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MOLLET TALKS

February 1957

NATO Defense - Defense of Europe

Recommended U.S. Position

1. The NATO strategy agreed at the December Ministerial Meeting is the only sound one. It calls for both a nuclear retaliatory capability and also for shield forces capable of a "forward strategy" defense which could deal with incidents such as local hostile actions without necessarily using nuclear weapons.

2. A really effective shield is essential. Without such a shield we would invite local actions which could only be dealt with by all-out nuclear retaliation. Such inflexibility would gravely jeopardize NATO unity and the maintenance of the deterrent.

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3. In light thereof, while the U.K. force reductions are serious, they do not mean the beginning of the end of NATO defense, provided that the other NATO member nations do not succumb to domestic pressures to in turn reduce their forces. A snow-ball reaction must be avoided. We must create collective realization that shield forces must be maintained despite political pressures to follow the British action. Speedy completion of the German buildup is all the more important.

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4. We hope we can assume that in connection with the pending reorganization of France's forces, no reduction in fighting strength in connection with streamlining is involved. We assume France will work closely with SACEUR to this end.

5. We hope France can soon restore some of its forces from North Africa.

6. We fully realize the importance of U.S. forces in Europe. But our European allies must do their part in providing forces and equipment if collective defense and political solidarity are to be maintained.

nuclear

7. We attach much importance to the modernization of European NATO forces. The French Government has just been advised of the initial increment of advanced weapons tentatively allocated to France under the F.Y. 1957 Military Assistance Program. We expect to be able to respond shortly to a French request for equipment and technical data to assist the development of capacity for the manufacture of advanced weapons in France.



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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 28, 1957

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
 Mr. Ollenhauer, Chairman, German Social Democratic Party  
 Mr. Fritz Heine, Press Chief of Social Democratic Party  
 Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO:

S/S(2), EUR (2), G, I, IO, RA, WE, GEN, EE  
 Ambassador Bonn



1-1402

During his call on the President, Mr. Ollenhauer raised the question of German reunification and European security. He said that it is apparent that there can be no reunification of Germany without the agreement of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union is unwilling to contemplate a reunited Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He, as the leader of the Social Democratic Party in Germany, felt that it is entirely possible that present Soviet opposition to reunification can be overcome by an agreement "acceptable to both sides". He felt that it is most important to strive to reach such an agreement in order that Germany may develop normally. The President observed that the difficulty with this thesis is the fact that, while the Western powers would observe the terms of any such agreement, Soviet behavior has taught us that the Soviet Union would violate such an agreement whenever it might feel that it was to its advantage to do so. For this reason, the President said, we feel strongly that the Western Powers can only talk to the Soviet from a position of strength. For this reason also, NATO is an indispensable defense structure which enables us to deal confidently with Russia.

Mr. Ollenhauer said that the Social Democratic Party in Germany does not favor unilateral talks between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union on the subject of reunification. His party recognizes that Germany's very close connections with the West demand that any negotiation in this field be conducted with the Western Powers. He did not want the President to be in any doubt about this. The President said that Germany is one of the strongest of the European countries and that, since this is so, it is inconceivable that Germany can be a "neutral" country. While it would be most undesirable for Germany to

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By 3/10/82 NLE Date

DULLES-KESTER SERIES

Box 6, Dulles, John Foster  
Mar. 1957

Walter D. Eisenhower Papers 23  
 President of the United States  
 1953-61 (John Whitman File)

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CONFIDENTIAL

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revert to the militaristic policies of former years, it is important that it not remain unarmed and that it form a part of a peaceable but strong European defense structure. The President said further that the preservation of peace is the basis for our deep interest in the matter of European integration. The uniting of European countries can, he believed, assure the peace of the world. Mr. Ollenhauer agreed that it is impossible to contemplate a neutral Germany. He was in complete agreement with the President on the great importance of European unity and he felt that present efforts at integration should be carried further and include all European countries and not only six of them. The President felt that once the six have joined together in an European community other countries would be attracted to that nucleus. It is possible that such a community would exercise a peaceful influence on the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. He felt that the development of a real European community would be the greatest imaginable step forward.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 4, 1957

1691

SUBJECT: Developments in Eastern Europe.

U. S. Side

PARTICIPANTS:

The Secretary of State  
Deputy Under Secretary Murphy  
Senator George

Mr. Bowie

GERMAN Side

Mr. von Brentano, German Foreign Minister  
Dr. Krekeler, German Ambassador  
Professor Grewe, German Foreign Office  
Baron von Welck, German Foreign Office  
Mr. von Kessel, Minister, German Embassy

Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Timmons  
Mr. Reinstein  
Mr. Creel

Mr. Parker  
Mr. Sullivan (Defense)

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Senator George 7 S/P-Mr. Bowie 4 EE 11 GER (3) 8 12-19 Moscow 2  
G - Mr. Murphy 3 RA-Mr. Timmons 6 P 6 OLI (2) 22-23 Warsaw 28

MAR 22 1957

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Turning to the second item on the agenda, the Secretary asked Mr. von Brentano if he would like to speak on this item.

Brentano said this item was of particular interest to the Germans. They felt some concern that the Middle East crisis tended to push the Eastern European problem into the background. They felt it was most important for us to keep in mind at all times that the principal field in the East-West struggle lay in Eastern Europe.

Brentano said there were two related questions: (1) Do recent events in Eastern Europe compel us to make a change in our own policy toward the Soviet Union, and (2) Should we follow a uniform policy toward the Soviet Union and the various satellites, with particular reference to Hungary and Poland?

As for the Soviet Union Brentano felt that the effects of the Twentieth Party Congress and the de-Stalinization program were not yet clarified. The series of developments set in motion thereby were still going on. He was convinced, however, that no events had taken place which would justify us in deviating in any way from our present policy. Such changes as have taken place were merely in personages and he was convinced that there had been no change whatever in the basic political objectives of the Soviet Union. He cited in this connection the Soviet November 17 proposals and the Khrushchev interview with Alsop. He therefore considered it extremely dangerous, and he wished to be clear about this, to think now in terms of making concessions to the Soviet Union. He referred to various discussions now going on in certain quarters on the possibility of troop withdrawals, neutralization of Germany, establishment of a neutralized belt in Central Europe, etc. Brentano said that he wished to say frankly and firmly that, in the opinion of the Federal Government, any proposals along these lines would be extremely dangerous.

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Brentano then turned to the question of the satellites. In Hungary he said the people had been turned back by brutal oppression and there appeared little that could be done to reverse this. He felt, however, that for humanitarian reasons something should be done to assist the Hungarian people even though in the process we might grant some measure of relief to the Soviets.

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In Poland, Brentano said, the line of development was not clear. He was not optimistic that Gomulka could maintain his position. He urged that we develop and maintain a common policy toward Poland and coordinate the implementation of the agreed policy. Unilateral action would be highly undesirable. In response to a question from the Secretary, Brentano made it clear that the coordination he had in mind involved not just the United States and the Federal Republic but the entire free world.

Turning to the Soviet Zone of Germany Brentano referred to his conversation with the Secretary at Paris. He said that there was no immediate danger to a revolution there. The present stage of relative calm there was due primarily to the fact that the people still had hopes that developments in process would bring about German reunification and to their realization that any uprising would be immediately suppressed by the Soviets with brutal force as in Hungary. The principal danger would arise if there were a revolution in Poland which could spread to East Germany and produce another June 17. This was his great fear.

Here again, Brentano emphasized, it was important that we coordinate our policies. He cited as an example of this need a recent shipment from the United States of 87,000 tons of hard coal to the Soviet Zone via Hamburg. This created a difficult problem for the Federal Republic, which had been endeavoring to use the East Zone's need for hard coal as a political weapon in order to get some quid pro quo for any hard coal shipments. The Federal Republic has been giving substantial financial assistance to the hard-pressed Evangelical Church in East Germany. The East Zone regime had refused to permit this to continue unless it were supplied with hard coal by the Federal Republic and had arrested a man who was sent to the East Zone with 800,000 marks for the Evangelical Church. If the East Zone succeeded in getting hard coal from other sources the Federal Republic was deprived of a political weapon. Brentano asked the Secretary for his views on how we might best coordinate our policies on such matters.

In reply to these points the Secretary said he agreed entirely on what Brentano had said about the situation in the Soviet Union. Despite the developments set off by the Twentieth Party Congress he felt nothing had happened which justified any change in our policies toward the Soviet Union.

As for Hungary, he also agreed with Brentano's analysis and his concept that some humanitarian relief should be given to the Hungarian people even though that might involve some advantages to the Soviet Union. There was no point in protracting misery. If these relief measures could be administered in such a way that they could be identified as coming from the West, possibly the net balance would be in our own favor.

The Secretary said the situation in Poland was different. He believed that the Government of Poland wished to gain some measure of independence from the Soviet Union. It obviously did not wish to do anything which would provoke what had happened in Hungary and it was not in our interest to do so. Our view was that the gradual development of Polish independence should be promoted by peaceful evolution rather than by violent revolution as in Hungary.

The Secretary

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The Secretary referred to the fact that a Polish Trade Mission is now in Washington. He said that the talks were as yet in an exploratory stage and no decisions had been reached. We felt it useful that Poland not feel entirely dependent economically on the Soviet Union and that it have some assurance the Soviets cannot destroy it by economic measures. The process of gradual evolution can be promoted by cautious steps along this line. It would be very useful to give the Poles a taste of what it is like to get economic support from the West. This might also make the Soviets realize the unwisdom of putting too much pressure on the Poles. With regard to economic aid to Poland at this time we are not thinking of anything of great magnitude. The principal commodities in which the Poles have indicated interest are short-staple cotton, coal-mining machinery and wheat. We understand the Poles are also talking with the Canadians, the British and the French regarding the same commodities.

As for the matter of coordination of this problem, probably the best forum was the North Atlantic Council. We have already made a preliminary statement there and will make a further one after the situation has developed. It would be useful if other countries could also discuss in the Council what steps they are taking. The Secretary said that he did not think coordination should be carried on in a way in which nothing is done until it is fully coordinated. He believed that what Brentano had in mind on this was the kind of talk they were having at the moment. Brentano nodded assent.

As for the problem of coal shipments to East Germany, the Secretary thought the best place for coordinating the matter was in Bonn. He pointed out that COCOM controls were limited to strategic goods and that it was not so easy to control non-strategic items. He was sorry if the coal transaction had been embarrassing. While he was not sure we have the machinery to control this, we did recognize some primacy of interest on the part of the Federal Republic in the matter of trade with East Germany and we would try to work this problem out. Brentano said he thought this problem could be dealt with by the quadripartite Working Group in Bonn.

The Secretary asked Brentano whether any thought was being given to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland by the Federal Republic. Brentano said there were groups in the Federal Republic urging that this step be taken. However, the Federal Government had taken a basic position against this. It was the Government's policy not to recognize any government which recognized the German Democratic Republic. Only one exception had been made to this policy. That was in the case of the Soviet Union where it was felt the exception was justified because of the matter of repatriation of German war prisoners and because of the special responsibilities of the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany.

Brentano said he would be interested in the Secretary's views as to whether establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland would be a good idea or not. One aspect to be borne in mind is that such a step might amount to a "kiss of death" for Gomulka. Brentano had recommended in the Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee that no steps be taken at this time toward recognition of the Polish Government and this would continue to be the Federal Government's posture in the immediate future. At this time the Germans were thinking only in terms of limited economic assistance, without any overall trade agreement, in such commodities as grain. A figure of 200,000 tons was under discussion. It was conceivable that in the future trade missions could be

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aged which would have no political powers and would not involve diplomatic recognition. Any such step would be taken only in consultation with the other Powers.

The Secretary said that while this problem lay primarily within the competence of the Federal Republic, nevertheless since Brentano had asked his views on the establishment of diplomatic relations, he would consider it premature at the moment. He could see, if the evolutionary process should develop, that it might be helpful if it led to a discussion of the problem of the Polish-German frontier. The Soviet Union was in a position to bring pressure to bear on Poland by alleging that the frontiers would be changed to the disadvantage of Poland. This question had repercussions even in the United States, where there are substantial groups of Polish extraction. The time might come when it would be useful to do away with the fear that without Soviet support Poland would be dismembered. In any event he supposed it would probably not be fruitful to have this issue come to the fore before the coming elections in the Federal Republic. Brentano nodded assent.

It was agreed that in response to any inquiries from the press it would be said that the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had had a useful exchange of views on the Middle East and Eastern Europe and that the discussions would be continued the next day.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

MAR 14 1957



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles for the U.K.

1. At the NSC meeting on January 11, 1957, a presentation was made on our ballistic missiles programs which included a discussion of possible deployment of IRBM units in the United Kingdom. At that time, no decision was sought as to deployment. As indicated in Secretary Wilson's letter to you of January 28, the same presentation was later made the basis of discussion with Minister of Defense Sandys during the U.S.-U.K. defense talks of January 28-February 1, 1957. This presentation was based upon the THOR missile, but it was pointed out that our final selection might be the JUPITER, for which approximately the same factors would apply. While no promises or commitments of any sort were made or sought on either side, the British have indicated that they are receptive to the whole concept.

2. Having in mind the urgency attached to establishing an IRBM capability, it is believed that we should go forward with a program to establish an IRBM capability in the U.K. as soon as possible. Your meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan at Bermuda affords an excellent opportunity to finalize this program, if you decide this is desirable. The concept proposed raises major policy questions in two fields: I - IRBM Deployment, II - Availability of Nuclear Warheads to Allies including U.K. These policy questions are described below and certain recommendations are presented for your consideration.

I - IRBM Deployment

3. The proposed deployment discussed with Sandys including the "emergency capability" (Tab A) would place in the British Isles the entire presently planned IRBM operational inventory through June 1960 and would have placed it entirely in the hands of the United Kingdom by the end of 1960. This raises major strategic and political questions. The Department of Defense having carefully weighed all the strategic considerations, has concluded that the proposed deployment to the United Kingdom of the entire presently planned IRBM production through mid-1960 is the right course of action. The Department of State concurs, and the Department of Defense is studying what additional deployments of IRBMs should be undertaken in the U.K. and/or in other areas, both in the period through mid-1960, and in the period following 1960.

SecDef Cont. No. 15-344

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BY [signature]

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4. It now appears to the Departments of State and Defense to be undesirable and unnecessary for the United States Government to commit itself at the present time to put this IRBM capability entirely in British hands by the end of 1960. It is considered that the U.S. would have considerably less influence on the use of these weapons by the U.K. than if some part of the IRBM capability in the U.K. remained in U.S. hands. Further, the Continental NATO countries might view the turning over of the entire initial IRBM production to the British as part of a United States intention to establish the United Kingdom as an "independent" strategic nuclear power, and as an indication that both the United States and the United Kingdom, (which has just announced a major reduction in its NATO ground and air forces) are losing interest in the defense of Western Europe, the United Kingdom hoping to shelter behind the IRBM and the United States relying for its safety primarily on the IRBM. The Departments of State and Defense therefore recommend that if the IRBM proposal is to be put to the British Government it be reshaped so as to modify the original proposal that all four squadrons of IRBMs will be placed in British hands by the end of 1960. Instead, the British would be assured that two squadrons (30 missiles) will be transferred to them, with the remaining two squadrons to continue in United States hands, without prejudice to a decision at any time to transfer the two United States squadrons to British hands if such action should be mutually acceptable to the two governments. This will not cause any delay in bringing the IRBM capability into existence.

5. Specific political understandings should be reached between the United States and United Kingdom Governments as part of the over-all IRBM agreement as to the purposes for which the IRBMs transferred to the U.K. would be used. The British would be requested to affirm that:

a. The IRBMs to be transferred to them would be deployed only in the United Kingdom.

b. The IRBMs would be used only against the Communist bloc in case of general defensive war against the Soviet Union.

c. The use of IRBMs would be the subject of joint determination between the two governments.

d. Arrangements would be made for coordinating the selection of the targets against which IRBMs transferred to British hands would be used with over-all U.S.-U.K. target selection and coordination plans.





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i.e. The U.K. will give sympathetic and prompt consideration to any future requests by the United States to deploy additional IRBMs in the United Kingdom or other U.K.-controlled territory.

The foregoing understandings are deemed to be essential in order to insure that the missiles will be devoted to appropriate purposes, and to protect U.S. interests (bearing in mind that the transfer of IRBMs to the U.K. will arouse intense public, Congressional and foreign interest). These understandings should be acceptable to the United Kingdom.

## II - Availability of Nuclear Warheads to Allies including U.K.

6. Directly related to the IRBM problem is the question of availability of nuclear warheads to our Allies in case of hostilities. The U.K. is developing some military nuclear warhead capability, but it may be five years or more before they will have a nuclear capability for the IRBMs. The V-bombers of the Royal Air Force are compatible with U.S. strategic bombers and there is an arrangement that the United States would furnish atomic bombs to the U.K. in time of general war (Tabs B and C). The U.K. has been informed that if IRBMs are transferred to them, the warheads for the IRBMs will be stocked in U.S. custody under the same general conditions as atomic bombs are to be stocked (Tab D). Also, we are providing the U.K. with the CORPORAL missile, and the U.K. has asked us to make nuclear warheads available to them for the CORPORAL in case of hostilities. Arrangements are being worked out in accordance with the exchange of views expressed in Tab E, preparatory to a general understanding later on. If you should desire to do so, you could inform the British at Bermuda that we see no difficulties in working out such an understanding.

7. What we do with the United Kingdom with respect to making nuclear warheads available in case of hostilities affects our other NATO Allies. They will almost certainly learn of any US-UK arrangements and would resent being treated on a discriminatory basis with respect to weapons, such as the CORPORAL, designed for uses other than strategic bombardment, which NATO has agreed is primarily a US-UK responsibility. It is believed that under existing law the President has the authority to transfer nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs to our Allies in case of hostilities. The Departments of State and Defense believe the United States should tell the North Atlantic Council that the President is prepared to do so under certain circumstances and understandings, and that the necessary arrangements to stock nuclear components in U.S. custody will be undertaken as required.



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8. It is recommended:

a. That you approve the deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to the United Kingdom and the transfer of such missiles to British control, to the extent and on the basis set forth above, subject to our obtaining in advance the political understandings specified in paragraph 5 above.

b. That you authorize the necessary preparations for you to communicate this position to Prime Minister Macmillan at Bermuda next week, if you should decide to do so.

9. If you approve the above recommendations, appropriate steps will be taken to consult with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on these matters.

10. In view of the serious British foreign exchange position, IRBNs transferred to the U.K. would almost certainly have to be given to them on a grant aid basis. This would be done under the authority of the Mutual Security Program at a cost of approximately \$62 million for equipping and training two squadrons and we would plan to fund this in the U.S. fiscal years 1958 and 1959. It is our intention to inform the appropriate Congressional leaders on this point.



~~CHRISTIAN A. HERTER~~

Christian A. Herter  
Acting Secretary of State

SIGNED /

Charles E. Wilson  
Secretary of Defense

5. Incls.

1. Tab A - Memo on Deployment of IRBNs to UK w/Schedule
2. Tab B - Ltr dtd 30 Jan 57 Sandys to Wilson
3. Tab C - Ltr dtd 1 Feb 57 re atomic strikes Wilson to Sandys
4. Tab D - Ltr dtd 1 Feb 57 re IRBN Wilson to Sandys
5. Tab E - Memo re Atomic Warheads dtd 31 Jan 57 BJSM fr Adm Austin

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ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM OF U.S. - U.K. DISCUSSIONS

ON DEPLOYMENT OF U.S.-PRODUCED IRBMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The following paragraphs summarize a concept for a possible deployment of IRBMs in the United Kingdom which have been discussed between the British Delegation and the Department of Defense, without, of course, any commitment on either side, financial or otherwise. The present memorandum does not deal with political considerations, which are a subject for separate conversation.

A. Deployment Plans

- (1) In view of the importance of deploying a ballistic deterrent at the earliest possible date, the U.S. Defense authorities have outlined the concept of a crash program. This program would probably involve the use of contractors personnel, one experimental squadron of five missiles. If agreed to this would involve deployment at a United States aerodrome in the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible. If decisions are taken soon it is hoped that such a squadron could be deployed by July 1958. This part of the program would be fully paid for by the United States and would be wholly U.S. manned.
- (11) Four regular sites would be developed as rapidly as possible, the experimental squadron being disbanded as these become available. The first two would be constructed by the United States and manned initially by U.S. service personnel. They would hope to have these operational by 1959. In parallel, the United Kingdom would undertake construction of two further sites with a view to bringing them into operation with British personnel at the earliest possible date. The target is that



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these two additional sites plus the United Kingdom take-over of the other two sites would be achieved by December 1960.

(iii) The U.S. would be responsible financially for all material produced in the United States. This would cover:

- (a) The missiles.
- (b) Specialized equipment.
- (c) Spares required by the U.K. to maintain the missiles in an operational condition (subject to a cut-off date to be mutually agreed).

The remaining costs would be borne by the United Kingdom, to include:

- (a) General supporting equipment.
- (b) Cost of any additional land required, etc.

(iv) As regards training, the U.S. would be prepared to make available training facilities at a U.S. base for U.K. service personnel without charge. The U.K. would, however, be responsible for transport, messing charges, etc. Insofar as the U.K. requires missiles for use in training, the U.S. will provide those under (iii)(a) above.



#### B. Other Technical Considerations

(1) The U.S. intends to continue development of all major technical components in the IRBM, based on their program for the development of a larger missile. The U.S. also intends to continue the development of this model up to standardization at a range up to 2,200 statute miles.

(ii) The stage at which the weapon can be accepted as adequately developed for service use would be discussed and agreed between

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the appropriate U.K. and U.S. authorities.

- (iii) The U.S. authorities would use their best offices to promote such arrangements between the U.K. and U.S. firms as may be necessary to carry out the program.
- (iv) The safety conditions to govern deployment of these missiles on U.K. territory would be discussed between the U.K. and U.S. service authorities and would be subject to U.K. agreement.
- (v) The U.K. would be free to arrange for the missile to be fired on the Woomera Range in Australia if it so desires.



C. Warhead

References to the missile in this document do not include the warhead which will be dealt with separately.



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington

February 1, 1957

Dear Mr. Sandys:

There is enclosed a memorandum of US-UK discussions with respect to the possible deployment of US-produced IRBMs in the United Kingdom. You will observe that references to warheads for such missiles are specifically excluded from this memorandum. The purpose is, of course, to protect the vital and sensitive nature of arrangements with respect to warheads.

Reference is made to General Twining's letter to Air Chief Marshal Boyle of 12 December, your letter to me of 30 January and my letter to you of 1 February, all concerning themselves with measures to furnish the Royal Air Force with U.S. atomic weapons in the event of general war. While, of course, no decision has been reached with respect to the matters summarized in the enclosed memorandum, I am able to indicate to you that should such deployment be agreed upon and become effective, the U.S. will make available nuclear warheads for the IRBM generally under the same terms and conditions as described in the terms of reference which General Twining sent to Air Chief Marshal Boyle.

I should repeat that the same legislative and constitutional considerations apply in this case as described in my letter to you of 1 February.

Sincerely,

/s/ C. E. WILSON



The Right Honorable Duncan Sandys  
Minister of Defense of Great Britain

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
to the  
BERMUDA MEETING  
March 21-23, 1957

USDel/MC/4

30

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 21, 1957

Time: 3:45 p.m.

Place: Mid-Ocean Club

Participants:

United States

The President  
Secretary Dulles  
Ambassador Whitney  
Senator George  
Mr. Hagerty  
General Goodpaster  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Phleger  
Mr. Rountree  
Mr. Morris  
Mr. Timmons  
Mr. Wilkins  
Mr. Macomber



United Kingdom

The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister  
Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary  
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador to the U.S.  
Rt. Hon. Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to Cabinet  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Permanent Under-Secretary  
Foreign Office  
Mr. P. H. Dean, Deputy Under Secretary, FonOff  
Mr. Harold Beeley, Assistant Under-Secretary, FonOff  
Mr. C. P. Hope, FonOff, Press Director  
Mr. F. A. Bishop, Personal Asst. to PM  
C.O.I. Ramsden, Personal Asst. to PM  
D. S. Laskey, Personal Asst. to Foreign Secretary  
Mr. J. A. N. Graham, Personal Asst. to Foreign Secretary

Subject: Thursday Afternoon Session, March 21,  
1957, Bermuda Conference

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Defense (Wilson), ICA (Hollister), Treasury (Rumphrey),  
ODM (Gray), CIA (Dulles), Cairo (Hare), Athens (Allen),  
London (Whitney), Ankara (Warren)

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Agency Case NSC F-88-876  
NLE Case 88-114#2  
By AWP NLE Date 7/18/91

AWP / Ent 11 / 3 / Macmillan Visit March 20-22 1957  
Bermuda Conf. Mar 20-24 1957 (2)

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The Prime Minister opened the session at 3:45 P.M. with the discussion of Palestine. The Prime Minister referred to the Joint US-UK working level paper, prepared before the Conference, the general conclusion of which was to the effect that there is not much present hope of an over-all Palestine solution, and we must therefore concentrate on individual aspects as they arise.



Selwyn Lloyd mentioned that a number of problems would have to be settled such as frontiers, waters, etc., but these could only be solved and an overall solution obtained, if peace were maintained meanwhile. The British believed the UNEF should be continued for the time being.

The Secretary referred to his statement of August 1955 with which Eden had concurred, as presenting the basic US position. He mentioned that the British had been informed of the Four Power memorandum which King Saud had brought to the US, which had struck us as a reasonably moderate statement since it did not take the point of view that Israel could not exist.

The Prime Minister commented that this point was certainly important.

The President concurred, adding that King Saud had taken that position while in Washington.

The Prime Minister asked about the views on this issue of the other Arab States.

Selwyn Lloyd replied that, while privately many of them would probably agree that Israel was here to stay, they could

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not say this publicly. The best we could hope for right now was the maintenance of peace and the gradual development of conditions which could eventually permit a real Palestine solution.



The discussion on Palestine was closed by approval being given to the working level paper.

The Foreign Secretary opened the discussion on the General Question of Anglo-American Cooperation in the Middle East, the next agenda item. He expressed the view that there had been an underlying improvement recently in the Middle East situation despite the emergence of certain immediate issues, such as Gaza and Aqaba. This underlying improvement following the military operation was characterized by three factors: (1) The Israelis no longer behave like "cornered rats" but appear more relaxed and confident; (2) the "bubble" of Egypt's military power had been cracked, at least in the view of the other Middle East Arab leaders; and (3) the UNEF is there "on the ground". Lloyd also mentioned that the Baghdad Pact had stood up rather well in the face of recent developments. He then emphasized the great importance of holding the Persian Gulf with its oil. Egyptian penetration had not yet progressed very far in this area. Present systems of control are still pretty effective. On the other hand what would we do if there should be a coup d'etat in Kuwait? There are currents underneath the surface and such a thing could happen.

The President asked what forces the British have in Kuwait.

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Selwyn Lloyd replied that there are really none, only some local units of rather doubtful value. They might be confronted suddenly with a new and dangerous situation in Kuwait, and would have to take action at once in this extremely important area.

The President asked what the British thought of King Saud.

In reply, the Foreign Secretary agreed that an effort should certainly be made to detach Saudi Arabia from Egypt, though the British consider that the situation in that country is "brittle", even though Saud is clearly the best man for us to back.

The President emphasized that with the new American Joint Resolution, we wish to help in these areas and capture the initiative. But, he pointed out, in King Saud's recent discussions in Washington, the latter kept mentioning Buraimi. It is therefore evident that King Saud wants the British to pay a reasonable price and settle this issue.

Selwyn Lloyd pointed out that the difficulty is that Buraimi does not belong to Britain but to two local rulers.

The President asked if the British would make arrangements with the Saudis which would result in better relations.

Selwyn Lloyd replied that the trouble is that this is just about as difficult as solving the Kashmir issue.

