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7/2/57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

Personal and Private
SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH ADMIRAL RADFORD
4:30 p.m., Tuesday, July 2, 1957

Admiral Radford said he wished to speak to me about our letter of April 27 which related to his prospective talk with General Ely. He said that in general he thought it was better for him to listen to what Ely had to say, to explain the legal limitation under which we were operating, but that we did believe we could approximate some of the things which the NATO wanted in terms of atomic weapons. Radford indicated, however, he felt NATO was going ~~much~~ too far in terms of modern weapons and it was getting too expensive.

I went over with Admiral Radford the draft of my letter to Secretary Wilson of July 2 regarding an atomic NATO stockpile, and Admiral Radford said he saw no objection to this, and his suggestion was along the lines which they themselves were thinking.



TWBU:SL

- Cc: U - Mr. Herter
- G - Mr. Murphy
- EUR- Mr. Elbrick
- C - Mr. Reinhardt

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 11/18/85-578-6
By SL NLE Date 9/17/85

S:JFDilles:cjp

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Dille, P / Gen Curran / Memos of Conv. - Gen - A-Plan R(A)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY



MEMORANDUM

Recd
7/4/57

7-9-57 file

To: The Secretary
Through: S/S
From: EUR - C. Burke Elbrick *CB*
Subject: Attached memorandum concerning the NATO Atomic Stockpile to be used in conversation with M. Joxe, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office.

Background:

The attached memorandum outlining a suggested position concerning the NATO atomic stockpile was furnished to the addressees on an urgent basis in view of the fact that M. Joxe's appointments with officials of the Department began at 11 a.m. on July 8. The position outlined is in conformity with your letter of June 27, 1957 to Admiral Radford, suggesting the position which he might wish to take in his discussions with General Ely on the question of a NATO atomic stockpile. I understand that M. Joxe did, in fact, raise the question with Mr. Murphy in his discussion with the latter on the morning of July 8.

He raised the subject in the course of conversation with me yesterday and I replied along the lines of the attached memorandum.

Attachment.

Clearance:

RA - B.E.L. Timmons

EUR:RA:MJTibbets:adm
7/9/57

RM/R
Anal
Rev
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740.5611/7-9-57
(Rec'd)

M E M O R A N D U M

July 6, 1957

To: U - The Under Secretary
G - Mr. Murphy
W - Mr. Dillon
O - Mr. Henderson
C - Mr. Reinhardt
S/P - Mr. Bowie

A true copy
of the signed
original.

Through: S/S

From: EUR - John Wesley Jones

Subject: Forthcoming Talks with M. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of
the French Foreign Office: NATO Atomic Stockpile.

Background:

During the course of his visit to Washington July 8-10 M. Joxe may raise for discussion with one or more of the Department's senior officials the question of a "NATO integrated atomic stockpile". This matter was raised by Foreign Minister Pineau at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Bonn in May. The Secretary replied that the idea was an interesting one and would receive the most serious study by the U.S. Government. Subsequently, at the June 12 meeting of the North Atlantic Permanent Council, the United States Representative stated that the idea was being examined by the U.S. Government and that a report would be made to the NAC when our study had been completed.

General Ely, Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, indicated that he wished to discuss the question of "integrated Depots for atomic weapons" in Europe with Admiral Radford during the talks they are to have in Paris next week. The position outlined below is in conformity with the line which the Secretary, in a letter dated June 27, 1957, suggested that Admiral Radford take in the talks with General Ely. It is recommended that you reply to M. Joxe along these lines, if he should raise the question of a NATO atomic stockpile with you.

Suggested Position Concerning NATO Atomic Stockpile:

The United States Government is giving its active and close attention to the question of a NATO atomic stockpile. Studies are proceeding in

both

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both the Departments of State and Defense. It will be appreciated that this is a problem of considerable complexity, particularly in view of the United States law which necessitates U.S. custody of U.S. atomic weapons. The United States is well aware of the importance which our NATO allies attach to this issue and shares their view that the proposal deserves thorough consideration.

FYI

Without going beyond the position outlined above, it is hoped that M. Joxe will receive the impression that the U.S. is in earnest in its consideration of this matter, that we are moving as rapidly as possible, and that our approach to the idea is essentially a positive one.

The essence of the arrangement now being studied by the Departments of State and Defense is to retain U.S. custody of all U.S. nuclear components which would be stocked for use in the event of emergency by the forces of our NATO allies, but to stress that such stocking arrangements are in implementation of NATO strategy and in conformity with the plans of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Thus, we hope to give the arrangements a strong NATO "flavor" while retaining the essential custody and control required by U.S. legislation. In view of the fact that these arrangements are still under consideration inside the U.S. Government, it is not believed desirable at this time to indicate to M. Joxe the specific lines along which our thinking is proceeding, or to make any effort to elicit from him any suggestions the French Government may have regarding a "NATO stockpile". If, however, he should disclose any details of French thinking on this subject, our people in EUR working on the question will be much interested.

Clearances:

S/AE - Mr. Smith
WE - Mr. Tyler

EUR:RA:MJTibbetts:BELTimmons:mck
7/6/57

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Therefore, we have had to come to the conclusion that, as far as existing fissionable materials is concerned, we cannot safely ourselves deny its use for weapons purposes because we cannot get any assurance that others will do the same. Therefore, we predicate our proposals on the assumption that there will continue to be the use of fissionable material for weapons purposes at least to the extent that that has occurred up to the cut-off date that we propose.

Now, if that is to be the case, we do not ourselves want to be in a position where our allies are wholly dependent upon us. We don't think that is a healthy relationship. Therefore we are studying ways whereby, through perhaps a NATO stockpile of weapons and various arrangements of that sort, there can be assurances to our allies that if they are attacked, if war comes, that they will not then be in the position of suppliants, as far as we are concerned, for the use of atomic weapons. Now, that may or may not require some amendment of the Act. Quite possibly it would. But we do not think that we are far enough along in that path to make it worthwhile to come to any definitive program of that sort. So far the Soviet Union seems to be unwilling to accept the idea of a fissionable cut-off at all, and of course if they don't accept it, then the problem becomes academic. And also, if they are going to accept the fissionable cut-off, we don't know at all what the date would be.

A lot of things have to happen before that date comes, because there have to be large installations of supervisory machinery and so forth. So, you see we don't know today either whether the Soviets accept the concept or what might be a possible date. Until we know those two things with greater certainty, it

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is not practical or desirable for us to work out any concrete program.

Q. Does that apply, Sir, only to the NATO allies, that possibility, or would it apply in any other quarter of the globe?

A. Well, so far we have only thought about it in connection with the NATO allies. Conceivably it might apply elsewhere, but so far we have only thought about it in that connection.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said last spring that you hoped to see a wholly new development within the North Atlantic community of consultation, not only about political matters within the community but outside. If this question of providing atomic weapons for NATO were to go through, would that not involve a much greater degree of consultation than has existed to date?

A. I think it would be an act of confidence which would strengthen the fellowship of the North Atlantic community. You may recall this proposal was made by the French at the Bonn meeting of the NATO Council and it has received very active consideration ever since then. We have the problem that has been alluded to of our legislation, and we have that same problem in relation to the matter of establishing intermediate missiles in the United Kingdom. There are certain things that can be done within the confines of the present legislation; other things that will require a change in that legislation. Those are highly technical problems that are being studied by the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission, and we hope that there will be some conclusions on that aspect of the matter within the next few weeks perhaps. But so far there is no definite conclusion.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, with an alternative to creating a stockpile of atomic weapons for NATO, would an alternative be to provide atomic weapons to some of the principal NATO partners which were interested in having them, such as Britain and France?

A. I think that it would be more appropriate to deal with this matter, if possible, as a NATO matter which would not involve drawing lines of distinction as between different allies. That becomes an invidious process.

Q. Mr. Secretary, who would own this NATO stockpile of atomic weapons?

A. Well, that is one of the problems that we have to consider, whether the ownership would technically be in the United States or not. Now, SACEUR wears in a sense two hats. He is the United States representative and he also is a representative of the NATO powers. Conceivably he might have those under his control in his capacity as an American General. And, of course, it's accepted that in time of war the President would have authority to turn such weapons over to our allies and that the present provisions of law would at that time give way to the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. We are operating on that assumption now, in the training of our allies to handle atomic weapons, in the provision of equipment which is capable of handling atomic weapons, i.e., appropriate planes, weapons and so forth. So we are proceeding on the assumption that if there is a war, atomic weapons will be useable at least, and may be useable by our allies.

Q. Do you assume, Sir, that if there is such a NATO nuclear stockpile there would automatically be a Warsaw Pact stockpile?

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A. I don't think that the Soviets have the same degree of confidence in their satellites that we have in our allies.

Pulles

BHJ

= PULLES

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INCOMING TELEGRAM ⁶⁷ Department of State

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7/18/57

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FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State

SS
G

NO: 346, JULY 18, 3 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 346, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 40.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

DEFENSE MINISTER TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT HE WAS TREMENDOUSLY PLEASED AND ENCOURAGED BY PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY'S FAVORABLE REFERENCES TO PROPOSED NATO STOCKPILE.

HE SAID THAT IT IS HIS VIEW, WHICH IS WIDELY SUPPORTED BY FRENCH POLITICAL OPINION AS EURATOM DEBATE HAD SHOWN, THAT FRANCE CAN NO LONGER REMAIN WITHOUT AN ATOMIC CAPABILITY. UNITED KINGDOM NOW (RPT NOW) HAS THAT CAPABILITY AND FRANCE, WHICH IS FRONT LINE OF WESTERN DEFENSE, MUST HAVE IT ALSO. HOWEVER, FRENCH ATOMIC PROGRAM STARTED LATE AND MOVED SLOWLY AND IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE TO CATCH UP.

IF FRANCE COULD HAVE AVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCIES ATOMIC WEAPONS SUPPLIED BY ITS ALLIES, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH NATO, WHICH COULD BE USED AT ONCE IN CASE OF SOVIET AGGRESSION, AND IF FRENCH FORCES COULD IN MEANTIME BE TRAINED IN USE OF THOSE WEAPONS, PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED. MINISTER WAS THEREFORE DEEPLY IMPRESSED AND PLEASED BY OUR STATEMENTS, THOUGH HE REALIZED UNITED STATES CONGRESS IS YET TO BE HEARD FROM.

HOUGHTON

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
S/AE

JUL 18 1957

JS

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8/1/57

August 2, 1957

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 333rd Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, August 1, 1957

Present at the 333rd Council meeting were the President of the United States; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Attorney General (participating in Items 2, 3, 4 and 5); Mr. Frederick Mueller for the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in Items 2, 3, 4 and 5); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5); the Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Assistant Secretary of State Bowle; Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague; Mr. William M. Holaday, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Ralph Spear, Federal Civil Defense Administration; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Cutler and Dearborn; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Director, NSC Secretariat.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. DEFINITION OF THE TERM "MOBILIZATION BASE"
(NSC Action No. 1522-h; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: "Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base", dated March 1, 1957; NSC 5707/8; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Definition of the Term 'Mobilization Base'", dated July 24 and 26, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this project (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting). He added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the Planning Board recommendation, and called on the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for comment.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC FRG-411
NLE Case	78-148-118
By	JW
NLE Date	11/7/91

DWA/NSC/9

Mr. Gray said that the proposed Planning Board definition was satisfactory to ODM.

Mr. Brundage felt that the illustrations in the second paragraph of the definition were restrictive and subject to change from year to year. Since U. S. policy with respect to the mobilization base was already set forth in the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5707/8), he felt it was unnecessary to add illustrative material to the definition.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the proposed definition contained a new element which had never before appeared in a definition of the mobilization base--namely, the services required for survival activities. He said this element appeared in the illustrative material in the second paragraph of the definition. Mr. Brundage said that some other new element might be thought of next year.

The President said perhaps we will think of something new next year. He felt the concept of survival must be an essential part of the definition of the mobilization base. He pointed out that global war could be divided into two stages: first, survival of the initial blows, and second, going on to win the war.


Mr. Cutler asked whether Budget would object if the illustrative material were placed in a footnote. The President said the illustrations in the second paragraph of the proposed definition were valuable. The elements affecting the state of readiness of essential military, civilian and survival activities must include everything. It seemed to the President that the Planning Board's proposed definition was satisfactory as it was.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the proposed definition of the term "mobilization base" prepared by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1522-h and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 24, 1957, and the proposed revision of that definition prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 26, 1957; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.
- b. Adopted the revision of the definition prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 26, 1957.

NOTE: The definition referred to in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all interested departments and agencies.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY




Mr. Dulles pointed out that the hostilities in Muscat and Oman had more importance than any very, very small war had had for some time.

The importance of this conflict lay in the fact that it might spread throughout the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms. The British feel their prestige is involved and are very much disturbed. If the conflict spreads, it would involve areas with vital oil resources. Mr. Dulles noted parenthetically that no oil had yet been discovered in Oman.

Secretary Herter said he was glad Mr. Dulles had explained the relation between Saudi Arabia and the conflict in Oman. The State Department had been informed that Saudi Arabian arms were not being used in this conflict.

Mr. Dulles then said that the elections in Central and East Java had resulted in a substantial increase in Communist strength. These elections were for municipal offices and did not directly affect the Central or Provincial Governments. Mr. Dulles displayed a chart showing the election returns in detail. He felt that the Communists had gained because Sukarno, father of the Nationalist Party, had withdrawn his support from that party, and that the Moslem parties had also lost strength.

Secretary Herter asked whether Sukarno had gone beyond the point of no return. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative, saying that Sukarno had been impressed by his trip to Moscow, had concluded that the party system did not work, and would henceforth play the Communist game.



The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World (NIE 100-4-57); Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries (NIE 100-6-57); and the situations in Guatemala, Argentina, Muscat and Oman, Syria, and Indonesia.

3. U. S. POLICY ON INDONESIA
(NSC 5518; NSC Action No. 1681-b)

Mr. Cutler read paragraph 12 of NSC 5518, as follows:

"Employ all feasible [.....] overt means, including, in accordance with constitutional processes, [.....] to prevent Indonesia or vital parts thereof from falling under Communist control by overt armed attack, subversion, economic domination, or other means; concerting action with other nations as appropriate."

and NSC Action No. 1681-b, as follows:

"b. Noted the President's statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should arrange consultation with CINCPAC to ensure that there is a mutual understanding of the current situation in Indonesia, which does not at this time appear to require military action (other than continued planning) to implement paragraph 12 of NSC 5518."

Mr. Cutler asked whether, in the light of the briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on Indonesia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be asked to study the military consequences of Java falling under Communist control. The President said he would like to have the views of the Department of State also.

Secretary Herter said he was disturbed by the developments in Indonesia. It appeared to him that a democratic government in that country was out the window,

..... He felt it would be useful to have a JCS estimate of the importance of maintaining Java in the Free World. He would also like to know the probable consequences of a division between Java and Sumatra. Such an estimate would be very helpful in enabling us to decide how much effort to devote to Indonesia in the future.

Admiral Radford said

..... If the Joint Chiefs were asked for their opinion now, they would probably say that the establishment of a Communist government would be militarily harmful, since Indonesia is astride the routes of communication in Southeast Asia and has a great many potential Communist submarine bases. He added that Sumatra was most important militarily, on account of its oil.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that Indonesia might fall to pieces, with Java becoming Communist and the rest of the islands remaining non-Communist. Admiral Radford thought the psychological effects of such a development would perhaps be worse than the military effects.

The President said that when the implications of the situation in Indonesia were under study, we should also consider what we can do about it. The best course would be to hold all Indonesia in the Free World. The next best course would be to hold Sumatra if Java goes Communist. We should also consider what to do if all Indonesia votes Communist.

Admiral Radford said he didn't believe the Indonesians were really Communists at heart.

Mr. Dulles, in reply to a question by the President, said Sukarno's recent desertion of the Nationalist Party was due to political ambition and political immaturity.

Admiral Radford said the Communists have worked through the Chinese community in Indonesia. They had exacted tribute from the Chinese and used it to build schools, and so forth.

The Vice President thought that Sukarno was probably right in believing that a democratic government was not the best kind for Indonesia. He said the Communists could probably not be beaten in election campaigns because they were so well organized, and were able to play upon the ignorance of the people. In his view, the United States should work through the Indonesian military organization to mobilize opposition to Communism. Admiral Radford agreed that there was a good chance of working successfully with the Indonesian military.

The President asked what military strength Sukarno controlled. Mr. Dulles said he controlled the Indonesian military strength in Java. Mr. Dulles added that the Indonesian officers were competent, mostly Moslem, and Dutch-trained. Admiral Radford said some Indonesian officers had been trained in the United States. He then suggested that the Departments of State and Defense make a prompt survey of the situation in Indonesia, in order to be prepared for fast action if necessary. Secretary Herter asked that a representative of ICA be included in this group.

The National Security Council:

Agreed that a group composed of representatives of the Departments of State (Chairman) and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency (and the International Cooperation Administration for economic aid matters), should prepare, not later than September 1, 1957, a report for Council consideration on:

- a. The implications for U. S. security of recent developments in Indonesia, especially Communist political gains in Java.
- b. Possible actions which the United States might take with respect to the situation in Indonesia pursuant

to NSC 5518, including possible actions in the event of imminent or actual Communist control of Java.

NOTE: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director, ICA, for appropriate implementation.

4. HUMAN EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

(NSC Actions Nos. 1430-p, 1448, 1502 and 1665; NIE 100-4-57; NIE 100-6-57; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 29, June 19, and July 22, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this project, and added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the draft NSC Action proposed by the Planning Board. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

Governor Hoegh said FCDA concurred in Governor Peterson's report and in the draft Action proposed by the Planning Board. Governor Hoegh felt that this was not the solution, but a solution, to be strengthened and supplemented in the future. He felt it was an admirable grass-roots approach.

The President also thought this was a good approach. He said if we attempted to inform the public on the human effects of nuclear weapons by dramatic actions, we would create hysteria instead of spreading information. Working through the Foreign Policy Association and the American Assembly was a sound method. He favored the gradual approach. He wondered whether we had sounded out the Foreign Policy Association and the American Assembly. Mr. Cutler reported that FCDA had already been in touch with these organizations.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that there was a difference of opinion in the Planning Board as to the appropriate official to make the initial contacts with the Foreign Policy Association, the American Assembly, and other organizations. The President said this was a job for FCDA in the long run. Mr. Cutler said that many of the topics listed for group discussion fell in the State Department's field, and suggested that the Secretary of State might be asked to collaborate with the Federal Civil Defense Administration in making the necessary contacts. The President and Secretary Herter agreed with this suggestion.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the proposed program of group discussions of national security issues and related matters detailed in paragraph 7 of the report on the subject

prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator pursuant to NSC Action No. 1665-b and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 19, 1957, and the draft NSC Action thereon prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 22, 1957; in the light of the intelligence estimates prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1665-d (NIE 100-4-57 and NIE 100-6-57) and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.

b. Agreed that:

- (1) In lieu of earlier recommendations for joint governmental-private sponsorship of such group discussions (reference memorandum of January 29, 1957), efforts should be made to stimulate such group discussions under private auspices.
- (2) A gradual, developmental approach should be favored over a dramatic, nationwide approach.
- (3) The Foreign Policy Association, the American Assembly, and other appropriate organizations should be encouraged to take the lead in the matter.
- (4) The Federal Government should not be responsible for developing materials to facilitate the group discussions referred to in (1) above, but the cognizant agencies of the Federal Government should continue to make available, as part of normal information material, unclassified information designed to facilitate such group discussions.

c. Noted that the President designated the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, to make the initial contacts referred to in b-(3) above.

NOTE: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator and the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation.

5. A FEDERAL SHELTER PROGRAM FOR CIVIL DEFENSE
(NSC 5408; NSC 5606; NSC Actions Nos. 1642 and 1691; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958", dated January 3, 1957; NSC 5709; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense", dated July 2, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this subject (briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).

The President asked whether FCDA, at a previous Council meeting, had not stated that it was making available to builders plans for shelters that could be built into homes. Mr. Cutler said this matter was being covered in the shelter studies.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted the receipt of the "Report to the National Security Council by the Special Committee on Shelter Programs", prepared by a committee representing the Federal Civil Defense Administration (Chairman), the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Department of Defense, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1691-b-(1), transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 2, 1957.
- b. Deferred consideration of the above Report until completion of the other studies called for by NSC Action No. 1691-b-(2), -(3) and -(4).
6. RELATION OF PORT SECURITY POLICY TO U. S. POLICY TOWARD POLAND
(NSC 5408; NSC 5616/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 30, 1957)

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the Polish merchant ship "Stefan Okrzeja" was arriving in the Port of New Orleans today. He said that under present port security policy (paragraph 21-c-(1) of NSC 5408) such a vessel would be denied entrance to a U. S. port unless an exception were made by the Secretary of the Treasury after consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Cutler said that the necessary exception had been made in this case, and that the Coast Guard had been directed to board and search the "Stefan Okrzeja" and to admit it to the Port of New Orleans unless suspicious circumstances were disclosed. He added that the Planning Board is preparing a report, for Council consideration, on the State Department's recommendation as to granting a general exception for Polish ships.

The President said the FBI should watch everything connected with the Polish ship.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted that, pursuant to paragraph 21-c-(1) of NSC 5408 and in the light of NSC 5616/2, the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Acting Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, has directed the U. S. Coast Guard to board and search the Polish merchant ship "Stefan Okrzeja" and to admit the vessel to Baton Rouge through the Port of New Orleans unless suspicious circumstances are disclosed when the ship is boarded and searched.
- b. Noted that the NSC Planning Board is preparing a report for Council consideration, on the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of State circulated by the reference memorandum of July 30, 1957, as to granting an exception to paragraph 21-c-(1) of NSC 5408 for Polish vessels in the light of NSC 5616/2.

7. U. S. POLICY TOWARD GREECE

(NSC 103/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Review of Current National Security Policies Adopted Prior to 1953", dated April 30, 1954; NSC Action No. 1193; NIE 32-56; NSC 5718; Supplement to NSC 5718; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Policy Toward Greece", dated July 31, 1957)

Mr. Cutler introduced NSC 5718, "U. S. Policy Toward Greece" (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting). After reading paragraph 27 of NSC 5718, Mr. Cutler read the JCS proposals for amendment of this paragraph, and called upon Admiral Radford for comment.

Admiral Radford said the Joint Chiefs merely wished to make the paragraph clearer. Secretary Herter said he had some difficulty in understanding the implications of the Joint Chiefs' amendments. Admiral Radford said the JCS proposals had no particular implications. They were merely designed to clarify the meaning of paragraph 27.

Secretary Herter asked what was meant by the term "atomic-capable weapons systems". Admiral Radford said it would make little difference whether the paragraph said "weapons" or "weapons systems". The President said he thought the term "weapons systems" was satisfactory. He pointed out that a weapons system for air defense might include not only the anti-aircraft projectile, but also the entire system of interception and fire control.

Secretary Herter said that, after these explanations, he had no further objections to the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5718, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 31, 1957.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5718, subject to the following amendment:

Paragraph 27, page 10: Revise to read as follows:

"27. Continue during FY 1958 to support currently approved Greek force levels. Consider providing in the total military aid program for

Greece for the period Fy 1958-60 appropriate conventional equipment and recurring maintenance costs; and atomic-capable weapons systems, predicated upon her desire and ability to absorb, train with and maintain such systems as are contained in Military Assistance Programs and, if applicable, upon the granting of atomic storage rights to the United States. The United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Greece and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Greek armed forces, appropriately revise Greek force levels in the light of NATO requirements."

NOTE: NSC 5718, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5718/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

(At this point, Secretary Herter left the meeting, and Assistant Secretary Bowie took his place at the table.)

8. U. S. POLICY TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE
(Supplement to NSC 5718)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of the statement of policy toward settlement of the Cyprus dispute (Supplement to NSC 5718). (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, together with part of his note on Greece.)

Mr. Cutler noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the Supplement to NSC 5718.

The President asked whether this was not an unusual type of paper for the National Security Council to consider. It appeared to him that the courses of action in the Cyprus Supplement consisted mostly of things the Department of State should do. Mr. Cutler said the Cyprus Supplement had been prepared primarily for the information of the Council. The Planning Board had felt it was difficult to talk about Greece without any mention of Cyprus.

Mr. Cutler then pointed out that there was a difference of opinion in the Planning Board on paragraph 12 of the Supplement, relating to U. S. participation in arrangements guaranteeing the

8/2/57

interim or eventual status of Cyprus. Secretary Bowie said that it was conceivable that a guarantee arrangement might be concluded some time in the future, especially if the United States would participate. State was not asking that the NSC now approve U. S. participation in a guarantee, but had suggested paragraph 12 of the Supplement in order to alert the Council to the problem. He said State would be prepared to amend the wording of the paragraph so that the phrase "be prepared to give serious consideration to participating" would replace the phrase "be prepared to participate".

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in the Supplement to NSC 5718, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.
- b. Noted the suggestion by the Department of State that the last sentence of paragraph 12 of the Supplement to NSC 5718 be amended by revising the phrase "be prepared to participate" to read "be prepared to give serious consideration to participating".
- c. Noted the President's statement that the statement of policy contained in the Supplement to NSC 5718, as amended above, should be referred to the Secretary of State for his use in the conduct of future U. S. foreign relations with respect to the Cyprus dispute.

NOTE: The Supplement to NSC 5718, as amended by b above, subsequently referred to the Secretary of State pursuant to the President's action in c above.

9. GERMANY, EAST GERMANY and BERLIN
(NSC 160/1; Supplement to NSC 160/1; NSC 5404/1; Progress Reports, dated July 17, 1957, by OCB on NSC 160/1, Supplement to NSC 160/1, and NSC 5404/1)

Mr. Dearborn briefed the Council on the reference Progress Reports (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).

Admiral Radford said the comments he was about to make were his own, not those of the JCS. He wished first to highlight the great reductions that had been made in plans for the German armed forces. The plan to have 518,000 men in these forces by the end of 1959 had been scaled down to planning for 340,000 men by that time. The United States had 250,000 military men in Germany and another 150,000 dependents and civilians. He did not feel Germany was doing what it could and should do to contribute to NATO strength, and was very much concerned by the situation.

Admiral Radford then turned to the problem of air traffic entering Berlin.

He said he had asked the Air Force to look into the situation and make recommendations for the action which the United States should take if necessary. He would make these recommendations available to the Department of State.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Reports on the subjects by the Operations Coordinating Board, with particular reference to recent reductions by the West Germans in plans for their defense contribution, and recent indications of possible Soviet or East German interference with Western civil air travel to Berlin.
- b. Noted the statement by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the U. S. Air Force has been requested to prepare a report on possible U. S. actions in the event of Soviet or East German interference with Western civil air travel to Berlin; and that this report will be made available for consideration by the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency for NSC 5404/1.

NOTE: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation by the Department of the Air Force.

10. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM) AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (IRBM) PROGRAMS
(NSC Actions Nos. 1433, 1484, 1690 and 1743)

Mr. Cutler noted that after the Defense presentation on the missile programs on July 8, the President had asked the Secretary of Defense to recommend, not later than August 15, any missile programs which could be eliminated before October 1, 1957 (in addition to the missile programs which, as stated in the presentation, were scheduled to be phased out). Mr. Cutler invited attention to NSC Action No. 1484-c and the President's directive issued in lieu of approval of NSC Action No. 1484-d (December 21, 1955). Mr. Cutler then called upon Secretary Wilson.

Secretary Wilson read a memorandum addressed to the President under date of July 31, 1957 (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting), as follows:

"The present dual approach to the IREM development program with its resultant excessive cost is no longer justified. I recommend that the THOR and JUPITER development programs be combined into a single missile program.

"I propose to establish a committee composed of three members, one each from the Department of Defense, the Air Force and the Army to consider both the JUPITER and THOR programs with the purpose of properly evaluating the engineering and scientific information provided by the work to date. This committee will be asked to recommend a final program which, when adopted, will be under the management of the Air Force. The advisability of a new name for the program will be considered at that time.

"I propose in the meantime to suspend or cancel the production of additional missiles and missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program. I further propose that overtime be eliminated except that necessary in conjunction with flight testing and for the small amount necessary to take care of emergencies. This applies to both contractors' operations as well as those under our supervision.

"I conceive the new program as costing substantially less than the present dual approach.

"These changes may cause some delay in the program. While this cannot be definitely evaluated at this time, I believe it will not be great enough to be important in the light of the time it will take to work out operational use and deployment of the perfected missile.

"In respect to the ICBM programs, I propose to continue the ATLAS at the highest priority. We are re-examining the facilities and schedules for experimental production, including a careful study of the overtime problem, to see if acceptable economies can be made.

"In respect to the TITAN program, I believe that by reducing the pressures on this program we can make substantial economies in this alternative development.

"I would like to make it clear that the actions we are proposing at this time might be considered to depart from the directions that we received as a result of National Security Council Action 1433 on 8 September 1955 under which we were

instructed to pursue these programs at highest priority and to explore promising alternative avenues of development. I should therefore like your approval for this proposed course of action."

Secretary Wilson asked that the President approve the recommendations in this letter.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the President had previously laid great stress on developing guided missiles rapidly for their psychological effect. The President asked whether Deputy Secretary Quarles and Mr. Holaday agreed with Secretary Wilson's recommendations, and Secretary Wilson replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Cutler wondered how long the committee referred to in Secretary Wilson's letter would require for its deliberations. Secretary Wilson said he didn't know.

The President asked why Secretary Wilson wished to put the single missile program, which would result from a combination of the THOR and JUPITER programs, under the management of the Air Force. Secretary Wilson said that the Air Force was responsible in accordance with its roles and missions, and that originally JUPITER had been put under the Army because of its REDSTONE experience. The President said that when he had agreed to the dual approach, he had also agreed that the force developing the missile need not be the one to utilize it. He still wondered why there should be an advance decision that the Air Force would manage the single missile program. Secretary Wilson said the Air Force would be responsible for installation and operational use, and that the Air Force had sufficient money in its 1958 budget, whereas the Army did not. The President said he wasn't objecting too strongly to Air Force management, but he wondered what would happen to morale if a group of technicians in a service worked for a long time on a missile and then had it taken away from them. He thought Secretary Wilson had adopted the correct approach in general, but still wondered about this advance decision on management by the Air Force.

The President added that the part of Secretary Wilson's letter dealing with cancelling the production of missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program, made him smile,

because he had suggested this some time ago. He had made the point that we should not approve components of production models unless we were sure the missiles would work. Secretary Wilson said that the United States had a "mess" of JUPITER and THOR missiles. The President said these missiles wouldn't be a mess if they worked. Secretary Wilson said we had a missile that went 1500 miles, but it had no guidance and the re-entry problem was not solved. He said we had two versions of an ICBM, one a year behind the other. We were replacing the first before we were sure it would work. Secretary Wilson thought that if ATLAS did not work, neither would TITAN. The President said he agreed with what Secretary Wilson was proposing.

With reference to overtime, the President thought the real bottleneck in missile programs was not overtime, but thinking out the problems. Mr. Dulles said that he had no evidence of anything new or dramatic in the Soviet missiles program. The President said he thought Secretary Wilson's plan was satisfactory.

Mr. Cutler said he understood that ATLAS was continued at the highest priority, and that the priority of TITAN was reduced. Secretary Wilson asked whether Admiral Strauss agreed with the recommendations in his letter, and Admiral Strauss replied in the affirmative.

The National Security Council:

Noted the President's approval of the following recommendations by the Secretary of Defense presented at the meeting:

- a. That the THOR and JUPITER development programs be combined into a single missile program.
- b. That a committee composed of one member each from the Departments of Defense, the Air Force and the Army, consider both the THOR and JUPITER programs and, after evaluating the engineering and scientific information available to date, recommend such final single missile program, to be under the management of the Air Force; with a report thereon by the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council not later than October 1, 1957.
- c. Meanwhile, as to the THOR and JUPITER programs:
 - (1) Suspend or cancel the production of additional missiles and missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program; and

(2) Eliminate overtime except that necessary in connection with flight testing and to take care of emergencies.

- d. Recognize that, while the actions in a, b and c above may cause some delay in the IRBM development program, such delay is not expected to be significant in the light of the time required to accomplish operational use and deployment of a perfected missile.
- e. Continue the ATLAS program at the highest priority; re-examining the facilities and schedules for experimental production, including a careful study of the overtime problem, to see if acceptable economies can be made.
- f. Reduce the priorities on the TITAN program in an effort to make substantial economies in this alternative development.

NOTE: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

MARION W. BOGGS
Director
NSC Secretariat

8/28/57

1980/272C

Delegation

28 August 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DATE: 11 April 1978

Subject: The Use of Nuclear Weapons (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 5 August 1957, subject: "Defense Mobilization Plan D-Minus (C)", wherein you assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility, within the Department of Defense, for preparing, as one of the "actions by the President" in Part III of Mobilization Plan D-Minus, a document dealing with:

- a. The use of nuclear weapons by U.S. forces.
- b. The transfer of nuclear weapons to U.S. Allies.
- c. Consultations with U.S. Allies as required regarding the use of nuclear weapons from allied bases.

2. The mechanics by which the Secretary of Defense obtains from the President the authority for the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. forces in an emergency is contained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff War-Emergency Check List and Master Readiness File. Normally, the request, as well as the authorization, would be oral. The desirability of a confirmatory document on a matter of such consequence is obvious.

3. With regard to Presidential authority for the expenditure of nuclear weapons by U.S. forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are preparing recommendations in accordance with your memorandum of 29 May 1957 on this subject.

4. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 precludes the transfer of atomic weapons to any foreign nation. However, the Emergency War Powers of the President are considered to empower the President, in general war, to transfer to those Allies of the United States who are fighting on our side against the common enemy, nuclear weapons of any size and in any quantity which he deems to be in the national interest.

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The Acting Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 9 July 1958, subject: "Standard Operating Procedures for Military Rights in Case of Hostilities", advised that the division of responsibility for consultation established between the Department of Defense and the Department of State is as follows:

The Department of State will be responsible for consultation prior to the outbreak of hostilities except in those cases where it is believed preferable that consultation be handled by the President personally. The Department of Defense shall have primary responsibility upon commencement of hostilities for the necessary consultation with all countries which have declared war on our side.

The Department of State will have primary responsibility for the necessary consultation with countries which have been attacked by a common enemy, but which have not declared war on our side.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft Executive Order, contained in the Appendix hereto, is suitable, from a military viewpoint, for use by the President in general war for

1. Confirms the authorization for use of nuclear weapons by U.S. forces.

2. Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to effect the transfer of nuclear weapons, through commanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to selected Allies and the fighting on our side.

3. Submits the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to consult with U.S. Allies as required regarding the use of nuclear weapons from allied bases as follows:

(1) The Department of State to consult with those countries which have been attacked by a common enemy but which have not declared war on our side.

(2) The Department of Defense to consult with those countries which have declared war on our side.

7. Upon completion of coordination of the draft Executive Order, contained in the Appendix hereto, with the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that they be informed of the action taken on the draft Executive Order.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. P. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure
Appendix

Approved: (S) (T)

Approved: (S) (T)

Approved: (S) (T)

Approved: (S) (T)

Approved: (S) (T)

CONFIDENTIAL
with Top Secret attachment
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

See said
with 6739
10/3/57

October 3, 1957

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: EUR - C. Burke Elbrick
SUBJECT: Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
LEO 11652: XGDS
Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

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10/3/57
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The attached position papers cover subjects which you may wish to raise with Foreign Minister Gromyko on Saturday. The papers cover disarmament (Tab A), the Middle East (Tab B) and Germany (Tab C), and were prepared in S/AE, NEA and GER respectively. These are issues of major importance to the Soviets and Mr. Gromyko would undoubtedly raise at least the first two, if you did not.

It is not believed desirable for you to raise two subjects which Mr. Gromyko might allude to during the meeting. These are East-West contacts and the Kozmin case, which are discussed in Tabs D and E respectively.

I expect to be present at the meeting and suggest that Mr. Freers, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, also attend. In addition, Mr. Berding has suggested that he be there in order to handle the press questions which will arise after the meeting. ~~our~~ ^{Freer} interpreter, ~~Mr. Akalovsky, will also be present.~~ ^{will interpret}

Recommendation:

That you approve the attendance suggested above.

Concurrence:

S/EWC
Mr. Frank Lacy
Tom

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

- Attachments: Position papers on
1. Disarmament
 2. The Middle East
 3. Germany
 4. East-West Contacts
 5. The Kozmin Case



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CONFIDENTIAL
with Top Secret attachment

It is suggested that the Secretary make the following points to Gromyko:

1. We feel the Soviets are making a great mistake in the adamant position they are taking on German reunification. The enforced division of Germany makes the creation of a stable situation in Europe impossible and constitutes a longer range threat to peace. It is our impression that Soviet policy aims at the indefinite perpetuation of the division of Germany. We feel this is a course fraught with risks for both the Soviet Union and ourselves.
2. We are, of course, aware of the public statements which the Soviet Government has made regarding the present government of the Federal Republic. If these statements reflect the real estimate of the Soviet Government on the political situation in Western Germany, we believe this estimate to be mistaken. We believe that the men who are running West Germany are men of moderation, with a deep desire to avoid a repetition of the events of Germany's recent past which have brought so much tragedy to Germany and to others. They have made great progress in eliminating differences between Germany and the Western countries. We have seen no signs of a resurgence of neo-Nazism or neo-Fascism in Germany. On the contrary, the extreme right parties have achieved no public support at all. The only possibility which we see of a danger of revival of Nazi tendencies would come from the frustrations created by the indefinite perpetuation of the division of Germany.
3. We recognize that the reunification of Germany would result in changes in the military situation in Europe and that this is a matter of great concern to the Soviet Government. It is not our intention to create a situation which would constitute a threat to legitimate Soviet security interests. We have tried to make this clear to the Soviet Government on numerous occasions. We are prepared to negotiate with the Soviet Union, in conjunction with the reunification of Germany through free elections, a security arrangement which would contain provisions on a broad basis respecting the limitation and control of forces and armaments in Europe, including the deployment of forces. Our views are shared by the British, French and Germans, as well as the other Western European governments.
4. The proposals which we put forward on these subjects at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting of 1955 were designed to provide a basis for genuine negotiation with the Soviet Government. We regret that they were rejected by the Soviet Government out of hand, apparently without examination.
5. It is clear that no solution of the German problem can be reached without the agreement of the Soviet Government. The refusal of the Soviet Government to enter into discussions of the problem

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appears to us to be inconsistent with its public statements of its desire to find a solution to outstanding international problems.

Gromyko can be expected to reply along the lines of recent Soviet statements on Germany, laying stress on the following points: (a) The existence of two German states as a "fact" which must be recognized; (b) the aggressive policies of NATO and the Western insistence on German membership in NATO; and (c) the dangers involved in the establishment in West Germany of an atomic potential directed at the USSR.

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10/3/57

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DULLES-HERTER SERIES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Box 7

Dulles John Foster
October 1957 (2)

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 5, 1957

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Dulles
Mr. Elbrick
Mr. Edward L. Freers
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Zaroubin
Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky

COPIES TO:



1-1457

Secretary Dulles congratulated Gromyko on his having become Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko accepted his comment that perhaps this is not a matter of congratulation, in good humor. The Secretary also paid tribute to the achievement of Soviet science in launching an earth satellite last Friday. Mr. Gromyko expressed the hope that the achievement would be for the common good of mankind and of universal science.

SECRETARY DULLES: The Secretary suggested the present talk with Gromyko because of his concern about the state of relations between our two countries. Since the Soviet Foreign Minister was in the United States, he did not want to let the opportunity for an exchange of views pass by.

We are faced with some puzzlement about Soviet foreign policy. Since the change in the Soviet Government took place last June, the decree of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party gave as a reason the Party's desire to create conditions for improving foreign relations. However, ever since then relations between our two countries have become worse rather than better. This has been reflected in recent Soviet statements. Our hopes about the change have not materialized and the situation seems to be the reverse.

There have been many Soviet statements and notes of a ruder character than ever before—in fact than in all American history—specifically the recent one about the Middle East. This is not consistent with a desire for developing better relations. Developments in the Middle East and Central Europe have strained our relations. Because it is our hope and we hope it is yours that there be genuine peaceful coexistence, we want to give you our reactions to the developments of recent months. We are particularly concerned about the situation in the Middle

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Authority MR 86-34 #2

~~SECRET~~ E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 (a)(3)(5)

East

By bc NLE Date 3/3/86

State letter 1/29/86

2/25/86

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Last. Despite what has been said by the Soviet Union in its propaganda notes and speeches you may be assured that it is the United States desire that the Middle East be a free area of really independent states. If we had not felt this deeply, we would not have intervened last November and in March of this year to bring about a withdrawal of the British and French and subsequently the Israelis. It was not easy for us to strain relations with our oldest friends and closest allies, Britain and France, and to jeopardize NATO relationships. Although it was a difficult thing to do, we indicated our readiness to invoke sanctions against Israel in order to get their troops out of the Gaza strip, a result brought about by our action alone. The fact that we strained these relationships gave us considerable difficulty here at home. Thus it is clear we have a genuine concern that the nations of the area be independent. We didn't move to get our friends the British and French out, merely to see them replaced by the Soviet Union. If we took such strong action then, you can calculate as to how strongly we would feel about keeping the Soviet Union out.

