. The Soviets insist that the two German "states" must negotiate reunification and that the role of the Four Powers is to negotiate a peace treaty and work out with the Germans the future political, military and economic status of a unified Germany.

The West has repeatedly offered to provide proposals for general European security arrangements to afford security guarantees to the USSR in return for its acceptance of a fully sovereign, unified Germany, under a freely elected government. These proposals generally involve some form of limitations of forces and arms in a reunified Germany and guarantees against possible future aggression by her. These proposals have never been spelled out in detail owing to the absence of any indication from the Soviets of a willingness to negotiate. Efforts to arrive at an agreed US-UK-French-West German position on specific proposals to serve as the basis for an initiative in the field of negotiations and to strengthen the public

posture

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posture of the West on the problem have been unsuccessful. These efforts are stalled at present owing to the German unwillingness to agree to the Outline Plan (Annex A) discussed in the Four Power Working Group on Germany. This attitude is based on the feeling that Germany should be an equal NATO partner in a military as well as any other sense.

The Soviets have endeavored to consolidate the Communist system in East Germany as well as in Eastern Europe and to improve their strategic position in general by putting forth a number of proposals concerning disarmament and European security. These include proposals for withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, the demuclearization of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, aerial inspection against surprise attack in Central and Western Europe.

The Mayor of West Berlin has suggested that the Geneva talks on test suspension and surprise attack be broken off as a means of exerting pressure on the Soviets.

The US-UK-and France most recently proposed the convening of Four Power talks on Germany in a note to the Soviet Union on September 30, 1958.

The German Federal Republic replied to a Soviet proposal for Four Power negotiations on November 17, 1958.

Recommendations

(a) That the proposal of the Western Powers to negotiate with the USSR on the German problem be reiterated in connection with a demonstration of the Western Powers to maintain their rights in Berlin by force if necessary.

(b) That notification of the impending use of force for this purpose be accompanied by an offer to negotiate new rights in Berlin on a far reaching basis.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

File # 2+3 distributed to Eisenhower Neerhaunt Smith 12/14/58

~~TOP SECRET~~
Personal and Private

December 12, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower
Mr. Greene



1. I showed the President the draft of the statement which I proposed to make following our discussion, and with the changes in the last two paragraphs shown on the attached copy, he approved it. (Mr. Hagerty was present for this item.)

2. The President expressed discouragement at the level of the efforts the other NATO countries are making to the common defense and expressed the belief that at the forthcoming Ministerial Meeting in Paris I should chide them a bit. He suggested that the other NATO Governments be reminded that the United States is maintaining the principal deterrent power and, through the Mutual Security Program a great portion of the expense of the defense posture of the free nations around the periphery of the Sino Soviet bloc. Notwithstanding this, the President felt that our allies are not manning their own fronts.

There was some discussion, in which Mr. Herter participated, of the extent of the shortfalls of the NATO countries' defense efforts. Mr. Herter noted that these are expected to some extent in all the European countries and noted that while the United States might have to transfer two battle groups from existing divisions to the status of service troops to man the NATO atomic stockpiles, during 1959, this did not contemplate reduction in our overall force strength in Europe. The President recalled that when he first went to SHAPE, there had been talk that the United States assistance to the NATO countries' defense efforts would be for a "maximum" of five years. Since then the NATO countries have come to depend overly on the United States; the President reiterated that it is time for us to begin to wean our allies from overdependence upon us and to encourage them to make better efforts of their own.

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59 WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS SERIES Box 7 WH Neerhaunt 7/1/58

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~~TOP SECRET~~
Personal and Private

PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (1)(3)(5)
State letter 2/8/82
NLE DATE 4/5/82

Authority MK 81-11 #2
LWS
4/5/84

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Personal and Private

-2-



In this connection I showed the President Ambassador Burgess' estimate (POLTO 1646) and General Norstad's message to me (ALO 1111). The President expressed his agreement that we should not back down from the commitments undertaken in MC 70, and approved our adhering to those goals for calendar year 1959. The President alluded to the pressures on the U.S. fiscal position and the difficult problem this posed for our budget. I said that notwithstanding these, I thought it important that we take this position because among other reasons it would be dangerous if we allowed the impression of great United States strength to be dissipated.

3. Turning to Berlin, I showed the President Chancellor Adenauer's message to me (Bonn's 1245). The President agreed with the thoughts that the Berlin and all German questions should be in the first instance dealt with separately, that we should not enter into negotiations under the ultimatum of a time limit, and that we must insist on the validity of existing agreements until they are modified also by agreement.

I noted that I would be meeting with the British, French and German Foreign Ministers on Sunday to discuss these questions.

4. I also noted that the first meeting of the US-Canadian Joint Cabinet Defense Committee, which was established during the President's visit to Ottawa in July, would be held in Paris on December 15.

5. I said that I would also be seeing General de Gaulle on Monday. I said that he is beginning to be troublesome in his desire to be in on everything all around the world.

6. I said that Mr. Dillon had informed me of Admiral Strauss' call to Governor Herter about oil imports. I expressed serious misgivings about the idea, attributed to Secretary Strauss, of a compensating import excise tax on oil. Mr. Herter participated in the ensuing discussion during which it was pointed out that the Department of Justice insists on the voluntary program for restriction of oil imports not continuing, that a system of mandatory quotas would replace it effective January 1, and that rather than leave the whole matter up to Congress, we in the State Department felt that with three months time we could work out an agreement with Canada and Venezuela which would avoid violations of our agreements on trade. The President said he would prefer almost any agreement to leaving the matter up to Congress.


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-3-



John Foster Dulles

S. J. N. Greene, Jr.:jm

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12/15/58
= 12/12

December 15, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
December 12, 1958 - 2:30 PM

Others present: Secretary Dulles
Secretary Herter
Mr. Greene
Mr. Hagerty
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the draft of the statement to be made by the Secretary of State at the White House immediately preceding his departure for Europe to the NATO ministerial meeting.

The President's initial reaction, on reading the text of the draft, was to question the wording of the last paragraph, which began, "Because NATO meets these tests. . . ." He felt the next to last paragraph, containing a set of conditions, to be truthful; but he tended to disagree with the implication that NATO is currently functioning smoothly. The President stated that he has worked hard for NATO himself, but that he becomes discouraged at the continuing pressure for the retention of sizeable U.S. forces. He pointed out that other countries are withdrawing forces, in spite of the fact that they are doing better financially than we at the moment; and yet when we mention withdrawing any portion of our forces, they protest vehemently. He pointed out the preeminent role played by our six-division (equivalent) force, and stated that it represents the only force being maintained as a respectable combat force in Western Europe.

The Secretary of State, while not disagreeing with this viewpoint, pointed out that Western Germany is making real progress in building its forces. Its start was initially slow; however, it has now reached the point where its army has eight divisions, and will have twelve by next year.

The President then pointed out areas in which he was dissatisfied with the current performance of NATO. He cited as an example that

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-204

MR 80-196 #1

By DJH Date 10/30/81

Staff Secy (Sub) / 005 / 3 / 'State Dept - 9/58 - (157 (4)'

the British are selling generators in Mexico City at half the U. S. price. We, on the other hand, are losing our foreign trade because of our heavy defense expenditures at home, which come to a total of some \$45 billion, which is over 10% of our GNP. He further pointed out the failure of our allies to get together on such matters as the reply to Khrushchev's note of November 27 on Berlin. He cited the divergency of opinion between the British and French on timing, content, and other matters pertaining to our reply. On this matter, Secretary Dulles assured the President that the influence of the U.S. has not yet been brought to bear. Once our influence makes itself felt, according to the Secretary, we will have a united front in this area.

The President then addressed himself directly to the wording of the last paragraph of the statement. He approved the statement with the substitution of the words, "These are the ends which NATO serves...." in place of the former wording. "Because NATO meets these tests...."

(Upon completion of the text of the statement, Mr. Hagerty departed.)

