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By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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up*

January 11, 1956

*To Mr Hoover
Merchant
Smith*

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I am very much in accord with your proposals on European integration and atomic energy outlined in your memorandum of January 9th, and approve the recommendations for joint action by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State in the last paragraph of the memorandum.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Subject: European Integration and Atomic Energy

At the NSC meeting on November 21, you spoke of the great importance that should be attached to European integration. I have been giving consideration to specific measures in my power which might encourage such European development.

I believe that only the Community of Six offers promise of opening the way to a genuine United States of Europe. There are various other institutions, different in their scope of activity, their aims, and the degree of our involvement, which contribute to European cooperation but not to cooperation itself. NATO and the OEEC are made up of members drawn from the entire Atlantic Community and their objective is closer cooperation. NATO provides a cooperative framework for cooperative association of the United Kingdom with France, Germany, the Benelux, and Italy.

The Coal and Steel Community, however, is a proven and successful institution in European political and economic life. The six member governments are now maneuvering from the NSC setback and beginning, anew, to explore possibilities for expanding on a Community into new fields, with great promise that they will succeed in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Even in this field, however, there is international opposition and the Community's efforts may fail without accurate United States support.

If the six countries set up an integrated institutional personneling effective control and inspection authority in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, control over military uses of atomic energy by these six countries would be simplified, and there would be set a precedent for similar regional arrangements elsewhere.

Success would bring the incalculable political and psychological advantage of tying Germany more firmly into a Western

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European community. It would confer upon the Community great technical and economic advantages.

Under these circumstances, I believe that we should prepare to take active measures to stimulate the Six to come to a conclusion which offers real promise for consolidating and enlarging their integration. For us to seize this opportunity will require placing ourselves in a position to make a maximum contribution which may be required for creation of an integrated Community of Six program in the field of atomic energy. I believe we should act without delay to place ourselves in such position.

As you know, pursuant to NSC policy, we are now engaged in the early phases of bilateral negotiations with some of the six countries looking towards industrial nuclear power cooperation. Any resulting agreements should reflect in some way the possibility of U.S. approval or assignment of the bilateral agreements to the multilateral Community.

If you concur in the above conclusions, I suggest that you direct AEC and the Department of State to study on an urgent basis moves which the United States could make in the atomic energy field to encourage six country integration, and in the meantime to take steps to assure that any bilateral negotiations with these six countries look not to cooperation in the nuclear power field will not take such form as to embarrass the larger objectives we have in mind.

John Foster Dulles

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DOD DA 5200.1
By R.D. NARS, Date 2/17/88

20/53

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION PLAN September 1953

DATE Sept 76

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Proposed European Security System.

1. In response to the memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 23 September 1953, subject as above, and with further reference to our interim reply dated 25 September 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the military implications of the German and the Belgian proposals and of the "Related Military Questions" contained in the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 3 September 1953, as relating to a United States position with respect to German unification. The views of the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR) as to the "Related Military Questions" have now been received and considered.

2. In their consideration of the "Related Military Questions", the Joint Chiefs of Staff were guided by the following basic premises:

a. It must continue to be the goal of United States policy that an adequate initial defense of Western Europe will be achieved with indigenous European forces and resources;

b. No present indications exist that such a defense can be achieved without a substantial German contribution;

c. A sovereign Germany could not long maintain neutrality in the East-West struggle; and

d. A rearmed Germany (preferably a united Germany but at least a Western Germany) firmly allied with the West is essential to an adequate defense of Western Europe and therefore ultimately to the security of the United States.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the effect upon United States defense strategy of any withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany and the satellite areas under the several conditions described in paragraph 1 of the "Related Military

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9-20-53

Joint Secretariat.

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questions" would, of course, depend upon the conditions exacted by the Soviets as a price for such withdrawal. In general, it may be stated that any withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany and the satellite areas would constitute an improvement in the strategic position of the United States, provided such withdrawal were not conditioned upon the establishment of a neutralized and unarmed Germany. The degree of improvement in the strategic position of the United States would be directly related to the extent of such Soviet withdrawals.

4. In their memorandum for you dated 18 September 1953, subject: "United States Position with Respect to German Unification," the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that in their opinion "... the agreement of the Government of Germany should be sought to the retention in Germany of at least U.K. and U.S. occupation forces until such time as their withdrawal from the Continent will not substantially impair the capability of the Allied Command Europe to execute its defensive mission." This statement was based on the assumption that from a practical standpoint the necessary political arrangements could not be consummated nor suitable facilities be made available elsewhere on the Continent for the accommodation of these forces. If these practical difficulties of redeployment could be overcome, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be of the opinion that the United States could agree to an earlier withdrawal of Allied occupational forces from Germany to other locations on the Continent in return for adequately compensating Soviet concessions. Under these circumstances, the most desirable locations for the redeployed United States and United Kingdom occupational forces would be in Allied countries from which they could support effectively the other NATO forces.

5. The question of the minimum acceptable level of German armed forces and the phased withdrawal of occupation forces cannot be categorically answered. It is estimated that, as a minimum, a German D-day contribution of approximately 12 divisions, 1,300 aircraft, and 300 vessels of various types is required for the defense of Western Europe against Soviet-controlled military forces. This contribution is a requirement in addition to NATO forces in Europe. Under optimum conditions of German rearmament and alignment, and under the assumption that United States and United Kingdom forces in Germany could be replaced at least in part by European Defense Community forces other than German, the United States could accept, as a minimum position and in return for compensating Soviet concessions, a withdrawal of United States and United Kingdom forces from Germany (but not from the Continent) beginning as early as one year after the initiation of full-scale German rearmament. Only after German rearmament has reached at least

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By RVD NARS, Date 4/17/88

the level indicated above should any major withdrawal of United States or United Kingdom forces from the Continent be considered.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the effect upon NATO strategy in event of the establishment of a sovereign, independent, unified Germany should be viewed under the following two assumptions:

a. A Germany rearmed and aligned with the West; Under this assumption, the NATO military position would be greatly strengthened and a more forward strategy could be adopted within two years after the initiation of full-scale German rearmament.

b. A Germany rearmed but not actively aligned with the West; Under this assumption, present NATO strategy would no longer be feasible. A comprehensive review of military requirements and adoption of a new strategy would be required.

7. The German and Belgian proposals represent an approach different from any previously considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that the concept of a demilitarized zone is introduced. Subject to a firm and acceptable definition of the demilitarized zone which would not lend itself to the generation of future controversy, and provided suitable arrangements are made for a withdrawal of Allied occupation forces phased with an adequate build-up of German forces, it would appear that the German proposal would be well within the area of military acceptability from the standpoint of United States and NATO security interests. Subject to the same conditions which would govern acceptance of the German proposal, the Belgian proposal is considered to represent approximately the lower limit of military acceptability. Any agreement which would preclude Germany from rearming and aligning itself with the West would be militarily unacceptable.

8. An approximate representation of the demilitarized areas in the German and Belgian proposals as interpreted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is attached hereto as an Appendix.

Copies to:
Chairman, JCS (2)
Asst C/S, G-3
Secy to CNO (JCS)
Director/Plans, AF
Director J/S

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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
ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(JCS 2124/110 - Approved as amended -
29 Sept 53)

Enclosure;
Appendix
(Encl. is Appendix to JCS 2124/110)

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USEUCOM PLAN (BERLIN) 10-55
AND USEUCOM PLAN (BERLIN) 12-55

Approved by JSPC; JCS 1907/137, 14 Apr 56

THE PROBLEM

1. To review USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 10-55* and USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 12-55.**

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 29 December 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed*** USCINCEUR to prepare certain plans on the military aspects of United States policy toward Berlin (NSC 5404/1)**** to include unilateral contingency plans to deal with a blockade, if imposed by the Soviets or East Germans, and for meeting local reprisals and harassing actions.

3. On 12 January 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended# that the Secretary of Defense approve a recommendation## by the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), that the National Security Council give consideration to unilateral courses of action which might be appropriate at this time to deal with a blockade of Berlin, if imposed by the Soviets or East Germans, or to deal with increased harassment seriously impeding Western access to Berlin. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that, after their review of the plans referred to in paragraph 2 above, they would advise the Secretary of Defense of proposed courses of action.

4. In response to the directive set forth in paragraph 2 above, USCINCEUR submitted two reports### on the status of his plans. He submitted USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 10-55 as a unilateral contingency plan for limited use of United States military forces, to determine Soviet intentions and reopen access to Berlin in

* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat; see J.C.S. 1907/128

** Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat; see J.C.S. 1907/127

*** Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1907/112; see Note to Holders of J.C.S. 1907/112, dated 29 December 1954

**** Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/104

Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1907/114

Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/113

See Notes to Holders of J.C.S. 1907/112, dated 10 August 1955 and 23 February 1956

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 By RVD NARS, Date 2/17/88

case of a blockade or in case Western access to Berlin is seriously limited by harassing actions, and USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 12-55 as a unilateral airlift plan in the event all surface means of access to Berlin are blocked.

5. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,* the Chief of Naval Operations,** the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force,*** and the Commandant of the Marine Corps**** have submitted comments on these plans.

DISCUSSION

6. For discussion, see Enclosure "C".

CONCLUSIONS

7. USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 10-55 and USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 12-55, subject to the modifications to USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 12-55 contained in the Appendix to Enclosure "A" hereto, should be approved.

8. No action by the National Security Council should be taken, at this time, with respect to the military aspects of unilateral courses of action which might be appropriate to deal with a blockade, if imposed by the Soviets or East Germans, or to deal with increased harassment seriously impeding Western access to Berlin.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A" hereto, together with its Appendix, which reflects the conclusion in paragraph 7 above, to USCINCEUR.

b. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "B" hereto, which reflects the conclusion in paragraph 8 above, to the Secretary of Defense.

10. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this paper to commanders of unified or specified commands.

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/134 and J.C.S. 1907/129
 ** Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/135 and J.C.S. 1907/132
 *** Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/136 and J.C.S. 1907/133
 **** Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/130 and J.C.S. 1907/131

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By RJD NARS, Date 2/17/88

ENCLOSURE "B"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Berlin

1. In a memorandum for the National Security Council* dated 7 January 1955, subject as above, the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, forwarded for consideration by the National Security Council an Operations Coordinating Board recommendation with respect to paragraph 9 of NSC 5404/1** which stated that ". . . the NSC give consideration to courses of action which might be appropriate at this time, in the absence of . . . consultation [with France and the United Kingdom], to deal with a blockade [of Berlin] imposed by the Soviets or the East Germans or to deal with increased harrassment . . . seriously impeding Western access to Berlin . . ."

2. On 12 January 1955 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended*** that you concur in the above recommendation by the Operations Coordinating Board, and stated that you would be advised of proposed courses of action after the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reviewed U.S. unilateral contingency plans being prepared by USCINCEUR to deal with a blockade of Berlin, if imposed by the Soviets or the East Germans, and for meeting local reprisals and harassing actions.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently reviewed these plans**** and consider that they provide for adequate implementation, at this time, of those military aspects of U.S. Policy

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/113
** Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/104
*** Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1907/114
**** USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 10-55 and USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 12-55, on file in Joint Secretariat; see J.C.S. 1907/128 and J.C.S. 1907/127

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Toward Berlin* concerning U.S. unilateral courses of action dealing with a blockade, if imposed by the Soviets on the East Germans, and for meeting local reprisals and harassing actions.

4. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that no further action be taken at this time by the National Security Council with respect to the military aspects of the recommendation by the Operations Coordinating Board set forth in paragraph 1 above.

* NSC 5404/1, on file in Joint Secretariat; see Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/104

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J.C.S. 2220/97

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29 May 1956

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON J.C.S. 2220/97

A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee
on

EXCHANGE OF ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION WITH THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA

Note by the Secretaries


1. At their meeting on 29 May 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation in paragraph 7 of J.C.S. 2220/97.
2. The memorandum in Enclosure "A" was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, dated 29 May 1956.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of J.C.S. 2220/97.

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 48 Jan 77

RICHARD H. PHILLIPS,
R. D. WENTWORTH,
Joint Secretariat.

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| Adm. Burke (CNO) | Gen. Lindsay (Dir. Plans, Air) |
| Gen. Twining (CSAF) | Gen. Alness (DD Plans, Air) |
| Gen. Eddleman (DC/S, MO) | Adm. Austin (D/JS) |
| Gen. Harkins (ADC/S, MO) | |



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17 May 1956

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Pages 649 - 656, incl.

DATE 48 Jan 77

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

EXCHANGE OF ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION WITH
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA

- References: a. J.C.S. 2099/548
b. J.C.S. 2101/224
c. J.C.S. 2220/79
d. J.C.S. 2220/80
e. J.C.S. 2220/90

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*See Decision on dtd 5-29-56.
See Note to Holders dtd 7-26-56.
See Note to Holders dtd 1-23-57.
See Note to Holders dtd 2-20-57.*

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EXCHANGE OF ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION WITH
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA

THE PROBLEM 3/19/56

1. In response to a memorandum* by the Secretary of Defense, to determine whether military considerations justify, at this time, an attempt by the Department of Defense to seek amending legislation to permit the United States greater latitude in dealing with its major Allies, notably the United Kingdom and Canada, in areas concerning atomic weapons, and nuclear power for military applications.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In a memorandum* for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 9 March 1956, the Secretary of Defense pointed out the difficulties being experienced in implementing the Agreements for the Exchange of Atomic Energy Information with the United Kingdom** and Canada,*** and in the exchange of information relative to military reactors. He requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding possible remedial legislation thereon.

3. On 2 March 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded**** a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense expressing the view that it is desirable to equip selected allied forces with new weapons including atomic capabilities, but noted that under existing legislation atomic weapons cannot be released to the custody of allied forces.

4. On 15 March 1956, the National Security Council (NSC) in NSC 5602/1# provided basic policy guidance to the effect that atomic energy legislation as it relates to weapons should be progressively relaxed to the extent required for the progressive integration of such weapons into NATO defenses to enable their

* Dated 9 March 1956; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/90 ✓

** Annex "C" to J.C.S. 2220/80

*** Annex to J.C.S. 2220/79

**** Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2099/548

Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/224

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use by selected Allies upon the outbreak of war, and that the release of weapons or weapons systems to allied forces should be considered a separate problem in each case, in light of their contributions to the collective defense system and with full consideration of security, budgetary, and strategic factors.

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion see Enclosure "B".

CONCLUSION

6. Amending legislation, as outlined in Enclosure "A", to permit the United States greater latitude in dealing with its major Allies, notably the United Kingdom and Canada in the areas concerning atomic weapons and nuclear power for military application should be sought at this time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A", which reflects the above conclusion to the Secretary of Defense.

8. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this paper to commanders of unified or specified commands.

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JCS 2220/97

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ENCLOSURE "A"

*Sent on 5/29/56*D R A F TMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Exchange of Atomic Energy Information with
the United Kingdom and Canada

1. Reference is made to your memorandum* dated 9 March 1956, in which you requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the question of seeking amending legislation which would permit greater latitude in dealing with our major Allies in the areas of nuclear weapons and nuclear power for military applications.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion, from a military point of view, that it is most desirable that selected major Allies now be assisted in the achievement of operational delivery capabilities with appropriate weapons systems compatible with U.S. stockpile atomic weapons, and that we now proceed with all necessary preparation to facilitate a controlled release of U.S. stockpile atomic weapons as may be required in an emergency. The weapons systems selected in each case should be chosen to meet the progressive needs of mutual defense, insofar as the political, economic and security factors permit. Similarly it is considered that selected Allies should be encouraged and assisted in the achievement of military nuclear power applications. Scientific and intelligence cooperation and the exchange of atomic information with our major Allies should be adequate to satisfy the needs of mutual defensive readiness, as have been outlined in general above. However, the extent of exchange of scientific information necessary to meet readiness requirements would not be comparable to the former full wartime cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada, in research and development activities dealing with the military applications of atomic energy.

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/90

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Enclosure "A"

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3. An operational delivery capability with atomic weapons, from the military point of view, requires the establishment of complete weapons systems in readiness for the delivery of atomic weapons on target as directed. In the case of allied atomic weapons capabilities supported by the United States this must include, though not necessarily be limited to, the following:

(a) The compatibility of selected allied aircraft and missile systems with U.S. atomic weapons, or warheads.

(b) The availability of appropriate supporting facilities for the accommodation, maintenance, and readiness of the complete weapons systems, including the atomic warheads.

(c) The training and equipping of allied handling and delivery crews in all of the necessary elements of the stockpile to target sequence.

(d) The determination of atomic weapons requirements, the determination of weapons effects, and the preparation of detailed atomic operations plans, in support of current war plans.

(e) The ready availability of the atomic weapons or warheads necessary to complete the weapons systems.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore are of the view that the Department of Defense should seek new legislation that would permit the following:

(a) The exchange of atomic energy information with the United Kingdom and Canada to the extent necessary for the earliest possible achievement by those nations of operational delivery capabilities in suitable atomic weapons systems compatible with selected United States atomic weapons or warheads, including megaton yield systems.

(b) The exchange of atomic energy information and nuclear materials with the United Kingdom and Canada to the extent necessary for the rapid development of military applications of nuclear power.

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JCS 2220/97

Enclosure "A"

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(c) Scientific, development, and intelligence cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada, in the field of atomic energy to the extent required for the achievement of the above mutual defense readiness objectives.

(d) The exchange of atomic energy information with selected Allies other than the United Kingdom and Canada, to the extent necessary for the progressive development of operational delivery capabilities in suitable atomic weapons systems, compatible with selected United States atomic weapons or warheads, and for the development of military nuclear power applications.

(e) At the discretion of the President, the immediate availability of United States atomic weapons to selected allied nations, as may be required for the completion of established atomic weapons systems, and as may be considered necessary for the defensive readiness of the United States and its Allies.

5. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, in view of the responsibilities of the Department of Defense in the implementation of allied readiness in atomic warfare, and in view of the history of administrative difficulties in matters of joint judgement with the Atomic Energy Commission regarding the releasability of information, new legislation should establish Department of Defense as the ultimate responsible authority for the release of information in the field of military applications of atomic energy, as may be required to meet the needs of allied mutual defense.

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Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The limitations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954*, and the delays and uncertainties imposed by the required "joint determination" of the suitability of information for release, raise the question as to whether the act serves the best interests of the United States in meeting the problems of allied mutual defense.

2. An operational delivery capability with atomic weapons requires the existence of the complete weapons system in readiness for the delivery of atomic weapons on target as directed. In the case of allied atomic weapons capabilities supported by the United States this must include, though not necessarily be limited to, the following:

a. The compatibility of selected allied aircraft and missile systems with U.S. atomic weapons, or warheads.

b. The availability of appropriate supporting facilities for the accommodation, maintenance, and readiness of the complete weapons systems, including the atomic warheads.

c. The training of allied handling and delivery crews in all of the necessary elements of the stockpile to target sequence.

d. The determination of atomic weapons requirements, the determination of weapons effects, and the preparation of detailed atomic operations plans, in support of current war plans.

e. The ready availability of the warheads or weapons necessary to complete the systems.