You say that you think we are trying to get ourselves into the area. This is not the case. The Eisenhower Doctrine is designed to render military and economic assistance to help the nations there maintain their independence. That is the purpose of the resolution. There is no ulterior purpose--no desire whatever on our part to move into the area. However, we haven't done what we have done just to enable the Soviet Union to be the politically dominating power there. We are familiar with their activities and their propaganda there. It is difficult to recognize any other purpose on the part of the USSR than to take advantage of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the British and French attack in order to introduce itself into the area. This is a course which contains certain danger--one we both want to avoid. We realize there exist what look like attractive opportunities for a great power desirous of extending its influence there--the Arabs fear the Israelis, there are memories of British and French colonialism and their recent attack and there are the French relations with Algeria. We hope that the USSR will not be attracted to such a degree that it will find it is in difficult relationship with the United States. We don't want this to happen and thus want to tell the Soviets how we feel.

The situation in Central Europe is very dangerous and explosive. We realize the Soviet Union feels that this should not concern us--only the Soviet Union. The fact is, if there should be a series of explosive situations, it would not be easy to assure that the situation would not involve us. We believe the Soviet Union ought to have friendly nations and friendly governments along its borders. We have no intention of trying to develop a cordon sanitaire around it. The Soviet Union is entitled to a sense of security. If a relationship could be developed with other bordering countries similar to that between Finland and the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, with a sense of independence and yet close relations, this would be a very acceptable solution. What we are afraid of is the question that arises from national aspirations, very old and persistent, that survive in the Eastern European countries even after many occupations. We do not believe it possible, without great danger at least, to deny them a greater measure of national independence nor to deny the urge for unity felt by such a great people as the Germans. We are willing to consider any formula regarding Germany which would eliminate danger to the Soviet Union and bring about reunification. In pursuing

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the latter we don't want to jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union nor increase the power of NATO. We do fear the danger in the situation existing in Germany and the satellite countries. The longer the present situation prevails the greater the danger—and any hope of the Russian people that their security not be endangered diminishes as well. We are anxious to find a basis for cooperation to eliminate the dangerous situation and do not seek gain for ourselves. A solution would afford much greater security.

With regard to disarmament, we are puzzled again about the attitude of the Soviet Union. No progress was made in the Subcommittee on Disarmament. The Soviet attitude at the end, in rejecting the Western proposals, cancelled out the hopes we held earlier in the negotiations. We know you feel that there cannot be progress without what you call "confidence". This cannot be built just out of words. It would be created by a system of inspection. This is of primary importance. The establishment of an accurate system would be a beginning and would be interpreted by the American people as indicating less chance for war and less need for armaments. This is true even though danger could still be lurking, despite such inspection. What else would breed confidence, we do not know. You proposed a system of ground inspection. We proposed aerial photography. Now we have agreed to a combination of both. We do not think ground inspection is adequate, since ground posts can be by-passed. Aerial photography is also needed. That is why we proposed a marriage of the two. We press this because it would give a real ingredient for confidence—a reduction of armaments would quickly result. On the nuclear side, great danger is the fourth power danger. An irresponsible dictator would get a bomb and would throw it wherever he wanted—on New York or Moscow. It is frightening to think of a world where anybody could have a bomb. The cruder they are the more fissionable fall-out results. That is why we proposed a cut-off of the use of fissionable material for new weapons. This is not popular with our allies. It would stop the UK with a small amount. It would prevent the accumulation of any at all by other countries such as France. We were able to induce other countries, Great Britain, France and Germany, to accept this although they were very reluctant. Only such a program would prevent one country after another from using a fissionable material for weapons. This is the only way we know to keep things under control—that is cutting off now—after a certain date never to use fissionable material to make weapons. We are worried about irresponsible countries. There is not much danger that the US and the USSR—and the UK with its smaller amount—would use their stockpiles of weapons irresponsibly. They have too much at stake. A dictator could use the bombs to blackmail the rest of the world. We don't know the basis of your objections to our proposal. Maybe you think we have a larger stockpile. Perhaps so, but yours is large enough to do much damage. And it will be a year or two before the cut-off would be effective. We cannot see why our proposal is so unacceptable to prevent the spread of these weapons to the rest of the world.

With regard to East-West exchanges, I know that we are to have meetings on this subject soon. Our law now makes it possible to admit without finger-printing. At the Foreign Ministers meeting in October and November of 1955 I said I hoped the passage of such a law would make possible a broad exchange of persons between your country and ours. What I had in mind was television exchanges, technical and cultural exchanges, something along these lines.

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In conclusion, I don't want to minimize what seems to me a dangerous deterioration of our relations.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMIKO: Before referring to the topics raised by Secretary Dulles, Mr. Gromyko asked for a translation of the Secretary's remarks concerning Central Europe and Algeria. Then he asked whether the Secretary in speaking of Germany referred not only to Germany but also Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

THE SECRETARY said yes and repeated that if these countries achieved a relationship with the Soviet Union like that of Finland and Yugoslavia this should be entirely satisfactory both for the Soviet Union and ourselves.

MR. GROMIKO: The Soviet Government is also concerned at the present state of relations between our two countries and has expressed this concern a number of times to the US Government. This was done particularly by Khrushchev and Bulganin in 1955 at the meeting of heads of government in Geneva and in Bulganin's personal message to President Eisenhower. The Soviet Union is concerned now as well with the state of these relations and has taken steps to try to improve them. The Soviet Government made efforts in this direction during the consideration of certain outstanding international problems such as Germany, disarmament, etc. and also in connection with direct relations with the United States by its proposal for a Soviet-US friendship treaty.

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Pages 5 through 13 are exempted in full.

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FOREIGN MINISTER GROMIKO: I will remain in the United States at least until October 15 in connection with the debate on disarmament in the UN.

SECRETARY DULLES: I will be busy with Canadian officials on Monday and Tuesday, and then will be occupied with the visit of the Queen of England. Perhaps if there is anything to discuss you could hold talks with Mr. Mountree, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMIKO: I will be pleased to do so.



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declassification in a previous review.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NLE 86-34 #2

Memorandum of Conversation

State 1/28/86
(8503978)

DATE: October 5, 1957

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Dulles
Mr. Elbrick
Mr. Edward L. Freers
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Zaroubin
Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky

COPIES TO:



1-1492

Secretary Dulles congratulated Gromyko on his having become Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko accepted his comment that perhaps this is not a matter of congratulation, in good humor. The Secretary also paid tribute to the achievement of Soviet science in launching an earth satellite last Friday. Mr. Gromyko expressed the hope that the achievement would be for the common good of mankind and of universal science.

SECRETARY DULLES: The Secretary suggested the present talk with Gromyko because of his concern about the state of relations between our two countries. Since the Soviet Foreign Minister was in the United States, he did not want to let the opportunity for an exchange of views pass by.

We are faced with some puzzlement about Soviet foreign policy. Since the change in the Soviet Government took place last June, the decree of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party gave as a reason the Party's desire to create conditions for improving foreign relations. However, ever since then relations between our two countries have become worse rather than better. This has been reflected in recent Soviet statements. Our hopes about the change have not materialized and the situation seems to be the reverse.

There have been many Soviet statements and notes of a ruder character than ever before--in fact than in all American history--specifically the recent one about the Middle East. This is not consistent with a desire for developing better relations. Developments in the Middle East and Central Europe have strained our relations. Because it is our hope and we hope it is yours that there be genuine peaceful coexistence, we want to give you our reactions to the developments of recent months. We are particularly concerned about the situation in the Middle

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Box 7
Dulles - October 1957(2)
President of the United States
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DULLES-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

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East. Despite what has been said by the Soviet Union in its propaganda notes and speeches you may be assured that it is the United States desire that the Middle East be a free area of really independent states. If we had not felt this deeply, we would not have intervened last November and in March of this year to bring about a withdrawal of the British and French and subsequently the Israelis. It was not easy for us to strain relations with our oldest friends and closest allies, Britain and France, and to jeopardize NATO relationships. Although it was a difficult thing to do, we indicated our readiness to invoke sanctions against Israel in order to get their troops out of the Gaza strip, a result brought about by our action alone. The fact that we strained these relationships gave us considerable difficulty here at home. Thus it is clear we have a genuine concern that the nations of the area be independent. We didn't move to get our friends the British and French out, merely to see them replaced by the Soviet Union. If we took such strong action then, you can calculate as to how strongly we would feel about keeping the Soviet Union out.

You say that you think we are trying to get ourselves into the area. This is not the case. The Eisenhower Doctrine is designed to render military and economic assistance to help the nations there maintain their independence. That is the purpose of the resolution. There is no ulterior purpose--no desire whatever on our part to move into the area. However, we haven't done what we have done just to enable the Soviet Union to be the politically dominating power there. We are familiar with their activities and their propaganda there. It is difficult to recognize any other purpose on the part of the USSR than to take advantage of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the British and French attack in order to introduce itself into the area. This is a course which contains certain danger--one we both want to avoid. We realize there exist what look like attractive opportunities for a great power desirous of extending its influence there--the Arabs fear the Israelis, there are memories of British and French colonialism and their recent attack and there are the French relations with Algeria. We hope that the USSR will not be attracted to such a degree that it will find it is in difficult relationship with the United States. We don't want this to happen and thus want to tell the Soviets how we feel.

The situation in Central Europe is very dangerous and explosive. We realize the Soviet Union feels that this should not concern us--only the Soviet Union. The fact is, if there should be a series of explosive situations, it would not be easy to assure that the situation would not involve us. We believe the Soviet Union ought to have friendly nations and friendly governments along its borders. We have no intention of trying to develop a cordon sanitaire around it. The Soviet Union is entitled to a sense of security. If a relationship could be developed with other bordering countries similar to that between Finland and the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, with a sense of independence and yet close relations, this would be a very acceptable solution. What we are afraid of is the question that arises from national aspirations, very old and persistent, that survive in the Eastern European countries even after many occupations. We do not believe it possible, without great danger at least, to deny them a greater measure of national independence nor to deny the urge for unity felt by such a great people as the Germans. We are willing to consider any formula regarding Germany which would eliminate danger to the Soviet Union and bring about reunification. In pursuing

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the latter we don't want to jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union nor increase the power of NATO. We do fear the danger in the situation existing in Germany and the satellite countries. The longer the present situation prevails the greater the danger--and any hope of the Russian people that their security not be endangered diminishes as well. We are anxious to find a basis for cooperation to eliminate the dangerous situation and do not seek gain for ourselves. A solution would afford much greater security.

With regard to disarmament, we are puzzled again about the attitude of the Soviet Union. No progress was made in the Subcommittee on Disarmament. The Soviet attitude at the end, in rejecting the Western proposals, cancelled out the hopes we held earlier in the negotiations. We know you feel that there cannot be progress without what you call "confidence". This cannot be built just out of words. It would be created by a system of inspection. This is of primary importance. The establishment of an accurate system would be a beginning and would be interpreted by the American people as indicating less chance for war and less need for armaments. This is true even though danger could still be lurking, despite such inspection. What else would breed confidence, we do not know. You proposed a system of ground inspection. We proposed aerial photography. Now we have agreed to a combination of both. We do not think ground inspection is adequate, since ground posts can be by-passed. Aerial photography is also needed. That is why we proposed a marriage of the two. We press this because it would give a real ingredient for confidence--a reduction of armaments would quickly result. On the nuclear side, great danger is the fourth power danger. An irresponsible dictator would get a bomb and would throw it wherever he wanted--on New York or Moscow. It is frightening to think of a world where anybody could have a bomb. The cruder they are the more fissionable fall-out results. That is why we proposed a cut-off of the use of fissionable material for new weapons. This is not popular with our allies. It would stop the UK with a small amount. It would prevent the accumulation of any at all by other countries such as France. We were able to induce other countries, Great Britain, France and Germany, to accept this although they were very reluctant. Only such a program would prevent one country after another from using a fissionable material for weapons. This is the only way we know to keep things under control--that is cutting off now--after a certain date never to use fissionable material to make weapons. We are worried about irresponsible countries. There is not much danger that the US and the USSR--and the UK with its smaller amount--would use their stockpiles of weapons irresponsibly. They have too much at stake. A dictator could use the bombs to blackmail the rest of the world. We don't know the basis of your objections to our proposal. Maybe you think we have a larger stockpile. Perhaps so, but yours is large enough to do much damage. And it will be a year or two before the cut-off would be effective. We cannot see why our proposal is so unacceptable to prevent the spread of these weapons to the rest of the world.

With regard to East-West exchanges, I know that we are to have meetings on this subject soon. Our law now makes it possible to admit without finger-printing. At the Foreign Ministers meeting in October and November of 1955 I said I hoped the passage of such a law would make possible a broad exchange of persons between your country and ours. What I had in mind was television exchanges, technical and cultural exchanges, something along these lines.

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In conclusion, I don't want to minimize what seems to me a dangerous deterioration of our relations.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: Before referring to the topics raised by Secretary Dulles, Mr. Gromyko asked for a translation of the Secretary's remarks concerning Central Europe and Algeria. Then he asked whether the Secretary in speaking of Germany referred not only to Germany but also Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

THE SECRETARY said yes and repeated that if these countries achieved a relationship with the Soviet Union like that of Finland and Yugoslavia this should be entirely satisfactory both for the Soviet Union and ourselves.

MR. GROMYKO: The Soviet Government is also concerned at the present state of relations between our two countries and has expressed this concern a number of times to the US Government. This was done particularly by Khrushchev and Bulganin in 1955 at the meeting of heads of government in Geneva and in Bulganin's personal message to President Eisenhower. The Soviet Union is concerned now as well with the state of these relations and has taken steps to try to improve them. The Soviet Government made efforts in this direction during the consideration of certain outstanding international problems such as Germany, disarmament, etc. and also in connection with direct relations with the United States by its proposal for a Soviet-US friendship treaty.

Mr. Dulles indicates, in commenting on the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that the US Government had expected a better turn in our relations as a result of the removal of certain persons from the Soviet Government and he referred to the fact that relations had in fact worsened rather than improved--that the position of the Soviet Union on certain matters affecting our relations had become more inflexible and rigid. It is necessary to clarify this. What connection does the matter of the removal from leadership in the Soviet Union of certain well known persons have with Soviet foreign policy--and with US-Soviet relations? The Central Committee decisions eliminated obstacles standing in the way of pursuing its foreign policy of peace. In adopting these decisions, the Central Committee proceeded from the fact that these persons, particularly Molotov, tried to impose a brake on the policies of the Soviet Union designed to relax international tensions and strengthen peace. This is a matter of the policy that the Soviet Union has been pursuing ever since the Communist state was founded--the policy of peaceful coexistence with other states regardless of their social systems. The Soviet Government will continue as heretofore to pursue this policy. It has done so in the past, is doing so in the present, and will do so in the future. It is going away with those who stood in the way. It is up to others to expect or not to expect something of the Soviet Union or the Soviet Government from changes that took place in its leadership--or, better expressed, from removals from that leadership. As far as its true policy is concerned, it is one of defending peace and seeking a relaxation of international tension. The Soviet Government has, is and will pursue this firm, or if you want to call it, rigid, policy. It is not clear what reasons there are for astonishment about some seeming changes recently. We believe there are none.

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With regard to the Middle East, we are concerned about the situation as it is evolving there. We want to be frank and express the views of the Soviet Government on the situation that has arisen of late. We believe that the situation that has arisen in the Near and Middle East at the end of last year and during the course of this year should be the cause of serious alarm. It is true that in the development of this situation there appeared to be periods of relaxation at times, then increases in tension such as occurred at the time of the aggression by Britain, France and Israel and such as now is occurring with regard to Syria. The situation is fraught with danger and represents a serious threat to the cause of peace in that area. I would ask Mr. Dulles to bear in mind that the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have no intention of putting themselves in the position of a party that has to excuse itself for its actions. There is no reason to do so for any actions taken by us. On the contrary, we have reasons to reproach and to accuse other countries for actions leading to complications and dangerous situations--such as those last year of Britain, France and Israel. The Soviet Government drew not only their attention but that of the US to this. Hence I want to reject the idea expressed by Mr. Dulles--which does not correspond to fact--that the Soviet Union seeks to take the place of colonial powers such as Britain and France and move into the Middle East. There is no reason for such an idea. The Soviet Government has not had and does not have any such intention. It is interested in only one thing--that there should be peace in the area and that it should not be used by some powers as a testing ground for conspiracies and military provocations, without taking account of the consequences. This desire on the part of the Soviet Union arises from its foreign policy. It has never made a secret of the fact that the countries of the Middle East believe they should be left alone and that others should not interfere with their internal affairs. There is also another consideration not appreciated to an appropriate degree in the West, particularly by the United States--that is, the desire of the countries of the Middle East, particularly the Arab countries, to maintain their independence and live in tranquility. These desires coincide with the interests of the Soviet Union, which cannot be indifferent to the situation there. I don't know whether we would call that part of the world the back door, the front door or the side door to the Soviet Union. The fact is that it is adjacent to the Soviet Union. How would the US feel if a situation arose periodically due to the activity of outside powers in Central America or even South America? I believe the view taken by you would be the same as that of the Soviet Union in a similar case. The Soviet Government has already drawn the attention of the Government of the United States as well as those of Britain and France (and I want to stress this so that there will be no misunderstanding between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the US) the fact that it cannot remain a passive observer where a situation arises involving the peace and security of the USSR. I want to repeat that there should be no misunderstanding on that score between our two countries. I want to emphasize that the Soviet Union will continue to make every effort to have the situation in the Middle East normalized and to have a relaxation brought about. This does not depend on the Soviet Union alone--in fact, least of all, since it is not the cause of the situation there. It would be well if the US acted in the same direction. In that case the situation could be normalized and we could avoid such situations arising from time to time. But if we proceed on the basis of facts--the US is interfering rudely with the countries in that area--through economic pressures and military threats and demonstrations. The 6th Fleet is a case in

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point. I won't dwell on that. We have also given our appraisal of the well-known doctrine on the Middle East. I will not repeat that appraisal. How is it possible to normalize the situation when the Soviet Union and the US are acting in opposite directions? The Soviet Union wants the area to be let alone--the US acts in the opposite direction. Judging from Mr. Dulles' speech in the United Nations in this connection, there is not much hope that the US wants the situation to be normalized.

With regard to the purchase of arms by some countries in the Middle East, it is well known that some countries in that area, Israel for example, purchased large amounts of arms from the West. This involved the US. Arms came from Canada, France, etc. Why can some countries in the Middle East having a common language with the US buy arms while others cannot? We know, and the US knows, that the arms acquired by Syria and Egypt are for purely defensive purposes. We refuse to believe that they can be used for any other purpose--that is, on Syria's part, for aggression against any of Syria's neighbors. How can anyone seriously believe that the purchase of arms by Syria for its defense can represent a threat to Turkey? Look at the role of Turkey. Turkey is being used (while we are talking here) to put pressure on Syria by concentrating Turkish troops on the Syrian frontier. This is not normalization--just the opposite. And Turkey would not have acted without outside encouragement. Turkey's present action does not correspond to normalization--just the contrary. Attention was drawn to this by the message from Bulganin to Menderes.

I noted the statement of Mr. Dulles when he said that the Government of the US also wants the countries of the Near East to be independent. If the US Government really has decided to pursue such a policy, then there are no differences between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. Could not the US and the Soviet Union reach an understanding that they would respect the independence of the Arab countries and condemn any pressure on and interference in the affairs of these countries? At one time the Soviet Union made a proposal embracing five principles. In our view, this could provide the basis for the attitude of the US and the other Western powers on the Middle East. Perhaps we could revert to these considerations or others in order to reach an understanding on noninterference. I would like to refer to another proposal (which we consider a minimum) which is to condemn the use of force to settle any of the matters pertaining to the Middle East--but the Governments of the Western powers including the US took a negative attitude to this proposal. We recognize the need for noninterference. Certainly we should condemn the use of force--the most flagrant form--to say nothing of the fact that renunciation of the use of force would contribute to peace and correspond to the interests of our Governments. We have proposed a wide platform of possibilities. We ask that you think the matter over. There must be some basis for an acceptable understanding. I would like to point out that one of the principles I mentioned refers to the sale of arms. Perhaps this would be a possibility. An understanding could be reached through, let us say, an exchange of notes, through a statement, or some other way. If there is a desire, the form could be found.

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SECRETARY DULLES interrupted at this point to ask whether Mr. Gromyko was speaking of just the Arab countries or all the countries of the Middle East in this connection.

MR. GROMYKO referred to the language of the Soviet note of February 11, 1957 which laid out the principles he had been talking about and explained that the descriptions they were using was the "Near and Middle East". (He noted that paragraph 5 referred to a mutual renunciation of arms shipments to the area which he had mentioned above). When pressed as to whether the Soviet description of the Near and Middle East include Turkey and Iran, Mr. Gromyko said that it did.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: To sum up, with regard to the Near and Middle East, in our view there is a possibility of our not quarreling regarding that area. However, both countries must agree not to interfere there — I emphasize, both countries. They should not exert political, economic or military pressures on the countries there; they should not set one country against another; they should not try to draw these countries into military groupings or blocs. Thus a normal situation would arise and there would be no need of quarreling. Our two countries have other problems and an understanding on this one would help with the others. Even now, when some of the countries are members of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq and Turkey, for example, it would be possible to reach an understanding based on the considerations I have outlined above. Our attitude toward the Pact, however, is well known. Since the Soviet Government estimates that what I have described can be achieved, I ask Mr. Dulles to consider it.

With regard to Algeria, our position is known to Mr. Dulles. The question is not settled. We are in favor of having a settlement brought about which is satisfactory to each side. We have set forth this position a number of times in the past. This was done in the communique issued following the visit of Prime Minister Mollet to Moscow a year and a half ago. Reiteration of our position was made at the session of the General Assembly last year. We believe there are no new elements which would require our changing our position on Algeria. We are sure that this position corresponds to the interests of France, if correctly understood, as well as to those of the people of Algeria. I will not conceal the fact that I was surprised by Mr. Dulles' indication that some power wants to make use of the fact that the Algerian problem is not settled -- a hint that the Soviet Union is trying to make use of this situation. I have nothing to say about this. If the supposition on my part is correct, I must put this idea aside as having no basis in fact. The Soviet Union has assumed a definite attitude regarding the Algerian problem, based on fundamental Soviet foreign policy. It has no ulterior motives. Any attempts to cast doubt on this are unfounded.

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SECRETARY DULLES: We are aware that Soviet arms arriving in Syria are being transshipped, or the arms they replace are being currently shipped, to rebels in Algeria. We assume the Soviet Union has an interest in this.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: This has nothing to do with the Soviet Union.

Speaking of Algeria, if US policy were more objective and more inclined to the vital interest of both parties, it would be helpful. In our view, the US policy is not doing everything it could in this respect.

Regarding Central Europe and Germany, I asked Mr. Dulles previously what he meant by Central Europe. His explanation showed that he referred not only to Germany but to some other countries. I must say at the outset that the question of Central Europe—and not only Central Europe but Eastern Europe as well (it doesn't matter where these countries are put)—cannot be the subject of any discussion between the Soviet Union and the United States. The same position holds for Germany. When the Government of the United States tried to make this area the subject of discussion at Geneva, the Soviet Government pointed out that it cannot have the countries there be the subject of discussion—Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia or any other People's Democracy. It is a matter of their internal affairs.

Just as the United States or the Soviet Union or any other country should decide for itself, the people of these countries should decide their own internal affairs, including the type of government they want. There can be no question of setting up a government which might be 50% satisfactory to the US and 50% satisfactory to the Soviet Union—only 100% in accord with the wishes of the people of these countries.

No country has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of those countries. I can only express surprise that Mr. Dulles raised the matter and at the hint that a situation might arise in which the US would not be able to remain aloof. The internal affairs and the foreign relations of the countries concerned can only be determined by them. They have chosen their own way of development whether this is liked by the US or any other country. There is no question of any recipes or suggestions from the outside as to how these countries can act. Mr. Dulles referred to Finland and Yugoslavia and put forth the idea that some of these countries should follow the same pattern. There is no need of recipes from the outside. Only these countries themselves can decide what they want. For that reason, the Soviet Government rejects any attempts at interference in the internal affairs of these countries.

As for situations which may arise in the area, these might arise in different ways. If they concern internal affairs, the people should decide the matter themselves. If peace is involved and the situation arises as a

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[result of activity by a third party from the outside, I emphasize that the Soviet Union is bound to these countries through its commitments in the Warsaw Treaty and would certainly fulfill those commitments. It is guided by its interests in the development of national independence and peaceful coexistence -- regardless of social systems.

Some similar thoughts to those regarding Eastern Europe were expressed by Mr. Dulles regarding the German problem. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, its position is absolutely clear and I can add little to what has already been stated by our government on that score. I repeat that we consider that now when two sovereign states are in existence there, the problem can be settled only through gradual rapprochement between these two parties. No other parties can help. Unfortunately, the Adenauer Government, the US Government and others are acting in the opposite direction. This only increases the problems between the two German states. Instead of facilitating their rapprochement, new difficulties are created. The Soviet Union will go to no conference at which the German problem is raised. The only way for settlement is by the Germans themselves.

Mr. Dulles mentioned the fact that the US Government understands the apprehensions the Soviet Union may have regarding the German problem from the viewpoint of its own security. Mr. Dulles also stressed the idea that the US did not seek a German settlement which would increase danger to Soviet security or enhance the power of NATO. This is not borne out by the facts. The latest Western proposals would naturally lead to that result. Mention is made to guarantees to be offered to the Soviet Union. Who would provide them? -- the military bloc of NATO? We believe that in accordance with the objective situation, NATO is the spearhead against the security of the USSR.

As to the possible situations which may arise regarding the position of Germany as hinted by Mr. Dulles in connection with the German Democratic Republic, these could also arise in different ways. If the situation involved the German Democratic Republic, including its relations with other states, it would be a matter for the GDR to deal with as a sovereign state. A different situation might arise if there were interference by third parties. This would be a threat to peace and security in Europe and I must say that the Soviet Union is bound by its Warsaw Pact obligations and would fulfill them with regard to the GDR as well as other countries mentioned. It stands to reason that the Soviet Government hopes that the situation in Europe will develop no serious complications giving rise to a threat to peace. If our two countries work together and facilitate cooperation between the two states for a settlement of the problem, this will be welcomed by the Soviet Union.

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I would like to add with regard to Germany, that in our view, the latest proposal of the GDR for a confederation of the two German states could provide an appropriate basis for gradual rapprochement and settlement between the two Germanys. Adenauer and others are pretending not to notice the GDR. In so doing, they are deepening the chasm between the two.]



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Of course, it was not a new idea that Mr. Dulles expressed in talking about the importance of the cessation of production of weapons from new fissionable material. There has been previous discussion on this question. Agreement on the basis of that proposal is impossible. We believe it would not improve the situation but lead to a deterioration of it. The production of weapons from newly produced fissionable material would be stopped, but the stockpiles of weapons would remain untouched, and the weapons themselves would not be prohibited. This would be tantamount to the legalization of nuclear weapons. This would be unacceptable. In our view, there is a possibility of an understanding on disarmament. Experience shows, however, that the problem as a whole is difficult. We should move to a partial agreement. We believe that the point mentioned by Mr. Dulles is no subject for agreement at the present time.

I will refer to other points on which we think agreement can be reached. First there is the question of the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen tests. We are convinced that this is one of the questions on which agreement can be reached even now. There are no objective obstacles to it providing there is a desire on the part of the US and the Soviet Union to reach an understanding. We think that it would be possible to detect any violation of this understanding by observation. We have proposed installation of control instruments on the territory of the Soviet Union, the US, Great Britain, France and the Pacific Ocean. An agreement on this point would facilitate agreement on more complicated questions—not to mention other positive results. There does exist a real threat to the health of people and not only to their health alone. Test explosions are made to develop weapons of greater explosive force. Cessation of tests would stop this development. The Soviet Union has no more to gain by it than the US. Both the US and the Soviet Union and the common cause of peace stand to gain if the tests are stopped. We are sure that the Soviet Union is not more interested in stopping the tests than is the US. We mention this point because we believe that a suspension of tests would lead to a better atmosphere between our countries and a better world atmosphere. An agreement here might prove a turning point. It might result in an improvement in the situation and a better atmosphere in which other aspects of disarmament would be settled.

I would like to mention the possibility of agreement on the renunciation of the use of atomic weapons, without for the time-being liquidating stockpiles. This could be for 5 years, say, and we could revert to the matter later on.

The Soviet Union has made other proposals. We have called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, from the NATO countries, and from the Warsaw Pact countries. Has the Government of the US taken everything into consideration in this regard? Would the Government of the United States think it over once again? An agreement would be to the advantage of your country, of our country, and of world peace.

We also made proposals regarding conventional armaments. The figures coincided with certain figures suggested by the US. I won't talk about our proposals regarding the liquidation of military bases. You know them well enough.

I want to talk now about proposals for checking posts and for aerial photography. With regard to the question of inspection posts—our proposal—we do

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[not put this forward separately from our other proposals for partial disarmament. We do look upon it as our proposal when it is combined with ^{our} other proposals. However, when it is detached from our other proposals, we do not look upon it as our proposal. We give consideration to this proposal in relation to other measures of disarmament and with initial measures in the field of nuclear weapons--that is, in connection with the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. When our proposal on inspection posts is thus connected with our other proposals, we consider it our own and a useful one. (In answer to a question from Secretary Dulles, Mr. Gromyko confirmed that he was at this point talking only about ground inspection--although at some future time ground posts could be installed at airports, he was still talking here about ground inspection.)

As far as aerial photography is concerned, the position of the Soviet Government was expressed immediately after the proposal advanced by President Eisenhower in an informal talk with Mr. Khrushchev. We reiterate that we believe it does not solve the question of the prevention of surprise attack--or ground inspection. In the beginning President Eisenhower did not link them at all. Last autumn we did agree to certain aerial photography. We advanced two proposals for zones, one in Europe and one in the Far East. This was done by Zorin in talks with Stassen in London. Unfortunately the West and the US did not show sufficient interest in those proposals. Two other ideas in the field of aerial photography were advanced--one in the Arctic region, not deserving serious consideration; the other for the whole territory of the US, the USSR and Canada, but it did not refer to other territories where military bases are located. (Secretary Dulles pointed out that this last point had been subsequently dealt with by him. Mr. Gromyko agreed but said he was describing the proposals as they were dealt with at the time.)

Why does one want to photograph the Arctic? All he would get would be pictures of ice, snow and polar bears.

SECRETARY DULLES: There have been Soviet explosions of nuclear devices in the area. On our part, there is an important base at Thule.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: What does this have to do with surprise attack?

SECRETARY DULLES: Everybody knows that surprise attacks are likely to come from the Arctic area. Air lines are beginning to cross the area with increasing frequency. We did in fact begin by proposing areas which would embrace the centers of military capacity--the territory of the US, the Soviet Union and other parts of Europe. You would not agree, so we proposed the Arctic as a beginning. This was an area with no political struggles and few population problems.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: As to aerial photography, the time is not yet ripe for an agreement. There is a lack of confidence between our two countries. We cannot consider it in earnest. Can anyone imagine British and American planes flying over the Soviet Union and Soviet planes flying over the US at the present time?

SECRETARY DULLES: As far as the US is concerned--yes.

MR. GROMYKO: Taking an objective view of the state of affairs, it is hardly

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possible to do so. At a later stage, when the state of international confidence improves to a necessary degree, the possibility may exist. But, at that time there would be no need for this nor other similar measures.

I have already touched upon the question of confidence. I cannot overemphasize the importance of the lack of confidence in international relations and the relations between our two countries that has been formed over a number of years and ask now that we try to establish a minimum of confidence. In our view a decisive role could be played by economic ties. At the present stage they are almost disrupted. Mr. Dulles did not refer to them. In our view, the establishment of economic relations is the most important--perhaps it is the most decisive element, in moving toward an improvement in our relations. Contacts in the field of culture, science and technology, of course, have an important part to play and we are interested in them. It is not our fault that such contacts are in a bad state. If we take all factors into consideration, economic ties are the only solution. We do not want it to be understood as if the Soviet Union were the only one interested in this, since both countries stand to gain--but the Soviet Union is interested. As a matter of fact, we believe that the disruption in economic ties was an advantage for us in the sense that it enabled us to develop certain fields of production we otherwise would not have had to develop, if it had not existed. However, economic ties would be beneficial to both parties. If any further proposals are put forward by the American side for the development of economic and political relations, we will welcome them. If Mr. Dulles and the US Government have any additional considerations, now or later, on the matters we talked about today, the Soviet Government is prepared to hear them and study them carefully. As I said before, we are in favor of an improvement in relations in all fields--political and economic--and in personal contacts on lower and higher levels. I will be in this country for a few more days. If nothing is forthcoming before then we are prepared to consider anything put forward through diplomatic channels. There is no lack of willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to do anything to improve relations.

SECRETARY DULLES: I appreciate your full exposition. We will study our notes carefully and see if there are any aspects of our discussion which suggest that fresh moves can usefully be made. Before we break up I wish to refer again to the situation in the Middle East and how we think at the present time. Mr. Gromyko may be assured that our concern regarding developments in Syria is not just that of the US. It arises from the fact that everyone surrounding Syria expressed great alarm to us, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Iraq and Turkey. When an event happens in a country and all five of its neighbors, who have differing views on many questions, are frightened about what has happened, we do not think it can be rejected as not a matter of broad international concern. We recognize that these countries do not wish to express concern publicly, though they do so in private, because of their concern with Arab unity. We hope the Soviet Union will help allay these fears.



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Turkey is not afraid of Syria. It is afraid of the Soviet Union in Syria. The Turkish Prime Minister expressed concern for its security. The Soviet Union can understand the concern of Turkey and Iraq who consider that the USSR is building a major base in Syria. We hope that the fears of these countries can and will be allayed. The fact that they existed is a reality.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: We think that whatever the Turks say, they really cannot believe there is any danger from the Soviet Union in Syria. With regard to the supposition that the Soviet Union is setting up a base in Syria, such a thought is absurd by whomever it is put forward. In his message to Prime Minister Menderes, Prime Minister Bulganin tried to explain the real state of affairs. Surely no threat to international peace can come from Syria. If proof is needed, the recent statements by Jordan and the other countries you name indicate that there are no such threats. Even supposing that at one time there could have been a misunderstanding about this, but now the situation has cleared sufficiently. We are trying to explain the situation as we see it. It will be well if the US acted in the same direction and explained the real situation to the Turks.

At any rate, could we not have at least an understanding on the non-use of force?

SECRETARY DULLES: We do not think that a mere repetition of the Charter obligations in the Middle East would have much effect. We will consider what action might be taken, study the notes, and may get in touch with you again.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: I will remain in the United States at least until October 15 in connection with the debate on disarmament in the UN.

SECRETARY DULLES: I will be busy with Canadian officials on Monday and Tuesday, and then will be occupied with the visit of the Queen of England. Perhaps if there is anything to discuss you could hold talks with Mr. Rountree, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs.

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: I will be pleased to do so.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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Return to
BOSS M. W.*

DATE: October 5, 1957

SUBJECT: Central Europe and German Reunification

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Dulles
Mr. Elbrick
Mr. Edward L. Freers
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Zaroubin
Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky

*OK for dist
wm*

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SECRETARY DULLES: The situation in Central Europe is very dangerous and explosive. We realize the Soviet Union feels that this should not concern us—only the Soviet Union. The fact is, if there should be a series of explosive situations, it would not be easy to assure that the situation would not involve us. We believe the Soviet Union ought to have friendly nations and friendly governments along its borders. We have no intention of trying to develop a cordon sanitaire around it. The Soviet Union is entitled to a sense of security. If a relationship could be developed with other bordering countries similar to that between Finland and the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, with a sense of independence and yet close relations, this would be a very acceptable solution. What we are afraid of is the question that arises from national aspirations, very old and persistent, that survive in the Eastern European countries even after many occupations. We do not believe it possible, without great danger at least, to deny them a greater measure of national independence nor to deny the urge for unity felt by such a great people as the Germans. We are willing to consider any formula regarding Germany which would eliminate danger to the Soviet Union and bring about reunification. In pursuing the latter we don't want to jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union nor increase the power of NATO. We do fear the danger in the situation existing in Germany and the satellite countries. The longer the present situation prevails the greater the danger—and any hope of the Russian people that their security/ ^{will} not be endangered diminishes as well. We are anxious to find a basis for cooperation to eliminate the dangerous situation and do not seek gain for ourselves. A solution would afford much greater security. . . .

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MR. GROMYKO:

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MR. GROMYKO: Before referring to the topics raised by Secretary Dulles, Mr. Gromyko asked for a translation of the Secretary's remarks concerning Central Europe and Algeria. Then he asked whether the Secretary in speaking of Germany referred not only to Germany but also Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

THE SECRETARY said yes and repeated that if these countries achieved a relationship with the Soviet Union like that of Finland and Yugoslavia this should be entirely satisfactory both for the Soviet Union and ourselves. . . .

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: . . . Regarding Central Europe and Germany, I asked Mr. Dulles previously what he meant by Central Europe. His explanation showed that he referred not only to Germany but to some other countries. I must say at the outset that the question of Central Europe—and not only Central Europe but Eastern Europe as well (it doesn't matter where these countries are put)—cannot be the subject of any discussion between the Soviet Union and the United States. The same position holds for Germany. When the Government of the United States tried to make this area the subject of discussion at Geneva, the Soviet Government pointed out that it cannot have the countries there be the subject of discussion—Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia or any other People's Democracy. It is a matter of their internal affairs.

Just as the United States or the Soviet Union or any other country should decide for itself, the people of these countries should decide their own internal affairs, including the type of government they want. There can be no question of setting up a government which might be 50% satisfactory to the US and 50% satisfactory to the Soviet Union—only 100% in accord with the wishes of the people of these countries.

No country has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of those countries. I can only express surprise that Mr. Dulles raised the matter and at the hint that a situation might arise in which the US would not be able to remain aloof. The internal affairs and the foreign relations of the countries concerned can only be determined by them. They have chosen their own way of development whether this is liked by the US or any other country. There is no question of any recipes or suggestions from the outside as to how these countries can act. Mr. Dulles referred to Finland and Yugoslavia and put forth the idea that some of these countries should follow the same pattern. There is no need of recipes from the outside. Only these countries themselves can decide what they want. For that reason, the Soviet Government rejects any attempts at interference in the internal affairs of these countries.

As for situations which may arise in the area, these might arise in different ways. If they concern internal affairs, the people should decide the matter themselves. If peace is involved and the situation arises as a result of activity by a third party from the outside, I emphasize that the Soviet Union is bound to these countries through its commitments in the Warsaw Treaty and would certainly fulfill those commitments. It is guided by its interests in the development of national independence and peaceful coexistence—regardless of social systems.

Some similar thoughts to those regarding Eastern Europe were expressed by Mr. Dulles regarding the German problem. As far as the Soviet Union is

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concerned, its position is absolutely clear and I can add little to what has already been stated by our government on that score. I repeat that we consider that now when two sovereign states are in existence there, the problem can be settled only through gradual rapprochement between these two parties. No other parties can help. Unfortunately, the Adenauer Government, the US Government and others are acting in the opposite direction. This only increases the problems between the two German states. Instead of facilitating their rapprochement, new difficulties are created. The Soviet Union will go to no conference at which the German problem is raised. The only way for settlement is by the Germans themselves.

Mr. Dulles mentioned the fact that the US Government understands the apprehensions the Soviet Union may have regarding the German problem from the viewpoint of its own security. Mr. Dulles also stressed the idea that the US did not seek a German settlement which would increase danger to Soviet security or enhance the power of NATO. This is not borne out by the facts. The latest Western proposals would naturally lead to that result. Mention is made to guarantees to be offered to the Soviet Union. Who would provide them? -- the military bloc of NATO? We believe that in accordance with the objective situation NATO is the spearhead against the security of the USSR.

As to the possible situations which may arise regarding the position of Germany as hinted by Mr. Dulles in connection with the German Democratic Republic, these could also arise in different ways. If the situation involved the German Democratic Republic, including its relations with other states, it would be a matter for the GDR to deal with as a sovereign state. A different situation might arise if there were interference by third parties. This would be a threat to peace and security in Europe and I must say that the Soviet Union is bound by its Warsaw Pact obligations and would fulfill them with regard to the GDR as well as other countries mentioned. It stands to reason that the Soviet Government hopes that the situation in Europe will develop no serious complications giving rise to a threat to peace. If our two countries work together and facilitate cooperation between the two states for a settlement of the problem, this will be welcomed by the Soviet Union.