The discussion of force levels for NATO continued. The President continued to review the responsibilities borne by the U.S. in the world. He stated that we should remind our NATO allies that the U.S. maintains the nuclear deterrent to general war under which they live; that we assist peripheral nations around the world; that we maintain two U.S. divisions in Korea; and that we maintain a capability to deal with crises such as Lebanon and Quemoy. Since we perform these air, naval, and ASW missions, our allies in Europe should at least provide the "immobile" forces which guard their own borders.

Secretary Dulles then pointed out that the United States is experiencing some shortfall in its MC 70 obligations; he asked Mr. Herter how much this shortfall is. To this Mr. Herter replied that our shortfall is not noticeable this year; however, in FY 1959 we must convert two battle groups to service troops in order to create the spaces for custody of atomic weapons for NATO forces. In actual spaces, we remain about level, although we must reduce some combat troops.

The President then reviewed his own experiences with regard to U.S. troop levels in NATO. He stated that in 1951 as SACEUR he accompanied by General Goodpaster, had traveled through Europe insisting

to the various European Governments that the maintenance of the equivalent of six U. S. divisions was an emergency measure only, and would be maintained only until the effects of the Marshall Plan could take hold, allowing the European economies to take over this responsibility. He added that he had thought at that time that five years would be a maximum (and that he was therefore considered by some governments to be quite unreasonable). The President continued to discuss the background of his current viewpoint on force levels, recalling that the Europeans at that time had feared that Germany might be permitted to maintain forces of too great strength for the common good. The U. S. and the U. K. had stood together on the matter of German rearmament. He had asked the Cabinets of the various NATO countries, during his initial round of visits in early 1951, who they thought their enemy was, the Russians or the Germans? At that time, the President had not been successful in convincing the Europeans that the Germans should be rearmed.

At this point Mr. Herter agreed that at the end of the year we should reassess the over-all philosophy of NATO, but at this time it would have a very unfortunate impact in the light of the Berlin situation. Secretary Dulles here mentioned certain cables from Ambassador Burgess on the subject of the Minimum Forces Study (MC 70). He reminded the President that MC 70 is subject to annual review. This document was approved about a year ago, and concurred in by all the interested departments of the government.

The President then specified that he has no intention of running away from commitments. We should stick with MC 70, but we should ask the European governments to what extent they intend to continue leaning on the U. S. He then cited further areas in which he felt the European nations were not doing their duty, such as cutting length of universal service and French deployment of NATO divisions to North Africa. He asked why the Germans could not produce 20 instead of 12 divisions.

Secretary Dulles and Mr. Herter pointed out that Germany is currently restricted to 12 divisions by agreement; and that creation of 20 divisions by Germany would probably scare the French. The President retorted that he would be glad to scare them; maybe that

would have an effect on French pretensions at being a world power. He terminated the discussion with the thought that the concept of the inexhaustibility of America (despite its definitely useful aspects in the cold war) can no longer be realistically considered applicable.

* * * * *

The discussion then turned to a message which Secretary Dulles had received from Chancellor Adenauer earlier in the day. (The letter had been summarized in the Daily Staff Summary, and the President was familiar with it.) As regards this letter, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that our best argument against the USSR is that the USSR has served notice that in six months they will unilaterally repudiate a four-power agreement, a thing which they have no right to do. In the light of the threatening nature of the November 27 Soviet note, Secretary Dulles does not recommend negotiations under these conditions. We can meet later, but in the meantime, the status quo must stand and be recognized.

The President stated, with respect to the Adenauer letter, only that he agreed on the separation of the subjects of Berlin and unification of Germany. He agrees that the issues are separate and distinct. Some discussion then transpired as to the situation in the British foreign office, with an effort to explain recent inconsistencies. The President was of the opinion that the British government is, at the moment, confused.

* * * * *

Secretary Dulles then reminded the President that the Canadian-U.S. Defense Committee will meet in Paris during the NATO meeting. Secretary McElroy will be present for these talks.

* * * * *

The discussion then proceeded to the subject of General De Gaulle. Secretary Dulles desired to point out that DeGaulle is becoming increasingly troublesome. To this the President offered the warning that De Gaulle is capable of the most extraordinary actions. He

recalled an instance during World War II in which De Gaulle had informed the President (then Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces) that he (De Gaulle) would remove all French forces from SHAEF command. The President had, in the presence of Churchill, informed De Gaulle that such removal would be satisfactory since the Americans and British would win the war anyway. However, De Gaulle could expect not another round of ammunition nor support of any kind, and would therefore be reduced to impotency. This attitude is not recommended, of course, for adoption by the State Department under present circumstances, particularly in the light of De Gaulle's present position of power and influence. It is offered only as illustration of the type of action that De Gaulle is capable of. The President added to watch out for him.

* * * * *

The final subject dealt with was that of regulation of oil imports. Secretary Dulles pointed out, in this respect, that the voluntary restrictions on oil imports will expire on 1 January. If we give the Congress the green light to transact legislation to equalize the price of oil imports, we are in trouble. In fact we might as well then cut off any talks we are having with Canada and Venezuela.

Mr. Herter here stated that the initial proposal to present this problem to Congress has been rescinded. All agree that this would be a dangerous procedure. Mr. Herter's recommendation is that the President issue a temporary mandatory restriction on January 1. This will give us more time in which to negotiate further voluntary restrictions with the oil companies. This was agreed.

John S. D. Eisenhower

*Referring to the proposal to send the problem to Congress.

12/17/58

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Paris, France, December 16-18, 1958

APPROVED
JAE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Retain class'n Change/classify to _____
 With concurrence of _____
 Declassify In part and excise as shown
EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1)
FPC/HDR by CW 10-129-94

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 18, 1958
Time: 6:20 p.m.
Place: Embassy Washington

Participants:

Department of State
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Burgess
Ambassador Bruce
Ambassador Loughton
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Harbo

Mr. Greene
Mr. Timmons
Mr. Smith
Mr. Becker
Mr. Hillenbrand

Defense
Mr. McElroy
General Twining
General Kerstad
General Gribble
Admiral Brown
Mr. Irwin
Mr. Barkall
Mr. Scobee

Subject: Berlin

Copies to: S/S - 2
USRO - 1
USSEL: Embassy Paris - 1
Mr. Reinhardt

Mr. Harbo
Mr. Smith
Mr. Becker
Mr. Hillenbrand

Secretary McElroy
Defense - Mr. Irwin
JCS - Gen. Twining

Washington: G GER Embassy Bonn for Amb. Bruce H
C S/P Embassy London for Amb. Whitney
EUR L S/S - 2

The Secretary began by noting that the Germans were anxious to have a strong substantive communique issued by the Foreign Ministers after their meeting on December 17. Spalk was opposed to this, and there was some reason for his opposition. However, the Secretary observed, it seems likely that the Foreign Ministers will have to say something. Spalk had already prepared a draft communique which might be issued by the NATO Council.

The Secretary said that his own disposition was to be rather tough in responding to the Soviets. Their proposal struck him as outrageous both in tone and substance. He had made an arrangement with them giving up Serevy and Trudingia in exchange for entry into the three Western sectors of Berlin. They had consolidated their position in the area which we had relinquished; now they want us to move out of Berlin. The Soviets talk of negotiating new agreements in the same breath as they denounce the old agreements. What is the point of arriving at agreements if they are going to be subject to unilateral denunciation when they no longer serve the purpose of one of the parties?

The Secretary noted that there was some difference of view as to whether or not a proposal for general negotiations should be included in the same document replying to the Soviet note. The Germans were apparently opposed to this, particularly

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Adenauer. Ambassador Bruce said that it was necessary to distinguish between the position of the Chancellor now, and the position which he might take a little later. He thought that the Chancellor would eventually accept, under pressure of public and party opinion in Germany, the idea of a proposal for negotiations. He would know this a little more clearly when the Germans stated their views on December 14.

The Secretary commented that the difficult thing is to find the point at which physically there would be a break with the Soviets. If our new contingency paper were to be accepted, that would establish the point, but it was doubtful that it would be accepted. The Secretary said he was convinced that the Soviets did not want general war with us and will not consciously get into one. The problem is to make the issue sufficiently clear-cut. Otherwise, a little shooting might grow into big shooting. The issue in this instance is elusive, and it is not clear how it will be posed.