The President added that, King Saud had in his Washington talks placed greatest emphasis on the question of pilgrims

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in the context of the Straits of Aqaba and on the Buraimi problem. The President also read out a telegram which he had just been shown, containing a request from the Saudi Arabians that the U.S. draw attention, at the Bermuda Conference, to the importance of the Buraimi issue.

Selwyn Lloyd asked whether the United States would be prepared to guarantee frontiers resulting from a solution of this problem.

In reply, the President pointed out, "shooting from the hip" (as he expressed it), that the U.S. hoped to use its aid program to promote stability in this general area, for example by indicating that no aid would be given to aggressors. We also might be willing as appropriate to come to the assistance of a victim of aggression.

Selwyn Lloyd said the trouble is that aggression in this area is not usually open, since other methods are used.

The President then asked whether the British felt from their experience that one can trust the word of a responsible Arab leader, indicating that he was inclined, following his recent discussion with King Saud, to believe the latter's promises to him.

Selwyn Lloyd replied that the British were also inclined to regard Saud as a man of honor, .....

.....

The Secretary pointed out that information the U.S. had

received ..... indicated that on his trip homeward, King Saud had stuck closely to the promises he had made to the President. Although King Saud had not been able to swing the other Arab leaders to his views in the 4-Power meeting in Cairo, it seemed clear that he had tried hard.

.....

The Secretary agreed that there was not a very solid base in Saudi Arabia, which is essentially a one-man regime, but emphasized that solid situations are not generally found in this area, and we must do our best with what we have to work with. He added that Nasser's prestige seemed to be descending, and we should try and promote King Saud as a rival Arab leader, the main trouble being the Buraimi issue. Thus, if the UK could find a solution to this problem, we might promote an evolution in this area which could eventually help sidetrack Nasser.

Prime Minister Macmillan said the difficulty is how to get a solution to the Buraimi problem without betraying Britain's friends.

Selwyn Lloyd mentioned that in the prior discussion, the British had been stressing the importance of a number of issues including the Baghdad Pact; holding the Persian

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Gulf; a better regime in Syria; and economic aid. He asked about this latter issue in terms of the U.S. action.

The President replied that a new U.S. aid program for the Middle East had not yet been adopted by the Congress.



The Secretary explained that the Joint Resolution had appropriated no additional money, but only given greater flexibility to the use of \$200 million already appropriated. Ambassador Richards had no spectacular plans for aid on his present trip, and the future program would depend more on additional funds to be asked of the Congress. The primary purpose of the Richards Mission was rather to indicate a greater U.S. interest in this area.

Selwyn Lloyd next mentioned the recent British decision to withdraw their troops from Libya, even though they still agreed it was important to keep King Idris on the throne. It was important to establish a common US-UK policy here.

The President asked how many troops the British would still maintain in Libya.

Selwyn Lloyd replied that the Foreign Office wished to keep one battalion, but the War Office claimed they could not find even this number of troops for this purpose.

The President emphasized that the U.S. was most anxious for close prior consultation with the British regarding such matters as aid and the stationing of troops in this general area. He emphasized the great importance of close US-UK

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liaison in this general field.

The Prime Minister and President agreed that the Foreign Ministers had full authority to go ahead with such close consultation.

The discussion then returned to the problem of Kuwait, and the Secretary asked what could be done if things went bad there.

Selwyn Lloyd pointed out the great importance that no word should leak to the press regarding the discussion of Kuwait. The President agreed, asking how many troops were needed to maintain stability in Kuwait. Would a battalion, as in Libya, be sufficient?

Selwyn Lloyd pointed out that possibly not very many troops were needed.

The President suggested that if Kuwait were so important, shouldn't we try to make this our main objective and subordinate other issues to it (thus implying a solution of the Buraimi problem.)

The Prime Minister pointed out that it was hard to imagine just what might happen in this general area in a few years, by which time the oil there would become even more important and valuable.

The President agreed that Middle East oil would certainly be very valuable for many years, adding that right beside the particular rich areas in which this oil was located, we found other areas of great poverty.

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The Prime Minister indicated that it was important to develop guarantees by the United States to maintain security and peace in this general area.



Selwyn Lloyd mentioned Aden as a specific case, an important Free World outpost, with a refinery, etc., which was now being menaced by the Soviets through assistance to Yemen, with additional help from Saudi Arabia.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the lesson from all this talk was the need for a detailed study of the area, including which parts of it are important and what might possibly be of lesser importance.

The President pointed out that such a study was certainly needed and should be tackled just like a "plan of battle."

The Secretary pointed out that one difficulty was that the US and the UK each attached a different magnitude of importance to particular problems, such as Aden and Buraimi. The problem was therefore one of trying to develop joint views. The US would now certainly be more involved in this general area than before, as a result of recent developments, and there was therefore a much greater need for close coordination.

The Prime Minister suggested that if we could only work out common objectives regarding this area, joint plans could then be developed, in the same way as were done so well during World War II. Despite recent events, he felt that the UK still had an important role to play in the Middle East.

The President replied that he wished to assure the British that the US wants if anything to build them up again in the Middle East.

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The Prime Minister then inquired as to how we should go about this joint study.

The President suggested the appropriate State Department official, presumably the Assistant Secretary for NEA, should get together with his British counterpart.

The Secretary asked whether such a joint study should be linked primarily to oil.

It was agreed that this would be the case.

The President suggested, and it was agreed, that a US-UK paper would be drawn up before the conference ends on the task and just how it should be tackled.

The question of Cyprus was discussed next. Selwyn Lloyd began by stating that the British welcomed Ismay's initiative, but unfortunately the Greeks turned it down although their reply may not be final. He believed that the Turks would accept Ismay's initiative, and mentioned the other details of the British statement on Cyprus just made in London.

The President said that he had received many representations from various sources emphasizing that if Makarios were returned to Cyprus, real progress toward a solution of the present problem could start.

Selwyn Lloyd replied that Makarios had been the origin and foundation of terrorism in Cyprus, that there were now indications that this terrorism was failing, and that not all

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Cypriots are prepared to accept Makarios as their spokesman. The British think that terrorism is much weaker now than before, and that the populace of Cyprus is getting fed up with it. Lloyd added that the British believe that the Turks take Cyprus very seriously and would be unwilling to let Greece have this island, which is so close to their coast. The British therefore regard themselves as a sort of "trustee".

The Prime Minister confirmed that the British are not greatly interested in Cyprus except for the military importance of the island, a factor which is changing and probably now less than before. Were it not for the Turks, the British probably would have gone much further by now toward a solution. Macmillan also emphasized that he is not without hope that Makarios may accept the latest British offer.

The President inquired about partition as a possibility, and whether this idea would be accepted in the island and by Turkey and Greece.

The Prime Minister suggested that partition may in fact be feasible, particularly if the 100,000 Turks in Cyprus were concentrated on the one side of the island (facing Turkey) and the 400,000 Greeks on the other.

Selwyn Lloyd pointed out that this was not a tidy solution at all, but Cyprus has become a serious ulcer which must be cured. The Greeks would not accept partition, because they want the whole Island.

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The Prime Minister and President agreed that the military importance of Cyprus today has become rather less, though it was still useful to have a base there.

The Prime Minister urged that the US should try and influence the Greeks to accept Ismay's initiative.

The President indicated that he would certainly be willing to consider doing this, and urged the British to free Makarios. In any case, he added, the US believes what the British leaders have just said about their real aims regarding Cyprus, is sympathetic with the British problem in Cyprus, and would certainly do its best to try and help.

The agenda for Friday was then discussed, and it was agreed that the Foreign Ministers would in the morning tackle all European questions other than those related to Defense, plus China and East-West trade, and in the afternoon session the President and Prime Minister would discuss the various items related to Defense, together with any points still outstanding from the morning's session.

The Prime Minister and President then considered and approved the report of the working party on Suez (reference SECTO 7 ), and also agreed that great care should be taken that there be no publicity at all regarding this matter or the despatch of the British message to Hammarskjold in Cairo.

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Finally, it was agreed that the press would be given the following brief communique on this afternoon's session:

"The President and Prime Minister continued the discussion of their common problems in the Middle East. The Foreign Ministers will meet at 10:30 a.m. Friday and will be joined later by the President and Prime Minister."

The session terminated at 5:30 a.m.



Cleared in draft:  
NEA: Mr. Rountree

USDel/Ber/BHMorris

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7/21/57  
DDE/acw

BERMUDA CONFERENCE

March 21, 1957.

The principals attending the meetings today were the President, Prime Minister Macmillan, Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd.

Each side was represented at the table by three other individuals and a few staff officers were behind this delegation.

I. The meeting was by far the most successful international meeting that I have attended since the close of World War II. This had three causes:

(a). The pressing importance of the problems discussed and the need for reaching some kind of definite answer rather than merely referring the problems to a study group, as is so often done in international conferences;

(b). The atmosphere of frankness and confidence that was noticeable throughout the day; this possibly resulted, in part, from the fact that Harold Macmillan and I are old wartime comrades and friends of long standing;

(c). The obvious fact that each side was well informed on the several subjects taken up. Consequently conversations were far more definite and to the point than is normally the case when generalizations and protestations of good will take the place of

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By DJH NLE Date 8/12/91

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RWF/DDE Diary 122/March 1957 diary

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informative exchanges.

II. We discussed all phases of the Mid East problem and it was apparent that there was a very large measure of agreement on most of the matters that have filled the pages of the public press for the past many weeks. Some of the items that came in for very special and searching investigation were:

A. The question of our future relationships with Nasser and a satisfactory arrangement for the future use of the Suez Canal.

Here, very early in the conversation, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Lloyd, delivered a tirade against Nasser, saying that he was not only an evil, unpredictable and untrustworthy man, but was ambitious to become a second Mussolini. He thought also that in pursuing his ambitions he would probably, just as Mussolini became the stooge of Hitler, become the stooge of the Kremlin.

This was followed up by a presentation by the British of the need for obtaining promptly a satisfactory arrangement for the use of the Canal. They felt the matter of tolls was probably the most important single consideration in such an agreement. They were quite clear that if we should fail to get a satisfactory arrangement, we should not later dodge the issue and pretend that it was at least a half-victory and one with which we could live.

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Rather, they believe we should under these conditions denounce the whole affair, including the intransigence of the British government. But they re-emphasized their need both economically and politically for obtaining a truly satisfactory agreement and this very quickly.

I immediately pointed out to them the inconsistencies in their approach to these two problems. If we were at this moment to begin an attack on Nasser (and we admit that he is far from an admirable character) and do everything in our power overtly and covertly to get rid of him, then the hope of getting an early and satisfactory settlement on the Canal would be completely futile.

They quickly saw the point of this and while earnestly retaining the hope that Nasser would come to some bad end, quickly agreed that we should first stick with the task of getting a satisfactory agreement on the Canal operation.

B. Gaza and Aqaba. We found ourselves largely in agreement on these two subjects and the consensus was that we must do our best to prevent extreme action by either side in the region. We believe that if we can have a period of tranquility during which time these two regions will be

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largely under the control of the United Nations, that we can probably work out satisfactory answers.

C. The question came up of maintaining oil production in the Mid East and satisfactory access to it through pipe lines and otherwise. This subject again brought out some very plain talk and I think much was done to clarify our thinking.

Harold Macmillan pointed out that Kuwait was really the key to a satisfactory answer. This is for the reason that even in a region where many areas are great producers of oil, Kuwait is by far the greatest of these and in itself can produce oil enough for all Western Europe for years to come.

Along with this fact was brought up the British difficulties in Burami involving the Arabs, and difficulties in Aden, Jordan, Egypt and Syria.

To each of these difficulties the British had certain proposals to make.

On our side we pointed out that so many different considerations apply in each of these problems that the only

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logical approach was to take our principal purpose or objective and subordinate all other purposes to a successful solution of this principal one.

This principal purpose is, of course, that of retaining access to Kuwait and an adequate flow of oil therefrom, for one of the requirements for success in this is to achieve better better relationships with the surrounding areas, the principal one of which would be Arabia. Yet the second important purpose mentioned by the British involves Burami, an object of bitter dispute between the British and the Arabians. I pointed out that the pursuit of both of these objectives simultaneously could very well endanger attainment of the important one. They had a number of reasons -- all of which they felt were unselfish -- for retaining their hold upon Burami, but I am sure that as a result of the conversation they are going to take a second look at their activities in the region and try to establish priorities that will keep first things first.

D. We agreed to put off discussion of the Baghdad Pact for a day or so. This was because of our own commitment to keep confidential our plans in this connection for a few days.

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E. The British mentioned the existence of a secret Egyptian plot for executing a coup to dispose of Nasser. They apparently thought we knew a great deal about it and wanted us to make some public statement against Nasser in the hope that this would encourage the dissident Egyptians. Manifestly anything the British said against Nasser would only make him stronger in the area.

This was a matter on which neither the Secretary nor I had any worthwhile information, but during the day we secured an evaluation from Washington. Our appraisal was that the dissidents didn't stand much chance. Again we brought out that if the United States had to carry the burden for the Western world of negotiations with Nasser for a Canal settlement, we had better keep our mouths shut so far as criticism of him was concerned, at least for the moment.

III. The Prime Minister outlined the major factors in the whole Cyprus problem. They are quite complicated and he asserts that Britain wants nothing more to do with the island except to keep

its base there, but any action that the British can suggest up to this moment antagonizes either the Greeks or the Turks. The British believe that the antagonisms that would be created by dropping the British responsibility in the island might even lead to war between the Turks and the Greeks.

I told them that I had certain important messages, particularly from the Greeks, asking me to urge upon Macmillan the importance of freeing Archbishop Makarios. I told them that in my opinion I didn't believe they were gaining much by keeping him prisoner, so I would just turn him loose on the world. At the very least this would prove to the world that the British were trying to reach a solution to this problem. My impression is that they are probably going to turn him loose, but subject only to his agreement not to go back to Cyprus and to abjure violence.

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3/22/57

UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
to the  
BERMUDA MEETING  
March 21-23, 1957

21

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 22, 1957

Time: 3:20 P.M.

Place: President's Quarters  
Mid-Ocean Club  
Bermuda

Participants:



United States

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Deputy Secretary of  
Defense Robertson  
Secretary of the Air  
Force Quarles  
Admiral Strauss, Special  
Assistant to the President  
for Atomic Energy Affairs  
Deputy Under Secretary of  
State Murphy  
General Goodpastor, White  
House Staff Secretary  
Mr. Timmons, Director, EUR/RA,  
State Department

United Kingdom

The Prime Minister  
The Foreign Secretary  
Sir Norman Brooke, Secretary to  
the Cabinet  
Sir Richard Powell, Permanent  
Secretary, Ministry of Defense  
Mr. P. H. Dean, Deputy Under  
Secretary, Foreign Office

Subjects: Wilson-Sandys talks;  
Possible declaration on  
limitation of nuclear  
testing.

Copies to: G, W, S/P, C, EUR, S/AE, P, U/MSA, ECA (Hollister), London,  
Defense (Wilson), Treasury (Humphrey), NSC (Strauss).

After a luncheon given by the President and attended by the U.S. side,  
the President invited Mr. Macmillan to call on him. Mr. Macmillan arrived  
at 3:20 p.m., accompanied by the above indicated advisers.

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Agency Case	88-114#3
NIE CDD	7/18/91
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The President indicated to the Prime Minister that he wished to discuss the question of guided missiles. He informed the Prime Minister that the U.S. was agreeable in principle to working out arrangements to make available to the U.K. certain intermediate range ballistic missiles. He emphasized that this decision related only to the principle of making these missiles available; all of the specific arrangements that would be required to implement this decision in principle would have to be worked out later and agreed upon.

The President emphasized that with respect to these arrangements the U.S. does not at this time know just what it will be able to do in this matter. Congress must be apprised. For all these reasons it would not be possible to decide upon or announce any details of the arrangements.

The President went on to speak of the uncertainties affecting the IRBM program. He said we do not yet know whether the missile will in fact become operational. There was also the possibility that a better piece of equipment would become available in the future. For all these reasons, the President continued, he did not wish at this time to work out any fixed or rigid arrangements on the IRBM between the U.S. and U.K. Governments or between the U.S. Government and Congress. The President reiterated that all that could be done now was to approve the idea in principle, in the interest of greater mutual efficiency and economy. He indicated his desire that any public reference to this matter merely speak in terms of guided missiles and not refer specifically to the IRBM.

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The President said that one concept of deployment had been discussed with U.K. Defense Minister Sandys when the latter had been in Washington in January last. This concept of deployment had spoken of the possibility that four squadrons of IREMs would be transferred to British hands by December 1960. Another concept of deployment about which the U.S. Government was thinking would provide that two squadrons of IREMs deployed in the U.K. would remain in U.S. hands and two squadrons of IREMs would be transferred to British hands. The President pointed out that there was a possibility that after the first missiles had been deployed to the U.K., the U.S. might wish to withdraw them and replace them with improved models. The President repeated that he believed all that could be said on this subject in the final communique to come out of this conference would be that the U.S. had agreed to make available to the U.K. certain guided missiles under arrangements to be worked out, in the interest of mutual economy and mutual security.

The Prime Minister said that he welcomed the statement that had just been made by the President. Mr. Macmillan went on to say that as he saw it there were two things that now had to be put down on paper. One was what could be said publicly in the final communique, and the second was what had been agreed as a result of this discussion. The latter could be put down in the form of a secret minute. The Prime Minister stressed that it was important to be clear on just what had been agreed, in order that the British might get on with their defense planning. He then repeated

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that the first step was to agree upon an eventual public statement, and then to get on with working out the details of the arrangements the President had referred to.

The President then referred to the question of nuclear warheads for IRBM. He noted that Mr. Macmillan had earlier spoken of the fact that the United States would "keep the key to the cupboard", meaning that United States nuclear warheads for any IRBMs made available to the United Kingdom would of course remain in full U.S. custody, as is required by U.S. law.

The President and the Secretary of State noted that the IRBMs to be made available to the British might be provided on a "lend-lease" basis, or perhaps financed with part of the available Plan K funds. The President also noted that one of the questions that had been discussed with Mr. Sandys was the application of Plan K funds to the purchase of Corporal missiles in the United States.

Mr. Macmillan said that as he saw the arrangements that would have to be worked out, they looked something like this: Four sites would be required for the four squadrons to be deployed in the U.K. The U.K. would finance the preparation of the bases. The warheads would remain in U.S. custody. The missiles, which are quite separate from the warheads, would be provided to the U.K. under Plan K financing or on some other basis. The Prime Minister went on to say that the U.K. needs as soon as possible some picture of the timing of the deployment envisioned by the United States.



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The President said that we must be careful in any estimates that are made of the timing of deployment. The Defense Department has taken precautions against delays in development by approaching the development of key items of the missile in two or more alternative ways. In spite of this "built-in insurance", the Defense Department could not of course yet guarantee that the missile would work.

Mr. Macmillan said that he understood perfectly that the missile is in the development stage.

The President noted that the next test of the IREM would take place in the next two or three weeks.

Mr. Quarles noted that with respect to the anticipated timing of deployment, as the President had said these were dates fixed by scientists and research people. However, the present timing estimates show that a handful of IREMs, say 5 to 7, would be deployed in the U.K. by July 1958. The first full squadron of 15 missiles would be deployed in the U.K. by July 1959, and the 4 complete squadrons would be in place by July 1960.

The Prime Minister said that information on the progress being made on the IREM would be of great help to the United Kingdom from the standpoint of two broad decisions which the U.K. must take. If the IREM will actually work, the U.K. would be inclined to knock out its development program for its own missile, except for a few million pounds a year on continuing research. This would enable the funds now being put into the U.K.'s comparable missile to be transferred into some other defense area.

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The President replied that the U.S. intends to go forward with the ICBM but that the U.S. was not in a position to firm up any further decisions on the ICBM today.



The Prime Minister then said that the second broad decision confronting the U.K. was what to do about the development of the bomber that would succeed the present bomber in service, i. e. the "Super V" bomber. The Prime Minister added that if the U.S. ICBM "proves out", he would be inclined to depend on missiles. He would need to know as soon as possible what the prospects are that the U.S. missile will work.

The President said that in his personal opinion the U.K. should keep on putting some money into bombers. The President then said that if there should be a war in which general reliance was placed on missiles of the ICBM and ICBM type, this could mean the end of civilization. The prospect that such missiles might be used might help to bring closer the possibility of real disarmament negotiations with the Soviets.

Mr. Macmillan then turned to the question of the Corporal missile. The President said that as he understood it the question of the Corporals was settled. He asked Mr. Robertson to comment. Mr. Robertson said that it was agreed that the financing of U.K. purchases of Corporals in the United States would be worked out, utilizing approximately 30 million dollars of Plan K funds. Mr. Robertson said that we were in a position to confirm this to the British. Mr. Robertson also referred to the question of nuclear warheads for Corporals. Admiral Austin, Director of the Joint Staff of the United States Chiefs of Staff, had addressed a memorandum on January 31, 1957 to

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the Commander of the British Army Staff, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, outlining the lines of an agreement whereby the U.S. would stockpile in U.S. custody nuclear warheads for Corporals near the British Corporal units. The U.S. was prepared to go forward and work out an agreement along the lines of Admiral Austin's memorandum. Mr. Macmillan inquired of Mr. Robertson whether the use of approximately 30 million dollars of Plan K funds for Corporals had been cleared with the Congress. Mr. Robertson replied that it had been.

The President said there was one other point stemming from the Wilson-Sandys talk which he wished to mention. The United States Air Force has one fighter wing, consisting of three squadrons, stationed in the U.K. This wing is equipped with F-86-D aircraft. It had been proposed that U.S. Air Force turn over the aircraft and equipment to the Royal Air Force, which would then assume the mission of the wing, and the U.S. personnel would be withdrawn. The President said that this matter had been broached with Mr. Sandys when the latter was in Washington in January.

The Prime Minister said he had heard of the matter "vaguely" from Mr. Sandys. He said that he understood there was some difficulty on the U.K. side, and asked Sir Richard Powell to comment.

Sir Richard Powell said that he thought the proposal was "not really worth it" from the U.K. side. The British were not interested in taking over F-86-D aircraft. If the wing could be equipped with newer aircraft, then they would be interested.

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The Prime Minister suggested that Mr. Patrick Dean and Sir Richard Powell might serve as the British members of a drafting group to prepare minutes of this conversation which could be agreed to by both sides. The President said that Mr. Robertson, Mr. Quarles and Mr. Murphy would be the U.S. members.

Turning to another subject, the President said that Admiral Strauss had come up with an idea bearing on the problem of testing hydrogen and atomic weapons that might be incorporated in the final Bermuda communique. The general idea would be to have a declaration saying our two Governments had agreed not to test nuclear weapons beyond the point of safety. The President suggested that this idea be looked at in order to see if it were useful.

The Prime Minister said that he was receiving questions every week on matter of limiting nuclear test explosions. Some of his critics were of course naive but underneath it all there was a strong feeling in Britain that nuclear tests should in some way be limited.

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Admiral Strauss said that the idea the President had referred to had been embodied in a draft paper, to the effect that the two Governments would not test to a point which would endanger life. The declaration might also indicate that the U.S. and U.K. were willing to register tests in advance with the UN and also to have limited international observation on a reciprocal basis.

The President said that any such statement should make it clear that the U.S. and U.K. tests would remain far below the amount of radiation which would be dangerous.

The Prime Minister stressed again that this matter of nuclear test limitation was an important domestic political issue in the U.K., and that the declaration referred to by the President and Admiral Strauss might well be very useful. Admiral Strauss then proceeded to read the draft that had been prepared on the U.S. side. The President again emphasized the need for saying something which was quite positive, to the effect that not only would we stay below the safety limit but that we might take some still lower figure and then say that we will remain well below such lower figure. Admiral Strauss said that one difficulty with fixing precise figure was that no reports on the effects of radiation have fixed a precise danger point.

Mr. Macmillan inquired of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd as to his estimate of what the Soviets might propose with respect to nuclear test limitation.

Mr. Lloyd hazarded the guess that the Soviets might come out for complete

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prohibition. The Prime Minister wondered where this whole matter was going. He observed that the U.K. was going to have a test shortly. Would this stimulate other countries to go in for the manufacture and testing of atomic weapons?

The President referred to the "Fourth Country" problem and the danger that atomic weapons might come into the hands of irresponsible countries.

The Secretary of State said that if the Soviets would accept our disarmament proposal on the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes, this could put a stop to the nuclear race.

Mr. Macmillan inquired whether the U.S. and U.K. could protect themselves against clandestine Soviet testing. Mr. Quarles said that he doubted that there could be any assurance that we could protect ourselves against this possibility. Sir Richard Powell thought that Soviet "cheating" could not be detected in a range of about 5%. We of course know that the Soviets have a sizeable stock of nuclear weapons. The possibility of "fourth countries" developing atomic weapons is the real problem.

The Prime Minister said that any announcement on this question should strike the world as an indication that the U.S. and U.K. are looking in the direction of limiting nuclear tests, and should not convey the impression that we are planning to go on indefinitely with tests. The President agreed that this was an important consideration. He said we should stress that we are voluntarily imposing on ourselves a limitation, yet we must maintain sufficient latitude to continue necessary tests.

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The Secretary of State inquired of Admiral Strauss where is the danger line to be drawn as regards the effect of radiation on the human body. Admiral Strauss said that the increase in radiation resulting from tests up to the present time had not been an important factor. Scientists estimate that during an average man's life he receives 4 roentgens of radiation from cosmic radiation and from the soil. He receives 3 additional roentgens from normal X-rays, medical, dental, etc. From all tests to date, and if tests were to continue at the present rate, he would receive one-tenth of one roentgen from this source.

It was agreed that Admiral Strauss would work with Mr. Dean of the British delegation and see what could be developed out of the nuclear test limitation idea which Admiral Strauss had advanced. The discussion ended at 4:10 p.m.



(NOTE: As a result of this meeting, three memoranda of conversation were prepared, one of which was sent to Selwyn Lloyd and two of which were sent to Sir Richard Powell, with a covering letter from the Secretary and from Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson. These documents, along with the replies from Lloyd and Powell, are attached. The entire exchange of documents was cleared by the President, the Secretary, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson, Secretary Quarles, Admiral Strauss, and Messrs. Murphy, Elbrick, Smith, Phleger, General Loper, and Mr. Sullivan.)

Cleared with Murphy and Tizzone 3/23/57 and Admiral Strauss 3/25/57.

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
to the  
BERMUDA MEETING  
March 21-23, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION



Date: March 22, 1957

Time: 10:30 a.m.

Place: Mid-Ocean Club  
Bermuda

Participants:

United States

Secretary Dulles  
Ambassador Whitney  
Senator Walter F. George  
Mr. Phleger  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Berding  
General Goodpaster  
Mr. Parsons  
Mr. Walmaley  
Mr. Tammone  
Mr. Macomber  
Mr. Dale

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd  
Mr. P. H. Dean  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
Lord Hood  
Sir Richard Powell  
Mr. Dennis Laskey  
Mr. J. A. H. Graham  
Mr. Dobbs  
Miss Rolleston

Subject: U.K. Association with the Continent.

MILITARY

Mr. Lloyd opened by reviewing the WEU discussions of the British plans for force reductions in Germany. He explained the U.K. had made it clear to the other WEU members that it had already made a firm decision to make substantial reductions in its armed forces in order to live within its financial means, but that it had not yet decided how much of the cut would

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Agency Case NSC 69-1511

NLE Case MR 89-44083

By 62 NLE Date 8/7/91

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fall on British forces in Germany. He said that the British were ready to meet SACUR's first recommendation concerning the timing of reductions and that they had no objection in principle to his second recommendation dealing with a rotation of air units but that they could not accept the third recommendation for placing the 5,000-man strategic reserve in Germany because Army units had to be stationed a certain length of time in the U.K. if HMG was to attract a sufficient number of recruits into the armed forces.