* On file in Joint Secretariat

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Enclosure "B"

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responsibility of
joint process*

3. The delays and uncertainties inherent in the requirement for a "joint judgement" between the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission regarding the releasability of atomic energy information, is seriously delaying the progressive development of allied mutual defensive readiness in atomic warfare. It appears that more positive progress in the implementation of this national security policy could be made if the Department of Defense were given the ultimate responsibility in the release and exchange of information in field of military applications of atomic energy as required to progressively meet the needs of allied mutual defense.

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JCS 2220/97

Enclosure "B"

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8/13/56

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By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

S/P-56309-7A

S/P

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE document consists of 2 pages
Number 1 of 2 copies, Series A
Memorandum of Conversation

1956 AUG 28 AM 9 51

520
DATE: August 13, 1956

SUBJECT: NATO Force Levels, OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
S/P

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Dulles Secretary of Defense Wilson
Under Secretary Hoover Admiral Radford
Mr. Bowie (S/P) General Gruenther
Mr. Murphy (C)

COPIES TO: 5 - The Secretary
U - Mr. Hoover
S/S (2)
S/P
G
EUR

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 981090
By HRT/MD NARA Date 4/2/89

Secretary Dulles opened the discussion with a reference to the need for a review of NATO force levels with special reference to American forces in Europe. Mr. Wilson expressed himself as being in thorough sympathy with the idea of a review looking to a reduction of American personnel stationed in Europe. There was an exchange of comments regarding German participation and a review of the position by General Gruenther. Secretary Wilson said he had made it quite clear to the Germans at the time of their recent visit that the German contribution of 500,000 men should be considered in ratio to the United States' contribution. He had pointed out that our force level was now 2 million 850 thousand, and that in ratio to our population, if our contribution were to be comparable to the one asked of the Germans, we would have a force level of only 1 million 650 thousand. Secretary Dulles explained that he had made the same point to the German Ambassador in a recent conversation. There was considerable discussion with General Gruenther regarding the makeup of the American forces stationed in Europe, the size of the divisional slice, which was estimated roughly at 40,000. General Gruenther laid emphasis on the morale factors involved which required services relating to schooling, communication, housing, dependents, etc., the importance of which he said should not be overlooked.

Secretary Wilson inquired as to how many American personnel are stationed in Europe at the present time and the Defense representatives were unable to give a figure, Admiral Radford saying that he was not certain, and General Gruenther indicating that it might be in the neighborhood of 400,000. There seemed to be agreement between Secretary Dulles and Secretary Wilson that a reduction in the

size

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NAS 1456 / 108 / Europe 75

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Authority NND 957245By SL NARA Date 3/11/97~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

size of the American establishment in Europe is possible and should be effected, although this should not necessarily take the form of a reduction of units but rather decreases in unit strength. General Gruenther emphasized that this would have to be studied very carefully as the effectiveness of the units would of course be reduced and many technical questions regarding handling of equipment would be raised. Admiral Radford was distinctly uncommitted. There was some conversation about the possibility of reducing the divisional strength by "X" number of thousands and the possibility that this might amount to as much as 5 to 10,000 based on a divisional size of 40,000. There was no agreement on this point. General Gruenther referred to an extensive study which is being made by the Army involving, he said, some 600 men. Secretary Wilson said he thought the question could be handled much more effectively by five or six men than by 600. Secretary Haller and Secretary Wilson recalled that reductions of our forces in Japan and Korea had been effected notwithstanding grave apprehensions expressed at the time, but the reductions had been made and the situation seems to have developed satisfactorily since then. They both expressed the opinion that a similar operation could be successfully accomplished in Europe, but there was no specification as to the magnitude of the reduction.

C: Murphy:alch

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10/2/56

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Authority NND 959245
By SP NARA Date 3/11/97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE COUNSELOR

1956 OCT 3 AM 10 50

October 2, 1956.

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Goodpaster,
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 881090
By HL-17/2007 NARA Date 4/27/89

Andy:

With reference to our telephone conversation this afternoon following the meeting with the President, I enclose three copies of the paper which was agreed at the White House today and approved by the President.

These copies incorporate the several little changes which were made in the paper. As I mentioned to you, we would be grateful if you would send one of the enclosed copies to Reuben Robertson so that we can be sure everyone is operating from the same piece of paper.

Douglas MacArthur II

Enclosures:

Cys 2, 3, 4 of 9A,
memo for President 10/2/56.

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Authority _____
By _____ NARA Date _____

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26

PPS 1956/108 / EWAPETS

Memo to Pres.
NATO Strategy
& Force Levels

10/1/56
(AKW
(10/2)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 959245
By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

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This document consists of 3 pages
Number 1 of 9 copies. Series A
October 1, 1956

Approved by the President, October 2, 1956)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: United States Position on Review of NATO Strategy
and Force Levels

I.

Following his conversation with you prior to departure for Europe, Senator George told the Foreign Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg that the Administration would not withdraw any forces from Germany; that there might conceivably be some streamlining reducing the number of men in a division, but no overall reductions or withdrawals. You will recall that prior to my departure for London on September 17, I reported this to you and asked whether this called for any corrective action. You thought not and confirmed that what Senator George had said was in accordance with your views. As you requested, I informed the Secretary of Defense accordingly.

When Senator George saw Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn on September 28, he said he wished to give the Chancellor the complete assurance of the President that there is no intention of withdrawing or reducing our forces so long as their presence is agreeable to the Germans and to the rest of the NATO group.

Pressures in the North Atlantic Council for the immediate commencement of a review of political guidance to the NATO military authorities have now become irresistible, and our failure so far to present the United States position has generated much doubt and confusion as to U.S. intentions and purposes. There has been a serious deterioration in the situation, which, if uncorrected, can have a serious adverse effect on the whole NATO structure.

It is therefore proposed that the United States position be stated promptly in the North Atlantic Council. Prior thereto, we are obligated to present our views to the British, who have proposed a major reduction in NATO conventional forces.


II.

Our presentation to the Council and to the British would be based on the following:

1. The NATO military mission now includes the defense of the NATO area against all types of aggression, including any local attack, by a satellite force for

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Memo to Pres.
NATO Strategy
& Force Levels

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

example. The maintenance of an effective shield for these purposes must include sufficient conventional ground forces to avoid inflexibility.

2. Accordingly, we find unacceptable any proposal which implies the adoption of a NATO strategy of total reliance on nuclear retaliation.

3. Despite reports to the contrary, the United States has no present plan for withdrawing divisions from Europe. In the light of developments in materiel and techniques, a streamlining of forces appears desirable and will permit economies in manpower without weakening NATO's defensive strength.

4. The United States will continue to carry out its undertakings of October 1954 to "continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area."

What constitutes a "fair sharing" of burdens among the members of NATO is not static. The burden on the United States of maintaining the nuclear deterrent, of assuring the defense of the North American portion of the North Atlantic Treaty area, and of maintaining naval forces to keep the sea lanes open, is steadily and rapidly increasing with the growing complexity and cost of these programs.

Accordingly, it seems only fair that the European nations should increasingly assume a greater share of responsibility for the ready forces required on the Continent to provide the shield which NATO strategy envisages.

5. We recognize the desirability of adjusting European thinking as rapidly as possible to the application of the "fair share" concept, but we would exercise discretion in the timing and nature of our presentation so as to avoid collapsing NATO as a result of any misconception of our purpose.

6. We would, however, urge a prompt restudy of the political and military situation by the NATO Permanent Representative with a view to assuring the fullest possible understanding by all NATO members of the current need and justification for the continued defense effort.

7. We believe that this review should be conducted by the Permanent Representatives, calling upon the NATO military authorities for advice as required. On the basis of the Permanent Representatives' study, political guidance to the NATO military authorities should be agreed at the Ministerial Meeting in December.

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Authority NND 959245

By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

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-3-

8. In the course of the review, consideration should be given to urging the NATO military authorities to accelerate the adjustment of their plans to take account of modern weapons and techniques so as to reduce manpower and materiel requirements to the extent consistent with security.

9. Secrecy with respect to the conduct of the review is politically imperative until final conclusions are reached.

10. Under the current treaty limitations, we could not agree to the UK-French proposal regarding the role of NATO or its members in event of hostilities solely outside the NATO area.

III.

If you approve this course, we would immediately inform the British Ambassador on the basis of the foregoing and advise the UK of our intention to speak in the North Atlantic Council along the above lines at an early date. We would also inform the UK of our hope that they would accept our views, but that we feel it necessary to proceed promptly in the Council in any event. Shortly thereafter, the United States would make a statement in the North Atlantic Council on the basis of the foregoing.

John Foster Dulles

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10/4/56



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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~RAF~~

4 October 1956

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to I-16,560/6

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Authority UND 87400
By CG NARA Date 1/24/97

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~~BM~~
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LANE TIMMONS
Department of State

SUBJECT: Release of Information

In accordance with our oral understanding reached on 27 September 1956, I enclose a status report on release of information to SHAPE. This is, as you know, a constantly changing picture, and although other actions are currently under way which will effect the report, it is accurate as of 15 September 1956.

H. A. Twitchell
H. A. TWITCHELL
Colonel, U.S.A.
Chief, Special Affairs

740.56/10.456

Enclosure - 1
"Release of Information to
SHAPE and NATO Nations" -
(SECRET)

On 29 November 1955 General Gruenther sent a message to Secretary Gray listing some 46 items or groups of items in the new weapons category on which he requested information for planning purposes. On 16 January 1956 the JCS was asked to review this list for adequacy and to recommend items for which information could be released under existing policy or as "exception to policy." On 2 February 1956 the JCS replied with a list of items upon which information could be released to SACEUR. It contained 16 of the 46 items requested plus several others, and advised that the JCS would continue to work on the remainder of the request.

On 5 July 1956, the JCS furnished another memorandum containing two lists of additional items. The first list recommended two items on the SACEUR list plus 5 others, on which information could be released under "exception to policy" provisions. The second list contained specific limited information on 7 of the SACEUR items plus 6 others. The JCS recommended clearance of both lists by S-D/MICC. Subsequent action cleared these items. On 27 July 1956 S-D/MICC forwarded this data to USMLR SHAPE.

Procedures for processing requests from NATO nations for new weapons were set forth in a Defense message dated 19 April 1956. Requests flow through the MAAG concerned to USCINCEUR, who after coordination with DEFREPNAME, forwards them together with his recommendations and a statement on need to know to Secretariat, S-D/MICC, who processes the requests in normal fashion.

Secretariat, S-D/MICC advises that as of 15 September the only calls which have been received from NATO nations are a German request on Nike 1 and B, TALOS and three Belgian requests for Nike 1, Honest John, Corporal, and the Skysweeper.

In addition to these individual country requests, USCINCEUR on 9 August 1956 requested detailed information be furnished the NATO MAAG's (less Portugal) on the new weapons being programmed in the FY 57 MDAP. Secretariat, S-D/MICC at the present time is processing this CINCEUR request. This information will be made available to the MAAGs through USCINCEUR about the latter part of October

10/4/56

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MESSAGE

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10/15/56

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

~~TOP SECRET~~
ROUTINE

A PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
Except prior to Category B encryption.
Physically remove all internal
refs by DTG prior to declassification

FROM: USNMR PARIS FRANCE SGD GRUENTHER

TO: JCS WASH DC

NR: ALO 1142 NOFORN

PERSONAL FOR RADFORD

JCS MESSAGE FILE
BRANCH
1730Z OCT 56

Message in 4 parts

Part 1.

Department of Army Executive Agent message, DA 910411 DTG 202301Z, indicates CINCEUR's request for dispersal authorization forwarded to SecDef has been returned, along with requests of other commanders, to JCS for reconsideration.

Part 2.

NATO planning for the defense of EUROPE is predicated upon the use of atomic weapons. The conduct of the tactical battle in Allied Command Europe requires the immediate availability of these weapons in support of NATO subordinate commanders' plans.

Part 3.

Failure to increase CINCEUR's dispersal authority, as the US stockpile and CINCEUR's allocation increases, thereby preventing the immediate availability of weapons required for use in NATO subordinate commanders' plans for defense of Allied Command Europe, is considered unsound from a military standpoint. This is particularly true in view of the growing USSR atomic capability of which subordinate commanders are well aware. Such a situation may have adverse psychological effects with respect to NATO commanders who would wonder why planning numbers of weapons available to them remain static.

Part 4.

I therefore urge continued JCS support for CINCEUR's request for increased dispersal authority.
ACTION: CJCS

DA IN 280256

(15 OCT 56)

JG/B

80

JCS FORM 375-4
1 AUG 56
REPLACES OCS FORM 375-4 1 MAR 56 WHICH MAY BE USED

Rec-10-24-56

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REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED

471.6 (8-15-45) Ser 8628
10-15-56

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NND 867400
By KON
Date 8/12/88

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 11778
Rec'd: OCTOBER 20, 1956
2:16 AM

FROM: BONN
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1518, OCTOBER 19, 7 PM

wkmi

10-24-56
N.A.R.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central Files
762A.5/10-1956

SENT DEPARTMENT 1518, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS, LONDON UNNUMBERED
DEFENSE MINISTER STRAUSS REPORTEDLY MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS
IN PRESS INTERVIEW OCTOBER 16:

1. REGARDING U.S.: "I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IS PRINCIPAL CONCERN OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT."
2. REGARDING ARMED FORCES BUILDUP:
 - A. BUILDUP WILL CONTINUE, BUT PRESENT PLANS NOT INVIOLETE. TOO EARLY TO TELL OF NEW PLANS, FIRST THERE MUST BE COMPLETE SURVEY OF SITUATION.
 - B. ABSURD ALLEGE THAT IDEA OF CITIZEN SOLDIERS AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES WILL BE ABANDONED NOW. PLANNING REMAINS WHOLLY DEFENSIVE AND SUPREME COMMAND WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE ENTRUSTED TO MILITARY MAN.
 - C. IN BUILDING ARMED FORCES MAXIMUM CONSIDERATION TO BE GIVEN TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING MUST ASSURE ADEQUATE USE AND SUPPLY MOST MODERN WEAPONS.
 - D. EQUIPMENT OF BUNDESWEHR WITH TANKS WILL BE SOLELY ON BASIS PLANS APPROVED BY NATO.
3. REGARDING ATOMIC WEAPONS:
 - A. RENUNCIATION OF ATOMIC WEAPON PRODUCTION REMAINS VALID, BUT THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH QUESTION WHETHER ATOMIC WEAPONS SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO FEDERAL REPUBLIC.
 - B. FEDERAL

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HBS

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DECLASSIFIED	NND 867400
By KON	NAARS, Date 8/2/88

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-2- 1518, OCTOBER 19, 7 PM FROM BONN

B. FEDERAL REPUBLIC LAW ON ATOMIC ENERGY SOLELY CONCERNED WITH PEACEFUL USES.

4. REGARDING PRODUCTION OF ARMS:

A. "I ADVOCATE A JOINT EUROPEAN PRODUCTION CHARACTERIZED BY SPECIALIZED ARMAMENT PRODUCTION IN VARIOUS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES."

B. ARMAMENT FOR FEDERAL REPUBLIC NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE PRODUCED WHOLLY IN GERMANY.

C. "AS LONG AS THERE IS NO COMMON MARKET WE HAVE TO COMPENSATE GERMAN ARMAMENT IMPORTS BY GERMAN ARMAMENT EXPORTS."

5. REGARDING RIGHT OF FORMER WAFFEN SS MEMBERS TO SERVE IN BUNDESWEHR:

A. ACROSS THE BOARD TAKEOVER NOT REPEAT NOT PLANNED.

B. TO EXTENT THEY APPLY IT IS PLANNED THAT THEY SHOULD BE INDIVIDUALLY EXAMINED BY CENTRAL AUTHORITY STAFFED WITH RELIABLE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE FAMILIAR WITH CONDITONS UNDER NAZIS.

CONANT

TJI

OCT 2 1988

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11/21/56

21 November 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Provision of Nuclear Capabilities to U.S. Allies.

1. In reference to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 5 November 1956, on the above subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your policy guidance for review of the Atomic Energy Act, prepared for use in the development of necessary remedial legislation.

2. The wording of the policy guidance refers to a possible provision of atomic weapons to selected Allies. This wording could possibly be interpreted to mean the transfer of custody of U.S. stockpile weapons to other nations for their discretionary use. The previously expressed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the development of operational delivery capabilities with selected Allies, with discretionary Presidential authority to make the atomic weapons available to meet the needs of defensive readiness of the United States and its Allies. This difference in emphasis expressed in the foregoing views is considered important, particularly in light of recent international developments involving policy differences with major Allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not contemplate the provision of atomic weapons to selected Allies in the immediate future, except as may be necessary, and at Presidential discretion, to meet the most urgent needs of defensive readiness.

3. The achievement of an integrated defense of the North American continent, with atomic weapons, is a problem of immediate concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this connection, it would be desirable for the President to have the discretion to furnish air-to-air, surface-to-air, and antisubmarine atomic weapons to Canada in an emergency. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the view that, in seeking remedial legislation, the objective of U.S.-Canadian defense should be given priority.

350.05(3-16-48) Sec 8 R.D.

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each 2
Rep. to be made in whole or in part as indicated except with permission of the issuing office.

DATE 23 Feb 1978

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CCS 350.05(3-16-48) (Sec 8)

11-21-56

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4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to contribute information on this matter to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), as he may require for presentation to Congress of proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Distr:

- Chairman, JCS (2)
- DC/S, Mil Op
- Secy to CNO (JCS)
- Director/Plans, AF
- Director J/S

as amended

(JCS 2220/111 - Approved/21 Nov 56)

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4/15/57

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COPY NO. 79

J.C.S. 2220/124

15 April 1957

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON J.C.S. 2220/124

A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee

on

ATOMIC SUPPORT OF ALLIED FORCES (U)

Note by the Secretaries

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

DATE 23 Feb 78


1. On 15 April 1957 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraphs 8 and 9 of J.C.S. 2220/124.

2. Copies of this paper are being forwarded to USCINCEUR, CINCNELM, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCFE, CINCARIB, U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, NATO, and Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of J.C.S. 2220/124.

R. D. WENTWORTH,
H. L. HILLYARD,
Joint Secretariat.

350,05 (3-16-48) Sec. 9 R.B.



Recd. 4-22-57

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COPY NO. 79

J.C.S. 2220/124

2 April 1957

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

Pages 799 - 806, incl. DATE 22-7-478.....

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

ATOMIC SUPPORT OF ALLIED FORCES (U)

- References:
- a. J.C.S. 927/89
 - b. J.C.S. 2101/231
 - c. J.C.S. 2101/244
 - d. J.C.S. 2220/70
 - e. J.C.S. 2220/79
 - f. J.C.S. 2220/80
 - g. J.C.S. 2220/97
 - h. J.C.S. 2220/112
 - i. J.C.S. 2220/113
 - j. J.C.S. 2220/114
 - k. J.C.S. 2220/115
 - l. J.C.S. 2220/116
 - m. J.C.S. 2220/119
 - n. J.C.S. 2220/120

350.05 (3-16-48) Sec. 9 R, D

See Corrig dtd 4-3-57.
See Second Corrig 4-13-57.
See Decision on dtd 4-15-57.