Ambassador Bruce said that we must be prepared to be tough from the beginning, assuming the analysis of the Soviet intentions made by the Secretary were correct. If we do not have a firm position on our part, we will not get over a comparatively firm position from our allies. The Secretary said that this was true enough, but did not really meet the basic problem just mentioned. We are prepared to be strong and tough, but how does this work out in specific terms? He referred to the case of a complete block and the decision which would have to be made to unseat our ally, but that would not accomplish much. Ambassador Bruce said that, if we told the Soviets we are going to maintain our access by surface and where, there may be incidents, and we might be faced by a crisis, but we will never know this unless we take such a stand. The British are inclined to temporize and to accept facts recognition of the GDR as well as the semi-permanent division of Germany. However, although the British do not have complete confidence in the Germans on the unification issue, they are prepared to be relatively tough on Berlin. The West Germans know that the GDR Government is determined and ready to employ force if necessary to maintain our access to Berlin. But the problem of how to deal with the other Allies who want to take a weaker position faces them.

Mr. Harland said that the decision which we may be faced with next week is whether if the British and French refuse to accept our proposals for revision of contingency plans, we are prepared to go it alone. If such a decision is taken, the sooner we tell the Russians this, the less possibility there would be of incident. He was opposed to changing the point at which we would be prepared to use force.

Mr. Harland said that, if we took a strong position on Berlin, we should also try to make a conference related to this firm position to give the Soviets a way out. Such a simultaneous proposal of a conference might also make it easier for the British not to take a firm position. Going it alone would cost the West a great deal. Ambassador Bruce commented that, as soon as Adenauer is certain of the strength of our own position, he will agree to anything. He would see themselves accept the idea of a meeting.

Mr. Child said he thought that the time when we should plan to resort to force would be that point where it would be credible to the Soviets that we would do so. This point did not seem to be that where GDR officials would require credentials of our officials to declare. A better point would be the clear blockage of our rights.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- Retain class'n Change/classify to _____
- With concurrence of _____
- Declassify In part and excise as shown

EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)

FPC/HDR by CS 10/24/94

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The Secretary commented that there would not be any such clear blockage of our rights. Rather there would be a slow process of strangulation. The principles are elusive. The GDR officials will say that certainly they will let us go through if we comply. Ambassador Bruce noted that, in the air, there may be incidents of a real war-like nature.

General Fulbright said that we certainly have to stop this somewhere. We must ignore the fear of general war. It is coming anyway. Therefore we should take the issue on a point we think is right and stand on it. Khrushchev is trying to scare people. If he succeeds, we are through.

Ambassador Bruce mentioned a dinner given recently by the President of the Bundestag, Dr. Gumbel, at which political leaders of all parties were present. They were unanimous in expressing that the U.S. must, if necessary, use force to maintain its position in Germany, even when illogically the some leaders were opposed to arming the Bundestag with atomic weapons. This was true also of German trade union leaders with whom the Ambassador had recently met in Düsseldorf.

The Secretary said that there was no doubt in anybody's mind that, if we give up, it would be a disaster, and that we would face the same threat later under ever worse conditions. We all know what the problem is, but grappling with it in specific terms is difficult.

Mr. McNamara said that, as he saw it, it was difficult to find the point where force could be applied. Berlin was isolated and some better way of securing our access thereto should be our limited objective in the present exercise. Therefore, there should be a conference on this subject. There was no doubt in the Defense Department about the necessity of taking a firm position.

The Secretary mentioned that the 1949 Paris Conference reached agreement on access to Berlin, but that had not stuck. Ambassador Bruce noted that nothing would be done in the Berlin area except the maintenance of the status quo.

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AF-15-58

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- Retain class'n Change/classify to _____
 - With concurrence of _____
 - Declassify In part and excise as shown
- EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)
- EPC/HDR by B.G. 10/24/94

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12/15/58

EYES ONLY

De

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

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Action
SS
Info

Control: 8932
Rec'd: DECEMBER 15, 1958
7:11 P M

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FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: DULTE 2, DECEMBER 15, 11 P M

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

WE HAD THIS MORNING THE FIRST MEETING OF THE US-CANADIAN MINISTERIAL COMMISSION ON JOINT DEFENSE. THIS WAS THE BODY WHICH YOU WILL RECALL, WE AGREED TO WHEN WE WERE IN OTTAWA TOGETHER LAST JULY. AS ANTICIPATED, THE MEETING SERVED MORE AS SCENERY THAN AS A PLACE FOR SUBSTANTIVE DEBATE ALTHOUGH A FEW INTERESTING POINTS CAME UP. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE MEETING WILL IMPROVE OUR CANADIAN RELATIONS.



THEN I HAD A MEETING WITH GENERAL NORSTAD, WHO WANTED TO SEE ME BEFORE I SAW DE GAULLE. HE OUTLINED THE SERIES OF OBSTRUCTIVE TACTICS WHICH HE WAS ENCOUNTERING ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH. I ALSO SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT HE MIGHT CONSIDER A FEW QUIET MOVES, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHICH WOULD NOT BE LOST ON THE RUSSIANS, TO INDICATE WE WERE TIGHTENING UP FOR THE BERLIN SITUATION.

THE BIG EVENT WAS MY MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH GENERAL DE GAULLE. WE WERE TOGETHER FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF AND I AM BOUND TO SAY THAT IT WAS A MOST UNSATISFACTORY MEETING. HE WAS ENTIRELY CORRECT AND CORDIAL PERSONALLY BUT OBVIOUSLY IRRITATED BY OUR FAILURE YESTERDAY TO VOTE AGAINST THE ALGERIAN INDEPENDENCE RESOLUTION IN THE UN AND ALSO OUR FAILURE TO COOPERATE WITH THEM TO TRY TO HOLD UP THE ADMISSION OF GUINEA TO THE UN. BASICALLY, HOWEVER, HE WENT BACK TO HIS LETTER TO YOU AND MADE IT EMPHATIC THAT FRANCE WANTED TO ESTABLISH A DEFINITE THREE-PARTY ORGANIZATION COMPOSED OF FRANCE

UK AND US

~~SECRET~~
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: MR 90-286 HCL
By: NLE Date: 8/1/81

AWF (Dulles) 1/8
mvd

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

-2-, DULTE 2, DECEMBER 15, 11 P M, FROM PARIS

UK AND US, WHICH WOULD MAKE GLOBAL POLICY AND DEAL WITH THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ETC. HE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT FRANCE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN COOPERATING WITH NATO ON INFRASTRUCTURE, ATOMIC STOCKPILES, IRBM'S AND THE LIKE WHEN IN EFFECT THE WHOLE SHOW WAS BEING RUN BY THE US. I TOLD HIM THAT WHILE I THOUGHT THERE COULD BE INFORMAL EXCHANGES OF VIEWS WHICH WOULD BE USEFUL, I WAS CONVINCED THERE COULD NOT BE ANY FORMAL ORGANIZATION OF THE KIND THAT HE ENVISAGED. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE OUTCOME WILL BE. I THINK WE CAN MAKE A GREATER EFFORT AT WASHINGTON TO MAKE THEM FEEL THAT THEY ARE IN ON IMPORTANT DECISIONS AND THEN SEE WHETHER THAT IN FACT BRINGS A DIVIDEND IN TERMS OF MORE COOPERATION WITH NATO. WE TALKED ABOUT BERLIN, AND I FOUND DE GAULLE QUITE SOLID ON THIS POINT. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF TAKING A SEPARATE LINE ON BERLIN OUT OF RESENTMENT AT WHAT HE CONSIDERS OUR SEPARATE LINES IN OTHER AFFAIRS.

HE SENT HIS BEST WISHES TO YOU. I SPOKE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS COMING TO THE US, BUT HE WAS VERY VAGUE AND INDEFINITE ABOUT THIS.

TONIGHT NORSTAD IS GIVING A BIG DINNER PARTY WHICH I SHALL FOREGO TO CONSERVE STRENGTH FOR THE NATO MEETING WHICH FORMALLY OPENS TOMORROW MORNING.