Mr. Lloyd stated that on Monday several proposals (including the Dutch, Belgian and Italian) were put before WEU and that the temper of the meeting was "quite good" as it reflected a common determination not to let the organization break up over the question of the British force reductions. He said that the first year's reduction of 13,500 men would be concentrated among administrative and anti-aircraft units. When it comes to discussion of the second slice in October, he stated that the British mind is closed regarding a reduction of 8,500 but still open on the question of the 5,000-man strategic reserve. Mr. Lloyd said the British are still planning, however, on the assumption that this force will be stationed in the U.K. rather than Germany.

Mr. Lloyd said that the Germans attach great importance to their proposal for a review in NATO, and, although the British were unenthusiastic about it, they would support the Germans because the Germans had been so helpful to them in the WEU meetings.

Mr. Lloyd went on to say that although the British reductions were generally represented as a weakening of their forces on the continent, in fact the cuts would be more in "tail than in the teeth" and there would be only a "slight weakening if it is any weakening at all". He also referred to an improvement in the quality of the remaining British forces in Germany.

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Mr. Lloyd added that only the U.S. and the U.K. maintained substantial forces in Germany and that it cannot be argued a "chain reaction" would take place as there is very little left to reduce as far as the other countries are concerned.

Mr. Lloyd said the argument they had used in WEU was economic to begin with in accordance with General Norstad's request, but since the fighting capability of the remaining U.K. forces would actually be superior, military efficiency was also involved.

Secretary Dulles suggested that discussion of military aspects be postponed until afternoon because we had some military people coming at that time. Mr. Lloyd replied that he understood the afternoon meeting might be a restricted one and wished to be sure to get his ideas on the record.

The Foreign Secretary then turned to economic aspects of British association with the continent saying that he was worried over developments regarding the free trade area and common market. He said that the British had found it necessary to eliminate agricultural products from their free trade area proposal because of the Commonwealth, in particular Australia, and that it was not yet clear what the six were going to do about agriculture. He thought, however, that something could be worked out between the common market countries and U.K. on this point.

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Mr. Lloyd stated that the French decision to include their North African colonies in the common market was a more serious matter. He feared that they would endeavor to erect a high tariff wall around themselves and Northern Africa which could split Western Europe and destroy the efforts which have been going on to liberalize tariff barriers. He claimed that the Belgians, on the other hand, desire a low tariff wall and if this principle prevails he believed that the U.K. could solve its problem with the colonies. Otherwise the U.K. would be accused of selling its colonies down the drain and the free trade area might no longer be feasible. He said that the Portuguese, Greeks and Turks resented the French position too and that he did not think the French themselves realized the trouble they will have with GATT. He added that all the U.S. and U.K. could do was to keep up pressure for a low tariff solution.

Mr. Lloyd then turned to discussion of the U.S. tariff, stating that he was worried over restrictions of oil imports from the Middle East, woolen worsteds and bicycles. He said that the President has up for decision the question whether to set the low tariff quota on worsted at 6 and 1/2 percent or 5 percent, and that the former would be of great assistance to the British.

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He added that, having borrowed money here, it was necessary for the British to trade with us in order to be sure of paying the money back. Mr. Lloyd said that the question of American tariffs, however, was not just a part of Anglo-American relations but also concerned the broad problem of maintaining a liberal trade policy.

The Foreign Secretary said that the British wished to build up the OEEC and to handle their relations with EURATOM through it. In this connection, he cited the OEEC Steering Committee on Atomic Energy.

Mr. Lloyd then turned to political aspects of the association with the continent and mentioned first that WEU members had agreed to holding regular Ministerial meetings every three months. He added that the British certainly did not want WEU to become a special group in NATO and said that in order to meet this point he had suggested that the organization be transferred to Paris with the NATO representative acting for WEU as well. He mentioned that this suggestion was received unfavorably by the continental members of WEU who maintained that such a move would look as though the UK were trying to disassociate itself from the continent and cited the fact that the Armaments Control Agency and Special Armaments Group of WEU were already in Paris.

Mr. Lloyd said that the UK had cooperated in the report of the "three wise men" on NATO's political functions and were cooperating in NATO along this line. He also mentioned that the UK had accepted promptly Lord Ismay's proposal of good offices in the Cyprus dispute.

Mr. Lloyd said that, except for the Coal and Steel Community Assembly which controls the High Authority, European organization assemblies are



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largely debating societies. Referring to the Council of Europe, he claimed that the relations between the Assembly and Council of Ministers had proven a failure. He said the British thought it was time to pull all the assemblies together into one which would, in turn, have committees on economic, cultural and military affairs. The military committee, which would do roughly what the WEU Assembly and the Assembly of NATO Parliamentarians do now, would have to be somewhat detached in order not to scare away neutrals from the economic and cultural committees. Mr. Lloyd thought that by this means a common feeling of unity could be built up in free Europe. He added, however, that the last thing the British wanted to do was to scare away the North Americans and hoped that if the common assembly should come into being we would become members of the military committee and perhaps associate members or observers on the others. Mr. Lloyd said that these assemblies are becoming a serious problem which might tend to split rather than unite Europe. Therefore, the British Government was suggesting a single assembly in their place with headquarters probably in Paris. This proposal, he said, gave effect to a striking trend in the UK toward closer association with the countries of western Europe.

Mr. Dulles said that he would not comment on the military aspects of the Foreign Secretary's remarks as the President had views he would wish to express in this field. On the economic side, however, he said that we were encouraged by trends towards integration in Europe, especially the Common Market, EURATOM and the Free Trade Area. He stated we have thought for a great many years that Europe could not realize its full potential without a greater degree of unity. The Secretary said that the French had

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told us they favored a common market area with low tariffs vis-a-vis outside countries. At this point Mr. Lloyd interjected that the French might start off with "high resolve" but he feared they would soon lapse.

The Secretary agreed that we must recognize the existence of this danger because of the pressure of French industrialists who operate on a high price-low output production system. He then warned that the effect of a high tariff wall on our own tariff policy could be considerable.

Referring to US tariff policies, the Secretary said that the President and the Executive Branch desire to pursue a liberal tariff policy but that the trend in Congress is in the other direction, a fact which cannot be ignored. He explained that previously, when the South was chiefly a cotton producing area, it could be counted upon to support low tariffs and free trade but that with the movement of industry to the South that area had become more protectionist minded. He said that it becomes harder each time to obtain Congressional approval for liberal trade legislation and that, whereas the President's views were based on the general interest and interests of the world as a whole, Congress tended to represent the views of special interests which superficially seemed to be advanced by higher tariffs. The Secretary forecast trouble when the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act comes before Congress again next year but said that the Executive Branch would continue to pursue liberal trade policies, perhaps not on every case but as a rule.

Concerning the political aspects of UK association with the continent the Secretary agreed that the multitude of organizations and assemblies presents a confusing picture and that simplification is desirable. He believed that some organizations should be entirely European in scope,

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perhaps even entirely continental. The Secretary said that we shouldn't retard progress towards integration in some of these in an effort to assure unity of treatment. Similarly, he did not believe that we should wish to see such great breadth of representation that it would hold up progress on such organizations as the Common Market, EURATOM or the free trade area.



The Secretary said that he did not know what the impact of these moves towards European unity would be on NATO. He recalled that we had tried hard to make NATO a more effective forum for political consultation but said he did not feel himself that we had yet "struck oil" in this field and that the tendency still exists for NATO to operate on the old basis. The Secretary said he was a little discouraged about this and believed that perhaps other organizations were more effective in some fields. He explained that it was difficult to steer all matters through the NATO Council and that the Congress was irritated when it first read in the press of policies agreed in the NAC, just as the NAC was irritated when it first read in the press of US policies of interest to it which have been discussed with Congress. He said that Canada and the US properly have interests, particularly in the defense fields, which would inevitably involve all of us. In this connection, he mentioned the retaliatory air power which is principally a US weapon but upon which all NATO members depend. He said, however, that our presence was not so indispensable in other areas, such as the economic, although we have indicated a willingness to contribute there too. He cited our offer of atomic material to EURATOM stating that it was in our interest as well as Europe's to see atomic power development pioneered in Europe. He believed that the US could benefit by European experience in building such

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
to the  
BERMUDA MEETING  
March 21-23, 1957

20

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: March 22, 1957

Time: 4:25 P.M.

Place: Mid-Ocean Club  
Bermuda

Participants:

United States

The President  
The Secretary of State  
Ambassador Whitney  
Ambassador George  
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Reuben Robertson  
Deputy Under Secretary of State, Robert Murphy  
Assistant Secretary of State Elbrick  
The Legal Adviser, Mr. Herman Phleger  
General Goodpaster  
Mr. William Macomber  
Brewster H. Morris, Counselor of Embassy, London

United Kingdom

Right Honorable Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister  
Right Honorable Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary  
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador  
Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to Cabinet  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office  
Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Under Secretary, Ministry of Defense  
Mr. P. H. Dean, Deputy Under Secretary, Foreign Office  
Lord Hood, Assistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office  
Mr. T. W. Garvey, Foreign Office, and Secretary to British Delegation  
Mr. J. A. N. Graham, Personal Assistant to Foreign Secretary

Subject: Record of Restricted Session, Bermuda Conference, held  
Friday afternoon, March 22, 1957 immediately following  
Private Session between the President and the Prime  
Minister.

The Restricted session commenced at 4:25 p.m.

Copies to: G, W, S/P, C, EUR, NEA, London (Whitney),  
Defense (Wilson), Treasury (Humphrey), CIA (Dulles),

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Agency Case NSC 68-876

NLE Case 88-11444

By *LWS* 7/18/91

*AWP (En 11 / 3 / Bermuda Conference (3)*



Prime Minister Macmillan opened the session with a description of the U. K.'s over-all defense plans and philosophy. He said that UK forces had been expanded as a result of the Korean War; that when the threat receded, the UK had prepared itself for the "long haul"; that even with reduced goals of recent years, the UK has had to cut back each year. Nothing, he said, could be more unsatisfactory than to be compelled to make such cuts at the last minute. The UK is now entering a new phase. England is a nuclear power, but on a smaller scale than the United States. The USSR is threatening aggression on many fronts other than military, and the UK is inclined to discount the imminence of military aggression. The British Government is convinced that England cannot continue to support its present forces indefinitely in view of the inroads defense expenditures are making in the British economy. Macmillan cited particularly the activities of Britain's competitors in the foreign trade field. And over the past five years, defense budgets have taken 10% of Britain's income. The Prime Minister also stated that at present over one-half of the entire technical manpower in the UK is absorbed on defense work. In view of the many troops stationed abroad, there is also a very heavy charge on the UK's balance of payments. Moreover, the UK is inclined to believe that its primary need in any real war would be in immediate terms, and the British Government doubts that there would again be a long-drawn affair like World Wars I and II, with the need to establish and maintain overseas supply lines, deal with enemy blockade attempts, etc.




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For these reasons, the UK has decided to make a substantial reduction in its over-all defense effort. The aim here is not only one of economy and the need to achieve a defense effort commensurate with the UK's resources, but also to streamline and modernize UK forces. The goal, which the British hope to achieve in about four years, will be forces for all three services totalling about 380,000 to 400,000 men, consisting as far as possible of regular, i.e. professional, troops. These figures are, of course, still very "Secret." The UK intends to make both atomic and hydrogen weapons. It will no longer attempt to defend on an impossible basis, i.e. through forces stationed at many spots of the world. The aim will rather be to maintain small forces abroad in a few key areas, and to rely on quick reinforcements from the central reserve area, for which reason adequate air transport will be stressed. The conventional fighter aircraft command will also be considerably reduced, and the mission of its manned aircraft will be limited essentially to defending sites of the "deterrent forces"



In terms of specific areas, Macmillan stated that all UK forces would be withdrawn from Jordan, according to the recent treaty. In the case of Libya, the first step will be to remove two battalions, though eventually the UK also hopes to eliminate all troops from Libya. The strategic Persian Gulf area will be defended by forces based in Aden, supported by reserves stationed in East Africa, and a naval task force in the Indian Ocean. In Southeast Asia, the UK will maintain her air forces, while reducing its ground forces in Malaya. In the case of Hong Kong, all that is needed

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are the forces required to preserve law and order, though in this case this means somewhat more than usual, due to the danger of infiltration into the colony and pressure from outside. The proposed NATO changes would be mentioned further in a moment (see below). Macmillan stressed that when these various reduction plans are announced in the House of Commons, through a Government White Paper, the Government will defend them, not just on the grounds of economy, but also stressing that the UK wants an efficient, modern and streamlined defense force.

Regarding NATO and the proposed British troop reductions in Germany, Macmillan said he thought the UK had erred in following SACEUR's advice and stressing the economic needs of Britain. The UK would have done better to justify these cuts on military grounds. For the British plan really involves "having a good crack" at the "tail." At the present time the ratio between fighting and support troops in Germany is 55 to 45; following the planned reduction, this ratio will be increased to 65 to 35. Thus the British hope to have a much better organized force as a result.

Regarding the British Navy, Macmillan indicated that certain changes would also be involved here. The basis of the Navy would become, just like that of the US Navy, carriers and their supporting units, organized into carrier task groups. The British hoped in fact to achieve an eventual reduction of about one-third of its present D-Day Naval strength. But the resulting force would consist much more of modern ships.

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In reply to a question from the President regarding the proposed disposition of these British carrier task forces, Sir Richard Powell stated that one would be maintained at home, one in the Mediterranean and one in the Indian Ocean.



The President commented on the continued importance of the British Navy's role in the SACLANT Command, .....

In connection with British plans for maintaining troops in Germany, the Prime Minister also mentioned that the German Parliament will apparently not ratify the recent UK-German agreement on support costs until this question is also settled with the US, for which reason the British hope the US will press for an early settlement of its problem in this respect.

The President commented in this connection that he had just received news that a very critical attitude had developed yesterday in Congress on the news that Germany would this time be prepared to pay so much less for US troop support, and this despite the excellent state of the German economy.

Regarding the UK troop reductions in Germany, the President also emphasized the important political-psychological problems raised for the other peoples concerned, problems which must be carefully considered, as otherwise the whole purpose of the British plan might be defeated. ....

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..... Thus, while the President agreed with the British economic and military analysis just presented, he felt that these important political considerations must certainly be kept in mind.

The Prime Minister and Hoyer Millar both commented that Germany could easily afford to pay more.

Reuben Robertson asked at what rate the British plan to reduce their military forces from the present total of about 750,000 to the over-all eventual goal of around 400,000. Sir Richard Powell replied: "By about 1962."

The President commented that this plan in fact reminded him a bit of the US "new look" idea, an idea which, however, had been considerably effected since its formulation a few years ago by political considerations around the world.

Reuben Robertson mentioned that the US was making great progress in "civilianizing" its total military manpower, especially abroad, and asked what was the proposed UK ratio in this respect.

Powell replied that the UK plans to have about one civilian to each military in its over-all defense setup.

The discussion then turned to the Coordination of Research Development and Production of armaments within WEU.

Selwyn Lloyd and the Prime Minister began by stressing that the British believe such coordination to be rather important politically, particularly

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at this time to help cushion the shock of the UK troop reductions in Germany. They pointed out, however, that the special security considerations affecting UK-Canadian-US relations would be a limiting factor here.

The President said it was important to maintain the special relationship now existing between the US, Canada and Britain.

Selwyn Lloyd said the UK wished to proceed in this field as far as the US will permit, adding that this program would of course not include any nuclear matters. What the British want from the US now is its general blessing on this scheme, in view of the large political dividend which might be expected.

The President asked whether the British could provide a memorandum on this subject.

Selwyn Lloyd remarked that the UK would provide lists for subsequent US consideration, i.e. of specific subjects proposed for WEU coordination.

The President replied that this seemed a good idea to him, rather like the idea under NATO consideration at the time he became Supreme Commander. Though no great tangible results had so far been obtained in this NATO endeavor, it seemed like a good idea to try.

Reuben Robertson asked, in this connection, whether NATO would be kept informed of British proposals and efforts in this field.

The Prime Minister nodded.

Meeting ended at 5:15 p.m.

(Cleared in draft - Mr. Elbrick (EUR))

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
to the  
BERMUDA MEETING  
March 21-23, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION



DATE: March 23, 1957

TIME: 10:35 A.M.

PLACE: Mid-Ocean Club

Participants:

United States  
Secretary Dulles  
Adm. Strauss  
Mr. Quarles  
Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Elbrick  
Amb. Whitney  
Senator George  
Col. Goodpaster  
Mr. Hagerty  
Mr. Gerard Smith  
Mr. Macomber

United Kingdom  
Selwyn Lloyd  
Amb. Caccia  
Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar  
Pat Dean  
William Strath

Subject: Atomic Energy Items: (1) French Request  
(2) Test Limitation

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NLE Case	2163/81
By	742
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Mr. Lloyd expressed the thought that the French might develop a small program, but if they tried to develop a big program, EURATOM external uranium supplies would suffer.

Secretary Dulles expressed U.S. regret that the EURATOM Treaty permits members of the Community to develop nuclear weapons. He said that the U.S. was not disposed to assist the French in a weapons program. If they wanted to produce nuclear weapons, they must do it on their own. Any U.S. uranium supplied to France would have to be used for peaceful purposes only. He added that this would certainly continue to be our policy as long as hopes existed for a comprehensive worldwide disarmament system.

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Mr. Smith reported that the French had asked for military cooperation in the nuclear submarine field which present U.S. statutory law prevented.

Mr. Quables said that on several occasions very informal approaches had been made to the Department of Defense by the French, but in each case the French had been told that U.S. law prevented weapons development cooperation.

Mr. Lloyd said he had

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PRBMs  
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March 23, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
March 22, 1957; 1 P. M.

Others present:

Secretary Dulles  
Secretary Quarles  
Secretary Robertson  
Admiral Strauss  
Mr. Robert Murphy  
Mr. Timmons  
General Goodpaster



Prior to going in to lunch with the President, the group reviewed major remaining questions pertaining to the project to give IRBMs to the United Kingdom. The President stated very emphatically that he did not want to make a commitment to production until we have a successful missile. Mr. Quarles outlined the production schedule of the missiles -- both for test and development and for inventory and unit purposes, pointing out that the latter implied simply a continuation of use of the capacity that had been developed during the test and development phase. Mr. Dulles inquired searchingly as to just what the proposed commitment to the British would be. Mr. Quarles summed it up to the effect that when they and we agree that we have a sound weapon, we will begin to furnish them. The President said he took that to mean that there would be no production of weapons for use until there was an agreed decision that the weapon was successful. Mr. Quarles said that would be observed, although of course we would be keeping the pipeline filled with items pending that decision, and those items would then be available to carry on the production flow. Mr. Murphy confirmed that the determination on production and production rates is for the U. S. to make.

Admiral Strauss confirmed that, through discussions between Defense and AEC, an agreed plan for custody of sensitive portions of the missile had been developed.

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Agency Case 1155-ESG-1124-61157
NLE Case 100-85113-46
To: DTH NLE Date: 8/11/87

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During lunch there was discussion of the basis on which the missiles would be made available to the British. Alternatives suggested were funding the missiles out of Plan K money, conveying them on a lend-lease basis, and straight aid (the latter was not favored).

While waiting for the British officials to join the group, the President read a memorandum from Mr. Robertson commenting on three phases of the Defense questions -- the use of Plan K funds (including the turning over of a F-86 wing to the British), support costs for British and U.S. forces in Germany, and Defense thinking regarding the necessity to cut down U. S. manpower (without decreasing the number of units) in Europe.

The Prime Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, Mr. Dean, Norman Brooke, and Richard Powell then joined the group. The President said that he felt we should handle the missiles question by saying that we have agreed that we will turn over guided missiles under arrangements to be mutually agreed, in the interest of mutual economy and collective security.

The President agreed, and said that if there were agreement on the documents then the technical people could work out the details. He mentioned that there are several different procedures that could conceivably be used for actually turning over the missiles.

In response to a question by Mr. Macmillan, Secretary Quarles said that if all goes well, we estimate that it should be possible to deploy a "handful" of missiles in the UK by mid-1958 as an initial emergency capability, to put the first squadron there by mid-1959, and to have four squadrons in place by mid-1960.

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The President said that the weapon is one of tremendous psychological importance, although he was inclined still to discount its military significance. In fact, he thought that when the two sides come to the point of waging war with such weapons, that all sense and logic would have disappeared. He therefore thought it was desirable to keep aircraft research and development going along.

The President next broached the idea of a joint declaration that both countries would limit their atomic testing to a level not exceeding the point of radioactive safety. Admiral Strauss outlined the proposal. There was a considerable amount of discussion and weighing of the various aspects of the proposal, which was then referred for further study and drafting.

The President next raised the suggestion of pulling out the U.S. F-86 wing now in Britain and turning the planes over to the British.

All present left except the top four and Mr. Dean and myself, and I reported certain developments in the Middle East.

  
A. J. Goodpaster  
Brigadier General, USA

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7/24/57

## United States and United Kingdom Exchange Views at Bermuda Meeting

*Following is the text of a joint communique with annexes issued at Tucker's Town, Bermuda, on March 24 by President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at the close of a 3-day meeting, March 21 to 24 (White House press release dated March 24).*

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, assisted by the United States Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary and other advisers, have exchanged views during the past three days on many subjects of mutual concern. They have conducted their discussions with the freedom and frankness permitted to old friends. In a world of growing interdependence they recognize their responsibility to seek to coordinate their foreign policies in the interests of peace with justice.

Among the subjects discussed in detail were common problems concerning the Middle East, Far East, Nato, European Cooperation, the reunification of Germany, and Defense.

The President and the Prime Minister are well satisfied with the results of this Conference, at which a number of decisions have been taken. They intend to continue the exchange of views so well begun.

The agreements and conclusions reached on the main subjects discussed at the Conference are annexed.

### ANNEX I

1. Recognition of the value of collective security pacts within the framework of the United Nations, and the special importance of Nato for both countries as the cornerstone of their policy in the West.

April 8, 1957

2. Reaffirmation of common interest in the development of European unity within the Atlantic Community.

3. Agreement on the importance of closer association of the United Kingdom with Europe.

4. Agreement on the benefits likely to accrue for European and world trade from the plans for the common market and the Free Trade Area, provided they do not lead to a high tariff bloc; and on the desirability that all countries should pursue liberal trade policies.

5. Willingness of the United States, under authority of the recent Middle East joint resolution, to participate actively in the work of the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

6. Reaffirmation of intention to support the right of the German people to early reunification in peace and freedom.

7. Sympathy for the people of Hungary; condemnation of repressive Soviet policies towards the peoples of Eastern Europe, and of Soviet defiance of relevant United Nations resolutions.

8. Agreement on the need for the speedy implementation of recent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly dealing with the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba.

9. Agreement on the importance of compliance both in letter and in spirit with the Security Council Resolution of October 13 concerning the Suez Canal, and on support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to bring about a settlement in accordance with its provisions.

10. Joint declaration on policy regarding nuclear tests (See Annex II).

II. Agreement in principle that, in the interest of mutual defense and mutual economy, certain guided missiles will be made available by the United States for use by British forces.

deployment in = giving to

## ANNEX II

1. For a long time our two Governments have been attempting to negotiate with the Soviet Union under the auspices of the United Nations Disarmament Commission an effective agreement for comprehensive disarmament. We are continuing to seek such an agreement in the current disarmament discussions in London. In the absence of such an agreement the security of the free world must continue to depend to a marked degree upon the nuclear deterrent. To maintain this effectively, continued nuclear testing is required, certainly for the present.

2. We recognize, however, that there is sincere concern that continued nuclear testing may increase world radiation to levels which might be harmful. Studies by independent scientific organizations confirm our belief that this will not happen so long as testing is continued with due restraint. Moreover, the testing program has demonstrated the feasibility of greatly reducing worldwide fallout from large nuclear explosions.

3. Over the past months our Governments have considered various proposed methods of limiting tests. We have now concluded together that in the absence of more general nuclear control agreements of the kind which we have been and are seeking, a test limitation agreement could not today be effectively enforced for technical reasons; nor could breaches of it be surely detected. We believe nevertheless that even before a general agreement is reached self-imposed restraint can and should be exercised by nations which conduct tests.

4. Therefore, on behalf of our two Governments, we declare our intention to continue to conduct nuclear tests only in such manner as will keep world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of the levels that might be hazardous. We look to the Soviet Union to exercise a similar restraint.

5. We shall continue our general practice of publicly announcing our test series well in advance of their occurrence with information as to their location and general timing. We would be willing to register with the United Nations advance notice of our intention to conduct future nuclear tests and to permit limited international observation of such tests if the Soviet Union would do the same.

## Meeting Between Secretary Dulles and Israeli Foreign Minister

*Following is the text of an agreed statement released on March 18 (press release 155) following a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir.*

Israeli Foreign Minister Meir discussed with Secretary Dulles today various aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, particularly developments in the Gaza Strip following Israeli withdrawal in accordance with the United Nations resolutions.

Mrs. Meir expressed her deep concern at the return of Egypt to Gaza, the re-establishment of its control therein and the reduction of the responsibilities of the United Nations in the Gaza area. The Foreign Minister of Israel pointed out the gravity with which Israel viewed this situation and emphasized that it was contrary to the assumption and expectations expressed by her and others in the United Nations on March 1 and subsequently. She also expressed her anxiety at reports and statements envisaging restrictions against Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, and the maintenance of belligerency by Egypt.

Secretary Dulles reaffirmed that the U.S. policy with respect to these matters continued to be as publicly expressed, notably in the speech of Ambassador Lodge in the United Nations General Assembly on March 1 and in the President's letter of March 2 to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary said that the United States was concerned with current developments and was in close touch with U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld and other members of the U.N. He said that the United States would continue to use its influence in seeking the objectives of peace and tranquillity and the avoidance of any situation which would negate the great efforts which had been made by the world community to settle the current disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The United States, the Secretary said, stood firmly by the hopes and expectations it had expressed with regard to the situation which should prevail in the area with respect to the exercise of the responsi-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 18, 1957, p. 431.

## Secretary Dulles' News Conference of March 26

Press release 175 dated March 28

**Secretary Dulles:** Since I last met with you, I have been to two important international conferences. The first was the conference of the South-East Asia Treaty Council, which was held in Canberra, Australia, and then more recently, the Bermuda conference with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom. Both of those conferences have been important, useful, and I think one can use the word "successful" conferences. I would be glad to answer questions about those conferences or any other matters that you want to question me about.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, as a result of the talks with the Prime Minister at Bermuda, do you expect a closer joint effort in the intelligence and planning fields between the United States and Britain?*

A. We do not plan to have any substantive change in that respect. We have, of course, for a long time had an association with the United Kingdom and Canada and with the NATO organization, particularly in relation to such matters as an alert if there should seem to be a danger of a Soviet attack. The NATO alert arrangement relates primarily to an attack, you might say, from the East, and the Canadian and U.K. arrangement to a possible attack from the polar area, from the north. There was some discussion about reviewing and perfecting some of these alert arrangements, but that is the only understanding on the matter that took place.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it correct that your understandings or conclusions or agreements, whatever the proper word may be, were set down on paper and initialed at Bermuda?*

A. There was no understanding put down on paper at Bermuda except a procedural one for refurbishing, you might say, or reviewing the intelligence arrangements which we have concerning alerts.

*Q. That is, there were no understandings, for example, on what policies the two Governments might pursue in the Middle East under various contingencies depending on the Hammarskjold mission in Cairo?*

A. No, although in the course of the long, extensive talks which we had and particularly some informal talks that took place, particularly in the dinner and evening sessions, we talked about a great variety of subjects, and I believe those things were touched upon, but they did not lead to any agreement.

*Q. That is, to written agreements? Nothing that was committed?*

A. No. I would stick by my original language.

*Q. In other words, each Government has its own position and not the same position on what it will do under these various possible contingencies?*

A. I would say that the exchanges of views that took place were useful, I think, in making it likely that there would be a common policy. But the contingencies that we had to deal with were so varied and so unpredictable that it seemed to be rather unprofitable to try to reach a formal agreement as to what we would do in any one of a score, perhaps, of possible variations of future development.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has this Government been receiving any interim reports from Mr. Hammarskjold, and, if so, could you characterize them?*

A. We have received no interim reports from Mr. Hammarskjold. We have through Ambassador Hare had some contacts with him and with the Egyptian Government, through which we have gotten some inkling, I would say, as to the nature of the talks, but we are still quite in the dark this morning, for example, as to what has taken place during the recent discussions. Those discussions are not yet concluded. There was one last night,



which I think probably was an important one. We have no report as yet. I understand Mr. Hammarskjold will shortly be returning, at which time he will probably make a report, which will be available to us and to others.