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JCS 2220/124

RB
J.C.S. FILE COPY
4-2-57

4-15-57.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~ATOMIC SUPPORT OF ALLIED FORCES (U)THE PROBLEM

1. To consider possible changes in the national disclosure policy* to facilitate a greater allied appreciation of U.S. atomic weapons and the development of realistic indigenous force goals by individual Allies.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 25 May 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved** a recommendation*** by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that an appropriate committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed**** to recommend implementing actions so that U.S. and allied commanders will take cognizance of U.S. atomic capabilities in reassessing force requirements for adequate defenses in certain areas.

3. On 19 September 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested# the comments and recommendations of CINCLANT, CINCNELM, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, CINCFE, CINCARIB, U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Military Committee, and Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee, as to any changes in national disclosure policy which would facilitate a greater allied appreciation of U.S. atomic weapons and the development of realistic indigenous force goals by individual Allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received## replies as requested.

* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat; see Note to Holders of J.C.S. 927/89, dated 28 December 1955

** J.C.S. 2101/231

*** Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/231

**** SM-442-56; See J.C.S. 2101/231

Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2101/244

(1) ✓ CINCLANT Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/112

(2) ✓ CINCNELM Comments; Appendix to J.C.S. 2220/120

(3) ✓ USCINCEUR Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/115

(4) ✓ CINCPAC Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/119

(5) CINCFE Comments; CINCFE message to DEPTAR, No. FE 803397, DTG 111011Z December 1956 (DA IN 279317); on file in Joint Secretariat

(6) ✓ CINCARIB Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/116

(7) U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, NATO Comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/114

(8) Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee comments; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/113

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JCS 2220/124

- 800 -

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~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~DISCUSSION

4. The replies received from the commanders of unified and 1
 specified commands vary considerably from the extreme of (1) 2
 indicating no change in national disclosure policy is necessary 3
 at this time, to (2) requesting authority to furnish detailed 4
 information concerning the size of our arsenal of nuclear and 5
 thermonuclear weapons to the NATO Alliance. Necessary actions 6
 to satisfy the requested changes have already been authorized 7
 or will be in the near future, with the exception of (2) above, 8
 on which, from a security standpoint, no action should be taken. 9

5. For additional discussion, see the Enclosure hereto. 10

CONCLUSIONS

6. No major changes are required at this time in national 11
 disclosure policy to facilitate (1) greater allied appreciation 12
 of U.S. atomic weapons or (2) the development of realistic 13
 indigenous force goals by individual Allies. 14

7. The military Services should obtain from the Atomic 15
 Energy Commission advance copies of a document entitled 16
 "Effects of Nuclear Weapons"* for distribution to our Allies 17
 through commanders of unified and specified commands prior 18
 to public availability of the document. 19

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note 20
 the above conclusions. 21

9. It is recommended that this paper be forwarded to 22
 USCINCEUR, CINCNELM, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCFE, CINCARIB, 23
 U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, NATO, and Chairman, 24
 Joint Middle East Planning Committee. 25

* Not on file in Joint Secretariat; see Enclosure hereto

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1. In their comments and recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject, CINCNELM, CINCPAC, CINCARIB and CINCFE indicated no changes were required in national disclosure policy to accomplish greater appreciation of U.S. atomic weapons development or realistic indigenous force goals by individual Allies. CINCLANT, the Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee, U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Military Committee; and USCINCEUR recommended changes in national disclosure policy so as to permit the release of:

- a. Detailed information on effective employment of nuclear weapons with regard to military targets.
- b. Detailed information on the effects of underwater atomic bursts against all type of ship targets.
- c. Atomic weapon training aids for delivery vehicles such as HONEST JOHN, MATADOR, and F-84F, as provided under the Military Assistance Program.
- d. Detailed information on fall-out effects of megaton weapons for defensive planning.
- e. Detailed information on the size of the U.S. arsenal of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

2. Regarding subparagraphs 1 a and b above, a manual* entitled "Capabilities of Atomic Weapons (U), Revised Edition, 1 June 1955", was prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) for the primary purpose of disseminating characteristics and capabilities of atomic weapons to selected U.S. Allies whose national security laws provide for adequate protection. Permission was granted to SACEUR on 24 August 1956, and to SACLANT on 2 November 1956, to release the contents of the manual to appropriate

* On file in Joint Secretariat; also identified as TM 23-200, OPNAV Instruction 003400.18 AFL 136-4 and NAVMC 1104

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subordinate headquarters, as authorized* by the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information. The manual specifies in considerable detail the effects of nuclear weapons on any major military target. The manual does not provide for the manner of determining the physical vulnerability of a given target. Such information has been provided in a separate Intelligence Document entitled "Target Analysis for Atomic Weapons",** which was authorized for release on 1 November 1956 to elements of SHAPE and subordinate commands as determined by SACEUR. The AEC published a joint AEC-DOD classification guide*** on 23 August 1956, which will facilitate passing to NATO countries atomic information which is neither Restricted Data nor transclassified Restricted Data.

3. Regarding subparagraph 1 c above, release to selected Allies of training weapons and aids for HONEST JOHN, NIKE, MATADOR, and atomic conversion kits for F-84F aircraft was authorized**** by the Secretary of Defense on 7 February 1957. Subject to the recipient countries having the capability to effectively operate and maintain these weapons from a technical and financial standpoint, this latest authorization should go far toward overcoming the deficiency mentioned by USCINCEUR and U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Military Committee.

4. With respect to the matter in subparagraph 1 d above, there exists a need for a military policy document to be issued containing all information which is releasable to our Allies, within present national disclosure policies, regarding fall-out effects of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. To this end, AFSWP has prepared a document for publication by AEC, entitled "Effects of Nuclear Weapons"#, which not only contains extensive information on fall-out effects, but also offers other unclassified

* C-M (55) 31; not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat; available to the Services through Service subregistries; see also Note to Holders of J.C.S. 2220/70, dated 2 May 1956

** Physical Vulnerability Technical Manual #14, U.S. Air Force, dated 30 June 1954; not on file in Joint Secretariat

*** On file in Joint Secretariat

**** See

(1) SECDEF message to USCINCEUR, DEF 917503, DTG 072134Z February 1957; on file in Joint Secretariat

(2) Note to Holders of J.C.S. 2220/97, dated 23 January 1957

Not on file in Joint Secretariat

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information concerning weapon effect data of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. Although this document has not been released officially for publication, the Director of Military Application of the AEC, in a letter* to General Luedecke, Chief, AFSWP, on 14 January 1957, concurred in the total declassification of the material on weapon effect data as portrayed in this document. It has been determined informally that the document will be released to the Government Printing Office on or about 20 April 1957. Upon publication of "Effects of Nuclear Weapons" on or about 1 June 1957, much of the data presently withheld from our Allies on weapon effects will be released to the general public as unclassified information. It is believed desirable that the military Services take cognizance of this fact, and obtain advance copies of this document for early dissemination to our Allies through commanders of unified and specified commands prior to public availability of the document.

5. Regarding subparagraph 1 e above, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954** does not preclude the release of such information. However, it is difficult to determine how the disclosure of the size of the entire U.S. nuclear and thermonuclear stockpile would contribute appreciably to NATO defense plans. It is quite possible that if certain NATO Allies were apprised of such sensitive information, they might be forced by internal financial and political pressures to reduce their national military appropriations, rationalizing such actions on the basis of the size of the U.S. atomic arsenal, heretofore unknown. Once such action starts, it could cause serious deterioration in the over-all NATO posture. In addition, releasing such sensitive data to non-U.S. nationals subjects the information unnecessarily to possible compromise.

* Not on file in Joint Secretariat

** On file in Joint Secretariat

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6. Specific requests by unified or specified commanders not listed in subparagraphs 1a through e are as follows:

a. CINCLANT requested the release of information on the broad aspects of U.S. atomic operational coordination machinery, specifically the purpose served by the Field Representative, Europe (FRE). There are no legal technicalities that preclude informing selected Allies that atomic coordination centers exist. In fact, a RAF Bomber Command representative is associated presently with FRE to coordinate the UK atomic capability. However, to go beyond the point of merely advising selected Allies that such coordination facilities exist would not afford greater appreciation of U.S. atomic capabilities, and would subject sensitive data to compromise.

b. The Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Committee, requested a revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954* in order to permit the execution of an agreement between the Baghdad Pact Powers and the United States for cooperation regarding atomic information. Authority for such agreements, either with individual countries or regional defense organizations, is contained in Sections 123 and 144 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

c. USCINCEUR requested that NATO Allies receive live weapons, including nuclear components, in a NATO emergency for those delivery vehicles included in NATO atomic planning for the defense of Europe. The present bilateral atomic agreements** between the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom provide for the release of information regarding the characteristics of atomic weapon delivery systems, including tactics and techniques, the compatibility of atomic

* On file in Joint Secretariat

** See

(1) Annex "C" to J.C.S. 2220/79

(2) Annex "C" to J.C.S. 2220/80

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weapons with various delivery vehicles, as well as other information. The possibility of offering other bilateral atomic agreements to selected NATO nations is also being studied. Under such an agreement, the United States would train NATO forces in the delivery problems attendant to employing atomic weapons. Nevertheless, it is envisaged that atomic weapons would remain in U.S. custody at sites appropriately positioned within the NATO area from which weapons could be delivered to NATO forces in an emergency.

7. In light of the foregoing, it appears that no immediate valid requirement exists for major changes in present national disclosure policy.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 34829
T-52-R-V R-IV
French

Paris, November 30, 1956

Mr. President:

In this letter, which we beg you to consider personal and confidential, we have, by writing it in both our names, sought to make known to you that our opinions and sentiments are in agreement with respect to our concern over the effectiveness and future of the Atlantic Pact.

You, Mr. President, have been the prime mover of this Pact. You are aware that Western Europe is still free because of NATO. You, like us, are persuaded that the peace of the world, which is our highest hope, depends on the vitality of this defensive organization, which is based on the close union of its members.

NATO has hitherto been able to carry out its providential mission because the moral, political, and military conditions needed for its effectiveness have been present. It appears to us that these conditions today are in danger of being changed.

NATO depends, first and foremost, on the faith which free peoples have in it.

We believe it our duty to inform you that in our opinion this faith has been shaken in the mind of the French people.

It rested, indeed, on the conviction that complete solidarity existed between the United States of America and

Western

His Excellency
President Dwight D. Eisenhower



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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 89-63 #2
BY DJH DATE 3/22/90

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Western Europe and on the feeling, which became a certainty after the official and public affirmation that atomic retaliation would be automatic in the event of Soviet aggression, that the American potentialities in nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and their certain use constituted the essential element in the security of the West, the sole means of discouraging aggression.

That certainty of atomic retaliation, with the adoption, which it involved, of a new strategy, the strategy of keeping ahead, and of new war doctrines, was the chief fact that gave full confidence in the effectiveness of the efforts undertaken by the NATO countries for their common defense. All plans have been built on this strategy and on these new doctrines, and putting them into effect with only the conventional means would obviously lead to irremediable defeat, and the definitive collapse of Europe.



However, the Soviets are engaging in a form of aggression other than direct aggression, and their menacing shadow is gradually spreading over the Middle East and Africa. It is the entire southern flank of this Europe that NATO intends to defend which is today on the point of collapsing. It is possible to cope with this Soviet strategy, which contains the seeds of marginal and localized conflicts, only if American solidarity is complete and only if, as a result, the reactions of the European countries whose interests are involved are protected from the threat of direct Soviet intervention by the assurance of an atomic counterblow.

That solidarity and assurance began to be questioned in official circles from the beginning of the Suez affair, not only in France,

but

but in neighboring countries, and that one of the two signers of this letter who has just left the post of Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces, Central Europe, was surprised at the remarks he heard in this connection at the time of his farewell visits to Bonn, Brussels, and the Hague and found it necessary to assert vigorously his absolute faith in the effectiveness of NATO, asking his listeners to share that faith, come what might.

When the U.S.S.R., one memorable day in November 1956, brutally threatened to rain guided missiles down upon the territories of the United Kingdom and France, the French people began actually to doubt the effectiveness of the Pact in providing an immediate counterblow, since they did not hear your voice immediately raised. We can imagine the reasons which prevented you from replying yourself, and we were happy over the terms of the vigorous statement made a few days later by the Supreme Commander of the Atlantic Forces. There exists, nevertheless, deep anxiety in public opinion, and also a doubt with respect to what might happen in the future if more serious threats should arise. Such an attitude of mind tends to lessen confidence in the Pact. Without that confidence, we have reason to fear that the Pact, stripped of its spirit and its will, may only too rapidly become an instrument that no longer fulfills the aims of its originators. It is fitting, moreover, to point out that these circumstances are already being used by Communist propaganda, which plays upon the isolationist sentiment of France to make our people believe that they are being forsaken by the United States of America. We are sure that the serious character



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of this psychological crisis does not escape your attention and that new words, coming from your heart, will be able to restore confidence in the bonds that unite us.

It is furthermore necessary that all acts harmonize with intentions and that, outside the territories covered by the Atlantic Pact, political differences not permit the Communist Powers to turn, in the Mediterranean, the flank of the Western defenses in Europe by crafty infiltration.

In this regard we know that no one is more aware than you, Mr. President, of the designs of the U.S.S.R., which aims to extend its influence through the Middle East and North Africa as far as Casablanca and Dakar. Communism encourages racial and religious rivalries in the Middle East. It gives its military aid to States which use their independence only to threaten their neighbors and repudiate their international obligations. It obtains the support of local Communist parties in every rebellion in North Africa; it tries to prevent the restoration of peace there by opposing every happy and liberal solution that might take account of the necessary coexistence of the French and Moslem populations. In short, the Communist States constantly support in the U.N., before an assembly perhaps more carried away by its passions than guided by reason, all proposals tending to break up the Atlantic Unity by pitting the United States against the United Kingdom and France. All these facts can leave no doubt in our minds concerning Moscow's desire to reach the shores of the Atlantic via the Mediterranean and North Africa.



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In this struggle, on which the fate of both the United States and Western Europe depends, we are obliged to note that, in spite of transitory appearances, every time the influence of the United Kingdom and France diminishes in the Near East and the Mediterranean, this does ^{not} benefit another Western Power but rather the U.S.S.R. and Communism.

It is, in fact - and we are convinced of it -, a snare and a delusion to believe in the possibility of an Arab bloc on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean that would serve the interests of the West.

That is why, in the present serious turn of events, we consider it desirable to inform you of the questions which we must ask ourselves as we face the future.

Is it well, in the coming days, for France and the United Kingdom by a too-hasty withdrawal of their forces in Egypt to abandon, unfinished, a task which they had undertaken only to save the West from the greatest perils?

Is it well for this withdrawal to be effected without definite prior guarantees concerning the ability of the International Force to maintain peace, the rapid clearing of the Canal, strict application of the principle of free navigation, the supplying of Europe with oil from the Middle East, the peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and the Arab States, and, lastly, the definitive termination of Egyptian meddling in Algeria?

Is it well for France, within a few weeks' time, to be morally condemned in the U.N. because she is defending herself in Algeria -- French soil -- against attacks inspired from abroad and is making an effort to preserve there, against the worst incitements to racial struggle and religious fanaticism, a profoundly humane task

which

which the Arab Governments have been incapable of performing at home, despite the financial and technical aid that has been lavished upon them?

Is it well, in the long run, for France to be obliged, because of its isolation, to maintain indefinitely in North Africa forces which she is eager to bring back to Western Europe to strengthen lines still threatened by Soviet pressure?

Would it be well, lastly, to abandon in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria positions essential to the defense of the United States and Western Europe, positions which it would be impossible for any other power to maintain very long if the French Army did not ensure the general security of the territories which surround them?

We are convinced that it is possible to find for all these questions solutions and formulas that are in the common interest of the United States and France, and satisfy the aims of the Atlantic Pact.

We beg you, Mr. President, to accept the assurances of our high consideration.

/Signed/

A. Juin

A. Juin
Marshal of France

/Signed/

Weygand

General Weygand



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2/26/57

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>MR 91-116 #4</u>
By <u>DTH</u> NLE Date <u>8/13/91</u>

Place: Cabinet Room, The White House

Date: February 26, 1957 - 1430 hours

Present: (U.S.) - The President of the United States
 Secretary of State Dulles
 Under Secretary of State Herter
 Hon. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State
 for European Affairs
 Ambassador C. Douglas Dillon
 Ambassador Amory Houghton
 Mr. James Hagerty
 General A. Goodpaster
 Lt. Colonel Vernon A. Walters

(France) - Premier Guy Mollet
 Foreign Minister Christian Pineau
 Ambassador Herve Alphand
 Ambassador Louis Joxe
 M. Pierre Baraduc
 M. Jean Daridan
 M. Emile Noel
 M. Paul Parpais



The President opened the meeting by asking whether, apart from the United Nations questions, there were any other thoughts the French wished to bring up concerning NATO, North Africa or any other matters of general interest.

Mr. Mollet said that he had discussed the European problem and that there were other matters, such as the common market, EURAFRICA and others.


Mr. Pineau then said that while the nations taking part in the common market were members of the OEEC, there would, of course, be more limitations for OEEC countries not participating in the common market. Mr. Pineau said that the common market had been decided upon by the six nations and would include all their economic, industrial and agricultural activities. In a recent conference of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the six countries participating, it had been decided to include their overseas territories as well. This referred to Belgium, Holland, Italy and France. They had moved far towards the common market and had agreed to create a common investment fund financed by the six countries for overseas investment. He wishes to emphasize that this would in no way limit or preclude private investment. General agreement had been reached on all of the problems of the common market and a period of adaptation had been chosen which was quite long because of the grave problems which the common market would create for the economies of all six countries. This period ran up to 15 years for the full implementation of the common market as it was now conceived.

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Mr. Pineau said Great Britain was still interested in the discussions and had proposed some months ago in the GEEC that a free exchange area be set up for trade between the six nations and Great Britain. The reason why the British were proposing the free exchange area, (and this was an important element) was because they could not give their outright adherence to it/^(common market)for two reasons: they could not agree to the introduction of agricultural products into the free exchange area because of the bilateral arrangements which they have with Commonwealth countries; outside tariffs were a problem which would have to be worked out, particularly with relation to those applying to Great Britain as her relationship with the Commonwealth was quite different from that of the six nations with their overseas territories, and it was for this reason that they could not accept entrance into the common market.



Technical problems set aside, there were two fundamental differences and for this reason it was necessary to set up two different organizations -- the common market and the free exchange area. These must, in consequence, be discussed separately. It had been agreed in principle that discussions with other nations would take place within the OEEC but as there were no nations in OEEC which did not propose to enter either the common market or the free exchange area, the French, in order to clear the ground, had proposed that all problems relating to Great Britain's participation in the implementation of the common market, Euratom or the Coal Steel Community be discussed beforehand in the Western European Union.

That was all Mr. Pineau had to say concerning the problem of Great Britain and the six countries. It was a delicate one, and undoubtedly interested the United States.