FAITHFULLY YOURS,

FOSTER

DULLES



MGG/23

NOTE: READ BY MR. DUNNIGAN (SS) 8:30 P M, 12/15/58 CWO- JSW

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

12/16/58

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

REF ID: A66301

07612

INDICATE: COLLECT CHARGE TO

TOP SECRET

1

SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS TEDUL 7 NIACT

H
Origin

SS
Info

Following is message from the President to the Secretary:


QTE December 16, 1958

Dear Foster:

I have had your two reports and I hasten to assure you that I fully understand your feeling of frustration after your two long conferences yesterday afternoon. It does seem that our friend should cease insisting upon attempting to control the whole world, of course with partners, even before he has gotten France itself in good order.

New Subject.

Dist. Desired (Offices Only)



Thank you for keeping me informed. All the best to yourself.

As ever, DE UNQTE

ACTING



Drafted by: S/S:ph 12/16/58
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Mr. Calhoun

Clearence: Mrs. Ann Whitman
The White House

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-204

TOP SECRET
PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12065, Sec. 1-301 (b)(c)

ANC letter 5/4/82

NLE Date 6/24/82

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By DJH Date 6/24/82

AWF/D-H/S

EISENHOWER LIBRARY

12/16/58

Kennan to Robert Matteson (White House), Dec. 16, 1958. Kennan Papers, Box 31, Mudd Library, Princeton. (Kennan is responding to a series of questions Matteson had posed; I asked him about this at Dulles conference, Jan. 88, but he does not remember what this was about.)

When Kennan was ambassador to the Soviet Union, he sent Washington a "long despatch" arguing that our offense-minded "NATO arrangements" "might be creating in the Soviet leaders' minds the impression that we considered war inevitable--an impression which they, in the light of their own intentions, could only have taken as an indication that we must be expecting at some point to inaugurate it."

"Many people on this side talk and write about our current relations with the Soviet Union as though war were a pre-ordained certainty, and as though all that was now involved was the question of who first attains a sufficient superiority in the atomic weapon and in other weapons of mass destruction to be sure of wreaking fatal damage on the adversary's country while receiving something less than fatal damage to his own. They appear to assume that the moment this point is reached, if it is the Soviet government which has the superiority, it will of course launch its attack. The implication, clear and inescapable, is that we would be fools not to do likewise if the balance were on our side. To these people, these considerations plainly seem so overwhelmingly important that everything else, including all normal political processes and calculations, pales into insignificance. I do not believe that the Soviet leaders have yet quite come to this point, but I would assert that if we continue for a long enough time to give them the impression that this is all that we are thinking about, and if we shape our defense measures in such a way as to confirm that impression, we can bring them to a point where very little else will matter to them, too, and where their thoughts will be as absorbed with this dangerous and sterile competition as are those of many people in this country, including such eminent observers as Henry Kissinger and my friend Joe Alsop."

This was in answer to a question about the "idea that the Soviet image of us which we have created has tended to make them more like that image than they otherwise would have been."

Note: there is some peculiar arrangement about quoting for publication. Kennan does not have to approve, but likes to see--whether before or after publication I do not remember. Call Nancy Breslin at Mudd Library for details.

Handwritten initials/signature

Summary of Conference with the President on December 12, 1958

Those present: Secretary Dulles, Secretary Herter, Mr. Greens, Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster, Major Eisenhower

Item 1 - Statement to be made by the Secretary of State at the White House preceding his departure for Europe to the NATO ministerial meeting;

The President approved this statement with the correction that the last sentence should read, "These are the ends which NATO serves...."

Item 2 - Force levels for NATO:

This matter, which involved considerable discussion, was brought up by the President, partly in connection with the Secretary's statement (Item 1).

The final position taken by the President may be summarized as follows:

(a) The U.S. will meet obligations agreed to in MC 70 (with possible minor exceptions.)

(b) The Secretary of State should point out to our NATO allies that the U.S. is carrying a heavy burden of defense around the world, to include the long-range nuclear deterrent, the naval force, and forward deployments of troops such as a two-division force in Korea. In the light of this, the European nations should begin to assume a greater proportion of the responsibility for the land defense of their own frontiers.

(c) The entire philosophy of NATO may be reviewed later, when the Berlin crisis has passed.

Item 3 - Berlin:

Secretary Dulles, in referring to the message received from Chancellor Adenauer in the morning, stated the position which he planned to take in any talks on Berlin in Paris. Specifically, he feels that our best argument against the USSR is that their action, in repudiating unilaterally a four-power agreement, is illegal. Further, since the Soviet note of November 27 places the West under a form of ultimatum, we should



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E.O. 12055, Sec. 3-204

Authority NSC letter 4-16-81

By DCH at NLE NARS Date 5-7-81

MR 80-182 #1
By DJH Date 5/18/81

*Box 3
State Department September 1958 -
January 1959 (4)*

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, Office of the Staff Secretary Records, 1957-61

SUBJECT SERIES; STATE DEPARTMENT SUBSERIES

postpone negotiations on the subject of Berlin to a time when this situation has been alleviated -- when the status of ultimatum no longer exists.

The President had no objection to this approach. As regards the Adenauer message, he expressed his agreement that the issues of German unification and the Berlin crisis are separate and distinct, and should be dealt with separately.

Item 4 - Canadian - U.S. Defense Committee:

The Secretary reminded the President that this committee will meet in Paris during the NATO meeting, with the Secretary of Defense present.

Item 5 - General De Gaulle:

The Secretary of State advised the President of difficulties which are being encountered in current relations with General De Gaulle.

Item 6 - Oil Imports:

The Secretary of State brought up the subject of oil imports. On January 1, the voluntary restrictions on oil imports, now in effect, will expire. The initial proposal to send this problem to Congress was considered unsound, and might well result in restrictions so severe that talks with Venezuela and Canada might as well be suspended. Governor Herter's recommendation, which was accepted, was that on January 1, 1959, the President should issue a temporary mandatory restriction. This would provide time for the negotiation of further voluntary restrictions, to replace those which will expire.



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12/17/58
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= 8:173

607/ 2554

December 17, 1958

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
December 11, 1958 - 10:30 AM (after NSC)

- Others present: Vice President Nixon
 Secretary Herter
 Secretary Anderson
 Secretary Quarles
 General Taylor
 Mr. Allen Dulles
 Mr. Gordon Gray
 Asst. Secretary Merchant
 Mr. Lay
 General Goodpaster
 Major Eisenhower



The President called this meeting as the result of learning that the contingency plans currently in effect covering a possible closing of the corridors to Berlin are not adequate. He began the meeting by announcing that we are here to consider the attitude that we will take in the face of the current Berlin situation.

Secretary Herter presented the basic State Department position by stating that we have now discovered that our initial position (that the GDR may be considered as agents of the Soviets) no longer applies. This conclusion he has reached because of: (a) the Soviet note of November twenty-seventh, which was received after the formulation of the U.S. position, and (b) the violence of the reaction of Chancellor Adenauer. Thus, since we do not recognize the GDR as agents of the Soviets, if GDR officials attempt to stamp or examine our papers, the question is what do we do?

Mr. Herter went on to explain that the draft message under consideration, which is designed for transmittal to the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, * is to be used as a paper for tabling at an Ambassadorial level talk to our allies in Bonn.

This contingency plan message, and the four-power discussions with relation to it, should not be confused with the four-power discussions which are soon to take place at the Ministerial level during

*State Dept. Telegram Amembassy Bonn NIACT 1236.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, SEC. 2.4 (5)

MR 87-2116-7
BY PLS 4/12/93

the NATO meeting in Paris. This Ministerial level meeting is designed to formulate an official answer to the Soviet note of November twenty-seventh. It had been recommended that this matter be considered in NATO rather than in Bonn because of the rigid attitude of the British Ambassador in Bonn. The decision had emanated from the recommendation of Ambassador Bruce in Bonn.