I would like to add with regard to Germany, that in our view, the latest proposal of the GDR for a confederation of the two German states could provide an appropriate basis for gradual rapprochement and settlement between the two Germanys. Adenauer and others are pretending not to notice the GDR. In so doing, they are deepening the chasm between the two. . . .

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 7, 1957

SUBJECT: Secretary Dulles' Conversation with Gromyko

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Albrecht von Kessel, Chargé d'Affaires, German Embassy
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Mr. J. J. Reinstein, GER

COPIES TO: EUR
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Embassy, Bonn (2)

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Mr. von Kessel called at his request to inquire regarding the Secretary's conversation with Gromyko of October 5. Mr. Elbrick said that the conversation had been devoted principally to the Middle East, which he estimated had taken up three-quarters of their time. He said that a good deal of time had been consumed in the translation from Russian into English of Gromyko's remarks.

Mr. Elbrick said that Gromyko had spoken in a diplomatic manner. He said that the Secretary had, at the outset of the conversation, referred to the launching of the Soviet earth satellite, which he had said represented a distinctive scientific achievement. Gromyko had responded that the Soviets hoped that it would benefit science throughout the world.

Mr. Elbrick said the Secretary had made it very clear to Gromyko that the United States did not intend to stand idly by and see the Soviets take over the Middle East. He said that the policy of the United States was to support the independence of the countries in the area. It had made this very clear in the Suez crisis when it had opposed the actions of its friends. We did not now intend to see the Soviets come in and take over the position which the British and French had formerly held. The Secretary had referred to Soviet arms shipments to Syria. He said that we had evidence that arms had gone on to Algeria and that we had the impression that the Soviets were trying to take advantage of any disturbance which occurred in the area.

Gromyko had responded that it was the policy of the Soviet Government to support the independence of the countries in the Middle East. Gromyko suggested that the Middle Eastern problem would be taken care of if the United States would agree to the principles which the Soviets had proposed in their recent note

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regarding the Middle East, among them the cessation of arms shipments to the area. In the course of the conversation, it was made clear that the Soviet proposal related to both the Near East and the Middle East. Gromyko denied that Soviet arms were going to Algeria. He said that the Soviet position with regard to Algeria was still that which had been stated to Mollet during his visit to Moscow last year. This was that the Soviets would like to see a solution which is mutually acceptable to the French and the Algerians. Gromyko implied that the United States was not using its influence sufficiently to promote such a settlement.

On the subject of disarmament, Gromyko had indicated it was impossible to conceive of aerial inspection in the present state of tension. He said he could not conceive of American planes flying over the Soviet Union or Soviet planes flying over the United States. The Secretary interjected that we could conceive of such arrangements. Gromyko indicated that the same difficulties would not apply to ground inspection.

Gromyko had refused to discuss the subject of Eastern Europe, saying that he could not engage in a discussion of internal affairs of the sovereign countries of Eastern Europe, but stated that the Soviet Union would carry out its commitments to these countries under the Warsaw Pact. He remarked that it was impossible to have a situation in Eastern Europe in which the governments would take positions which would be fifty per cent acceptable to the United States and fifty per cent acceptable to the Soviet Union. What was necessary was that the governments take a position which was one-hundred per cent acceptable to the people of these countries. The Secretary asked for a repetition of this sentence.

Gromyko had brushed aside the question of Germany completely, stating that the Soviet Union would not attend any meeting at which the German question could be raised, since this was a matter to be worked out by the Germans themselves.


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Following basic points made during Secretary's conversation with Gromyko October 5. Mailing should make statement along these lines at private NAC meeting October 9.

Secretary expressed concern about deterioration in US-Soviet relations in recent months and referred to Soviet attitude reflected most recently in Gromyko's press conference and latest Middle East note. Secretary said he wanted use Gromyko's presence here to clarify US position and seek clarification Soviet intentions and positions.

US especially concerned about Middle East. Our interest there is peace and maintenance independence countries of area.

Therefore Soviets should not miscalculate how strongly we feel about keeping USSR out of Middle East.

In reply, Gromyko remarked Soviets also concerned about area adjacent to them and particularly disturbed by recurring crises such as Suez last year and Syria

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Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

John Foster Dulles

Mr. Elbrick

RA - Mr. Timmons
- Mr. McBride

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Syria now. He said Soviet Union has no intention whatever of replacing other powers there. It is only interested in peace. He charged West underestimated desire ME countries, particularly Arab countries, for independence and tranquillity. These desires coincide with those of Soviet Union which cannot remain indifferent owing to geographical location of area. Repeatedly stressed USSR could not remain passive observer. Blamed Eisenhower doctrine, 6th Fleet, Western arms, and Turkey's troop concentrations for trend against normalization. Called for understanding regarding non-interference with Arab countries in any form and variant suggested in three Soviet notes on ME this year. Said Turkey and Iran included in ME but membership some countries BP should not prevent understanding.

Secretary made clear our concern regarding Syria arose from alarm of its five neighbors even though their public statements in UN might not reflect what said to us in private. Our view that Turkey not afraid of Syria, but ^{of} Soviet Union in Syria. Gromyko rejected any suggestion Soviet Union interested making Syria military base. He said alarm now over and we should work for normalization.

Secretary pointed out dangers in situation in Central and Eastern Europe, including Germany, where explosions might get out of hand and even involve us. Gromyko said Eastern and Central Europe, including East Germany, not subject for discussion between us. Regarding Germany, repeated standard line problem can only be solved by gradual rapprochement between two Germanies. He said Soviet Union would attend no repeat no conference where subject of Germany would be raised. As to explosive situations in EE, if they concerned internal affairs, people themselves should decide. If third parties involved, he emphasized Soviet Union bound to these countries by Warsaw Pact

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October 18, 1957

MEMORANDUM

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 340th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, October 17, 1957

Present at the 340th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State; Frank Wisner, Central Intelligence Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Cutler, Randall and Dearborn; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. U. S. POLICY ON FRANCE
(NSC 5614/1; NSC 5433/1; NSC 5719/1; NIE 22-57; NSC 5721; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 9, 1957)
2. INCREASED SHARING WITH SELECTED ALLIES OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION RELATIVE TO MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND ITS APPLICATION

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council in considerable detail on the contents of the proposed policy statement on France (NSC 5721), dealing in particular with paragraph 41, reading as follows:

"41. In the light of the availability of U. S. resources and over-all demands upon them, continue to furnish France military assistance for the purpose of assisting France to fulfill the missions of its U. S.-approved military forces for NATO, and endeavor to assure that MAP materiel will be used only in support of French military operations consonant with U. S. policy.

1987/1003
Box 9
NSC Summaries of Discussion

Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers as
President of the United States,
1953-61 (Ann Whitman File)

NSC SERIES

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

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MR 79-72 #6
BY DJH DATE 11/9/86

NSC Letter 8/20/86
NLE DATE 10/30/86

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The President again expressed anxiety as to how the case could be presented to the Congress. The Congress will not be content with generalities any more in the field of foreign military assistance. We have got to give them some specific ideas about our plans. Secretary Dulles commented that the Congress always wanted precision in these matters. Congress always wanted to pin you down. But you cannot run foreign policy on that kind of a basis, although it was possible to plan on that basis. A situation might even arise in which the President would want to provide France with assistance from his emergency funds.

Reverting once again to the forthcoming meeting with the legislative leaders in The White House, the President said he was perfectly willing to emphasize the importance of France and the fluidity of the French situation in order to convince these legislative leaders that we could not produce fixed conclusions at this time. Nevertheless, we ought to be able to indicate some general figure representing the costs which were likely to be involved.

Mr. Cutler said he believed he had sufficient guidance to work out the problem of paragraph 41, and asked the Council to direct its attention to paragraph 44, which also contained a significant split. He read this paragraph, as follows:

"44. a. Explore means, within the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, for the positioning of nuclear weapons, and, when released by Presidential directive, their rapid turn-over to NATO forces, including French components, for use in carrying out the military tasks assigned these forces within NATO policy and plans for defense of NATO areas, including France.

"b. Endeavor to secure atomic storage rights in France for the United States as soon as possible.

"c. Advise France that should it undertake independent production of nuclear weapons contrary to U. S. advice; the United States would be compelled to reexamine its policies and programs for military assistance.*

* Treasury proposal."

When Mr. Cutler had concluded, he also read to the Council a proposal for a revision of subparagraph 44-c, made by the Secretary of the Treasury. He likewise pointed out that in their written views the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended the deletion of subparagraphs 44-a and 44-c. Finally, he explained the general view of the Planning

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Board that the course of action in subparagraph 44-a simply made explicit what had been implicit in our basic national security policy paragraph 17 of NSC 5707/8--which read as follows:

".....the United States should continue to provide to allies capable of using them effectively advanced weapons systems (including nuclear weapons systems less nuclear elements)."

Mr. Cutler pointed out that this provision obviously implied that in time of war the United States would furnish to these capable allies the necessary nuclear warheads for rapid use of the weapons. (Mr. Cutler was thus taking issue with the point made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that subparagraph 44-a was not in consonance with paragraph 17 of our basic national security policy.)

Stating that he understood that Secretary Quarles had in mind a solution to the problem of subparagraph 44-a, Mr. Cutler called on Secretary Quarles to make a statement. Secretary Quarles replied that he had no difference of opinion as to the merits of subparagraph 44-a except with regard to the last sentence. All the other differences respecting this paragraph between the Departments of State and Defense had now been reconciled. He would therefore accept subparagraph 44-a with the recommendation that the last sentence be deleted, on grounds that it did not constitute an important national objective and that it was not pertinent to the rest of subparagraph 44-a. This recommendation, continued Secretary Quarles, also indicated the opposition of the Defense Department to the inclusion of subparagraph 44-c, as proposed by the Treasury Department.

Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Anderson to express the views of the Treasury Department as to subparagraph 44-c. Secretary Anderson replied that all he wished to say in defense of subparagraph 44-c was that the United States had, after all, only so much resources to assist its allies all over the world. If the French should now insist on spending millions of dollars on a program to produce nuclear weapons independently, we should accordingly re-examine our policy toward France. The French make more money per capita than any other Free World country except the United States. There was no reason, therefore, that we should not bear down on them with regard to this great expenditure for nuclear weapons.

The President said he wished to remind the Council that our basic constitutional requirement was to provide for the national defense. He said he could detect an analogy with the difficult British decision not to provide Spitfires for the French when Hitler was on the point of conquering France. This decision was made on the basis that it was necessary to retain these aircraft in Britain to save Britain itself from the Nazis, and it was the right decision. On

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the other hand, we are now telling the French in subparagraph 44-c, in effect, that if they do not do what we want them to do in the matter of nuclear weapons, we will give them no further help. Such a course of action would constitute a very grave mistake. We should certainly try to persuade the French not to embark on a course of action to fabricate nuclear weapons; but we should not exert force on the French to prevent them from doing this. If we did so we would sacrifice everything that we had built up in NATO.

Continuing, the President urged with great forcefulness the vital necessity of a fuller exchange of scientific information bearing on military matters between ourselves and our NATO allies. This point of view had been strongly pressed with the President just the other day at his meeting with the scientists who compose the Science Advisory Committee. He agreed with them emphatically, and insisted that we must find a way to get rid of the restrictions which prevent the right kind of exchange of scientific information between ourselves and our allies. He wished that Admiral Strauss, together with the Defense and State Departments, should prepare a complete proposed revision of existing statutes governing the exchange of military information of the sort he had in mind, so that the recommendations could be presented to the Congress. If we kept on as we were now doing, we would end up without any reliable allies.

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Governor Stassen suggested the possibility of developing an integrated NATO force with atomic capabilities as an alternative to creating a whole series of nations with independent atomic capabilities. This was something along the lines of the old EDC military concept. Mr. Cutler commented that such an idea as this could be considered in the context of subparagraph 44-a as now written.

Secretary Dulles said he hoped that the President's idea, of having State, Defense and AEC get together on recommending means of facilitating an increased exchange of scientific military information with our allies, would not be overlooked. Mr. Cutler said that the President's suggestion would go into the Record of Actions of the Council meeting. The Vice President also spoke of the timeliness of the President's proposal.

(At this point the Secretary of State left the meeting. He was replaced at the table by Assistant Secretary Gerard C. Smith.)

The President once again emphasized his very strong belief in the desirability of pooling the scientific resources of the United States, the NATO powers, and other friendly countries. He likewise spoke contemptuously of General Groves' exaggerated regard for secrecy.

The Vice President pointed out that the President's old idea for the creation of an academy of sciences was not only being picked up again by the press, but was apparently being adopted by the Democrats. He thought that the opportunity to create such an academy was better at this moment than it had ever been before.

Admiral Strauss pointed out that there was currently going on a meeting at Princeton of two teams of British and U. S. scientists, who had been working on the problem of controlled thermonuclear reaction. There had been a scientific break-through on this very significant problem, and there would presently be a joint announcement by the U. S. and British scientists, both of which groups had been responsible for the break-through.

The National Security Council (Action on Item 1):

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy contained in NSC 5721, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 9, 1957.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5721, subject to the following amendments:

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- (1) Pages 23-24, paragraph 41: Delete the bracketed subparagraphs and the footnote thereto, subject to the understanding indicated in c below.
- (2) Page 24, subparagraph 44-t: Delete the last sentence.
- (3) Page 24, subparagraph 44-c: Delete, and substitute the following:

"c. On the basis that it is in the best interests of all countries concerned to discourage production of nuclear weapons by a fourth country, seek to persuade France not to undertake independent production of such weapons. Assure France that the United States will find ways to make nuclear weapons available to NATO allies in the event of aggression against NATO."

c. Noted that the Department of Defense, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, would give consideration, in planning the FY 1959 Military Assistance Program for France, to the following proposal by the majority of the NSC Planning Board, which was deleted from the statement of policy in NSC 5721 by the action in b-(1) above:

"a. Through and after FY 1958 provide France with grant aid, in an amount determined in accordance with the criteria established in paragraph 17 of NSC 5707/8, for advanced weapons systems from the NATO regional program.

"b. Through FY 1958 provide France conventional military assistance on a grant basis.

"c. (1) After FY 1958 provide France conventional military assistance on a reimbursable basis (possibly including payment in francs) to the maximum extent practicable. If such reimbursable assistance will not meet essential French requirements, be prepared, in the light of the availability of U. S. resources and overall demands upon them, to provide France with a limited amount of grant aid for the above purpose.

"(2) Unless by the end of FY 1958 France has demonstrated that it will redeploy its NATO-committed forces from Algeria to continental

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Europe and will provide substantially for the maintenance and modernization of its conventional forces, review U. S. aid policy toward France."

NOTE: NSC 5721, as amended and adopted, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5721/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense

The National Security Council (Action on Item 2):

Noted the President's directive to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to review, and, in consultation with the Attorney General and others having responsibility, to submit recommended revisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and other relevant statutes, and relevant Executive Orders and security regulations; with a view to facilitating increased sharing with selected allies of scientific information relating to military research and development, and its application.

NOTE: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate implementation.

3. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

The Director of Central Intelligence commented briefly on the French governmental crisis, the strike of yesterday in France, and the Communist demonstrations which were scheduled to occur today. It was very hard to discern the true purpose of the proposed Communist demonstrations. Were they seeking to bring De Gaulle back into power?

The President said he supposed that the Communists' objective was the creation of a Communist government in France. Mr. Allen Dulles said that this of course would be premature. Governor Stassen suggested that the French Communists were trying to create such chaos in France that any future French government would be obliged to agree to Communist participation.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that the West German reaction to Tito's recognition of East Germany had been very strong. There was a dilemma involved. The Federal Republic does not want to break relations with

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MESSAGE

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DATE 11 Apr 1978

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The current atmosphere in Europe strongly supports the desirability of the United States assuming the initiative in emphasizing the qualities of solidarity and mutual trust on which the NATO alliance is based. However, any action which would be interpreted as being hastily improvised because of concern over ICBM, Sputnik, Middle East situation, etc, would lose much of its effect.

The NATO atomic stockpile subject appears to have possibilities in this connection. Public statements by the President, the Secy of State, and others, have indicated that this matter has been under consideration for a long time, and therefore a move in this direction could be made to appear as a normal development rather than as a quickly contrived maneuver. My views on the intrinsic advantages of the NATO atomic stockpile have already been reported to you. I now feel strongly that the current situation adds weight to the case already presented. I therefore recommend that the United States indicate to the North Atlantic Council its readiness to consult with its NATO allies on the constitution of a NATO atomic stockpile on the basis outlined in my previous message on this subject.

The action recommended continues to have a sound and urgent military basis. Although an announcement may at this time be regarded as both little and late from the standpoint of the political and psychological effect originally contemplated, the informal opinion of several council members suggests that, in the light of developments of the last few weeks, much of its usefulness in this respect could now be

See Suppl. attached.

GEN WENTWORTH (S JCS) 31

DA IN 64141

(21 OCT 57)

Ref on JCS 2019/203
wsm

OCS FORM 375-4 REPLACES OCS FORM 375-4 1 MAR 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

NR: ALO 957

PAGE 2

retrieved. As to timing, it is obvious that there will be a tendency to interpret any development which follows the arrival of MacMillan in Washington on Wednesday as having a particular Anglo-American coloration ***** as this sub ***** and should bear the mark of U.S. rather than U.K. initiative.

* ← where as this subject should be handled in a NATO context

Note: ***Being serviced

* Per Supplement attached.

ACTION: GEN TWINING (GJCS)

INFO: SECY MCELROY-(OSD)

DA IN 64141

(21 Oct 57)

JK/10

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DDE (AWP) DDE Bureau Box 27
Folder: OGI's 7 Staff Note (1)

~~10/31/57~~
10/22/57
(2)

~~SECRET~~

October 31, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
October 22, 1957

Others present:

Secretary Dulles, Mr. Berding,
Ambassador Whitney, Ambassador
Merchant, Mr. John Jones, Mr.
Hagerty, General Goodpaster



Secretary Dulles began by reviewing with the President a proposed schedule for Prime Minister Macmillan's visit. It was decided that the "supper" with the President the first night would be attended by the Secretary, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Lloyd, in addition to the President. The dinner on Thursday night would be attended by a larger group.

Secretary Dulles then reviewed the briefing memorandum with the President. He said that we must recognize that there are some differences in purpose between ourselves and the British regarding the meeting. They wish to stress their special relationship with us. From our standpoint whatever is issued must demonstrate our interest in all of our allies. He said we must recognize that our alliances are approaching a somewhat precarious state. Our allies feel that they are increasingly dependent upon nuclear weapons, but they are remote from the decisions regarding these weapons. He felt it is quite essential to make some progress on the NATO atomic stockpile. He has been pushing the matter hard with Defense, who have been seven months at it already. (He thought the stockpile must be under NATO control, specifically under a U. S. officer.) He said he was meeting with Defense later in the day to try to whip the matter into some shape. Also, he felt that it is time to close up the IRBM agreement with Britain and then to extend it to other countries. We cannot in his opinion tell our alliances in effect that these new weapons are becoming conventional weapons, and at the same time tell them that they cannot have such weapons. He felt that now is the time for a decision in this matter -- the alternative is that the alliances will fall apart. The President said he hoped to use the meeting as an occasion to tell our people more of the significance of these weapons -- to educate them that they are becoming conventional and that we cannot deny them to our allies.

q m PAV

q m PAV

return

Classified on 5/25/82
by the National Security Council
under provisions of E.O. 12065

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by BSR

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Mr. Dulles pointed out that some of the proposals would require a change in the legislation, and he and the President agreed that we should announce that we will ask for changes in the legislation.


Mr. Dulles next referred to our policy regarding China. Many Britishers now are coming to think that we are right in our policy on non-recognition. In the Persian Gulf, we should press the British to get together with King Saud. With regard to the common market, there are some signs of undercover resistance by the British, and we should tell them that this will not do. He said we also need a position on the Turkish-Syrian situation and Tunis-Algeria.

The President advanced an idea of much more intimate collaboration between the British and ourselves in the military field. If each assigns truly outstanding men to the Standing Group, they could meet quite informally and see that we have complete understanding and unity of view.

The President said the U K agenda (which Secretary Dulles showed him) tends to suggest that they are trying for a formally recognized two-country relationship, which could then be extended to others. He wondered if we could turn this around and work through our alliances to maintain the closest possible contact with the British on matters of common concern. Mr. Dulles said we should take the kinds of action that we can broaden to the whole alliance. The President asked if we could stress that we and the British are the only countries producing atomic weapons and that we are meeting to see how we can help our allies. Secretary Dulles thought it would be best not to overstress the two-country monopoly, but rather to talk in terms of the alliances as a whole.

The Secretary raised the idea of a meeting of Heads of Government at the NATO session in Paris in December. The President could attend that without a series of ceremonial visits to other capitals. Mr. Spaak should have a major part in such a suggestion.

The President said that he has frequently wondered how it might be possible to meet and talk for just a few hours every now and then with Macmillan, perhaps at some intermediate point such as Gander. Secretary Dulles said he agreed as to the desirability but did not see how it could practically be done.


A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

10/22/57

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Personal and Private
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October 22, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY

Participants: Prime Minister Macmillan
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
Secretary Dulles



We spent a few minutes diagnosing the broad problem that confronts the free nations and found ourselves in substantial agreement, along the following lines:

Nuclear power is coming to play an ever-increasing role both in offense and defense. The result of this is to leave in a state of considerable uncertainty and bewilderment those allies who do not themselves possess nuclear power, who do not have access to knowledge about the uses of nuclear power and other developments in that respect, and who feel that they would have no voice in the decisions as to whether to use nuclear power if the decision had to be made in their interest. Also as Soviet capacity for destroying the United States and the United Kingdom increases, there is increasing doubt as to whether, in fact, they would take the risks inherent in the use of nuclear power to defend their allies.

Also as the cost of nuclear developments increase, there is less and less capacity, and perhaps utility, in carrying out the "shield" concept.

Originally NATO was conceived on the theory that it would have a very large number of ready divisions sufficient to defend Europe. This concept was never realized and it is further than ever from realization today both from the standpoint of cost and from the standpoint of military strategy.

I pointed out the problem we confronted in Korea as illustrative of the problem we confront everywhere. We have been spending there nearly

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Personal and Private
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Authority MR 85-736 #3

By bc NLE Date 7/21/07

Dulles Pp/WHM/5/WH CVRres. - General 1957 (2) = 1987/3272

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a billion dollars a year for what actually is largely unnecessary except from a psychological standpoint and we cannot afford to go on doing that kind of thing around the world. On the other hand, the problem of a transition is admittedly a very difficult and delicate one.

I suggested that it might be necessary and advisable to move toward some allied representation centered in Washington, where there would be a greater sense of participation in the creation of community defensive power and decisions as to its use, which is now largely centered in Washington rather than in Paris. On the other hand, steps of this sort and comparable steps in relation to other regional groupings would have to be taken with the greatest caution and delicacy, so as to effectuate the orderly and constructive transition rather than the demolition of what now existed.

The Prime Minister said that he had sometimes thought of trying to create a new organization which would in many respects be a substitute for the United Nations, leaving the United Nations somewhat in the titular role of the House of Lords. He had felt, however, that this would have the tendency to alienate the neutralists who attached great importance to the United Nations and whom we needed to attract rather than to alienate.

I said that I had gone through much the same mental process and had thought of an organization comprehending all our allies, about 50 in number, but that I had come to the conclusion that any approach should be on a regional basis and not on a global basis which would seem to compete with the United Nations.

I referred to Clarence Streit's "Union Now" and said that his diagnosis was the same as that which we were now making and that as a diagnosis it was unimpeachable. However, our task was to find a politically practical solution rather than a solution which, while theoretically perfect, was impractical politically. The Prime Minister agreed, adding that the President had still three years in office, that I, he hoped, had three years still in office, and that he had two years still in office. This assured a possibility of our doing something that would live after us for the benefit of our posterity. If we could make this a living organism during the next

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couple of years, it would then not be destroyed even by governments which perhaps would not themselves have adopted our line of approach.

We agreed that this problem of what to do in relation to our mutual security arrangements was the overriding one which should be the primary object of discussion here in Washington and that we should concentrate in thinking of what practically to do to translate our ideas into reality.

There was some talk about a declaration. The Prime Minister said that he had been giving some thought to that. Selwyn Lloyd seemed to take a negative view toward any public declaration. But the Prime Minister and I agreed that if we could find practical ways to be quietly pursued to achieve greater unity under the new conditions, then it would probably be useful to make a public declaration which would help to create the atmosphere conducive to the quiet realization of our more concrete objectives. It was agreed that we would meet in intimacy again at three p.m. to try and shape up our thoughts toward the discussion with the President this evening.



S JFDulles:ma

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3272

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as
President of the United States,
1953-61 (Ann Whitman File)

DULLES WERTER SERIES

Box 7

Dulles, JF Oct. 1957 (1)

23

October 22, 1957

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AT THE BRITISH
EMBASSY

Participants: Prime Minister Macmillan
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
Secretary Dulles



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Authority MR 85-569 #4

By bc NLE Date 7/25/86

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TOP SECRET

-3-

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Translating Eisenhower-Macmillan Communique
of October 25, 1957 into NATO Planning

I. "...our possession of nuclear weapons power
as a trust for the defense of the free world."

The December meeting is the first occasion
for starting to fulfill the trust declared on
October 25, 1957 by the Heads of Government of the
U.S. and the U.K. To derive the most benefit from
this trust, we believe that appropriate NATO allies
should have a greater part with us in maintaining
the nuclear deterrent to war. This calls for two
moves:



A. Greater disclosure about the nuclear force
available for NATO's defense and the resolution and
responsibility with which it is held;

B. Providing NATO a share of the nuclear force
under appropriate safeguards.

1. "...this community...should possess more
knowledge of the total capabilities of security...".

There can be no real mutual security without
mutual confidence. It is difficult to maintain
confidence among states in the midst of the uncertainties

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
resulting from the development of awesome nuclear weapons capabilities. There is real danger that failure to have common understanding on matters of atomic weapons policy will critically weaken the mutual confidence of the NATO allies.

The unique problems involved in the possession and use of nuclear weapons should be shared with other members of the community -- with resulting advantage to both the military and the political aspects of our international relationships.



Our allies should be taken more into our confidence. They should have information they need to know in order to increase understanding of nuclear weapons and their political significance, e.g.,

(a) They should become more knowledgeable as to what nuclear weapons can do and what limitations there are on their effective use.



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
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(d) The possibilities of and limitations on a "restrained" use of nuclear weapons should be known by them.

(e) In general terms, our allies should know our thinking about the place of very small nuclear weapons in warfare.

(f) The prospect for U.S. and U.K. long-range missile development is an important factor for European confidence in their future.



(g) Central to a better understanding of the nuclear situation is our estimate of the state of Soviet nuclear development and missile weaponizing. If confidence among the NATO allies is to be put on a higher plane, more US/UK intelligence on Soviet development should be disclosed to other NATO nations.

(h) The prospect for defense against long-range missiles is a matter of first interest to our European allies. Current U.S. and U.K. projections on this

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score should be made available to NATO in such detail as security permits.

So long as major allies continue to approach the nuclear question separately, danger of serious misunderstandings persists. If a common appreciation and approach to the use of nuclear weapons can be obtained, the security of NATO will be increased.


In view of their great current psychological impact and long-range military and arms control significance, we should disclose to NATO our thinking and planning for earth satellites and our estimate of Soviet capabilities.



2. "...security now depends...upon...the deterrent and retaliatory power of nuclear weapons".

"...greater opportunity to assure that this power will in fact be available...".


A naked promise of nuclear protection by another is no longer a sound basis for any major country's security.




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The United States conceives of NATO as something more than a military asset to be used in whatever manner immediate U.S. security interests suggest.



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There should be no inconsistency between any arrangement for an atomic stockpile and the provisions of the Western disarmament proposals of August 29, 1957.

3. "...it will not be misused by any nation...".

Greater communication between our governments of planning for the use of nuclear weapons leading to a common appreciation of their problems will reduce fears that these weapons might be used irresponsibly or for purposes other than individual or collective self-defense, as authorized by the Charter of the UN. The fears and feelings of other members of the community are legitimate factors in any process leading to use or failure to use this tremendous new military force. Consideration should be given to the establishment of an appropriate consultative arrangement.* Such ~~arrangement~~ ^{arrangement could permit} the latest thinking



* perhaps a consultative committee in Washington.

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of top American officials on nuclear weapons use policy, and these officials could get first-hand views of the allies on nuclear weapons policy. In addition, such ^{an arrangement} ~~agreement~~ could be used as the institutional device to accomplish the purposes considered in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of this paper.

4. "It is not within the capacity of each nation acting alone to make itself fully secure. Only collective measures will suffice."

The community control we hope to build in order to assure readiness and availability to NATO of nuclear force in the event of attack will in itself be a further guarantee against irresponsible use.

A major element in the nuclear deterrent of the future will be a long-range ballistic missile. The U.S. is starting large-scale production of missiles capable of delivering tremendous blows against targets some 1,500 miles from the launching site. Any NATO military requirement for such weapons will be given high priority by the U.S. It is suggested that a NATO study be immediately started to determine where



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these could most advantageously be placed. It may be possible to start supplying such weapons as early as next year. This would be a new departure -- giving NATO European countries for the first time a share in the retaliatory force of the alliance.

A European production capacity for such missiles should be established in the near future. A European missile research and development capacity to design future missile types should also get underway now. U.S. transfers of missile technology will be essential to the success of any such venture. U.S. disclosure *policy* must be modified to enable this.

In very short order, we will have capability to send missiles to targets over 5,000 miles away. The development of such very long-range missiles far from lessening our dependence on Europe, makes even more necessary a closer integration of U.S. military force into the NATO structure.

In disarmament, we call for inspection and verification because the free world security cannot be based merely on the good faith of others, whose promises have so often been broken in the past. Yet even in dealings among allies, there is a limit to

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-10-

which one state can safely go in reliance solely on another's promise to come to the common defense in the event of attack.

This is especially true in the case of nuclear weapon power. Accordingly, steps have been taken to arm the forces of a number of NATO nations with nuclear capable weapons. Such nations want assurance that nuclear components for these weapons will be at hand for ready use in the event of war.

Under the criterion of the most efficient use of the Community's resources, it seems appropriate that the U.S. be the major supplier of such nuclear components for NATO forces. Arrangements to this end will be suggested by the Secretary of Defense during the present meeting of the Council.

We must not lose sight of the problems raised by the international deployment of nuclear weapons prior to the reaching of the universal arms control arrangement. These weapons are of special concern to all because any use of them may trigger off a general nuclear war.

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With such weapons available to NATO and with assurance against their illegitimate use, it may well be that individual members of the NATO Community will find it to their national interest to forego their sovereign right to start producing nuclear weapons, pending the effective East-West arms control agreement we seek and for which last summer NATO gave such clear evidence of support.



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10/28/57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

October 28, 1957

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
Personal and Private



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
GENERAL LAURIS NORSTAD

To S/S
for distribution
air left
to Jordan

General Norstad expressed himself rather critically of Turkish military conduct in relation to maneuvers near the Syrian border and also with respect to the movements in the Western Mediterranean of the Sixth Fleet. He said that this was creating a bad impression with some of our NATO Allies. General Norstad said that it was "ridiculous" to think of Syria attacking Turkey. I said that the matters he referred to related primarily not to NATO but to Middle East problems as to which probably and naturally he was not fully informed. No doubt it was true that Syria did not intend to attack Turkey. But the matter was not quite as simple as that. The vast shipment of Soviet arms into Syria and the promiscuous arming of the people created a danger that there might be armed aggression against Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq, where the governments were disposed to be pro-Western. There was already considerable unrest along these borders. If fighting broke out, for example, between Syria and Iraq, Turkey might be involved as a member of the Baghdad Pact. In any event the presence of Turkish forces near the Syrian border would tend to "cool off" Syrian hotheads. Furthermore, Turkey had a legitimate concern that the Soviet Union would not, in effect, establish a second border to the south of Turkey and thus put Turkey within a Soviet pincers.



I urged General Norstad not to judge everything just from the standpoint of Western Europe. I knew that the Western Europeans did not ever want the United States to get into trouble because of the Middle East or Far East. They were willing to have us fall back and appear weak in these areas so as not to make trouble for Europe. This was a selfish and unacceptable viewpoint. I recalled particularly the misjudgment of the United States by the Europeans three years ago at the time of the *China* offshore island tension.

Personal and Private

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PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12355, SEC. 1.3 (a)(3)(5)

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59

State letter 1/4/83

Authority MR 83-103 #1

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE AND MEMORANDA SERIES

NLE Date 2/7/83

NLE DATE 2/7/83

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Whe, Pp (GCM/1)

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I said that this was a time, when the Soviets were trying everywhere to give the impression that they were now the "top dog" and that the United States was intimidated and showing weakness, that we had to show strength. I particularly urged that strength be shown in relation to Berlin.

At this point we were joined by Ambassador Burgess and Mr. Timmons.



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DOE DIARIES

Box 27

Oct. 1957 Staff Notes (1)

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SECRET

October 29, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

October 26, 1957

Others present: Ambassador Perkins
 General Goodpaster

Mr. Perkins said he had come in to pay his final call on the President, having just returned from Paris. The President recalled that he had thought the Council should stay in London -- so as to give one major activity to each of the capitals -- Washington, Paris, and London.

Mr. Perkins told the President that General Norstad's recent meetings regarding the NATO military concept with the Council had been extremely successful in achieving an understanding and a stabilizing of this matter. He added that General Norstad is doing a great job in that assignment, and is proving a worthy successor to General Gruenther. The President said he was delighted to hear this. He recalled that General Gruenther had a great devotion to service, and in fact had taken the Red Cross post in order to remain available for public service. In fact, the only trouble we had been in at SHAPE was that, for a time, there was too much of a nationalistic tendency and a failure to grasp the allied feature. The President recalled in this connection the stress he had placed in having non-American officers in his own office there.

The President said he hoped Mr. Perkins had found his assignment in Paris interesting and Mr. Perkins said he had found it both interesting and rewarding. Now he is worried about the approaches we make to the problem of doing our part. There is too much of a tendency for the Pentagon to decide what to do and announce it without consultation or discussion. The President recalled that since 1953 we have had agreement in theory that we should move to advanced weaponry, keep more highly skilled, longer-term personnel, and thereby achieve more powerful forces with fewer people in uniform. However, because of the way budgets must be presented, we have to show overall strengths in manpower. It would be better to make our presentations

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case No. FRG-702 (1/24/57)
NLE Case MRRS 154A-9
By DJH NLE Date 2/10/58

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on the basis of units and their combat power, than in terms of numbers of men. He recalled that we have not reduced the number of divisions in Europe, and pointed out that the pentomic divisions, although they have fewer men, have a far greater strength than the old division.

The President went on to say that we are discussing with our allies such as the British ways and means to keep each other better informed of our military thinking. It should be possible to use the Standing Group more effectively for that purpose.

Mr. Perkins stated that the proposal for a NATO atomic stockpile would be very helpful to NATO if adopted. The President said this is the type of thing he has always had in mind, since we never agreed to station ground forces permanently in Europe.

He accepts, however, that we must keep some forces there as a pledge. He pointed out that the effort made by each country to have a self-contained force is very wasteful, and thought there would be great gains if each NATO country would rely on its partners, particularly for specialized weapons and forces.

The President asked Mr. Perkins for his comment regarding the trend of gold reserves in Europe, and they discussed the tendency of French and UK reserves to decline, and the German reserves to rise sharply. The President asked if it would not be good to put our troops in France so that their dollars would help France. Mr. Perkins said that Generals Norstad and Schuyler feel that it is much better to keep them forward; also it would be very expensive to build new establishments in France. The President said that we should have our lightest troops forward, keeping the heavier ones back as a reserve. He recognized that people have some tendency to stay where they have become comfortable. He concluded by saying the whole trend of gold reserves in France is critical in its implications.

The President asked if Mr. Perkins thought he would be able to assist the State Department as an advisor or consultant if specific needs were to arise in the future, and Mr. Perkins said he would of course be glad to do whatever he could.

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A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
and Private

October 29, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR S/S

In a conversation between Lewis Strauss and the Secretary on Monday, October 29, 1957, Admiral Strauss indicated that he felt that the President's decision last Friday at the 2:30 meeting had been, in effect, a decision to turn everything over to the British irrespective of whether or not this involved information of a very secret character and whether or not there was on the part of the British a real "need to know". The Secretary said that he did not think that the President had intended to go that far. He said the thing to do was to get to work and discuss between State, Defense and AEC just what the program should be and that he doubted that out of that would come any serious difficulties or the doing of what Strauss felt merely risked highly secret information without any corresponding good to the British.



David W. K. Peacock, Jr.

Dulles Papers
General Correspondence
and Memoranda Series
Box 1 Memo of Conversation
General - 5 (4)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MYL 92-3047
By JH 4/13/53
NLE Date

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Dulles (wmm) 8/3

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Handwritten notes:
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(...)

October 30, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

October 28, 1957

Others present: General Norstad
General Goodpaaster



The President opened the meeting by referring to the very fine reports he had had from Mr. Perkins concerning General Norstad's recent discussions with the Council. General Norstad said that really for the first time NATO seems to be developing a single idea and concept on its military arrangements in Europe. He thought this was extremely important psychologically. He said he had just met with Secretaries McElroy and Quarles and had told them that, if a cut were made into U. S. combat elements at this time, such action would constitute a NATO incident even greater than the British action of a year ago. A few men could be cut out but the battle groups should not be reduced.

The President recalled that we have five divisions and four separate regiments in Europe and that it has been agreed not to cut these but to cut out some headquarters and support units. In fact, he felt we were augmenting our fighting strength. On the point of cutting out headquarters, General Norstad reported that he is consolidating two Air Force headquarters (USAFE and 12th Air Force). He is trying to do the same for the Army, and is also cutting out one NATO echelon of command. In addition, he is turning back a large portion of the tactical air units since tactical missiles are now displacing them. He said he had asked Mr. McElroy to agree that, if it becomes necessary to cut manpower, he (General Norstad) would have the right to decide where the cuts should be made. He felt that now is no time to make substantial cuts in units in NATO. He recognizes that no one can plan in detail as far ahead as 1961.

The President agreed that we should not deal in figures so far ahead. He thought that Defense should give General Norstad a reasonable quota of men, but should not attempt to say which specific units or organizations

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should be cut out. General Norstad concluded on this point by saying that we now have a plan that will unify NATO -- something they can believe in.

With reference to his correspondence to the President concerning Turkey, General Norstad recalled he had said that Turkish forces could be cut from a military standpoint, but it was hard to see how to gain acceptance of such a proposal. Now, however, his study proposes specific cuts, and he has told the Turks about these. Specifically, in an allied capacity, he has told the Turks they can do with less. He suggested that we should not now promise them more in the way of military aid or support for larger forces because of current tensions. He hopes we will not propose increases above the figures he has developed.

The President said that we ought to search out every useless expenditure, and added that personnel is basically the most expensive category. He felt that once Defense had specified cuts to be made, General Norstad should say where they would be achieved, but should also make clear that our military power is constantly growing. General Norstad said we could do this very effectively, since the power of our units is increasing; he added, however, that the Russians are increasing their total power at the same time, so that relatively the position is by no means so clear.

The President said he had thought it a good idea to organize small atomic groups which might form a theater-wide organization under General Norstad's control. General Norstad suggested that I should look at a message he had sent to the Chiefs of Staff on this matter.

General Norstad suggested that, if the President visits Paris this fall, he should stay at his former quarters in Marnes-la-Coquette. The President indicated that he would get in touch with General Norstad and see what action would be best if he should decide to go. It might be simplest for him to stay in the Embassy, particularly considering that he would probably not be in Paris for the full meeting. After further thought, he said that if Mrs. Eisenhower accompanies him, he might well take General Norstad up on the offer.

In concluding the session, General Norstad stressed strongly that if the President comes to the meeting, he must have something firm and definite to say. It would not be effective simply to come and put out

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a communique. In this connection, he said that, although the NATO stockpile idea is no longer new, that could be the announcement the President would make.

A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA



11/6/57

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MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION,
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1957,
AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Those present: The Secretary of State, Robert Murphy, Burke Elbrick, B.E.L. Timmons, Gerald Smith, and Philip Crow, on behalf of the State Department. General Robert Cutler and Mr. Stassen were also present to assist Mr. Dulles.

Those called in for consultation were: General William Draper, Messrs. John Hughes, George Perkins, Charles Spofford, Frank Pace, Nelson Rockefeller, and Paul Nitze.

The Secretary opened the meeting with a survey of certain of the problems which were concerning him in undertaking the preparations for the December 16 NATO meeting.