The six nations had decided to solve the problem of a common outside tariff after lengthy discussions. This had been done as far as the six nations were concerned. The problem, however, was not settled insofar as the free exchange area was concerned. On that, discussions had just been started. Insofar as the common tariff was concerned, the six countries at the end of the 15 year period would constitute, so to speak, one country in relation to others. There was every reason to believe that normal commercial exchanges between the six nations and other countries would not be changed. On the contrary, they might

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well be improved as a result of the lowering of customs duties in some cases. In conclusion he could say that they felt they had solved the problem of the common market and had gone far in settling relationships in the six nations and the free exchange area. He likewise felt that the progress which had been made in common market, instead of pushing Great Britain farther away, actually tended to develop closer collaboration between Great Britain and the common market.

The President then thanked Mr. Pineau for his explanation and said that he felt that the day this common market became a reality would be one of the finest days in the history of the free world, perhaps even moreso than winning the war. Before they went on to other subjects, he would like to get in one statement -- he understood that Mr. Pineau was to meet Ambassador Eban and he would like to repeat what he had said in the morning. He couldn't believe there was anything more important than to get Israel to withdraw so we could support her future position and she would be able to get full fights in that area. As a corollary, we would see that other nations would act in accord with their obligations, that is to say Egypt, the Canal, etc. Whatever Mr. Pineau could do to convince Mr. Eban of this need would be a service to all.

The President asked whether Mr. Pineau had anything special he wished to bring up at this time. The Secretary of State then asked whether Mr. Pineau had read the Memorandum. Mr. Pineau said he had just begun to read it and he had two main remarks concerning the text; the first was that he felt that if we wished to present a solution acceptable to Israel, it would be advantageous to make the least possible mention of the armistice agreement. Mr. Dulles then said that he had just talked to Mr. Eban and expressed concern regarding the fact that there were some indications that they wished to consider the armistice agreement as null and void. If they took this position, a serious problem would arise in that this would restore belligerency to full vigor and it would be difficult to assert rights of innocent passage into the Straits of Aqaba. He did not know where we would be in regard to the boundaries which had been fixed by the armistice agreement. These were not political but de facto, and if the armistice agreement was considered null there would be only the 1947 agreement which the Arabs wanted and Israel did not. Mr. Eban was still talking with

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our legal advisers who saw dangers in considering the armistice agreement void. He agreed with Mr. Pineau, however, to the extent that the least reference to the armistice agreement in the Memorandum the more palatable it would be to Israel.

There was some discussion regarding the wording which was finally agreed to.



Mr. Pineau said he had his second point he wished to make. He thought we ought to give more emphasis to our desire to take advantage of the period of transition for peace negotiations which should be undertaken as soon as possible so as to give Israel the impression we were less trying to consolidate a past situation and more trying to create a new situation.

There was some further discussion regarding wording revolving around the words "permanent peaceful settlement" and finally the wording was agreed.

Mr. Pineau then said that he did not believe it would be wise to give Eban the impression that they were presenting him with a common ultimatum. If not, his task of rapprochement would be made even more difficult. He would like to see the President and the Secretary again after his meeting with Eban. He felt that if Eban wanted to change a few words here and there, that would not alter the substance, he should have a little latitude.

Prime Minister Mollet then said he felt it would be useful if Secretary Dulles would brief Mr. Pineau regarding his talk with Eban. Mr. Dulles then said that Eban indicated that he could see a way to solve the problem for the Gulf of Aqaba along the lines they had discussed on Saturday and Sunday but that was contingent upon an agreement, or common understanding, that the armistice still prevails and that there was no return to a state of belligerency. If there were, the right of innocent passage would disappear. With regard to Gaza he was disappointed with the results of his talks yesterday with Hammarskjöld who continued to reiterate the legal position of Egypt in the Gaza Strip and that he (Hammarskjöld) had no legal right to deny Egypt's right of occupancy. Eban read the Secretary a statement that Hammarskjöld had given him the previous night in this respect, and this statement seemed to the Secretary to be quite correct. Eban felt, however, it was negative and had asked Hammarskjöld not to publish the statement. The Secretary agreed with Eban

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that it would have a bad effect on the situation in Israel if it were published. At that point, Eban suggested the possibility of a solution now covering Aqaba and to reserve for future consideration the problem of Gaza. Secretary Dulles did not consider this possibility from a legal standpoint. He saw no solution except for an Israeli withdrawal from both places. The Secretary told Eban that in the talks he had had with the French and the British on this matter that the French had come up with some new ideas and he hoped there would be an opportunity for Mr. Pineau to discuss them with Eban. He had not gone into the details of Pineau's formula as he understood that the latter had a tentative appointment at four o'clock with Eban to present his ideas.

At this point there was some discussion as to whether Mr. Mollet should go to the talks with Eban. He felt, however, that if it appeared that he had broken off his conversations with the President to go to this appointment, it would present their discussion in a false light. Mr. Pineau then said he might see Hammarskjold two days later to see what could be worked out at U.N. level. Secretary Dulles then said that unless we can have considerable assurance of progress along these lines he felt that a resolution would be adopted in the General Assembly the following day. Mr. Pineau then said he would see what could be done.

The President then asked if there were any other matters, such as NATO, that the French wished to take up. Mr. Pineau then said he had some thoughts concerning European defense. Because of the small amount of time available he would sum up the French position on the problem that concerned them the most now, that is to say the changes which Great Britain desires to make in her military structure and in her occupation forces, since information available to the French indicates that she desires to make a one-third reduction in her ground forces and to reduce her air forces by half. Proposals along these lines by the British bring to mind certain thoughts. First, it is not difficult to conceive that if a member of NATO or WEU should effect changes of this type in the structure of her armed forces, it would be quite possible that others might wish to adopt similar changes. Essentially, the French felt that it was up to the Supreme Commander, General Norstad, to say what the new structure

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should be and what the tasks should be for all concerned. Today in London, where this problem was being taken up at a WEU meeting, the French position on this matter was the same as that of the Germans and other members. It was impossible to make a decision on a matter like this without hearing the opinion of the military technicians. The second concern felt by the French was that it seemed dangerous to them, even from the psychological point of view, to cut forces in Europe below a certain level, no matter how much you might increase their fire power.

Additionally, with regard to Germany, it was difficult to see how we could obtain from her Parliament the appropriations and military legislation to implement her defense program if at the same time Great Britain was cutting her forces. Further, we might give the Russians the impression that we were orienting ourselves towards peripheral defense. The effect would be to put certain temptations before them in Central Europe and furthermore if there was considerable reduction in forces, and conventional weapons were replaced by atomic weapons, we might be put in the situation of supreme danger where if an incident of minor proportions occurred, either we would have to do nothing or resort to general atomic war. For these reasons, the French felt that it was essential that this matter be thoroughly studied within NATO and that any changes that were to be made should be made with the general agreement of the members. The French are well aware of the financial difficulties of Great Britain and can well understand their desire to reduce military expenditures but they felt it was important to keep an appropriate balance between conventional forces and nuclear forces in Europe.



The President said that he had not talked to any of the British concerning their reduction plans since they had been announced but they had told him they must do something to avoid the drain of foreign exchange to avoid a collapse. That meant a reduction of their expenses throughout the world. Of these, the biggest was the cost of the troops in Germany. He agreed that no movement of troops ought to be made without two-way consultation nor should there be any change in character without a full conference with SACEUR and, where necessary, with the NATO Council. No one party of the Treaty ought to take unilateral

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action regarding its forces until it had explored the matter with the other partners to see if there was not a chance that the others might make good the deficit. Back in 1950 we had hoped that German troops would become available in sufficient size and promptly enough so that the burden of other nations might be reduced. Our own troops had gone over at that time as an emergency measure to give the French, Germans and others time to get their forces established. None of this in any way impaired the truth of what the French had been saying. There should be a full conference between the interested parties and the commanders.

Secretary Dulles then said that the U.K. had a special obligation in their undertaking with the WEU.

The President then said that Germany had had no defense troops since the war and consequently not had these costs.

Secretary Dulles said that they had agreed to make a substantial contribution to cover the foreign exchange costs of maintaining the British forces in Germany.

Mr. Elbrick said that negotiations were underway but that generally they had agreed to pay some two-thirds of the costs, which was a lot of money.

The President then inquired whether the French had any particular proposal to make on this and Mr. Pineau replied that they did not reject the principle of economies on military expenditures but they only wished that these economies be effected in agreement with the other partners rather than on a unilateral basis. The President said that he agreed with this. Mr. Pineau said that if General Norstad could propose some plan which would allow the British to make some reduction and still ensure effective defense, he would be delighted. The President said this was a serious problem for us also as we had obligations all around the world from Korea to Great Britain.

Mr. Pineau said that there was another aspect to European security that he had brought up with the Secretary of State in January and that problem related to disarmament and the political problems involved in German reunification. There had been discussions on this between the U.S., Great Britain, France and



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Germany. He did not enter into the details of the disarmament plan, particularly in the absence of his friend Jules Moch, but he felt that when this matter is examined by the Sub-committee in the United Nations and perhaps later at the Ministerial level, there will be a number of Soviet proposals to neutralize Germany or part of Europe. This would involve considerable danger resulting from the pressure not only on German public opinion but on public opinion in Western Europe. He felt it was important that the Western powers have a common position and that none of them become committed to separate discussions upon neutralization of Germany. He felt this problem might come up in one or two months and he believed it would be useful to study it in advance.

The President said that it would be difficult for us to make pronouncements concerning German neutrality without German agreement. He felt we should avoid the subject and not let ourselves get involved with the Soviets on matters such as disarmament or arms reduction.

Secretary Dulles then said there was one question he would like to raise. The Soviets had suggested that the Foreign Ministers attend the disarmament meeting in London. In our view, this would merely serve to give greater propaganda value to the Soviet proposals which would be introduced without any serious purpose other than propaganda value. In our view the Foreign Ministers should not be present.



Mr. Pineau then said he wanted to answer the President's concern regarding the association of Germany in the conversations. He felt these conversations were useful as Germany was not a member of the United Nations but through them the Germans could be kept up on everything that was going on.

Secretary Dulles then said he wanted to say a word to the President regarding the matter which he felt of great importance in the conduct of foreign policy and that was the great understanding between France and Germany. He wanted to mention the part played by the French Government, taking into account the preoccupations of the German Government, and showing sympathetic understanding for them. He felt this was something "terrifically important" and added that the French Government deserves great credit for what they have done.

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Mr. Mollet then said he wanted to add a word concerning what the Secretary had said -- that at the last meeting of the six Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers he had had a long tete-a-tete conversation with Chancellor Adenauer in which they had talked freely about all problems and he could say that Chancellor Adenauer saw these problems in exactly the same fashion as they did and felt that, even more than France, they were representing Europe in this respect.

The President then said that the solution of the Saar problem had been a tremendous step forward.

Mr. Mollet then said that a communique would have to be issued the following day and he wondered if some members of the delegations could not start working on this. To this the President was quite agreeable. He also expressed the hope that complete secrecy would be observed regarding the meeting with Mr. Eban as it was particularly important that the impression not be given that Israel was being confronted with an ultimatum by the other two powers.

It was then agreed that those present at the conference would meet again in the Cabinet Room at the White House at 11:15 the following morning.



VAW/dbi

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enclosed in 762A.5/7-957
 Am Embassy Bonn → 1003 7/9/57
 (Lawrence Vaas)

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Encl. 1
 Desp. D-47
 AMEMBASSY Bonn

"Interview of Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss with
 Associated Press, June 28, 1957"

Bonn, Germany, June 28 (AP) - Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss said today that the success or failure of world disarmament negotiations would decide whether West Germany arms herself with atomic weapons.

Strauss made this statement to the Associated Press in an interview as the Soviet Union warned West Germany that atomic armament would doom any hope of German reunification.

In Moscow yesterday West German Ambassador Wilhelm Haas was handed a Soviet note declaring "nuclear armament of Germany and German reunification are irreconcilable."

Strauss was asked here when West German Forces, being trained to fight an atomic war if one should come, would accept atomic warheads.

"So far", he replied, "we have neither requested any nuclear armament whatsoever nor has it been offered to us."

Strauss also said:

"The decision on the possible equipment with tactical nuclear warheads will be taken at the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) Ministerial Conference in December.

"The decision of the Federal Republic (West Germany) as to whether to accept must naturally follow that conference and depend on the state of negotiations on a disarmament treaty which ought to include atomic and conventional weapons with an adequate system of safeguards and control."

Strauss also said in the interview:

1. The campaign for the September 15 (West German elections) has no particular effect on the rate of German rearmament with NATO. The rate is slow, he said, because of lack of housing for troops, equipment and training personnel.

2. When the first three German divisions are integrated with NATO Forces July 1 two will be assigned to the American Command in South Germany and one to the British in the North.

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10/24/57

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 Authority NND 957295
 By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

ODS/P-57309--Great Britain
 Top Secret

24 October 1957

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER
 FROM LEWIS STRAUSS, DONALD QUARLES, SIR
 EDWIN BLOWDEN AND SIR RICHARD POWELL

(Declassified)
 "G5 pop file"

I.

1. We have concluded that there has been a good measure of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in the overall field of weapons research and development under such instruments as the Burns-Templer Agreement and the Sandys-Wilson Agreement of 1954. There is still much room for improvement. In addition to exchanges of information, there should be allocations between the two countries of resources and efforts, extending to specific projects, so as to permit the most effective use of available funds, facilities and scarce skilled manpower. At vital points in the weapons research and development spectrum, there have been serious blocks owing to legislative restrictions on the exchange of atomic energy Restricted data. These blocks have [not only inhibited a fuller and more rapid development by the two nations of their nuclear weapons programs but they also have]

PRS 1957-61 / 170 / Great Britain

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Authority NND 95295By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

-2-

seriously impeded important cooperation in other weapons fields, e.g., in the development of missiles and other vehicles to carry nuclear warheads. The heart of the whole problem of achieving fuller cooperation in the overall weapons field is to remove as many as possible of the blocks existing in the nuclear weapons field.

2. On the assumption that the necessary legislative authority can be obtained, we concluded that it would substantially advance the common security if programs could be carried out in the following fields:

- (a) Such transfers and exchanges of nuclear materials for military purposes as may be agreed to be of mutual advantage. For example, both the United States and the United Kingdom have plants for enriching uranium which ^{historically} to some extent they procure jointly. The cost of enriching uranium is substantially higher in the United Kingdom because ^{among other factors} of electric power costs. The United Kingdom has plans for substantially expanding its enriching capacity up to a total cost of some \$400 million.


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Authority *NND 959245*By *SR* NARA Date *3/11/97*

-3-

This large capital "expenditure" and use of scarce engineering *and scarce electric power* skills could be avoided if the United Kingdom procured the required additional material from the United States.

- (b) Exchanges of weapons information and rationalization of weapon design projects, both offensive and defensive, of the two countries looking to the most efficient use of limited facilities and scarce scientific and engineering skills. In this latter respect, we have in mind some allocation of specific weapons design and development projects between the two countries to make the most effective use of their joint resources. For example, fuller exchange of information and coordination of research efforts would permit progress in achieving advanced weapons systems such as those for defense against missiles or submarines. As a further example, substantial savings might accrue from a joint use of facilities for the testing of *weapons systems including* nuclear weapons.
- (c) To reduce wasteful use of treasure and talent, the United States as the most advanced in weapons technology could supply complete weapons systems to the United Kingdom with custody retention



-4-

in U.S. hands as necessary and with assurance of use only as jointly determined by the two countries. For example, the United Kingdom is presently developing and producing nuclear weapons of both large and small yield (tactical). If the United Kingdom procured so-called tactical weapons in the United States (even subject to residual custody in U.S. hands), it might be possible to modify or terminate production of such weapons in the United Kingdom with substantial savings in money and manpower. As a further example, the United States has developed and produced efficient submarine propulsion plants. The United Kingdom is devoting substantial sums of money and skilled personnel to developing a nuclear submarine capability. There is presently some information exchange on this subject between the two countries. It appears that it would be to the advantage of both countries if the present U.K. effort in this field could be diverted to other important military technological developments. This would be possible if the U.K. could ~~procure~~ procure in the United States complete submarine propulsion units (and perhaps submarines).

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-5-

(d) Training and operational planning for utilization of nuclear weapons would be facilitated by removal of existing restrictions on communication of weapons data.

3. We have concluded that if extensive cooperation along the lines discussed above is to be undertaken, some institutional framework is necessary. It is suggested that a committee of experts look into the question of whether the Combined Policy Committee should be revived for this purpose (with necessary revision in its terms of reference) or whether alternative institutional arrangements should be established. Canada is a member of the CPC.

4. It is suggested that the areas and types of cooperation touched upon in this paper need to be fully blueprinted. To this end, a technical committee of U.S. and U.K. experts should meet as soon as possible in Washington under a directive to report their findings by Dec 20.

5. In the meantime and while existing legislative restrictions still obtain, consideration should be given to the possibility of

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liberalizing existing administrative interpretation of such concepts as "important information concerning the design or fabrication of nuclear components of an atomic weapon" as referred to in Section 144(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

This may be necessary preliminary for fruitful work by the Technical Committee proposed in para. 4 above

II. 1. We recognize that there has been extensive and profitable cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy.

However, we have concluded that the most efficient use of our economic resources may call for even greater cooperation. For example, we have in mind the possibility of nuclear material transfers and exchanges as may be mutually agreed.

H.S. - "I think it is excellent" - only editorial changes 3.

10/29/57

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By DAD NARA Date 4/10/87



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

~~S/RE - Mr. Farley~~
~~RT - Mr. [unclear]~~

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL
SECRET

American Embassy
Paris, October 29, 1957

RM/R - file

(X)
740-5612
740-5

Dear Lane:

As you will have noted from my letter of October 8 to Burke Elbrick, General Norstad has been following with considerable interest the negotiations between the Embassy and the French Government on the various questions (related at least in French eyes) of storage rights, exchange of scientific information in the atomic field, the earmarking of modern weapons for the French, and the French desire for IRBMs. General Norstad feels that he can take the load off the U.S. back to some degree in these matters if the French can be induced to approach him on the NATO aspects. It appears that recent conversations between Yost and DeCourcel have borne some fruit in this regard, and General Ely and DeCourcel are now scheduled to pay a call on General Norstad some time this week. In the meantime, the new French Ambassador to NATO, Crouy-Chanel, has paid a call on General Norstad and has expounded the French viewpoint. This visit took place on October 26, and lasted about an hour and a half. There follows an account of the presentation made by Crouy-Chanel, as summarized to me later by General Norstad.

Crouy-Chanel emphasized at the outset that current developments made it essential that there be full and intimate collaboration in scientific matters within the NATO framework, and that this collaboration should probably also include collateral contact with scientific research in such countries as Switzerland and Sweden. He went on to say that within NATO there should be a mechanism involving a common effort in the field of modern weapons including evaluation, production, and common use, along the same lines as similar efforts with respect to conventional weapons. The fact that the NATO Governments have agreed to a strategic concept involving the use of atomic weapons to defend the NATO area should be accompanied by corresponding adjustments across the board in the way in which atomic matters are

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By MR/WJB Date 9-25-96

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[Handwritten initials and markings]

now
B. E. L. Timmons, Esquire,
Director, Office of European Regional Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

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- 2 -

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now handled in NATO. It is no longer appropriate that the resolution of these questions rest solely on the shoulders of the United States and on American public opinion. There should be a more general contribution, and France was anxious to share in the common effort.