The President agreed that this message would be all right for discussion purposes with our allies. He then went on to explain some of the difficulties which he visualizes. First of all, the U.S. now finds itself in a different situation from that in which the present agreements were formulated. These agreements came about at a time when all four powers were occupiers, which we no longer are. In the President's view, the U.S. made an error in attempting to control Germany from Berlin, so far behind the Russian lines. But he also recognizes that we now have pledges in the form of two million Germans in West Berlin, and we must stay there for their protection if nothing else. Since the present agreements were formulated, we have recognized West Germany and the Soviets have recognized East Germany. Since we refuse to recognize East Germany, our position with respect to Berlin can best be described as a "can of worms."

The President then referred to a conversation which he had recently with Secretary Dulles. At this time the two had agreed that negotiation with the Chinese Communists and the GDR to leave our prisoners in their hands has not in itself resulted in recognition. The problem is, where do we go from here? We are in a position of using an obsolete agreement with a former occupying power as a basis on which to force our way into Berlin. In conclusion, the President stated that this paper is acceptable to table for discussion purposes with our allies, with recognition of the magnitude of the problem facing us.

* * * * *

The President then turned to another aspect of the problem, to wit, the definition of the term "token force." Mr. Quarles suggested that the key to the "token force" idea is to avoid letting the situation slip to the point that the force must become a major invasion. Our position must be to meet the first indications resolutely.



The President, in general agreement with this idea, questioned whether we shouldn't make it clear to the Russians that we consider this no minor affair. In order to avoid beginning with the white chips and working up to the blue, we should place them on notice that our whole stack is in this play.

* * * * *

Mr. Herter then shifted the conversation to a British paper received the other day (State Department Daily Summary, December 11) in which the focus was thrown on the issue of interference with our rights of access, and the matter of recognition downgraded. On this matter, the President stated that in some of the reports he had seen, Brandt has complicated the issue by taking a softer attitude toward the prospect of a free city (including all zones) than does Adenauer. On this, Mr. Dulles, seconded by Mr. Herter, stated that Brandt has made one statement to that effect but that his position is not quite clear.

* * * * *

The President then gave a review of the actual events that transpired in 1945 with regard to selection of Berlin as a site from which to govern Germany. (He referred to the press conference of December 10.) He stated that he had been in favor of a cantonment type of combined headquarters located at the juncture of the zones. In contrast to this situation, we are now confronted with a group of hostages in the hands of the Soviets.

* * * * *

Mr. Herter then mentioned the problem of timing of a reply to Khrushchev. The French are in no hurry to reply to the Soviet note. Mr. Herter considers that how we approach the USSR on this matter is most important. On this, the President stated that we must give a reply after the Ministerial meeting of NATO. This reply should specify that we stand to guarantee the safety of West Germany.

Here Mr. Herter pointed out that Mr. Merchant is preparing a communique similar to that issued after the Berlin airlift in 1948.

* * * * *

The President now questioned the State Department as to their views on the efficacy of token force. Mr. Merchant's answer to this was that the key issue is a willingness to use limited force to maintain our rights. The attitude of the Germans if we let the GDR officials stamp our papers would be bad. If we accept any signs of jurisdiction by the GDR in the first instance, we have no firm line on which to stand if later provocations follow. He repeated that we must use limited force at the first instance, and that will be the greatest deterrent.

General Taylor proceeded to outline the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to wit, that it is difficult to tell how far we will go ultimately in our use of force. The important thing, in the view of the JCS, is to verify that we have been stopped, not by our own backing down, but by actual use of force on the part of the Soviets. From there we may have to proceed to an airlift as the next step; but this is the least desirable course of action and is regarded as a form of defeat. In short, an attempt on the part of an armed convoy may be regarded as a "reconnaissance in force." Its failure would leave us facing two choices: the use of more force, or the use of an airlift.

* * * * *

The Vice President then posed the question of what Khrushchev is after. Mr. Nixon considers it improbable that Khrushchev is seeking a fight but believes that Khrushchev may be seeking a conference.

On this, Mr. Dulles ventured that Khrushchev is probably looking for a way out at this time. His first motive had been to point up Europe since things in the world had been going rather well for the U.S. (Lebanon and Quemoy).

Mr. Nixon pointed out the parallel between this situation and the Quemoy situation in that the Soviets had stirred up trouble as a

device to lure us into a conference. He then asked if the U.S. is willing at this time to have a conference.

Mr. Herter, still referring to the question of Khrushchev's motives, stated the view that Khrushchev had felt a need to bolster East Germany. Many people were making their escape from East Germany through Berlin. A high percentage of these people comprised intellectuals. Mr. Dulles agreed with Mr. Herter, stating that if a free election were held in East Germany, only 10% would vote Communist.

* * * * *

The President referred back to the joint message to be formulated at Paris as an answer to Khrushchev. In this message, the President feels we should use a tone which establishes that we are not seeking war and that we realize that the USSR is likewise not seeking war. This message should, after establishing our peaceful intentions, proceed to say that, "When you deny us our rights then we must reassess the situation." This message should be sent by the U.S. and our associates should send parallel messages. These messages should be sent soon after the NATO meeting. Once again the President reiterated that the messages should be in a friendly tone. To these thoughts, Mr. Herter added a final view that the theme of the messages should emphasize the regretability of unilateral repudiation of obligation on the part of the USSR.

* * * * *

Mr. Merchant now brought up a new problem: the orders which are currently in effect directing personnel in the field to deal with GDR officials as agents of the USSR. Mr. Merchant feels that this must change. General Taylor agreed, pointing out that the orders are the result of Ambassadorial agreements. Mr. Merchant added they had been in effect since 1954.

This fact came somewhat as a surprise to the President, who stated that he believed he detected a correlation between this fact and the actions of Khrushchev. In the President's view, Khrushchev has



probably been counting on this to be our policy. He directed Mr. Herter to get the message off immediately to the Ambassador at Bonn to initiate Ambassadorial meetings with a view to revision of these instructions.

* * * * *

Mr. Gray now brought up the question of immediate action in the event of interference with convoys. Primarily, the question is one of timing. In the event a convoy is held up, do we pull back and consider the next move or is a limited use of force automatic (The President observed that every convoy in a way is a probe.)



Mr. Gray continued with the thesis that our major problem is how to make the USSR use force first. Obviously, interference with airlift requires the USSR to be the first to use force. Mr. Gray questions whether our policy in this regard has changed. General Taylor specified one point: when a ground convoy is stopped it does not remain at the detention point but departs the scene. In this connection, Mr. Herter pointed up the weakness of railroad traffic, which is that the Communists can blow a bridge and interdict the railroad without the direct use of force. General Taylor again reiterated his former point that he dislikes to retreat to the use of airlift.

* * * * *

Mr. Quarles now brought up the subject of a tack to be used in our approach to the Soviets. He feels that we should emphasize the rights of the two million people of West Berlin rather than the military rights of the occupying powers. To this, the President agreed, specifying that a proper vehicle for emphasizing this point would be the talk which the Secretary of State might make when he leaves the hospital.

* * * * *

In regard to the text of a reply to Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Merchant expressed the view that we must reject the Soviet unilateral action

and propose a talk on the status of all Germany. The President interposed that Khrushchev had refused to consider a talk on all Germany. Mr. Merchant recommended that we not accept this stand of Khrushchev's. As to timing, Mr. Merchant agreed that we should have a draft completed after the NATO Ministerial meeting. However, he pointed out that the British will oppose the principle of use of limited force.

In view of possible difficulties with the British, the President then directed that we get our views in front of the British right now to allow them maximum time for consideration. In particular, if our policy is to be that our tack is to force the East Germans to use force, this point should be established early. However, the President specified that our main task should be to reach Khrushchev, ascertain what he wants, and proceed from there.

* * * * *

As a finale to the meeting, the President illustrated the complexity of these questions by describing a recent meeting he had had with a lady (Queen Frederika). She had urged that he take steps to ease world tensions by making a generous offer to the Soviets, so generous that the Soviets and the world would recognize it as such -- but it must be short of surrender. This, the President stated, would be the trick of the week.