*Q. You could not say now as to whether you are hopeful or not of the progress of his talks?*

A. Well, I used in the background conference which I had at Bermuda the phrase "cautious optimism," and I think that that is a phrase which can be safely taken out of the wraps of the background conference and even permitted publicly.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your understanding as to Mr. Hammarskjold's impending report? To whom would it be made? To the Advisory Committee, or what?*

A. He would make it presumably to the Advisory Committee, at least. It might be made public. I don't know what his intentions are.

*Q. Yes. But I was wondering as to whom it would be addressed in the first place.*

A. Yes.

*Q. I notice annex II of the Bermuda communique<sup>1</sup> dealt with a joint policy of the two countries toward testing of nuclear weapons. Did that come about as a result of the protests on the part of Japan?*

A. No. It did not come about as a result of those protests, except as you can say that those pre-occupations held by Japan were a part of the sum total of the concern which prompted us to make some statement on the subject. But it was not specifically ascribable to any one cause.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, at yesterday's White House briefing of the congressional leaders on the Bermuda conference, to what extent was the possibility or the prospect of the United States' providing guided missiles for France discussed?*

A. Well, it was discussed only in a very casual way. A question was asked as to whether there was a possibility that guided missiles might be supplied to countries other than the United Kingdom, and the reply made was that we were not actually giving any consideration to that because the whole project was still in an experimental stage. These missiles are not actually flying yet,

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1957, p. 561.

and we can't predict with absolute certainty as to when they can be made available even for the United Kingdom. It seemed that the United Kingdom was the first place to start in this business of deploying these missiles to areas from

### Deployment of Ballistic Missiles in United Kingdom

*Statement by James C. Hagerty  
Press Secretary to the President*

White House press release dated March 25

The project for the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the United Kingdom is an initial project which itself is yet to be fully developed, both from the standpoint of the weapons themselves and the precise conditions for deployment. This is the logical place of beginning. Subsequent deployments will, of course, remain to be considered but are not under active consideration.

which they could, if need be, serve most effectively as a deterrent, and this seemed to be the best way to start. Now, in principle, there is no reason to limit it to the United Kingdom, except that as a practical matter it would be premature to start considering it on a broader basis when we still have quite a ways to go before this particular United Kingdom project can be realized.

### Egypt and the UNEF

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States believe that Egypt should make a pledge of nonbelligerency to Israel?*

A. We believe that under the Armistice Agreements there is not a right to exercise belligerent rights. We believe that is evidenced by the fact that that was the basis for the Security Council decision of 1951 with reference to the right of passage of cargo for Israel through the Suez Canal. And the basis for that decision was that under the Armistice Agreement Egypt did not possess belligerent rights. We voted for that resolution at the time, and we adhere to the view which was then held.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do we believe that the United Nations Emergency Force should be stationed on both sides of the armistice line?*

A. We believe that it would conduce to the tran-

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PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Following message from President should be delivered to  
Chancellor Adenauer. Advise date and time delivery.

QTE April 12, 1957

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I have received your letter of March 25, 1957 with regard  
to the German contribution to the costs of supporting American  
forces in the Federal Republic. I appreciate your having gone into  
the matter personally and am glad that you have written me on  
the subject.

I can understand that this problem involves difficulties  
for you. Frankly it also involves serious political difficulties  
for my Administration. Our defense budget is now being con-  
sidered by the Congress. As you probably know, we ran into sub-  
stantial difficulty with the Congress last year regarding the  
amount of financial support which the Federal Republic gave to  
our forces. The Congress was very critical of the agreement  
which we made with you last year, and there has been increased

criticism

Drafted by

S/S: cph

4/12/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Greens

Clearance:

General Goodpastor  
The White House

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

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1989/25-84  
ML 86-398-5

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criticism this year of the arrangements which your Government has proposed to us.

The criticism stems basically from the fact that our Congress does not feel that the Federal Republic has been carrying its fair share of the burden of defending the Atlantic Community, either in financial terms or as regards the actual contribution of forces. Our figures indicate that the defense burden borne by the Federal Republic has been substantially less than that of the average for other European NATO countries and far less than the burden being carried by the United States. While I recognize that the buildup of military forces by the Federal Republic is now under way, progress has been considerably slower than we had been led to expect by earlier statements by the Federal Government. Our agreement to the current level of support for our forces was based in large measure on the increased burden to the Federal Republic that was expected to result from a rapid buildup of military forces, which has not materialized. Moreover it is not clear to us that steps are being taken which will in fact lead to the creation of the forces which we understood as recently as the conversation between Defense Minister Strauss and Admiral Radford in December 1956 would be established.

At the same time, as you are aware, the already heavy burden of our defense budget has been rising and we are encountering increasing difficulty in meeting fully all of the varied military requirements which our own position in the world imposes upon us. The current

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level of DM support covers only a fraction of the total cost of equipping and maintaining the United States Forces in Germany, and any further reduction in the level of support would directly increase our already rising defense costs. These circumstances create a political problem for us which I can assure you is a very genuine one.

I have been glad to learn from your letter of the importance which you attach to the arrangements which you have worked out with the British. I hope that these arrangements, and those which you have made with the French, can be brought to a final conclusion as soon as possible. Prime Minister Macmillan mentioned to me at Bermuda his concern regarding this matter. I see no reason why the conclusion of these arrangements should be held up by our negotiations.

When we concluded the arrangements on this subject with your Government last year, our negotiators made it clear that our agreement to the amount of support which you offered for our forces was premised on our expectation that the buildup of German forces would proceed rapidly. It was understood we were free to raise the issue of further support in the future if, in our judgment, the circumstances warranted.

In view of our respective political problems, it occurs to me that we might approach the matter on somewhat the same basis as that employed last year. This might permit us to accept the lump-sum payment which your Government has offered us. It would be regarded as a payment "on account" so that the entire subject could be

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reviewed again in six months' time. This suggestion might provide the way out of our immediate problems. Meanwhile, your forthcoming trip to Washington will give us an opportunity to discuss all these problems personally.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER UNQTE

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COPY NO. 79

J.C.S. 2220/124

15 April 1957

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON J.C.S. 2220/124

A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee  
on

ATOMIC SUPPORT OF ALLIED FORCES (U)

Note by the Secretaries

1. On 15 April 1957 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraphs 8 and 9 of J.C.S. 2220/124.
2. Copies of this paper are being forwarded to USCINCEUR, CINCNELM, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCFE, CINCARIB, U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, NATO, and Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of J.C.S. 2220/124.

R. D. WENTWORTH,  
H. L. HILLYARD,  
Joint Secretariat.

350.05 (3-16-48) Sec. 9 R.B.



Recd. 4-22-57

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ATOMIC SUPPORT OF ALLIED FORCES (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider possible changes in the national disclosure policy\* to facilitate a greater allied appreciation of U.S. atomic weapons and the development of realistic indigenous force goals by individual Allies.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 25 May 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved\*\* a recommendation\*\*\* by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that an appropriate committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed\*\*\*\* to recommend implementing actions so that U.S. and allied commanders will take cognizance of U.S. atomic capabilities in reassessing force requirements for adequate defenses in certain areas.

3. On 19 September 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested# the comments and recommendations of CINCLANT, CINCNELM, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCFE, CINCARIB, U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Military Committee, and Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee, as to any changes in national disclosure policy which would facilitate a greater allied appreciation of U.S. atomic weapons and the development of realistic indigenous force goals by individual Allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received## replies as requested.

\* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat; see Note to Holders of J.C.S. 927/89, dated 28 December 1955

\*\* J.C.S. 2101/231

\*\*\* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/231

\*\*\*\* SM-442-56; See J.C.S. 2101/231

# Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2101/244

## (1) CINCLANT Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/112

(2) CINCNELM Comments; Appendix to J.C.S. 2220/120

(3) USCINCEUR Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/115

(4) CINCPAC Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/119

(5) CINCFE Comments; CINCFE message to DEPTAR, No. FE 803397, DTG 111011Z December 1956 (DA IN 279317); on file in Joint Secretariat

(6) CINCARIB Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/116

(7) U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, NATO Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/114

(8) Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/113

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#### DISCUSSION

4. The replies received from the commanders of unified and 1  
specified commands vary considerably from the extreme of (1) 2  
indicating no change in national disclosure policy is necessary 3  
at this time, to (2) requesting authority to furnish detailed 4  
information concerning the size of our arsenal of nuclear and 5  
thermonuclear weapons to the NATO Alliance. Necessary actions 6  
to satisfy the requested changes have already been authorized 7  
or will be in the near future, with the exception of (2) above, 8  
on which, from a security standpoint, no action should be taken. 9

5. For additional discussion, see the Enclosure hereto. 10

#### CONCLUSIONS

6. No major changes are required at this time in national 11  
disclosure policy to facilitate (1) greater allied appreciation 12  
of U.S. atomic weapons or (2) the development of realistic 13  
indigenous force goals by individual Allies. 14

7. The military Services should obtain from the Atomic 15  
Energy Commission advance copies of a document entitled 16  
"Effects of Nuclear Weapons"\* for distribution to our Allies 17  
through commanders of unified and specified commands prior 18  
to public availability of the document. 19

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note 20  
the above conclusions. 21

9. It is recommended that this paper be forwarded to 22  
USCINCEUR, CINCNELM, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, 23  
U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, NATO, and Chairman, 24  
Joint Middle East Planning Committee. 25

\* Not on file in Joint Secretariat; see Enclosure hereto

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E N C L O S U R E

DISCUSSION

1. In their comments and recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject, CINCNELM, CINCPAC, CINCARIB and CINCPAC indicated no changes were required in national disclosure policy to accomplish greater appreciation of U.S. atomic weapons development or realistic indigenous force goals by individual Allies. CINCLANT, the Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee, U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Military Committee; and USCINCEUR recommended changes in national disclosure policy so as to permit the release of:

- a. Detailed information on effective employment of nuclear weapons with regard to military targets.
- b. Detailed information on the effects of underwater atomic bursts against all type of ship targets.
- c. Atomic weapon training aids for delivery vehicles such as HONEST JOHN, MATADOR, and F-84F, as provided under the Military Assistance Program.
- d. Detailed information on fall-out effects of megaton weapons for defensive planning.
- e. Detailed information on the size of the U.S. arsenal of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

2. Regarding subparagraphs 1 a and b above, a manual\* entitled "Capabilities of Atomic Weapons (U), Revised Edition, 1 June 1955", was prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) for the primary purpose of disseminating characteristics and capabilities of atomic weapons to selected U.S. Allies whose national security laws provide for adequate protection. Permission was granted to SACEUR on 24 August 1956, and to SACLANT on 2 November 1956, to release the contents of the manual to appropriate

\* On file in Joint Secretariat; also identified as TM 23-200, OPNAV Instruction 003400.18 AFL 136-4 and NAVMC 1104

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Enclosure

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subordinate headquarters, as authorized\* by the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information. The manual specifies in considerable detail the effects of nuclear weapons on any major military target. The manual does not provide for the manner of determining the physical vulnerability of a given target. Such information has been provided in a separate Intelligence Document entitled "Target Analysis for Atomic Weapons",\*\* which was authorized for release on 1 November 1956 to elements of SHAPE and subordinate commands as determined by SACEUR. The AEC published a joint AEC-DOD classification guide\*\*\* on 23 August 1956, which will facilitate passing to NATO countries atomic information which is neither Restricted Data nor transclassified Restricted Data.

3. Regarding subparagraph 1 c above, release to selected Allies of training weapons and aids for HONEST JOHN, NIKE, MATADOR, and atomic conversion kits for F-84F aircraft was authorized\*\*\*\* by the Secretary of Defense on 7 February 1957. Subject to the recipient countries having the capability to effectively operate and maintain these weapons from a technical and financial standpoint, this latest authorization should go far toward overcoming the deficiency mentioned by USCINCEUR and U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Military Committee.

4. With respect to the matter in subparagraph 1 d above, there exists a need for a military policy document to be issued containing all information which is releasable to our Allies, within present national disclosure policies, regarding fall-out effects of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. To this end, AFSWP has prepared a document for publication by AEC, entitled "Effects of Nuclear Weapons"#, which not only contains extensive information on fall-out effects, but also offers other unclassified

\* C-M (55) 31; not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat; available to the Services through Service subregistries; see also Note to Holders of J.C.S. 2220/70, dated 2 May 1956

\*\* Physical Vulnerability Technical Manual #14, U.S. Air Force, dated 30 June 1954; not on file in Joint Secretariat

\*\*\* On file in Joint Secretariat

\*\*\*\* See

(1) SECDEF message to USCINCEUR, DEF 917503, DTG 072134Z February 1957; on file in Joint Secretariat

(2) Note to Holders of J.C.S. 2220/97, dated 23 January 1957

# Not on file in Joint Secretariat

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JCS 2220/124

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(Page revised by Corrigendum - 3 April 1957)

Enclosure

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information concerning weapon effect data of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Although this document has not been released officially for publication, the Director of Military Application of the AEC, in a letter\* to General Luedecke, Chief, AFSWP, on 14 January 1957, concurred in the total declassification of the material on weapon effect data as portrayed in this document. It has been determined informally that the document will be released to the Government Printing Office on or about 20 April 1957. Upon publication of "Effects of Nuclear Weapons" on or about 1 June 1957, much of the data presently withheld from our Allies on weapon effects will be released to the general public as unclassified information. It is believed desirable that the military Services take cognizance of this fact, and obtain advance copies of this document for early dissemination to our Allies through commanders of unified and specified commands prior to public availability of the document.

5. Regarding subparagraph 1 e above, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954\*\* does not preclude the release of such information. However, it is difficult to determine how the disclosure of the size of the entire U.S. nuclear and thermonuclear stockpile would contribute appreciably to NATO defense plans. It is quite possible that if certain NATO Allies were apprised of such sensitive information, they might be forced by internal financial and political pressures to reduce their national military appropriations, rationalizing such actions on the basis of the size of the U.S. atomic arsenal, heretofore unknown. Once such action starts, it could cause serious deterioration in the over-all NATO posture. In addition, releasing such sensitive data to non-U.S. nationals subjects the information unnecessarily to possible compromise.

\* Not on file in Joint Secretariat

\*\* On file in Joint Secretariat

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(Page revised by 2nd Corrigandum - 13 April 1957)

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6. Specific requests by unified or specified commanders not listed in subparagraphs 1a through e are as follows:

a. CINCLANT requested the release of information on the broad aspects of U.S. atomic operational coordination machinery, specifically the purpose served by the Field Representative, Europe (FRE). There are no legal technicalities that preclude informing selected Allies that atomic coordination centers exist. In fact, a RAF Bomber Command representative is associated presently with FRE to coordinate the UK atomic capability. However, to go beyond the point of merely advising selected Allies that such coordination facilities exist would not afford greater appreciation of U.S. atomic capabilities, and would subject sensitive data to compromise.

b. The Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee, requested a revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954\* in order to permit the execution of an agreement between the Baghdad Pact Powers and the United States for cooperation regarding atomic information. Authority for such agreements, either with individual countries or regional defense organizations, is contained in Sections 123 and 144 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

c. USCINCEUR requested that NATO Allies receive live weapons, including nuclear components, in a NATO emergency for those delivery vehicles included in NATO atomic planning for the defense of Europe. The present bilateral atomic agreements\*\* between the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom provide for the release of information regarding the characteristics of atomic weapon delivery systems, including tactics and techniques, the compatibility of atomic

\* On File in Joint Secretariat

\*\* See

- (1) Annex "C" to J.C.S. 2220/79
- (2) Annex "C" to J.C.S. 2220/80

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Enclosure

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weapons with various delivery vehicles, as well as other information. The possibility of offering other bilateral atomic agreements to selected NATO nations is also being studied. Under such an agreement, the United States would train NATO forces in the delivery problems attendant to employing atomic weapons. Nevertheless, it is envisaged that atomic weapons would remain in U.S. custody at sites appropriately positioned within the NATO area from which weapons could be delivered to NATO forces in an emergency.

7. In light of the foregoing, it appears that no immediate valid requirement exists for major changes in present national disclosure policy.

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Tell Cmr & Murr Bx 12

Mon - Aug '30 '57 (4)

MONDAY  
April 27, 1957  
10:15 a. m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO GENERAL CUTLER



C. returned the call. The Sec. said on the question of authority to use nuclear weapons etc., EUR which was not by mistake in on some of our talks called his attention to a number of things which made the Sec. think it desirable if the authority to use those weapons in the NATO Theater were given to Norstad in his capacity as the US leader there. The Sec. suggests it be brought to the President's attention with his feeling that it would be more assuring to our allies if he were given this authority. As far as a meeting is concerned C. will call around and if they don't agree it could be brought up that way with the President. The Sec. said that there is a lot of stuff that we have implied - that the authority will remain as a political decision. He does not think we are stuck with that. It would be reassuring to keep it at a high level and with someone they have confidence in. C. will get word to the Sec. who said he is leaving to go directly to the airport from the Hill.

NOTE: Gerry Smith informed and he informed Elbrick.

S:PDB:jm

(W)



4/24/57

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DDE DIARIES

Box 23

Apr 57 Miscellaneous (1)

DDE - Macmillan

SECRET - PERSONAL

Augusta, Georgia,  
April 28, 1957.



Your letter of some ten days ago was filled with interest for me. I follow reports of your government's activities and progress almost as intensely as I do our own.

As you know, I have agreed that you were wise in making important technical changes in the character of your military forces; my only fear was that populations at large, particularly in Europe, would erroneously regard some of the consequences as indicative of British loss of interest in NATO and find in it an excuse for doing less, themselves, in the anti-Communist effort.

So far as the Canal is concerned, I agree with you that there is in sight no completely satisfactory solution. From the beginning that has seemed to me to be an ill-starred affair, and I did my very best to keep it from developing as it did. But we have done everything, as we agreed at Bermuda, to obtain the best possible "interim" agreement.

If, in the Mid-East, one could completely separate the problems of the Canal from the age-old Israel-Arab dispute and deal with each of these individually, I am certain that we could reach a satisfactory arrangement in the lesser one, and make considerable progress toward improving the chronic one. To believe that such might happen soon is, of course, nothing but wishful thinking. In spite of this, I remain confident that we shall eventually secure a fairly satisfactory Canal agreement, if we can live with some patience with the interim arrangement. To look forward

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
to the  
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
Bonn, Germany, May 2-4, 1957

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 1, 1957  
Time: 3:45 p.m.  
Place: Palais Schaumburg,  
Bonn

Participants:United States

Secretary Dulles  
Ambassador Bruce  
Mr. David R. Thomson

Germany

Chancellor Adenauer  
Foreign Minister von Brentano  
State Secretary for Foreign  
Affairs Hallstein  
Ambassador Krekeler  
A German Interpreter

Also present: Mr. Reinhardt, Mr. Elbrick, Mr. Bowie, Amb. Perkins, Amb. Bruce,  
Mr. Reinstein, Mr. Timmons, Mr. Nolting, USRO (2), Embassy Bonn,  
Embassy London, Dept. G, S, E, IO, S/S, S/AE, Embassy Moscow

In the course of presenting President Eisenhower's compliments to the  
Chancellor as well as his own, the Secretary told the Chancellor that he  
could not have come personally to the NATO Ministerial Conference had it  
not been for the opportunity to consult with the Chancellor.

Political Situation in West Germany

The Chancellor began the substantive discussion by stating that the  
current governmental coalition, and especially the CDU party, was united  
on all important questions, and that its main problem was the election  
next September. The SPD, which had already lost two elections, was resort-  
ing to all available means to win the election. The SPD, the Chancellor  
said, could find few arguments in its favor based on internal policy, and  
was concentrating on the field of foreign affairs. In the latter field,  
the question of atomic weapons had now unfortunately given them new issues  
and new hopes. The first pertinent event had been the statement of the  
18 scientists who had opposed further development of atomic weapons.  
Although this statement had been rebutted by many other scientists, it had  
been followed up by Albert Schweitzer's statement, the Soviet Government's  
threatening note, and today a new and similar note from the Soviet Zone

regime.

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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regime. The SPD was making its election appeals on emotional, not on rational, bases. Its principal appeal had been to opposition to conscription, and opposition to the development of atomic weapons. The conscription question, the Chancellor said, had been settled--indeed, so fully settled that the CDU had been able to ignore it in its election propaganda campaign--but now the British had reopened it with their White Paper.

Disarmament and the Election

Chancellor Adenauer said that the results of the West German election would be decisive for all European policy. If the SPD should obtain a working majority, he was convinced that it would steer a course entirely different from his Government's policy, namely, the neutralization of Germany. The Chancellor felt very strongly that it was essential to the coalition's success in the election to stand for general controlled atomic disarmament. Nothing must be allowed to appear to render this election slogan foolish or without prospect. In particular, it would be most harmful if the London Disarmament Conference should break up before the election without result. The conference should at least be drawn out so as to terminate after the election. At the same time, to counteract the effect of the recent British measures, it was very significant for the election that the present NATO Ministerial Conference have a strengthening influence on NATO and, above all, give this appearance to the electorate.

West German-Soviet Relations

The Chancellor then reviewed recent Soviet declarations on Germany. He noted that the Soviet Embassy publication, "Soviet Union Today", in its issue just before Easter, had printed a statement to the effect that the improvement of West German relations with the Soviet Union does not require, as a condition, deterioration of West German relations with the Western nations. West Germany's exit from NATO, according to this publication, would not result in relaxation of tensions but might have the contrary effect. Since the Soviet Union aims at reducing tensions, according to the article, the Soviet Union can hardly press for such a step. Two days later, the Chancellor continued, Bulganin had sent his letter to Macmillan in which he laid the heaviest of blame upon the Germans for their past actions and judged them unsuitable for being trusted with any kind of armament. Thereupon, the Chancellor had called in Soviet Ambassador Smirnov, (with von Brentano present), and had asked him bluntly which of the foregoing statements represented Soviet policy. The Chancellor said that he had made three very clear statements to Smirnov: (1) the Federal Republic possesses no atomic weapons; (2) the Federal Republic has requested no atomic weapons from its allies; (3) the Federal Republic strongly desires controlled disarmament in every sector, and

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especially in the sector of atomic weapons. The Chancellor emphasized that he had not told Smirnov that the Federal Republic never would acquire atomic weapons, and added that Smirnov had not posed this question. The Chancellor said that Smirnov had attempted to rebut this clear position in a long-drawn-out presentation, in which he had used the most ridiculous assertions about German rearmament intentions. Finally, Smirnov asked if he should report the Chancellor's three points to his Government, to which the Chancellor said he had replied with emphasis that they should be brought to Bulganin's personal attention. Two and a half days later, however, there had been a new threatening note from Bulganin to which the Chancellor had sent a reply restating his position, complaining that Bulganin's note took no account of the Chancellor's position, asserting that he knew his conversation must have been reported to Bulganin, and requesting an explanation. This, said the Chancellor, represented the present state of the Federal Republic's relations with the Soviet Union. It showed, he concluded, why the NATO Conference must be a clear success, for internal German political reasons.

The Secretary began his reply by stating that the people of the United States, from President Eisenhower to the man-in-the-street, were following with interest and some concern the developments with regard to West German election prospects. He drew some parallels between the problems of the German elections and the American elections of last November. He noted that efforts had been made also in the United States to focus campaign attention on international issues, and also to a certain extent on atomic issues. In the latter, he said, there is always considerable interest and, understandably, some emotional feeling. The American people, the Secretary said, adjudged President Eisenhower the man best qualified to deal with these issues; and (speaking unofficially and strictly as a private citizen) he hoped that the German people would be enlightened enough to make the same judgment with regard to Chancellor Adenauer. The Secretary continued by saying that he realized that the German elections posed additional and different problems caused by the division of Germany, by its proximity to the Soviet Union, and by the fact that Germany does not possess atomic weapons and does not desire to have them and to enjoy directly their deterrent effect.

#### U.S. Policy on Atomic Weapons and Disarmament

Referring to the Chancellor's remarks on a controlled atomic disarmament program, the Secretary states that the Chancellor's goal was in complete harmony with United States policy. He suggested that the Chancellor might usefully look at the pertinent paragraph of his speech of the previous week, which, he said, had the full and detailed concurrences of President Eisenhower. The Chancellor and von Brentano replied that they had in fact studied this paragraph that very morning.

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The main point, the Secretary continued, was that the United States cannot tolerate the Soviet Union's obtaining preponderance in the atomic field, since the Soviet Union would without any doubt use such preponderance to threaten the free world. In its policy on disarmament, therefore, the United States must emphasize controls. Controls, the Secretary said, are very difficult to work out, but they are absolutely essential when dealing with a government which virtually makes a career of deceit, intending to achieve its aims only by threats and deceit. No one can be expected to have confidence in the Soviet Government's word. On Easter Sunday, the Secretary recalled, he had spoken to a Japanese representative on the possibilities of terminating atomic experiments. The Secretary had stated that Japan should be more aware than most nations of how undependable were Soviet promises. He had reminded the Japanese representative that the Soviet declaration of war against Japan had been made while the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact was still in force. He had also referred to the terms of the Japanese surrender which deal with the return of prisoners, and to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London in 1945 which dealt with this matter. Secretary of State Byrnes had discussed with Molotov the implementation of this provision. Molotov had replied, however, that the provision had been inserted only to get the Japanese to surrender, and had asked why the allies should bother with it any further.

There would be no point in reaching with the Russians an agreement on disarmament, the Secretary continued, of a type which would leave open to the Russians the possibility of taking a similar attitude after the Western nations had disarmed themselves. In a game of chess, he said, the object is to maneuver yourself into a position to take the King. Your opponent must then resign. Many say that atomic weapons may never be used, the Secretary continued, and perhaps they are right. But the Soviets must be prevented from maneuvering in the field of atomic development to the point where the free world would be obliged to resign.

Aside from the foregoing problem, which is primarily a problem between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Secretary said that he considered another aspect to be in some ways the greatest danger. This was the question of other countries acquiring atomic weapons. Both of the two great powers have a great stake in abstaining from the use of atomic weapons. The Secretary referred to their respective great industrial complexes. If the possession of atomic weapons should be extended to many nations, however, the weapons might get into the hands of irresponsible nations and dictators, and then it would really be impossible to sleep at night. The Secretary said that he had just been emphasizing to Mr. Stassen that prevention of the wide-spread possession of atomic weapons was one of today's most significant efforts, and one which might entail some hope of success.

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The Secretary noted the Chancellor's desire that the London disarmament talks be prolonged through the period of German elections. The Secretary said that he was not yet in a position to give assurances on this matter, which involved many other people. Among the many other considerations, one might even have to think over whether it was humanely possible to require of Mr. Stassen and his associates to remain in session with the Russians for the next several months. The Chancellor replied that suitable recesses might be arranged. The Secretary said that he would give great weight to the Chancellor's views and suggestions on this subject and would try to obtain a prolongation of the talks if this should be found to be at all practicable.

#### The NATO Conference

Referring to the Chancellor's strongly expressed desire that the current NATO Conference be a public success, the Secretary asked if the Chancellor had any concrete recommendations to make. The Chancellor replied that he did not in fact have anything specific in mind, but hoped that everything possible would be done to raise esteem for NATO in the public mind. The Chancellor concurred in the Secretary's suggestion that there were limits to what one can do with communiques. However, the Chancellor did hope that the Conference would produce a good communique and a good press conference. The Secretary agreed that capable people should be assigned to working on the communique, and that they should start their preparations well in advance.