In his reply to Crouy-Chanel, General Norstad said that many Americans felt there were already "two too many nations" in the business of manufacturing atomic weapons and, at times, even wondered if there were not "three too many." Of course, if France, or any other government, decides to move in this direction, that is the right of a sovereign state. General Norstad emphasized that his misgivings about such a course for France stemmed from the formidable financial problems involved and the need to make the most rational and efficient use of the resources of the NATO Alliance. In this connection he asked Crouy-Chanel whether there was any realistic basis whatsoever for an assumption that the Western European nations would be able to defend themselves against the Soviets without the participation of the United States. Given these considerations, the United States was understandably reluctant to encourage trends towards the manufacture of atomic weapons by more NATO nations.

Whatever the merit of the objective and abstract arguments presented by Crouy-Chanel, it seems clear to us at SHAPE that the underlying animus is one of national pride and prestige so far as the French are concerned. They want to be on the same footing as the British in matters of this kind, and will probably continue to press in one way or another to obtain this status. Although some aspects of the French position will be easier to handle if the NATO atomic stockpile program is established, none of us here believes that this will be the end of the story. For your information, General Norstad continues presently to feel most strongly that actual national possession of atomic weapons by the continental members of NATO will loosen, rather than strengthen, the Alliance. Adoption of the atomic stockpile idea a couple of years ago might have headed off the kind of pressure we now anticipate; whether it can do so now is more doubtful.

General

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
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By DAD NARA Date 4/10/97

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General Norstad considers Crouy-Chanel an extremely valuable personal contact and has asked that the contents of this letter be handled on a very restricted and "need-to-know" basis.

Sincerely,



Ray L. Thurston

cc: Ambassador Houghton and Mr. Yost, AmEmb Paris
Ambassador Burgess and Mr. Nolting, USRO Paris

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5473
NOVEMBER 9, 1957
10:16 AM

FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: POLTO 1240, NOVEMBER 9, 2 PM

1

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

IN CONVERSATION THIS MORNING CROUY-CHANEL INDICATED FRENCH
READY TO DISCUSS POOLING AGREEMENT OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
FOR PRODUCTION SECOND OR THIRD GENERATION NEW WEAPONS.
INDICATED IN THIS CONNECTION NEED ASSURANCE ON AVAILABILITY
WARHEADS FIRST FOR MILITARY SATISFACTION AND SECOND THAT
THEY MAY STUDY WEAPONS IN RELATION TO ANY PRODUCTION
PROGRAM.

PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT GENERAL NORSTAD SEES THIS MESSAGE.

BURGESS

DT

740.5611/11-957

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OFFICIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
S/AS

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32

Mr. Fear
7810

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: *V/S/S*
FROM: EUR - C. Burke Elbrick *CBE*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with General Norstad, 3:00 p.m. November 12

NOV. 12, 1957

General Norstad has sent you a copy of a letter he sent to the President on November 7, regarding the December NATO meeting (Tab A).

The following questions will probably arise in your talk with Norstad today:

1) NATO Atomic Stockpile. Norstad's views on this question coincide closely with our own. He can be expected to reemphasize the importance of the President's being able to announce the stockpile plan at the December meeting, and the importance of the stockpile being genuinely multilateral and "common", as opposed to a system of purely bilateral agreements with individual NATO countries. He feels, as we do, that the stockpile must have a NATO flavor. We have had some concern that the proposal now being developed by the JCS, though substantively acceptable, may lack enough of this flavor. You may wish to tell Norstad that we are continuing to work closely with Defense to obtain an acceptable proposal.

2) IRBM. Norstad will doubtless wish to discuss with you his ideas, set forth in his letter to the President, for a U.S. announcement that IRBMs will be made available to NATO allies as soon as available; that allocation of the weapons should be made a NATO activity rather than a series of bilateral arrangements; that the U.S. should offer information and know-how for NATO-controlled production in Europe of a "second generation" IRBM; and that a NATO agency should be established in which the research and development of a third-generation IRBM could be concentrated, for production in Europe. In his memorandum to you of November 8, Mr. Murphy expresses his growing conviction that the punch-line of the December meeting should be a plan for the provision of IRBM to certain NATO areas in addition to the U.K. You may wish to tell Norstad that we are very interested in the idea and we are taking it under urgent study.


3) NATO Strategy. One of the basic problems confronting the Alliance in the military field today is uncertainty whether the major NATO powers wholeheartedly concur in and support NATO strategy. A strong statement by the President that he considers NATO strategy sound, and capable of execution, would, in Norstad's view, immeasurably increase confidence in agreed NATO strategy and thereby contribute to the success of the meeting and the future unity and strength of NATO.

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- 2 -

4) U.S. Air Contribution to NATO. Norstad is likely to express serious concern over plans to withdraw a substantial number of additional USAF squadrons from Europe during calendar 1958, as a result of FY 1958 budgetary and manpower ceilings, and the planning that is going forward for FY 1959. These squadrons would be over and above the 3 squadrons whose withdrawal we have already announced to NATO in our 1957 Annual Review submission. We understand that Defense feels we will have to announce part of this cut (8 squadrons) by the end of this month. Norstad will point out that unilateral U.S. reductions of this magnitude, leaving our contribution in Europe 10 squadrons short of his just-revised and reduced minimum force requirements for end-1958, could have most serious results for the Alliance.

Concurrences

C - Mr. Reinhardt *RR*

Attachment:

1. Tab (A), Copy of General Norstad's Ltr to the President.

EUR:RA:RAFearey *RAF*

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11/12/57

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By RUD NARS, Date 2/8/88

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MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~TOP SECRET~~

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PRIORITY

FROM: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE

TO: JCS WASH DC

INFO: CINCNELM LONDON ENGLAND, CINCLANT NORFOLK VA,
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY, CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN
GERMANY, USNMR PARIS FRANCE

NR: EC 9-6296

NOFORN

FOR SEC

Ref JCS msg nr 932330 dtd 6 Nov 57.

This msg in 4 parts.

Part 1. Intelligence brief.

161642Z NOV 57
DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 4 April 1979

1. Recent harassment of rail, highway and air traffic to West Berlin emphasizes capability of USSR to interfere with movement of personnel and freight in a divided Germany and highlights the vulnerability of West Berlin. All personnel and freight moving between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin must cross more than 100 miles of Communist-controlled territory. Communists can obstruct or halt, with little or no advance warning, all land traffic to Berlin without fear of Western interference with Communist internal traffic.

2. Soviet policies and actions affecting Berlin over past decade must be viewed against background of USSR's long-range objective - to force withdrawal of Western powers from Berlin. While USSR and East Germany are undoubtedly influenced by this over-all objective, their recent behavior is believed to have been motivated primarily by one or more of the following immediate objectives:

A. To force allied occupying powers increasingly to deal with GDR, thus achieving de facto recognition of that

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(16 NOV 57)

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JCS OF 1458 / 22338 / (8-20-47) see 40

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
PARA SECTION, ROOM 2-C-934
THE PENTAGON

381 (8-20-45) see 40

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932330

11-16-57

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 By KED NARS, Date 2/8/88

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 2

Government.

B. To embarrass the US in West Berlin, where US interests are perhaps most vulnerable with a view to emphasizing Soviet's new "position of strength" and Kremlin's ability to harass Western powers without fear of significant reprisal.

C. To encroach on rights of allied occupying powers to extent that they would institute a self-imposed blockade rather than submit to humiliating controls.

3. Throughout past decade, the pattern of Communist activities regarding allied access to Berlin has reflected, almost without exception, Soviet's overall approach to international affairs. Recent harassments, when viewed in this perspective, are considered to be a by-product of current harsher Soviet foreign policy line rather than aspects of a new Soviet policy approach to Berlin problems.

Part II. Most probable course of action and summary.

1. Course of action most likely to be followed by Communists in the immediate future is one of continued, sporadic harassment and restriction of Berlin traffic, short of total blockade. Soviets and East Germans appear to have divided responsibilities for carrying out this action, with the USSR conducting activities against allied occupying powers, and GDR concentrating on West Germans and West Berliners.

A. Soviets may, for example, refuse to clear allied military trains and convoy travel, unless permitted to conduct a physical inspection of interior of railroad cars or vehicles. They might also attempt to restrict air access by refusing to "guarantee flight safety" for some or all allied flights. Recent unilateral efforts by Soviets to introduce regular GDR commercial flights into the south air corridor to Berlin, without prior joint authorization by the four powers, are indicative of the Soviets threat to restrict air access.

B. Soviets may relinquish certain controls to GDR, such as rail and autobahn check points, thus forcing allies to either deal directly with GDR or discontinue travel, i.e.

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
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MESSAGE
 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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NR: EC 9-6296

PAGE 3

creating a partial self-imposed blockade.

C. East Germans may impose more stringent controls on border traffic, such as rigid pass and travel control systems, to discourage travel into West Berlin.

2. Summary - Although end of current series of harassments cannot be predicted, it is not believed that Communists are planning an all-out crisis over Berlin. Much will depend upon reaction of Western powers, especially the US. If allies counter Communist harassment with firm and united action, subsequent incidents will probably continue to be of minor significance. If allies make minor concessions, the Communists would be expected to press for further major advantages. A provocative and unyielding US position, which would deny the Soviets latitude for negotiation, however, could bring on a real crisis.

Part III. US-Allied capabilities to counter.

1. Local reprisals and harassing actions: US CINCEUR has capability to counter primarily by continuation of protest and negotiation, tripartitely agreed at Embassy level, and delivered to Soviets by allied officials in Berlin.

A. This measure may become more effective by concurrent delivery of formal protest and worldwide dissemination of timely publicity which rightfully places Soviets in an unfavorable position.

2. Security of Berlin garrison: Security of Berlin garrison is insured to the limit of the capability of available forces.

A. Current US combat strength in Berlin consists of 6th Inf Regt and two MP companies with total assigned strength of 3,272.

B. Following plans for employment of these forces are current and rehearsed periodically:

- sectors, Berlin.
- (1) Tripartite - Defense of allied
 - (2) Unilateral:

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PAGE 4

(A) US garrison attacked in their
 troop installations without warning.
 (B) Threat of military attack
 or civil disturbance.
 (C) US sector Berlin attacked
 by enemy force.

3. Maintain free access to Berlin in case of severe harassing action US and allied capability to counter more severe harassing action (e.g Soviet's threats to introduce regular GDR commercial into the south air corridor to Berlin) would necessitate elevating formal protests and aggressive negotiations to the Ambassador level, tripartite Ambassadors at Moscow, or ultimately to United Nations, synchronized with compatible local public statements and news releases.

4. Limited force in the event of actual blockade of Berlin:

A. Unilateral: CINCUSAREUR plans for use of limited force, in case of a blockade, are considered adequate to counter presently foreseeable Soviet and/or East German courses of action.

B. Tripartite: CINCUSAREUR submitted a tripartite military study, on the feasibility of employing limited force to regain access to Berlin, to the allied Ambassadors, Bonn, 17 December 1956. (Note: CINCUSAREUR has not received reply to date).

5. Evacuation of US non-combatants from Berlin:

A. Unilateral: Plans for evacuation of non-combatants by air, motor and combination of motor and rail are current and rehearsed periodically.

B. Tripartite: Allied plans for air evacuation of US non-combatants from Berlin are being formulated by CINCUSAFE, in coordination with CINCUSAREUR to incorporate views of British, French and US Embassies.

6. Recommendations to facilitate US EUCOM's capability to counter Soviet and/or East German's local

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SECRET

FROM: BONN
TO: Secretary of State
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Control: 9397
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762A. 5/11-1087

PRIORITY
SENT PRIORITY PARIS TOPOL 58; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY DEPARTMENT 1550

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE; PARIS PASS USCINCEUR AS BONN'S 101.

COUNTRY TEAM VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN ON FRG 1957 AR SUBMISSION BASED ON LIMITED SCOPE OF AR THIS YEAR AND RESTRICTION OF FRG PLANS TO 1 APRIL 1959. IN SPITE ABOVE DIFFICULTIES COUNTRY TEAM FEELS FRG MILITARY PLANS, AND SUPPORTING FISCAL AND ECONOMIC DATA, AND INTENTIONS FOR GER FY 1958-59 IN MOST RESPECTS FRANK AND COMPREHENSIVE, COMMENTS HEREIN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH DETAILED MAAG COMMENTS HAND-CARRIED CINCEUR HQ.

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

BELIEVE FOLLOWING FACTORS CONCERNING FR DEFENSE PLANNING FOR FR FY 1958 AS SUBMITTED IN AR 1957 CAN BE HIGHLIGHTED:

1. MAJOR IMPEDIMENTS TO MORE RAPID PACE REARMAMENT FOR TIME BEING NOT RPT NOT FINANCIAL, BUT RATHER TECHNICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND IN SOME INSTANCES POLITICAL AND ARE CONSIDERED BY FR AUTHORITIES AS "PRACTICALLY UNREMOVABLE LIMITS". INCLUDED ARE PROBLEMS LAND ACQUISITION, PERSONNEL, BARRACKS, ETC.
2. MILITARY FORCE PLANNING APPEARS SOUND AND CONSISTENT WITH INTERIM REPLIES OF DECEMBER 1956 AND MARCH 1957, ALTHOUGH DETAILED TIMING OF UNIT ACTIVATIONS NOT PROVIDED AND INFO

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SOFT ON STANDARDS READINESS EXISTING ARMY DIVISIONS.

- 3. SIGNIFICANT SHORTCOMINGS IN ORGANIZATION AND DISPOSITION LOGISTICAL FACILITIES, AND CONSCIOUS POSTPONEMENT FOR ANOTHER YEAR TASK BUILDING WAR RESERVES.
- 4. FR CONSIDERS EXPERIENCE WITH 12 MONTH CONSCRIPTION PERIOD INSUFFICIENT BASIS TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE INCREASE.
- 5. MORE DEFINITIVE PLANS ON TERRITORIALS PROVIDED AND PLANNED INCEPTION A RESERVES TRAINING PROGRAM, ALSO CONTEMPLATED SHORTENED PERIOD OF BASIC TRAINING TO MAN THESE FORCES.
- 6. PLEA TO MAKE MORE TRAINING AREAS OF STATIONING FORCES AVAILABLE FOR FR FORCES BY TRANSFERRING TEMPORARILY SOME OF FORMER OUTSIDE NR FOR TRAINING.
- 7. NOTWITHSTANDING SUBSTANTIAL CARRYOVERS UNEXPENDED FUNDS INTO FY'S 1958 AND 1959, FR CLAIMS THESE NEEDED IN 1959 AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO PRECLUDE DEFICIT FINANCING. THEREFORE, LANGUAGE IN SUBMISSION EXPRESSED IN STRONG TERMS THAT CURRENT YEAR BE LAST FOR SUPPORT COSTS.
- 8. FR EMPHASIS ON DESIRE ONLY FOR MOST MODERN WEAPONS AND TO MAXIMIZE HOME PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT FROM EPU AREA, NOTING HOWEVER LIMITED AVAILABILITY FROM LATTER AREA.
- 9. SPECIAL NOTATION THAT INFORMATION CONCERNING PROCUREMENT CERTAIN TYPES WEAPONS NOT AVAILABLE IN VIEW WEU-NATO RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR PRODUCTION IN FR.

B. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS

APART FROM SPECIFIC MILITARY PROBLEMS ANALYZED IN CONTEXT MAAG STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, COUNTRY TEAM WISHED COMMENT ON FOLLOWING MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS WHICH THOUGH PERTAINING TO FORCE PLANS HAVE GENESIS IN VARIOUS COMBINATIONS POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND MILITARY FACTORS.

1. WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGY

MAAG-EMBASSY IMPRESSED WITH INCREASING EMPHASIS FR MILITARY AND OTHER OFFICIALS PLACE ON NOTION THAT FR MUST HAVE ONLY

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LATEST WEAPONS. FR OFFICIALS AWARE, HOWEVER, THIS LEADS ULTIMATELY TO ROCKETRY AND POSSIBLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SITUATIONS WHICH REQUIRE SLOW AND CAREFUL PREPARATION GERMAN PUBLIC AND FOR WHICH INITIATIVE MUST COME FROM FR'S NATO PARTNERS FOR OBVIOUS POLITICAL REASONS. CONSEQUENTLY BELIEVE RATE REARMAMENT GEARED IN CONSIDERABLE MEASURE TO THESE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH NOW COMPOUNDED BY IMPLICATIONS NORSTAD STUDY, AND CAN EXPECT INCREASING RELUCTANCE FR MILITARY TO INVEST IN WHAT IT CONSIDERS "TRANSITION" WEAPONS, OTHER THAN FOR LIMITED TRAINING PURPOSES. IN THIS RESPECT BELIEVE GERMAN MILITARY ARE SOMEWHAT PRONE TO USE PROBLEMS ON LAND ACQUISITION, FINANCES, AND PERSONNEL AS "WHIPPING BOYS" ALTHOUGH PROBLEMS HAVE IN FACT REAL BASIS.

2. LAND ACQUISITION

THIS PROBLEM EXTENDS FROM NIKE SITES THROUGH BARRACKS, TRAINING AREAS ARE INADEQUATE, AIRFIELDS INSUFFICIENT TO PERMIT GAF OR NAVY TO MEET NATO STANDARDS FOR STATIONING OF AIR UNITS. FED GOVT IS RESTRICTED IN MEANS AVAILABLE FOR SOLUTION THIS PROBLEM BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHICH CANNOT BE AMENDED SINCE OPPOSITION HAS SUFFICIENT VOTES IN BUNDESTAG TO PREVENT SUCH CHANGE. LAND ACQUISITION LAW IS CUMBERSOME, TIME-CONSUMING, AND REQUIRES FED GOVT TO WORK THROUGH LAENDER; BUT WITH FIRM DETERMINATION ON PART FED GOVT BELIEVE PROCESS COULD BE SPEEDED UP. IMPACT OF THESE DIFFICULTIES ON BUILD-UP MIGHT BE MITIGATED BY TURN-OVER BY STATIONING FORCES OF FACILITIES NOT BEING USED TO FULL CAPACITY, BY RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES NOW IN FORMER BARRACKS, AND BY TRAINING OF STATIONING FORCES TROOPS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS OF FRG TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR UPON LAENDER ARE CHIEF FACTORS UPON WHICH SOLUTION DEPENDENT. COUNTRY TEAM BELIEVES STRONG NATO PRESSURE MUST BE EXERTED CONTINUOUSLY TO SECURE THE CONTRIBUTION DESIRED.

3. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHORTAGE.