John S. D. Eisenhower
John S. D. Eisenhower

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

12/17/58



CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 9874
Rec'd: DECEMBER 17, 1958
5:33 AM

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FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1273, DECEMBER 17, NOON

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1273 REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 227

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

PARIS FOR SECRETARY

IN NOTE DATED DECEMBER 16 AND DELIVERED BY MESSENGER TO EMBASSY DECEMBER 17 MFA REQUESTS ISSUANCE DIPLOMATIC VISA AND LAISSER-PASSEZ TO FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN COUNCIL MINISTERS A. I. MIKOYAN "WHO IS GOING TO USA IN CAPACITY OF GUEST OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO USA. DEPARTURE IS INTENDED AT BEGINNING OF JANUARY. IT IS PLANNED THAT VISIT WOULD LAST ABOUT TWO WEEKS. MINISTRY WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO EMBASSY FOR AN URGENT ANSWER ON THIS QUESTION."

RECOMMEND FAVORABLE ACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THIS REQUEST. BELIEVE WOULD BE VERY USEFUL FROM MANY POINTS VIEW FOR MIKOYAN TO RECEIVE AT FIRST HAND AUTHORITATIVE EXPOSITION OUR POLICIES FROM HIGHEST OFFICIALS US GOVERNMENT.

THOMPSON

PK

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Authority MR 88-25749
By Alb NLE Date 7/28/89

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12/17/58

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 10030
Rec'd: DECEMBER 17, 1958
8:54 A.M.

34-H

Action
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FROM: MOSCOW

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1274, DECEMBER 17, 2 P.M.

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1274, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 228

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

PARIS FOR SECRETARY

RE MYTEL 1273

MY GUESS IS THAT CHIEF PURPOSE MIKOYAN'S TRIP WILL BE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES OF INCREASING TRADE RELATIONS WITH U. S. AND COROLLARY PURPOSE TO TAKE OUR TEMPERATURE ON BERLIN QUESTION. SIGNIFICANT THAT HE PLANS TRIP BEFORE PARTY CONGRESS. SUGGEST WOULD BE ADVISABLE INFORM AT LEAST BRITISH AND FRENCH PROMPTLY IN ORDER ALLAY ANY SUSPICIONS THEY MAY HAVE. IF THIS DONE WOULD APPRECIATE AUTHORIZATION INFORM MY FRENCH AND BRITISH COLLEAGUES HERE. SUGGEST MIGHT BE USEFUL REFER TO INVITATION CONTAINED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KHRUSHCHEV OF FEBRUARY 15 THAT INFLUENTIAL SOVIETS VISIT U. S.

THOMPSON

LJ 21

DECLASSIFIED
Auth: MR 88-257 #10
By: JLS 7/28/89

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AMEMBASSY PARIS TOSEC 30 PRIORITY

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LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Re EMBTEL 1273. NBC has report from "reliable source abroad" Mikoyan has applied for US visa "to visit Nixon". In response request confirmation, Dept press officer has denied knowledge such visit.

[Handwritten Signature]

Acting

(FDK)

HERTED

Dist. Desired (Offices Only)

Drafted by:

EUR:FDKohler:bsm

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

EUR - Foy Kohler

Clearances:

1/P - Mr. White

S/Sr. Calhoun

P - Mr. Kretz

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Authority <i>ML 88-25748</i>
By <i>JW</i> NLE Date <i>7/28/89</i>

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12/17/58

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AMEMBASSY PARIS TOSEC 29 PRIORITY

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RPTD INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Re Moscow 1273, 1274 RPTD INFO Amembassy Paris 227,228

Dept concurs your recommendation and Embassy authorized issue Mikoyan diplomatic B-2 visa in accordance order cited below if Secretary sees no objection. Paris requested advise Moscow. In issuing visa Moscow should request dates of visit. Port and date arrival needed prior to entry. US does not issue Laissez-Passer but Embassy authorized inform Ministry appropriate courtesies will be accorded.

Secretary or Merchant may wish inform UK, French and possibly others of visit at meeting tomorrow. Would agree usefulness mention President's letter, ^{to Bulgaria} Feb 17. If this inconvenient, Dept will notify UK and French here and inform Moscow in order that Ambassador may inform British and French colleagues. Paris requested advise Moscow and Dept. Visas Four Mikoyan (28). Order December 17. Requirement

Dist. Desired
(Offices Only)

Drafted by

EUR:EE:NDavis 12/17

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

EUR - Fay Kohler

Clearances

RA - Mr. Lehman (substance)

U/PR - Mr. Spruks (substance)

VO - Mr. Auerbach H - Mr. [unclear]

G - Mr. Murphy (draft U-Acting Secretary)

Mr. Kretzmann (draft) UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED.

W - Mr. Dillon (draft)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MIL 88-257#7
By [Signature] NLE Date 7/28/89

CONFIDENTIAL
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2

Note 2, 22CFR 41.150 waived. In other words notation on visa of waiver of excluding provision not rpt not required.

FYI Amb Thompson: (1) You may wish let it be known informally to Mikoyan/ Secretary not expected return regular schedule in Dept until about January 7. (2) As soon as dates confirmed, we would consult Ambassador Menshikov with view arranging appropriate meetings. (3) Dept had planned request you return January for consultation. Would appreciate your views in relation prospective Mikoyan visit. (4) Any further info available on Mikoyan purpose would be welcome. END FYI.

[Handwritten Signature]
Acting

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

(2/20/58)

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

53-M

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

Control: 12378

Action

Rec'd: DECEMBER 20, 1958

EUR

4:20 PM

3

Info
RMR

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2305, DECEMBER 20, 2 PM

G

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C

SAE

SENT DEPARTMENT 2305 REPEATED INFORMATION BONN 214, LONDON 498

DEPT PASS DEFENSE

EYES ONLY: FOR AMBASSADORS

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

NOFORN FROM THURSTON



EARLIER THIS YEAR SACEUR MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH GERMAN MILITARY AUTHORITIES FOR TRAINING OF A GERMAN FIGHTER-BOMBER UNIT IN ORDER THAT IT MIGHT HAVE A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEARBY STORAGE FACILITIES WITHIN FRAMEWORK NATO ATOMIC STOCKPILE SCHEME. THIS PROJECT KNOWN AS "WAGON TRAIN" WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED SOME WEEKS AGO.

ON OCCASION GENERAL NORSTAD'S CALL ON GERMAN FORMIN BRENTANO AND MOD STRAUSS DECEMBER 15 (BLANKENHORN ALSO PRESENT), STRAUSS REFERRED TO FOREGOING ARRANGEMENTS AND ASKED THAT APPROPRIATE WEAPONS NOW BE INTRODUCED FOR SUPPORT THIS GERMAN UNIT. NORSTAD REPLIED THAT WEAPONS COULD BE EARMARKED BUT NOT COMMITTED AND THAT NO GUARANTIES COULD BE GIVEN THAT SPECIFIC QUANTITIES WOULD BE CONTINUALLY AVAILABLE FOR GIVEN UNIT. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT HIS PLANNING IN THIS MATTER HAD TO BE FLEXIBLE IN LIGHT OVER-ALL PRIORITIES AND REQUIREMENTS. SACEUR CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD TAKE STRAUSS REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION.

SACEUR DISPOSED MOVE AHEAD IN THIS MATTER BUT WOULD

APPRECIATE

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~~TOP SECRET~~ PORTIONS EXEMPTED

Classification No. 12356; SEC. 1.3 (a) (2) (3)

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Authority: MRC 81-4#5
LIP NLE Date 4/5/84

State letter 4/22/81


BWF 10/4/81
[Handwritten initials]

NLE DATE 4/5/84

TOP SECRET

-2- 2305, DECEMBER 20, 2 PM, FROM PARIS

APPRECIATE INDICATION DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS (MERCHANT AND
BRUCE ALREADY INFORMED ORALLY OF SUBSTANCE FOREGOING
DURING RECENT NATO MEETING).



HOUGHTON

JAC/21



TOP SECRET

12/22/58

484

mb22(58(1))

EUR

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

DEC 22 PM 3 06

10686

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7

52 SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 2257
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Origin Amembassy LONDON 5839
SS
Info: PARIS FOR THURSTON AND USRO

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS
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NOFORN FOR THURSTON

Reference Paris tel 2305, G-514, sent Bonn G-326.