Professor Hallstein urged the Chancellor to emphasize that the Conference communique should contain strong rebuttals of Soviet declarations regarding Western use of atomic weapons. Foreign Minister von Brentano then read to the Chancellor the statement which the Secretary had made on arrival at the Wahn Airport. The Chancellor remarked, with satisfaction, that this statement pointed up the right themes, and reacted particularly to the reference to "the control of nuclear destructive power."

#### The German Military Build-Up

The Chancellor then remarked that he had heard from Ambassador Kerkelers that there were some doubts within the Department of State regarding West German willingness to proceed with the rearmament effort. The Chancellor wished to emphasize that there was no foundation for such doubts, and he said that detailed explanations could be provided later during the Secretary's visit.

#### Patterns of National Power

The Secretary concluded the conversation by sketching certain long-term trends which he said he wished the Chancellor to know that the

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United States recognizes. Great Britain, the Secretary said, has long been declining as a great power, but this historical development is only now becoming manifest. This was the real meaning of the British White Paper, the significance of which in terms of technical strategy should not be overrated. The decline of the United Kingdom had been concealed during recent decades because it had been helped by its allies to win two world wars. The capability of British power to stand alone had not been fully demonstrated. But the events in the Middle East since last November, when the United Kingdom tried to undertake a policy different from and opposed to that of the United States, had exposed the true extent of British weakness and had made manifest what has been latent in Great Britain's situation for many years.

By contrast, the Secretary said, the world position of the United States and of Germany is increasing in power and influence. The growth of German power had been concealed because stupid German leadership in 1914 and 1939 had aroused a world coalition against Germany. The Chancellor's leadership, however, was now succeeding in achieving a break-through for Germany's true influence in world affairs. If the German people could recognize this, the Secretary said, they should be proud of this achievement and willing to assume the responsibilities which go with it. The Secretary suggested that it was not easy for the Chancellor himself to project this picture for the German people because he was indeed the hero of this achievement. The Secretary ended by saying that he hoped the American Government would be told of anything it could do to help make the true picture of the German position known.

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
to the  
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
Bonn, Germany, May 2-4, 1957.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 4, 1957  
Time: 11:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.  
Place: Palais Schaumburg,  
Bonn

Participants:

United States

Secretary Dulles  
Assistant Secretary Elbrick  
Ambassador Puce  
Mr. David R. Thomson

Germany

Chancellor Adenauer  
Foreign Minister von Brentano  
Defense Minister Strauss  
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs  
Hallstein  
Ambassador Krekeler  
Lt. General Heusinger  
Interpreter Weber

Subject: Middle East; Defense Strategy

Copies to: S/S, L, W, G, C, EUR, U/MSA, S/AE, NEA,  
Embassy Bonn (2); Embassy London,  
Embassy Moscow; Embassy Paris



Election Prospects

The Secretary asked the Chancellor how he thought the elections would come out. The Chancellor replied that he thought that the prospects were good--the other parties of the coalition were now coming closer to the CDU, though there were still grounds for caution in assessing prospects. The Chancellor remarked that the Russians had "dropped their bomb" regarding atomic weapons much too early in the German election campaign. The Secretary said that Adlai Stevenson had made an issue of atomic tests during the American election last fall. The Soviets had sent a note in support of his position, and this had not helped Stevenson at all. The Secretary added that one can almost count on the Russians to make tactical errors of this kind in dealing with elections.

The Chancellor stated that, in considering the forthcoming German election, a principal factor was the effect on German public opinion of the past war and the consequent great fear of any new war. The SPD was doing its best to exploit this feeling. The Chancellor continued that he had seen a brochure on Ollenhauer's visit to the United States, however, and had noted that Ollenhauer had never spoken

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about the issue of atomic weapons there—and the American press had not even questioned him on it.

#### Atomic Weapons

The Chancellor said that the SPD takes the position that the Federal Republic should have no atomic weapons and that the Allies should not keep them on German territory. This view, the Chancellor said, was completely senseless. The Chancellor said that the United States, as the principal power which has undertaken the responsibility of protecting Germany, must have the right to determine its own weapons. The Chancellor felt that steps should be taken to make this point plain for all to understand. He suggested that between now and the time of his visit to the United States, the Secretary give some consideration to the kinds of statements which might be made.

The Secretary said that he had made a somewhat similar statement in his press conference that morning. He had wished to make clear his view that, unless an international agreement on disarmament can be obtained, the development of atomic weapons must continue. Naturally, all efforts for controlled disarmament must be made. But abstention from development of atomic weapons under present circumstances would be like undertaking to face any enemy's rifles with bows and arrows.

With reference to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, the Secretary said that he had been surprised and impressed by the reluctance of other Western nations to see atomic weapons abolished. It was his interpretation, the Secretary said, that these countries felt they might become increasingly dependent on Germany for their defense if atomic weapons should be abolished and their defense based entirely on conventional weapons. The Secretary noted that these countries appeared to prefer, for their defense, to be dependent on the United States rather than dependent on Germany. The Chancellor replied that this thought had not previously occurred to him.

#### German Relations With France



Von Brentano said that he had received no hint of such a feeling from French Foreign Minister Pineau, with whom he had had a completely frank conversation that morning. He said that Pineau's feeling, on the contrary, was that the defense of Europe should not be left entirely to non-continental-European powers, and should not be allowed to depend too greatly upon Great Britain, in particular.

The Chancellor said that his main concern in the military field was with relations with the United Kingdom, and that there were no reasons for worrying about relations with the French. He referred to confidential conversations and exchanges of letters with Premier Mollet some time ago, and said that it had been agreed that French and German military staffs and individual officers be brought together as much as possible, to prevent the development of differences. Strauss emphasized this by referring to the Protocol of January 18, 1957 on technical military cooperation between France and Germany, which confirmed this proposal and established a committee.

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#### German Relations With Italy

German Relations With Italy

The Chancellor said that, likewise, the Federal Republic's relations with Italy, including his personal relations with Italian statesmen, could hardly be better. He had assured Foreign Minister Martino that Italy would not be pushed aside as a weaker power. He also enjoyed excellent relations with Segni and Fanfani. The Secretary remarked that Fanfani was indeed a good man, .....

The Secretary said he felt the Western nations should consider having the Italians participate more fully on matters which could be handled on a five-power basis. The Chancellor said that he could indeed understand Italy's feelings in this respect. Von Brentano, however, suggested that any steps in this direction must be taken with caution, because of the parallel feelings of the Benelux nations. He noted that there had been many signs of jealousy on their part resulting from Germany's excellent relations with France. The Chancellor stated, conclusively, that good German-French relations were of first importance, and that other nations would have to accommodate themselves to this principle.

The discussion then proceeded to a number of points which the Chancellor had listed on a personally hand-written agenda.

Soviet Penetration of the Mediterranean

Indicating that he had not yet had a chance to discuss this matter with von Brentano, the Chancellor said he was concerned that the NATO Ministerial Conference had failed to discuss Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean area and the consequent dangers, particularly for Italy. He said that Segni had brought this up with him years before. The Chancellor continued that Soviet designs on the Mediterranean area, part of a vast pincer movement against Western Europe, were presumably one of the bases for the recent Soviet intervention in the Middle East crisis.

The Middle East

The Secretary said that there was no doubt about Soviet ambitions to obtain control of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The German documents captured in Berlin showed that conversations between Molotov and Hitler regarding a possible division of the world into three spheres of influence had broken up on the

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issue of Molotov's insistence on control of the Persian Gulf area. At the first Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 1945, furthermore, Molotov had demanded a Soviet trusteeship of Tripolitania.

The Secretary said that the Soviets had undoubtedly made some progress in penetrating Egypt and Syria,

Now that the United States had taken the problem of the Middle East in hand, however, the Secretary expected a reduction of Soviet influence in the long run.

the United States believed that the problems of the Middle East could be peacefully worked out in time and Soviet influence reduced. He said that the beginnings of a reduction of Soviet influence in Jordan could now be perceived, and there was a much improved relationship with Saudi Arabia. He expected that the situations in Syria and Egypt would eventually change to Western advantage. The whole problem of Soviet influence in the Middle East would be easy to handle, the Secretary continued, if it were not for Israeli-Arab enmity. In summary, the Secretary felt that, with inevitable fluctuations, the trend in the Middle East problem was toward improvement.

#### Economic Assistance in the Middle East

The Federal Republic ought to be able to assist in extending economic assistance to the Middle East, the Secretary said to the Chancellor. Germany is now free from any colonial taint. On long-term economic development projects in this area, the Secretary said, the Federal Republic and the United States should work more closely together than has been the case in the past.

The Chancellor replied that he agreed to this general proposition, and that the Federal Republic was in principle prepared to proceed with projects. He referred to his recent visit to Tehran at the invitation of the Shah, a man who, he said, was to be taken seriously. The Shah had requested German-Iranian cooperation in the field of economic development, and in his reply the Chancellor had stated that it would be necessary to have capital participation from other countries, particularly the United States. In specific industrial projects, the Chancellor felt that German nationals should not take on the leading jobs--this would cause future difficulties in relations with Iran. The outcome of the discussions had been the formation of a joint committee of experts located in Iran and charged with formulation of specific recommendations. On the basis of such recommendations, the Chancellor would consult once again with the Shah. (The Secretary remarked at this point that the Iranians could use a tough German tax collector. The Chancellor: Should we give up Schaeffer?) The Chancellor noted that the British press had been "very impolite" about his visit to Iran, though he felt he could hardly have done anything there to arouse British antagonism.

The Iranians had demonstrated in their talks with the Chancellor particular interest in a project for a pipeline direct to Turkey (not through Iraq). The

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Chancellor said he hoped that, if the Germans should decide on some practical projects, the United States would be ready to participate in them also. The Secretary asked whether the Chancellor had in mind American governmental assistance or investment by private enterprise. The Chancellor said that he meant assistance through private investment, and the Secretary added he considered this to be better.

The Chancellor continued that he could not quite agree with the approach suggested by Special Ambassador Richards, who, he thought, was recommending too fast a start. For example, according to the Chancellor, Richards has suggested to the Iranians that they invest in a steel mill with the capacity of 300,000-400,000 tons--a project which the Chancellor considered totally unrealistic. The Secretary replied that this might have been a misunderstanding. The Chancellor said that he had heard this from the Shah, who had made a perfectly clear statement as he had just retold it. The Chancellor wondered whether the Iranians were exaggerating matters in order to encourage the Germans to take bolder steps. The Secretary said that this kind of thing had been done before, and that he was always glad to have such a cross-check on statements by third countries. The Chancellor then said that when he had gone into the matter more closely with the Shah, it had appeared to him that Richards must have been talking about steel mills in the United States.

#### Military Policy

The Chancellor said that he had received the news the previous day that Great Britain would no longer call up draftees from the class of 1940. If this had indeed now been stated so precisely by the British, the Chancellor said, then Germany was confronted by a very grave situation. The Chancellor said that he was currently very concerned by the mass of Soviet troops in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Recent British actions, said the Chancellor, had sharpened the necessity for him to clarify his views on atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr. (He commented in this connection that his views on this subject as published in the press were almost always subjected to some distortion, and he specifically named the London Times and Le Figaro as offending newspapers.) In the wake of the story of the scientists' statement on atomic weapons, and of the emotional reaction of the Evangelical Church, particularly under the leadership of Niemöller, he wanted to make plain once again the following points:

- 1) The Federal Republic has no atomic weapons.
- 2) The Federal Republic has not asked its allies for any atomic weapons.

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(But he emphasized that he had not stated that the Federal Republic never would acquire atomic weapons.)

- 3) According to his information, the United States has not yet achieved practical results in the production of tactical atomic weapons. The interim period, therefore, must be used to press for disarmament. Once tactical weapons become a reality, however, Germany should re-examine the situation.



#### British Military Leadership

The Chancellor said that he was now confronted with the following very serious situation: He understood that UK ground forces were to be deployed in the future from Kassel to the North Sea, while US forces were to be confined to the area south of Kassel. He had also heard from his German military advisers that Britain's military leaders, and particularly Montgomery, were adopting a strategy which was quite contrary to the US policy of forward defense. He was in general very much concerned with the trends in top British military leadership. His concern had been increased by a book published by two reputable French journalists with close connections in the French Ministry of Defense (Les Secrets de l'Expedition d'Egypte, by Beuve-Merry and Bromberger). The Chancellor said that this book presents British leadership in a fearful light, and he recommended that the Secretary read it. The Chancellor said that all these things, together with British intentions to reduce forces in northern Germany, left him acutely worried about the security of the North German plain. The Russians, he said, have 7,200 tanks in the Soviet Zone, and might be tempted to push into this area if it should be stripped of its defenses.

The Chancellor, therefore, wished to request that a certain number of United States combat units be attached to the German division stationed in Hannover. He felt that only in this way would there be sufficient security for northern Germany, since the presence of American troops would surely be a deterrent to the Soviets.

The Secretary replied that the basis for these British steps was, as he had said on May 1, the historical change occurring in the status of Great Britain as a world power. The Secretary wished to make it clear, however, that he did not consider the UK as a factor to be written off as negligible. He said that, despite the Suez fiasco, the US military consider the British to be competent and dependable. Weaknesses in British military performance in the Suez affair had been due, at least in part, to an effort to preserve the secrecy of the undertaking at the outset. Eden had been a sick man. The Secretary continued that he felt that Macmillan was a good, strong, and dependable person; and that one should not conclude, on the basis of Suez or of French-oriented or other journalistic reports, that the British forces were other than dependable and brave.

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The Chancellor replied that the virtues of British troops should not be confused with the qualities of British military leadership. He was greatly concerned, the Chancellor continued, at Montgomery's proposals for "defense in depth", which had been expressed as a matter of moving Belgian troops back to

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Belgium, Dutch troops back to the Netherlands, etc. General Heusinger amplified this statement by describing the recent NATO exercise at which Montgomery had projected possible defense actions in a theoretical attack situation in 1965. Heusinger said that Montgomery had thoroughly supported the thesis expressed in the White Paper. Heusinger added that General Norstad had indeed stressed the theory of the "forward strategy", but Heusinger had been surprised that Norstad had not countered Montgomery's presentation in much more detail. The Secretary assured the Chancellor that such opinions expressed by Montgomery were not shared by the US Government, and said it was his impression that they were also not shared in many responsible quarters of the British Government. The Chancellor said that he hoped not, but added that the British have never done anything about Montgomery.

### Defense Strategy

The Secretary said he believed that the defense of Germany and Western Europe cannot be left entirely to the deterrent of massive atomic counter-attack. Depending on the situation, there would be powerful moral considerations against a massive retaliation on Moscow which would annihilate millions of people. There was a definite development, however, toward nuclear tactical weapons with far greater power than conventional tactical weapons. The time would arrive fairly soon, though it had not arrived yet, when forces equipped with such weapons, if stationed on a national border, might make virtually impossible invasion by hostile forces. Though this development was by no means yet complete, the Secretary believed that the trend was therefore away from defense by massive retaliation and toward defense by tactical atomic weapons.

### Disarmament

The Secretary said that he doubted whether it would be possible to obtain an agreement on controlled disarmament which would abolish atomic weapons, since this new form of power was bound to be utilized in the field of armaments. He did believe, however, that it might be possible to reach agreement on control of the means of delivery of atomic explosives, i.e. on control of weapons of mass destruction in contrast to tactical atomic weapons. The Secretary felt that this was the most likely direction in which the London Disarmament Conference might achieve some kind of positive result on controls.

The Chancellor repeated his concern about the United Kingdom's placing all reliance on massive retaliation. In the light of the British inclination to pull out of the North German plain even in the absence of an agreement on controlled disarmament, the Chancellor felt that there was a genuine chance of the Soviets' moving into the plain if there were no US forces stationed there. General Heusinger gave a brief presentation on the strategic importance of the North German plain. Strauss stated his conviction that neither Soviet nor satellite forces would attack this area if it involved the risk of tangling directly with United States forces, and said that the specific German request was that two US combat teams be relocated from south to north Germany.

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The Secretary stated that on these military matters he could not express an opinion, but assumed that the Germans would be discussing them with General Norstad.

#### Soviet Embassy's Note of May 4

During the course of the conversation, Ambassador Smirnov's note of May 4 to the Chancellor was delivered. An interpreter was called in and he rendered a rough oral translation which was the basis for the provisional report of this note in Embassy telegram No. 4289 of May 4. The Chancellor reacted in particular to the allegation in the note that he and von Brentano had said the Federal Republic should possess atomic weapons if other Western powers acquired them. He retorted: "I never said that."



As soon as the note had been read, the Chancellor remarked that he was not sure whether the Federal Republic should proceed with commercial negotiations with the Soviet Union. If we should start them, he said, perhaps we shall see to it that they are dragged out. There would have to be some trade with the Soviet bloc, of course, but the Chancellor did not think that it should be allowed to grow too large. The Secretary concurred. The Chancellor said he would have to study Smirnov's note further, but that he thought the Soviet note of April 27 was outrageous.

The Secretary said that, if the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister would allow him to do von Brentano's work for a moment, he could suggest the lines of a reply which he would make to the May 4 note if he were in the latter's position. The Federal Republic, the Secretary suggested, might state that it has one great responsibility to itself and to humanity: to ensure that its territory is not used as a base for any aggression. This responsibility the Federal Republic will scrupulously discharge. As for the means of its own defense, however, the Federal Republic will not accept the dictates of any country; least of all of a country which forcibly holds some 20 million Germans in bondage. As for the reference to policy on disarmament, the Secretary concluded in his suggestion, this subject was being negotiated in conference at London and the Federal Republic will observe any agreement reached there.

#### Relations With Poland

The Chancellor asked the Secretary about the course to be set for relations with Poland. The Secretary replied that it was difficult to judge the degree of independence achieved by the Gomulka regime. The Secretary was inclined to believe that there had been some beginnings of Polish independence which deserved some encouragement--though this should not be overdone. Referring to the aid negotiations, the Secretary said that the United States may be disposed to extend a certain amount of economic aid, designed to encourage whatever additional degree of independence might be practicable in Poland and possibly in other satellite countries. This had not been an easy decision to reach, the United States Government was not entirely sure about the decision

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it was taking, but it did have a certain amount of confidence in the wisdom of its decision.

The Chancellor replied that it might therefore appear appropriate for the Federal Republic cautiously to envisage the establishment of additional economic relations with Poland.

#### European Unity and the Role of Great Britain

Von Brentano said that he had had a very useful conversation that morning with Pineau on ratification of the Rome Treaty and allied subjects, and on their common concern about the United Kingdom's position. The UK, von Brentano said, had been exerting an unfortunate pressure on France in two respects: (1) The British had been urging the French to reach agreement on the Free Trade Area prior to ratification of the treaty on the Common Market. Von Brentano had agreed with Pineau that this would be impossible--negotiation of the Common Market treaty had taken some 18 months, and it was obvious that negotiations on the Free Trade Area would also last for months. This British intervention, therefore, could have only a very unfortunate psychological effect on the French with respect to prospects for ratification of the Common Market treaty. (2) Von Brentano also considered British advocacy of the so-called "Grand Design" as unfortunate. He felt that this was not a good scheme, and that it could only have the effect of destroying prospects for practicable projects toward European unity. Von Brentano said that Pineau had fully agreed with him on this point. Von Brentano explained that one of the most questionable aspects of the "Grand Design" was that it was proposed as including all the NATO countries in its membership. He said that he did not know whether the United States and Canada would be willing to join the proposed single great assembly, whereupon the Chancellor interjected: "We would not join it."

The Secretary replied that the United States Government shares some of this concern regarding the British moves.

[The Secretary said that he agreed that there are some tendencies to endanger the prospects for practical European projects by superimposing rather vague, more generalized plans. The United States Government, he assured the Chancellor, would not participate in such maneuvers, and specifically had no intention of joining the "Grand Design".]

Von Brentano confirmed that he and Pineau had agreed not to accept the British proposal regarding the Free Trade Area. Their position would be that the Common Market treaty should be ratified first and as soon as possible, and that negotiations on the Free Trade Area should then proceed.

The Secretary said that the United States Government strongly supported the Common Market, and did not wish any position on its own part to interfere

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with the prospects for ratification of this treaty. If the Common Market treaty should not be ratified soon, he said, there would be great discouragement in the United States about European unity. As long as Western Europe remains divided, the Secretary said, it appears to the American public either as subject to being captured by the Russians or as representing some kind of charge on the U. S. which the American public is not prepared to carry indefinitely. A united Europe, by contrast, could be as powerful as the United States or the Soviet Union. Complete sovereignty for the many nations of Europe, said the Secretary, is a luxury which European countries can no longer afford at U. S. expense. If the Common Market treaty should fail, after the failure of the EDC, the Secretary thought that further support for Europe could hardly be expected from American public opinion.

The Chancellor said that the German process of ratification should be completed at the end of June. Von Brentano mentioned that the French Government also hoped to meet this deadline, but he had heard that the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, had been making representations toward delaying the French schedule on ratification. The Secretary suggested that the Chancellor discuss this matter with Macmillan during the latter's forthcoming visit.

#### Support Costs

The Secretary said he hoped that President Eisenhower's most recent proposal on support costs would be found acceptable by the Chancellor.



Von Brentano replied that the Federal Government would, of course, like to reach agreement as soon as possible, but the difficulty was that parliamentary approval was required for each separate agreement on support costs. If the US-German agreement should contain a reservation, the Bundestag would undoubtedly object on the grounds that other countries would demand similar consideration. Hence there could be no certainty about keeping the Federal Government's total contribution down to the definite sum envisaged by the Bundestag. Under the present budgetary situation, the Bundestag could hardly be expected to grant more than last year's total contribution. The Federal Government had indeed made a generous offer to the British, von Brentano said, and this had been partly because the Secretary had encouraged it to do so.

The Secretary replied that he hoped the Germans realized that the United States Government was also faced with parliamentary difficulties in this matter. The Congress had become excited about the support costs issue, and this was admittedly to a certain degree attributable to certain Defense officials who were anxious to free funds for other projects. The point in the President's proposal, the Secretary said, was that the residual problem for this year could be dealt with after the parliamentary recesses on both sides and after the German elections. The United States Government could emphasize to the Congress the reservation in the proposed agreement; while the Federal Government would be in a position to assure the Bundestag that it was committed to make no further payment without the agreement of the Bundestag.

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Von Brentano

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Von Brentano asked if it would not be possible for both sides to agree on the figure offered by the Germans, since a formula could undoubtedly be found which would not exclude later discussions. The Secretary said that he believed there was agreement on this point, but Hallstein pointed out that there was still one difficulty in the US proposal: namely, that the first payment was characterized as "on account". This implied that a later payment must be made, Hallstein said, and the implication would undoubtedly be unacceptable to the Bundestag. The Secretary said that it had not been our intention now to obtain an implied obligation to make a further payment, but simply to find a formula on later discussions which would be acceptable to both parliaments.



#### Stinnes Properties

Von Brentano said that he had heard from Washington of the U. S. decision to proceed with sales of the vested Stinnes properties, and wishes to make again an urgent plea that such sales be delayed until after the German elections. The Chancellor added that it should not be forgotten that Stinnes had numerous socialist connections.

The Secretary asked if it would not be possible to solve this problem by organizing a group of German interests who would purchase the properties to be sold. Hallstein replied that such a group had indeed already been organized, but Krekeler explained that it was not clear to what extent such a group would be legally in a position to purchase. Less than 50 per cent of the securities were apparently legally unencumbered for such sale. Krekeler expressed the view that a delay of some months in disposition of the properties, affording time to negotiate, would provide desirable clarifications for both sides. The Secretary said that both the President and he had discussed this matter with the Attorney General. There were many complex regulations affecting this sale under legislation administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which make delay costly. The Secretary felt confident, however, that a solution to the question would be found through purchase by a German group. He pointed out that, for the first time, exceptions to previous practice were now possible so as to permit purchase of vested German properties by German interests.

#### Status of Forces Negotiations

The Secretary stated briefly to von Brentano (as the meeting adjourned to the luncheon table) the US position favoring a continuation of the negotiations.

#### Effects of Atomic Radiation

Particularly in the light of the forthcoming Bundestag debate on the subject, the Chancellor told the Secretary that it would be most helpful to the Federal Government to obtain from the United States as much factual material as possible which would demonstrate the limits to the effects of nuclear radiation on human beings.

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Proposed Visit

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Proposed Visit of Nuclear Scientist

In the presence of the Chancellor, the Secretary suggested to Ambassador Bruce that steps be taken within the coming weeks to get a top-ranking and prominent American nuclear scientist to visit Germany.



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1957  
Time: Noon  
Place: Hotel Matignon, Paris  
(Prime Minister's Office)

Participants:

United States

Secretary Dulles  
Ambassador Houghton  
Assistant Secretary C. Burke Elbrick  
Mr. Charles W. Yost  
Mr. William R. Tyler

France

G. Mollet  
C. Pinson  
L. Joux  
J. Lalay  
P. Schillescu  
P. De Beaumarchais

Copies to: S/S, G, W, EIR, U/MR, S/AE, MRA, Embassy Paris (2), Embassy Cairo, Embassy Bonn.

After the usual amenities, the Secretary opened the conversation by saying that the Mutual Security appropriation was being considered by Congress and that the US Government was encountering some difficulties. He said that there was a strong feeling in Congress in favor of making economies and that the President was personally making considerable efforts in support of the appropriations request. The Prime Minister asked whether Europe would be affected much by any cuts that would be made by Congress. The Secretary said that Europe would be affected to a certain extent, in the field of new weapons for NATO. He went on to describe the new organization of the Foreign Aid Program which was to be divided more sharply between the strictly defense and the economic development aspects. The Prime Minister returned to the subject of the effect on Europe of any cuts, and asked specifically whether these might bring about a change in the strength of US forces in Europe. The Secretary said that the latter would not necessarily be affected since they were financed by the regular Defense Budget. At this point the Secretary told the Prime Minister that he had already stated at the NATO meeting that the US Government adhered to the position it had taken in December 1956 and

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to \_\_\_\_\_  
☐ With concurrence of \_\_\_\_\_  
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there was no intention at this time to make any significant reduction in US military strength in Europe. He said there would be some streamlining of US divisions everywhere in the world (some reduction of support elements), not exclusively in Europe.

There followed a brief discussion of the achievements of the recent NATO meeting in Bonn and it was agreed on both sides that it had been a good meeting.

Mr. Pineau then raised the subject of integrated nuclear equipment for NATO. He stressed the importance of this in the French view and said that it would be particularly effective as a reply to Soviet propaganda. Mr. Pineau recalled that he had raised this subject at the NATO meeting. The Secretary answered that he was aware of the French view. He thought that it was an interesting idea which should be studied carefully and that it might be possible that we should be able to do something. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of nuclear weapons for Germany. The Secretary said he had had a long talk with Chancellor Adenauer before leaving Bonn. He added that the subject of nuclear equipment is very complicated and that Mr. Adenauer himself was not sufficiently familiar with this field to be able to reply to the Soviet notes on the subject. The Secretary said the question of nuclear weapons was of great importance with regard to the forthcoming German elections, to which the Prime Minister replied that it was more than a political problem, for if Germany were to refuse equipment with atomic weapons, this would have an extremely adverse effect on the whole Western defense picture. The Secretary commented on the rapid current evolution of nuclear weapons, which is moving so fast that it renders the problem even more difficult. He said that formerly atomic weapons were capable only of being produced in such a way as to make a "big bang". Now, he said, smaller weapons were being developed which were susceptible of tactical utilization and were "clean" in the sense of minimizing radio-active fallout. These smaller weapons would be developed and this meant that one could look forward to the day when the present popular revulsion against the idea of huge nuclear weapons will yield to an acceptance of the protection which smaller and cleaner weapons would afford against a potential aggressor. The Prime Minister said that the smaller the weapons the more necessary it was that they should be readily located for use in Europe rather than being kept far away. He said that this was the basic change in the situation. He went on to define the three principles bearing on the problem of nuclear weapons with regard to Europe:

- a) The necessity of maintaining US troops, not merely as troops but as human beings, in Europe;
- b) The impossibility of relying exclusively on nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe;
- c) The necessity of having nuclear weapons available in Europe itself.