He discussed the recommendations of the "Three Wise Men" for strengthening NATO as an organization. These are largely concerned with the role of the Secretary General and the staff supporting him and toward giving the NATO Council greater significance. He said that Mr. Spaak, the new Secretary General, was showing great initiative and had many ideas. The Council had been instrumental in achieving a unified NATO position on disarmament much to the annoyance and irritation of the Russians.



In spite of these improvements the Secretary said that he was disappointed with the report of the Three Wise Men. He felt that the steps which they had recommended were inadequate.

He then turned to the subject of the recent Eisenhower-MacMillan talks. He said that at the outset of those talks he had secured the agreement of the British to the proposition that nothing would be agreed to between them and us which could not be extended to the free world as a whole. He had tried to avoid any exclusiveness in the United States-British relationship.

The Secretary then dealt with the military basis of the problem caused by Russian missile development. He referred to the fact that Khrushchev had said that manned bombers were obsolete. The Secretary said that it would be two or three years before intercontinental ballistic missiles were in effective production. Then there would probably be several years during which manned bombers and missiles were equivalent. Thereafter missiles might become the preferred weapon.

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He then referred to the concept of NATO requiring both a shield and a sword. He said the British White Paper had had the effect of concentrating on the sword rather than the shield. In his opinion the British White Paper constituted a rationalization of a decision based on the need for economy.

He said that the continental European countries were in doubt as to their role in NATO strategy, if any. He said that there was also growing doubt in Asia and in the Middle East on the following points:

1. What are our capabilities for general war? These are largely United States capabilities.

2. Can there be confidence that they will be used when needed? Will the United States take the risks involved or will it hold back in the event of local aggression? Will the United States start a process of giving way -- a process which once started would spread without limit.

3. Some people have doubts as to whether we might misuse our nuclear power. Each geographic area feels most strongly about the threats to itself and tends to take more lightly threats to others. The NATO countries objected to the measures which we took to defend Taiwan. These measures were necessary and successful. Think where we would have been had they not been taken. Mr. Spaak and General Norstad were worried by the movements of the Sixth Fleet in the Syrian crisis. They did not seem to understand that otherwise Jordan would have gone, Lebanon would have been next, and Israel would have been surrounded by a hostile Communist-dominated Arab world.

The Secretary said these were not new problems. He has had them under consideration for two or more years. The Policy Planning Staff has been studying them. The problems existed before Sputnik but have not been made easier by Sputnik.

The Secretary said there was a dilemma between the alliance approach and the collective defense approach. Article 51 provides a provisional substitution for action by the Security Council. Our European allies have a broader concept of alliances. They tend to believe that allies should support each other on all political issues and in all places. When our alliances were initially being evolved Senator Vandenberg and he made clear that the opposite was our view. Otherwise we would be associated with colonialism everywhere. We cannot operate on the European concept of alliances. The only concept we can operate on is that of reacting against aggression anywhere. Otherwise we would be involved in every local issue such as the issues between India and Pakistan.



The Secretary said we could achieve an immediate strengthening of our NATO defenses if we were prepared to follow the European theory of alliances. But then we would have to write off everything else in the world. We could win the Middle East in a minute if we were prepared to take a position against Israel. Our gains, however, would be short lived.

The Secretary then discussed the dilemmas posed by a regional approach versus a worldwide approach. He said there was need for greater understanding in each regional group of what went on in the other regional groups. It could be argued that we should have a single organization of all fifty members of the alliance system. The question would arise, however, as to whether such an organization would be considered to be competitive with the United Nations. It might also alienate the neutrals. It seemed to him that what we needed was an interlocking system rather than a unified system. But if this is so, how do you bring it about? The best place to bring about coordination would be Washington. Washington is in effect the capital of the free world. It is hard to communicate with the outside regional centers. The Organization of American States accepts the concept of coordination in Washington. The twenty O.A.S. ambassadors sit around the table here in Washington and Mr. Dulles can talk to them directly. It would be desirable if one could have similar sessions in Washington with the NATO or the SEATO ambassadors. But if you propose to move the seat of NATO or SEATO to Washington you would have a political explosion. It would look like a power grab on our part.



The Secretary said what was needed was a development of the concept of interdependence. But how do you implement this concept? Clarence Streit has long proposed federation. But even he is unable to decide who should be members of the federation. In the Secretary's view federation is unrealistic.

He pointed out that in time of war nations are prepared to surrender a portion of their sovereignty. But how do you accomplish this in times of peace?

There is also the question of political instability within each democratic country. It is possible to find ways of increasing confidence of others in the United States. The two major political parties are not opposed in their fundamental approach. As a country we have both resolve and the capacity for restraint. Trust, however, must operate both ways. It is not enough that others trust us. We must also allocate tasks to them. We must give them things to do. They all want to be in the missile business and do not wish to be mere cannon fodder.

The Secretary said there was a certain reluctance on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the A.E.C. to put confidence in governments where the opposition leaders expressed views wholly contrary to the alliance system. This was particularly true of Ollenhauer and Bevan.

The Secretary then went around the table asking each of those he had called in for consultation for their suggestions.

Mr. Pace pleaded inadequate background and withheld comment the first time around.

General Draper talked at some length on the existing procedures in the United States Government for the coordination of weapons development and procurement with our allies. He thought these procedures were inadequate and could be improved by securing the assistance of such knowledgeable people as General Gruenther, Tracy Voorhees, and Colonel George Lincoln. He commented on the bottle neck which currently exists in the committee controlling the dissemination of weapons information to our allies.

Mr. Nitze said that Mr. Dulles' description of the current situation reminded him of some of the problems which we faced in the fall and winter of 1950 when things were going badly in Korea. We were uncertain in Washington how best to restore the situation and our allies were confused and in doubt. It seemed to us then that we had a two-fold task: The first was to make up our own minds as to how we thought the strategic situation could best be righted and the second was to then discuss these views with our allies and seek their cooperation in getting done what seemed to us needed doing.

Similarly today it would appear that there are important decisions which need to be taken within the United States Government. How seriously do we view the threat presented by Russian technological achievements? What level of effort do we think this threat merits on our part? What percentage of our gross national product do we think should be devoted to defense and to the support of our foreign policy? How much reliance should we put upon S.A.C. to preserve local situations against pressure around the periphery of the Communist world? Should we not reverse the trend toward inadequate ground, sea, and tactical-air forces? What balance should there be between measures to improve our military situation, and economic and political measures to strengthen



the position of the free world in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia?

Mr. Nitze said that it would seem to him that the current threat warranted an increase in our effort, that the strategic situation indicated that we should both improve the security of S.A.C. and simultaneously reverse the trend toward inadequate ground, sea, and air forces for limited military operations. He further thought that what was done in these two areas should be integrated into a broad and comprehensive program which included tools for improving our situation in the uncommitted areas. He suggested that assistance to India in moving forward with its five-year plan might be of very great importance.

Mr. Nitze said that if we were reasonably clear within the United States Government as to what we thought ought to be done then we could go about the job of explaining our position to our allies and attempting to secure their cooperation in the comprehensive program which this would entail. He said that in order to restore the confidence of our allies it might well be necessary for us to make nuclear weapons available to them to be held in Europe under United States custody in peacetime and to be employed in war under NATO command.

The Secretary said that what Mr. Nitze was proposing was, in effect, that we do nothing at the December 16 meeting. It was impossible to get complete agreement within the United States Government on all the details of such a comprehensive program within the time limit necessary.

Mr. Nitze said that he had not proposed agreement on all the details but what he had had in mind was a decision as to the general direction in which we proposed to move.

Mr. Spofford said that in his opinion restoring confidence depends on how the nuclear thing is handled. In 1950 everyone understood that there was no adequate defense for Europe but some ideas were developed and NATO was in fact invigorated. Sharing nuclear weapons with our allies would indicate that we share confidence in them. It would tend to interest them again in self-defense. Without facing up to that problem it will be very difficult to restore their confidence.

Mr. Spofford said that at least in the intermediate period until we and the Russians have operational ICBM's Europe has great strategic value to us as well as we to them.

The Secretary expressed agreement with this viewpoint. He emphasized the importance of the people and industrial capacity of Europe in the long run. He said that it had been



the judgment of the military that we did not need to develop an ICBM. He said that in the intermediate time until we had ICBMs we had to rely heavily on over-seas bases. The question was how could we translate this strategic interdependence into real terms. Our allies are worried about where the decision will be made that will save them. Obviously it is the President who will make it in Washington. The Koreans for instance are worried as to whether there will be time for them to be heard. The essential decisions might have to be taken within two hours. They want to feel that they will be at least able to whisper their views to us. In Korea we are spending a billion dollars a year in support of the twenty Korean divisions, and of our two divisions, to insure Syngman Rhee that the communists will not over-run them. This is an expensive business. The real deterrent is not the divisions in Korea but the fact that we would within minutes wipe out the industrial complex of Manchuria if Korea were attacked. We have the same kind of problem in many areas. The problem is not one of thinking through what it is we would do under various hypothetical situations. We can have all the N.S.C. position papers in the world and they will persuade no one. What our allies want to know is the state of our will, of our resolution.

The Secretary said that he has not any doubt that if there was an attack anywhere that we would move. We would do so not because we are bound by treaty and not because we love the Koreans. We would do it for the cold reason that if we didn't react the thing would spread. People around the world feel lonely and alone.



Mr. Rockefeller said that we needed dramatic and positive moves to capitalize on the courageous decision of the President to attend the December 16 meeting. He had five concrete suggestions on what should be done to give focus and drama to our position:

1. Make atomic weapons available to them. This would give them a sense of participation. It might even lead to the creation of a third force in Europe which would be able to defend Europe without committing the United States to all-out war.

2. Create a joint NATO-United States weapons research commission. This would dramatize technological cooperation. It could be located in Washington and thus carry out Mr. Dulles' desire for a shift of important functions to Washington.

3. Create a joint United-States European commission for peaceful uses of atomic energy.

4. Create a joint United States-European commission on basic research.

5. Institutionalize our economic effort in support of the uncommitted areas. We should create a structure of our own to work with regional structures in other parts of the world such as the Colombo Plan organization. Such a structure would constitute a joint between private enterprise and government.

Mr. Stassen said that the net effect which he thought we should strive to have the meeting leave, would be:

1. Greater strength and sense of strength.
2. Progress toward the integration of Europe.
3. A sense of participation by the Europeans in a common effort.
4. A reaffirmation of our willingness to negotiate.
5. An atmosphere of peace.

To produce these effects he suggested the following concrete measures:

A NATO wing of B-47s should be organized. This would be an elite nuclear force under SHAPE command and would be composed of volunteers.

We should organize a NATO outer space project. This would imply that we would be willing to tell them what we now know.

We should reaffirm that our objective is peace. We should emphasize our willingness to negotiate both about arms control and about major political issues.

We should indicate our willingness to cooperate through the O.E.E.C. in world economic competition in Asia and Africa. It is this area where the decision in the cold war is going to be made.

Mr. Stassen made the point that Germany was putting only 4.4% of its gross national product into defense. Germany could make a substantial contribution to economic competition in Asia and Africa. The O.E.E.C. could organize a study and liaison group which could focus the cooperation of the Western world with such institutions as the Colombo Plan.



The Secretary said that the prospect was that we would get more money for outer space than we need and that we would then lose the war which really counts -- which is the economic war. He doubted whether the O.E.E.C. was the appropriate instrument. Perhaps it was well regarded in Asia because it does not do anything which affects them.

Mr. Perkins said that there were certain short range things which could be done of the type which had already been mentioned. He thought that an organization could be set up to stimulate the training of scientists and to organize their selection and financing. But the long range success of NATO, Mr. Perkins thought, depended on United States willingness to work through NATO. We worked through NATO on the disarmament negotiations with great success on all those matters as to which the United States position was reasonably clear within the United States Government. We were not very clear about what we meant by ground inspection or air inspection and as a result we had run into serious difficulty in working through NATO on those points.

Mr. Perkins said that today the European countries do not know where we think we are going to avoid war. He thought that we should (a) think these things through ourselves and then (b) talk to the Europeans about them. The Europeans had been disturbed about developments in Syria. They were not sure that we knew what we were doing. He did not think that mechanical consultation in Washington was the way to do it. Political consultation has been successful when we have been willing to participate in the process. In the last few years the United States Government has not always been able to participate because it had not yet decided what position it wanted to take.

The Secretary said that he was unaware of such issues which had not been decided and asked Mr. Perkins for examples. Mr. Perkins said that one example that came to his mind was a question on air interception rules where there was a difference between the position proposed by NATO and the rules that had been agreed upon under four power control of Germany. He said it had taken six months to get an answer from Washington as to the position the United States Government wished to take. Mr. Perkins said that if he had his files he could mention many other instances.

The Secretary said that he was reassured that the matters on which there had been a delay in arriving at a decision were not important enough for Mr. Perkins to remember.



Mr. Hughes said that he supported the view that we should work out the best method for improving NATO's position as we see it. If we are prepared with clear lines then many areas of duplication can be avoided.

The Secretary said that he had always made it clear that there was no subject that we were unprepared to discuss in NATO. This does not mean that we are prepared to agree to the European positions on everything. Europeans think we should back them up every place in the world. The French for instance feel that if we should make the police-type arms available to the Tunisians that France would be justified in getting out of the alliance. He said he was disturbed by the multiplication of discussions which were necessary. Elaborate consultation was necessary with Congress, and then with each group of our allies. This multiplication of discussions constituted a hazard.

Mr. Hughes said that it would be extremely constructive if NATO could get an agreement on Cyprus.

Mr. Perkins said that Adenauer might be prepared to announce, at the December meeting, that Germany would increase its defense appropriations.

Mr. Pace suggested that Canada might make a contribution in anti-submarine warfare.

General Cutler referred to the problem of selectivity in making information available. Even on items where the Russians are technologically abreast it would be helpful to them to know exactly the stage at which our development is.

The Secretary concluded the meeting by suggesting that if any of us had concrete suggestions to make he would like to have them in writing.



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: November 6, 1957

SUBJECT: Discussion of Ways and Means of Strengthening NATO.

- PARTICIPANTS:
- The Secretary of State
 - Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
 - General Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 - James P. Richards, Special Assistant to the President
 - C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
 - Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
 - William B. Macomber, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
 - Phillip Crowe, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
 - D.S.L. Timmons, Director, Office of European Regional Affairs
 - William H. Draper, Jr., U.S. Special Representative in Europe 1952-53
 - John C. Hughes, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 1953-55
 - Paul H. Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State 1950-52
 - Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army 1950-52
 - George W. Perkins, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 1955-57
 - Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President 1954-55
 - Charles H. Spofford, U.S. Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council 1950-52
 - Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President

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London-Ambassador Whitney

The Secretary opened the discussion at 10:30 A.M. by saying that he and the President hold the conviction that NATO must go forward or slip back, and he assured this view was shared by those present today. He had made this view explicit in his speech to the Associated Press on April 23, 1956, just in advance of the NATO meeting which established the Three Wise Men's Committee to recommend how NATO non-military cooperation could be increased. This Committee had come up with useful recommendations on increasing the authority of the Secretary-General and of making political consultation in NATO more frequent

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frequent and more comprehensive. Secretary-General Spaak has brought a dynamic approach to NATO and more frequent political consultation is, in fact, taking place. Therefore, he felt a good deal of progress has been made.

The Secretary cited particularly the success of political consultation with respect to disarmament. The Western Four had consulted continuously with the North Atlantic Council. This enabled the disarmament talks in London to proceed in an orderly way without generating strains in NATO. If such discussions had not taken place, the Alliance would have been under serious strain, since the vital interests of Germany and other countries were under discussion in the disarmament subcommittee. If there had been no machinery to coordinate the NATO position, this could have had a disruptive effect upon the Alliance. The Soviets had hoped it would in fact have such disruptive effects, and they were bitter over the fact that it had not. In short, the agreement in NATO on the 4-power disarmament proposal had been an important test of NATO, which had survived the test and was now stronger. In particular, the promptness in which NATO had acted was exemplary and had greatly aided the work of the U.S. Disarmament Representative, Mr. Stassen.

However, the Secretary continued, the steps taken in NATO to promote unity have been inadequate. He had been somewhat disappointed that the report of the Three Wise Men had not been more far-reaching in scope. The recently-concluded Macmillan talks had dealt primarily with the question of cooperation within the Free World. These US-UK talks were not designed to set up an exclusive arrangement, and in fact no agreement was reached about anything not capable of being projected (with necessary modifications) into our system of Alliances, which NATO is the most significant. There were no secret US-UK arrangements which detract from that spirit. The Declaration of Common Purpose does express certain concerns we feel and which have been growing for some time. These concerns have been accentuated of late by the development of new means of warfare. Now there are great quantities and varieties of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and an increase in the methods by which such weapons can be delivered. For the next two or three years ahead, delivery of nuclear weapons would primarily be by bombers, but perhaps in two or three years missiles will have become as important as bombers. It may be that in two or three years after that time missiles will have become the primary means of delivery. Khrushchev has talked of bombers being obsolete, but the US believes the Soviets have stretched out their long-range bomber program, hoping to skip over bombers and concentrate on guided missiles. Since the Soviets know we will not commit an act of aggression against them, there is no risk to them in stretching out their bomber program, concentrating on missiles which will not be ready for operational use until a few years in the future.

The Secretary

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The Secretary went on to say that all of these military developments have great importance for all collective defense organizations, and in particular for NATO, which is the most highly developed organization of all. Up to now, NATO strategy has run largely in terms of the sword of nuclear striking power and the shield of greater forces in Europe. The British White Paper on Defense, while probably largely economic in motivation, sought to rationalize the British decisions in terms of military strategy, i.e., the sword assuming greater importance and the shield assuming much less importance. If general war broke out, it would probably be almost entirely a nuclear war fought over great distances. The Continent NATO countries are in doubt about what their role would be. In many countries there is growing doubt on three points: (1) What are the defensive capabilities of the Free World (which means largely the US)? (2) Can other countries have confidence that these capabilities will in fact be used, as the Soviets develop their own capacity to strike blows directly at the US itself? This question thus becomes: Will the US take risks to defend itself and other Free World countries or will it hold back out of fear of Soviet capabilities? (The Secretary cited Turkey or Berlin as places where some people feel that aggression might occur without the US being willing to act.) (3) There is concern on the part of some countries that the US might misuse its nuclear defensive power.

The Secretary pointed out that each area with which we have collective security alliances tends to think largely of itself, i.e., it wants the US to take a strong position and be willing to defend that particular area, but it does not also feel the same way regarding other areas with which we have collective security pacts. For example, our NATO allies were worried in 1955 about the strong position we were taking concerning the defense of Formosa and the offshore islands. They were afraid that they would be plunged into war by our action in defending Formosa if Communist China had decided to attack. Events proved how right the US decision was. Another example was the recent movement of the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean. If this action had not been taken, Jordan might have gone under. The movement of the Fleet was an important move in encouraging King Hussein to stand fast. If Jordan had gone, Lebanon might have been next and then Iraq, thus creating a solid Soviet bloc around Israel. The Secretary said that none of these things were just the result of Sputnik. However, certainly these problems, to which he and other people in the Department have been giving thought for several years, were not made any easier by recent Soviet moves in the missiles and outer space fields.

The Secretary said that he wanted to call attention to some of the basic dilemmas confronting US foreign policy. One major dilemma is the difference between the "collective defense approach" and the "alliance approach".

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Suez had showed this distinction very clearly. The French and British tended to look upon NATO as a political alliance, and therefore felt that we should have sided with them in their action over Suez. On the other hand, Article 51 of the UN Charter provides for individual or collective self-defense as a provisional substitute for action by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. Articles I and V of the North Atlantic Treaty refer to this provision of the UN Charter. Thus NATO is not an old-fashioned political alliance. It is rather a collective security organization. The French, in particular, have felt that because France and other countries are allied in NATO, these allies must stick together on every issue that arises around the world. The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time of the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty showed clearly that the U.S. did not subscribe to this theory. Nevertheless, it was still a strong view in NATO that the Alliance cannot be "politically divided", i.e., all NATO countries must support one another on all political issues. The U.S. with its world-wide responsibilities cannot operate on this theory. The only basis that is acceptable to the U.S. is an alliance for defense against aggression. This was made clear in the U.S.-U.K. Declaration of Common Purpose, particularly paragraph 5 thereof. The U.S. cannot be drawn in on the side of Pakistan against India, or refuse to give arms to Tunisia on the grounds that the U.S. must support France fully in North Africa.

The Secretary pointed out that it would be easy to strengthen NATO on a short-term basis if we were to take the "political alliance" approach. However, this would mean that we would have to "write off" our relations with the rest of the world. Since all our allies want us on their side on all questions, the cheap and easy way to strengthen the Alliance would be to take the "political alliance" approach. This would give great comfort and warmth to our allies. The Secretary said that the U.S. could win the Middle East in a minute if we took the same position that the Soviets take, i.e., complete support of the Arab states against Israel. The Secretary said, in concluding his remarks on this point, that if we took the "alliance" approach, the immediate gains would be much more than offset by the long-term disadvantages.

The Secretary said the second dilemma confronting the U.S. Government is the question of regional versus world-wide arrangements. Obviously, there is room in each of our actual security arrangements for better understanding of what goes on in others. We need to dispel the fear in Europe that we are being reckless in the Far East or the Middle East, and also to dispel the fear in the Far East that we will sacrifice their interests in favor of our European allies. The Secretary said that one possible approach would be to bring together all of our allies (nearly 50) into a single organization. While this might have advantages, such an organization would look like a competitor with the UN, and could alienate the neutral and uncommitted countries. Therefore, we have concluded that a single world-wide security

organization

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organization would not be a wise move at this time. We are thinking of developing greater interlocking arrangements among the various organizations, so as to create better understanding. Thus, the problem here is how to solve the problem of creating more understanding with respect to US purposes and capabilities. The best place to do this might be Washington, where countries which we wish to reassure could talk with the President, the Secretary of State, the JCS, etc. In Washington they could feel the spirit of resolution, yet caution, that actuates the US Government. With respect to the Organization of American States, they accept Washington as the center of that alliance, and the Secretary spoke of his frequent meetings with the Latin American Ambassadors to brief them on important developments. However, he said if it were to be proposed that NATO be shifted to Washington, an explosion could result. Equally, if SEATO were to be shifted to Washington, this would cause it to lose the Asian flavor that we have tried to create. Also, bringing the headquarters of all alliances to the US would look like a "power grab".

Fourthly, the Secretary said we have the problem of how to implement the concept of interdependence. One route would be the course long advocated by Clarence Streit in proposing a Federal Union. However, the Secretary said it is not realistic at this particular time to believe that it is possible to bring about a political union of the US, UK and Canada, much less a union of all the NATO countries. Streit himself has vacillated on the issue, first proposing the union with the UK and Canada alone, and then suggesting all the founding countries of the North Atlantic alliance. The Secretary said that a solution along the route of Federal Union has to be ruled out, at least at the present time, as a practical matter. The Secretary said that in this dilemma we face a problem which appears insoluble but which, nevertheless, must be solved. In any case it is another matter. Many countries give up sovereignty, adopt common policies and accept restraints. It is different in time of peace. One great obstacle to the implementation of the concept of interdependence is the political instability in almost all European countries; that is, uncertainty as to the life expectancy of the governing government. The US is situated in the best position in this regard. We have a very large measure of unity on basic foreign policy issues and, therefore, we ought to be able to find ways to increase the trust and confidence of other nations in the free world in the US. We have the capability, the resolve and the restraint, and he thought that in fact other free world countries do trust us. However, trust is a two-way street. We must depend on others and give them a significant part to play. Here the Secretary reminded that the French and other NATO countries are now saying that the US must not take the line that we will supply the missiles and other hardware and they should supply the manpower. It is only natural that there should be reluctance on the part of the Defense and AEC people to repose full trust and confidence in other countries whose Governments may be changed overnight, bringing in a new Government composed of people we might not be able to trust.

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to trust. He cited, for example, the possibility of Mr. Bevan becoming Foreign Secretary in the UK. Bevan doesn't appear to believe in the NATO system and might well make a deal with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the US military people say: "Why should we split up the tasks? We are self-sufficient and we can't afford to depend upon those who aren't dependable in the long run."

The Secretary said at this point that he had attempted to sketch out some of the basic issues as he sees them, and that he would now like to throw the meeting open for discussion and to receive the ideas of those he had asked to meet with him today.

Mr. Draper suggested the creation of liaison officers between NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. These liaison officers would not sit in Washington, but would maintain contact among the three alliances in their respective headquarters.

The Secretary said that some thought had been given to having a Roving Ambassador. This might, of course, have adverse effects on the position of the US Permanent Representatives in NATO, SEATO, etc.

Mr. Draper also suggested that the Secretary might wish to avail himself of the advice of General Gruenther, Mr. Tracy Voorhees and Colonel G. A. Lincoln.

The Secretary said that General Gruenther would have been invited to this meeting today but he still was at the Red Cross Conference in New Delhi.

Mr. Draper suggested the possibility of creating a commission like the Millican Commission on the air defense of the US. He thought there were too many research organizations hired by the individual armed services, and that there was a gap in the overall US research and development picture since Mr. Spulac had moved upstairs in Defense. Even if a crash program were undertaken, such a study would require six months, but it might in the long run answer some of the basic questions the Secretary had referred to. Mr. Draper went on to say that the problem lies in developing a real policy on the disclosure of classified research and development information to our allies. He referred to the valuable work that had already been done in the NATO Mutual Weapons Development Program, sponsored by the US.

The Secretary said it was really ridiculous that, because of the limitations in the Atomic Energy Act, the British should be spending so much money duplicating work in the atomic weapons field that we have already done. The Secretary said a US Government committee is now studying what amendments should be made in the Atomic Energy Act.

Mr. Draper said that the problem was not only the question of disclosure in military atomic areas, but in the non-atomic area as well. These decisions are recommended by a group of Colonels in the Pentagon and their attitude is almost invariably negative.

The Secretary

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The Secretary agreed with Mr. Draper that much more could be done in the way of disclosure under the present law.

Mr. Nitze thought the present situation was similar to that of 1950. At the time of the aggression against South Korea the problem was how to pull the US Government together and then coordinate with our allies. He thought that as the US Government becomes clearer as to what it wants to do, it will become much easier to coordinate with our allies in NATO, etc. One area he thought should be studied was how to reverse the trend away from ground forces in favor of nuclear air power. Mr. Nitze also suggested that if we decide on an Indian aid program, this would improve our position vis-a-vis the Soviets and the neutral countries.

The Secretary said that while there might be something in what Mr. Nitze said, he thought the problems to which he (the Secretary) had referred would still persist even if we do something about the things to which Mr. Nitze had referred. The task is how to instill confidence in our allies and how to divide up the tasks on an acceptable basis. The Secretary pointed out that everyone in NATO wants to make atom bombs but not to supply ground troops. It appears that the U.S. not only has to make atom bombs, but has to supply manpower as well. The Secretary referred to the "fair share" statement he had made in 1954 at the time of the signing of the London and Paris Accords. It had been foreseen that at that time there would be 14 French divisions, 12 German, 4 British and 5 US divisions in Europe. Now, in 1957, the British are cutting their forces, General Norstad has projected only 4 M-day divisions for the French, and the Germans will have only 5 divisions at the end of this year, whereas we are still maintaining our 5 divisions. This is hardly a fair share.

Mr. Nitze said that he thought there was perhaps a lack of clarity in our own minds on the basic strategic question. He seemed to have a real doubt as to why there should be ground forces. Once we have clarified this in our own minds we can make a better argument with the Europeans as to why they should contribute ground forces to the NATO Shield.

The Secretary agreed that there was some lack of clarity and precision on these matters, but said that to attain such clarity was a counsel of perfection. Even if the US came up with a clear and precise answer on the exact strategy for NATO it might ^{not} be accepted by the UK or the Continental allies. He knew that General Norstad will say in his new study that a shield is required. The real question is: who will provide the shield? The French want to produce atomic weapons, and undoubtedly the Germans will want to also. These countries have seen that the British possession of atomic weapons has been a "ticket of admission" to big power talks and the French and Germans want to follow suit. There are important elements of national pride involved. It may not make sense for the French to have a navy, or the Belgians to have an air force, but they want one. Rationalization of military effort is very difficult to achieve.

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*Mr. Nitze
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Mr. Nitze says

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Mr. Nitze said he thought an atomic stockpile is a necessity for NATO.

The Secretary agreed, and said that the US hopes to have a concrete proposal by the December meeting. The Secretary spoke of this in his press conference yesterday. We can go quite far under present law while maintaining atomic warheads in US custody. This is the arrangement we foresee with the UK on IRMIs.

Mr. Draper said that we need to devise a major strategic role for ground forces under circumstances of other than all-out atomic war.

The Secretary said he tended to agree. He said he had recently pointed out in his Foreign Affairs article that as tactical weapons are integrated into the military forces of the Free World, this may restore the power of the Shield forces, and that we may be moving toward a new era in this respect. Such a development could give our allies a fresh sense of purpose and participation. However, this matter was an evolutionary one, and could not be expected to bear fruit by December.

Mr. Spofford said one important point in his mind was how the whole complex of atomic weapons problems is to be handled. In 1950, there had been a feeling in Europe of the uselessness of defense, a flight of confidence. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of SHAPE had restored confidence and a sense of participation. Now he senses that the nuclear monopoly of the US is a basis for neutralism and a feeling of lack of participation and control. He wondered if it would not be feasible to share atomic tactical weapons with selected NATO partners. This would show ~~that we trust our allies,~~ would enable them to help defend themselves, and would give them a sense of participation. Also it would provide a better role for ground forces. Mr. Spofford also pointed out that one of the driving forces behind the desire of our NATO partners to see us maintain forces in Europe was to make us dependent to some extent on them.

The Secretary said that while our NATO allies are more dependent on us than we on them, Western Europe is still very important to us. We would be in a bad way if we lost Western Europe to the Soviets. We need bases for our bombers, and for our intermediate range ballistic missiles. He said that our ICBM program is in good shape and is equal to or ahead of the Soviet program.

In response to a query from the Secretary, Mr. Spofford said that the NATO organization is a flexible one. He doubted, however, that it should be moved to Washington.

The Secretary said that was out. The problem is not one merely of holding meetings on the permanent representative or ministerial level and engaging in political consultation. The real problem is this: If there is a sudden attack on one of our allies, where will the decision be made that

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that can save them? Obviously in Washington, by the President of the US. Suppose South Korea was attacked. The decision to respond would have to be taken by the US in a matter of hours or less. What worries the Koreans is what factors will operate on the President in making such a decision. The Koreans would want to be heard. They know that we will not delegate our decision-making power to them, but they want a chance to state their case. Also, the Secretary pointed out, if there is a sudden emergency in the Far East, the Europeans will worry whether our decision to respond will not plunge the whole world, including Europe, into war. He spoke of the situation in the US where there is no doubt in California or Maine that the US Government will act if there is aggression against the US. The same feeling of confidence does not exist among all of our allies. We must devise a way for our allies to be heard on these grave decisions.

Mr. Face said that he thought the establishment of any such machinery should be carefully weighed. It would be a disservice if we set up a framework and then found it not workable.

The Secretary said that the real element in this problem is the establishment of closer contact between our allies and the state of mind in the US, so that our allies will be convinced that we will take proper action and will never take improper action. The Secretary referred to Korea, where it costs the US \$1 billion a year to keep President Rhee satisfied that if he is attacked the US will do something about it. If there is any proposal to reduce Korean forces or to take out US troops, Rhee immediately charges we are giving way in the face of Communism. How can we convince Rhee that the real power that defends him is the US power to wipe out the centers of Chinese industry and war potential?

Mr. Face pointed out that Rhee's attitude may in part be motivated by his desire to keep US money flowing into Korea.

The Secretary agreed, but said that Korea would be much better off if it did not have to maintain 20 active divisions.

Mr. Spafford asked whether political consultation in NATO had achieved what the Secretary expected of it.

The Secretary said it works pretty well, and gives our allies current US thinking on problems but does not give them the essential element of feeling, i.e., the determination and will of the US to defend itself and its allies. He could show our allies our war plans, but what they need to sense is the resolution that actuates the US Government. The Secretary said that there was no doubt in his mind, knowing how the President and the NSC feel, and the state of public opinion in the US, that we would respond in case of Soviet aggression. We would not respond merely because of the Treaty or of our affection for the Koreans, but in our own interest, because we know that if Russia once started aggression we must stop it at the very outset, otherwise eventually the US would go under also. He referred to the position he had taken at the beginning of the aggression against South Korea (he was in Japan at the time) that this aggression must be stopped. The Secretary

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could people around the Free World are indifferent and remote from the US; they are not in contact with the true feeling of the US, and do not adequately sense the resolution and will of the US.

Mr. Bremer suggested that a combined Secretariat might be established in Washington, with representatives from NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

The Secretary said this was worth thinking about. Such representation would have to be at a high enough level to carry conviction.

Mr. Rockefeller said the US has set up an opportunity to dramatize to the world our determination to strengthen NATO. In Paris the President can speak of our concept of united action toward a common objective. He thought concrete proposals have to be made. He suggested the five following tangible points:

1) A NATO stockpile or pool of atomic weapons, both tactical and retaliatory.

2) A joint US-European NATO military research commission, perhaps located in Washington.

3) A joint US-European commission for the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. EURATOM might serve as the vehicle here, but the effort should not be limited to a small group of countries.

4) A joint US-European commission on basic scientific research. Mr. Rockefeller spoke of the important role played by European scientific talent in the advances made by the United States in the atomic and other fields.

5) In the economic field, we need to institutionalize our economic cooperative effort. Perhaps a structure should be created which could work with other economic organizational structures. More use needs to be made of private enterprise. US companies are loath to take foreign contracts in some instances. Perhaps the organization he had in mind could be set up as a US development authority to cooperate with a European development authority. Similar development authorities could be set up with respect to Asia and the Middle East.

Mr. Stassen said the net effect of the NATO session in December should include (1) greater long-term strength and sense of strength; (2) move toward integration of Europe; (3) a sense of participation by all NATO countries; (4) reaffirmation of the objective of peace; (5) establishment of atmosphere of confidence.

Mr. Stassen

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Mr. Stassen suggested the prompt establishment of an elite NATO integrated military force with nuclear capability. A wing of B-47's might be the first step. It would include volunteers from all NATO nations and would function under command of SHAPE. He thought it dangerous to spread atomic weapons to all NATO countries. He thought his proposal would embrace one of the basic ideas of the European Defense Community. After World War II Europe's need for economic aid from the US had brought about the beginning of the economic integration of Europe. He thought that now Europe's desire for nuclear weapons could bring about real military integration. He also proposed a NATO outer space project, in which scientists of all NATO nations would participate, to be commonly financed like infrastructure. He thought it important to tell Europe that we know in the missile field and where we know the Soviets already have this knowledge. In addition to reaffirming NATO's general objectives, the US should reaffirm its willingness to negotiate suggested first-steps in disarmament and political settlements. This should be done only after we have established publicly our intention to remain strong in the military field. He also suggested that NATO nations should participate through OEEC in the economic development of Africa and Asia. A closer link between OEEC and the Colombo Plan would be excellent for this purpose. This would bring trade, development and technical aid into a more effective relationship and would draw upon the substantial resources of Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The real competition of the future between the US and its allies and the Soviet bloc may well be in the field of world economic development. NATO should not act in this area as a body, but should say that its members will act through the OEEC. Mr. Stassen pointed out that Germany is not contributing its fair share either in the form of defense expenditures or in the form of contributions to the economic development of under-developed areas.

The Secretary said that the proliferation of organizations greatly outpaces planning things done.

Mr. Stassen pointed out that both the OEEC and the Colombo Plan organizations are still in being. What is needed is a link between them, which would be that is a link between two great economic areas. Mr. Stassen again stressed that NATO must move to create a greater sense of strength.

The Secretary said one great danger that is not sufficiently recognized is that if a vote is voted for military purposes, but that this will be without the assurance of economic aid. This could cause us to lose the Cold War. The problem of NATO acting in under-developed areas is a perplexing one. It is not clear that NATO has a colonial taint attached to it.

Mr. Stassen said that in addition to the NATO countries, the Swiss and the French are in OEEC, and that OEEC does not have a colonial taint. He said that OEEC is highly regarded in Asia.

Mr. Rockefeller

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Mr. Rockefeller referred to Mr. Stassen's proposal for a NATO outer space project. He said that if such a project were launched, it might appear to imply that we could not make the grade on our own and had to go to Europe for help. The US should get its satellite up first.

Mr. Perkins suggested a project for the training of scientists on a NATO-wide basis. Perhaps a "NATO University" should be established. On longer range matters, Mr. Perkins said he felt our allies do not know where we are going. The disarmament discussion in NATO went well because our allies had time to think the matter out and to make suggestions. Even here, in the beginning, the US was not entirely clear as to what we meant by air and ground inspection. Recently we have announced cuts in our armed forces, but not where such cuts are to be made, or why, other than this is being done to save money. This is an example of the type of thing we should discuss first with our friends and allies before announcing it publicly. With respect to the tension between Syria and Turkey, it was not made sufficiently clear to our allies why we were worried about the Syrian situation. All of this is not a question of mechanism for coordination; rather it is a question of telling our allies frankly what is on our mind. The US must make a decision that we are fully willing to participate in NATO consultation. We need to give more vigorous leadership in NATO.

In response to a query from the Secretary for an example of delays in receiving instructions from Washington, Mr. Perkins cited the delays that had intervened in getting a US position on rules for air interception over Europe.

Mr. Hughes said that in preparing for the December meeting positive suggestions should be developed. For example, the US should go to Europe with an appraisal of the best method of maintaining the NATO defensive shield. He should be clear in our own mind on the desirable apportionment of tasks. He should take the lead in pushing political consultation in the Council.

The Secretary said he wished to make it entirely clear that the US was prepared to talk about any item in the North Atlantic Council. The problem as he saw it lay in the "alliance" concept. For instance, the French had said that if we gave arms to Tunisia, this might seriously damage NATO and even cause the French to withdraw from NATO. He had already pointed out that we could tighten the bonds of the alliance tomorrow by agreeing to back up the French and our other allies on all matters around the world. This was a separate point, however, from a willingness to discuss matters in the NATO Council.

Mr. Hughes also supported the sharing of tactical atomic weapons with our NATO allies. Finally, he suggested it would be a most dramatic and inaugurating step if NATO could announce at the December meeting that the Cyprus dispute had been agreed upon.

The Secretary

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The Secretary agreed, and said that a solution in Algeria would also help. However, this is certainly not in the realm of the practical for the December meeting.

Mr. Rockefeller suggested that the President stop in Berlin on his way to or from the NATO meeting.

The Secretary said this might be good in Germany, but would be disastrous in Italy. In any event, the Secretary said, the President will go to Europe in Dec. only to attend the NATO meeting and will not pay any visit to any individual country.

Mr. Perkins suggested that Adenauer announce at the December meeting that he is increasing Germany's defense expenditures. The Secretary said this would be most useful.

Going around the table again, the Secretary asked Mr. Pace if he had any further comments.

Mr. Pace suggested that there were many areas in the military effort that the US should not have to carry out all by itself. These could be "farmed out" to other NATO countries, somewhat along the lines of the cooperation between the US and Canada.

The Secretary agreed in general with this concept and said that what we need to do is to build up strong institutional ties in NATO so that when there are changes in Government in various NATO countries, the new people coming in will be equally committed to the support of NATO. This would mean the successor Governments would pursue the same policies vis-a-vis NATO as the previous Governments. We can not have European countries feel that they are "fluffy checks" and that they can go off in any direction.

Mr. Pace then spoke of the good work being done by the American Council on NATO, which reaches influential private sectors of public opinion. It is building much support for NATO.

The Secretary said he fully recognized the importance of this. It is vital to back up with the peoples of the NATO countries what is done at the December meeting. In this way much public support for NATO can be rallied.

General Cutler said the security problem was a real one and that he had not heard much mention for the necessity for selectivity in communicating scientific and military information to our NATO allies. He said that recently Mr. Bill Bohr had been asked whether he thought the Russians had learned much from the defection of Fuchs to the Soviets. Bohr said Fuchs had probably not increased Soviet atomic progress but that he had been able to tell the Soviets how far along the West was.

Mr. Stassen

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He referred to the fact that preparations for the December meeting are being made under the very greatest pressure. It will be necessary to exchange views with our allies in advance of the meeting as they do not wish to be confronted with any surprises.

The meeting ended at 1:10 P.M.

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 - 115765

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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY

1 of 5 copies

November 7, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT
 THE WHITE HOUSE

On the basis of Mr. Sprague's confidential briefing as to the SAC reaction possibilities under certain extreme circumstances, I expressed to the President the view that I felt that these possibilities were so remote in practice that I doubted whether we would be justified in going to the extreme in the way of cost that alertness would require. The possibility considered was that in a time of relative tranquility and a reduction of international tension there would be mounted a massive surprise attack against the United States and simultaneously against all our important bases.