SACEUR proposal under reference discussed on Jamaica-bound aircraft with Secy who stated he saw no objection on political grounds to SACEUR's proceeding in this matter in accordance his own/military judgment subject to prior notification to Adenauer by Bruce. In event Adenauer raised objection however the Secy would wish to reconsider before proceeding with introduction weapons.

Our aim is to secure soonest German acquiescence in establishment of NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany along with Section 114 b information agreement necessary for achievement ~~atomic~~ ^{German} atomic capability. Would appreciate soonest therefore Bruce's reply to G-326/(sent December 19) in order that, if propitious, early approach could be made by Bruce to Adenauer in coordination with SACEUR as envisaged by Secretary.

ACTING

HERTF

Drafted by: EUR:LFMerchant:mt
12/22/58 RA:MJTibbetts

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Livingston T. Merchant
S/S - Mr. McElhiney

Clearances:
GER Mr. Vigderman
RA Mr. Timmons
S/AE Mr. Courtney

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Authority MR 81-4 #4
By SLS
NIE Date 4/5/84
Dis. Desired
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484

12/22/58
EUR (2)

DEC 22 PM 8 06

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

10686

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7

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RPTD INFO: Amembassy BONN 1314
SS Amembassy LONDON 5839

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ACTING

HERTEP

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Authority MR 81-4 #4
By [Signature]
NLE Date 4/5/84
(Office Only)

Drafted by: EUR:LTMerchant:mt
12/22/58 RA:MTTibbetta
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Livingston T. Merchant

Clearances: GER Mr. Vigderman - Mr. Murphy
RA Mr. Timmons
S/AE Mr. Courtney
S/S - Mr. McElhiney

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12/23/58
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Department of State

W.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1

Action

Classification

Control: 13340

SS

Rec'd: DECEMBER 23, 1958
8:38 A.M.

Info

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1336, DECEMBER 23, 1 PM.

PRIORITY.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1336, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 412,
LONDON 290.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.

NOFORN FOR SACEUR AND THURSTON.

DEPTEL 1314 AND AIRGRAM G-326.

I AM READY TO PROCEED AS SOON AS FINALLY INSTRUCTED TO CONVERSATIONS
WITH ADENAUER THESE SUBJECTS. SINCE I SHALL BE IN BERLIN FROM
DECEMBER 27 TO JANUARY 1 AND WOULD LIKE TO BE ABSENT FROM POST
ON LEAVE FROM JANUARY 4 TO 11 I WOULD SUGGEST I SEE CHANCELLOR
ON JANUARY 2 OR 3. WOULD IT NOT BE WELL, IF POSSIBLE, TO HAVE
MINISTER STRAUSS PRESENT?

BRUCE

DHP



DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 81-4#3

By LKS NLE Date 4/5/84

EYES ONLY

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Trans. by [unclear] 12/26/58

12/24/58

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: NATO Atomic Stockpile in Germany

General Norstad is anxious to proceed with the provision of an atomic capability for German NATO forces under his command. The German forces have atomic-capable fighter-bomber aircraft and are scheduled to acquire other atomic-capable weapons (such as NIKES and Matadors). It remains to ensure that atomic bombs and warheads can be made available to German forces in case of need under the same arrangements as are being worked out, or are in prospect, for the forces of other NATO countries.

In all cases, the actual atomic weapons would remain in U.S. custody and control.

Defense Minister Strauss approached General Norstad during the recent NATO Ministerial meeting and indicated that the German Government wishes the NATO stockpile program extended to cover German forces, starting with a German fighter-bomber unit. This matter was discussed with the Secretary on the return trip from Paris, who stated he saw no objection on political grounds to SACEUR's proceeding with this matter in accordance with the latter's own military judgment, subject to prior notification to Chancellor Adenauer by Ambassador Bruce.

We have carefully weighed this matter and consider it desirable for Ambassador Bruce to discuss the matter with the Chancellor as soon as possible. The development of an atomic capability by German forces, as well as by other NATO forces, is

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Agency Case NSC 67-1004
NLE Case 87-308 H. 2
By *bc* NLE Date 3/21/89

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AWF / D-11 / 8 also 1989/1474

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- 2 -

is essential if NATO defenses are to keep pace with the offensive capabilities of the Soviets, and will be an indication of the West's firmness and resolve, particularly with respect to the Berlin situation. We recognize that when this matter becomes public, the Soviets will intensify their propaganda against the "atomic rearmament" of Germany. There may also be criticism from certain political circles in Germany who are in opposition to Chancellor Adenauer. We think, however, that the gain to Germany and to NATO will outweigh any disadvantages from such propaganda or criticism.

Enclosed herewith for your approval is a proposed State-Defense message to Ambassador Bruce which will authorize him to proceed with discussions with the Chancellor. The Department of Defense has concurred in this message.

Robert Murphy
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested message.



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12-23/58

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Department of State

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33

Classification

Control: 13952
Rec'd: DECEMBER 24, 1958

Action

EUR

Info

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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1343, DECEMBER 23, 7 PM

mk

13952
DECEMBER 24, 1958
5:41 AM
Office of European Affairs
MESSAGE CENTER
12/24/58
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
12/24/58
PM 12 20

B1
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A5

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS KINGSTON AS BONN'S 1.

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY

FOL IS TRANSLATION OF LETTER AND ENCLOSURE CHANCELLOR REQUESTED BE SENT SECRETARY URGENTLY.

BEGIN VERBATIM TEXT

DEAR FRIEND:

FIRST OF ALL I AM MOST EAGER TO THANK YOU HEARTILY FOR YOUR EXCELLENT BEARING IN PARIS. I BELIEVE I NEED NOT ASSURE YOU HOW WARMLY GRATEFUL WE ALL AND IN PARTICULAR I MYSELF ARE TO YOU.

TO YOU AND MRS. DULLES I WISH A FINE CHRISTMAS AND I HOPE THAT THE STAY IN JAMAICA WILL BRING YOU COMPLETE RECOVERY. MY VERY BEST WISHES ACCOMPANY YOU FOR THE YEAR 1959. I COULD IMAGINE THAT YOURS IS NOT ALWAYS AN EASY TASK IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS. IT SEEMS TO ME, HOWEVER, THAT SEN. HUMPHREY HAS HEARD AND HAS SEEN THINGS IN MOSCOW WHICH WERE NEW TO HIM.

YOU WILL SEE MIKOYAN. YOU KNOW, OF COURSE, HIS BACKGROUND AND YOU ALSO HAVE HEARD ABOUT HIS INTELLIGENCE. I WROTE TO YOU AT THE TIME ABOUT THE CONVERSATION WHICH I HAD WITH HIM HERE IN BONN. PERHAPS AN EXTRACT FROM THE MEMORANDUM OF THAT CONVERSATION MIGHT BE IMPORTANT TO YOU. I ATTACH IT FOR YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS TO MRS. DULLES AND YOURSELF I AM, AS ALWAYS

YOURS

(SIGNED) ADENAUER

NOTE: PASSED KINGSTON 12/24/58 (ENCLOSURE: [redacted])

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NND 921092

FORWARDED TO ()

Correction made by RM/R

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58
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INCOMING
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CORRECTION ISSUED
12/27/58 4:30 PM

1/16/59
OFFICE
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CONTROL: 13952

RMR

-2- 1343, DECEMBER 23, 7 PM, FROM BONN - CORRECTED PAGE 2

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(ENCLOSURE: EXTRACT FROM THE PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE CONVERSATION OF THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WITH MIKOYAN FIRST DEPUTY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR ON 26 APRIL 1958)

MIKOYAN REPEATEDLY RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF EQUIPPING THE BUNDESWEHR WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A FATEFUL DECISION AND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE IT REVERSED. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED, IN THE EVENT THAT WE DO NOT PROCEED WITH NUCLEAR REARMAMENT, TO GIVE US CONTRACTUAL ASSURANCE THAT IN THE CASE OF A NUCLEAR WAR THE FEDREP WOULD NOT BECOME THE TARGET FOR ATOMIC ATTACKS. MIKOYAN DESCRIBED THE EFFECTS OF AN ATOMIC WAR WHICH THE SOV UNION HAD TESTED ON TOWNS WHICH WERE SPECIALLY BUILT FOR THIS PURPOSE, AND WHICH WERE FRIGHTFUL. HE TRIED, THROUGH ALL KINDS OF DESCRIPTIONS, TO INDUCE THE CHANCELLOR TO DESIST FROM EQUIPPING THE BUNDESWEHR WITH NUCLEAR ARMS.