Mr. Pineau added briefly that it was necessary not only to have nuclear weapons but the training required to utilize them.

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The Secretary asked the Prime Minister how things were going in Algeria. The Prime Minister said that from a military standpoint things were improving but that the real issue, which is the political aspect, was not progressing as well. He said that the rebel leaders had not taken up the French Government offer for a cease-fire and were waiting for various reasons: for another session of the UN, or for a change of Government in France, or for some similar event. The Prime Minister said he thought that this negative approach was due largely to the following factors:

- a) The National Liberation Front was divided within itself;
- b) The rebels do not feel that it is in their interests to accept a cease-fire, although it undoubtedly is in the interest of the civilian population;
- c) The majority of the Algerian fighters are very young men, who preferred continuing to fight to looking for industrial jobs in metropolitan France. He added that for them the prospects of a democratic and viable society in Algeria held little practical attraction.

The Prime Minister went on to say the only thing the French Government could do was to persevere in its present course of action. He said that in the last few months over 1500 new municipalities had been created, and that while there had been some obstacles, on the whole, things were moving forward more smoothly in this respect. He said that progress was not being made in territorial and provincial organization. He said that in general it was very difficult to find Moslems who had real political authority and were in a position of carrying out in fact any commitments they might be willing to accept.

The Secretary recalled that in a speech earlier this year, the Prime Minister had said that the French Government would hold elections in Algeria. Mr. Pinson commented that elections would be held only after a cease-fire had taken place. The Prime Minister said that it would be possible as of now to hold municipal and even territorial elections, but that he had not taken a decision to hold them, because it would be claimed that any elections held now were not free but had been held under the threat of the French Army. He said that it was the intention of the French Government that elections should eventually be held in the presence of observers from various democratic countries.

The Secretary commented that there was another difficult problem: that of Cyprus, which had some similarities with that of Algeria. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister seemed reluctant to agree that the resemblances were anything more than superficial.

Turning

M. Selwyn Lloyd a rappelé qu'il restait fidèle au plan franco-britannique, tel qu'il a été amendé en 1955<sup>(1)</sup>.

La seule indication donnée à la presse sur ce débat a été que le Conseil atlantique avait été unanime pour estimer qu'il fallait continuer à rechercher un accord de désarmement offrant des garanties suffisantes.

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M. BOUSQUET, AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE À BRUXELLES,  
À M. PINEAU, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.

T. n° 432.

Bruxelles, 6 mai 1957<sup>(2)</sup>.

La presse belge, et notamment la *Libre Belgique* consacre depuis quelques jours des articles au « grand dessein de M. Selwyn Lloyd »<sup>(3)</sup>.

Elle se pose la question de savoir si, en proposant un regroupement des assemblées européennes, Londres ne « tente pas d'empêcher la formation d'un bloc continental ». Elle rappelle qu'il y a cinq ans, dès avant que « l'Europe des Six ne soit en train de s'unir », M. Eden était intervenu à Strasbourg avec un plan, « sorte d'ultimatum adressé aux fédérateurs ». Ce plan avait pour objet d'obtenir que la Communauté charbon-acier fût « incorporée à la Grande Europe des Quinze, où, grâce à l'appui du bloc scandinave, Londres escomptait la majorité ».

Aujourd'hui, « c'est à une manœuvre analogue qu'a recouru la diplomatie anglaise ». Il y a cinq ans, l'Angleterre s'efforçait de noyer la Petite Europe des Six dans une Grande Europe où le veto anglais se serait exercé. Maintenant, le gouvernement britannique propose d'unifier tous les organismes européens en un seul « sous prétexte de les rationaliser »... « Les États-Unis et le Canada seraient proclamés « Européens » pour les besoins de la cause. De la sorte, la diplomatie anglaise supprime le concept européen et transforme l'Organisation européenne en un succédané de l'Alliance atlantique où les Anglo-Américains ont la prépondérance ».

En réalité, selon la *Libre Belgique*, « le plan anglais est bien un plan antieuropéen qui vise à « déseuropéaniser » le système actuel. Et les soupçons qui se manifestent dans les rangs des Européens ont quelque fondement. Et le journal de rappeler que des voix nombreuses et autorisées proposent, en Grande-Bretagne, sous forme plus ou moins déguisée,

<sup>(1)</sup> Sur ce plan, voir D.D.F., 1955-I, n° 208 (note).

<sup>(2)</sup> En clair, par porteur.

<sup>(3)</sup> Sur ce « grand dessein », voir ci-dessous les n° 202 (note), 292, 352.

l'absorption de tel ou tel petit pays européen, notamment du Portugal, dans le « système économique britannique ».

Cependant, le chancelier Adenauer s'oppose énergiquement « au grand dessein ». La « décision britannique de retirer partiellement les effectifs anglais d'outre-Rhin<sup>(1)</sup> » n'a pas contribué à créer en Allemagne un climat de confiance ».

Au cours de mes conversations avec MM. Spaak et Rothschild, j'ai pu mesurer combien l'un et l'autre sont réticents à l'égard du « Grand dessein » et combien leurs préoccupations rejoignent celles des milieux officiels allemands dont fait état M. Couve de Murville dans son télégramme n° 1153 à 1162<sup>(2)</sup>.

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## COMPTE RENDU

*Conversation à l'hôtel Matignon, lundi 6 mai 1957, entre M. Dulles, d'une part, et M. Guy Mollet, président du Conseil des ministres, et M. Christian Pineau, ministre des Affaires étrangères, d'autre part.*

N. Secret.

M. Dulles dit combien il est heureux de l'occasion que lui donne la réunion des ambassadeurs d'Amérique à Paris, pour avoir une conversation avec le chef du gouvernement français, puisque, contrairement à l'habitude, la réunion du Conseil de l'Atlantique s'est tenue à Bonn et non à Paris<sup>(3)</sup>.

## I. Programme américain d'aide à l'étranger.

M. Dulles indique que le gouvernement des États-Unis traverse actuellement une période difficile dans ses relations avec le Congrès. Des pressions extrêmement vives s'exercent au Parlement américain pour obtenir une réduction des crédits d'aide à l'étranger. Le président des États-Unis, qui prend une part personnelle très active à cette affaire, tente un effort majeur pour éviter des réductions trop sensibles des crédits demandés. M. Dulles pense que des réductions massives seront évitées, mais que certaines réductions seront inévitables.

<sup>(1)</sup> Sur cette décision et ses suites, voir ci-dessus les n° 133 (et note), 183 (note), 202, 228, 234, 235, 241, 244.

<sup>(2)</sup> Du 24 avril, ci-dessus reproduit sous le n° 330.

<sup>(3)</sup> À la suite de la session du Conseil atlantique à Bonn, les 2 et 3 mai, et avant de regagner Washington, M. Foster Dulles s'était rendu à Paris, le 6 mai, pour présider une réunion des ambassadeurs américains en Europe. Il rencontrait le même jour, à midi, MM. Guy Mollet et Christian Pineau.

Sur la réunion du Conseil de l'Atlantique à Bonn, voir ci-dessus les n° 133 (et note), 183 (note), 202, 228, 234, 235, 241, 244.

M. Mollet demande quels seront éventuellement les effets de ces réductions de crédits d'aide sur l'Europe.

M. Dulles répond que ces réductions seront sans doute peu sensibles. Mais elles affecteront incontestablement la fourniture des armes nouvelles si les diminutions de crédits dépassent un certain niveau.

Pour se défendre plus efficacement et vigoureusement, le gouvernement américain sera amené à définir plus précisément les aspects économiques et les aspects militaires du programme d'aide à l'étranger, et probablement à le scinder en deux programmes. Parfois, la fusion des aspects économiques et militaires facilite le vote global du Congrès. Après mûres réflexions, il apparaît au président Eisenhower et à ses collaborateurs que, dans les circonstances présentes, il y a intérêt à délimiter les aspects militaires et économiques de l'aide à l'étranger.

M. Mollet demande si les réductions de dépenses affecteront les forces américaines stationnées en Europe.

M. Dulles répond que les dépenses entraînées par les forces américaines en Europe sont couvertes par le budget de la Défense et non par le programme d'aide; elles ne seront donc pas affectées. Le gouvernement américain n'a aucunement l'intention de réduire les forces américaines en Europe. Mais il a actuellement une étude portant réforme de la dimension des divisions. C'est une politique générale, applicable partout où existent des troupes américaines, destinée à rendre les unités divisionnaires plus efficaces et plus mobiles. Mais, pour le moment, le gouvernement de Washington n'envisage pas de réduction de ses effectifs en Europe.

M. Dulles, néanmoins, considère que l'exemple donné par le gouvernement britannique<sup>(1)</sup> ne peut être sans conséquence sur l'opinion du Congrès américain, où il constitue un précédent fâcheux propre à entraîner une réaction en chaîne.

M. Mollet souligne que des conséquences encore plus graves peuvent en découler en Allemagne.

## II. Réunion de l'O.T.A.N.

M. Dulles estime que la dernière réunion du Conseil de l'O.T.A.N. est une des meilleures et des plus fructueuses qui aient jamais été tenues. Les discussions ont été très franches et très ouvertes. Des questions très pertinentes ont été posées et seront mises à l'étude.

M. Mollet et M. Pineau rappellent l'importance attachée par le gouvernement français à la question d'un armement atomique intégré en Europe, à la disposition du commandant suprême de l'O.T.A.N., et entreposé dès le temps de paix en Europe. Le président du Conseil souligne qu'il s'agit là d'une affaire extrêmement importante vis-à-vis de l'opinion publique européenne. Il s'agit d'une part de l'efficacité de l'Alliance atlantique, et d'autre part de répondre au problème particulier posé par

(1) Sur le projet des Britanniques de réduction de leurs forces sur le continent, voir ci-dessus les nos 133 (et note), 183 (note), 202, 228, 234, 235, 241, 244.

l'Allemagne. C'est enfin la meilleure réponse possible aux manœuvres des Soviétiques, qui portent sur les risques nationaux de l'armement atomique.

M. Dulles répond qu'il a pris bonne note de la question posée par M. Pineau à Bonn : il reconnaît là un problème important que son gouvernement est tout à fait disposé à étudier, car il y a peut-être en effet quelque chose à faire dans cette voie.

M. Dulles indique qu'il a eu sur les questions atomiques une conversation de près de trois heures avec le Chancelier fédéral allemand, qu'il a trouvé très embarrassé pour préparer sa réponse aux Soviétiques<sup>(1)</sup>. Le Chancelier fédéral se trouve en présence d'un problème très important sur le plan électoral; mais son embarras s'explique en particulier par sa connaissance insuffisante du sujet.

M. Mollet rappelle qu'il n'y a pas là seulement un problème électoral, mais une question essentielle en elle-même, à laquelle la solution d'un armement atomique européen intégré est la seule réponse possible.

M. Dulles explique qu'il a montré au Chancelier fédéral que la pensée militaire et le planning militaire en Occident étaient en pleine transformation. Il y a quelques années, la défense de l'Europe et du monde libre était fondée sur la menace de représailles atomiques massives (*massive retaliation*), parce que le seul usage connu de la bombe atomique était la destruction massive (*big bang*). À présent, l'on s'oriente vers l'usage d'armes atomiques tactiques qui seront utilisables sur des objectifs militaires délimités et précisés. Il s'agit d'armes aux effets plus précis et plus limités, vis-à-vis desquelles les critiques morales et humanitaires sont moins pertinentes puisque les ravages qu'elles exerceront pourront être circonscrits. Il s'agit, en quelque sorte, d'armes plus « nettes » dans leur effet (*more clean*). En particulier, ces armes n'auront pas les effets si désastreux sur la vie humaine du strontium. Dans quelques années, l'Europe pourra donc être protégée non plus par la menace de représailles massives mais par des armes classiques transformées, placées sur la route de l'envahisseur éventuel.

C'est dans cette perspective que les expériences d'armes nucléaires, qui font aujourd'hui l'objet des critiques soviétiques, prennent toute leur importance. Ces expériences sont en effet indispensables pour mettre ces armes nouvelles au point.

M. Mollet montre combien la mise au point et l'utilisation de ces armes atomiques tactiques militent encore davantage en faveur de leur stockage intégré en Europe.

M. Dulles répond qu'en principe il en va bien ainsi, mais ces armes ne sont pas encore fabriquées en quantité suffisante. En attendant leur mise en place, il faut bien continuer à fonder la défense sur la menace de représailles massives. Mais l'accent va être mis dans l'avenir de plus

(1) Entendons la réponse à la note soviétique du 19 avril, qui mettait en garde le gouvernement allemand contre un réarmement atomique : voir ci-dessus le n° 348 (note).

en plus vers l'usage et les possibilités offertes par les armes atomiques tactiques.

M. Mollet montre à M. Dulles que la thèse française sur le problème de la défense européenne est fondée sur trois principes :

1° Nécessité d'une présence américaine en Europe. Il n'est pas important seulement que l'Amérique entretienne des moyens de combat sur le continent européen. Il est indispensable aussi qu'elle soit humainement représentée : d'où l'importance du problème numérique des effectifs.

2° Impossibilité de se fier aux seules armes atomiques. Les armements classiques restent indispensables. L'Europe ne peut, en effet, prendre le risque de se trouver un jour devant une difficulté locale où elle n'aurait plus à choisir qu'entre une guerre atomique généralisée et la capitulation devant les exigences des Soviétiques.

3° Nécessité de stocker les armes atomiques, surtout les armes tactiques sur la ligne où, dès le temps de paix, est organisée la défense.

M. Pineau souligne l'importance d'une part de l'intégration européenne de l'armement atomique et d'autre part de la formation technique du personnel qui sera amené à l'utiliser.

### III. Algérie.

M. Mollet expose à M. Dulles, à la demande de celui-ci, l'évolution des choses en Algérie.

La situation militaire est excellente, meilleure qu'elle n'a jamais été. Les rebelles n'ont plus aucun espoir s'ils l'ont jamais entretenu, d'imposer à la France une solution par la force. Mais il faut reconnaître que le règlement véritable du problème algérien est à rechercher dans l'ordre social, économique et politique. Or, peu de progrès ont été accomplis dans ce domaine parce que les chefs de la rébellion — ou ceux qui se disent tels, car leurs luttes et leurs rivalités intestines sont intenses — se contentent pour l'instant d'attendre. Ils attendent une décision nouvelle des Nations Unies; ils attendent un changement de gouvernement à Paris; ils attendent une modification de l'état d'esprit au Parlement français; ils attendent l'usure française. Aucun effort n'est tenté de leur côté pour répondre aux offres françaises. Non seulement on ne répond pas aux offres, mais on nie même du côté de la rébellion qu'elles aient jamais été faites. Chaque fois que, par intermédiaires, des contacts ont été pris avec certaines personnalités rebelles, la preuve a été demandée par le gouvernement français du caractère représentatif et de l'autorité de ces personnalités, celles-ci se sont toujours dérobées devant l'épreuve. L'explication tient au fait que ce que la France offre à l'Algérie intéresse non les combattants armés, mais la population. Il s'agit donc de trouver un moyen de permettre à la population d'exprimer ses sentiments véritables.

Les éléments armés de la rébellion sont essentiellement composés de très jeunes gens : près de 50 % de la population en Algérie a moins de 20 ans. Entre une existence relativement misérable d'ouvriers dans l'industrie en France ou en Algérie, et le prestige de la rébellion, beau-

coup de jeunes Algériens n'hésitent pas. Dans la rébellion, ils trouvent de l'argent, des armes qui ont toujours tant d'attraction pour les Arabes. Ils trouvent dans l'insurrection *the best of life*. L'appel de la construction démocratique de l'Algérie, du développement économique et de la paix ne porte guère sur eux. Il n'y a donc que peu d'espoir d'obtenir rapidement une réponse aux offres françaises. Cette réponse ne pourrait venir que des chefs civils et politiques de l'insurrection. Il n'est pas certain que ceux-ci seraient suivis dans une tentative de pacification, alors qu'ils sont suivis lorsqu'ils prêchent la guerre.

En attendant, la France fait un effort considérable pour implanter en Algérie des réformes. 1.500 municipalités nouvelles ont été constituées, associant musulmans et Européens à la gestion des villes et des bourgs. Il est arrivé parfois que l'expérience se soit soldée par un insuccès et que les musulmans participant à la réforme soient assassinés. Mais progressivement, néanmoins, nous passons de l'organisation municipale à l'organisation territoriale et provinciale, dans la perspective d'une certaine organisation fédérale de l'Algérie.

Ainsi, nous ne pouvons travailler que petit à petit à rétablir progressivement la paix jusqu'à ce que la population, prenant conscience de ses intérêts véritables, se sépare toujours davantage des rebelles.

Il y a donc des différences profondes entre l'insurrection algérienne et les mouvements nationalistes que l'on a connus en Tunisie et au Maroc. En Tunisie, le mouvement nationaliste était solidement encadré par un parti politique bien constitué et relativement moderne, efficacement dirigé par un chef rompu aux méthodes occidentales. Au Maroc, il fallait tenir compte d'un sentiment national qui n'avait en fait jamais cessé d'exister et d'une allégeance religieuse au Sultan, qui donnaient au mouvement nationaliste une cohésion qu'il n'a pas ailleurs.

M. Dulles rappelle que l'an dernier, le gouvernement français envisageait de tenir des élections en Algérie et demande si, à cet égard, les intentions de M. Mollet restent les mêmes.

M. Mollet précise qu'il serait parfaitement possible, actuellement, de tenir des élections locales dans plusieurs zones de l'Algérie. Le gouvernement français hésite parce que la rébellion proclamerait partout que ces élections sont tenues sous la pression de l'armée et qu'elles sont sans valeur. Dans ces conditions, le gouvernement français préfère attendre qu'interviennent des cessez-le-feu locaux en nombre suffisant jusqu'à ce que puissent être tenues des élections à l'observation desquelles seront invitées des représentants d'états amis neutres.

M. Dulles se demande si la situation à laquelle la France fait face en Algérie n'est pas comparable à celle de la Grande-Bretagne à Chypre.

M. Mollet et M. Pineau montrent que les situations sont radicalement différentes. Il n'y a pas de population anglaise à Chypre. Tout au plus, pourrait-on comparer le problème algérien à celui que pose la juxtaposition dans l'île de Chypre de deux communautés, turque et grecque, dont il faut assurer la coexistence pacifique.

M. Dulles veut simplement dire qu'il y a similarité dans la difficulté de maintenir ou de rétablir l'ordre public devant le terrorisme.

M. Mollet exprime sa confiance dans l'issue du conflit en Algérie, mais il répète que les choses vont très lentement et ne peuvent qu'aller très lentement.

#### IV. Suez.

M. Dulles rappelle que le gouvernement américain a mené avec l'Égypte des conversations sur le mémorandum du gouvernement du Caire relatif à la gestion du canal de Suez<sup>(1)</sup>. Le gouvernement américain a mené ces conversations sans jamais se donner le caractère de représentant de la communauté des usagers, mais uniquement pour faire quelques suggestions propres à améliorer le texte égyptien.

Il y a quinze jours environ, le gouvernement britannique a demandé l'arrêt des conversations. Sachant qu'il lui serait indispensable, pour des raisons économiques, d'utiliser le Canal, le gouvernement britannique était soucieux d'aller rapidement au Conseil de sécurité et de faire entériner un régime même provisoire.

Le gouvernement américain a posé au gouvernement anglais la question de savoir si celui-ci serait disposé à boycotter le Canal. Le gouvernement de Londres a répondu par la négative. Au Conseil de sécurité, le gouvernement américain considérerait qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de faire autre chose qu'un rapport sur la situation et d'y faire enregistrer la position des puissances occidentales, équivalant à une acceptation tacite *de facto* du mémorandum égyptien. Malgré le désir du gouvernement britannique, le gouvernement de Washington ne voit guère l'utilité d'une nouvelle réunion du Conseil de sécurité.

Il semble qu'actuellement, le gouvernement britannique éprouve une difficulté particulière en ce qui concerne le choix des devises dans lesquelles pourraient être payés les droits de passage à l'Égypte. Londres veut obtenir que la livre sterling soit acceptée par Le Caire. Des conversations sont en cours, à Bâle, après un premier sondage auprès de la Banque nationale d'Égypte, sur les résultats desquelles M. Dulles n'est pas encore informé.

Le gouvernement de Washington ne pense pas qu'une réunion nouvelle du Conseil de sécurité soit utile ou heureuse. Il n'y a pas lieu de chercher à obtenir dorénavant des précisions supplémentaires sur le langage utilisé par le mémorandum égyptien. On n'obtiendrait pas, dans cette voie, l'accord de la majorité des membres du S.C.U.A. Si en effet, le gouvernement égyptien se montre extrêmement arrogant et exigeant à une réunion du Conseil de sécurité, ce qu'il ne manquerait pas de faire après l'échec qu'il vient d'essuyer en Jordanie<sup>(2)</sup>, et que l'on soit tenu de se plier à ses conditions, Nasser ne pourra sortir que renforcé de l'épreuve, ayant remporté un grand succès.

<sup>(1)</sup> Sur le mémorandum et les conversations subséquentes, voir ci-dessus les n° 287 (note), 289, 296, 298, 306, 307, 316, 326, 337.

<sup>(2)</sup> Sur les événements récents de Jordanie, voir ci-dessus le n° 341 (note).

M. Pineau indique qu'aux yeux du gouvernement français, une réunion du Conseil de sécurité, qui aurait pour objet de demander à Nasser de ne pas aller au-delà des termes de son mémorandum, est inacceptable. Le gouvernement français estime qu'aucun gouvernement, aucun organisme gouvernemental ou intergouvernemental, ne doit prendre une décision politique qui pourrait être interprétée comme un acte sanctionnant le mémorandum égyptien. Si des compagnies privées de navigation décident de faire utiliser le Canal par leurs bateaux, c'est là une décision d'ordre privé qui ne doit pas influencer sur les décisions gouvernementales.

M. Dulles indique que sur le plan gouvernemental, la seule décision prise par le gouvernement de Washington a été de dire aux compagnies de navigation battant pavillon américain de ne payer à l'Égypte les droits de transit que sous protestation. En attendant, les avoirs égyptiens aux États-Unis restent bloqués.

M. Mollet désire que M. Dulles retire de sa conversation à Paris une impression très franche et très nette de la position du gouvernement français vis-à-vis de l'Égypte dans l'affaire de Suez.

Peut-être devons-nous reconnaître que nous avons perdu l'épreuve. Mais en aucun cas, nous ne pouvons accepter politiquement et juridiquement la position égyptienne. On peut s'incliner devant le fait matériel du succès de Nasser, mais il nous est impossible de le revêtir d'une reconnaissance politique ou juridique.

La thèse britannique est autre. Le Royaume-Uni a d'abord espéré, comme nous-mêmes, se débarrasser de Nasser et de son gouvernement. Nous n'avons pas réussi. Réaliste, constatant l'échec, devant des raisons économiques impérieuses, le gouvernement britannique décide qu'il lui faut de nouveau utiliser le Canal.

En ce qui nous concerne, cette position n'est pas acceptable. La France ne voit pas seulement dans l'affaire une question de prestige, mais deux dangers très précis :

1° Accepter de passer par le canal de Suez, c'est reconnaître qu'il n'y aura pas de modification au régime du contrôle absolu exercé sur le Canal par le colonel Nasser. Or, il s'agit là du ravitaillement de l'Europe occidentale en pétrole. Les armes conventionnelles, qui restent essentielles pour la défense de l'Europe, sont immobilisées sans un approvisionnement suffisant en pétrole. Le contrôle incontesté de Nasser sur le Canal affecte donc directement et grandement la défense de l'Europe de l'Ouest.

2° Relevant le danger ancien du pangermanisme et complétant l'action du panslavisme, le panarabisme fait peser sur la paix générale une menace d'une extrême gravité.

Reconnaître la thèse de Nasser est donc inacceptable. L'Angleterre considère qu'elle doit tout plier à la défense de la livre aujourd'hui menacée. Le franc est menacé aussi : nos réserves de change sont dans une situation difficile, notre balance commerciale est très déséquilibrée, peut-être allons-nous traverser des heures graves... Mais il s'agit, en ce

qui concerne la France, d'une attitude délibérément politique, devant laquelle les considérations économiques doivent s'incliner.

M. Mollet mentionne la brochure du colonel Nasser où est exposé son programme. La menace est clairement établie. Il ne faut pas compter sur son gouvernement pour, en une génération d'hommes, faire subir à l'Occident un second Munich.

M. Dulles répond que le gouvernement américain est d'accord avec le gouvernement français sur le danger que représente le panarabisme nationaliste de Nasser. Aussi pense-t-on à Washington que l'on ne peut faire aucun fond sur le gouvernement Nasser et quel que soit le soin avec lequel un accord passé avec lui serait rédigé, que l'on ne pourrait guère compter sur son exécution. La concession faite à la Compagnie du canal de Suez était parfaitement claire et nette, elle n'en a pas moins été violée. On ne peut donc aucunement se fier à Nasser. Il n'y a donc pas lieu d'attacher beaucoup d'importance à ce qu'il dit, à ce qu'il ne dit pas, à ce qu'il promet ou à ce qu'il écrit.

La France et les États-Unis ont différé sur la méthode à employer avec Nasser. Mais il n'y a pas lieu de revenir sur la controverse. Les développements récents en Jordanie ont permis de nouer des liens plus étroits entre le Liban, l'Arabie séoudite, l'Irak et la Jordanie. Ainsi se trouve constituée la base d'une action politique dont la direction sera opposée à celle de Nasser. C'est dans cette voie qu'il faut chercher à long terme une réponse à l'action égyptienne.

Mais quels que soient ces développements politiques, il est toujours plus vital et plus important de trouver des moyens de communications suppléant les pipe-lines existants et le Canal. Rétrospectivement, il faut reconnaître que les nations de l'Occident auraient dû penser à ce problème quand le gouvernement britannique a quitté la base de Suez. Les forces qui ont amené les Anglais à quitter l'Égypte étaient en effet celles qui allaient pousser plus loin leur avantage contre l'Occident. Ces moyens de communication qui pourraient suppléer le Canal sont à chercher essentiellement dans la zone nord du Moyen-Orient. Le pipe-line envisagé à travers le territoire d'Israël ne sera peut-être pas, en effet, facile à alimenter en pétrole arabe.

M. Mollet reconnaît ces difficultés, mais estime qu'il n'y aura pas trop de deux nouveaux pipe-lines, dont le pipe-line d'Eilath.

M. Dulles estime d'autre part qu'il faut encourager la construction de tankers toujours plus gros et toujours plus nombreux. Enfin, tout doit être mis en œuvre pour découvrir des sources nouvelles de pétrole. Quoi qu'il en soit, il faut reconnaître que, malgré la fermeture du canal de Suez et l'interruption du service des pipe-lines, l'économie de l'Europe occidentale ne s'est pas effondrée à l'automne dernier. Certes, le pétrole était plus cher, et les réserves de devises de l'Europe occidentale ont beaucoup diminué. Mais il n'y a pas eu d'effondrement. L'Europe occidentale a été ravitaillée.

M. Dulles reconnaît qu'il existe un problème de la défense militaire occidentale par rapport au pétrole arabe. Le gouvernement des États-Unis est prêt à y réfléchir et à travailler à sa solution.

M. Mollet ne pense pas qu'à long terme, la France et les États-Unis envisagent les problèmes du Moyen-Orient sous un angle très différent. Peut-être des appréciations différentes se font-elles jour sur les questions de méthode.