I said I considered that such an attack without provocation involving casualties of perhaps one hundred million would be so abhorrent to all who survived in any part of the world that I did not think that even the Soviet rulers would dare to accept the consequences.

John Foster Dulles

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Authority MR 80-546 # 16
 By W.C. NLE Date 1/16/64

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-3- DULTE 6, JULY 31, 5 PM, FROM LONDON

ON THE OTHER HAND WE AGREE THAT UNCONTROLLED MOBILITY GRANTED ANYWHERE TO SOVIET INSPECTION TEAMS COULD BECOME DANGEROUS - THEREFORE IN THIS DISTRICT WE PROVIDE FOR

UNCLASSIFIED

November 8, 1957



1140

Meeting Held in Room 5100, New State, November 7, 5:30 to 6:45 PM. Attended by Treasury Secretary Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles, Admiral Strauss, General Cutler, Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy, Assistant Secretary Smith, Counselor Reinhardt, Admiral Foster, Under Secretary of Treasury Scribner, and Others

1. Referring to Item I(d) of the attached outline for work of the Scientific Group, Secretary Anderson called attention to the major problems involved in attempting to locate among allies the production of non-nuclear weapons. He recalled the difficulty encountered in an attempt to establish a factory in the Netherlands which would recap all tires used by NATO. He said that problems arose involving labor unions, raw materials, level of employment existing in the various countries, and questions of paying for the products. He stated that allocation breaks down when the various economic interests of the NATO members are involved. He stated that if the manufacture of non-nuclear weapons was to be allocated, NATO would need to create a pool into which these products would be placed for distribution to individual members. Present U.S. procedure is for us to consider total NATO requirements and then break down distribution by individual countries.

2. Secretary Quarles indicated that the emphasis would be placed on allocated research and development. He said that there was considerable cooperation now, and in his view we should extend and perfect the existing machinery rather than seek to create anything new. He asked what was to be the objective of the papers to be produced—to decide what we will do for NATO or to decide how NATO would allocate production. He said he favored the first, but recalled that Secretary General Spaak believed that the U.S. should take the leadership in the problem of allocating research, development and production.

Under Secretary Murphy stated he felt the preparatory paper should deal with both questions.

General Cutler believed the Defense paper should state what we are now doing, state a concept of how to proceed which would be acceptable to the U.S. and suggest a way of implementing our concept in NATO which would then decide the specifics of allocation.

3. Secretary Quarles stated that cooperation in the research and development field was largely classified. He said it was now being done on a bilateral basis, which he preferred to any NATO-wide effort. He opposed sending classified information to NATO for general distribution. He said that he would not object to putting into the NATO Library descriptions of certain weapons sufficient to enable planners to decide where the weapon should be produced. He granted that specialization in production was necessary if the allocation system was to work. He agreed that NATO should try to plan research and development and tell each member what products it would produce. Then, the U.S. could work bilaterally with the other NATO member chosen to produce a specific weapon in an area.

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in what area it would work.*

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M. Kefley (?), who is the U.S. representative at NATO dealing with this problem of allocating research and development, stated that a NATO task force had submitted a report on the question under discussion. The report states that there is real saving to be made in the research and development field if the NATO members can cooperate. His concept was not a common hamper into which all weapons produced in NATO would be placed, but rather an expansion of the existing NATO mechanism to increase cooperation as much as possible.

General Cutler quoted General Draper as saying that weapons research could be done bilaterally, and when the new weapon was ready for production a decision could be made as to how it was to be distributed to NATO members.

4

4. Secretary Quarles referred to the NATO stockpile. He said everyone now agreed that the stockpile would be set up on the basis of staying within the existing AEC law. The existing US-UK and US-Canada system would be used. Everyone now accepts a workable arrangement which will meet the military requirement, but not the national pride requirement.

Mr. Smith stated that the Joint Chiefs were preparing their views and General Norstadt's views. The paper in its present form contains few details and in general accepts the plan to proceed on a bilateral basis.

taking into account

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5. General Cutler asked whether the NATO papers are to deal with what we will do if the AEC law is amended. Secretary Quarles urged that the papers be limited to what we can now do, plus a statement that we will seek to have the law changed. He argued that to do more in NATO would harm the Administration's effort to get the law changed. Mr. Smith urged that we inform NATO that we are not contemplating changing the law in regard to the prohibition of the transfer of weapons to foreign hands. He believed it would be easier to get Congress to accept amendments in the law which we believe are necessary, if we flatly stated to the Committee that we did not contemplate giving custody of weapons to any foreign state.

Secretary Quarles doubted whether we should be so flat in our statement to NATO. He suggested that we could describe the existing US-UK-Canada arrangements and offer to make the same arrangements for NATO.

6

6. Mr. Murphy asked whether we could place IREMS in NATO countries other than the four squadrons in the UK. He said that psychologically, we needed some specific action which could be taken at the NATO meeting to dramatize the defense posture of NATO.

Secretary Quarles said He believed we could provide them as we have done for the UK. He doubted these weapons should be distributed to other NATO countries. He called attention to the fact that the IRBM was just one weapon in a series of nuclear capable weapons, such as Honest John, Corporal, etc. He believed that if only three NATO countries had IRBMs, the other NATO countries might feel they were downgraded.

UNCLASSIFIED

November 16, 1957

1144

FOSTER REPORT

Atomic Energy Cooperation



Page 2, paragraph 4.


For "provided," substitute "unless."

Page 2, paragraph C.

Is the joint Defense-AEC determination the maximum as to transmissible information under the law? Has the joint Defense-AEC agreement been exploited as far as possible?

Pages 2, 3, 4 - Section III.

The recommended U. S. position with respect to NATO cooperation in furnishing nuclear materials for weapons purposes and in the fields of nuclear weapons development and production for weapons materials is exactly negative.



1990/1144 (acknowledgment) WS

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4(b)
AUTHORITY: USC 8536-214
DATE: 6-15-83

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This reasoning turns on the U. S. having nuclear secrets superior to those possessed by the Soviets and seems contrary to Presidential declarations that there was little point in not divulging to NATO partners what the enemy already knows.

Another reason for this negative position is that for the U. S. to provide assistance to NATO nations in their development and production of nuclear weapons would not lessen that country's scientific drain resulting from weapons research because the country would continue to try to improve its nuclear weapons design.

- C. Do not request or agree to NATO cooperation in NATO research development and production programs of nuclear weapons.

Reason: U. S. nuclear design is far more advanced than in other NATO countries and there would be risk of leak to the enemy.


- D. Keep the matter of NATO cooperation in U. S. research development and production programs for nuclear weapons under study.

If a NATO country makes a break-through, then offer to share with that country within definite limits and for a prescribed period of time.

This reasoning also seems contrary to the spirit of the President intent for it says what the U. S. has it keeps to itself and what others may learn they must share with the U. S.

- E. With reference to the "NATO Stockpile" no change in current legislation is advocated.

This means a continuation of U. S. custody and training limitations (?).



- F. Encourage NATO nations to sell to the U. S. nuclear materials produced by them which they might divert to weapons in the absence of a U. S. created "NATO Stockpile."

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The technical question is how much foreign processed nuclear material does the U. S. need for weapons for military purposes?

The President has agreed that any plutonium by-product of nuclear materials furnished to a foreign nation for peaceful uses if purchased by the U. S. under the bi-lateral option will be used only for peaceful purposes.

However processed nuclear material can be purchased by the AEC in special transactions not involving peaceful uses bi-laterally. However, if a U. S. agreement to purchase processed nuclear material is to be effective in preventing a foreign country from making its own nuclear weapons, such agreement must be long term. The present Atomic Energy Law permits only a one-year commitment, and if it is technically desirable for the U. S. to acquire substantially all foreign processed nuclear material the law must be amended.

Query as to need of a new Presidential announcement - unless the plutonium acquired under the peaceful uses bi-laterals was also needed for U. S. military purposes.

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NLE MR Case No. 85-53 R

Document No. 4

11/12/57

CONFIDENTIAL

12 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversations held in Bonn between Senator Prescott Bush, U. S. Senate, and German Minister of Defense Strauss

Germany

The undersigned accompanied Senator Prescott Bush during an official call on German Minister of Defense Strauss in his office in Bonn at 11:45 a.m., this date. The general atmosphere was most cordial and the conversations most forthright. Minister Strauss, in response to the general question as to major problems confronting the Germans in the build-up of their Armed Forces, responded along the following lines:



1. He was being pressurized by the French and the British particularly, and the Italians somewhat, to purchase from their respective governments a day fighter plane that they had for sale. The British particularly emphasized that this was a must from their point of view if the plane was to stay in production. The French pressed their case nearly to the same degree. Strauss went on to point out that if he gave way to all the pressures that were brought to bear by the different governments, he would have seven or eight types of airplanes to maintain and support. He realized that the Germans had been exploring the field of planes and missiles for a considerable period of time and that it was now necessary for them to make a decision. However, he in no way indicated what this decision might be. He evidenced definite irritation at the pressures being brought to bear on him by outside government agencies. He did not mention the United States as falling in this category although he did concede that the F-100 series was to be taken into consideration.

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2. Minister Strauss stated that while they were anxious to consummate a deal with the French for research and development in the Colombo-Basha area of Algeria, in order to pursue the rocket and missile development, still there were grave political implications if the Germans showed up in that area with scientists and armed forces personnel. He indicated no final decision had been made in this matter as to time or extent of participation.

3. Minister Strauss stated that yesterday at a Defense Council meeting, Chancellor Adenauer had asked many questions but two were of outstanding significance:

a. In event that the Russians made an all out surprise atomic attack on the United States and its bases around the Russian periphery, would the United States be able to retaliate or could U. S. bases be so

Russia

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Authority MR 85-53 H 4

By 5/12/82 NLE Date 5/12/82

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completely neutralized that retaliation would be ineffective! The question was double barreled and part two was, in essence, what would be the psychological effect on the U. S. to find themselves suddenly under close physical attack in their own native land when such action had never before taken place during either World War I or World War II?

b. What would the United States do if the Russian capabilities for delivering atomic weapons on the United States continued to increase to a point where virtual parity was reached with us at which time the Russians undertook a limited aggression such as the subjugation of Berlin; an attack on Turkey; a Syrian attack on Israel (in light of the Eisenhower Doctrine); a move into Austria or an occupation of northern Denmark and southern Norway in order to insure free passage to and from the Baltic to the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean for their Naval forces?


4. Strauss stated that General Heusinger, supported by further statements by himself, responded to question "a" that the United States would be able to retaliate with the same degree of effectiveness now, two years from now or five years from now as he considered it impossible for the Russians to neutralize all the operational bases from which such retaliatory attack would be launched even though they destroyed some American cities and some Air Force bases. He agreed that it would be virtually impossible to evaluate the psychological impact on the United States if, for the first time, America was brought under direct physical attack.

5. To question "b" Strauss stated that while, of course, he didn't know what the United States' position would be, he felt very strongly that this was the time, now, for the United States to take a strong position and re-emphasize its policy that an attack on any NATO country was an attack on all. For us to avoid any indication of uncertainty or "the jitters" which would naturally bring aid and comfort to the Russian cause.

6. In response to queries from Senator Bush as to what Germany might hope would come out of the NATO Council meeting next month, Strauss had the following to offer:

a. He felt first of all that NATO should not, at the conclusion of the meetings, recite a lot of cliches about unity, the free world, determination, etc., but should spell out specifically the NATO position in event that any of its members came under attack. That NATO should reaffirm its determination to repulse aggression in a united effort.

b. Strauss felt that NATO should adopt a standard intermediate ballistic missile; also secondary rockets and missiles to be used by all NATO nations, as well as a standard fighter aircraft; that all the research and development in this general area should be a NATO effort and that once the decision had been made as to the weapons, the participating nations would be allocated areas of responsibility for production. This the Germans are going to propose.



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c. That a single military headquarters at NATO should have the authority, in event of a sudden attack by the Russians, to use the weapons at their disposal without processing requests to fifteen member nations through NATO Ambassadors.

d. That there should be a single NATO supply system to include maintenance and spare parts. The Germans intend to propose this also. National supply responsibility could be effective only for a period of one week to ten days and that thereafter the NATO supply agency established would be responsible for continuing logistic support to NATO forces.

7. On the subject of air defense of Europe, Strauss made the following observations:

We certainly can't turn over the skies to the enemy to rove and hunt at will. We must take the greatest toll possible of enemy aircraft. However, I am not convinced NIKE, supported by interceptors, is the answer. I believe we must have such tremendous capability for destruction by means of a ground delivery system and other means that the Russians will think a thousand hours before they start anything. Strauss stated he realized the anti-missile missile which was badly needed was a few years away.

CLARK L. RUFFNER
Major General, USA
Chief

cc: Senator Huber
Ambassador Bruce
OSD/ISA
Deputy CINCEUR

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11/12/57

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NOV. 12, 1957

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: EUR - C. Burke Elbrick

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with General Norstad, 3:00 p.m. November 12

General Norstad has sent you a copy of a letter he sent to the President on November 7, regarding the December NATO meeting (Tab A).

The following questions will probably arise in your talk with Norstad today:

1) NATO Atomic Stockpile. Norstad's views on this question coincide closely with our own. He can be expected to reemphasize the importance of the President's being able to announce the stockpile plan at the December meeting, and the importance of the stockpile being genuinely multilateral and "common", as opposed to a system of purely bilateral agreements with individual NATO countries. He feels, as we do, that the stockpile must have a NATO flavor. We have had some concern that the proposal now being developed by the JCS, though substantively acceptable, may lack enough of this flavor. You may wish to tell Norstad that we are continuing to work closely with Defense to obtain an acceptable proposal.

2) IRBM. Norstad will doubtless wish to discuss with you his ideas, set forth in his letter to the President, for a U.S. announcement that IRBMs will be made available to NATO allies as soon as available; that allocation of the weapons should be made a NATO activity rather than a series of bilateral arrangements; that the U.S. should offer information and know-how for NATO-controlled production in Europe of a "second generation" IRBM; and that a NATO agency should be established in which the research and development of a third-generation IRBM could be concentrated, for production in Europe. In his memorandum to you of November 8, Mr. Murphy expresses his growing conviction that the punch-line of the December meeting should be a plan for the provision of IRBM to certain NATO areas in addition to the U.K. You may wish to tell Norstad that we are very interested in the idea and we are taking it under urgent study.

3) NATO Strategy. One of the basic problems confronting the Alliance in the military field today is uncertainty whether the major NATO powers wholeheartedly concur in and support NATO strategy. A strong statement by the President that he considers NATO strategy sound, and capable of execution, would, in Norstad's view, immeasurably increase confidence in agreed NATO strategy and thereby contribute to the success of the meeting and the future unity and strength of NATO.

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MEMORANDUM

4) U.S. Air Contribution to NATO. Horstad is likely to express serious concern over plans to withdraw a substantial number of additional USAF squadrons from Europe during calendar 1958, as a result of FY 1958 budgetary and manpower ceilings, and the planning that is going forward for FY 1959. These squadrons would be over and above the 3 squadrons whose withdrawal we have already announced to NATO in our 1957 Annual Review submission. We understand that Defense feels we will have to announce part of this cut (3 squadrons) by the end of this month. Horstad will point out that unilateral U.S. reductions of this magnitude, leaving our contribution in Europe 10 squadrons short of his just-revised and reduced minimum force requirements for end-1958, could have most serious results for the Alliance.

Concurrences

C - Mr. Reinhardt

Attachment:

1. Tab (A), Copy of General Horstad's ltr to the President.

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Gen. Curtis
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By bc NLE Date 12/14/82


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November 14, 1957

GENERAL PURPOSES

At the December NATO meeting, the U.S. should try to reinvigorate NATO and increase the confidence of its members in the future. This confidence may require at least the following:

1. NATO must be convinced that the free world knows where it is going and that NATO has an appropriate role to play,
2. The mutual capacity for destruction now possessed by the U.S. and the USSR does not eliminate the need for a large-scale European military effort. NATO must be persuaded that there are more alternatives for the future than--
 - (a) peace through deterrents (in which they have a minimal part);
 - (b) nuclear holocaust; or
 - (c) capitulation.
3. If the deterrents to war fail, employment of nuclear weapons in defense would be a rational act and one over which the Europeans would have some control.
4. The U.S. continues to retain strategic bombing superiority.



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11/16/57

Nitze

Skepticism in basic MRP idea

viction in representing your point of view and to transmit our will and resolution to carry out our nuclear strategy. You reflected a sense that you, and you alone, could persuade others of our will and resolution and that the task must be performed in Washington since obviously you could not be everywhere at the same time.

The problem seems to me to go far deeper than consideration of the place of communication. The difficulty on the part of our Ambassadors most probably does not arise from a deficiency of understanding or of the arts of persuasion. It is indeed difficult to transmit conviction without first being convinced. That our Ambassadors lack faith in the adequacy of our policies to meet the demands of the times is not surprising, for surely they are not alone in this. I suggest that the difficulty of convincing our friends is not that they do not understand but that they understand very well. The requirement is not simply to turn the task of persuasion over to the one who has the highest will to believe and most zeal to convince. It is first to get policies which, because sound, can appeal to the reason of others and second to explain them to the others concerned. Both elements are necessary, but the second is surely subordinate to the first in order of difficulty and importance.

In this connection I wish to comment on the language of the October 25 communique regarding the sharing of "knowledge of the total capabilities of security ... in being and in prospect" and "greater opportunity to assure that this power will in fact be available in case of need for their common security, and that it will not be misused by any nation for purposes other than individual and collective self-defense..." This language recognizes the need to assuage some anxiety on the part of our allies. It is essential to be clear about the cause and nature of that anxiety lest we worsen it by false remedies.

I suspect that the anxiety abroad does not really rise from a fear that we may go off on some unilateral aggression nor even from any suspicion of the honesty of our intentions to honor our commitments. Rather it rises from a suspicion, well founded in fact, that the means we have provided ourselves are already, or will soon become, inadequate to our intentions and that we may fail them not because we wish to but because we lack resolution to provide ourselves with the means necessary for success. In this situation our allies



Nitze → JFD, 11/16/57. Dulles Pp / Gen Cor & Mem / 3 / 'Strictly Confidential - pp 3-4 only' N-P (1)

wish to test their anxieties in the light of disclosure, hoping that the necessity of disclosure may compel us to establish a better basis to disclose.

In my view the remedy surely does not lie in the direction of some sort of a NATO nuclear council geared to give all the governments concerned assurance that we would or would not -- as the case may be, in the light of circumstances -- use nuclear weapons. We should avoid trying to bring any such organizational rabbit out of a political hat in hope of avoiding the vexing questions that really count. Unless vested with decision, such a council would be without power to give such reassurance. Decision would have to be either by a prescribed majority or on the basis of unanimity. Would we, while dissenting, yield to a majority decision precipitating us into a life-or-death war? Would we yield to a veto by others of action deemed necessary by us as a life-or-death matter? I think we should have no doubt as to what the answer of the Congress would be to either proposition. Such a council could therefore be only advisory, therefore without power to give the reassurance proposed, and likely to produce only another impediment in crisis -- in sum, an organizational blind-alley.

The solution, I emphasize, must lie in the direction of policy, not of organizational contrivance.

This brings me to the second range of issues -- those concerning your attitude respecting the development and use of instruments in support of our foreign policy.

Your remarks on November 6 and on November 7 at the White House were not the first occasions on which I have been puzzled by your attitude toward measures designed in the longer run to bring our capabilities into balance with our unavoidable commitments. The Secretary of State in the United States form of government has broader duties than the mere conduct of our foreign relations. He is properly the principle minister to whom the President can look for recommendations designed to generate and to preserve this country's ability to support its foreign policy.

In the spring of 1953, at the outset of your tenure as Secretary, you withheld your support from the proposals outlined in N.S.C. 141 which if adopted would have gone far toward avoiding the dangerous strategic situation which we now face. At that time you were also reluctant to support foreign aid and technical assistance. You were hesitant even to concern yourself about the adequacy of staff assistance in your own establishment.




11/19/57

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

NOV 22 1957

NOV 4 DATE: November 19, 1957

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As changed



Subject: Preparations for the NATO Heads of Government Meeting

- Participants:
- French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau
 - M. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - Ambassador Hervé Alphand
 - M. Charles Lucet, Minister of the French Embassy
 - M. Jean de la Grandville, Counselor of the French Embassy
 - M. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor of the French Embassy
 - M. Francois de Rose, Chief of the Treaty Section of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 - General André Martin, Deputy for Air to the French Chief of Staff
 - M. Albert du Chalet of the French Atomic Energy Commissariat

- The Secretary of State
- Mr. Adlai Stevenson
- Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
- Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
- Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary EUR
- Mr. Walter N. Walmsley, Deputy Assistant Secretary IO
- Mr. Joseph Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary NEA
- Mr. John N. Irwin, II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
- Mr. B. E. L. Timmons, RA
- Mr. John Bovey, AF/N
- Mr. Matthew Looman, WE

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 Authority: MND 887420
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 NARA, OMB

Copies To:

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| S/S 1 | IO 10 | RA 7 | Amembassy, London 23 |
| G 2 | NEA 12 | OLI (2) 17-18 | Amembassy Rome 20 |
| W 3 | S/AE 13 | USUN, N.Y. 18 | Amembassy Bonn 23 |
| C 4 | INR 14 | OSD/ISA 28 | |
| S/P 5 | AF/N 15 | USRO, Paris 21 | |
| EUR 6 | WE (2) 8-9 | Amembassy, Paris 22 | 25-2 |
| NE 11 | FE 16 | | |

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Mr. Pineau stated that in view of the violent French reaction on the Tunisian arms issue, the first and essential problem now was to find before the December meeting a formula that would restore the French public's faith in and support of NATO. It would be highly desirable to develop ideas such as the exchange of scientific information, but what was first needed was to reestablish the concept of NATO solidarity. In this connection, it seemed to him absolutely necessary that the NATO partners consult on developments in other areas where two or more NATO powers had interests. Mr. Pineau stated he had long felt that NATO constituted an alliance of the signatory powers, rather than only a military pact which covered a specific geographic area. The impression must be given to the Europeans that if they are expected to abandon a certain measure of sovereignty in NATO, this would be compensated for by solidarity of the NATO powers. Mr. Pineau hoped that some formula along these lines could be developed before the December meeting.

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The Secretary recalled that at the NATO meeting of last December, he had pointed out some of the problems which the U.S. faced with regard to the possibility of committing itself solidly with one particular group of powers and attributing to that relationship a primacy over all other commitments which the U.S. might have in other areas of the world, such as South America, the Far East, etc., where the U.S. already had certain international obligations. The Secretary thought, nevertheless, that since the last December meeting considerable progress had been made with regard to consultations in the NATO Council on political matters affecting areas outside of NATO. This could undoubtedly be improved. What was basically required of all the members concerned was to develop the habit of holding consultations. In some instances, such as the Tunisian arms question, events had moved so rapidly that consultations in NATO had not been feasible. Other countries, the Secretary said, had probably erred in the past as much if not more than we had in failing to consult the NATO partners before taking action on matters of vital and mutual concern. A recent instance had been the important joint announcement by the Netherlands and Australian Governments with regard to West New Guinea. We had received no advance notice of this announcement from either the Netherlands, which is a member of NATO, or Australia, which is a member of SEATO. Nevertheless, the Secretary said, it was to be hoped that all the NATO partners would develop a habit of consulting together on matters in other areas which were of mutual concern. The Secretary doubted, however, that it would be feasible to formalize such an intention or to go farther than the recommendations of the "Three Wise Men" Report which had been adopted last December. Technically, the only basic obligation inherent in the North Atlantic Treaty is a military one, namely, that aggression in any part of the area would be considered as an attack against each one of the NATO partners. It must be remembered, the Secretary said, that in ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty, the Senate specifically precluded the establishment of any exclusive consultations for NATO with regard to matters in other areas, such as Latin America, the Far East, etc. It was, of course, difficult to isolate the military obligation from the desirability to harmonize to the maximum extent feasible our respective policies in other areas of the world. The Secretary accordingly thought that it might be possible to reaffirm the goal which Mr. Pineau had indicated, namely, to seek to maintain NATO solidarity, insofar as feasible and to the extent that it was in consonance with our respective commitments to other countries. Of course, it would be undesirable if other countries outside the NATO area felt their fate was being determined by NATO without their point of view being heard. Moreover, it would appear imprudent to encourage bloc voting in the U.N., particularly in view of the fact that NATO was a minority bloc, by giving any impression that the NATO powers were concerting on all U.N. matters.

Mr. Pineau stated that he was not asking for exclusive consultations within NATO and felt that such consultations should in no sense preclude consultations on the same subjects with other countries outside of NATO. He did believe, however, that where two or more NATO powers were involved in another area of the world, it would be desirable for the NATO powers concerned to endeavor to align their policies rather than pursuing conflicting policies, as had been the case in Syria. There was no need to amend formally the North Atlantic Treaty, but in view of the present state of French public opinion, it was absolutely essential to find some formula which would meet the need for bolstering NATO solidarity. In this connection, Mr. Pineau wished

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to point out to the Secretary that a very serious crisis was developing between the U.K. and the six Western European nations. An example of this was the current British effort to sabotage the Common Market. Mr. Pineau felt that this was an appropriate subject for NATO consultations.

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The Secretary agreed that this matter might be usefully discussed in the NATO forum. He had always felt that matters, such as Cyprus, should be subject to NATO consultations. In this connection, did the Foreign Minister think it would be useful to discuss Algeria in the NATO Council?

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Mr. Pineau stated that in May of 1956 he had spoken on Algeria in NATO and would be glad to speak again on this issue.

The Secretary stated that the U.S. would be glad to explain any of its policies regarding other parts of the world in the NATO Council and would agree to being questioned on such policies. It was clear, however, that it could not be expected that NATO would have a veto power in such matters. Similarly in occasions where events were moving swiftly, such consultations might not prove feasible. Mr. Pineau stated that it might be possible to simplify the procedure. For instance, rather than discussing matters in the full NATO Council, two or more of the interested NATO partners might consult together with the NATO Secretary General.

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The Secretary agreed that it might not prove useful to discuss certain matters with Iceland or possibly with Portugal. Similarly it might be more feasible to have the NATO consultations elsewhere than at the NATO Council in Paris. Immediately after Prime Minister Macmillan visited here, the Secretary said, he had had the opportunity to acquaint immediately and informally the NATO Ambassadors regarding the substance of the U.S.-U.K. discussions. It was at that time that he had explained that there had been no special bilateral aspect to the discussions but rather that an effort had been made to develop some ideas which might usefully be considered subsequently on a broader basis by the NATO powers. The Secretary stated that in conclusion he was in agreement that the matter of NATO consultations merited further emphasis at the December meeting.

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Mr. Pineau stated he now wished to raise with the Secretary the detailed preparations for the December NATO meeting. Referring to his talk with the Secretary on September 7 regarding the necessity for establishing a Western scientific community, he said that the French Government had now developed a specific plan which it wished to propose for the setting up of a NATO body devoted to basic scientific research. The purpose of this organization would be to stimulate scientific research in such matters as electronics, geophysics, etc. -- not applied research which was quite different. This organization would provide for the rapid exchange of scientific discoveries in the West, for the development of young Western scientists, and for the possibility of Western scientists having ready access to different laboratories in the NATO countries. It might even be possible to establish joint centers of scientific

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learning where Western scientists of different nationalities might study together. Such an organization would be headed by scientists and administrators of the NATO nations. Each country would have to make a proportionate financial contribution, although it was impossible at this juncture to estimate the total amount of funds that would be needed. The French Government would propose that at the December meeting a committee of NATO scientists, engineers, and administrators be constituted which would be required to submit within three months a report recommending both the immediate and long-term programs for such a body. Mr. Pineau stated that the French Embassy would shortly furnish the Department of State with a written summary of this proposal.

Referring to scientific advances in such countries as Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, the Secretary asked whether the organization as proposed by the French Government was intended to be limited exclusively to the NATO members. Mr. Pineau replied that while the NATO partners would be the permanent members, it would be later possible to associate other countries with the work of such an organization.

Mr. Pineau stated that he wished to raise an extremely delicate but most important matter, which he had already discussed with the Italian and German Governments. It was imperative, he said, in the apportioning of the defense responsibilities among the various NATO countries, that there be no discrimination in principle with regard to any NATO country, notably with regard to the production of atomic weapons. Frankly, Mr. Pineau stated, he could not say at this juncture whether or not France would go ahead with the production of atomic weapons. However, one thing was absolutely certain, namely that France would be obliged to reject categorically any suggestion to the effect that it not produce such weapons. He strongly emphasized that it would be most unfortunate if this problem were ever raised.

Another matter in this connection, Mr. Pineau said, he wished to mention concerned the future conditions of any atomic war. There was, he said, a general repugnance in France, as well as in Europe in general, towards having on French territory launching sites for short-range missiles, that is having a range of from 100 to 300 kilometres. The French public could never accept being armed with missiles which could only be effective when the Soviets approached French territory and after their cities had been atomized. On the other hand, it was essential that there be intermediate range missiles having a range of about 2,000 kilometres which could provide for an immediate counter to the Soviet menace in the event of hostilities.

The Secretary stated, as he had said in his press conference earlier that day, that the United States hoped to be in a position to station intermediate range missiles in NATO countries towards the end of 1958. (He hoped that it would be possible that such missiles could be available for use by any NATO country concerned in the event of hostilities in accordance with NATO strategy.) The nuclear warheads would have to remain technically under U.S. custody, that is under the command of U.S. officers, ~~as was the case in Canada and~~ as was presently envisaged for the U.K. In fact, however, the warheads would be located where best use could be made of them; the troops of the country concerned would be stationed in the vicinity; the country would be assured that in the event of war the warheads located there would be made

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immediately available to it.) The Secretary had recently discussed with General Norstad this matter which was now under consideration by our military people. Mr. Pineau, the Secretary said, would presumably have an opportunity to discuss this matter further with Mr. Quarles, who was the principal authority.

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In response to Mr. Pineau's question as to whether there were political or technical reasons for not stationing the missiles in NATO countries before the end of 1958, the Secretary replied that the reasons were solely technical. The United States had several different intermediate range prototype missiles. It had not yet been decided definitively which type was the best. Moreover, advances were still being made in the development of each of these types. It had therefore not as yet been feasible to undertake production on any large scale. The Secretary added that Mr. Quarles would be able to give more up-to-date information on this matter to Mr. Pineau. In this connection, Mr. Irwin clarified that it now appeared that such missiles could probably not be sent to the NATO countries before the beginning of 1959. Moreover, he pointed out, a considerable time would be required for the development of the launching sites, so that probably the launching sites could not be made ready before the missiles became available.

Mr. Pineau asked whether a European production of such missiles had to be held up pending the full scale production of such weapons in the United States. The Secretary replied that he did not think that a European contribution along these lines would have to be so delayed. The United States Government was currently considering the possibility of dividing up the manufacturing tasks of these items and European factories might thus be able to contribute to such production.

Mr. Pineau said that if the United States could provide the European countries with the research information developed on these matters in the United States, the European production would be far less expensive and time-consuming. The Secretary agreed that it would be undesirable to have a duplication of effort in this matter. He hoped that we might be in a position to discuss this matter definitively at the NATO meeting in December.

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Mr. Pineau referred to his earlier proposal for Nato stockpiling of atomic weapons. He thought that such a formula should not pose problems for the United States in view of the fact that SACEUR was a U.S. officer and he accordingly urged that this proposal might soon be implemented. The Secretary replied that he hoped we would be in a position to set forth a concrete U.S. proposal on this matter at the December meeting.

Mr. Pineau then raised the desirability of an exchange of classified military information between the NATO members. It seemed to him that the United States should not be inhibited from providing its NATO Allies with classified information which the U.S. Government knew was already available to the Soviet Union. The Secretary agreed that this seemed to be a reasonable proposition. However, he said that there were frequently differences of opinion as to the extent of Soviet knowledge.

Mr. Pineau~~SECRET~~

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Mr. Pineau asked whether the Secretary contemplated discussing the Middle East situation during the NATO meeting and possibly issuing a joint NATO declaration with regard to the Middle East. He thought it would seem unrealistic if at such a high level meeting the current situation in the Middle East were not to be considered.

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 The Secretary said that he did not exclude the possibility of the NATO powers issuing a declaration with regard to the Middle East, providing that something could be said which would serve a useful purpose. NATO was not popular in some areas of the Middle East. While some of the countries in the "northern tier" might react favorably to such declaration, he was concerned about the possible impact upon such countries as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Arab states of Africa. As a practical matter, moreover, it might be extremely difficult within the short time available, which would have to be devoted to a series of new NATO proposals, to have a full and meaningful discussion on current Middle East problems. Constitutionally, it would be difficult for the United States to give in any such declaration guarantees with regard to the integrity and independence of the countries of the Middle East. Nevertheless, it might prove possible to develop a declaration which indicated NATO's concern with regard to developments in the Middle East. In view of current charges by certain Middle East countries as to the so-called "imperialistic designs" of the Western powers toward the Middle East, it was important that nothing be done by NATO that might be exploited by our enemies in this area.

Mr. Pineau felt that nothing would be risked by a declaration of the NATO powers that they considered that the maintenance of the status quo of the area as the basis for the integrity and independence of the Middle East countries concerned.

The Secretary stated that it was true that the joint Congressional resolution on the Middle East of last March went quite far in affirming that the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the countries of the Middle East was of concern to the United States. It might prove feasible to reiterate in the NATO forum the general sense of this resolution.

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
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By JR NARA. Date 1/23/92

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MINUTES
of
a
MEETING
between the
SECRETARY OF STATE
and the
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER

DEC 17 1957

NOVEMBER 21, 1957 at 4:00 P.M.

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Murphy
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Elbrick
Mr. Gerard C. Smith
General Guthrie
Mr. Timmons
Mr. Reinstein
Mr. Reinhardt

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 887426
By JR NARA. Date 1/23/92

Federal Republic of Germany

Foreign Minister
Dr. Heinrich von Brentano
Ambassador Blankenhorn
Ambassador Krekeler
Mr. Limbourg

Interpreters

Mr. Weber
Mr. Charlick

Reporting Officer

Jacques J. Reinstein

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contribution in this respect, but the individual European states were too small to do this by themselves. They should therefore agree on a program of common research going beyond national boundaries. The center of this effort must, however, be the United States. Herr von Brentano said that this proposal was not put forward for selfish motives. It was essential that research, both basic and applied, be carried on. However, the Europeans could carry it on only in cooperation with the United States. He knew that there were difficulties of a legal character in the United States, but difficulties existed to be overcome.

Herr von Brentano said he had discussed this matter with Signor Pella, who was in agreement. He believed that the Benelux Governments would also agree. The idea was to establish a European center of armament research, which could be directed to those matters of particular interest to European countries. He cited by way of example the development of an intermediate range missile with a range of 2000 kilometers. Herr von Brentano said that the Europeans did not wish to compete with the United States, but rather to relieve the United States of some of its burdens. However, they could only do this with the help of the United States. He realized that the matter could not be settled at the NATO meeting. There was for example the question of the protection of security, which was extremely important. However, agreement should be reached on the principle. Its application could be worked out in a meeting of Foreign Ministers at a later time.

NATO Military Organization

Herr von Brentano said that the third principal point which should be dealt with at the NATO meeting was the subject of military organization. We should try to reach a greater measure of integration in some fields. For example, there still are separate French, Belgian, and Dutch air forces. He said this was medieval. We could no longer afford to have separate forces. More should be done also in the way of standardization of weapons. NATO could make recommendations and put pressure on the Governments to do more. There could be sharing of tasks. There should also be greater integration in training.

Herr von Brentano said that another subject in this field was that of the Supreme Command. He did not doubt the competence of the members of the Standing Group. However, they were too dependent on their governments. The Standing Group should be given greater independence. As matters now stand, they do not think in terms of the alliance as a whole.

Nuclear Weapons

Herr von Brentano said he also wished to speak about atomic weapons. He said that the Federal Republic does not want either now or in the near future to be released from its treaty obligations. It does

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not want to produce ABC weapons. On the other hand, it does want to participate in research in this field. He said he was not an expert, but he felt that there was only one area of research in the atomic field. No distinction could be made between military research and research for other purposes. A question arose as to the form in which this research should be carried on. This was also an area in which there could be cooperative action.

Another subject which should probably be dealt with in a restricted session at the NATO meeting was the question of storage and control of nuclear weapons. He recognized that in this respect also there were legislative difficulties in the United States. Such weapons should be under the control of NATO. He did not mean by this that they should be under the control of individual commanders but under political control. If the possession of nuclear weapons is confined only to some countries, other countries will want to produce weapons, which will then be outside the control of NATO. The development of such a situation would involve the risk of war. Herr von Brentano said there should be a frank discussion of how NATO would make decisions on the use of weapons.

Procedure at the NATO Meeting

Herr von Brentano said he would also like to make some comments on procedure to be followed at the NATO meeting. The Federal Republic thinks that the meeting should not take up the routine matters normally dealt with at the December Ministerial meeting. The Annual Review resolution should be approved before the meeting. He suggested that General Norstad should give a briefing on the present military situation and on the measures which needed to be taken. Finally, all member governments should give the Secretary General in advance of the meeting a basic outline of the proposals they would make.

Herr von Brentano said that he would give the Secretary on the following day a separate paper covering the points which he had outlined.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY

Declaration to be Issued at the NATO Meeting

The Secretary thanked Herr von Brentano for the expression of his views. He thought that his own thinking was very much in harmony with what Herr von Brentano had expressed. He said he would like to comment on some of the specific suggestions which had been made and perhaps to add a few thoughts of his own. The Secretary said he agreed it was of the utmost importance that the declaration to be made at the meeting should not deal exclusively with military matters and that it should indicate the great concern of the NATO Governments for the peace,

independence,

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of the Cabinet and of the National Security Council. He thought it was also sound to enlarge the powers of the Secretary General. He did not think we would have to do much on this subject. M. Spaak, who was a dynamic personality, would do it himself.

The Secretary said there was one suggestion on which he would welcome Herr von Brentano's views. It might be helpful if the Ambassadors of the NATO countries could meet with the Foreign Minister in a particular capital for consultation if a specific occasion for doing so arose. He said that if the need arose he would be prepared to meet with the NATO Ambassadors. No matter how capable the permanent representatives were, and in our case we had capable representatives, there was no substitute in some circumstances for getting information first-hand, since everything could not be conveyed by cable. He thought that this procedure might be particularly applicable in Washington, London, Bonn, and Paris. In Paris, of course, the French Foreign Minister could meet with the permanent representatives in the Council.

NATO Military Organization

The Secretary said he was a little at a loss as to what to say on military matters. He would ask Mr. Smith to speak on the question of basic and applied research, since he was somewhat better posted on this subject. He did not wish to comment on matters of military organization in the absence of representatives of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Nuclear Weapons

As to nuclear weapons, the Secretary said it seemed to us that it would be a very wasteful use of our combined assets if at this stage one country after another were to undertake the long and expensive process of trying to make such weapons. The United Kingdom had done this, and he would not undertake to say whether this decision had been wise or not. If the other NATO countries were not to make such weapons, the nuclear weapons produced by the United States needed to be assured of use to a greater extent than heretofore. This should be done on a basis of impartiality, in light of the military judgment of SACEUR. He thought that something of this character could be worked out, although there were legal problems involved. As far as we were concerned, we did not think it possible to contemplate a situation in which there were first and second class powers in NATO.

The Secretary said that he knew that at the time of the London and Paris Agreements, and to some extent still, atomic weapons were regarded as something apart, both from a political and moral viewpoint. He did not think this would always be the situation. Nuclear materials were

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This was exactly what he had asked for - see 115 above

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now a source of power, and in five or ten years would be running cities. He could not conceive of this material being all around us and not being used in war. On the contrary, he thought it certainly would be used. In the course of time the distinction between nuclear and other weapons would gradually break down. Of course, if agreement could be reached with the Soviet Union, it might be possible to do away with such weapons. Even so, they would be produced if there were a war. During the last war we produced them, starting with nothing. With existing materials, nuclear weapons could be produced in a few months or even a few weeks. The Secretary said that a moral stigma had been attached to nuclear weapons by the Soviets. While this had some basis, conventional weapons were also highly destructive. He thought, for example, that it was questionable whether the inhabitants of Tokyo were better off at the time that it was subjected to fire bombing than were the inhabitants of Hiroshima.

Making these weapons is, of course, a very costly process. United States production was increasing both in quality and quantity. We were getting them clean and making them smaller. We were doing this at enormous cost and it would be folly for all the countries of NATO to attempt to do this. The converse of this was that there must be confidence that the weapons would be available for our NATO Allies in time of war.