PERSONNEL SHORTAGE, ALTHOUGH OVER-ALL IN SCOPE, HAVING MOST SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON CRITICALLY NEEDED CATEGORIES OF NCO'S, SPECIALISTS, AND JUNIOR OFFICERS. CALLS FOR VOLUNTEERS FROM CONSCRIPTEE CLASSES HAVE BEEN OVER-SUBSCRIBED BUT SUCH VOLUNTEERS NOT CONSIDERED BY MOD GENERALLY SATISFACTORY FOR MORE SPECIALIZED MILITARY TRAINING, ALTHOUGH FR EXPECTS HIGH

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PROPORTION RE-ENLISTMENTS AND EVENTUALLY EASEMENT PERSONNEL SHORTAGE IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT PROBLEM WILL NOT BE SOLVED FOR SEVERAL YEARS. WHEREAS IN MARCH 1957 SUBMISSION FR PLANNED HAVE TOTAL 220,000 BY 1 APRIL 1959, NOW PLAN 203,000, A CUTBACK OF 17,000. NO REFERENCE MADE TO PREVIOUS GOAL OF 343,000 EM AND OFFICERS BY MARCH 1961, BUT OBVIOUS THAT ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF 60,000 MENTIONED IN MARCH SUBMISSION STILL IN DOUBT.

MAJOR FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MILITARY PERSONNEL SHORTAGE TOO WELL KNOWN TO ELABORATE; PAY OF SOLDIERS, TIGHT LABOR MARKET, LOSS OF MILITARY PRESTIGE, NON-EXISTENCE ARMED FORCE DURING 11 YEAR PERIOD, SHORTAGE OF BARRACKS AND OTHER FACILITIES. COUNTRY TEAM INCLINED VIEW THAT FR CAN AND WILL MATCH PERSONNEL TO ACCOMMODATIONS WITH LATTER MOST IMPORTANT LIMITING FACTOR. RECOMMENDS QUESTION OF 203,000 VS 220,000 TROOPS BY MPXVIIH BE FULLY EXPLORED IN EXAMINATION. FEELS THAT TRUE PROPORTIONS PERSONNEL PROBLEM CAN ONLY BE DEDUCED IN RELATION TO MANNING PLANS FOR 1959, 1960 AND LATER.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE November 19, 1957

THROUGH: S/S

1957 NOV 20 PM 3 05

FROM: S/AE - Philip J. Farley

SUBJECT: Scope of Atomic Energy Cooperation *Wirtz POK*
S/P

BACKGROUND

To establish the position to be taken by U.S. representatives, in a meeting on November 23 with U.K. officials, regarding the possible scope of extended U.S.-U.K. atomic energy cooperation.

DISCUSSION

On November 23, Sir Edwin Flounden and Sir Richard Powell will meet with Adm. Strauss, Mr. Charles and Mr. Murphy to resume discussions on U.S.-U.K. atomic energy and other weapons development cooperation. Embassy London reports that the U.K. intent is to "find out more about exactly what the U.S. is prepared to do in the nuclear field." The British Embassy has provided us with a list of the military activities, both atomic and non-atomic, in which they envisage close cooperation (Tab A).

Discussions on the U.S. side among the staffs of State, Defense, and AEC have revealed a sharp difference of opinion (Tab B). The AEC and DOD envisage only a slight expansion of present U.S.-U.K. cooperation and no important modification of the Atomic Energy Act. AEC and DOD favor provision of limited additional atomic weapons information to the U.K. for training U.K. delivery forces and to enable the U.K. to relieve U.S. overseas personnel of the responsibility for maintaining non-nuclear components of certain standard U.S. atomic weapons. They recommend against (1) transfer of fissionable material to the U.K. for U.K. manufacture of weapons, (2) transfer of weapons design and fabrication information for use in U.K. nuclear weapons development and production, or (3) transfer of weapons information as a basis for joint or coordinated U.S.-U.K. research and development for improved nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

State Department representatives have taken the position that the AEC-DOD recommendations fall far short of what was envisaged in the Strauss-Charles-Flounden-Powell report initiated by the President and the Prime Minister on October 25 (Tab C). That report envisaged the possibility of close cooperation in nuclear weapons research, development, and production, including both transfer of weapons materials and transfer of weapons design and fabrication information.

Underlying the AEC-DOD position is the belief that the U.S. objective should be to dissuade the U.K. to the maximum extent possible from engaging in further nuclear weapons development and production. AEC also argues that advanced U.S. weapons design information should under no circumstances be made available

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available to the U.K. unless the U.S. is certain that the Russians have such information. State representatives believe that, at this stage at least, we should explore fully the possible advantages to the U.S. which might be derived from joint or coordinated U.S.-U.K. weapons development and production programs. Account must also be taken of the fact that a U.K. program does exist and it is unlikely that the U.K. will accept the dependence upon the U.S. which DOD and AEC favor.

A more flexible approach appears to be more consistent with the President's philosophy. Although the President told Prime Minister Macmillan that the U.S. did not expect to make all atomic secrets available to the U.K., he also took the position in U.S.-side talks that our attitude should be one of liberal exchange and that he was clear as to the need for a broad agreement.

The proper U.S. position in initial discussions with the U.K. appears to be one of readiness to explore all the areas of possible cooperation laid out in Tab C. No decision to exclude the areas opposed by AEC and DOD should be made until the net advantage to the U.S. and the joint U.S.-U.K. effort can be assessed, and any decision to turn down British proposals falling within the scope of the report initiated by the President and the Prime Minister should be made only by the President.

Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act.

Representatives of AEC, State, Defense, and Justice have been considering possible revisions of the Atomic Energy Act. Language has been prepared (Tab D) which would permit a full range of cooperation. Decision as to the scope of the amendments to be recommended to the President for submission to the Congress will finally be made after the scope of cooperation with the U.K. has been determined, since presumably cooperation with the U.K. will be at least as broad as that with any other country or organization. No agency favors revision of the Act to provide specific authorization of transfer of custody of nuclear weapons.

Institutional Arrangements for U.S.-U.K. Cooperation.

The October 25 report (Tab E) points out that, if U.S.-U.K. atomic energy cooperation is to be extended, some institutional framework may be necessary. Decision on this matter also depends on decision as to the extent of U.S.-U.K. cooperation. Preliminary thinking of State, Defense, and AEC staffs is that, if cooperation is substantially extended, then the Combined Policy Committee should be revitalized as the over-all coordinating and policy body. Making use of the CPC has the advantages of using an existing mechanism rather than creating a new one, and of bringing Canada into the program in an appropriate way. A sub-group would presumably be set up as an operating unit to handle expanded cooperation, just as the Combined Development Agency under the supervision of the CPC handles joint uranium procurement.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you authorize State Department representatives to take the position that no U.S. decision to narrow the scope of possible U.S.-U.K. atomic energy cooperation should be taken until after the U.K. proposals have been heard and discussed, and that any such proposed narrowing should be referred to the President for decision.

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CLEARLY ONE OF THORNIEST PROBLEMS FACING NATO ALLIANCE AT THIS MOMENT IS DISTRIBUTION IRBMS AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THESE AND OTHER WEAPONS.

AS DEPT IS AWARE, FRENCH HAVE STRONG VIEWS ON THIS MATTER AND ARE ATTEMPTING TO DRUM UP SUPPORT FROM GERMANS, ITALIANS AND PERHAPS OTHERS OF SIX. FRENCH HAVE ALSO EMPHASIZED UNOFFICIALLY ON NUMBER RECENT OCCASIONS THEIR INTENT PRODUCE BOTH IRBM AND NUCLEAR WEAPON.

THEY HAVE APPEALED FOR U.S. HELP IN BOTH FIELDS, BUT ALSO MADE CLEAR THEIR INTENTION OF GOING AHEAD WITH HIGHEST PRIORITY ON THEIR OWN, IF NECESSARY, NO RPT NO MATTER WHAT THE SACRIFICE. IN FACT, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY STARTED ON THE MANUFACTURE OF THEIR OWN NUCLEAR WEAPON.

FRENCH INSISTENCE ARISES FROM TWO CONCERNS: (1) MILITARY CONCERN THAT THEIR FORCES SHALL HAVE LATEST AND BEST WEAPONS IN CASE OF NEED, PARTICULARLY SO THEY WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY LARGER ROLE IN DECISION TO USE NATO RETALIATORY POWER; (2) POLITICAL OR PRESTIGE CONCERN THAT THEY SHALL NOT RPT NOT BECOME "SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS" WITHIN NATO, SHALL NOT RPT NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM "NUCLEAR CLUB," SHALL NOT RPT NOT BE LIMITED IN THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE ANY WEAPON THEY WANT, AND SHALL BE ABLE PROVIDE THEIR PEOPLE ASSURANCE THEY HAVE ON FRENCH TERRITORY WEAPONS CAPABLE OF STRIKING DIRECTLY AT SOVIET TERRITORY IN CASE OF AGGRESION AGAINST FRANCE.

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
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AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, GENERAL U.S. OBJECTIVE IS TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS NATO DEFENSES WITHIN A FRAMEWORK DESIGNED TO AVOID OR MINIMIZE FRICTION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. IF OUR UNDERSTANDING IS CORRECT, USG IS CONSIDERING: (1) IN ACCORDANCE WITH SACEUR RECOMMENDATIONS, PLACING CERTAIN IRBM'S IN THOSE NATO COUNTRIES WHICH DESIRE THEM; (2) AFTER FURNISHING OF INITIAL WEAPONS BY U.S., LATER ASSISTING CERTAIN NATO COUNTRIES MANUFACTURE IRBM'S OF SUBSEQUENT GENERATIONS; (3) DEPOSITING NUCLEAR WARHEADS, IN FORM OF NATO STOCKPILE UNDER SACEUR CONTROL AND US CUSTODY, ADJACENT TO NEW WEAPONS, INCLUDING EVENTUALLY IRBM'S MANNED BY NATO FORCES TRAINED IN THEIR USE. QUESTION ARISES WHETHER THESE DISPOSITIONS WILL SATISFY MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONCERNS OF FRENCH.


AS TO MILITARY CONCERNS OUTLINED FOURTH PARAGRAPH THIS MESSAGE, IT WOULD SEEM PROBABLE ABOVE QUESTION COULD BE ANSWERED IN AFFIRMATIVE, PROVIDED FRENCH ARE OFFERED AGREEMENT THAT DECISION TO USE WEAPONS IN THEIR TERRITORIES WILL BE TAKEN BOTH JOINTLY AND PROMPTLY IN CASE OF NEED. HERE WE HAVE CASE OF AMBIVALENCE, FOR HOST COUNTRY WOULD AT SAME TIME WISH TO SHARE IN DECISION BUT WOULD WISH IT TO BE TAKEN, IF NECESSARY, IMMEDIATELY. AT THIS POINT ENTERS NEED FOR CLEAR ASSURANCE TO EFFECT THAT U.S. WILL ENGAGE IN NUCLEAR WAR TO DEFEND EUROPE EVEN IF U.S. HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN ATTACKED. THIS IS PERHAPS REAL KEY TO LEGITIMATE FRENCH CONCERN - THAT THEY WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON NOT WHOLLY CERTAIN AND POSSIBLY DELAYED U.S. DECISION IN ORDER TO RETALIATE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST SOVIET MISSILE ATTACK ON FRENCH TERRITORY.

POLITICAL OR PRESTIGE CONCERNS ARE QUITE ANOTHER MATTER. IT WILL BE VERY UNPALATABLE PILL FOR FRANCE TO SWALLOW THAT THEY CANNOT BE "TRUSTED" WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY BUT MUST COUNT ON RECEIVING THEM AT VERY LAST MOMENT FROM AMERICANS, EVEN IF FRENCH SHOULD BE FIRST ATTACKED. NATO STOCKPILE UNDER SACEUR CONTROL HELPS TO VEIL THIS "HUMILIATION" (ONE OF FAVORITE FRENCH WORDS THESE DAYS). BUT WE DOUBT THEY WILL CONSIDER IT AS MORE THAN TRANSITIONAL STEP. FACT U.K. HAS NUCLEAR RESOURCES OF ITS OWN WILL MAKE WHAT FRENCH CONSIDER TO BE "DISCRIMINATION" DOUBLY BITTER.

OUR CONCLUSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

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(1) WE FEEL IT IMPORTANT FRENCH BE INFORMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF DECISION RE PLACING IRBM'S IN NATO COUNTRIES AND THAT THEY ALSO BE EXPLICITELY ASSURED OF IMPORTANT ROLE TO BE GIVEN FRANCE, I.E., THAT SACUR WOULD RECOMMEND GIVING PRIORITY TO FRANCE IN ALLOCATING FIRST IRBM'S. SUCH ACTION WOULD DO MUCH TO RELIEVE PRESSURE FOR FRANCE TO PROCEED ON ITS OWN INDEPENDENT IRBM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, WHICH WOULD ONLY BE DONE TO DETRIMENT OF OTHER PROJECTS WHICH FRANCE SHOULD PROPERLY UNDERTAKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLE OF LOGICAL APPORTIONMENT OF TASKS AMONG NATO COUNTRIES.

(2) WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE IF WE COULD INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST UNDER NATO PROGRAM FRANCE AND OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE IN LATER DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF IRBM'S IN LINE WITH GENERAL NORSTAD'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON ASSISTING EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH SECOND AND THIRD GENERATION WEAPONS.

(3) THESE ACTIONS AND SUCH STEPS AS NATO STOCKPILE PROPOSAL AND GREATER EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION WILL, WE FEEL, PRODUCE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WE WILL HAVE BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESSFULLY PRESSING HOME OUR LONG-STANDING REQUEST FOR STORAGE RIGHTS IN FRANCE. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO STOCKPILE IN PARTICULAR WOULD FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON U.S. STORAGE, SINCE COULD BE POINTED OUT THAT WEAPONS BEING STORED FOR U.S. FORCES ARE WITHIN CONTEXT NATO STOCKPILE, WITH U.S. FORCES BEING THE FIRST NATO FORCES TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO USE WEAPONS. THIS WOULD HELP ELIMINATE IMPRESSION THAT U.S. STORAGE REQUEST A PURELY BILATERAL AFFAIR.

(4) ON ATOMIC WARHEADS, WE DO NOT RPT NOT RECOMMEND AT THIS TIME ANY CHANGE IN POSITION WHICH WE UNDERSTAND U.S. IS PROPOSING TO TAKE AT FORTHCOMING NATO MEETING, WHICH IS LIMITED TO NATO STOCKPILE CONCEPT. HOWEVER, WE FEEL IT NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE CURRENT FRENCH ATTITUDES AND POSITION THEY ARE LIKELY TO TAKE, WE MUST FACE UP TO PROBABILITY OF ATOMIC WEAPONS MANUFACTURE BY FRANCE, POSSIBLY WITH HELP OF GERMANS OR OTHERS OF SIX. WE DOUBT THAT ANY CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMY OR OF SOUND DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG NATO STATES WILL SURELY PREVENT FRENCH FROM BREAKING DOWN DOOR OF NUCLEAR CLUB IF THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT ADMITTED OR OFFERED WHAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER TO BE SUBSTANTIAL SATISFACTION IN THIS FIELD. ISSUE OF US TO DECIDE IN THIS CONNECTION MAY BE, IF WE ARE UNABLE TO DISSUADE FRENCH FROM PROCEEDING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION, WHETHER (A) IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO MAKE

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OUR CONCLUSIONS ARE AS FC

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THEIR EXTRAVAGANCE AS INEXPENSIVE AS POSSIBLE BY GIVING THEM SOME TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DESPITE PRECEDENT THIS WOULD ESTABLISH RE FOURTH COUNTRY PROBLEM, OR (B) IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO ALLOW THEM TO PROCEED ENTIRELY ALONE IN HOPE THAT COSTS INVOLVED IN THEIR OWN PROGRAM WOULD BRING HOME TO THEM EVENTUALLY FOLLY OF SEPARATE LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

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FYI. Re conclusions reftel, numbered paras 1, 2 and 3 are answered, insofar possible at this time, by TOPOLS 1774 and 1775. Importance of issue posed last sentence para 4 is fully appreciated here. Issue has been under active exploration recently and Farley prepared review with Embassy current thinking during his visit Paris. End FYI.

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
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Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: January 23, 1958
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SUBJECT: German-French-Italian Cooperation on the Production of Nuclear Weapons
S/P

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Josef Rust, State Secretary, Federal German Defense Ministry
Jonathan Dean, Office of German Affairs

See memo, dated 2/12/58 - to Secy from SCS giving condensed version.

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- EUR - Mr. Jandrey USRO - Ambassador Burgess

2-1498

Following his lunch with Senator Sallonstall and other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I walked with Dr. Rust from the Senate to the National Gallery of Art.

During the drive from the German Embassy to the Senate, Dr. Rust had several times mentioned the conversation he had had at the dinner given the evening before by Assistant Secretary Sprague of the Defense Department. He now said he had been somewhat disturbed by the course of the discussion during the evening and had requested the Assistant German Military Attache, Lt. Col. Paulsen, to make a carefully detailed account of it and send it to Germany immediately. Dr. Rust said that Mr. Sprague and his colleagues from the Pentagon had appeared to have a very negative attitude towards the projected German-French-Italian cooperation for military research. I pointed out that this was very probably because they would regard such a closed-shop cooperation as a divisive element in NATO. I remarked that to judge from such indications as Mr. Murphy's question to him (see memorandum of conversation of January 20) as to whether the Federal Republic, like France, wished to have atomic weapons of its own, some of the leading officials in the United States Government appeared to believe that the planned cooperation might include nuclear weapons. I said that I myself presumed that this might well be so, and that if it was, Dr. Rust would understand that a number of important political factors would be involved. Dr. Rust said that he was very glad that

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that I had put the point in that way since he had felt all along that that was the case, but had considered it impolitic in unfamiliar surroundings to pursue the point further. After some silence, Dr. Rust stated that since he had known me for some time, he would like to be quite frank in giving his personal views on this subject. /During the subsequent conversation, Dr. Rust repeatedly stressed the personal nature of his views and requested that they be treated in closest confidence./

Dr. Rust said that it was a fact that the agreement recently signed in Paris by the defense ministers of France, Italy and the Federal Republic included provision for eventual research on nuclear weapons. Dr. Rust emphasized the agreement had as yet had no practical effect, that it would be a very considerable time before it went into effect, and that it would move very slowly if it ever did go into effect because of the costs involved and because of public opposition to the project, particularly in Germany. He said that there was no German thought whatever of violating the limitations now applicable to German armaments in any clandestine fashion. (He implied that when the time came for relaxing the WEU armament restrictions, formal and open application would be made and would presumably receive the approval of other WEU members. He said that he felt that this certainly would have to be done in the case of the limitation of German missiles since effective anti-aircraft missiles had already advanced to a size larger than those permitted the Germans.) Dr. Rust said that what he had told senior officials of the State and Defense Departments concerning the general aims of the defense minister's agreement on research had been absolutely correct. The agreement had the aim of forming a nucleus for research and development within NATO - and not outside of NATO - to utilize the geographic proximity and common resources of the participating countries for the benefit of themselves and of the Alliance. The results of the research and development would be given to NATO. This was the main motivation of the participants, Dr. Rust remarked.