M. Mollet craint que la Russie ne joue un jeu très intelligent. Les Soviétiques ne jouent pas le roi Séoud, ou le roi Hussein, mais tablent sur le mécontentement des masses. Aucun prince ou souverain arabe ne peut, en fait, assurer le bonheur de ces masses misérables. Le danger est celui de la montée d'une manière de révolte, plus ou moins communiste, que les souverains arabes n'ont guère le moyen de canaliser à leur profit ou à celui de l'Occident. Ce sentiment très fort, généralisé, ne devient efficace que lorsqu'il se conjugue avec une action nationaliste et avec un chef nationaliste. Or, Nasser remplit à merveille ce rôle personnel et idéologique. Nasser a prouvé aux masses arabes que le monde s'était incliné devant lui. En Jordanie, certes, un succès vient d'être marqué. Pour l'instant, la masse des réfugiés palestiniens s'incline, mais elle va chercher sa revanche. Aussi longtemps que le régime égyptien n'est pas changé, l'action soviétique n'est pas sérieusement contrecarrée. L'expérience en Extrême-Orient, en Indonésie, a montré que les motifs les plus nobles du nationalisme pouvaient servir de paravent à la pénétration soviétique, facilitée par la complaisance et la tolérance de l'Occident. Il ne faudrait pas que la même expérience se répète dans le monde arabe, qui, sans la Russie, ne serait que peu de chose.

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M. GORSE, AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE À TUNIS,  
à M. MAURICE FAURE, SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES,  
CHARGÉ DES AFFAIRES MAROCAINES ET TUNISIENNES.

T. n<sup>os</sup> 2394 à 2400. Secret. Réservé.

Tunis, 7 mai 1957, 16 h. 30.

(Reçu : 16 h. 40.)

Une série d'incidents témoigne de la persistance à travers le territoire tunisien du trafic d'armes à destination des rebelles algériens. Le dernier en date est survenu avant hier matin près de Ben Gardane. Un camion de cinq tonnes qui, d'après nos renseignements, transportait du matériel suspect, est tombé en panne. Une patrouille française a reçu ordre de l'empêcher de repartir. Le général de Guillebon a demandé à l'autorité tunisienne d'effectuer elle-même la visite du véhicule. Celle-ci s'y est refusée et a envoyé sur place des éléments de la garde nationale et de l'armée tunisienne pour gêner notre détachement.



P.U.R.S.S. et que, pour la première fois, une conversation sérieuse peut-être s'engager. En parlant ensuite des expériences atomiques, M. Lloyd a indiqué qu'il y aurait à son avis intérêt à accepter tout de suite l'enregistrement des expériences; on essaierait ensuite d'obtenir la constitution d'un groupe d'experts techniques pour étudier les possibilités de limitation des expériences et à un troisième stade, on pourrait proposer d'interdire à la fois les expériences et la fabrication.

M. Martino a demandé que la nouvelle proposition soviétique sur le contrôle, qui pouvait avoir des incidences sérieuses sur la défense atlantique, soit soumise pour avis aux organismes militaires de l'O.T.A.N. Cette proposition a été acceptée.

Prenant la parole à son tour, M. Dulles a rappelé les déclarations de M. Pineau de la veille sur la nécessité de garder un équilibre entre l'armement conventionnel et l'armement atomique. Cette position est conforme à la directive politique adoptée en décembre par l'O.T.A.N. et se reflète dans les études qui sont entreprises en commun actuellement sur la réorganisation de nos défenses et qui contribuerait à maintenir le maximum d'unité entre membres de l'Alliance. Il a noté avec intérêt la suggestion de M. Pineau tendant à la constitution sous l'autorité du Commandant suprême d'une réserve intégrée de munitions atomiques<sup>(1)</sup>. Washington étudiera avec le plus grand soin cette intéressante idée qui permettrait de surmonter les problèmes politiques posés par le stockage de ces munitions en Europe. Il a insisté pour qu'aucune publicité ne soit donnée à cette proposition tant que toutes ses incidences militaires, politiques et législatives n'auront pas été complètement examinées.

Bien qu'il soit trop tôt pour donner un avis sur la proposition soviétique du 30 avril, le gouvernement américain pense qu'elle doit être étudiée avec soin. M. Dulles a rappelé les remarques de M. Pineau de la veille sur les problèmes que pose l'évolution atomique, et il a indiqué qu'il fallait en tenir compte dans l'élaboration de la tactique à suivre au sous-Comité. M. Dulles est d'accord avec M. Pineau sur ces différents points : la réunification de l'Allemagne et la fin de la division de l'Europe sont en dehors de la compétence du sous-Comité. Il ne peut y

(1) Au cours du Conseil de l'O.T.A.N., le ministre français des Affaires étrangères avait souligné la nécessité d'établir un équilibre entre les armes atomiques et les armes conventionnelles : sans ces dernières, l'Occident pourrait être obligé de choisir entre ne pas répondre à une agression ou prendre l'initiative d'une guerre atomique. En ce qui concernait l'implantation d'armes atomiques en Europe, M. Pineau indiquait que l'opinion publique s'inquiéterait si ces armes devenaient des cibles situées en territoire français sans que la France pût s'en servir pour répondre à une agression. La solution consisterait à intégrer les stocks dans l'O.T.A.N. et ces stocks seraient mis à la disposition du Commandant en chef. Le Ministre refusait l'idée d'une limitation des armements nucléaires à un certain nombre de pays (États-Unis, Grande-Bretagne, U.R.S.S.). Les pays en état de fabriquer la bombe atomique au cours des prochaines années étaient dans l'ordre : la France, la Suède et Israël. S'il y avait arrêt de la fabrication des armes entre les trois pays qui en possédaient, les autres se poseraient la question de savoir s'ils se trouveraient effectivement garantis par le fait que deux ou trois posséderaient la bombe, mais qu'aucun de ces pays n'exercerait un contrôle parfaitement effectif sur l'autre. Il serait extrêmement difficile de justifier devant l'opinion publique de ne pas fabriquer un certain nombre de bombes atomiques pour avoir un moyen, sinon de défense, du moins d'intimidation à l'égard d'un agresseur éventuel. (Note du Secrétariat général, coordination des questions atomiques du 7 mai, non reproduite.)

avoir de désarmement nucléaire sans désarmement conventionnel. L'organisation du contrôle doit dans toute la mesure du possible permettre de suivre le développement des techniques nouvelles éventuelles. Les pays producteurs actuels doivent en effet envisager une réduction des munitions existantes.

Les Occidentaux se trouveront certainement devant un choix difficile et ne devront rien entreprendre sans avoir pesé attentivement tous les risques. C'est dans cet esprit que les propositions américaines ont été faites à Londres. Elles permettent de sonder les intentions de l'U.R.S.S. Les États-Unis pensent qu'il faut s'efforcer d'obtenir une réduction des armes nucléaires, même s'il est impossible de les éliminer, et il faut se borner à contrôler ce qui peut l'être. Ainsi, si l'on ne peut organiser un contrôle efficace des moyens de production, peut-être pourrait-on trouver des modalités satisfaisantes pour le contrôle des moyens de lancement. Enfin, il est de l'intérêt de tous, même des pays qui renoncent à la fabrication des armes nucléaires, de ne pas voir celles-ci mises à la disposition d'irresponsables.

Les dirigeants soviétiques semblent préoccupés sincèrement par le pouvoir de destruction des nouvelles armes. Ils sont désireux de conserver, avec peu de pays, le monopole qu'ils détiennent actuellement. Enfin, la tension de leur économie les incite à ne pas rechercher à augmenter leur défense. Compte tenu de ces différentes circonstances, on peut penser qu'un début de discussion sur le contrôle est possible. Les États-Unis, pour leur part, n'accepteront jamais de prendre des risques exagérés. Ils savent qu'en cas de conflit général, c'est leur territoire qui serait le premier l'objet d'une attaque nucléaire. L'Ouest doit prendre grand soin d'éviter de se trouver, à la suite d'un accord que l'U.R.S.S. serait seule à ne pas respecter, dans l'impossibilité de résister à un chantage à la destruction.

M. Pineau est intervenu alors pour dire que le gouvernement français estimait également qu'il fallait continuer à explorer les possibilités d'un accord sur le désarmement. L'opinion en France ne comprendrait pas que l'on y renonce. L'U.R.S.S. craint que de nouveaux pays disposent prochainement de la possibilité de fabriquer des engins nucléaires. On peut penser, en effet, que dans un avenir prochain, une telle fabrication pourrait être possible, notamment en France et en Suède.

Le problème de l'armement atomique se pose donc différemment pour les états qui ont déjà un certain potentiel, et pour les pays qui peuvent hésiter entre un désarmement et l'entreprise d'une fabrication coûteuse.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères de Norvège est intervenu, à son tour, pour insister pour que soit établi au minimum l'enregistrement des explosions expérimentales, qui risquent de provoquer une retombée radioactive hors des frontières du pays intéressé. M. Spaak a signalé le danger que comporterait un désarmement atomique total auquel ne correspondrait aucun désarmement sur le plan des armes conventionnelles.



5/21/57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

S/AE

S/AE-766/LA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 21, 1957

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

EO 11652: XGDS 1 2 (3) 4

Authorized by: A. D. Brewster

August 4, 1975

RA - Mr. Timmons

SUBJECT: Draft Telegram re NATO Stockpile Possibility

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Although the United States will have to make some commitments about the availability of nuclear components to NATO trained countries in the event of hostilities, I have doubts about the desirability of making such commitments at this time. It will take a long time for the required training to be completed. The commitment by the United States to supply and train in the non-nuclear field was only made a short time ago. I wonder if this is not a sufficient earnest of our intentions to hold the line for the next year.

The French are the only NATO country in a position to undertake nuclear weapons manufacture in the next few years, and I do not think that the proposed arrangement would cause a change in their apparent policy of building up a stock of weapons material against the time when they take a decision to manufacture weapons. I know of no hard evidence that other NATO countries are anywhere near a decision to manufacture nuclear weapons.

In any event I suggest that a better procedure than that proposed in the draft telegram would be to have this concept staffed through the DOD and the State Department as a policy matter. I should think that Governor Stassen's judgment should also be obtained.

The indication in paragraph 8 that U.S. policy should seek to weaken NATO desire to be dependent on the U.S. in the atomic field is not understood. I think that such dependence is to our advantage.

In summary, I don't think that for operational reasons there is urgency about this matter since the operational requirement may be as much as two years away. The political judgment is for others than S/AE but my reading of the information from Western Europe does not indicate any broad demand for the U.S. commitment proposed in the draft telegram.

*My 21/57*  
*Gerard C. Smith*

Gerard C. Smith

740.56/5-2151

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5/24/57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
May 24, 1957

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Talks with Chancellor Adenauer

Before your meeting with the Chancellor on Tuesday morning, I will have two talks with him on Monday. We plan to discuss disarmament, German reunification, NATO military problems, the status of the German military build-up, European integration, and relations with the Soviet bloc. The Chancellor will also raise the question of German assets in the United States. We plan to raise with him the question of financial support for United States forces in Germany if a settlement has not been reached by that time.

The Chancellor will have two principal problems on his mind. One is the implications of the increased development of nuclear weapons. The other is the question of disarmament and its relation to German reunification.

As you know, the Chancellor is deeply troubled from a moral viewpoint about the implications of nuclear warfare. In addition, nuclear weapons have become a major campaign issue in Germany which is causing him serious difficulty. The Chancellor has taken the position that the German Federal Government is not seeking atomic weapons, but he has refused to foreclose the possibility of eventual German possession of tactical nuclear weapons if an agreement on disarmament is not reached in the next several years. He has also defended the stationing of United States units with atomic capability in Germany. His position is being sharply attacked by his Socialist opposition. You may wish to mention your appreciation of the courageous stand which he has taken.

At the same time, the Chancellor is very much concerned that Western defense efforts are being too exclusively centered on nuclear capability, particularly in the British case. He fears that we will drift into a position in which we will be unable to deal with any difficulty except by resort to nuclear weapons.

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The Chancellor will wish to be reassured regarding two points of American policy. One is the maintenance of United States forces on the continent. The other is our determination to respond to a Soviet attack on Europe, concerning which he has lingering doubts.

It would be useful if you could discuss with him the role of nuclear weapons and assure him that we believe that the NATO shield forces, which must be ready to use nuclear weapons in all-out war, should be sufficient to also be able to handle limited hostilities without necessarily using nuclear weapons. It will also be desirable that you assure him of our firm determination (a) to fulfill our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, reacting instantly to a Soviet attack, and (b) to contribute on a fair share basis to the defense of Europe.

In this connection, it would be useful if you could emphasize to him the importance of an effective contribution by Germany to NATO defense in Europe. You might say that, while we appreciate the political difficulties which confront him, we have a feeling that the Germans have not set their sights high enough in the terms of the effort which they are making. Once the election is out of the way, we look forward to a real effort on their part to move forward rapidly with the creation of the forces which we have been expecting for some time they would contribute to NATO. You may wish to stress the importance to the alliance of every nation contributing its fair share to the defense effort.

The Chancellor is most anxious that we should continue our negotiations with the Soviets in an effort to reach an agreement on disarmament. At the same time, he is concerned, as are the German people, that an agreement of substantial scope on disarmament might be reached without having come to an agreement with the Soviets on German reunification.

I will have gone over the disarmament problem with him in some detail. It would be most helpful if you could do so as well and review the main aspects of the problem with him. I recommend that you also assure him that we will do nothing in the disarmament field which would prejudice the reunification of Germany. On the other hand, it would be well if you could emphasize the importance of our continuing to explore the possibilities of a disarmament arrangement with the Soviets in a flexible way.

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
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The Chancellor may raise with you the possibility of a new Four-Power conference with the Soviets later in the year. What he may have in mind is pressing the issue of German reunification simultaneously with the disarmament discussions in order to keep at least a loose link between the two and to take advantage of any flexibility in the Soviet position. You may wish to point out the dangers involved in a new meeting unless there is real ground for believing we could make progress. You might suggest that it would be premature to consider the matter until we can gain a clearer idea of Soviet intentions from the London discussions. In the light of the development of the talks with the Chancellor, you may wish to express a willingness to review the question later in the year.

The Chancellor will also probably raise with you the question of German assets in the United States and perhaps the forthcoming sale by the Alien Property Custodian of the predominant German share in the Stinnes Company, an American holding company with properties located in Germany. If he does, it would be desirable to bring the Attorney General into the discussions.

The Chancellor will hope that the final communique will be of assistance to him in Germany from an election viewpoint. We will have to devote a part of the meeting on Tuesday to a discussion of the communique.



  
John Foster Dulles

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5/24/57  
4/24/57DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
May 24, 1957

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Talks with Chancellor Adenauer

Before your meeting with the Chancellor on Tuesday morning, I will have two talks with him on Monday. We plan to discuss disarmament, German reunification, NATO military problems, the status of the German military build-up, European integration, and relations with the Soviet bloc. The Chancellor will also raise the question of German assets in the United States. We plan to raise with him the question of financial support for United States forces in Germany if a settlement has not been reached by that time.

The Chancellor will have two principal problems on his mind. One is the implications of the increased development of nuclear weapons. The other is the question of disarmament and its relation to German reunification.

As you know, the Chancellor is deeply troubled from a moral viewpoint about the implications of nuclear warfare. In addition, nuclear weapons have become a major campaign issue in Germany which is causing him serious difficulty. The Chancellor has taken the position that the German Federal Government is not seeking atomic weapons; but he has refused to foreclose the possibility of eventual German possession of tactical nuclear weapons if an agreement on disarmament is not reached in the next several years. He has also defended the stationing of United States units with atomic capability in Germany. His position is being sharply attacked by his Socialist opposition. You may wish to mention your appreciation of the courageous stand which he has taken.

At the same time, the Chancellor is very much concerned that Western defense efforts are being too exclusively centered on nuclear capability, particularly in the British case. He fears that we will drift into a position in which we will be unable to deal with any difficulty except by resort to nuclear weapons.

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Box 14, Adenauer 1957-58 (S)

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It would be useful if you could discuss with him the role of nuclear weapons and assure him that we believe that the NATO shield forces, which must be ready to use nuclear weapons in all-out war, should be sufficient to also be able to handle limited hostilities without necessarily using nuclear weapons. It will also be desirable that you assure him of our firm determination (a) to fulfill our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, reacting instantly to a Soviet attack, and (b) to contribute on a fair share basis to the defense of Europe.

In this connection, it would be useful if you could emphasize to him the importance of an effective contribution by Germany to NATO defense in Europe. You might say that, while we appreciate the political difficulties which confront him, we have a feeling that the Germans have not set their sights high enough in the terms of the effort which they are making. Once the election is out of the way, we look forward to a real effort on their part to move forward rapidly with the creation of the forces which we have been expecting for some time they would contribute to NATO. You may wish to stress the importance to the alliance of every nation contributing its fair share to the defense effort.

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I will have gone over the disarmament problem with him in some detail. It would be most helpful if you could do so as well and review the main aspects of the problem with him. I recommend that you also assure him that we will do nothing in the disarmament field which would prejudice the reunification of Germany. On the other hand, it would be well if you could emphasize the importance of our continuing to explore the possibilities of a disarmament arrangement with the Soviets in a flexible way.

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John Foster Dulles

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ADENAUER VISIT

Washington, May 26-29, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 26, 1957  
Time: 11:30 A.M.  
Place: Department of State

SUBJECT: NATO Military Problems.

PARTICIPANTS:

German Side

Chancellor Adenauer  
Foreign Minister von Brentano  
Ambassador Kerkeler  
Dr. Grewe, Foreign Office

Mr. von Eckhardt  
Mr. von Hase  
Mr. von Baudissin  
Mr. von Lilienfeld  
Mr. Limbourg  
Mr. Schnippenkoetter

U.S. Side

Secretary Dulles  
Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Dillon  
Ambassador Bruce  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Berding

Mr. Irwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of Defense  
Col. Heasty, Defense Department  
Mr. Timmons  
Mr. Reinstein  
Mr. Walmsley  
Mr. Groel

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Embassy Paris; Embassy Paris for Knight; USRO (2); Embassy London.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to \_\_\_\_\_  
☐ With concurrence of \_\_\_\_\_  
☒ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown  
EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) ( 9/14/94 )  
FPC/HDS by CJ  
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Taking up the third Agenda item, NATO military problems, the Secretary said he had little or nothing to add to what he had said at the NATO Meeting in Bonn, where he had also had an opportunity for full discussions with the Chancellor. It did come to his mind, however, that since that date the Chancellor had had a meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan; the Chancellor was possibly in a position to throw further light on the question of British thinking, particularly on their willingness to leave reserve forces on the Continent.

The Chancellor said he would like first to say something about his conference with General Norstad shortly before leaving Bonn for the United States. Norstad had given him a comprehensive survey of the NATO situation and had made a very good impression.

The Chancellor said he also wished to refer to the recent resolution of the Bundestag on atomic weapons, and to the recent press conference of Mr. Ollenhauer in which he had said that should the Social Democrats come to power in Germany they would insist that United States forces in Germany not be equipped with atomic weapons; he had also indicated that the SPD was prepared to accept all the consequences flowing from this decision. The Chancellor said he did not think the SPD would be successful in forming the next government and he was confident the present government would remain in power. In this event it would insist that Allied troops in Germany should be equipped with the most modern and efficient weapons. The Chancellor added that it was obviously the intention of the SPD to undermine NATO whereas his government wished to see NATO made as strong as possible.

As for the Macmillan talks, the Chancellor said they had been conducted in a very good atmosphere, although at first he had been somewhat concerned over British insistence on building hydrogen weapons and reducing their conventional forces. The formula which had been agreed upon in the talks was that steps must be avoided under all circumstances which would produce any weakening of NATO, and that in assessing the British as well as the overall NATO situation account must be taken of the German forces which are now being built up.

The Chancellor said he had later asked General Norstad if hydrogen weapons of British manufacture would come under his command. Norstad had replied in the negative but had said he could not conceive of a situation where the British would not cooperate fully with NATO in this matter. The Chancellor said that, as the Secretary was aware, the French were also considering manufacturing hydrogen weapons. Such a development, quite apart from French difficulties in Algeria, would involve further

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weakening of the conventional forces assigned to NATO. The Chancellor said he therefore saw a possibility (and he stressed this was only a possibility) of a development in the direction of a weakening of NATO should NATO member states attempt to build up stocks of atomic weapons not coming under the control of the Supreme Commander while at the same time reducing the conventional forces under the Supreme Commander's control. It was quite important whether the Supreme Commander had the power of control in this situation or was entirely dependent on the goodwill and understanding of the other parties. The Chancellor said he was aware the Secretary might not wish to comment on this problem now but he had merely wished to direct attention to his concern over this potential development.

The Secretary said he was not clear whether the Chancellor was satisfied with the question of the disposition of the British reserve force, i.e., whether this should be stationed on the Continent or in the United Kingdom. The Chancellor said this problem had been discussed but no decision had been taken. The matter required the approval of the Council of Western European Union. This in turn required the advice of General Norstad which was not expected until some time during the summer. It therefore appeared that the decision of the WEU Council could not take place before fall.

The Secretary said he wished to comment briefly on the Chancellor's remarks about the position of the SPD, not because he was interested in intervening in German internal affairs but because the question was of great importance to the posture of the free world. (The Chancellor interpolated that Mr. Ollenhauer had made the statements in question at a large press conference.) The Secretary drew the Chancellor's attention to the world map behind him. He referred to Finland, where important mineral deposits had been taken over by the Soviet Union during the last war; to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had been forcibly taken over by the Soviets; and to Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Albania, which had come under Soviet control solely as a result of the Soviet threat to use military force in these areas. On the other side of the world Mongolia, Tibet, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam had all been taken by Soviet force. All these aggressive expansions had occurred in areas where there were no collective security arrangements. On the other hand, in no area protected by such collective security arrangements had there been such aggression. The Secretary said he also wished to observe that the heart of collective security arrangements is the willingness of all parties thereto to use whatever force is necessary to repel aggression. He therefore could not but conclude, as had the Chancellor, that to leave such a vital area as the Federal Republic unprotected by collective security arrangements, or so

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poorly protected that it would become a tempting target for aggression, would represent a betrayal not only of the Federal Republic but also of others in the free world who were willing to stand beside the Federal Republic. We were trying to limit the danger that atomic weapons would be used in a manner contrary to the moral sense of those peoples who have any moral sense. But to agree to forego the availability in case of need of the most effective weapons would be as foolish as to have agreed to forego the use of gunpowder when this began to replace bows and arrows.

The Chancellor said he was in complete agreement with the Secretary. He was convinced, as he had already indicated, that his government would win the elections. He had wished to make the point only so that there would be no doubt the majority of the German people approved his government's course of action. He wished to reiterate once again that both for Germany's allies and for its own forces, his government wished to have the most modern and effective equipment possible.

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Minutes of a Meeting, Secretary of State Dulles' Office,  
Department of State, Washington, May 28, 1957, 4 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

Secretary of State  
Ambassador David K.E. Bruce  
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR  
Mr. Robert R. Bowie, S/P  
Mr. John N. Irwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Mr. J.J. Reinstein, GER

*Federal Republic of Germany*

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer  
Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano  
Ambassador Heinz L. Krekeler  
Professor Wilhelm Grewe

*Interpreters:*

Mr. Weber  
Mrs. Lejins

SUBJECT

Disarmament

The Secretary said that we had the impression that the Soviets may be sincerely interested in a disarmament agreement. The reason, he believed, was that the burden of the present rate of armament on their economy was something which they would like to lighten. We are ourselves, with our strong industrial economy, finding it a considerable burden to devote ten per cent of our gross national product to armaments. The Soviets perhaps find it difficult to keep up with us, considering the fact that their gross national product is perhaps one-third of ours. We also think that they are concerned lest the possession of atomic weapons spread generally and are particularly concerned that some of the satellites might come into possession of atomic weapons and consequently exercise greater independence. The Soviets have recently shown greater interest in the treaty to establish an international atomic energy agency to exercise controls which would assure that atomic materials will be used only for peaceful purposes. In London they have exhibited considerable interest in what is called there the "fourth country problem".

The Secretary said that he himself would not place any particular confidence in what the Soviets say merely because they say it, but when what they say coincides with their self-interest, one can place some reliance on it. This is particularly true when our free world interest lies in the same direction. We had therefore concluded

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 888. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinstein on June 3.

it was worthwhile to probe further as to what the Soviets would or would not do. The Secretary said it is basic that we would not do anything on the basis of a Soviet undertaking unless it can be controlled. We are alert to the fact that there is always a tendency on the part of the democracies to disarm, if there is the slightest excuse for doing so. We hope at least we would not follow the pattern which has happened so many times in our history, of limiting our armaments without reciprocal limitations, with the result that aggression follows.

The Secretary said he had had considerable international experience in his lifetime and he well realized the tendency of people to put faith in treaties which sound well, which are signed by people with well-known names, and which have seals and red ribbons on them. We were determined to seek an agreement which is not a trap. We had had very considerable discussion during the last few days in particular about the subject of disarmament. There had been meetings in the State Department under his chairmanship, at which the Defense Department, the Armed Services, the Atomic Energy Commission and other agencies of the government concerned had participated. The conclusions resulting from these meetings had been taken to the President on the previous Saturday and had been approved by the President.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary said he wished the Chancellor to know that there was nothing in our position which was not fully approved by the Defense Department, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Secretary personally.

The Secretary said that one conclusion we had come to was that the aspects of the disarmament problem which particularly touched on Western Europe ought to be dealt with by more full participation of the Western European powers than is presently the case. We had received word that the other Western Powers which are active in the London disarmament negotiations, that is, the United Kingdom, France and Canada, this morning had agreed with this point of view. It would probably be presented at a meeting of the NATO Council which we hoped would be held on the following day. The Secretary said we hoped that out of this discussion would come some program which would insure that the Western European countries and SACEUR would have a more active voice in the disarmament question and that responsibility would not devolve solely on the Four Western Powers involved in the London discussions.

The Secretary said he had thus far confined himself to a discussion of procedural matters. He now wished to take up the following questions of substance: (1) inspection and controls; (2) nuclear weapons; and (3) conventional weapons.

<sup>2</sup>See vol. xx, pp. 513 ff.

5/28/57

The Secretary said that as far as inspection and controls were concerned, the United States adheres to the position originally put forth by the President at Geneva.<sup>3</sup> This was that we would be ready to have aerial inspection and ground controls, either fixed or mobile, over all of the continental United States (and Canada, as well, if this were agreeable to the Canadian Government), if the U.S.S.R. would agree to the same arrangement for its territory. If, as we believe, the Soviets would reject this, we face the problem of what alternative arrangement could be made. It seemed to us that the alternative must then be a series of stages in which a beginning would be made where the problems were least difficult, with a gradual extension as circumstances permit. The Soviets had suggested an aerial inspection and ground control system over a slice of eastern Soviet territories in Siberia as against a slice of the United States including all of the United States west of the Mississippi. The Secretary said that our military people could see little advantage in inspection of only such a slice of the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, there would be great political difficulty for us in equating such a substantial part of the United States with even a substantial slice of Siberia, even if the areas were comparable on an acreage basis. While we have not arrived at any fixed conclusions and while there is considerable flexibility in our position, and we intend to probe Soviet intentions, it may be that the only feasible thing which can be done at present is to start on an experimental basis in areas relatively free from the political complications which the Secretary had referred to, that is, principally in the Arctic areas. The Secretary said he wished to repeat that our ideas were flexible and not fixed, but that our thinking was developing along these lines.

The Secretary then turned to the subject of nuclear armaments. He said our suggestions have as their central purpose the suspension of the development and growth of nuclear weapons, at least for a period during which it could be ascertained whether nuclear weapons could be brought under control. It would be our suggestion that, after a date to be fixed, those countries which have nuclear weapons should agree not to use any further fissionable materials to produce weapons and that during this stage at least nations which do not have nuclear weapons should agree not to manufacture them. The Secretary said that an agreement not to put new fissionable material into weapons is the kind of an agreement which our experts tell us can be controlled. It would not be possible to account for past production of fissionable materials, but it could be determined whether new production was devoted to peaceful purposes.

<sup>3</sup>For text of the President's "Open Skies" proposal, see the vol. v, pp. 447-456.