THE CHANCELLOR REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: SUCH A DECLARATION BY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE USELESS. IF A GLOBAL WAR WERE ACTUALLY TO BREAK OUT, ALL SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD HAVE NO SIGNIFICANCE. ATOMIC WAR MUST BE AVOIDED UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS, HOWEVER, WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY THROUGH CONTROLLED DISARMAMENT, BOTH AS REGARDS NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. THE MOMENT APPEARS FAVORABLE FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THERE EXISTS AT PRESENT A CERTAIN BALANCE IN ARMAMENTS. ALL NATIONS ARE CONVINCED OF THE NECESSITY OF AVOIDING AN ATOMIC WAR. NO ONE COULD BE THE WINNER IN SUCH A WAR. ONE SHOULD THEREFORE RESOLUTELY INITIATE A SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO SEE WHETHER AND HOW ONE MIGHT ACHIEVE SUCH DISARMAMENT. SUCH CONFERENCE MIGHT LAST QUITE SOME TIME, PERHAPS YEARS, NOT THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE FORM THAT THE HIGHEST REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATES WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSTANTLY IN SESSION. THEIR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE INTERRUPTED BY NEGOTIATIONS AMONG GROUPS OF EXPERTS ON A GREAT VARIETY OF SUBJECTS.

THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR EMPHASIZED THAT THE MAIN THING WAS THAT ALL SHOULD EARNESTLY DESIRE DISARMAMENT. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE WEST WAS FIRMLY RESOLVED TO HAVE SUCH A CONFERENCE. THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA SHOULD BE "CONTROLLED DISARMAMENT AND RELAXATION OF TENSION". ONE SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO PLACE AT THE OUTSET TOO MANY ITEMS ON THE AGENDA. MUCH WOULD DEVELOP ONLY IN THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE AND THE DISCUSSIONS. ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS TO START WITH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

MIKOYAN REPLIED

AA1/23

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

NND 921092

58
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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

CORRECTION ISSUED

~~12/27/58, 4:30 PM~~

1/16/59

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OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

CONTROL: 13952

RMR

-2- 1343, DECEMBER 23, 7 PM, FROM BONN - CORRECTED PAGE 2

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H

(ENCLOSURE: EXTRACT FROM THE PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE CONVERSATION OF THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WITH MIKOYAN FIRST DEPUTY TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR ON 26 APRIL 1958)

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MIKOYAN REPLIED

AAI/23

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CONFIDENTIAL FILE

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-3- 1343, DECEMBER 23, 7 PM, FROM BONN

MIKOYAN REPLIED THAT SOVIET RUSSIA ALSO DESIRES A CONTROLLED DISARMAMENT WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. THE SOV GOVT, HOWEVER, WAS NOT CONVINCED THAT THE US DESIRES THE SAME THING. THE SOV GOVT BELIEVES THAT PRES. EISENHOWER MIGHT BE AGREEABLE BUT NOT MR. DULLES. IN ALL HIS STATEMENTS, THERE BECAME APPARENT MIKOYAN'S GREAT DISTRUST WITH REGARD TO MR. DULLES. HE ASSERTED AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE AMERICANS WANTED TO RULE THE WORLD AND THAT THEY WERE NOT AT ALL WILLING TO HAVE DISARMAMENT BECAUSE THEIR ECONOMY WOULD SUFFER TOO HEAVILY.

THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR STATED THAT HE WAS A FRIEND OF MR. DULLES. MR. DULLES HAD A SPECIAL WAY OF NEGOTIATING WHICH PERHAPS WAS NOT TO EVERYONE'S LIKING. MR. DULLES, HOWEVER, IS A VERY SERIOUS AND VERY TRUSTWORTHY NEGOTIATOR WHO ALWAYS ABIDES BY WHAT HE SAYS. HE (THE CHANCELLOR) HAS THE GREATEST CONFIDENCE IN MR. DULLES AND HE ASKED HIM (MIKOYAN) TO PUT THE SAME GREAT TRUST IN MR. DULLES. MR. DULLES CERTAINLY WANTS PEACE AND CONTROLLED DISARMAMENT.

DURING THE FOL DISCUSSIONS THERE WERE REPEATED REMARKS CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE OF MR. DULLES AND THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AGAIN EMPHASIZED WHAT HE HAD SAID PREVIOUSLY. MIKOYAN FINALLY STATED THAT THE SOV UNION ALSO WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH MR. DULLES.

END VERBATIM TEXT.

BRUCE

AM

(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

NOTE: NOT PASSED KINGSTON PER MR. CASSILLY SS-DO 12/24 (AM)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

12/30/58

DEC 30 1958



MEMORANDUM FOR ERIG. GEN. A.J. GOODPASTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Transmitting Text of United States Reply
to Soviet Note of November 27

I am forwarding herewith a copy of a telegram just received from our NATO delegation in Paris containing the clean text of our reply to the Soviet note of November 27 as it will be delivered in Moscow tomorrow at 3:00 P.M. Moscow time (7:00 A.M. Washington time). The agreed release time is 10:00 A.M. Washington time (3:00 P.M. London time and 4:00 P.M. Paris time). The text of the replies which the British and French will deliver are not identical, but the three notes do not differ from each other in any major substantive respect. Their key paragraphs have been particularly coordinated.

The attached United States text, allowing for minor changes in wording and certain rearrangements, is substantially the same as that seen by the President.

Due to internal procedural requirements, the reply of the Federal Republic will not be delivered in Moscow until January 3. It was decided, however, that the other three countries would go ahead as originally planned to make delivery on December 31.

ROBERT H. MILLER
for John A. Calhoun
Director
Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

POLTO Telegram 1829,
December 30, 1958.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 88-257#12
By JWS 7/28/89
NLE Date

To Mr. Tolson for handling

[Handwritten signature]

12/31/58

December 31, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On December 29, 1958, the President (at Gettysburg) examined the SecDef document, [REDACTED]

dated December 12, 1958. This document was drawn up in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Presidential Letter of May 22, 1957, [REDACTED]

This implementation paper was originated by DOD; coordinated with State, and discussed extensively prior to this perusal.



In the course of his examination of the paper, the President:

- a. Took note of a suggested change in paragraph 5 (d) on page 8 as follows:


[REDACTED]

The President stated he felt that this change is all right.

[REDACTED]

*OS 0250/MSJ
WAT/SK / Sub Alpan / 14 / In handwriting
to Commander (4)*

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Agency Case	DSD 88-MDR-298A
NLE Case	89-16 #8
By	<i>[Signature]</i>
NLE Date	12/27/90



The President then telephoned Secretary Quarles (about 1245 hours) and, (1) expressed the view to him (in general terms) that these changes in the implementing letter should be made, and (2) requested that Mr. Quarles [redacted] On this call, the President expressed the view that [redacted]



John S D Eisenhower

John S. D. Eisenhower

x Para d. above.

Comments on Instructions for [redacted]

- 1. Page 8, paragraph 5.d. Recommend rewrite as follows:

[redacted]

REASON: To tighten up this paragraph and reduce possibility of misunderstanding.



- 2. Page 12, paragraph 6.g. Recommend addition of the following:

[redacted]

REASON: To ensure that the degree of secrecy of the document is understood.

- 3. Page 18, paragraph 4.a(1) [redacted]

[redacted]


- 4. Page 19, paragraph 5.a. [redacted]

[redacted]


OSM/NSC/
WHD/SS/sub Alpha/14 / per members of
Committee (4)

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Agency Case ODD 88-MDR-2989
NLE Case 89-16 #10
By 240 NLE Date 12/27/90

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5. General comment.



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