The Secretary recalled that Herr von Brentano had said that the decision to use nuclear weapons should be a political one. This was true in the case of the United States with one exception. If a military force were attacked, the Commander had authority to use whatever means were at his disposal to protect his force from destruction. This would not mean that he would have a right to drop a bomb on Moscow, but if he had small tactical weapons, he would have a right to use them. With this exception, in our case as in the case of most other countries, the use of weapons is and should be a political decision.

Procedure at the NATO Meeting

With regard to the procedure at the NATO meeting, the Secretary said that the question of acting on the Annual Review prior to the meeting would be discussed again on the following Tuesday. He hoped that it would be decided to dispose of the Annual Review before the Heads of Government meeting. He thought that Herr von Brentano's suggestion regarding General Norstad was a good idea. He believed that this sort of thing had been done before and thought we would go along with whatever the majority wanted. As to the declaration, it was important that work should be done in advance. The declaration could not be written in the last few hours of the meeting as is usually done with a communique. He

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thought that M. Spaak was perhaps preparing a draft for discussion by the permanent representatives. If it were to be done by one person, M. Spaak was probably the best choice. The Secretary said he hoped he could get to Paris a day or two before the meeting, perhaps on the previous Sunday. It might be useful if some of the Ministers were in Paris before the meeting and could work with Spaak.

Scientific Cooperation in NATO

The Secretary asked Mr. Smith to discuss scientific cooperation. Mr. Smith said that as he understood it, Herr von Brentano had referred to three principal areas: (1) basic research; (2) applied research; and (3) design of long-range missiles. He thought that these presented different degrees of difficulty. As to basic research, we were studying the report of the NATO Task Force. We were in general agreement with it and thought we could be quite forthcoming at the Paris meeting. The field of applied research involves problems of greater difficulty, but they were ones which we believed were manageable. He thought we would have proposals to make in this area. The third area presented even greater difficulties, although we felt that good results were well within the order of possibility. It would be quite ridiculous if we did not tap European and particularly German talent, in view of the role Germany had played in the missile field. On the other hand, there were other problems involving proprietary rights, for example. One should not expect too rapid progress. He said that the United States would approach this matter sympathetically at the meeting.

In addition, Mr. Smith said that reference had been made to a joint venture with the French and Italians. As to this point, he could only echo what the Secretary had said. He did not think that this would be an economical use of resources. He suggested that agreements under Section 114(b) of the Atomic Energy Act might be a more practical approach. He pointed out the problem of designing warheads for ballistic missiles was extraordinarily complex. It had taken the United States ten years to develop a warhead for the intermediate range missile. The Secretary asked how much money it had cost us, remarking that it was probably between ten and twenty billion dollars. Mr. Smith said that we would have to take our entire investment into account. He thought that the cost could reasonably be estimated at \$1.2 billion.

AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN HERR VON BRENTANO AND THE SECRETARY

German Military Build-up

The Secretary said that Herr von Brentano had spoken of the Annual Review. He had been frank enough to recognize that the Federal Republic had been delinquent to some extent in connection with its own build-up. He hoped that some reassurance could be given to the NATO meeting on this point. This was something which was always being thrown at NATO and at us, because we were to some extent partners of the

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Federal Republic. He hoped that something could be said on this subject by the Chancellor. A good many countries, including the United States, would want to hear what the Federal Republic was proposing to do.

Herr von Brentano said that General Norstad was satisfied with and agreed with the plans for the build-up of the German forces. However, the new German Minister of Finance had drawn a very serious picture of the German financial situation when the matter had come up. Herr von Brentano suggested that Herr Etzel should come to the United States and talk with the Secretary and with the Secretary of the Treasury on the subject. When the German build-up had been discussed in the Defense Council, it had been estimated that the cost for 1958 would be DM 14 billion, for 1959 DM 17 billion, and for 1960 DM 21 billion. This was to be compared with an existing budget level of DM 9 billion. It was not clear how these sums could be raised. They would have to be raised in part by increasing taxes. This might cause difficulties with Parliament, but the Federal Government was resolved to push forward with the build-up, not only because of its treaty obligations but because it felt there was an urgent need for doing so.

Nuclear Weapons; Limited War

Herr von Brentano said he would like to raise two other points. The first was that he himself did not think that one could speak of a difference between conventional or nuclear war, nor could one draw a distinction between local and general wars. He could not conceive of war with conventional weapons with the Soviets because of their overwhelming superiority in this area. They would overrun Europe in a very short time.

The second point related to a decision to use nuclear weapons, which he previously had said should be a political decision. The Secretary had said that one exception must be made to this principle. He was in agreement with what the Secretary had said. However, one must not allow a feeling of discrimination to arise. If United States forces were to have the possibility of defending themselves with nuclear weapons, other Allied forces must have this possibility as well. Furthermore, if they did not have such weapons, the Russians might be tempted to start attacks in areas where they know the forces do not have such weapons. NATO could be strong only if people knew that all could defend themselves with the same weapons.

The Secretary said the whole purpose of what for convenience has been called the NATO atomic stockpile is to create conditions in which all will have an opportunity to get these weapons in case of need.

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The Secretary said that Herr von Brentano had remarked that no distinction could be made between local and general wars. He thought it was possible to envisage local wars. Herr von Brentano said he had not intended to generalize. If war broke out on the Soviet-German boundary, it could not be localized. However, not every local conflict need become a general war. The Secretary said that it was possible to envisage conflicts in the Far East with atomic weapons which need not involve general war.

Relations between Regional Security Organizations

The Secretary said one suggestion we were thinking of was some way of interlocking the various regional security organizations. This could perhaps be done by having observers from the various organizations attend meetings of the other organizations. This would have both advantages and disadvantages. The fact of the matter was that the world is becoming interlocked. While it is possible to have local wars, there is a danger that a local war would give rise to a general war. The idea of observers had been suggested by one of the organizations. We had reached no conclusion about it and had mentioned it to no one else. In fact, it had not yet been carefully considered in our own Government. The Secretary said he did not know whether it was wise or not, but he thought it was worth considering.

Herr von Brentano said that this was a new proposal on which he was not prepared to comment. In general, he thought it was useful to have contacts between the organizations and to exchange information. Some of the areas involved overlap. He thought the idea of observers was perhaps a good one.

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

The Secretary said he should perhaps say something about the question of supplying IREMs to other NATO countries. As he had said in his conversation with Herr von Brentano at his home, long-range bombers will be the most effective means of delivery until 1960. The United States has marked superiority over the Soviets in this field. Our missile program will be making good progress in 1960. We could accelerate it somewhat. If this were done, it would be more for psychological than for military reasons. By extreme effort, we could accelerate it to a point where the missiles would be in production in a little over a year. This would be extremely costly, however, and whether it would be worthwhile to spend the necessary money to accelerate to that degree had not yet been decided.

The Secretary said that these missiles involve two aspects. One is the production of the missile itself and the other is the creation of an ability to use it, which involves both establishing necessary installations and training people in its use. The second matter is extremely expensive in itself.

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11/26/57
NATO
The Secretary

Memorandum of Conversation

8222
DATE: Nov. 26, 1957

SUBJECT: December NATO Meeting

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Heinz L. Krekeler (German)
Mr. Gerard C. Smith

COPIES TO: The Secretary
Messrs., Murphy, Elbrick, Reinhardt, Farley

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Ambassador Krekeler came in at his request to pursue further the matter of U.S. thinking about NATO cooperation in the scientific, research and development fields. He indicated that it seemed likely that at the December meeting Germany, France and Italy would propose a weapon development center with possible participation by the BENELUX countries. The main purpose would be to develop weapons of special interest to the Europeans. He cited an anti-tank weapon as an example. He also said that the three nations would probably undertake a joint venture in the field of nuclear weapon research. He also raised the question of German participation

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and
in U.S. and U.K. research/development in the
field of controlled thermonuclear reactions.

Mr. Smith indicated that he believed that
the U.S. position at the December meeting would be
quite consistent with the proposal for joint
non-nuclear research and development in Europe,
and indicated that the U.S. thinking might be
somewhat more ambitious than the project
Ambassador Krekeler had outlined.

In the nuclear field, Mr. Smith pointed out
that it would not be difficult for the Europeans
to design and produce a "first generation" nuclear
device. The difficulty of going from such device
to useful warheads for missiles, etc. would be
immensely costly. He expressed the hope that
Europeans would find the American offers to supply
nuclear weapons sufficiently attractive to warrant
the Europeans avoiding the diversion of treasure
and talent to an independent nuclear weapon pro-
duction project.

Ambassador Krekeler agreed with this hope but
indicated that it would be better if the U.S. did
not put up any "warning" signals at Paris in an
effort to block the proposed joint German-France-
Italy nuclear weapon research project. Mr. Smith
expressed the opinion that no such U.S. effort was
at all likely.



On the subject of IRBMs, Ambassador Krekeler wanted to get across the idea that von Brentano's apparent coolness to the stationing of IRBMs in Germany was not owing to any pressures of public opinion but to doubts as to the military usefulness of such missiles located in Germany. The German military authorities apparently believe that the short warning time allowed to German missile crews would not permit them to get into action before they were destroyed.

Mr. Smith expressed the opinion that there were likely psychological advantages in having in NATO-Europe a long-range retaliatory capacity, but stated he had no views as to any specific locations for the IRBMs.


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

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Personal and Private

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Governor Adams

Deputy Secretary Quarles
Mr. Percival Brundage
Mr. Mansfield Sprague
(and others)

Place: Governor Adams' Office

Time: 9:45 a. m., Wednesday, November 27, 1957



There was a long discussion about accelerating the intermediate missiles program. I said that from a foreign policy standpoint I thought that the need could be met if, in addition to meeting our UK commitment, we were in a position to deliver one or two squadrons of missiles to the continent by the end of 1959. I said that getting ready to receive these would involve a series of measures, strategic, political, fiscal, and so forth, quite apart from the actual construction work which I understood would take about a year. Also there would be training required, etc. I felt therefore that a NATO program looking toward reception would probably take about two years from the present date. However, it seemed to be the consensus that the program should be somewhat accelerated beyond that, largely for psychological reasons, and it was tentatively agreed to try to have the British missiles ready by the end of 1958 and the others for the continent by the middle of 1959. Mr. McElroy said that they would probably go into production with both Jupiter and Thor if they had to go now. I inclined toward a more conservative program, delaying the production until a choice could be made. However, it seemed to be felt that other factors were controlling and that there was an irresistible pressure to accelerate the program and demonstrate our capacity as rapidly as possible.

I emphasized that an accelerated program would on net balance be very serious if the cost of acceleration were, directly or indirectly, taken out of the Mutual Security Program. I said this program represented the struggle we were actually fighting on a daily basis and that our resources were stretched very

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
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Personal and Private

I referred to the fact that I understood the Bureau of the Budget was proposing to cut our figure by about \$1 billion and that I said would be disastrous. Mr. Brundage said the figure of \$1 billion was an exaggeration. Mr. Sprague said that it was at least \$700 million.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of several loops and a long horizontal stroke, is positioned to the left of a circular stamp. The stamp is partially obscured by the signature and contains some illegible text around its perimeter.

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Personal and Private

11/27/57

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27 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 21 Aug 78

Subject: NATO Atomic Stockpile Suggestions (U).

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 12 November 1957, which requested recommendations for the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the IRBM proposals and on the NATO stockpile suggestions contained in a letter, dated 7 November 1957, from General Norstad to the President.

2. With regard to the NATO atomic stockpile suggestions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 14 November 1957, forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, a draft document on the subject: "The Basis for the U.S. Position on the Provision of U.S. Atomic Weapons for the Common Defense of the NATO Area", which had been approved by General Norstad. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with General Norstad in the appropriateness of announcing the procedures for providing atomic weapons for use by NATO forces, and consider that their draft document sets forth the formula, referred to by General Norstad, by which these weapons can be made available.

3. In regard to IRBM's for NATO, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided recommendations concerning the provision of IRBM's to the United Kingdom, France and other NATO nations. They reaffirm their recommendations that the initial deployment of four squadrons to the United Kingdom should not be altered, and that subsequent priorities within NATO should be determined by NATO military authorities. In this light, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will forward further recommendations, concerning future deployments of the IRBM on a world-wide basis, confirming the desirability of locating a substantial part of the force in the NATO area and also the principle that it is to the mutual advantage of the United States and the host country to plan for the gradual and eventual assumption of manning and control responsibilities of certain units by indigenous forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it desirable to stress the NATO aspect of U.S.

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actions to provide IRBM's. Accordingly, they favor, whenever feasible, NATO agreements on problems related to U.S. provision of the IRBM to NATO. However, this does not mean that it is either necessary or appropriate to grant to NATO final authority on the disposition or distribution of U.S. supplied weapons or equipment.

4. Concerning the offer of information and know-how for NATO-controlled production of a so-called second-generation IRBM, it appears that, in view of the present state of research and development on this IRBM, the matter should be considered under the contemplated NATO agency for research and development. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided you with recommendations in favor of the establishment of a NATO agency for research and development by memorandum, dated 20 November 1957, subject: "Coordination of Military Research, Development and Production in NATO".

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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U. S. Embassy
London, England
November 29, 1957

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Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

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Dear Lane:

For what it may be worth, I wish to spell out a bit more of Sir Richard Powell's comments at lunch today about NATO strategic plans, particularly as they relate to MC 70, though you may have gotten much of this during his recent visit.

1. US and UK have trouble agreeing on procedure because within our Governments procedure is so different. The U.S. insists on a strictly "military point of view" after which political and economic considerations are brought to bear. The UK view is that regardless of theoretical preferences, it is in practice impossible for Chiefs of Staff to exclude implicit political and economic assumptions from their work and it is better to provide them explicitly by arranging outside participation in their work from start to finish.

2. In this case, it is politically essential that MC 70 not contain figures so above available resources and pressed with such vigor that NATO countries at the political level will feel either that the effort is hopeless and their contributions too short of what is needed to be worth maintaining, or that there needs to be a substantial change of missions, which could also raise grave issues.

3. He appreciates that it was not possible for SACEUR and SACLANT to each know enough about what the other needed to come up with a total demand which could be met; all he asks is that SGN make a real adjustment in level, if necessary, after there is a reconciliation of strategic concepts underlying each of their plans to insure conformity with the political directive, especially as regards time phasing.

4. He also agrees that military plans are necessarily rough estimates, have a natural tendency to be on the safe side, have a further element of fuzziness introduced by the emphasis

Mr. B. E. L. Timmons, Director,
Office of European Regional Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

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Mr. B. E. L. Timmons

- 2 -

November 29, 1957

on deterrence rather than combat readiness, that costing is a most inexact science, especially as regards new weapons, and that there are some advantages, under present world conditions, to having goals which keep countries "on the stretch" as far as size and efficiency of their military effort is concerned, by having goals a little beyond easy reach. Nevertheless, he still considers that considerations in paragraph 2 above dominant and require that NATO stated military requirements somehow be kept very close to economic availabilities.

5. How to do this without sacrificing agreed missions is not clear but he definitely feels that ground defense of Europe is overemphasized mission and therefore vulnerable to cuts. First he thinks, and says all British think, Soviets would surely bypass Europe and hit nuclear retaliation bases, first in UK and then in US. If we ever get competent nuclear bases in Europe then this might change, but he wonders if those countries will let us put them there.

Second he thinks Europe is not defensible any more than UK. He just about said that the British know the UK is indefensible (against nuclear air attack) and see no reason why one should spend resources on basis different assumption as to Europe. He did admit that European peoples probably thought occupation would be even worse than destructive air attack and hence protection against it worth seeking, but he found it hard to admit they might be right. He would, of course, agree that if we had installations in Western Europe really important for the strategic retaliation, they should be protected on the ground, but he didn't seem to believe this was the case now. (If we made them less vulnerable to air attack by giving them mobility, it would of course increase the value of ground defense.)

Summary of content

6. He is greatly concerned about French pressure for help to become a fourth nuclear power and connected pressure to get positive role in deciding on use. He still feels most strongly that NATO must stay away from efforts at advance planning on how decision to use will be made, though he expressed some concern that policy of "mutual trust" in this regard seemed to be boiling down, almost inevitably, to one of trust by everyone else that US will be firm but not reckless in its decisions. He said this was gist of his reporting telegram from Washington on this subject.

Sincerely,

Edwin M. Martin

Edwin M. Martin
Minister for Economic Affairs

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DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1949-1969
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Following is for delivery to Chancellor by Ambassador on latter's return. Ambassador is informed.

November 29, 1957

QTE/My dear Chancellor Adenauer:

My letter to you of November 24, 1957 was, as it indicates, written prior to the concluding exchange of views which took place at my house with Dr. von Brentano, Ambassador Blankenhorn, and Ambassador Krekeler.

At that meeting we discussed further the problem of NATO "consultations".

I made a point which no doubt will be reported to you, but which is so important that I want to speak to it myself.

Under present conditions, and with a man of Khrushchev's temperament at the head of affairs in Russia, there is a great likelihood of Communist "probing" operations in Europe (e. g. Berlin), the Middle East, and the Far East. These probing operations will be designed primarily to test United States will, and to see whether recent Soviet developments such as sputniks and the

S:JFDulles:cjp 11/29/57

S:JFDulles



EUR - Mr. Ribick (by phone)
Ambassador Bruce (by phone)

C - Mr. Reinhardt

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potential intercontinental missile have now made the United States less willing to defend wherever our allies may be threatened.

It is of the nature of a probing operation that in the first instance it is exploratory, involving no committal of prestige. If it encounters a quick, strong response, then the probe ceases.

If, however, there is no such quick response, the inference is that the opposition is indecisive. The probe then grows into an operation of a different character. The prestige of the prober becomes committed, and what would otherwise be a minor incident becomes grave.

Since it is a fact that the determination and will of the United States has not wavered in the slightest, it is of the utmost importance that we be in a position to make this evident to the Soviet or Chinese probers. Delay, and an appearance of indecision, could have serious consequences and increase the likelihood of a major conflict.

I pointed out during our talks on Saturday and Sunday that the United States is prepared to explain and discuss its general policy, as indicated above, at the NATO Council. And we are quite willing always to explain why we did what we have done. But I do not think it is in the common interest to adopt a formula so rigid that it would disable us from reacting quickly to a probe. That might be the case if we were committed to submit any proposed reaction to prior consultation in

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the NATO Council. And I might add if such consultations were deemed by us to be consistent with the general welfare, other demands would arise. The ~~weak~~ result would be a false appearance of ~~weakness~~ and indecision which would encourage Communist boldness to a point which would really involve the risk of major war.

I said to Dr. von Brentano that our nations are in effect like a doctor prescribing a capsule for a patient. There are three necessary ingredients: consultation, capacity for quick action, and trust. The patient will die if we prescribe a capsule which has no content other than consultation and which excludes a capacity of quick action with a willingness to trust each other to some reasonable extent.



I can assure you that I do not think that such trust will be misplaced or that there will ever be any reckless action. There are always risks, but the greatest risk of all would be not to be able to react quickly to Sino-Soviet probing.

I know that consistently with this there can be a very large measure of useful consultation and follow-up information, and the United States is prepared to go to the limit in this respect.

We have been much ^{disturbed} ~~disturbed~~ over the last few days by the President's illness. Happily, he is making such an almost miraculous recovery that it is now not wholly excluded that he should come to the NATO meeting. However, this should not be counted upon.

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I was sorry to hear you were laid up with a cold. I hope it is nothing that will trouble you for long.

With every best wish, I am

Faithfully yours,

Foster Dulles UNQTE



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(11/30/57)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: November 30, 1957

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

PARTICIPANTS: H.E. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
Mr. B.E.L. Timmons, Director, EUR/RA

In a discussion before lunch on November 30, the French Ambassador referred to the question of decision on the use of nuclear weapons by NATO. He said that it was obviously impossible to set out precise multilateral procedures whereby decisions on the use of nuclear weapons would be taken in the event of emergency. I agreed.

The French Ambassador went on to say that, however, it would be necessary to have bilateral arrangements providing for agreement between the United States and France in respect of the use of any U.S. nuclear warheads stored in French territory. He referred to the arrangements already in existence between United States and Great Britain in respect of U.S. bomber bases in the U.K.

EUR/RA:BEL/Timmons:mck

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There is also maintained a shield of NATO ground, sea, and air forces. This shield is an integral part of the major deterrent to aggression and, if attack occurs, must provide adequate defense until the total effort of the Alliance can take effect. This shield has the additional capability of dealing with local actions. Therefore, we believe that NATO must continue to improve the already substantial efforts to strengthen the shield.

It follows from the foregoing that NATO possesses a selective and flexible military capability, and does not depend entirely on ~~the~~ long-range nuclear power.

It also follows that if the shield is to perform its functions adequately, it must have an integrated atomic capability. Since the adoption, three years ago, by the North Atlantic Council of its basic military doctrine, great strides have been made in this direction. U.S. forces in Europe--ground, air, and sea--have such a capability.

such a capability

But it was never intended that ~~it~~ should be confined to U.S. forces alone. Including amounts already programmed, the U.S. plans to furnish nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars for modern weapons--mainly ~~missiles~~ aircraft and missiles--for the forces of our NATO allies. These aircraft and missiles--Matadors, NIKES, Honest Johns, Corporals--will flow in increasing numbers to NATO forces. Personnel of several NATO countries are increasingly being trained in the maintenance, operation and employment of these weapons systems. We hope in this connection it will be possible to move ahead on the NATO Missile Training Center, which is included in the Ninth Slice Infrastructure Program.

It now remains to complete the structure--~~to assure~~ ^{to assure} that ~~atomic warheads~~ ^{atomic warheads} ~~are available~~ ^{are available} for these

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Classification

ase aircraft and missiles will be available to NATO forces in the event of hostilities.

This subject has been receiving the careful consideration of my Government since it was ~~the~~ first discussed at the meeting of this Council in Bonn last May, on the initiative of the French Foreign Minister.

The United States is prepared, if it is the desire of this Council, to play its part in the creation of a NATO Atomic Stockpile, dedicated to the defense of NATO. Within this stockpile system atomic warheads would be deployed under U. S. custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and, of course, in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In event of hostilities, the atomic warheads would, under authorization from the President, be released from U. S. custody to the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander for employment by the nuclear-capable forces of NATO in accordance with appropriate NATO defensive ~~planning~~ plans.

The United States is convinced that this arrangement meets NATO military requirements and ensures that atomic warheads can be employed promptly by NATO shield and strike forces whenever such use may be required to deal with an attack.

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Authorized by: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

CLEARLY ONE OF THORNIEST PROBLEMS FACING NATO ALLIANCE AT THIS MOMENT IS DISTRIBUTION IRBMS AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THESE AND OTHER WEAPONS.

AS DEPT IS AWARE, FRENCH HAVE STRONG VIEWS ON THIS MATTER AND ARE ATTEMPTING TO DRUM UP SUPPORT FROM GERMANS, ITALIANS AND PERHAPS OTHERS OF SIX. FRENCH HAVE ALSO EMPHASIZED UNOFFICIALLY ON NUMBER RECENT OCCASIONS THEIR INTENT PRODUCE BOTH IRBM AND NUCLEAR WEAPON.

THEY HAVE APPEALED FOR U.S. HELP IN BOTH FIELDS, BUT ALSO MADE CLEAR THEIR INTENTION OF GOING AHEAD WITH HIGHEST PRIORITY ON THEIR OWN, IF NECESSARY, NO RPT NO MATTER WHAT THE SACRIFICE. IN FACT, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY STARTED ON THE MANUFACTURE OF THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPON.

FRENCH INSISTENCE ARISES FROM TWO CONCERNS: (1) MILITARY CONCERN THAT THEIR FORCES SHALL HAVE LATEST AND BEST WEAPONS IN CASE OF NEED, PARTICULARLY SO THEY WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY LARGER ROLE IN DECISION TO USE NATO RETALIATORY POWER; (2) POLITICAL OR PRESTIGE CONCERN THAT THEY SHALL NOT RPT NOT BECOME "SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS" WITHIN NATO, SHALL NOT RPT NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM "NUCLEAR CLUB," SHALL NOT RPT NOT BE LIMITED IN THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE ANY WEAPON THEY WANT, AND SHALL BE ABLE PROVIDE THEIR PEOPLE ASSURANCE THEY HAVE ON FRENCH TERRITORY WEAPONS CAPABLE OF STRIKING DIRECTLY AT SOVIET TERRITORY IN CASE OF AGGRESION AGAINST FRANCE.

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(1) WE FEEL IT IMPORTANT FRENCH BE INFORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF DECISION RE PLACING IRBM'S IN NATO COUNTRIES AND THAT THEY ALSO BE EXPLICITELY ASSURED OF IMPORTANT ROLE TO BE GIVEN FRANCE, I.E., THAT SACEUR WOULD RECOMMEND GIVING PRIORITY TO FRANCE IN ALLOCATING FIRST IRBM'S. SUCH ACTION WOULD DO MUCH TO RELIEVE PRESSURE FOR FRANCE TO PROCEED ON ITS OWN INDEPENDENT IRBM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, WHICH WOULD ONLY BE DONE TO DETRIMENT OF OTHER PROJECTS WHICH FRANCE SHOULD PROPERLY UNDERTAKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLE OF LOGICAL APPORTIONMENT OF TASKS AMONG NATO COUNTRIES.

(2) WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE IF WE COULD INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST UNDER NATO PROGRAM FRANCE AND OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE IN LATER DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF IRBM'S IN LINE WITH GENERAL NORSTAD'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON ASSISTING EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH SECOND AND THIRD GENERATION WEAPONS.

(3) THESE ACTIONS AND SUCH STEPS AS NATO STOCKPILE PROPOSAL AND GREATER EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION WILL, WE FEEL, PRODUCE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WE WILL HAVE BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESSFULLY PRESSING HOME OUR LONG-STANDING REQUEST FOR STORAGE RIGHTS IN FRANCE. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO STOCKPILE IN PARTICULAR WOULD FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON U.S. STORAGE, SINCE COULD BE POINTED OUT THAT WEAPONS BEING STORED FOR U.S. FORCES ARE WITHIN CONTEXT NATO STOCKPILE, WITH U.S. FORCES BEING THE FIRST NATO FORCES TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO USE WEAPONS. THIS WOULD HELP ELIMINATE IMPRESSION THAT U.S. STORAGE REQUEST A PURELY BILATERAL AFFAIR.

(4) ON ATOMIC WARHEADS, WE DO NOT RPT NOT RECOMMEND AT THIS TIME ANY CHANGE IN POSITION WHICH WE UNDERSTAND U.S. IS PROPOSING TO TAKE AT FORTHCOMING NATO MEETING, WHICH IS LIMITED TO NATO STOCKPILE CONCEPT. HOWEVER, WE FEEL IT NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE CURRENT FRENCH ATTITUDES AND POSITION THEY ARE LIKELY TO TAKE. WE MUST FACE UP TO PROBABILITY OF ATOMIC WEAPONS MANUFACTURE BY FRANCE, POSSIBLY WITH HELP OF GERMANS OR OTHERS OF SIX. WE DOUBT THAT ANY CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMY OR OF SOUND DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG NATO STATES WILL SURELY PREVENT FRENCH FROM BREAKING DOWN DOOR OF NUCLEAR CLUB IF THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT ADMITTED OR OFFERED WHAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER TO BE SUBSTANTIAL SATISFACTION IN THIS FIELD. ISSUE OF US TO DECIDE IN THIS CONNECTION MAY BE, IF WE ARE UNABLE TO DISSUADE FRENCH FROM PROCEEDING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION, WHETHER (A) IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO MAKE

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-2- 2785, DECEMBER 2, 7 PM, FROM PARIS

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, GENERAL U.S. OBJECTIVE IS TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS NATO DEFENSES WITHIN A FRAMEWORK DESIGNED TO AVOID OR MINIMIZE FRICTION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. IF OUR UNDERSTANDING IS CORRECT, USG IS CONSIDERING: (1) IN ACCORDANCE WITH SACEUR RECOMMENDATIONS, PLACING CERTAIN IRBM'S IN THOSE NATO COUNTRIES WHICH DESIRE THEM; (2) AFTER FURNISHING OF INITIAL WEAPONS BY U.S., LATER ASSISTING CERTAIN NATO COUNTRIES MANUFACTURE IRBM'S OF SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS; (3) DEPOSITING NUCLEAR WARHEADS, IN FORM OF NATO STOCKPILE UNDER SACEUR CONTROL AND US CUSTODY, ADJACENT TO NEW WEAPONS, INCLUDING EVENTUALLY IRBM'S MANNED BY NATO FORCES TRAINED IN THEIR USE. QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THESE DISPOSITIONS WILL SATISFY MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONCERNS OF FRENCH.

AS TO MILITARY CONCERNS OUTLINED FOURTH PARAGRAPH THIS MESSAGE, IT WOULD SEEM PROBABLE ABOVE QUESTION COULD BE ANSWERED IN AFFIRMATIVE, PROVIDED FRENCH ARE OFFERED AGREEMENT THAT DECISION TO USE WEAPONS IN THEIR TERRITORIES WILL BE TAKEN BOTH JOINTLY AND PROMPTLY IN CASE OF NEED. HERE WE HAVE CASE OF AMBIVALENCE, FOR HOST COUNTRY WOULD AT SAME TIME WISH TO SHARE IN DECISION BUT WOULD WISH IT TO BE TAKEN, IF NECESSARY, IMMEDIATELY. AT THIS POINT ENTERS NEED FOR CLEAR ASSURANCE TO EFFECT THAT U.S. WILL ENGAGE IN NUCLEAR WAR TO DEFEND EUROPE; EVEN IF U.S. HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN ATTACKED. THIS IS PERHAPS REAL KEY TO LEGITIMATE FRENCH CONCERN - THAT THEY WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON NOT WHOLLY CERTAIN AND POSSIBLY DELAYED U.S. DECISION IN ORDER TO RETALIATE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST SOVIET MISSILE ATTACK ON FRENCH TERRITORY.

POLITICAL OR PRESTIGE CONCERNS ARE QUITE ANOTHER MATTER. IT WILL BE VERY UNPALATABLE PILL FOR FRANCE TO SWALLOW THAT THEY CANNOT BE "TRUSTED" WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY BUT MUST COUNT ON RECEIVING THEM AT VERY LAST MOMENT FROM AMERICANS, EVEN IF FRENCH SHOULD BE FIRST ATTACKED. NATO STOCKPILE UNDER SACEUR CONTROL HELPS TO VEIL THIS "HUMILIATION" (ONE OF FAVORITE FRENCH WORDS THESE DAYS). BUT WE DOUBT THEY WILL CONSIDER IT AS MORE THAN TRANSITIONAL STEP. FACT U.K. HAS NUCLEAR RESOURCES OF ITS OWN WILL MAKE WHAT FRENCH CONSIDER TO BE "DISCRIMINATION" DOUBLY BITTER.

OUR CONCLUSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

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-4- 2785, DECEMBER 2, 7 PM, FROM PARIS

THEIR EXTRAVAGANCE AS INEXPENSIVE AS POSSIBLE BY GIVING THEM SOME TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DESPITE PRECEDENT THIS WOULD ESTABLISH RE FOURTH COUNTRY PROBLEM, OR (B) IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO ALLOW THEM TO PROCEED ENTIRELY ALONE IN HOPE THAT COSTS INVOLVED IN THEIR OWN PROGRAM WOULD BRING HOME TO THEM EVENTUALLY FOLLY OF SEPARATE LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

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FRS B-2/52

December 4, 1957

NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1957

The Provision of U. S. Atomic Weapons for the
Common Defense of the NATO Area

(Background Paper)

The attached paper was drafted by Def/ISA - Col. Bingham and has been cleared by Col. Twitchell and General Loper in the Department of Defense. It has been cleared by S/P - Mr. Gerard Smith.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff paper, to which reference is made in Appendix A, has not been reproduced and distributed generally. Copies have been furnished, however, to C - Mr. Reinhardt, G - Mr. Murphy, S/P - Mr. Smith, S/AE - Mr. Farley and the White House - General Cutler.

Eugene V. McFuliffe
S/S-RO
Ext. 5836
Room 5274 NS

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (2) (3)

NSC Letter 4/15/86

NLE DATE 6/12/86

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By bc NLE Date 6/10/86

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The Provision of U. S. Atomic Weapons for the Common Defense of
the NATO Area

The Problem:

To establish the U. S. position regarding procedures under present U. S. law for establishing an effective atomic weapons capability for Allied NATO forces in the common defense of the NATO area.

Discussion: (See Appendix A)

Conclusions:

1. Nuclear weapons can be made readily available by the U. S. to atomic capable delivery forces of NATO for effective and timely use in the defense of NATO.

2. This can be accomplished without changing existing U. S. legislation.

3. The arrangements necessary to undertake the foregoing would entail the following responsibilities on the part of both the U. S. and Allied NATO nations concerned:

a. The U. S. will provide personnel for the technical surveillance and custody of the weapons as required by U. S. law.

b. Other NATO nations as appropriate, would:

(1) Provide physical facilities for the additional storage sites which will be required because of the expansion of capability.

(2) Assure external security of these storage sites.

(3) Provide certain support for the U. S. contingent responsible for the custody and technical surveillance.

The provision of atomic weapons to the armed forces of our NATO Allies is not inconsistent and does not conflict with U. S. disarmament proposals.

Recommendation:

That the U. S. position to be developed on this matter for the December NATO meeting be based upon the foregoing conclusions.

APPENDIX "A"

Classification

The problem of providing atomic weapons to the forces of our NATO Allies for the common defense of the NATO area in furtherance of NATO military plans can readily be divided into three successive steps as follows:

- a. The provision of the atomic weapons delivery systems to selected NATO countries under the MAP.
- b. The training of the forces concerned in the maintenance and employment of these systems.
- c. The timely provision of the atomic weapons themselves.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have addressed themselves specifically to the latter aspect of the problem and the system recommended by them is indicated at Tab A.

With regard to the first of the three steps referred to above, it has been observed that doubts are frequently expressed as to the ability of certain countries to handle the modern weapons to be provided them. It is pointed out in response to questions raised in this connection that one of the fundamental requisites governing the operation of the MAP is that the provision of specific items of military equipment is predicated upon the ability and willingness of the recipient nation to absorb, utilize and maintain the items concerned; while the provision of atomic weapons delivery systems to Allied NATO forces is determined by and based upon NATO requirements and military plans, the distribution of the equipment itself and arrangements for spare parts and maintenance are made through normal MAP channels on a grant aid or reimbursable basis. Thus, if it is assumed that the MAP operates on a sound basis, it must be acknowledged that any country which has received modern weapons under the MAP has accepted them willingly and had the ability to absorb and properly apply them.

With regard to training, the second of the three successive steps in this problem, there are two general types provided by the U.S.


The first tier which the MAP and is primarily concerned with care and employment of the non-restricted data component of the equipment. Such training is now being conducted in the U.S. and in Europe in furtherance of our Military Assistance Program. The second type consists of the training which can be carried out under the authority of the NATO Atomic Information Agreement which permits the NATO forces receiving MAP equipment to receive training in the atomic application thereof. Such training is to include weapons effects, safety criteria, atomic weapon employment and, in the case of aircraft, delivery techniques. There may be some restrictions on the check-out and delivery training, the extent of which will vary with the delivery systems and the weapons themselves. It is however, possible for U.S. personnel to provide such check-out as may be required. The contribution of the above two categories of training would produce a delivery capability which, upon receipt of the atomic weapons in accordance with



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the system outlined by the JCS in their paper, Tab A, will enable the allied military units concerned effectively to carry out their assigned tasks as set forth in NATO war plan.

The provision of atomic weapons to NATO might possibly be construed as being contrary to the U.S. policy of disarmament. Such, however, is by no means the case. There is nothing contained in statements of U. S. policy which prohibits the provision of atomic weapons to Allies and at no time has anything but the full support of NATO been included in U. S. policy. The provision of atomic weapons to the forces of NATO for the common defense of the NATO area is in full accord with long-standing U. S. policy, contributes measurably to the defensive posture of the Alliance and adds to its overall deterrence to general war.



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December 4, 1957

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NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1957

The Provision of U. S. Atomic Weapons for the
Common Defense of the NATO Area

(Background Paper)

The attached paper was drafted by Def/ISA - Col. Bingham and has been cleared by Col. Tritchell and General Loper in the Department of Defense. It has been cleared by S/P - Mr. Gerard Smith.



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Eugene V. McAuliffe
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Ext. 5836
Room 5274 KS

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The Provision of U. S. Atomic Weapons for the Common Defense of
The NATO Area

The Problem:

To establish the U. S. position regarding procedures under present U. S. law for establishing an effective atomic weapons capability for Allied NATO forces in the common defense of the NATO area.

Discussion: (See Appendix A)



Conclusions:

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2. This can be accomplished without changing existing U. S. legislation.

3. The arrangements necessary to undertake the foregoing would entail the following responsibilities on the part of both the U. S. and Allied NATO nations concerned:

a. The U. S. will provide personnel for the technical surveillance and custody of the weapons as required by U. S. law.

b. Other NATO nations as appropriate, would:

(1) Provide physical facilities for the additional storage sites which will be required because of the expansion of capability.

(2) Assure external security of these storage sites.

(3) Provide certain support for the U. S. contingent responsible for the custody and technical surveillance.

4. The provision of atomic weapons to the armed forces of our NATO Allies is not inconsistent and does not conflict with U. S. disarmament proposals.

Recommendation:


That the U. S. position to be developed on this matter for the December NATO meeting be based upon the foregoing conclusions.

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Conclusions

The problem of providing U.S. atomic weapons to the forces of our NATO Allies for the common defense of the Western area in furtherance of NATO military plans can readily be attacked upon three successive steps as follows:

- a. The provision of the atomic weapons delivery systems to selected NATO countries under the MAP.
- b. The training of the forces concerned in the maintenance and employment of these systems.
- c. The timely provision of the atomic weapons themselves.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff have addressed themselves specifically to the latter aspect of the problem and the system recommended by them is indicated at Tab A.

With regard to the first of the three steps referred to above, it has been observed that doubts are frequently expressed as to the ability of certain countries to handle the modern weapons to be provided them. It is pointed out in response to questions raised in this connection that one of the fundamental requisites governing the operation of the MAP is that the provision of specific items of military equipment is predicated upon the ability and willingness of the recipient nation to absorb, utilize and maintain the items concerned. While the provision of atomic weapons delivery systems to Allied NATO forces is determined by and based upon NATO requirements and military plans, the distribution of the equipment itself and arrangements for spare parts and maintenance are made through normal MAP channels on a grant aid or reimbursable basis. Thus, if it is assumed that the MAP operates on a sound basis, it must be acknowledged that any country which has received modern weapons under the MAP has accepted them willingly and has the ability to absorb and properly apply them.

With regard to training, the second of the three successive steps in this problem, there are two general types provided by the U.S.


The first lies within the MAP and is primarily concerned with care, use and employment of the non-restricted data components of the equipment. Such training is now being conducted in the U.S. and in Europe in furtherance of our Military Assistance Program. The second type consists of the training which can be carried out under the authority of the NATO Atomic Information Agreement which permits the NATO forces receiving MAP equipment to receive training in the atomic application thereof. Such training is to include weapons effects, safety criteria, atomic weapon employment and, in the case of aircraft, delivery techniques. There may be some restrictions on the check-out and delivery training, the extent of which will vary with the delivery systems and the weapons themselves. It is however, feasible for U.S. personnel to provide such check-out as may be required. The combination of the above two categories of training would produce a delivery capability which, upon receipt of the atomic weapons in accordance with

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the system outlined by the JCS in their paper, Tab A, will enable the allied military units concerned effectively to carry out their assigned tasks set forth in NATO war plans.

The provision of atomic weapons to NATO might possibly be construed as being contrary to the U.S. policy as stated in Sec. 3, however, it is not the case. There is nothing contained in statements of U. S. policy which prohibits the provision of atomic weapons to Allies and at no time has anything but the full support of NATO been included in U. S. policy. The provision of atomic weapons to the forces of NATO for the common defense of the NATO area is in full accord with long-standing U. S. policy, contributes measurably to the defensive posture of the Alliance and adds to its overall deterrence to general war.



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PRS B-2/51

December 4, 1957

NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1957

NATO Defense Policy and Strategy
(Background Paper)

The attached paper was prepared by RA -
Mr. Fearey and was cleared by S/P - Mr. Gerard
Smith.



Eugene V. McAuliffe
S/S-RO
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Working Group on NATO

NATO DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGY

PROBLEM

To set forth U.S. policy with respect to NATO defense policy and strategy.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The U.S. firmly supports NATO strategy as set forth in the NATO Political Directive of December 1956 and NS 14/2 ("Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area"). Principal elements of this strategy are:

(a) To maintain an effective deterrent to aggression, based on adequate nuclear and other ready forces and a manifest determination to retaliate against any aggressor with all necessary force;

(b) To prepare for a general war by ensuring our ability both to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counter-offensive and to absorb the enemy's onslaught, and by developing our ability to use our land, sea and air forces for defense of the territories and sea areas of NATO as far forward as possible, counting on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset; and

(c) To be prepared to react instantly and in appropriate strength to infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions against NATO territory, without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons.