Dr. Rust said there had been great unrest on the continent with regard to strategic planning since it had first appeared a year or so ago that the inter-continental ballistic missile would become a practical reality. The leaders of the continental countries, particularly of France but also of the Federal Republic, had been extremely upset by the action of Great Britain in moving to establish itself as an independent nuclear power. The French, in particular, felt that the British had left them in the lurch. Dr. Rust said that, as a result of the British action, it appeared to him inevitable that the French and the other nations would insist on developing their own nuclear weapons. In the case of France, it might only be a question of mistaken national prestige, but French determination to proceed in any case appeared unshakable. Dr. Rust said he felt modern technology, specifically nuclear research and the use of nuclear energy for power, would in any case inevitably bring with it the capacity to make weapons. He said it would be impossible to prevent any major industrial country which had the necessary basic technology from developing its own nuclear energy resources. Even if the German Government wished to prevent this development, the demands of industry, of medical research, and air and sea transportation would force the Government to establish nuclear energy research in Germany.

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By KSP NARA Date 8/4/95

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I pointed out that, in addition to possible difficulties in NATO, it would seem to me that, although the senior American officials with whom he had spoken in Washington might not have been absolutely sure that the tripartite research agreement included nuclear weapons, they undoubtedly felt that if the three countries decided to engage in research on nuclear weapons, it would mean a diversion of important economic resources which might be more usefully employed for other defense purposes. I observed that the prospect of Franco-German-Italian development of nuclear weapons would have an effect on the problem of preventing an uncontrollable dispersal of atomic weapons throughout the world and might also raise doubts in the minds of people who were not yet convinced of the stability of political conditions in the Federal Republic.

Dr. Rust said he could understand these points very clearly. He said that he himself thought the Paris defense ministers' agreement had been unnecessary and ill-advised. It had been ill-advised because effective research on nuclear weapons could not come for years because the countries concerned did not have the necessary resources. The Federal Republic, for example, would have to put every spare pfenning into carrying out its NATO commitment. [It was plain from his remarks that Dr. Rust was almost as unhappy at the financial as well as at the political connotations of his minister's actions and he restrained himself with visible effort from further criticism.] The agreement had been unnecessary because research cooperation for specific projects could be carried out through exchange of research teams such as that now planned with the United States without the necessity of a formal pact, which had already created considerable suspicion in Great Britain and apparently in the United States, and which would blow German politics sky-high if it ever became publicly known because of German public opposition to nuclear weapons.

When I suggested that a decrease in European confidence in American determination to defend Europe appeared to me to be the main factor leading to the defense ministers' agreement, rather than any immediate military necessity, Dr. Rust endorsed this view with great vigor and emphasis. He said that, quite aside from any specific difficulties the United States may have had with Europe in such questions as the "Radford Plan" and the provision of nuclear arms for Europe, he and other German leaders felt that it would be a real contribution to strengthening the alliance with the United States if continental Europe (not Germany alone) could be placed in a position where it had a real prospect of being itself able to deter Soviet attack independently of the United States. Dr. Rust said he felt to maintain the present almost total military dependence of Western Europe on the United States would be unhealthy both for Europe and the United States. He said he could not see any hope for real partnership between Europe and the United States until the United States came down from its lonely eminence of carrying the heavy responsibility of being the only Western power with a real nuclear deterrent. Now the United States needed rocket bases in Europe and advanced radar positions in Europe for its own national defense. It previous commitment to defend

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Europe, which had been in the United States' long-range strategic interest, but had not had a direct and immediate bearing on the defense of the continental United States against attack, had now been converted to direct self-protective interest. Under such conditions, it was not right and it would not contribute to the health and soundness of the NATO structure for the United States to insist on maintaining a monopoly over the deterrent needed for European defense. Dr. Rust said he thought it would be extremely advantageous for the United States if Europe, through the development and possession of nuclear missiles, could be in a position to deter outright Soviet attack in a way which would not automatically involve the necessity of American strategic intervention.

Dr. Rust emphasized that he himself, like many other Germans, would have preferred to leave nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States, and, since needs must be, of the Soviet Union, with no other powers having them. But now that Great Britain had "broken the spell", the development could not be held back indefinitely. In a few years, for example, it would probably be possible to buy the components of nuclear weapons commercially. Dr. Rust said that he realized that the United States had genuine reasons for concern with the Fourth Power question and the general question of spread of nuclear armaments, a concern which was shared by most Germans. He said he felt it was necessary that any European development of nuclear armaments be carefully controlled and that no one European country should be able independently to decide on their use. (Throughout the conversation Dr. Rust gave the impression of being quite unhappy with the course taken by the defense ministers and of being out of sympathy with it.)

I pointed out that the subject of our conversation was of extreme importance and could, if mishandled, have the most adverse effects on confidence between Germany and the United States. It appeared to me that one absolute requirement of the situation was the maintenance of the utmost frankness and openness between our two countries in discussing the question. Dr. Rust agreed, and said that Minister Strauss planned to make the defense ministers' agreement the main subject of his discussions in the United States during his pending visit. I said that I was sure this would be very desirable but the importance of the question was such that it might be worthwhile as well to consider the possibility of Chancellor Adenauer discussing it with Ambassador Bruce in Bonn. Dr. Rust agreed emphatically, saying that he would definitely discuss the problem with the Chancellor immediately after his arrival in Germany (February 22).

Special precautions should be taken to protect the source of this report

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 By Red NARS, Date 2/8/88

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ENCLOSURE

to JCS 1907/104
 31 Jan 1958
 (JSPC Report on Berlin)

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

JCS CF 1958 / <CS 381 (8-20-69) see 40

1. On 21 January 1954, the President approved NSC 5404/1 "U.S. Policy on Berlin".*
2. On 8 May 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved** USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 10-55,*** a unilateral contingency plan for limited use of U.S. forces to determine Soviet intentions and to reopen access to Berlin in case of a blockade or in case western access to Berlin is seriously limited by harassing action.
3. On 8 May 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved** USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 12-55,*** a unilateral airlift plan in the event all surface means of access to Berlin are blocked.
4. On 7 November 1957, the Department of State prepared a study**** on the current Berlin Status and Access problems. The study analyzed the following problem areas:
 - a. A possibility of measures to incorporate the Soviet Sector (East Berlin) into the Soviet Zone under the German Democratic Republic (GDR) regime.
 - b. Interference with circulation between West and East Berlin.
 - c. Interference with German traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic.
 - d. Interference with allied access to Berlin by road, rail, and air.

Furthermore, the study summarized for each of the above problem areas, (a) the action taken by the Soviets or GDR, (b) the counteraction taken by the Allies, (c) rumors or threats of

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*Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/104
 **See Decision On J.C.S. 1907/137
 ***On file in Joint Secretariat

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	NARS, Date 2/8/88

additional Soviet or GDR action, (d) estimates of further developments which might be expected, (e) allied planning to meet problems which might arise, and (f) the conclusions regarding allied planning, reached by the State Department.

5. On 20 December 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views* to the Secretary of Defense regarding a draft statement of policy on the U.S. Policy Toward Germany (NSC 5727).** They informed him that they were of the opinion that NSC 5727 constitutes a satisfactory statement of U.S. policy to supersede NSC 160/1,*** the Supplement to NSC 160/1**** and NSC 5404/1 (U.S. Policy on Berlin).# The NSC Planning Board, in their preparation of NSC 5727 (U.S. Policy Toward Germany) and their review of NSC 5404/1, recommended no change in the policies set forth in NSC 5404/1.

6. On 16 December 1957, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, in a memorandum## for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended that a message### be dispatched to USCINCEUR which would require a full report on the status of unilateral and multilateral military planning regarding contingencies in respect to Berlin, including any major problems connected therewith.

*Enclosure to J.C.S. 2124/188

**Enclosure to J.C.S. 2124/187

***Enclosure to J.C.S. 2124/91

****See Note to Holders of J.C.S. 2124/91, dated 14 September 1956

#Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/104

##Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, CSAFM 314-57, dated 16 December 1957, subject:

"Berlin Situation (U)"; on file in Joint Secretariat

###Enclosure to memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S.A.F., CSAFM 314-57, dated 16 December 1957, subject: "Berlin Situation (U)"; on file in Joint Secretariat

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2/5/58

To: The Secretary

Through: S/S

1958 FEB 6 PM 5:09

From: EUR - C. Burke Elbrick

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR

Subject: French-German-Italian Cooperation ~~and~~ New Weapons Production

This memorandum sets forth the facts as they are known to us on the cooperative arrangements now being worked out by the French, Germans and Italians for the production of advanced weapons, with particular reference to the discussions which the Ministers of Defense of those countries are reported to have held on January 21 on the cooperative production of nuclear weapons components.

Summary

Plans for cooperative production of nuclear weapons components were discussed at the January 21 meeting but no decisions were reached. Strauss was apparently anxious to reach agreement with the French on the project but the French avoided committing themselves. The Italians have basically played the role of interested bystanders. A good deal of jockeying for position is now going on, with the French Foreign Office and apparently also Gaillard showing increased concern over the idea of the Germans acquiring their own atomic capability through participation in the French program.

Careful consideration was given to the question whether the U.S. should approach the Italian, French or German Ministers of Defense before the January 21 meeting to express our concern over their reported agreement to undertake joint production of nuclear weapons. After thorough study of the question and discussions between Mr. Murphy and Mr. Quarles, it was decided not to make such an approach, primarily due to the belief that the three Ministers would interpret such an urgent demarche as a U.S. attempt to prevent France from undertaking the production of nuclear weapons and that the net effect would be counter-productive.

Full details are contained in the Background section.

Department Action

The French Foreign Office has just advised our Embassy in Paris that the three powers will shortly report to WEU on the January 21 meeting, and that representatives of the three in Washington will simultaneously inform the Department about the meeting. A high French Foreign Office official has indicated that the Foreign Office would be very receptive if the Department, following receipt of this report, wished to express reservations and concern over the prospect of French-German-Italian cooperation in the manufacture of atomic weapons. The entire question is under urgent consideration and we will forward recommendations to you as soon as possible.

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Background

1. During the Heads of Government meeting in Paris Adenauer mentioned to you the possibility that research on nuclear weapons might be undertaken by France, Germany and Italy. He said that he wanted the U.S. to know about this and would see to it that we were properly informed. You replied that we knew about it in a general way but would be glad to know more. You suggested on a personal and preliminary basis that something like a nuclear weapons authority might be the best way to keep the situation under control as regards the undue spreading of nuclear weapons. Adenauer's reaction to this idea was one of hearty approval.

2. On January 16 the Italian Minister of Defense (Taviani) informed our Embassy in Rome that he and the French and German Ministers of Defense had concluded an agreement while in Paris for the Heads of Government meeting to engage in the joint production and procurement of modern arms, including missiles, jet aircraft and nuclear energy. In the field of nuclear energy Taviani stated that the work would be done in France with the support of a German financial contribution and an Italian contribution in terms of brain-power and a small amount of money.

3. Admitting that the nuclear project was expensive and ambitious, Taviani said that the three Governments considered that, in view of the fact that U.S. legislation prevented our turning over nuclear warheads to other governments, it was necessary for them to have an atomic capability under their own control in order to enable them to meet certain contingencies. He suggested that if attacked by the USSR Italy might not be able to rely upon U.S. support, since the U.S. might consider the conflict as local and not wish to precipitate global nuclear war. Presidential illness or other complications might result in the U.S. not being able to bring its forces to bear decisively and in time. If each of the three powers had an atomic capability in its own hands, even if amounting to relatively few warheads, he continued, the Soviets would be certain that any attack would immediately involve nuclear war, and local war as far as the three powers were concerned would be impossible. Taviani hoped that the French nuclear development would receive U.S. technical support in order to accelerate achievement of the atomic stockpiles. While keeping the new arrangement strictly a European affair, he said the three powers would undoubtedly invite the participation of Belgium and The Netherlands at a later date.

see Bonn's 2247, dated Jan. 23 - (L F file)

4. On January 21, following their meeting in Bonn, the three Ministers of Defense issued a communique stating that their military and technical assistants had discussed the organizational problems connected with cooperation in the armament field; that the Ministers themselves had reached basic agreement as a result of their conversation; and that joint research and production would be undertaken in the armaments field in accordance with the principles of NATO and with the aim of standardization. The French

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Minister (Chaban-Delmas) informed the press that joint research and production programs had not only been decided but had actually been begun; that a tripartite committee had been set up to discuss the organization of specialized working groups on conventional ground weapons, aircraft, guided missiles, rockets and scientific research; and that these groups would meet under the committee's supervision February 4-6 in Rome. Our information on the Ministers' consideration of coordinated production of nuclear components is derived from public statements of the participants and from Embassy reports of confidential conversations with the participants and with foreign office officials.

5. In a foreign policy debate on January 23 in the German Parliament Defense Minister Strauss avoided a question by Ollenhauer whether production of nuclear components had been discussed at the Bonn meeting. Strauss merely stated that production of such weapons in the Federal Republic in cooperation with France and Italy had not been discussed, and that the Federal Republic continued to abide by its renunciation of atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons expressed in the Brussels Treaty.

6. Taviani informed General Schuyler, Chief of Staff to General Norstad, on January 27 that the question of nuclear capability had been discussed at the Bonn meeting and that he expected that an agreement concerning this aspect of the tripartite arms effort would be firmed up in two or three months. On January 30 he informed Ambassador Zellerbach that the three Ministers had agreed to undertake production of nuclear weapons on the basis of the French development alone. He stated, however, that action in the matter had been postponed at the request of the French to await the outcome of French talks with the U.S. on the subject. These talks, he said, were being carried on at the top levels in Washington, while at the same time a French missile team was in the U.S. for orientation purposes. The French had stated at the meeting, according to Taviani, that one school of thought in Washington maintained that since France was about to achieve a nuclear explosion the U.S. should provide technical assistance on atomic weapons development to France only; another U.S. school thought that such information should be made available to France for purposes of sharing its resultant nuclear capability with Germany and Italy.

7. On February 1 a high French Foreign Office official (Laloy) informed our Embassy that the possibilities of cooperation in the fabrication of atomic weapons in France had definitely been discussed during the Bonn talks. He said that it was planned that the three powers would shortly report to WEU on the Bonn negotiations, and that representatives of the three in Washington would simultaneously advise the Department on the subject. Laloy said that the French Foreign Office would be very receptive if the Department, following receipt of this report, wished to express reservations and concern over the prospect of French-German-Italian

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cooperation in the manufacture of atomic weapons. He stated that the Foreign Office was greatly concerned over the prospect of the West Germans acquiring their own atomic capability through participation in the French program. He believed that Strauss and a few German military representatives were pushing hard for this, despite what Strauss might be saying to the U.S. Laloy made clear that he was not in any sense questioning France's own determination to proceed with at least a limited atomic weapons program.

8. On February 3 Laloy advised a member of our NATO Delegation that French Defense Minister Chaban-Delmas had indicated at the Bonn meeting that France was not yet prepared to proceed in the field of atomic cooperation, that Strauss had been furious on hearing this, and that Strauss had indicated that such a negative French attitude on German participation in atomic production could well mean the end of tripartite plans for production of other weapons. Laloy said that Gaillard's eyes were now open and that he was putting the brakes on Chaban-Delmas. He added that the French would not participate in discussions of atomic nuclear components production cooperation at the Rome meeting in early February.

9. During his recent visit to the U.S. Dr. Rust, State Secretary in the German Ministry of Defense, informed a Departmental officer in confidence that the agreement recently signed in Paris by the three Ministers of Defense did include provision for eventual research on nuclear weapons. Dr. Rust emphasized that the agreement had as yet had no practical effect, that it would be a considerable time before it went into effect, and that the project would move slowly if it ever did go into effect, because of the cost involved and because of public opposition, particularly in Germany. He said that as a result of the British action in developing an independent nuclear capability it appeared to him inevitable that France and other European nations would insist on developing their own nuclear weapons. He felt that modern technology, specifically nuclear research and the use of nuclear energy for power, would inevitably bring with it the capacity to make weapons.

Concurrences:

S/P - Mr. Smith

RA - Mr. Timmons

HUR/RA:RAFearey:enc

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NND 867400
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FROM: BONN
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 2469, FEBRUARY 8, 2 PM

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File

SENT DEPARTMENT 2469 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 433
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PARIS PASS USRO

BAUDISSIN TELLS US HE HAS BEEN GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY IN FOREIGN OFFICE FOR SUMMIT MEETING PREPARATIONS AND THAT SOME INITIAL PROPOSALS SHOULD BE AGREED NEXT WEEK BY BRENTANO, SHERPENBERG, AND BLANKENHORN. BAUDISSIN THINKING ALONG FOLLOWING LINES : (THIS REPRESENTS ONLY HIS OWN VIEWS)

1. AS TO PARTICIPANTS SUMMIT MEETING, WEST MIGHT FIRST PROPOSE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM AND SOVIET UNION. SOVIETS, DISLIKING 3-1 PROPORTION, MAY WELL COUNTER WITH SUGGESTION FOR BROADER PARTICIPATION. WEST SHOULD THEN PROPOSE NARROWING NUMBER TO ONLY UNITED STATES AND USSR. SOVIETS SHOULD FIND THIS HARD TO REJECT. FURTHERMORE, PROSPECT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE SERIOUS WOULD BE IMPROVED.

2. WEST SHOULD NOT AGREE DISCUSS EUROPEAN SECURITY UNLESS SOVIETS AGREE DISCUSS REUNIFICATION.

3. WEAKEST POINT PRESENT WESTERN POLICY EUROPEAN SECURITY-REUNIFICATION LIES IN GENERAL AREA FUTURE MILITARY STATUS OF A REUNITED GERMANY. WESTERN POWERS NEED TO CLARIFY AND ELABORATE THEIR POLICY ON THIS SUBJECT. IN THIS CONNECTION, BAUDISSIN REFERRED TO POINT 3 OUTLINE TREATY OF ASSURANCE PRESENTED AT GENEVA (ZONE IN WHICH FORCES AND ARMAMENTS LIMITED) AND PHRASE IN BERLIN DECLARATION TO EFFECT WEST WOULD NOT SEEK MILITARY ADVANTAGE AS RESULT WITHDRAWAL SOVIET FORCES.

4. NAC

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4. NAC SUB-COMMITTEE OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC, UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND ITALY MAY BE MOST PRACTICAL FORUM EXCHANGE VIEWS THESE SUBJECTS.

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By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

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American Embassy, Bonn

Despatch No. 1569 ✓

Department of State, Washington

March 5, 1958

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2/14 EUR E / CIA OSO Army Navy Air USIA

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HBS

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ON FIG AGREEMENT AND SUMMIT MEETING

The following summarizes a conversation between Graf Baudissin, Foreign Office, and an Embassy officer which took place on March 4.

German-French-Italian Military Cooperation

Baudissin said that in November there had been a written agreement concluded between the Defense Ministers of Germany, France, and Italy regarding cooperation in research, development, and production of weapons. This agreement was not "well phrased" and had not been reviewed by the lawyers or Foreign Office staffs. It did not deal "adequately" with the question of the relationship of trilateral cooperation to WEU or NATO coordination. Baudissin thought it would be a mistake for another country to press for a copy of this agreement.

I said I had no idea that we would ask for a copy. Our main interest had been with respect to the relationship to NATO. Baudissin said this had been the Foreign Office interest as well.