The Secretary said we would also propose that nations which have fissionable materials at the agreed date should agree to take certain amounts out of their weapons stockpile and put them into a stockpile for peaceful purposes. Thus we might start initially in a modest way to check future fissionable materials production for military purposes and also to make some inroad in the stockpile already devoted to military purposes. The Secretary said he had alluded to the fact that we would propose that nations not possessing nuclear weapons might forego their production to see how this experiment goes. However, he wished to make it clear that we would not agree to withhold such weapons from our Allies if their importation were necessary to repel aggression. In other words, our proposals would not extend to what might be called a NATO stockpile, where U.S. weapons could be stored subject to the possibility of transfer to its Allies if the need for their use should arise, nor would our proposals preclude the training of our Allies in the use of nuclear weapons.

The Secretary said that we still feel that the suspension of nuclear tests should be coupled with some form of nuclear control. He said we had given most conscientious and thorough study to the problem. We were convinced, on the one hand, that the testing of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, if kept within certain limits, would not be injurious to human life. On the other hand, we were concerned over the possibility that the continuity of developing and testing weapons would be irrevocably interrupted by a suspension of tests while the Soviet development program would continue to go forward. This opened up the possibility of a Soviet breakthrough in this area because the Soviets would continue with their preparations while our whole establishment would be broken up and our scientists scattered.

With respect to conventional weapons, the Secretary said that our proposals in the first stage are based on the concept of a reduction of forces by the U.S.S.R. and the United States to a level of armaments consistent with armed forces of 2,500,000 men. There might have to be some comparable ceilings for other Western powers which have a substantial military potential, although it is likely that U.K. forces will be below the ceiling before it can be agreed upon. Such countries as the Federal Republic, which are just beginning their build-up, would not be required to reduce their forces, but would be asked to accept some ceiling such as that established in the Brussels Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>For text of the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, concluded at Brussels on March 17, 1948, among the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9, 1948, pp. 600-602.



The Secretary said he had referred to a level of armaments compatible with a certain number of men in the armed services. He said he thought that the number of men in the armed services at any one time is a most dangerous and elusive concept. He remarked that in the Brussels Treaty, the approach is that certain levels of forces are fixed, but the effective limitation is on the armaments appropriate to the number of forces. Armaments involve a less elusive and more definite concept than numbers of men, since men can be moved in and out of the military services if there are arms for them. The Secretary said we would think it appropriate that there be some reduction in armaments at the time when the agreed level is arrived at between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Secretary said this involved difficult problems in comparing weapons. This was particularly difficult when it came to dealing with a country like the U.S.S.R., which we knew from experience always cheats on its agreements.

The Secretary said that he did not attach great importance to the reductions which might be made in forces at the first stage. Reductions at the second stage, which would be of more significance, would be dependent on two things. One was the settlement of some of the major political issues in the world, such as the reunification of Germany. The second would be the establishment of roving, mobile controls within the Soviet Union. While it would be difficult to make such controls 100 per cent effective in such a vast country as the U.S.S.R., some risks might be incurred if there had been a settlement of some of the major political problems. The Secretary said there was one other area he should mention, that is, guided missiles and outer space missiles. It is our thought that a commission might be established to study how to insure that the use of outer space missiles would be exclusively for peaceful purposes. We think this is a suitable area for study but not for agreement at this time.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he was very grateful for the explanation which the Secretary had given. In his response he wished to go into some of these matters in some detail. However, before doing so, he wished to ask one question. When the Secretary had spoken of a first step, did he mean that this would deal only with aerial inspection or would it deal with other matters?

The Secretary said that we were thinking of aerial inspection plus ground controls in the inspected area, together with the establishment of an inspection system of atomic plants which would make it possible to control an agreement that future production would be used only for peaceful purposes. The establishment of controls in atomic plants would require about two years, so that it would take that period of time to bring into force the agreement to use future production of fissionable materials only for peaceful purposes. Initial steps in aerial inspection and ground controls could be brought into

force, we hope, in a few months' time. In addition, there would be a reduction of conventional forces as between the United States and the U.S.S.R., which would come into force in about twelve months.

In response to a further question from the Chancellor, the Secretary said he wished to make clear that, in our opinion, a first stage Treaty should include the following matters:

1. Aerial and ground inspection in some areas, perhaps not of great significance, primarily to make sure that controls of this character can be implemented.
2. An agreement to abstain from future productions of nuclear weapons, both on the part of nations which have such weapons and on the part of nations which do not have them.
3. A reduction of the forces of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to a level of 2,500,000. He remarked that he did not attach great military importance to this aspect of the Treaty.

The Secretary said a first stage Treaty involves all of these arrangements, although they would come into force at different times depending on the time required to set up protective controls which might be as much as two years in respect to some matters.

The Chancellor asked whether there would be an armament stop in this period.

The Secretary said there would not be.

The Chancellor asked whether, therefore, during this time, and until there was an effective control, the development of armament could go on.

The Secretary said this was correct except as regards the limit of 2,500,000 men in the U.S. and Soviet forces. The Chancellor remarked this was probably not of great significance and the Secretary said our Forces would probably be at that level at any rate. The whole modern trend is toward reduction in the number of men as the effectiveness of weapons increases.

The Chancellor said that in the first part of the Secretary's statement he had spoken of countries belonging to the Soviet Union. He asked whether this would cover Red China.

The Secretary said that we did not contemplate that, as part of the first stage, controls would be established over Red China. We did contemplate the inclusion in the Treaty of a provision under which if military developments and activities in Red China made it desirable, the U.S. could call off the arrangement. It was intended to approach the matter in that form in order to avoid the political problem of recognizing and dealing with Red China. The problem would be dealt with negatively rather than positively, so to speak.

After referring to his notes, the Chancellor said that the statement by the Secretary to which he had referred was that the U.S. would be prepared to agree to the inspection of the entire continental



area of the U.S. if the U.S.S.R. would subject all its territory to inspection. Did this statement cover Red China, he asked.

The Secretary responded that it related only to the Soviet Union.

The Chancellor asked whether the satellites would be covered. The Secretary said they would not. He recalled that the original proposal made by the President at Geneva covered only the territory of the U.S.S.R. He said that our military authorities felt that if inspection were extended to the whole of the U.S.S.R. and not merely to a part which would be sealed off from the rest, we would gain greatly. He said the fact of the matter was that, as far as the U.S. is concerned, there is little that the U.S.S.R. cannot learn. It is possible to buy at most book stores maps and pictures of military establishments in the U.S. It is possible to fly over most of the U.S. except for six restricted areas. Anyone can hire a Piper Cub and photograph anything except in theory in these restricted areas. In fact, one can fly high enough to get most of these areas.

The Secretary said that an agreement enabling us to fly over the U.S.S.R. would give us much and would add very little to Soviet knowledge. For this reason, he believed it was certain that the U.S.S.R. would continue to reject our proposal. The Secretary said that we actually see no military disadvantage in agreeing to inspection of part of the U.S. in exchange for the right to inspect part of Siberia. We would gain from such an arrangement. However, it raised the political difficulty of equating part of the U.S. for part of Siberia.

The Chancellor said that, while his information was perhaps not correct, he had understood that the U.S. had such an inspection over the U.S.S.R. Two and one-half years ago he had received a visit from high ranking American officers who had showed him apparatus which they said they could use by flying in the air stream over the Soviet Union. They also showed him pictures which had been taken.

The Secretary said he wished this were true. While we had some useful pictures, they were only of a small part of the U.S.S.R. It was not feasible at the present time, whether through over-flights or through use of balloons to cover all of the U.S.S.R.

The Chancellor said that he did not wish to go into these technical details but would like to make some general remarks. He said he thought he agreed freely that the U.S., as the leading power of the Western world, should make every effort to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on disarmament. The question of timing, however, was of very great importance. That is, when one should go to the U.S.S.R. with a generous proposal. The Chancellor said that he was sorry to say that he could see no sign of the Russians wishing to come to an agreement with the West. He recalled the talks which he

had with Bulganin and Khrushchev at Moscow in 1955.<sup>5</sup> He and von Brentano had had a lengthy discussion of a very frank character with them. They had been told that the Soviets found it very difficult to meet the demands of their population, to rearm at the rate necessary to keep pace with the U.S., and to meet the demands of Red China. The Soviets had asked the Germans to help them with Red China. They had not said anything about disarmament. What they had said was that they were afraid of the U.S., and also, perhaps for reasons of politeness, that they were afraid of the Germans. The principal point which they had made was that they were afraid of the U.S. and that they found it necessary to keep up with the U.S. in the arms field.

The Chancellor said that the Germans had, of course, rejected the Soviet proposal. He thought that the important thing was that the Soviets had not said anything about disarmament. The Chancellor said, that in looking back to October 1955, that he thought he should frankly say that the power of the U.S.S.R. had increased. There were several factors involved. The first was that the power of the West had diminished. This was due in part to difficulties between the U.S. and the British and French. In the second place, the U.K. had, to some extent left the framework of NATO. The Soviet Union on the other hand had crushed the revolt in Hungary and managed to keep Poland under control and had extended its influence in the Middle East. The Chancellor said that he did not wish to say that the Soviet Union was stronger than the U.S., but he did think the power of the Soviets had increased relatively.

The Chancellor said that this was a subject on which one could not furnish proof. One theory was as good as another. However, he thought that one should consider what the results might be of unsuccessful negotiations. The will of some countries to resist the Soviets would diminish. The Soviets would believe that if proposals had been made to them and rejected, other proposals would be made. The essential question was whether the Soviets had given up their goal of world domination. He personally did not believe that they had.

The Chancellor said that, as he remarked at the beginning, this was a situation in which a solution must be found without war. If the United States believed that the time had come that the Soviets were prepared to give up their aim to dominate the world, the other countries of the free world must accept this view. However, taking such a decision placed a great responsibility on the United States, perhaps a greater responsibility than had ever been placed upon any American Administration. If the negotiations failed and there were a

<sup>5</sup>See vol. v, pp. 573 ff.

loss of confidence in the United States, the United States would have lost everything that it had been working for for a period of years. The Chancellor said that this was a question of such seriousness that he felt it desirable to be completely frank in discussing it.

The Chancellor said that the proposal raises particular problems for Germany. The Secretary had said we must avoid anything which would perpetuate the continued division of Germany. He had also said that responsibility must devolve on other countries and that NATO would be consulted regarding disarmament on Wednesday. It would be impossible for the NATO Ambassadors to be in a position to comment on proposals at a meeting on Wednesday without having consulted their governments.

With specific regard to Germany, the Chancellor referred to the discussions which had taken place in the morning meeting<sup>6</sup> and particularly to the point he had made that the German elections would be of decisive importance to the entire Western world. He said that if the proposals to be made at London could be used for propaganda purposes and if it could be portrayed that steps were being taken in the disarmament field without laying a basis for political settlements, this would have a very serious effect on the German elections. He said he frankly could see no chance for the Government.

The Secretary said that he was glad that the Chancellor had asked these questions. In the first place, the Chancellor had asked whether we thought the Soviets had renounced their desire to rule the world. His answer was that they had not. However, there was more than one way to winning the domination of the world. It might be possible that the Soviets might be willing to renounce the effort to dominate the world by military forces if they thought they could achieve it by other means.

The Secretary said that if the West, and particularly the United States, were not willing to deal in any way with the problem of disarmament, we would have undermined the confidence of many peoples in the Western governments, and particularly in the United States Government. The Secretary said the Chancellor had spoken of a possible loss of confidence in the United States. He thought that confidence in the United States, to the extent that it exists, rests, not only on the fact that we are strong, but on the belief of other people that we are sincerely devoted to peace and freedom and that we want to find ways of lightening the burden of armaments on mankind.

The Secretary said that the first phase of steps we are considering are certainly of such a character that they will in no way limit and will in fact increase the military strength of the United States.

<sup>6</sup>See Documents 113-115.

We have some chance of finding out through aerial inspection something about the Soviet Union that we do not know in exchange for something that they know. In the nuclear field, we propose that materials should not be used for weapons at a time when our stockpile is larger, perhaps several times larger, than that of the Soviets. We do not propose to diminish our weapons stockpile, nor to abandon the bases from which we could stage an attack on the U.S.S.R., if necessary. In other words, our proposals would leave us in a position of superiority.

The Secretary said that he did not believe that such an initial step would be interpreted as giving up our superiority or endanger any part of the free world. On the contrary, it would freeze our superiority.

The Secretary said that he thought that anything less than this in the first stage would be interpreted throughout the world and indeed in the United States as a trend toward militarism which was not appropriate to a free and Christian people.

The Secretary said that the Chancellor had referred to the NATO meeting on Wednesday. He felt he must have failed to make his point clear. It had never entered his mind that the NATO representatives would express views at the meeting on Wednesday. The purpose of the meeting was to tell the NATO countries our view that they should organize themselves to take a greater role and responsibility in the field of disarmament. When the disarmament discussions touched on issues such as German reunification and the situation in the satellites, we felt that the NATO countries should have the opportunity and, indeed, the responsibility of participating. We had in mind a greater degree of participation than is gained by an occasional report to NATO, an occasional discussion with an Ambassador in London or a meeting such as the one which he was having with the Chancellor. Although his meeting with the Chancellor was highly useful and afforded him an opportunity to give the Chancellor our thoughts to a degree which few people in the United States Government knew them, it was, nevertheless, more or less accidental and would probably not be repeated within the next few months. The whole purpose of our approach to NATO was to propose to the NATO countries that they organize themselves to participate effectively in the disarmament problem. The Secretary said he personally believed that their countries should have continuous representation in London somewhat similar to the representation the Germans had had at the Geneva Conference in 1955.

Herr von Brentano said he wished to ask a question. The Chancellor had indicated, and there was no need to stress, that the Germans were interested in a relaxation of tension. However, he was somewhat concerned as to how Germany would be affected by the

proposals. As he understood it, the proposals would comprehend inspection, limits on nuclear weapons and some limitations on conventional forces. He asked whether he could assume that the proposals would cover Europe.

The Secretary said that the United States did not assume this. We did not think that the first phase of the effort should touch Europe in any way. We further felt that before anything was done affecting Europe, the European countries should organize themselves so that they could participate effectively and accept greater responsibility in this area. He said that we did not wish to be in a position of simply telling the Europeans what was being done. We wish them to decide for themselves what should be done. He said the United States could not think for Germany, but that Germany should think for itself and participate in the development of such a program. The Secretary said that our thinking was at this time there should be no over-flights in Europe, no ground controls in Europe and no limitation of conventional forces in Europe. These should be left until we come to the second stage, which would be based upon European participation. He indicated that he felt that participation was particularly necessary in the case of Germany, the Benelux countries and possibly Italy. If the European countries involved wanted Europe dealt with in the first stage, we would have no objection. However, it was not part of our proposal.

Herr von Brentano said that he was still somewhat concerned about what the Secretary had said. If he understood it correctly, an attempt would be made to reach a comprehensive agreement on disarmament between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was psychologically impossible for an agreement to be reached between the larger countries without affecting the smaller countries. One could not limit the armament of the larger powers without limiting the armament of the smaller powers. As he understood the proposal, it would mean that Britain would in fact leave WEU. It would mean the implicit confirmation of the division of Germany. This would create great problems in Germany. He said he wished to raise these problems, not because he was a German, but because of the importance of the German problem to all countries. If the feeling developed in Germany—that the division of Germany had been accepted and that an agreement on disarmament would be based on the division of Germany, the reaction would be very bad and might affect other countries, as well.

The Secretary said that he thought that to describe what we proposed as a comprehensive agreement was going far beyond what was actually contemplated. All that was contemplated was what he had already outlined involving the inspection of areas remote from Europe. It did not involve areas where the problem of freezing the

political situation was an issue. It touched on the problem of disarmament only by proposing that the atomic stockpiles of the United States and the U.S.S.R. be frozen at their present levels. This would involve the Soviets conceding U.S. superiority in this field and abandonment of the Soviet effort to catch up with the United States. The proposed reduction of conventional forces to 2,500,000 had been put forward a long time ago. It had no substantive significance.

The Secretary said Herr von Brentano had spoken of the United Kingdom leaving WEU. He could not see any connection between these proposals and the Brussels Pact. The Brussels Pact would not be affected, nor would NATO, nor would the United Kingdom forces in Germany, nor would our ability to meet a Soviet attack.

The Secretary said that none of these substantive proposals were new. The proposal for reciprocal aerial inspection had been made by the President at Geneva. The proposal of a cut-off date for the production of nuclear weapons had been made at least six months ago. The limitation of 2,500,000 men had been made a long time ago. The only new thing was that we did not think the arrangements should apply to Europe until there had been a settlement of the political problems in Europe. In other words, we were cutting back our proposals until the conditions described by Herr von Brentano could be dealt with. We did not wish to go into these problems until Germany was in a position to deal with these matters.

Herr von Brentano said he did not wish to be misunderstood. He acknowledged the accuracy of what the Secretary had said. On the other hand, he did not wish to have the impression created that there would be relaxation of tension separate from the settlement of political problems. This was why the Germans had suggested that it be stated that, because there were new negotiations in prospect, it was desirable to solve the political problems. This was why they wished to propose a future Four Power conference. This would make it clear that there was a connection between the disarmament negotiations and the solution of the German problem.

The Secretary said we would have no objection to making clear in any way that in our view a comprehensive disarmament agreement was not possible without a solution of some of the major political problems, such as the reunification of Germany. Our own working papers reflect this. The essence of the decision which we had just made, which he had thought would be pleasing to the Germans, was that it was not possible to have the degree of disarmament which had been previously discussed without European participation. The political responsibility was too great for us to bear.

The Secretary said that as far as inspection was concerned, we were proposing to do it only on an experimental basis. We did not even wish it to apply to the European area without full German and

other European participation in the decision. He remarked that it was Governor Stassen's opinion that the Soviets would not be willing to accept real inspection and ground controls unless they cover Europe. If this were so, the question would then be up to the Germans and their European colleagues to decide. We would not urge them. The Secretary said he himself had thought we were purporting to speak in London for other countries to too great an extent without having a mandate to do so. We did not wish to do so any longer.

The Chancellor said he wished to ask a question. The Secretary said he had not answered all of Herr von Brentano's questions. The Chancellor said perhaps his question would in fact deal with these unanswered questions. The Secretary had spoken of agreements regarding three matters, air and ground inspection, nuclear weapons and conventional forces. His question was to what extent such a proposal would affect American participation in NATO. The Secretary said, not at all. The Chancellor said the agreement would be a very good agreement in this case.

Herr von Brentano referred to the German suggestion regarding a Four Power conference and requested the Secretary's views. The Secretary said he thought that the proposal was an interesting one but that he doubted that it could be made in the communiqué. He did not think we could confront our Allies with a statement on this subject before they had been consulted.

The Secretary said that, in point of fact, the same proposal had been made by some people in our own government recently and we had been considering it during the last ten days. He found it interesting that the Germans had made the same proposal. The Secretary said that while he felt the proposal had some merit, he was afraid it might operate as an enticement to the Soviets to accept things in the disarmament agreement on the basis of the feeling that they would gain more than we would out of a Four Power conference. He thought we would need to weigh very carefully what we would gain from such a conference. He was not sure we had gained very much out of the Geneva conferences. He was not sure what we would gain out of another Four Power conference. On the other hand, he thought some way should and could be found to link a comprehensive disarmament agreement with the reunification of Germany.

The Secretary said he wished to point out that what the Soviets want most out of a disarmament agreement was not comprehended in what we were now proposing to do. For a long time the Soviets had pressed in particular for three things. One was the liquidation of all foreign bases. This was not touched in any way. The second was the withdrawal of United States forces from Europe. This was not touched in any way either. The third was the liquidation of NATO and WEU. This was not touched in any way. The Secretary said that,

in other words, the things which the Soviets really want, even inspection in Europe, would not be touched in our proposals. It was implicit in our proposals that the extension of these arrangements would be dependent on the solution of some of the major political problems, notably the reunification of Germany.

The Secretary said that he was not certain whether we could usefully add a Four Power conference to these proposals. If he hesitated, there were two reasons for doing so. One was the need for consulting our allies. The other was whether such a conference would in fact be an asset to us. He thought that we could make it clear that there could not be an effective general disarmament plan unless there were reunification. As far as a possible Four Power conference was concerned, we would, of course, give great weight to German views.

The Chancellor said that he would like to think this entire matter over.

The Secretary said he hoped that the Chancellor would take the time to think it over. He was satisfied it was the kind of policy which the Chancellor would want us to adopt. He wished to make clear again that what we were considering was a very limited agreement and not a comprehensive agreement, that it need not apply to Germany or to Europe, and that from the standpoint of procedure, we proposed to bring Europe and particularly Germany into the discussion of the problem. These were the only new points. Everything else was old.

# 117. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer, Department of State, Washington, May 28, 1957, 10 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

[Only the interpreter, Mr. Weber, was also present.]<sup>2</sup>

The Chancellor said he was glad of a chance to talk with me privately about personalities. He was anxious to know what we thought about Krekeler as Ambassador. Was he adequate? The Chancellor said he felt that von Kessel was abler, but he was not quite so sure as to his complete integrity. He was going to have this further checked.

<sup>1</sup>Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation, Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The conversation lasted until 10:45 when the Secretary escorted Adenauer to the White House for a meeting with the President. A memorandum of their conversation is printed *infra*.

<sup>2</sup>Brackets in the source text.

P.U.R.S.S. et que, pour la première fois, une conversation sérieuse peut-être s'engager. En parlant ensuite des expériences atomiques, M. Lloyd a indiqué qu'il y aurait à son avis intérêt à accepter tout de suite l'enregistrement des expériences; on essaierait ensuite d'obtenir la constitution d'un groupe d'experts techniques pour étudier les possibilités de limitation des expériences et à un troisième stade, on pourrait proposer d'interdire à la fois les expériences et la fabrication.

M. Martino a demandé que la nouvelle proposition soviétique sur le contrôle, qui pouvait avoir des incidences sérieuses sur la défense atlantique, soit soumise pour avis aux organismes militaires de l'O.T.A.N. Cette proposition a été acceptée.

Prenant la parole à son tour, M. Dulles a rappelé les déclarations de M. Pineau de la veille sur la nécessité de garder un équilibre entre l'armement conventionnel et l'armement atomique. Cette position est conforme à la directive politique adoptée en décembre par l'O.T.A.N. et se reflète dans les études qui sont entreprises en commun actuellement sur la réorganisation de nos défenses et qui contribuerait à maintenir le maximum d'unité entre membres de l'Alliance. Il a noté avec intérêt la suggestion de M. Pineau tendant à la constitution sous l'autorité du Commandant suprême d'une réserve intégrée de munitions atomiques<sup>(1)</sup>. Washington étudiera avec le plus grand soin cette intéressante idée qui permettrait de surmonter les problèmes politiques posés par le stockage de ces munitions en Europe. Il a insisté pour qu'aucune publicité ne soit donnée à cette proposition tant que toutes ses incidences militaires, politiques et législatives n'auront pas été complètement examinées.

Bien qu'il soit trop tôt pour donner un avis sur la proposition soviétique du 30 avril, le gouvernement américain pense qu'elle doit être étudiée avec soin. M. Dulles a rappelé les remarques de M. Pineau de la veille sur les problèmes que pose l'évolution atomique, et il a indiqué qu'il fallait en tenir compte dans l'élaboration de la tactique à suivre au sous-Comité. M. Dulles est d'accord avec M. Pineau sur ces différents points : la réunification de l'Allemagne et la fin de la division de l'Europe sont en dehors de la compétence du sous-Comité. Il ne peut y

(1) Au cours du Conseil de l'O.T.A.N., le ministre français des Affaires étrangères avait souligné la nécessité d'établir un équilibre entre les armes atomiques et les armes conventionnelles : sans ces dernières, l'Occident pourrait être obligé de choisir entre ne pas répondre à une agression ou prendre l'initiative d'une guerre atomique. En ce qui concernait l'implantation d'armes atomiques en Europe, M. Pineau indiquait que l'opinion publique s'inquiéterait si ces armes devenaient des cibles situées en territoire français sans que la France pût s'en servir pour répondre à une agression. La solution consisterait à intégrer les stocks dans l'O.T.A.N. et ces stocks seraient mis à la disposition du Commandant en chef. Le Ministre refusait l'idée d'une limitation des armements nucléaires à un certain nombre de pays (États-Unis, Grande-Bretagne, U.R.S.S.). Les pays en état de fabriquer la bombe atomique au cours des prochaines années étaient dans l'ordre : la France, la Suède et Israël. S'il y avait arrêt de la fabrication des armes entre les trois pays qui en possédaient, les autres se poseraient la question de savoir s'ils se trouveraient effectivement garantis par le fait que deux ou trois posséderaient la bombe, mais qu'aucun de ces pays n'exercerait un contrôle parfaitement effectif sur l'autre. Il serait extrêmement difficile de justifier devant l'opinion publique de ne pas fabriquer un certain nombre de bombes atomiques pour avoir un moyen, sinon de défense, du moins d'intimidation à l'égard d'un agresseur éventuel. (Note du Secrétariat général, coordination des questions atomiques du 7 mai, non reproduite.)

From Paris (→) Ministère des A.E., 6 mai 1957  
(# 366)

avoir de désarmement nucléaire sans désarmement conventionnel. L'organisation du contrôle doit dans toute la mesure du possible permettre de suivre le développement des techniques nouvelles éventuelles. Les pays producteurs actuels doivent en effet envisager une réduction des munitions existantes.

Les Occidentaux se trouveront certainement devant un choix difficile et ne devront rien entreprendre sans avoir pesé attentivement tous les risques. C'est dans cet esprit que les propositions américaines ont été faites à Londres. Elles permettent de sonder les intentions de l'U.R.S.S. Les États-Unis pensent qu'il faut s'efforcer d'obtenir une réduction des armes nucléaires, même s'il est impossible de les éliminer, et il faut se borner à contrôler ce qui peut l'être. Ainsi, si l'on ne peut organiser un contrôle efficace des moyens de production, peut-être pourrait-on trouver des modalités satisfaisantes pour le contrôle des moyens de lancement. Enfin, il est de l'intérêt de tous, même des pays qui renoncent à la fabrication des armes nucléaires, de ne pas voir celles-ci mises à la disposition d'irresponsables.

Les dirigeants soviétiques semblent préoccupés sincèrement par le pouvoir de destruction des nouvelles armes. Ils sont désireux de conserver, avec peu de pays, le monopole qu'ils détiennent actuellement. Enfin, la tension de leur économie les incite à ne pas rechercher à augmenter leur défense. Compte tenu de ces différentes circonstances, on peut penser qu'un début de discussion sur le contrôle est possible. Les États-Unis, pour leur part, n'accepteront jamais de prendre des risques exagérés. Ils savent qu'en cas de conflit général, c'est leur territoire qui serait le premier l'objet d'une attaque nucléaire. L'Ouest doit prendre grand soin d'éviter de se trouver, à la suite d'un accord que l'U.R.S.S. serait seule à ne pas respecter, dans l'impossibilité de résister à un chantage à la destruction.

M. Pineau est intervenu alors pour dire que le gouvernement français estimait également qu'il fallait continuer à explorer les possibilités d'un accord sur le désarmement. L'opinion en France ne comprendrait pas que l'on y renonce. L'U.R.S.S. craint que de nouveaux pays disposent prochainement de la possibilité de fabriquer des engins nucléaires. On peut penser, en effet, que dans un avenir prochain, une telle fabrication pourrait être possible, notamment en France et en Suède.

Le problème de l'armement atomique se pose donc différemment pour les états qui ont déjà un certain potentiel, et pour les pays qui peuvent hésiter entre un désarmement et l'entreprise d'une fabrication coûteuse.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères de Norvège est intervenu, à son tour, pour insister pour que soit établi au minimum l'enregistrement des explosions expérimentales, qui risquent de provoquer une retombée radioactive hors des frontières du pays intéressé. M. Spaak a signalé le danger que comporterait un désarmement atomique total auquel ne correspondrait aucun désarmement sur le plan des armes conventionnelles.