2. The basic instruments of the above strategy are (a) NATO nuclear retaliatory power, lodged primarily in the U.S. Strategic Air Command and the Naval Striking Forces, and (b) the NATO shield. Essential aspects of the shield are that it consist of forces of all three Services, that it have a dual capability, and that it be deployed in the forward area. The functions of the shield are to defend NATO peoples and countries, to complete the deterrent, and to provide an essential alternative to the employment of ultimate capability.

3. Recent technological developments, particularly the probable deployment of Soviet IRBM and ICBM earlier than previously anticipated and the prospective deployment of IRBM to NATO, in no way invalidate NATO strategy, but, by increasing the danger of limited aggression (due to the aggressor's hope that the U.S. will be unwilling to risk meeting aggression in Europe with its full nuclear retaliatory power), impart added importance to the deterrent and defensive functions of the NATO shield.

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4. The thesis advanced in Secretary Dulles' Foreign Affairs article, that as tactically nuclear weapons become more controllable and more adaptable to area defense they will give an advantage to defenders against aggression, derives from and reinforces NATO defensive strategy.

DISCUSSION

1. During 1953 NATO Supreme Commanders initiated a series of "Capabilities Studies". These studies were essentially a re-examination of NATO strategy and tactics in light of the prospective availability of nuclear weapons to Soviet bloc and NATO forces. In November 1954 the Military Committee approved MC 48, "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years". In this document the Military Committee recommended a new pattern of NATO defensive strength based on the availability of "atomic delivery forces adequately protected from initial attack and constantly ready to launch or initiate counter attack". At the Ministerial Meeting the following month the Council approved MC 48 "as a basis for defense planning and preparations by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval does not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities". The U.S. took the lead in securing approval of MC 48, and had to overcome considerable reluctance on the part of some NATO countries.

2. In November-December 1955 the Military Committee approved and the Council noted MC 48/1, which confirmed and rounded out, particularly in respect of naval forces, the strategy and measures set forth in MC 48. During the spring and summer of 1956 the U.K. and several other NATO countries voiced concern over the cost of NATO forces modernization and doubts over certain aspects of NATO defense strategy. The ensuing discussions in the Council culminated in the approval at the Ministerial Meeting in December of a Political Directive to the NATO military authorities calling for a review of NATO defense planning "to determine how, within the resources likely to be available, the defense effort of the Alliance and of each individual member can best achieve the most effective pattern of forces". The Directive stipulated inter alia that "the shield forces must include the capability to respond quickly, should the situation so require, with nuclear weapons to any type of aggression. They must, of course, also have the capability to deal with the situation envisaged in paragraph 4b above (infiltration, incursions, or hostile local actions) without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons".

3. In April 1957 the Military Committee approved the first two of three military papers developed in response to this Directive, namely MC 48/2, "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area", and MC 48/2, "Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept". The third

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paper, MC 70, "The Minimum Essential NATO Force Requirements", is now under development. The three NATO Supreme Commands have each submitted requirements studies to the Standing Group as their contribution to MC 70 ("Allied Command Europe, Minimum-Force Study, 1958-63"; "Allied Command Atlantic -- Minimum Forces Study 1958-1962"; and "Allied Command Channel Minimum Forces Study, 1958 - 1965") in which they spell out in special application to their respective areas the strategy set forth in MC 11/2, summarized in the Conclusions section of this paper:

4. The decision in December 1954, repeatedly reaffirmed since, that NATO defense planning must be based on the employment of nuclear weapons in case of major attack, and that such weapons must be available for use if necessary in the event of limited attack, rests on the compelling facts (a) that the Soviet bloc forces facing NATO are known to possess such weapons; (b) that NATO's only hope of effective defense against numerically superior opposing forces, even if those forces did not possess nuclear weapons, is possession of the most effective weapons; and (c) that compact forces utilizing the latest weapons are the only kind of forces NATO can afford under existing political-economic limitations on defense efforts. The continued validity and, indeed the continued existence, of the shield in Europe is dependent on the continued validity of the assumption of availability, and employment if necessary, of nuclear weapons.



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7. In addition to the U.K. position, the view has been expressed in some quarters that the advent of nuclear weapons NATO strategy may have been at least partially invalidated. This criticism usually reflects ignorance of the facts that NATO defense planning has been based since December 1954 on the use of nuclear weapons, that U.S. forces in Europe have for some time been equipped with such weapons, and that large quantities of nuclear-capable weapons are programmed for NATO allies. While it is too early to state with assurance what the impact of IRBM and ICBM will be on NATO strategy, it is not expected that important changes will be required, though long range missiles will, for the reasons indicated in paragraph 3 of the Conclusions, confer added importance on the deterrent and defensive functions of the shield.

Secretary Dulles

8. The Secretary expresses a number of views in his recent Foreign Affairs article relevant to NATO strategy. The most pertinent passages are:

"Recent tests point to the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and radiation effects of which can be confined substantially to predetermined targets. In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt."

"As nuclear weapons come to provide greater possibilities for defense, this will require changes in military and related political strategy. So long as collective security depends almost wholly upon the deterrent of retaliatory power and the ability to wreak great destruction upon an aggressor nation, there has to be almost sole dependence upon the United States. As nuclear weapons become more tactical in character and thus more adaptable to area defense there will inevitably be a desire on the part of those allies which are technically qualified to participate more directly in this defense and to have a greater assurance that this defensive power will in fact be used."

9. The principal related provisions in the Political Directive are as follows:

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"The shield forces must include the capability to respond quickly, should the situation so require, with nuclear weapons to any type of aggression. They must, of course, also have the capability to deal with the situations envisaged in 4(b) above (infiltrations, incursions or hostile local actions) without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons."

10. The essential thought in the above-quoted passages from the Secretary's article is that as tactical nuclear weapons become more controllable and more adaptable to area-defense, technically qualified Free World nations will become increasingly anxious to possess such weapons, and to know that the nuclear warheads will be available in time of emergency so that the weapons can be effectively used. This thought reinforces the statement in the NATO Political Directive that the shield forces must be capable of responding quickly, with nuclear weapons where necessary, to any type of aggression. There is no suggestion in the article that nuclear weapons should be automatically used against all types of aggression, including local actions identifiable as such. Preservation of the capacity to deal with local actions without necessarily using nuclear weapons remains accepted U.S. as well as NATO policy.



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PRS B-2/57

December 4, 1957

NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1957

Nuclear Policy
(Background Paper)

The attached paper was prepared by the Policy Planning Staff and has been cleared by S/P - Mr. Gerard Smith.

Eugene V. McAuliffe
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

At the upcoming NATO meeting, the U.S. should try to reinvigorate NATO and increase the confidence of its members in the future. This confidence may require at least the following:

1. NATO must be convinced that the U.S. really knows where it is going and that NATO has an appropriate role to play.

2. The mutual capacity for destruction now possessed by the U.S. and the USSR does not eliminate the need for a large-scale European military effort. NATO must be persuaded that there are more alternatives for the future than--

(a) peace through deterrents (in which they have a minimal part);

(b) nuclear holocaust; or

(c) capitulation.

3. If the deterrents to war fail, employment of nuclear weapons in defense would be a rational act and one over which the Europeans would have some control.

4. The U.S. continues to retain strategic bombing superiority.

5. The "clean business" in regard to sharing nuclear technology, authority and responsibility with our allies.

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Translating Eisenhower-Macmillan Communique
of October 25, 1957 into NATO Planning

I. "...our possession of nuclear weapons power as a trust for the defense of the free world."

The December meeting is the first occasion for starting to fulfill the trust declared on October 25, 1957 by the Heads of Government of the U.S. and the U.K. To derive the most benefit from this trust, we believe that appropriate NATO allies should have a greater part with us in maintaining the nuclear deterrent to war. This calls for two moves:

A. Greater disclosure about the nuclear force available for NATO's defense and the resolution and responsibility with which it is held;

B. Providing NATO a share of the nuclear force under appropriate safeguards.

1. "...this community...should possess more knowledge of the total capabilities of security...".

There can be no real mutual security without mutual confidence. It is difficult to maintain confidence among states in the midst of the uncertainties

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resulting from the development of awesome nuclear ~~weapons~~-capabilities. There is real danger that failure to have common understanding on matters of atomic weapons policy will critically weaken the mutual confidence of the NATO allies.

The unique problems involved in the possession and use of nuclear weapons should be shared with other members of the community -- with resulting advantage to both the military and the political aspects of our international relationships.

Our allies should be taken more into our confidence. They should have information they need to know in order to increase understanding of nuclear weapons and their political significance, e.g.,

(a) They should become more knowledgeable as to what nuclear weapons can do and what limitations there are on their effective use.

(b) The significance of the development of "clean" weapons should be brought home to them.

(c) To the extent that U.S. security considerations permit, they should be informed as to the prospects for developing "clean" weapons over the whole range of available yields.

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(d) The possibilities of and limitations on a "restrained" use of nuclear weapons should be known by them.

(e) In general terms, our allies should know our thinking about the place of very small nuclear weapons in warfare.

(f) The prospect for U.S. and U.K. long-range missile development is an important factor for European confidence in their future. The advantage for U.S. security of generating such confidence should be factored into the equation when estimating the degree of security risk involved in disclosing any such estimates to NATO.

(g) Central to a better understanding of the nuclear situation is our estimate of the state of Soviet nuclear development and missile weaponering. If confidence among the NATO allies is to be put on a higher plane, more US/UK intelligence on Soviet development should be disclosed to other NATO nations.

(h) The prospect for defense against long-range missiles is a matter of first interest to our European allies. Current U.S. and U.K. projections on this

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score should be made available to NATO in such detail as security permits.

So long as major allies continue to approach the nuclear question separately, danger of serious misunderstandings persists. If a common appreciation and approach to the use of nuclear weapons can be obtained, the security of NATO will be increased.

In view of their great current psychological impact and long-range military and arms control significance, we should disclose to NATO our thinking and planning for earth satellites and our estimate of Soviet capabilities.

2. "...security now depends...upon...the deterrent and retaliatory power of nuclear weapons".

"...greater opportunity to assure that this power will in fact be available...".

A naked promise of nuclear protection by another is no longer a sound basis for any major country's security. [Our NATO friends need further earnest of our firm intention and resolution to bring nuclear force into play if deterrents fail to keep the peace.]

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The United States conceives of NATO as something more than a military asset to be used in whatever manner immediate U.S. security interests suggest.

Best assurance that this power will in fact be available lies in our allies actually having a share in this power close at hand and a capability to employ it effectively. For some years, we have been moving in this direction. Fulfillment of the nuclear trust now calls for acceleration of this process. This will require ~~xxxxxxxx~~ reconciling the need for some NATO community control over the nuclear forces available to it and the legitimate reluctance of individual nations at this time to relinquish all authority over the immense force contained in the nuclear weapon. We believe that there is a sound answer to this problem under which a high degree of readiness, a measure of community control and reasonable protection to the supplying nation's interest can all be obtained. Under such arrangement in the event of war, these nuclear warheads will be available to the appropriate NATO commanders for allied purposes.

All this was deleted from copy of WDFL released 12/12/88 - 237A1!

By a continuous process of consultation as proposed ~~in paragraph 5~~, the allies should be convinced that nuclear power will be used--

- a. automatically in response to nuclear attack; and
- b. if necessary to meet other than a nuclear attack.

There should be no inconsistency between any arrangement for an atomic stockpile and the provisions of the Western disarmament proposals of August 29, 1957.

3. "...it will not be misused by any nation...".

Greater communication between our governments of planning for the use of nuclear weapons leading to a common appreciation of their problems will reduce fears that these weapons might be used irresponsibly or for purposes other than individual or collective self-defense, as authorized by the Charter of the UN. The fears and feelings of other members of the community are legitimate factors in any process leading to use or failure to use this tremendous new military force. Consideration should be given to the establishment of an appropriate consultative arrangement.* Such ~~arrangement could permit the exchange of~~ ~~groups xxxxxxxxxx given~~ the latest thinking

* perhaps a consultative committee in Washington.

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of top American officials on nuclear weapons use policy, and these officials could get first-hand views of the allies on nuclear weapons policy. In addition, such ^{an arrangement} ~~xxxxxxx~~ could be used as the institutional device to accomplish the purposes considered in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 of this paper.

4. "It is not within the capacity of each nation acting alone to make itself fully secure. Only collective measures will suffice."

The community control we hope to build in order to assure readiness and availability to NATO of nuclear force in the event of attack will in itself be a further guarantee against irresponsible use.

A major element in the nuclear deterrent of the future will be a long-range ballistic missile. The U.S. is starting large-scale production of missiles capable of delivering tremendous blows against targets some 1,500 miles from the launching site. Any NATO military requirement for such weapons will be given high priority by the U.S. It is suggested that a NATO study be immediately started to determine where

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these ~~could~~ most advantageously be placed. It may be possible to start supplying such weapons as early as next year. This would be a new departure -- giving NATO European countries for the first time a share in the retaliatory force of the alliance.

(A European production capacity for such missiles should be established in the near future. A European missile research and development capacity to design future missile types should also get underway now. U.S. transfers of missile technology will be essential to the success of any such venture. U.S. disclosure policy must be modified to enable this.)

In very short order, we will have capability to send missiles to targets over 5,000 miles away. The development of such very long-range missiles far from lessening our dependence on Europe, makes even more necessary a closer integration of U.S. military force into the NATO structure.

In disarmament, we call for inspection and verification because the free world security cannot be based merely on the good faith of others, whose promises have so often been broken in the past. Yet even in dealings among allies, there is a limit to

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which one state can safely go in reliance solely on another's promise to come to the common defense in the event of attack.

This is especially true in the case of nuclear weapon power. Accordingly, steps have been taken to arm the forces of a number of NATO nations with nuclear capable weapons. Such nations want assurance that nuclear components for these weapons will be at hand for ready use in the event of war.

Under the criterion of the most efficient use of the Community's resources, it seems appropriate that the U.S. be the major supplier of such nuclear components for NATO forces. Arrangements to this end will be suggested by the Secretary of Defense during the present meeting of the Council.

We must not lose sight of the problems raised by the international deployment of nuclear weapons prior to the reaching of the universal arms control arrangement. These weapons are of special concern to all because any use of them may trigger off a general nuclear war.

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With such weapons available to NATO and with assurance against their illegitimate use, it may well be that individual members of the NATO Community will find it to their national interest to forego their sovereign right to start producing nuclear weapons, pending the effective East-West arms control agreement we seek and for which last summer NATO gave such clear evidence of support.

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AT SPAAK'S LUNCH TODAY FOR PERMREPS, CROUY AND BLANKENHORN, FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, PRESSED SPAAK TO TRY TO SCHEDULE VERY PRIVATE MEETING HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS WITH ONE OR TWO ADVISORS DURING DECEMBER SESSIONS FOR VERY FRANK DISCUSSION WHICH, THEY CLAIMED, COULD NOT BE DONE EXCEPT IN VERY RESTRICTED MEETING. BLANKENHORN SAID CHANCELOR INSISTS ON THIS AND WANTS TO TALK FRANKLY ABOUT POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN NATO. CROUY INDICATED FRENCH DIFFICULTIES WITH ATOMIC STOCKPILE PROPOSAL CREATED NECESSITY FOR SAME TYPE OF VERY RESTRICTED MEETING. MAJORITY OTHER PERMREPS SEEMED TO AGREE.

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PRS B-2/55

December 6, 1957

NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1957

IRBM's

(Background Paper)

The attached paper, drafted by Defense - Col. Robinson, has been cleared for Defense by Col. Twitchell. It is circulated for information.

Eugene V. McAuliffe
S/S-RO
Room 5274 NS
Ext. 5836

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IRBM'sI. Recommended U.S. Position.

It is recommended that the President inform the North Atlantic Council that if the NAC desires to add IRBM's to the NATO arsenal, the U.S. is prepared to make available, under U.S. MAProgram (grant aid or sales under terms to be worked out), several squadrons of IRBM's to SACEUR, to be deployed in accordance with his plans. Such deployment would be agreed between SACEUR and the countries directly concerned.

The U.S. expects to be ready to deliver these squadrons when the NATO nations in which they would be deployed have prepared the necessary base sites and are in a position to receive the missiles. Nuclear warheads for such weapons would constitute part of the NATO atomic stockpile.

The U.S. believes that the follow-up development and production of IRBM's could advantageously be undertaken in Europe. To this end, the U.S. is prepared to make available under appropriate safeguards blueprints and other necessary data relating to the IRBM delivery system, if it is decided by the NAC that the further development and production of this missile is to be undertaken by NATO countries in Europe on a cooperative basis.

II. Background.

In March 1957 the U.S. agreed to furnish the U.K. four squadrons (60 missiles) of IRBM's with appropriate spare parts. Negotiations concerning the detailed provisions of this offer are still being conducted. On 23 September the French Government requested that the U.S. discuss the availability of IRBM for France. On 14 November the JCS stated that they concurred in the provision of IRBM to France and other NATO allies provided such action does not interfere with the U.K. IRBM program. State is being advised that Defense concurs in the JCS views.

On 7 November, General Norstad proposed that there be a NATO IRBM Program in the sense that U.S. collaboration should be with NATO rather than with individual NATO members on a strictly bilateral basis.

On 12 November, Secretary McElroy advised Secretary Dulles that it would be technically practicable to begin delivery of IRBM's to the NATO area during FY 1959 (with the possibility that this could be as early as December 1958). This program would be accelerated by a build-up to 195 missiles of 13 squadrons for the NATO area by and FY 62.

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On 27 November the JCS reaffirmed their recommendations that the initial deployment of four squadrons of IRBM to U.K. should not be altered, and the subsequent priorities within NATO should be determined by NATO military authorities. In this light, the JCS will provide further recommendations, concerning future deployments of the IRBM on a world-wide basis, confirming the desirability of locating a substantial part of the force in the NATO area and also the principles that it is to the mutual advantage of the U.S. and the host country to plan for assumption of manning and control responsibilities of certain units by indigenous forces. The JCS consider it desirable to stress the NATO aspects of U.S. actions to provide IRBM's. Accordingly, they favor, whenever feasible, NATO agreements on problems related to U.S. provision of the IRBM to NATO. However, this does not mean that it is either necessary or appropriate to grant to NATO final authority on the disposition or distribution of U.S. supplied weapons or equipment.

Also on 27 November, Secretary McElroy publicly announced that authorization was being granted to place into production both THOR and JUPITER missiles. By making use of the production capacity now available for these two missiles, an operational capability can be achieved by the end of 1958 in the U.K., and on a similar time scale at other appropriate locations.

On 29 November General Norstad indicated that he hoped the forces established to handle the IRBM's would be assigned to NATO and fall under the direct operational control of SACEUR. He envisaged a three stage program as follows:

- (1) An expression of U.S. willingness to make IRBM available to NATO under given conditions and acceptance in principle of this offer by appropriate NATO political authority;
- (2) Appropriate NATO military commanders will determine the IRBM assignment plan under which these weapons can best contribute to more effective and integrated NATO defense effort and make suitable recommendations to higher NATO authorities; and
- (3) Agreement with such NATO countries as may be directly concerned.

The above approach is designed to meet both political and military NATO requirements and to eliminate misconception in some quarters that these proposals represent U.S. pressure to obtain military bases for unilateral purposes.

On 29 November the JCS stated that considering the military factors of target coverage, weapon survival, accessibility for logistical support, existing facilities and integration with other weapons systems, it is considered that plans for the 4 squadrons now programmed for the

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U.K. should not be changed. From the U.S. military point of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the next available squadrons should be allocated for deployment to Turkey, Alaska, Okinawa, and France, in that order of priority. After these requirements have been met, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Italy, Greece, Taiwan, Spain, and West Germany are most suitable deployment areas. These areas are not listed in order of priority. In addition, Norway, Denmark, Pakistan, and Japan are also most suitable if political objections can be overcome.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the ultimate number of IRBM units should not be established without consideration of other weapon systems with similar or overlapping operational life spans, and that in the development of these systems, variations in weapon reliability, accuracy, and over-all effectiveness can be expected to occur. Therefore, it is impracticable at this time to specify the ultimate number of IRBM units which will be required in the future. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently recommended to you an accelerated program for production of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles amounting to 16 squadrons.

Concerning the manning of IRBM units deployed on foreign territory, it appears most logical for the time being to plan for initial U.S. manning and control. However, it is considered to be to the mutual advantage of the United States and the host country to plan for the assumption of manning and control responsibilities of certain units by indigenous forces as rapidly as possible.

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12/6/57

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1. Agree general line you have taken with Crouy-Chanel (first para reftel). Assume French fully appreciate there are no RPT no plans for amending provision Atomic Energy Act requiring U.S. custody. You should continue focus attention on fact that U.S. proposal fully meets NATO military requirements.

2. We would appreciate any further info you can provide on specific points French unhappiness, without of course raising matter with French directly. In discussion with Dept officers December 4, Alphand, apparently speaking personally, said stockpile proposal provided no RPT no assurance warheads would be released by U.S. if needed. Dept anticipates we will stress at December meeting U.S. determination respond to any type of aggression and necessity mutual trust and confidence among NATO allies that all will carry out treaty obligations. This seems as far as U.S. can go.

3. Re question highly restricted session at Heads Governments meeting, we agree such a meeting may become necessary, but concur should not RPT not be scheduled at this time.

Drafted by: BRT
EUR/RA:BELT:mck 12/6/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: C - G. Frederick Reinhardt

Clearances: S/AE - Mr. Fatley

DEC 6 1957 P.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT POLTO 1694, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON POLTO 255
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MEMBER GERMAN DELEGATION, REFERRING TODAY'S NAC DISCUSSION (REPORTED SEPARATELY), INQUIRED WHETHER GERMAN UNDERSTANDING CORRECT THAT DECEMBER MEETING WOULD BE ASKED APPROVE ONLY ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO ATOMIC STOCKPILE AND THAT COUNTRIES WOULD NOT (RPT NOT) BE EXPECTED STATE WHETHER THEY PREPARED ACCEPT ATOMIC WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY. WE REPLIED THIS ACCORDS OUR UNDERSTANDING. GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE, PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO STATIONING OF WARHEADS FOR USE BY GERMAN FORCES, SAID WAS NOT (RPT NOT) SURE OF GERMAN RESPONSE IF MILITARY SHOULD SO RECOMMEND.

USRO ASSUMES NO NATION WILL BE EXPECTED TO DECLARE ITSELF ON ACTUAL STATIONING OF STOCKPILE AT DECEMBER MEETING.

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Documents

on

Disarmament

1945-1959

VOLUME II

1957-1959

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Department of State Publication 7008

Released August 1960

Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.

such attempt will lead to catastrophe for all. The only way is to exist peacefully together in spite of differences and to give up the policy of hatred and violence.

The moral and the ethical approaches demand this. But even more so, practical common sense points this way.

I have no doubt that this can be done. I have no doubt that America and Russia have it in their power to put an end to this horror that is enveloping the world and darkening our minds and our future.

Millions of people believe in what is called Western capitalism; millions also believe in Communism. But, there are many millions who are not committed to either of these ideologies, and yet seek, in friendship with others, a better life and a more hopeful future.

I speak for myself, but I believe that I speak the thoughts of vast numbers of people in my country as well as in other countries of the world. I venture, therefore, to make this appeal to the great leaders, more especially of America and Russia, in whose hands fate and destiny have placed such tremendous power today to mould this world and either to raise it to great heights or to hurl it to the pit of disaster. I appeal to them to stop all nuclear test explosions and thus to show to the world that they are determined to end this menace, and to proceed also to bring about effective disarmament. The moment this is done, a great weight will be lifted from the mind of man. But it is not merely a physical change that is necessary, but an attempt to remove fear and reverse the perilous trend which threatens the continued existence of the human race. It is only by direct approaches and agreements through peaceful methods that these problems can be solved.

237. Letter From the Soviet Premier (Bulganin) to President Eisenhower, December 10, 1957¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am addressing this letter to you in order to share with you certain thoughts regarding the international situation which is developing at the present time. The Soviet Government has recently examined the international situation in all its aspects. In doing so, we could not of course fail to give serious attention to the fact that at the initiative of the United States of America and Great Britain measures are now being developed the purpose of which is a sharp intensification of the military preparations of the

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 27, 1958, pp. 127-130. The President replied on Jan. 12, 1958 (*post*, doc. 240).

NATO members, and that specific plans are being considered in connection with the forthcoming session of the NATO Council.

It is already evident that these measures in their essence amount to the mobilization of all the resources of the member states of NATO for the purpose of intensifying the production of armaments and for preparations in general for war. The NATO leaders openly state that at the forthcoming session military and strategic plans providing for extensive use of atomic and hydrogen weapons will be considered.

It is also very obvious that all such activity is taking place in an atmosphere of artificially created nervousness and fear with respect to the imaginary "threat" from the U.S.S.R., and, in the effort to create such an atmosphere, particularly wide use is being made of references to the latest scientific and technical achievements of the Soviet Union.

In our view there is serious danger that, as a result of such actions, international developments may take a direction other than that required in the interest of the strengthening of peace.

On the other hand, in all states of the world there is a growing and spreading movement for a termination of the armaments race, and for averting the threat of an outbreak of a new war. Peoples are demanding that a policy be followed whereby states may live in peace, respecting mutual rights and interests and deriving advantage from cooperation with one another, instead of sharpening their knives against one another.

All of this leads us to the conviction that in the development of the international situation a moment of great responsibility has arrived.

We feel that in this situation the responsibility that rests upon the government of every state in determining its future foreign policy is greater than ever before. Especially great is the responsibility of the governments of the great powers.

I must frankly say to you, Mr. President, that the reaction of certain circles in your country and in certain other NATO countries regarding the recent accomplishments of the U.S.S.R. in the scientific and technical field, and regarding the launching, in connection with the program of the International Geophysical Year, of the Soviet artificial earth satellites in particular,² appears to us a great mistake.

Of course, the launching of artificial earth satellites bears witness to the great achievement of the U.S.S.R., both in the field of peaceful scientific research and in the field of military technology. However, it is well known that the U.S.S.R. has insisted and still insists that neither ballistic missiles nor hydrogen and atomic bombs should ever be used for purposes of destruction, and that so great an achievement

² See *post*, doc. 239.

³ The first two sputniks were launched by the U.S.S.R. on Oct. 4 and Nov. 3, 1956.

of the human mind as the discovery of atomic energy should be put to use entirely for the peaceful development of society. The Soviet Union has no intention of attacking either the U.S.A. or any other country. It is calling for agreement and for peaceful coexistence. The same position is held by many states, including the Chinese People's Republic and other socialist countries.

On the other hand, in the present situation the governments of the Western powers are making the decision to step up the armaments race still further and are following the line of intensifying the "cold war." It is our deep conviction that nothing could be more dangerous to the cause of world peace.

First of all, who can guarantee, if the present competition in the production of ever newer types of weapons is continued and assumes still greater proportions, that it will be the NATO members who are the winners in such a competition? I do not even mention the fact that the armaments race in itself is not only becoming an increasingly heavy burden on the shoulders of peoples but is also still further magnifying the danger of an outbreak of war.

Let us suppose that, in calling for further development of military preparations with special emphasis on the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction, the American military leaders expect to achieve some success. But nothing can change the fact that even with the present status of military technology a situation has developed for the first time in history where in the event of war the territory of none of the great powers will any longer be in a privileged position that would spare it from becoming one of the theaters of war from the very beginning of the conflict. Nothing is changed in this respect, even by the fact that the U.S.A. has a network of far advanced military bases, nor by plans to use territories and military potential of Western European allies.

At the present time in the United States of America there has been proclaimed the thesis of "interdependence" of the countries members of NATO. A new and increased contribution to the military preparations of this alliance is expected of them. No little pressure is being exerted upon them to obtain consent for the stationing of nuclear and rocket weapons in their territory.

Apparently for the purpose of reducing the dangers which are fully understandable and are caused in these countries by the prospect of having nuclear weapons stationed in their territory, military circles in the West are attempting to implant the idea that the so-called "tactical" atomic weapons are not very different from conventional types of weapons and that their use would not entail as destructive results as that of atomic and hydrogen bombs. One cannot fail to see that such reasoning, designed to mislead public opinion, constitutes a dan-

gerous attempt to justify preparation for unleashing an atomic war. Where can all this lead?

The military situation of the U.S.A. itself, in our opinion, will in no way improve as a result of this; the U.S.A. will become no less vulnerable, while the danger of war will increase still further.

It is doubtful that such a policy would even lead to a strengthening of relations between the U.S.A. and its European allies. The contrary might be true, for in the last analysis no country can be content with a situation where it is compelled to sacrifice its independence for the sake of strategic plans that are alien to its national interests and to risk receiving a blow because of the fact that foreign military bases are situated in its territory.

As for plans to transfer nuclear weapons to allies of the U.S.A. in Europe, such a step can only further aggravate an already complicated situation on that continent, initiating a race in atomic armaments among European states.

One likewise cannot fail to take into account, for example, the fact that the placing of nuclear weapons at the disposal of the Federal Republic of Germany may set in motion such forces in Europe and entail such consequences as even the NATO members may not contemplate.

One of the arguments advanced in military circles in the West to justify the demand for expanding military preparations is the so-called theory of "local wars." It must be most strongly emphasized that this "theory" is not only absolutely invalid from the military standpoint but is also extremely dangerous politically. In the past too, as we all know, global wars have been set off by "local" wars. Is it possible to count seriously on the possibility of "localizing" wars in our time when there exist military groupings opposing one another in the world and including dozens of states in various parts of the world, and when the range of modern types of weapons does not know any geographic limits?

One's attention is also attracted by reports regarding the existence of plans for combining in some form the military blocs created by the Western powers in various parts of the world—NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact.¹ I cannot but say to you, Mr. President, that we evaluate the development of such plans as a trend directly opposed to the principles of a joint strengthening of international peace and security, in the name of which the U.N. was created with the active participation of our two countries. In fact, if even now the existence of so-called military blocs exerts a baneful influence on the entire international situation, then it is completely obvious that an attempt

¹ For the texts of these regional security treaties, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 812-815, 853-854, 871-873, 912-915, and 1257-1259.

to bring states together, to include those of several continents in a program which in essence amounts to joint preparation for a new war, would mean undermining the U.N. and would inflict irreparable damage upon it.

We are of course aware that the plans for further intensification of military preparations are represented as plans directed toward insuring the security of the Western powers and toward the strengthening of peace. However, the leaders of such countries as the United States and the Soviet Union bear too great a responsibility not to attempt to approach the evaluation of this or that course of foreign policy without prejudice, objectively, and taking into consideration the facts as they actually exist, and historic experience. After all, does not the whole experience of the development of international relations during the past decade indicate that the thesis that peace and the security of nations can be insured by means of intensified armament and of "cold war" or through a "brink of war" policy has absolutely no basis?

The last ten years have been characterized by the policy of "a position of strength"¹ and "cold war" proclaimed by certain circles in the West.

During all these years the minds of men in the West have been poisoned by intensive propaganda, which, day after day, has implanted the thought of the inevitability of a new war and the necessity of intensified preparations for war. This propaganda for war, which contributed not a little toward aggravating the international situation and undermining confidence in the relations between states, is one of the chief elements of the policy of "a position of strength."

Today the entire world is witness to the fact that this policy has not produced any positive results, even for those powers which have for such a long time and so insistently been following it, and which have confronted mankind with the threat of a new war, the terrible consequences of which would exceed anything that can be pictured by the human imagination.

It is not by accident that the voices in the world which call for an end to propaganda for war, an end to the "cold war," an end to the unrestrained armaments race and an entry upon the path of peaceful coexistence of all states are becoming louder and louder. The idea of peaceful coexistence is becoming more and more an imperative demand of the historical moment through which we are passing.

It is well known that the most rabid champions of the "cold war" are trying to picture this demand as "Communist propaganda." We Communists do not of course deny that we stand wholeheartedly for a program of peaceful coexistence, for a program of peaceful and friendly cooperation among all countries, and we are proud of it.

¹ See Secretary of State Acheson's statement of Feb. 16, 1950 (*ibid.*, p. 6).

But are we the only ones with such a program? Are all those statesmen and public figures of India, Indonesia, Great Britain, France, and other countries who insistently and ardently call for the renunciation of the "policy of strength" for peaceful coexistence also Communists? And do not their voices express the attitude and the will of millions and millions of people?

It seems to us that at the present time the international situation has become such that the actions taken by states in the very near future, and primarily by the great powers, will to a considerable extent determine the answer to the main question which so deeply concerns all mankind, namely:

Will the movement in the direction of a war catastrophe continue, and with ever-increasing velocity, or will those who are responsible for the policy of states enter upon the only sensible path of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between all states?

After all, for this it is necessary only to cast a sober look at the present situation; to recognize in fact that every country has the right to choose its own form of government and its own economic system; to renounce any attempt to settle international questions by force; to renounce war once and for all as a means of solving international disputes; and to build relations between states on the basis of equality, respect for the independence of each state, and noninterference in the internal affairs of one another, on the basis of mutual benefit.

If one proceeds from the premise of insuring universal peace, it is necessary, in our opinion, to recognize quite definitely the situation that has developed in the world where capitalist and socialist states exist. None of us can fail to take into account the fact that any attempts to change this situation by external force, and to upset the *status quo*, or any attempts to impose any territorial changes, would lead to catastrophic consequences.

I am well aware, Mr. President, that in your statements you have repeatedly expressed the thought that no durable peace can be based on an armaments race and that you strongly desire peace and cooperation with other countries, including the Soviet Union. This was also stated in your conversations with N. S. Khrushchev and myself during the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers in the summer of 1955. Unfortunately, however, it must be said that in practice all the steps taken by the Soviet Government to improve relations with the United States have not up to now met with a positive response on the part of the Government of the United States of America.

Meanwhile, the present state of Soviet-American relations cannot give any satisfaction either to the Soviet people or, it seems to us, to the American people. The tense and even almost hostile character which

these relations very often assume cannot be justified from a political, economic, or moral viewpoint. It is an inherently absurd situation when two gigantic countries which have at their disposal everything that is necessary for their economic development, which have repeatedly and successfully cooperated in the past, and which, we are convinced, even now have no irreconcilable conflicts of interest, have been as yet unable to normalize their mutual relations.

This problem is all the more significant because the fate of universal peace depends to a high—probably even decisive—degree on the state of mutual relations between our countries under present conditions. For this very reason, it is especially important that our two countries display initiative and take the step which peoples have already been awaiting for a long time, namely, breaking the ice of the “cold war.”

For this the necessary prerequisites exist. I have no doubt that the American people do not want a new war any more than the Soviet people do. Our countries, in close cooperation, achieved victory in the struggle against Hitlerite aggression. Is it possible that now, when prevention of the universal calamity of a new war depends to such an enormous degree upon our countries, we should fail to find within ourselves the courage to face the facts clearly and be able to unite our efforts in the interests of peace?

A consciousness of the gravity of the present situation and a deep concern for the preservation of peace prompts us to address to you, Mr. President, an appeal to undertake joint efforts to put an end to the “cold war,” to terminate the armaments race, and to enter resolutely upon the path of peaceful coexistence.

Allow me to set forth what exactly, in our opinion, might be done in this respect.

We regret that, because of the position taken by the Western powers, the disarmament negotiations did not bring about successful results. The Soviet Union is, as before, prepared to come to an agreement concerning effective disarmament measures. It depends on the Western powers whether the disarmament negotiations will be directed into the proper channel or whether this problem will remain in a deadlock.

We must recognize that the achievement of an agreement on disarmament is hindered by the fact that the sides which take part in the negotiations lack the necessary confidence in each other. Is it possible to do something to create such confidence? Of course it is possible.

We propose the following things. Let us jointly, with the Government of Great Britain, undertake for the present only an obligation not to use nuclear weapons, and let us announce the cessation, as of January 1, 1958, of test explosions of all types of such weapons, at the beginning at least for two or three years.

Let us jointly, with the Government of Great Britain, agree to refrain from stationing any kind of nuclear weapons whatsoever within the territory of Germany—West Germany as well as East Germany. If this agreement is supplemented by an agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on renunciation of the production of nuclear weapons and on the nonstationing of such weapons in Germany, then, as has already been officially declared by the Governments of Poland¹ and Czechoslovakia, these states likewise will not produce or station nuclear weapons in their territories. Thus would be formed in Central Europe a vast zone with a population of over one hundred million people excluded from the sphere of atomic armaments—a zone where the risk of atomic warfare would be reduced to a minimum. Let us develop and submit to the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact² for consideration a joint proposal for the conclusion of some form of nonaggression agreement between these two groupings of states.

In order to normalize the situation in the Near and Middle East, let us agree not to undertake any steps that violate the independence of the countries of this area, and let us renounce the use of force in the settlement of questions relating to the Near and Middle East.

Let us conclude an agreement that would proclaim the firm intention of our two states to develop between them relations of friendship and peaceful cooperation. It is time to take measures to halt the present propaganda in the press and on the radio which generates feelings of mutual distrust, suspicion, and ill will.

It is also necessary to reestablish the conditions for a normal development of trade relations between our countries, since mutually advantageous trade is the best foundation for the development of relations between states and the establishment of confidence between them.

Let us do everything possible to broaden scientific, cultural, and athletic ties between our two countries. One can imagine what fruitful results might follow, for example, from the cooperation between Soviet and American scientists in the matter of further harnessing the elemental powers of nature in the interest of man.

There is no doubt whatsoever that the implementation of the above-mentioned measures, which would in no way harm either the security or the other interests of any state, would be of enormous significance to the promotion of a wholesome atmosphere in the entire international situation and to the creation of a climate of trust between states, without which one cannot even speak of insuring a lasting peace among peoples.

¹ See Foreign Minister Rapacki's address of Oct. 2, 1957 (*ante*, doc. 225).

² *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 1239-1242.

The creation of the necessary trust in relations between states would then make it possible to proceed with the implementation of such radical measures as a substantial reduction in armed forces and armaments, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and the destruction of stockpiles, the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of all states, including the member states of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact, and replacement of the existing military groupings of states with a collective security system.

The critical period in the development of international relations in which we are now living makes it necessary, perhaps as never before, to adopt realistic decisions that would be in accord with the vital interests and the will of peoples. The experience of the past tells us how much can be done for the benefit of peoples by statesmen who correctly understand the demands of the historic moment and act in accordance with those demands.

Knowing you, Mr. President, as a man of great breadth of vision and peace-loving convictions, I hope that you will correctly understand this message and, conscious of the responsibility which rests with the leaders of the United States of America and the Soviet Union in the present situation, will manifest a readiness to combine the efforts of our two countries for the noble purpose of turning the course of events in the direction of a durable peace and friendly cooperation among nations.

Attaching great importance to personal contacts between statesmen, which facilitate finding a common point of view on important international problems, we, for our part, would be prepared to come to an agreement on a personal meeting of state leaders to discuss both the problems mentioned in this letter and other problems. The participants in the meeting could agree upon these other subjects that might need to be discussed.

Respectfully,

N. BULGANIN

238. Letter From President Eisenhower to the Indian Prime Minister (Nehru) on Nuclear Test Explosions, December 15, 1957¹

DEAR PRIME MINISTER: I have read with great sympathy your earnest and eloquent public appeal of November 28 on disarmament.² This is a matter which has also concerned me deeply for a very long time.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 6, 1958, p. 17.

² *Ante*, doc. 236.

In the days immediately following the end of World War II, the United States proposed that the dreadful power of the atomic bomb, which we alone then possessed, be forever denied all nations.¹ We hoped, instead, that the wonders of the nuclear age could be devoted wholly to the uses of peace. This plan was refused and we were left with no choice but to maintain our armed strength. Since this time the United States has continued an unremitting effort to achieve a just system of disarmament and a secure peace for all nations. We have repeatedly stated our readiness, indeed our anxiety, to reduce the possibility of war through arms regulation and control, to stop tests of nuclear weapons, and to devote a part of our huge expenditures for armaments to the great causes of mankind's welfare. Our only concern is that these measures be accomplished in a way that will not increase the risk of war or threaten the security of any nation. We earnestly believe that the plan which we joined with the United Kingdom, France and Canada in suggesting at the London disarmament talks on August 29² offers a meaningful opportunity for removing fear and gaining international trust. It is a source of great personal regret to me that these proposals have not so far been found acceptable by the Soviet Union even as a basis for negotiations.

In these circumstances, I have been able to reach no other conclusion than that, for the time being, our security must continue to depend to a great degree on our making sure that the quality and quantity of our military weapons are such as to dissuade any other nation from the temptation of aggression. The United States, I can assure you unequivocally, will never use its armed might for any purpose other than defense.

I know that the subject of testing of nuclear weapons is of understandable concern to many. I have given this matter long and prayerful thought. I am convinced that a cessation of nuclear weapons tests, if it is to alleviate rather than merely to conceal the threat of nuclear war, should be undertaken as a part of a meaningful program to reduce that threat. We are prepared to stop nuclear tests immediately in this context. However, I do not believe that we can accept a proposal to stop nuclear experiments as an isolated step, unaccompanied by any assurances that other measures—which would go to the heart of the problem—would follow. We are at a stage when testing is required particularly for the development of important defensive uses of these weapons. To stop these tests at this time, in the absence of knowledge that we can go on and achieve effective limitations on nuclear weapons production and on other elements of armed strength, as well as a measure of assurance against surprise attack, is a sacrifice which we could not in prudence accept.

¹ *Ante*, doc. 4.

² *Ante*, doc. 219.

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Your understanding correct. We assume question/~~XXXX~~ will arise in any formal way, not RPT not/~~XXXX~~ since deployment atomic warheads for use in event of hostilities by other NATO forces would be carried out in accordance SACEUR planning and such plans would be worked out after approval in principle by NAC of NATO stockpile proposal. You may wish discuss with General Norstad.

We assume Germans will not RPT not say anything publicly that would indicate they might not RPT not participate in ~~XXXX~~ NATO stockpile plan, as this could have most serious effect on Alliance.

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Buller (fr)

NOV 23
NOV 23

[Handwritten initials]

Drafted by: EUR/RA:BELTimmons:mck 12/10/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

C - G. Frederick Reinhardt

Clearances:

Defense - Col. Twitchell *[initials]*

EUR - Mr. Elbrick *[initials]*

S/S CR
[initials]
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X - 4

December 10, 1957

NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1957

Draft of President's Speech in Closed Session

*Final version
DPC 12/10/57*

Attached is the latest version of the second section of the principal speech to be made in closed session. This portion of the speech will be delivered by the Secretary.

It is requested that comments on this text be provided to the Counselor, Mr. Reinhardt, in Room 5159 New State, by noon, Wednesday, December 11.



Eugene V. McAuliffe
S/S-RO
Room 5274 NS
Ext. 5836

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NATO LEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEMBERS
Paris, December 14-15, 1957

Principal Speech - PART II

A - NATO Atomic Strategy

Since the President has covered the general principles which govern our NATO policy, I would like to reduce this concept to specifics, and discuss first certain aspects of the military problem which confront us. At the present time the major deterrent to Soviet aggression is the maintenance of a nuclear retaliatory power of such capacity as to convince the Soviets that any attack which they might make on NATO would result in the destruction of the Soviet Union. This rests primarily in the U.S. Strategic Air Command. In this respect we have a superiority over the Soviet Union. As long-range missiles come into operational use, they will play their part in maintaining this superiority.



There is also maintained a shield of NATO ground, sea and air forces. This is an integral part of the deterrent and, if attack occurs, must provide adequate defense until our full force can take effect. This shield also has the capacity to deal with local actions. Therefore, we believe NATO must continue its efforts to strengthen the shield, which must have a nuclear capability. US forces in Europe - ground, sea and air - now have such a capability.

However

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However, it was never intended that this capability would be confined to US forces alone. Including amounts already programmed the US plans to furnish nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars for modern weapons - mostly missiles and aircraft - for forces of our NATO allies. Personnel of several NATO countries are increasingly being trained in the maintenance, operation and employment of these weapons systems. We hope in this connection it will be possible to have them seen on the NATO Missile Training Center.

It now remains to complete the structure - to assure that atomic warheads for these aircraft and missiles will be available to NATO forces in event of hostilities. We have considered this most carefully since it was first proposed by the French Foreign Minister at Bonn last May.



The US is prepared, if this Council so wishes, to participate in a NATO Atomic Stockpile, for the defense of NATO. Within this stockpile system, atomic warheads would be deployed under US custody, in accordance with NATO defensive planning and, of course, in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In event of hostilities, the atomic warheads would under authorization from the President, be released from US custody to the appropriate Supreme Allied Commander of NATO for employment by the nuclear-

capable

capable forces of NATO.

We are convinced that this arrangement meets NATO military requirements and ensures that atomic warheads can be employed promptly when needed.

B - IREMs

In addition to the above, Intermediate Range ballistic missiles are in a state of rapid development. If this Council be decided, the US is prepared to take two concrete steps in this connection.



First, the US is prepared to make available, under our military assistance program, several squadrons of IREMs to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to be deployed in accordance with his plans. This deployment would of course be agreed between SACSEUR and the countries directly concerned.

We would expect to be ready to deliver these squadrons when the NATO nations in which they would be deployed have prepared the necessary base sites and are ready to receive them. Nuclear warheads for IREMs would form part of the NATO atomic stockpile.

Second, the US believes that the follow-up development and production of IREMs could advantageously be undertaken in Europe. To this end, we are prepared to make available under appropriate safeguards blueprints and

other necessary data relating to the IREX delivery system, if this Council decides that the further development and production of the IREX should be undertaken on a cooperative basis by NATO countries in Europe.]

C - Cooperation in Scientific Field

The vital importance of scientific research and manpower in the NATO countries was called to our attention a year ago by the Committee of Three Report. Sound and adequate science and technology are essential to the Atlantic Community. Many useful ideas in this field have been advanced. In addition to those sponsored by individual countries are the reports of the NATO Parliamentary Conference and the NATO Scientific Task Force.

We believe that NATO should now act in this field - wherever possible in cooperation with existing organizations, such as the OEEC. Therefore, we recommend, as urged by the Task Force, the immediate establishment of an overall NATO Science Committee, responsible to the Council, to commence its work as soon as possible. We urge also the appointment of a Science Advisor to the Secretary-General.

We propose that the Science Committee and Science Advisor review all of the pertinent proposals submitted by individual nations. Based on this review, specific programs should be recommended for increasing scientific

forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area." This remains the policy of the US government.

F - Nuclear Policy

Having discussed nuclear weapons in various contexts, I believe this subject of such importance that it is worth taking time to express US thinking on nuclear questions in some detail. The U.S. considers that the confidence of the free world can best be maintained if our NATO allies have a greater part with us in responsibility for the nuclear deterrent to war. This calls for greater disclosure by the US regarding the nuclear force which is available for NATO's defense, and the resolution and responsibility with which it is held. In addition, it requires transferring to NATO a share of this nuclear force, along the lines indicated above.



There can be no real mutual security without mutual confidence. It is difficult to maintain confidence among states in the midst of the uncertainties resulting from the development of awesome nuclear weapons capabilities.

A common understanding on matters of atomic weapons policy among the NATO allies is essential. The responsibility involved in the nuclear weapons problem should be shared by the members of the community - this should bring a greater sense of community in both the political and military field.

The US believes that NATO as a whole should have more information to increase their understanding of nuclear weapons and their political significance

9.6.

a) What nuclear weapons can do and what limitations there are on their effective use.

b) The significance of the development of "clean" weapons.



c) To the extent possible the prospects for developing "clean" weapons over the whole range of available yields.

d) The possibilities of and limitations on a "restrained" use of nuclear weapons.

e) US thinking about the place of very small nuclear weapons in warfare.

f) The prospect for US long-range missile development.

g) US estimate of the state of Soviet nuclear development and missile weaponizing.

h) The prospect for defense against long-range missiles.

So long as major allies continue to approach the nuclear question separately, danger of serious misunderstandings persists. If a common appreciation and approach to the use of nuclear weapons can be obtained, the security of NATO will be increased.

The US

The US would propose that precise arrangements be made for furnishing this information to the members of IASO. We would defer to the Secretary-General as to the mechanism for receiving this information. The US would further like to take this occasion to make the following announcements:

Contingent upon changes in United States laws requiring the approval of our Congress, the US Government has decided to consider an arrangement for cooperation with IASO nations in the development and production of military nuclear propulsion and power units.



We would make available information on research, development, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use of those military nuclear units we now have in operation. We would be prepared to make available complete nuclear power plants for use on land or at sea. We would be prepared to supply fabricated nuclear fuel elements for military reactors, to reprocess them as needed, and to provide nuclear fuels to assure the continued operation of the military units.

G - Atoms for Peace

Having devoted so much time to questions of atomic weapons, I should like to conclude my discussion of nuclear weapons with the emphasis on the

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(2/14/57)
(2)

Paris
Bristol Hotel
December 14, 1957
8:00 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~
Personal and Private

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
WITH CHANCELLOR ADENAUER
(Mr. Seegar present as Interpreter.)

The Chancellor said that he was confident that his Parliament would approve of the storage of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear sites in the Federal Republic but that it would be necessary to go through the process of parliamentary debate.



I spoke of the Soviet proposal and of Macmillan's idea that perhaps it would be a good thing to agree that there should not be missile sites in the Federal Republic, East Germany, Poland or Czechoslovakia. I said that while as a military matter it might not be desirable or important to have such sites east of the Rhine, I had some question as to whether or not it would be good to give all of the Federal Republic a special status in this regard. It might be a move toward neutralization. The Chancellor said that he agreed with that point of view and that the Federal Republic would not be equated with East Germany.

The Chancellor expressed the fear that there might be a change of US sentiment due to the fact that it would come under fire from Soviet ICBMs. He feared also that this might lead to the US exercising its right to withdraw from NATO. I said I did not think that there was any cause for concern on these points. I said that we had already assumed that Soviet bombers with megaton weapons would be able to inflict massive destruction on the US even though many of them were shot down and that whether or not this destruction was caused by the bombers that got through or by missiles did not particularly alter the situation.

The Chancellor referred to the proposal that research on nuclear weapons be done by France, Germany and Italy. He said he did not know whether we had been officially and adequately advised about this, but he wanted us to know and would see to it that we were properly informed. He thought that if they started such a joint project, it should be open to other states also to join. I said that we knew about this in a general way but would be glad to know more. I said that I, on a personal basis, was

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GROUP 1, EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MR 85-379#1
JWS
2/11/86
GCM/c

~~TOP SECRET~~
Personal and Private

File
Box 1, memo of Conversation -
General - through D (1)

wondering whether it might not be desirable to try to create something like a nuclear weapons authority which would include the three states mentioned plus the US and UK. It seemed as though something like this might be the best way to keep the situation under control as regards the undue spreading of nuclear weapons. I emphasized that this was purely a personal thought and that it had not been explored. The Chancellor's reaction to this was one of hearty approbation.

The Chancellor said that he felt that the decision on use of nuclear weapons should most properly rest with the President although he felt that some formula should be devised which would give a measure of concurrence to the French, for example, if they had the weapons. I said I had suggested to the UK that there be some measure of joint control with the understanding in advance that it should be exercised in accordance with the NATO principle that an attack upon one is an attack upon all. The Chancellor said he thought this was a good idea.

The Chancellor expressed the hope that we could in our speeches, particularly the public speech of the President, emphasize the importance of peace. I said that this was in the President's mind and that I would carry to the President the Chancellor's exhortation in this respect.

The Chancellor said that he felt chagrined that although the US and indeed German military people really had knowledge of the Soviet advances in the way of missiles they had not adequately reacted. I said perhaps this was because the information went primarily to the Air Force and the Air Force tended to depreciate developments that might end up by putting them out of business.

The Chancellor said that General Heusinger had felt that the command structure of NATO was so complicated that it would never work. He suggested that I should ask General Norstad to talk to the Chancellor and General Heusinger about this if there was an opportunity. I said I would try to communicate that thought to General Norstad this evening.

John Foster Dulles



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12/14/57

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, France, December 10-18, 1957



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

APPROVED
JG

Date: December 14, 1957
Time: 11:30 a.m.
Place: U.K. Embassy

10

Participants:

United States

United Kingdom

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Houghton
Ambassador Burgess
Mr. Elbrick
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Cutler
Mr. Smith, reporter

Prime Minister Macmillan
Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Mr Norman Brooke
Sir Richard Powell
Sir Haroldaccia
Sir Frank Roberts
Sir Anthony Rumboldt
Sir Gladwyn Jebb
Sir Patrick Dean
Sir Leslie Rowan
Mr. Bishop, pvt. sec. to P.M.
Mr. Laskey, pvt. sec. to F.M.

Copies to:

Amb. Houghton, Amb. Burgess, Mr. Elbrick, Mr. Reinhardt,
Mr. Gerard Smith, Amembassy London

1497/3307

Washington Distribution: S/S, O, C, EUR, S/AE, S/P, RA

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PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (2)(3)(5)

Authority MR 85-540 #4

NSC 60001 8/25/86

By bc NLE Date 6/20/86

NLE DATE 6/12/86

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The Prime Minister opened by asking if the Secretary would like to discuss the matter of how the conference should go, both from the procedural and the substantive point of view. He recalled that during the Eisenhower-Macmillan talks at Washington it had been felt that the purpose of the NATO meeting would be to galvanize and give new life and color to NATO and "of course" deal with certain military matters. However, the buildup of expectations in the public press and the large-scale Soviet propaganda campaign has resulted in the likelihood that the European nations will inject important political matters for discussion. The form of the meeting has changed; we must face these problems now and not put them off. He expressed the hope that the U. S. and U. K. would see eye to eye on these questions.

J First, the essential importance of keeping NATO in being. NATO has proved its worth. Its importance is continually evidenced by the hostility which the USSR bears it.

Second, it is essential to keep the Germans firmly in the NATO structure so that after Aderauer dies, Germany will not become neutral. Germany should be so built into NATO as to be inextricably involved.

Third, we must avoid NATO's becoming a "Maginot Line." Its flanks are vulnerable. We must bring the military aspects of NATO into relationship with the economic capability of the countries. The Prime Minister expressed alarm that military assessments of needs will continually demand more without full consideration of the economic burdens.

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The Prime Minister stated that he felt the conference will have to get deeper into the political issues.

Secretary Dulles agreed that the conference may have to get into matters of substance more than had been anticipated last month in Washington and pointed out that the time is short. He referred to the procedural ideas expressed by M. Spaak on December 13. Spaak hopes to conclude the formal opening statements Monday afternoon - fifteen minutes for each country. Secretary Dulles pointed out that this would take some four hours. He said the U. S. would like about thirty minutes for its statement and Spaak thought this would be agreeable. The President in the closed session will delegate part of his presentation to Secretary Dulles and perhaps a part to Secretary McElroy. Secretary Dulles pointed out that it might be undesirable for the President to lead off in the restricted session after having spoken just before at the open session. Selwyn Lloyd mentioned that the U. K. would like to speak toward the end of the presentation. Doubt was expressed that the formal statements would be concluded by Monday night. Selwyn Lloyd said that any speeches before President Eisenhower's in the restricted session would be of little interest because all would be waiting to hear what the President said. Selwyn Lloyd added that he thought that all the representatives in the North Atlantic Council thought that the President would open up the restricted session. Spaak will wind up each session giving the line which he proposes to follow in his press conferences each evening. There was some discussion about the nature of the Tuesday morning session. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the President might visit SHAPE Tuesday morning and that perhaps his presence at the Tuesday morning NATO meeting would not be necessary.

Selwyn Lloyd expressed doubt that the conference could finish its work Wednesday night. If that is to be the case, should not one say so at the start to avoid the appearance of any hitch. Secretary Dulles agreed that if there was to be a delay in finishing up, we should announce it as early as possible. He pointed out that some countries probably would not take their full fifteen minutes for formal statements. He suggested that the matter of spilling over to Thursday wait until we see how the Monday session goes. The Prime Minister said the speed of the conference depended entirely on whether there was discussion of substance or just general talk. Selwyn Lloyd pointed out the new factor

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
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that the Soviet notes had brought into the situation and wondered how we could assume the offensive. Secretary Dulles pointed out that it might be well to establish a group to make recommendations about letters NATO might send to the Soviet Union suggesting changes in their policy. He expressed the opinion that the Soviet note writing was excellent craftsmanship and their timing very good. He pointed out that they are capitalizing on the relatively novel technique of public letters between heads of government.

Selwyn Lloyd suggested that we might take the political offensive by some statements in the communiqué. For example we might agree that the foreign ministers should meet to discuss disarmament. Secretary Dulles suggested that Hungary might be a good subject to discuss. He felt, however, that this proposal could not be settled at the present NATO meeting.




The Secretary then spoke about the matter of consultation, pointing out that the consultative process often results in actions being cleared too late to do any good. It is hard to expose one's plans to fifteen countries debating in the North Atlantic Council. A number of the countries don't know very much about the problems on which we are asked to consult. He expressed doubt that agreement could be reached in the North Atlantic Council on an answer to the Bulganin notes. The Prime Minister agreed but wondered if it would not be possible to get

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some consensus on principles. Secretary Dulles pointed out the difficulty of a coalition in competition with a single power. He added that there should be more trust by the coalition in the leadership of a few countries. He referred to his talk in Washington with Von Brentano and Blankenhorn. Blankenhorn had pressed him for consultation to an extreme degree. Secretary Dulles had replied that in the coming months he was sure the Communists would engage in a number of probing operations "now that we are all under the guns so to speak." It is essential that we be free to react instantly. If we don't, the situation could get out of control - the probers' prestige might get committed and the operation might not be stopped short of war. He felt that Blankenhorn was more extreme in his views on consultation than Von Brentano. Secretary Dulles said that he had written to Adenauer about this matter and received a very satisfactory reply. The U. S. is quite willing to make its general policies known and discussed in the North Atlantic Council, but in the matter of application of such policies, the alliance must rely on us to some extent. Secretary Dulles cited the example of a recent insulting note which we had received from the USSR. We were tempted immediately to turn the note back to the USSR, but at NATO it was discussed in the North Atlantic Council at such length and so much time passed that the rejection of the note did not seem feasible. The Prime Minister agreed that the important thing was to get agreements on principles allowing for fast action in individual cases.

11/24/57
E. H.



Secretary Dulles said we had hoped that the moves we were about to make in NATO would make it easier for the French to decide not to make their own nuclear weapons. He asked Mr. Smith to comment on this point. Mr. Smith said he was not optimistic that the French would be dissuaded by anything in this NATO meeting but would go ahead with nuclear weapon production.



Secretary Dulles asked about the completion of the U. S. -U. K. IRBM agreement. Mr. Smith pointed out that Sir Richard Powell had said this morning that the only remaining problem was how, for U. K. internal domestic reasons, to give some semblance of U. K. control over the first squadron (planned for the sake of speed to be manned by U. S. personnel). Secretary Dulles said that on the question of control over these missiles he felt that we should use the principle that an attack on one nation would be an attack on all members of the coalition.

*Tip US
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Secretary Dulles referred to the revival of the Combined Policy Committee and it was agreed that this would be a good mechanism to supervise the new technological cooperation established during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington last month. Secretary Dulles pointed out, however, that this did not mean that any past decisions of the CPC would have binding or precedential effect for the future.

The Prime Minister asked about the possibility of "regularizing" the control arrangements for the decisions to use IRBMs and referred to the Churchill-Truman agreement about U. S. use of U. K. bases for U. S. bombers. He spoke of bringing this formula up to date. He said IRBMs are only another form of bomber. Secretary Dulles asked if he had in mind doing this now, and the Prime Minister said "no." The Prime Minister said it would be useful if we could develop a formula so that "we can quote it."*

Secretary Dulles referred to the question of support costs and asked if the U. K. had made any progress with the Germans. Sir Frank Roberts said that this question had been put to the North Atlantic Council and three independent experts will meet shortly, following the procedures

*It is assumed that he was referring to the need for something to use with U. K. public opinion which is presently exercised about the nature of U. S. strategic bomber rights in the U. K.



set out in the July 6 North Atlantic Council resolution.

Secretary Dulles said he was to see Chancellor Adenauer at 6 o'clock today. Selwyn Lloyd said that the support cost question was a matter of some urgency with the U.K. in that their budget estimates had to be firmed up by mid-January. The Prime Minister then stated that Germany with its great wealth should go in more for foreign investment. It had accumulated one thousand million dollars a year and immobilized this vast sum. He was fearful that this process would lead to a world-wide depression. A paramount imperative of capitalism is to put such reserves to use around the world. If they do not do this, Germany will be ruined in the end. It is the Marxist argument that capitalism will not find productive use for its reserves and thus destroy itself. Marxism has been confuted by the examples of the U.K. and the U.S. which had put its accumulated reserves to productive use all around the world. We must get Adenauer to understand this.

G. Smith/

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USDel/MC/25

December 19, 1957

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TO THE
NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 16, 1957
Time: A.M.
Place: Paris

Participants:

United States
Gen. Norstad

Federal Republic of Germany
Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Brentano
General Heusinger
Amb. Blankenhorn



Subject: Military Structure of NATO

Copies to: Mr. Reinhardt Mr. Timmons
 Mr. Elbrick Mr. Thurston
 Amb. Burgess Embassy Bonn
 Mr. Nolting

Washington Distribution: S/S, G, C, EUR, PA, S/P
No distribution outside Department.

At the Chancellor's request General Norstad called on him this morning and a discussion lasting about 15 minutes ensued. The Chancellor stated that before meeting with the President and before making his presentation in the meeting he wanted to have the benefit of General Norstad's views on the military structure of NATO. It was the Chancellor's impression that the structure was cumbersome and that improvements could be made.

General Norstad said that there were two aspects of the problem, one the question of how an Alliance goes to war, and secondly, the general questions on command, control and organization. On the first point it was the General's view that no good would be served by discussing the subject during this meeting, and he recommended that it be avoided. The Germans all agreed. Concerning the second category of questions, General Norstad said that given the nature of modern weapons, we are

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PORTIONS EXEMPTED (3)(5)(9)
E.O. 12333, SEC. 1.3 (a)
NSC Letter 2/5/86

Authority MR 55-529 # 9
LHO NLE DATE 4/14/86

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NLE DATE 4/14/86
Dec 16, 1957 (1)



past the point where we can afford to have critical forces go through the transition from national to international control at the outbreak of hostilities when such efficiency is required. General Norstad therefore recommended that the NATO military commanders be given a greater measure of operational control over these critical items in peacetime, though he recognized the reluctance of some governments to surrender control over national forces. The Germans agreed with this general approach.


As to organization the General expressed the view that the 1951-52 arrangements were cumbersome and that no doubt the organization should be simplified. For example, it might be possible to eliminate one ground force echelon. General Housinger seemed to agree.


With regard to integration of forces General Norstad stated that he thought air defense was one field in which action should be taken in this regard. He expressed the hope that the Federal Republic would agree that in this and other fields, where effectiveness and economy could be improved, integration should go forward. The General made it clear that he was not recommending an overall approach here, but rather one in which integration would be effected in those fields where there were clear advantages to the Alliance. He thought it necessary to avoid any implication here that an attempt was being made to accomplish the purpose of the old EDC by the back door.

Summarizing his recommendations, General Norstad said that the NATO military commanders should have operational control over critical items in the transition from peace to hostilities and that the general principle of integration should be applied where effectiveness and economy called for its application.

See above (1487) / 563

Chancellor Adenauer then opened up a different subject. He said that it was unfortunate that SHAPE had had to change its plans on account of latest developments and that he felt Allen Dulles had not played fair with them on this in the field of intelligence. General Norstad rebutted this assertion by pointing out that the SHAPE Study was based on intelligence primarily of U.S. origin, which fully took into account the latest Soviet developments. General Norstad emphasized that the Pentagon did not see the SHAPE Study before it was issued and in making its recommendations SHAPE was not acting as the mouthpiece for any one country.





The Germans seemed to be relieved to hear the foregoing.

At the end of the discussion there was some talk about the question of Soviet capabilities. Adenauer inquired whether the recent Standing Group estimate was not too pessimistic from the NATO viewpoint. General Norstad answered that there was a natural tendency to overestimate the prospective enemy and that in view of the fact that we had been wrong a couple of times in underestimating the Soviet, we may now tend to be doubly sure in our current estimates. It seemed to General Norstad, however, that the important consideration was not the precise character of the Soviet capability, but rather does the NATO side continue to possess a deterrent having absolute qualities. It was General Norstad's view that we do continue to have this ability and that we should base our policy on that fact. Given this situation, General Norstad expressed the view that there continues to be the strongest justification for the maintenance of the Shield concept which completes the deterrent and imposes squarely on the Soviets the onus for any kind of military adventure originating from that side.

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12/19/57
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WSD:1/MG/25

December 19, 1957

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 16, 1957
Time: A.M.
Place: Paris

Participants:

United States
Gen. Norstad

Federal Republic of Germany
Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Ewertano
General Heusinger
Amb. Elankenhorn



Subject: Military Structure of NATO

Copies to: Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Elbrick
Amb. Burgess
Mr. Nolting
Mr. Timmons
Mr. Thurston
Embassy Bonn

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No distribution outside Department.

At the Chancellor's request, General Norstad called on him this morning and a discussion lasting about 45 minutes ensued. The Chancellor stated that before meeting with the President and before making his presentation in the meeting he wanted to have the benefit of General Norstad's views on the military structure of NATO. It was the Chancellor's impression that the structure was cumbersome and that improvements could be made.

General Norstad said that there were two aspects of the problem, one the question of how an Alliance goes to war, and secondly, the general questions on command, control and organization. On the first point it was the General's view that no good would be served by discussing the subject during this meeting, and he recommended that it be avoided. The Germans all agreed. Concerning the second category of questions, General Norstad said that given the nature of modern weapons, we are

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Priority MR 85-529 # 9
LHO
Date 4/14/86

PORTIONS EXEMPTED (3)(5)(9)
E.O. 12333, SEC. 1.3 (a)
NSC letter 2/5/86
Date 4/14/86

1987/1563
BY 4, NATO Heads of Government Meeting - Paris
Chancellor, December 16, 1957 (1)




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As to organization the General expressed the view that the 1951-52 arrangements were cumbersome and that no doubt the organization should be simplified. For example, it might be possible to eliminate one ground force echelon. General Housinger seemed to agree.

With regard to integration of forces General Norstad stated that he thought air defense was one field in which action should be taken in this regard. He expressed the hope that the Federal Republic would agree that in this and other fields, where effectiveness and economy could be improved, integration should go forward. The General made it clear that he was not recommending an overall approach here, but rather one in which integration would be effected in those fields where there were clear advantages to the Alliance. He thought it necessary to avoid any implication here that an attempt was being made to accomplish the purpose of the old EDC by the back door.

Summarizing his recommendations, General Norstad said that the NATO military commanders should have operational control over critical items in the transition from peace to hostilities and that the general principle of integration should be applied where effectiveness and economy called for its application.

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
Paris, December 16-18, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Time: Evening
Date: December 17, 1957
Place: Elysee Palace

Subject: Nuclear Weapons

Participants:

United States

France

Secretary of State

Minister of Defense
Chaban-Delmas

Copies to: Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Elbrick
Mr. Rockwell
Mr. Farley
Adm. Strauss

Mr. Sprague
Amb. Houghton
Am Con Gen Algiers
Am Embassy Tunis

Washington Distribution: S/S, G, C, EUR, S/AE, NEA, OSD, AF

In the course of discussion about nuclear weapons, I asked casually whether they would be interested in seeing our Proving Grounds in Nevada. He said they would indeed be very much interested. (Subsequently, I told Admiral Strauss that I thought it was appropriate for him to proceed with the French along the lines of his memorandum to me of December 17.)

He said that there was a problem about the fact that the nuclear weapons on French soil would be subject to use only by consent of the President. I said this was necessary under our system and applied equally to American forces anywhere. I said of course this consent could be given in advance to become operative on certain defined conditions.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

69570

SECRET

Retain class'n Change/classify to _____
 With concurrence of _____
 Declassify In part and excise as shown
EO 12356, Sec. 13 (a) (_____)
EPC/HDR by CV 10/23/94

75

10/23/75

I thought that probably some formula could be worked out for a sort of joint control and exercise of that control in accordance with agreed principles.

The Minister indicated that he agreed that it was folly for France to engage in the frightfully costly business of trying to develop nuclear weapons, and he thought that in fact they would not try to go very far if some satisfactory arrangement could be worked out by the United States. (I got the impression that they would want to have one or two explosions to prove to the world their capability and to become rated as a "nuclear power.")

The Minister said that the Algerian war was now virtually over. He could assure me confidently of that fact. The only possibility of its being revived would be if it were revived from Tunisia with the expectation there would be United States backing of Tunisia's action. He said that the French had yesterday made proposals to Tunisia which he considered very fair and that they were already helping Tunisia financially. He urged strongly that the United States make clear to Tunisia that we hoped for agreement between the Tunisians and the French.

I said I would communicate this point of view to the State Department.

/s/ JFD

John Foster Dulles

S:JFD:pdb

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Retain class'n Change/classify to _____

With concurrence of _____

Declassify In part and excise as shown

EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (_____)

EPG/HDR by BL 10/23/94

12/17/57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Paris
Elysee Palace
Evening of
December 17, 1957

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
WITH THE FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENSE
M. CHABAN-DELMAS

In the course of discussion about nuclear weapons, I asked casually whether they would be interested in seeing our Proving Grounds in Nevada. He said they would indeed be very much interested. (Subsequently, I told Admiral Strauss that I thought it was appropriate for him to proceed with the French along the lines of his memorandum to me of December 17.)

He said that there was a problem about the fact that the nuclear weapons on French soil would be subject to use only by consent of the President. I said this was necessary under our system and applied equally to American forces anywhere. I said of course this consent could be given in advance to become operative on certain defined conditions.

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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- Retain class'n Change/classify to _____
 - With concurrence of _____
 - Declassify in part and excise as shown
- EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) |
 PPC/HDR by WJ 11/1/94


231

DSP/331 = 107973

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financially. He urged strongly that the United States make clear to Tunisia that we hoped for agreement between the Tunisians and the French.

I said I would communicate this point of view to the State Department.


John Foster Dulles

S:JFD:pdh

-2-
SECRET

107974

12/23/57

ACTION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET

37-D
Action
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Control: 13521
Rec'd: DECEMBER 23, 1957
10:41 AM

FROM: MOSCOW
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1131, DECEMBER 23, 1 PM

JFS

File on

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

SENT DEPARTMENT 1131, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 202, PARIS 201, BONN 116

AT DINNER AT FRENCH EMBASSY LAST NIGHT I HAD LONG CONVERSATION WITH YURI ZHUKOV. HE EXPRESSED OPINION THAT IN FINAL ANALYSIS OUR PROBLEMS COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED BY BI-LATERAL DISCUSSIONS BUT THAT OUR ALLIES WERE PREVENTING THIS. HE HAD NOTED WITH INTEREST THAT BRITISH SEEMED TO HAVE CHANGED POSITION AND NOW WOULD FAVOR BI-LATERAL SOVIET-US TALKS. HE REFERRED TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH RESTON (MYTEL 730) STATING HE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REACH AGREEMENT WHILE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND MR KHRUSHCHEV WERE IN OFFICE.

HE POINTED OUT WE DID NOT HAVE MUCH TIME SINCE WITHIN A YEAR OR SO THE US WOULD BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT THE NEXT ELECTION AND NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT WHEN NATO PLANS FOR ARMING EUROPE AND PARTICULARLY GERMANY WERE CARRIED OUT. HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC IN INDICATING WHAT SUBJECTS HE THOUGHT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD COVER BUT STRESSED PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO END THE COLD WAR. HE REALIZED THAT THE US PRESS WAS NOT CONTROLLED BUT MAINTAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD INFLUENCE THE PRESS AND PARTICULARLY FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS. HE THOUGHT THAT IN ANY EVENT OUR POLICY OF PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS WAS INEFFECTIVE AND NOT IN US BEST INTERESTS. HE WAS CLEARLY UNAWARE OF CURRENT VOICE OF AMERICA POLICY AND WHEN I EXPLAINED IT TO HIM HE SAID HE THOUGHT AN AGREEMENT IN THIS FIELD WOULD BE POSSIBLE AND REFERRED NOT ONLY TO KHRUSHCHEV'S CBS BROADCAST BUT ALSO THE FACT THAT FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME BBC BROADCASTS HAD NOT BEEN JAMMED.

IN REPLY TO ZHUKOV'S QUESTION AS TO WHAT HARM COULD COME FROM TOP LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS I EXPRESSED OUR VIEW THAT TALKS AT

611.61/12-2357

HE S

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SECRET

-2- 1131, DECEMBER 23, 1 PM FROM MOSCOW

THE TOP LEVEL THAT FAILED HARMED BOTH SIDES BY CREATING A FEELING OF HOPELESSNESS AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO HAVING A PROPER PREPARATION FOR ANY HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSIONS. IN MY OPINION THE BEST APPROACH WOULD BE TO RESOLVE ONE OR TWO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS SUCH AS DISARMAMENT. MAKING CLEAR I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY I SAID I SAW NO HOPE OF ANY SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE STATUS QUO PARTICULARLY SINCE THIS WOULD INVOLVE OUR AGREEMENT TO THE CONTINUED DIVISION OF GERMANY BUT I ALSO REFERRED TO SECRETARY DULLES' DALLAS SPEECH IN WHICH HE MADE CLEAR WE WERE NOT SEEKING ANY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. ZHUKOV APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION BUT MERELY REPEATED THAT THE FIRST STEP WAS TO CALL A HALT TO THE COLD WAR.

THOMPSON

DT

SECRET

NSC Registry (PF)


~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 67

NSC 5728

December 24, 1957

LA



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

84-127	DECLASSIFIED
Authority	NSC Ltr 5/6/85 84-1072
By	MJR NARA, Date 8/5/87

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC 5728

~~TOP SECRET~~

December 24, 1957

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

References: A. NSC Action No. 1260-b
B. NSC 5605
C. NSC Action No. 1838

The enclosed revised Directive on the subject, approved by the President on December 24, 1957, on the recommendation of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, concurred in by the Statutory Members of the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 1838), is transmitted herewith for the information of the Council, and is being referred to the members of the Subcommittee for appropriate implementation.

The enclosed approved Directive supersedes NSC 5605.

84-127

NSC 5728 8/6/85 84-1042
3/5/87
MIR

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security

NSC 5728

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DIRECTIVE

on

A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

1. Pursuant to the recommendations of the National Security Council in NSC Action No. 1260-b (November 4, 1954) and my subsequent approval thereof, I hereby establish the following permanent procedure (superseding NSC 5605) to provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental United States and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those net capabilities.
2. Each integrated evaluation should:
 - a. Cover all types of attack, overt or clandestine;
 - b. Include consideration of the several courses of action which the USSR is capable of executing; and
 - c. Take into account the estimated future status of approved military and non-military U. S. defense programs.
3. Each integrated evaluation report should estimate, from the practical standpoint, the extent and effect of direct injury, including radioactive fall-out, upon the continental United States, resulting from the most probable types and weights of attacks which the USSR is capable of delivering during the nuclear phase of a general war (i.e., the period during which the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile or means of delivery of nuclear weapons on the United States would be substantially expended). Military operations overseas should be considered only in so far as they (a) require a diversion of Soviet resources from attack on the continental United States, or (b) affect U. S. capabilities to execute the Bravo mission and consequently the Soviet capability to attack the continental United States. Each report should consider, in so far as damage to the USSR is concerned, the effects of U. S. attacks on the USSR which would affect their capability to damage the United States. In addition, a general estimate should be made of the over-all effects of the U. S. attacks against the USSR which would show the general order of magnitude of destruction, disruption of communications and government, and loss of life in the USSR. In arriving at this general estimate, it is not expected or anticipated that detailed analyses will be undertaken. An evaluation will be made annually, on the basis of one of the following assumptions in their successive order of listing, with the first being

submitted in calendar year 1958. On recommendation of the Subcommittee and subject to my approval, the order in which the assumptions are evaluated may be changed to meet the contingencies of the world situation.

a. An initial Soviet attack designed to achieve strategic surprise and delivered with no specific strategic warning, but with tactical warning intervals appropriate to means of delivery and target locations.

b. An initial Soviet attack preceded by the detection of Soviet preparations therefor (but without conclusive evidence of Soviet intentions) and by such consequent U. S. military and non-military preparations as would be feasible in the period of warning which this detection of Soviet preparations would provide.

c. Strategic warning of imminent Soviet attack sufficient to cause a national decision by the United States to launch a nuclear attack on the USSR prior to the launching of a Soviet attack against the continental United States.

4. Integrated evaluations should be submitted to the Council on or before November 15 of each year, and relate to the situation on a critical date normally about three years in the future. In addition to these annual integrated evaluations, an integrated evaluation should be submitted to the Council at such times as the Subcommittee feels that a change has become apparent that would significantly alter the net capabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury upon the continental United States.

5. In order to prepare these integrated evaluations I hereby establish a Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council, composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will serve as Chairman, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Each Subcommittee member shall be consulted regarding and given ample opportunity to review the following prior to adoption by the Subcommittee: (a) subsidiary terms of reference, (b) the assumptions to be used as a basis for each evaluation report, (c) the complete evaluation report (less background material, which shall be made available only on a "need-to-know" basis), and (d) any recommendations which the Subcommittee may choose to submit. If the Director of the Subcommittee Staff, after adoption of the evaluation report by the Subcommittee, has any

additional comments which he believes should be presented to the NSC, such comments may be submitted to the President, through the Chairman of the Subcommittee, for consideration. The Chairman of the Subcommittee, in consultation with the Director of the Subcommittee Staff, will prepare regulations and establish procedures for the handling of highly sensitive information* required in the preparation of an evaluation report so as to safeguard its security on a strict "need-to-know" basis and to preclude the assembly of an unwarranted amount of sensitive information in one document. Such regulations and procedures shall not be finally adopted until the other members of the Subcommittee have been consulted concerning them.

6. Subcommittee members are designated to act as individuals, but each shall have the right to consult, at his discretion and under appropriate security safeguards, with his agency or committee prior to Subcommittee action on matters normally within the cognizance of his committee or agency. In subscribing to the reports and recommendations of the Subcommittee the individual members shall not be expected to assume responsibility for technical matters or conclusions not normally within the cognizance of his own parent committee or agency. Reports as submitted to the Council should show, so far as possible by textual footnotes, any dissents by Subcommittee members.

7. The Subcommittee will have a Staff, composed of individuals assigned by member agencies, as required by the Director, and under the direction of a Director whom I shall designate. The Director may be compensated through the National Security Council from contributions by the member agencies. Individuals assigned to the Staff from each military service and by the Central Intelligence Agency should normally serve for two years and be so appointed that, to insure continuity, not more than fifty per cent will vacate each year.

8. The Net Evaluation Subcommittee hereby established is empowered under the terms of this Directive to call on any agency of the Government for relevant information, evaluations, and estimates, subject only to establishment of appropriate security regulations and procedures for the handling of highly sensitive information as provided under paragraph 5 above.

* Information such as that relating to war plans, new weapons and equipment, techniques and tactics for their employment, the vulnerability of U. S. defenses, and domestic and foreign intelligence sources and methods.

9. Distribution of each completed Subcommittee report will be determined at the time by me.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

REC'D
AGG. BY NSC STAFF 5/2/85 84-1022
By MIR MIRA, Date 3/7/87

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

6/2/93 list
60
of Mark
Trachtenberg

DATE: December 27, 1957
2 p.m.

SUBJECT: IRBM's for France

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary of State
Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles
Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague
C - Mr. Reinhardt
RA - Mr. Timmons

COPIES TO: RA
G S/S (2)
EUR S/AE
C (2)

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
 Retain class'n Change/classify to ____
 Declassify with concurrence of ____
 after ____
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by RTM Date: 3-4-96
Withdrawal No. _____

1-1103

Mr. Quarles referred to his luncheon in Paris with the French Minister of Defense and Mr. Sprague's meeting with a group of French officials which had been fully reported from Paris by telegram (Embtels 3075 and 3076). With reference to the French effort to tie this subject to other matters, such as their desire for atomic information, Mr. Quarles thought that it would be useful if we could be more forthcoming with the French, particularly in lending them some assistance in the field of testing of nuclear weapons. He said we had now agreed with the British that we would invite the French to our Nevada testing grounds and the British would invite them to Australia. There were probably other ways in which we could be more forthcoming.

It was the Secretary's view that we should proceed with drafting a State-Defense message to Paris, setting forth our ideas as to how the Embassy should proceed in this matter with the French and at the same time, we should start drafting the text of a bilateral agreement.

pr
C:GFRreinhardt:aa

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Mr. Quarles said he believed that following the test series "Hardtack" scheduled to begin next March, which was the most substantial series of tests ever undertaken, the U.S. could agree to a suspension of testing without losing any more than the Soviet Union, provided there was adequate inspection machinery. He said the JCS preferred that disarmament proposals be dealt with as a package and not be separated, but that they were restudying this question as well as the implications of a suspension of testing. Mr. Farley pointed out that we should continue to make the point that to stop testing was not really a disarmament measure. The Secretary agreed. The Secretary also recalled that we had in the past pressed proposals for the establishment of technical groups, as suggested by Mr. Quarles. The British had also pressed such proposals but the Soviet reaction had been strongly negative.

FR
C:GFRreinhardt:aa

SECRET

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