In response to a question, Baudissin said the phrase in the statement which the FIG countries had made to WEU and NATO to the effect that cooperation in the "military utilization of nuclear energy" was not excluded had a precise meaning so far as Germany was concerned. This meant only that Germany was interested in the possibility of nuclear propulsion units for ships. The German Ambassador in London had been specifically instructed to say this in response to any questions which might arise when the FIG statement was presented to WEU. Baudissin then observed that the United States had offered assistance in this field during the NATO Heads of Government meeting. I noted that the trilateral agreement was on the agenda for the WEU Ministerial meeting now being held in Rome. Baudissin did not believe any particular problems in connection with the agreement would arise at this meeting.

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 By *SL* NARA Date *3/11/97*

Page No. 2
 Despatch No. 1569
 March 5, 1958
 From AmEmbassy Bonn

Summit Meeting

Baudissin said the Germans agreed one hundred per cent with the lines of our reply to the latest Soviet note about a Summit meeting. They would have no suggestions to make. He noted the Department's strong position with respect to reunification, and observed the Soviets agreed to talk about a peace treaty with Germany, an idea previously advanced by President Gerstenmaier. In his view this would not be adequate. The first step was to create an all-German Government.

He mentioned a meeting he had attended that day in the Ministry of All-German Affairs to discuss reunification questions and said an inter-Ministerial committee existed on this question. Dr. Fechter is the Foreign Office representative. The possibility of a referendum throughout Germany (Martino's proposal) was discussed at this meeting. However, the Germans have nothing yet that is "ripe" to propose to us in this regard.

The discussion then turned to European security questions. Baudissin said he would go to Paris to represent the Federal Republic on the NAC European security committee which will meet on February 10. He thought this meeting should be an exploratory one which would exchange views on the areas which needed study. Baudissin said the Foreign Office was not thinking in terms of mutual troop withdrawals but did believe the Western position needed to be clarified with respect to the zone of control, envisaged in the Treaty of Assurance, and with respect to the meaning of the phrase in the Berlin Declaration which states that the West will not take military advantage as the result of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Soviet Zone. In his view the latter has only one meaning, i.e. NATO forces would not move into this area.

Baudissin said the question of a working group on reunification had now been settled. It would "advise" the European security committee. He thought the work on reunification might be done in Bonn, formally or informally, with us, the British, and French.

For the Ambassador

William R. Tyler
 William R. Tyler
 Counselor of Embassy

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7/19/61

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By SL NARA Date 3/11/97

Page No. 3
Despatch No. 1569
March 5, 1958
From AmEmbassy Bonn

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KOR - Mr. Eibrick

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 7, 1958

KOR/RA - Robert H. McBride

1958 MAR 7 AM 9 03

JA

Production of Nuclear Weapons in Europe

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
S/P

The attached memorandum for the Secretary on the above subject has been prepared in light of recommendations received from the field and of Minister Strauss' statements in his conversation with you on Wednesday. We are advised by the Secretariat that the memorandum can be included in the papers the Secretary will take with him in the plane if we are able to get it to them by eleven o'clock. The Secretary would then cable his approval or disapproval.

Concurrences

WE - Mr. Torbert

GKR - Mr. Lisle

MIA/RA:AFearney:cnc

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S/P - Mr. Savage

Europe

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March 10, 1958

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
EUR - Mr. Vest S/P

The Secretary has approved, with the following comment, the recommendation contained in the staff study regarding "Production of Nuclear Weapons in Europe", submitted by EUR on March 7, 1958:

attached

"I don't think we should try to get the French to accept the principle of their being a non-nuclear power, but rather for the US to be noncommittal on this point, but strong on de facto abstinence by France."

RLB

Robert L. Burns
S/S-RO
Ext. 4154

cc: S/AE - Mr. Farley
✓ S/P - Mr. Savage

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MEMORANDUM

S/AE - by Courtney

State Dept
S/AE FILE COPY

To: The Secretary
Through: S/S
From: EUR - C. Burke Kilbrick
Subject: Production of Nuclear Weapons in Europe

On February 20 we requested the views of Ambassadors Houghton, Burgess, Bruce and Zellerbach as to the course of action the U.S. should adopt in continental Europe in furtherance of the U.S. policy that additional independent sources of production of nuclear weapons are not in US interest. We indicated that the problem is basically to determine what U.S. actions would be most effective (a) in confining the current French national program to minimum proportions, and (b) in preventing the development of French-German-Italian nuclear weapons cooperative arrangements under which German resources would be grafted on to the French program, thereby assisting achievement of independently controlled French, German and Italian nuclear weapons stockpiles.

We have now received Ambassador Houghton's, Ambassador Bruce's and Ambassador Burgess' recommendations. All three urge that the U.S. make its views on the question known without delay, and there is also general agreement on the points we should make. Ambassador Houghton and Ambassador Burgess differ, however, on the manner and forum in which the U.S. should make its views known.

Ambassador Burgess recommends the U.S. frankly state its position in the North Atlantic Council. He believes that silence on our part in NATO could be interpreted by NATO members as tacit sanction of nuclear weapons cooperation among the three countries, and could be construed to indicate lessening U.S. faith in NATO, greater reliance upon our relations with selected NATO powers, and a green light for others to participate in the cooperative effort. He accordingly considers it important that we present in NATO a clear picture of the dangers we perceive in the present situation; stress our view that NATO military requirements are met by the NATO Atomic Stockpile; emphasize the wasteful and duplicative allocation of resources which creation of additional sources of nuclear weapons in NATO would entail; and point to the prejudicial effects which such a program would have on efforts to achieve atomic disarmament. He recommends that we specifically state that the U.S. will not cooperate with any further nations on programs for nuclear components. Recognizing that a statement on these lines may create temporary problems with France, he considers that a lesser evil than continued delay in making our position known to all NATO Governments.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
S/AE

MAR 10 1958

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Spec Asst. / Atomic Energy
Lot 57 W 688 Box 384

Required Programs
File 1A.13 Required Programs WATD

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By CEP NARA Date 7/12/97

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Ambassador Houghton recommends that the matter be raised privately with the French at an early date in such a way as to give the French assurance of our desire to examine with them in a friendly and cooperative manner the entire range of questions in this field. He considers this desirable in order to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, which he feels is essential if we are to make real progress toward slowing or containing the French atomic weapons program. He states that the French, German and Italian Defense Ministers have doubtless discussed nuclear weapons cooperation, and may even have formulated proposals for joint research on atomic weapons. It is his opinion, however, that the three Ministers have dropped the idea for the present, and that its re-emergence can be most effectively prevented by a carefully formulated approach to the French. He considers discussion of the matter at this time in the MAC unnecessary, likely to irk the French gratuitously, and likely to reduce the efficacy of our arguments with the French, where acceptance of our views is crucial.

The points which Ambassador Houghton recommends that we make to the French are similar to those suggested by USRO for the Council, and include specifically:

- a) A clear statement (i) that the Executive Branch is not prepared under existing circumstances to recommend an affirmative Presidential determination that weapons cooperation with France "will promote...the common defense and security of the U.S.", and (ii) that acceleration of French test or production preparations would not improve prospects of an affirmative determination;
- b) assurance of the utmost efforts on our part to achieve quickly ample NATO deployments of atomic weapons and IRBM, emphasizing France's equal voice in decisions to use these weapons;
- c) re-affirmation of our offer to cooperate in the development of a French nuclear submarine and in French production of second generation IRBM; and
- d) an offer to supply enriched uranium under a long range commitment through the EURATOM supply agency for civilian atomic development.

Ambassador Houghton considers that momentum toward completing and testing the bomb or bombs the French are now working on are too strong to be abated. The prospect of persuading the French to stop with a single test or series of tests, or to continue with only a token program, are somewhat better "but far from exhilarating". In view of these less

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than promising prospects, he recommends that we continue our efforts to develop alternative proposals to reduce incentives for the development of independent nuclear capabilities, for use if the recommended discussions with the French do not accomplish this purpose.

Ambassador Bruce in his comments states that while various considerations are likely in the long run to impel the Federal Republic to desire an independent stockpile of nuclear weapons, there is at present no popular drive in West Germany for a stockpile independent of U.S. supply and control. Even within the Government such desire as may exist is centered in a handful of men headed by Strauss. Ambassador Bruce believes that if there were strong American objections Adenauer might accede to our views as to the undesirability of Germany accelerating a program of fourth country nuclear weapons production. Continued silence on our part may, on the other hand, Ambassador Bruce warns, be taken for consent. He accordingly recommends that he be authorized in the course of a tour d'horizon with the Chancellor to question him about his policies in regard to any nuclear armaments agreement, actual or potential, with the French and Italians. We would then be able to decide in light of Adenauer's observations and Strauss' comments in Washington whether to engage in further or more formal conversations.

Defense Minister Strauss told us yesterday that the Federal Republic is much interested in nuclear energy for military propulsion purposes, but is not interested in the production of nuclear weapons. He stated that Germany is entirely satisfied with the NATO Atomic Stockpile plan. He believed that the French intend to produce nuclear weapons, and hope for American help to this end, but said that nothing is being done by the three countries on a tripartite basis in the nuclear weapons field. While loyal to France, the Federal Government considers it important to know what France is doing in the nuclear weapons field. Strauss emphasized that Germany opposes the extension of independent nuclear capabilities, and believes that if France proceeds with its weapons program NATO will have to deal with the problem. A multilateral approach to the production of nuclear weapons would, he stated, be preferable to extension of independent national capabilities;

Ambassador Zellerbach's reports from Rome indicate that while Defense Minister Taviani has appeared personally to favor the achievement of limited independent nuclear stockpiles by each of the three countries, it is far from clear that the Italian Government supports him in this view. Because of the limited contribution Italy could make to a joint nuclear weapons program, Taviani's influence in discussions of the project among the three Ministers of Defense has probably not been great.

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We have considered Ambassador Houghton's and Ambassador Burgess' views and recommendations and believe that the course of action proposed by Ambassador Houghton offers the best prospect of our being able to exert effective influence on the situation. If you agree we will discuss with the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission an approach to the French on the lines proposed by Ambassador Houghton. The specific points recommended by Ambassador Houghton for presentation to the French would be evaluated during these discussions. We will at the same time advise Ambassadors Houghton, Burgess, Bruce and Zellerbach of our intended course of action, and request Ambassador Bruce's recommendation whether, in light of Minister Strauss' statements here, he still considers it advisable to seek Chancellor Adenauer's views.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you authorize the initiation of discussions with the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission looking to an approach to the French on the lines proposed by Ambassador Houghton.

Concurrences

S/P - Mr. Smith

S/AE - Mr. Farley

Approved _____ ✓

Disapproved _____

NWA/PA:RAF:cmv

3/6/58

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3/3/58

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLICY PLANNING STAFF

SECRET

1752

March 3, 1958

TO : The Secretary
 THROUGH: S/S
 FROM : S/P *Gerard C. Smith*
 SUBJECT: Possible Strauss Query on French-Italian-German
 Nuclear Collaboration

I have read the briefing memorandum *attached* which is being submitted to you by EUR. I would hope that the position recommended in this memorandum could be conveyed to Herr Strauss in such a way as to leave him under no illusion as to our negative attitude toward a FIG nuclear collaboration which, as we understand it, would graft German resources on to the French program and thereby assist the achievement of independently controlled weapons stockpiles by France, Germany, and Italy.

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PT 1957-61 / 151 / Europe 1958

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1958
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TO: Secretary of State
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1. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION WITH BRIMELOW YESTERDAY ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, EMBOFF SAID WE HAVE HAD REPORT FROM PARIS THAT FRENCH HAD STORY TO EFFECT KHRUSHCHEV HAS SUGGESTED TO AMBASSADOR THOMPSON BI-LATERAL US-USSR DISCUSSIONS ON CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL" SUBJECTS. EMBOFF TOLD BRIMELOW AMBASSADOR THOMPSON HAD COMMENTED THAT THIS STORY MAY HAVE ORIGINATED IN HIS RECENTLY INFORMING BRITISH AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS THAT SOVIETS HAD SEVERAL TIMES INDICATED THEIR INTEREST IN HAVING BILATERAL TALKS WITH US.

2. BRIMELOW REPLIED THAT THIS WAS INTERESTING BECAUSE COUNSELOR OF FRENCH EMBASSY HAD JUST BEEN IN TO SEE HIM TO INQUIRE IF BRITISH KNEW WHAT SUBJECTS SOVIETS WISHED TO DISCUSS BILATERALLY WITH US. BRIMELOW COMMENTED FRENCH SEEMED TO BE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED AND SUSPICIOUS AND ADDED HE HAD TOLD FRENCH COUNSELOR BRITISH HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER. EMBASSY OFFICER SAID ONLY THINGS OF EXCLUSIVELY US-USSR CONSIDERATION PRESUMABLY ARE SUCH ISSUES AS LEND-LEASE SETTLEMENT AND EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION US WOULD BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO ENTER INTO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON MATTERS OF GENERAL INTEREST EVEN IF URGED TO DO SO BY ITS ALLIES.

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FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2025, MAY 19, 1 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 2025, REPEATED INFORMATION BONN 211.

AT NORWEGIAN RECEPTION MIKOYAN INQUIRED WHAT PARIS AMBASSADORS' CONFERENCE TALKED ABOUT. I REPLIED CHIEF TOPIC OF INTEREST WAS POLICIES OF SOVIET UNION. MIKOYAN REMARKED "THEN YOU HAD TO SPEAK FOR US. THAT MUST HAVE BEEN A HARD JOB." HE ASKED TWICE IF IT WERE REALLY TRUE THAT THERE WERE PEOPLE WHO FEARED THE SOVIET UNION. I REPLIED THAT OF COURSE THERE WERE A GREAT MANY IN THIS CATEGORY AND WHEN PRESSED FOR REASONS I SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT TOSS 3,000 POUND SPUTNIKS IN THE AIR, MAKE THE STATEMENTS AND PURSUE THE POLICIES THEY DID WITHOUT CAUSING ALARM. HE SAID THE SPUTNIK WAS A PEACEFUL UNDERTAKING BUT TOOK OBVIOUS PLEASURE IN POINTING OUT THAT IT WEIGHED 300 TIMES AS MUCH AS THE AMERICAN SATELLITE.

HE SPOKE REPEATEDLY ABOUT THE GREAT IMPRESSION MADE UPON HIM BY ADENAUER SAYING THAT WHILE THEY DISAGREED THE CHANCELLOR WAS A MAN WITH WHOM IT WAS A PLEASURE TO TALK SINCE HE SPOKE HONESTLY AND DIRECTLY. HE SAID ADENAUER HAD SPOKEN WELL OF SECRETARY DULLES BUT ADDED "MR. DULLES DOESN'T LIKE US AND WE DON'T LIKE HIM."

MIKOYAN REFERRED TO THE GREAT EXPANSION SOVIET UNION WAS UNDERTAKING IN CHEMICAL AND PLASTICS FIELDS AND SAID THEY WOULD BE INTERESTED IN BUYING INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT IN US FOR SUCH PRODUCTION. I SAID I THOUGHT WE WERE PREPARED TO SELL EQUIPMENT IN THIS FIELD AND UNDERSTOOD THAT AN AMERICAN FIRM WAS WORKING WITH A BRITISH COMPANY IN SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT FOR THIS PURPOSE.

A REMARK OF MIKOYAN'S GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING UP BAKER CASE. HE APPEARED TO KNOW ABOUT IT AND SAID THERE WERE CERTAIN LIMITS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE OVERSTEPPED. AT THIS POINT OUR CONVERSATION WAS INTERRUPTED.

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FROM: BONN
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 3449, MAY 20, 6 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 3449, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 403, PARIS 620.

FROM BRUCE

CHANCELLOR TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT AS REPORTED IN TODAY'S FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE THE SPD CONVENTION AT STUTT GART WAS MAKING OPPOSITION TO FEDREP NUCLEAR ARMAMENT ITS PARAMOUNT POLICY. OLLENHAUER AND CARLO SCHMID HAD SPOKEN VIGOROUSLY ON SUBJECT. SINCE SPD HAS DIFFERENCES OF OPINIONS WITHIN PARTY RANKS ON OTHER ISSUES IT HAS DECIDED TO CONCENTRATE ON THIS, AND RESULTS THUS FAR ARE MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN ADENAUER EXPECTED.

THEREFORE HE SAID HE MUST FIND A NEW "FORMULA" TO DEAL WITH THIS TENET. HE HAS NOT YET DECIDED EXACTLY HOW TO PHRASE IT, BUT READ ME POINTS FROM TENTATIVE DRAFT WHICH, IF AND WHEN FINALIZED, WILL BE DISTRIBUTED FOR GUIDANCE TO CDU SPEAKERS PARTICIPATING IN NORTH RHINE WESTPHALIAN CAMPAIGN. (CHANCELLOR ALREADY SPOKE ALONG THESE LINES IN HIS DORTMUND SPEECH MAY 18.)

1. FEDREP ARMED FORCES NOW HAVE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
2. MATADORS BOUGHT IN U.S. ARE MEANS OF DELIVERY BOTH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT WILL REMAIN FOR 18 TO 24 MONTHS IN U.S. WHERE GERMAN PERSONNEL WILL BE TRAINED IN THEIR USE.
3. IF WITHIN 18 TO 24 MONTHS NO START HAS BEEN MADE ON DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT FEDREP WILL BE FORCED TO STATION MATADORS ON ITS TERRITORY BUT WARHEADS WILL BE UNDER SHAPE OR U.S. CUSTODY.

CONTINUING, HE SAID THERE WILL BE FIVE LAND ELECTIONS THIS YEAR AND OUTCOME

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AND OUTCOME WILL DETERMINE CONTROL BUNDESRAT. FOR CAMPAIGN PURPOSES, AS WELL AS OTHER REASONS, HE MUST HAVE SUMMIT CONFERENCE OR ELSE CLEAR DEMONSTRATION TO PUBLIC OPINION SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE. HE KNOWS MACMILLAN IS IN FULL ACCORD ON THIS AND HE BELIEVES PFLIMLIN ALSO.

HE SAID SOVIETS THINK CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NO REAL DESIRE FOR SUMMIT CONFERENCE. DESPITE ERRATIC TACTICS CHANCELLOR CONVINCED KHRUSHCHEV WANTS SUCH MEETING SINCE HIS MOTIVES ARE UNCHANGING AND HE NEEDS "HALO" LIGHTING HEADS OF GATHERING TO SUSTAIN HIS POSITION DOMESTICALLY.

IF IMPRESSION SHOULD PREVAIL IN EUROPE THAT U.S. HAD BLOCKED SUMMIT MEETING, THIS WOULD CREATE UNFAVORABLE REACTION AND SERIOUSLY IMPAIR U.S. PRESTIGE. IN FEDREP REGARDLESS OF PARTY THERE IS STRONG DESIRE U.S. PRESTIGE SHOULD NOT THUS SUFFER. HE STRESSED GREAT IMPORTANCE BE ASCRIBED TO HIS OWN ATTACHMENT TO U.S. AND TO SECRETARY.

NOW FOR HIS OTHER FEARS. IN COPENHAGEN TALKING TO BRENTANO, SECRETARY HAD REFERRED ONLY TO NUCLEAR WEAPON AND ROCKET DISARMAMENT BUT AMBASSADOR BURGESS IN RECENT STATEMENTS HAS INCLUDED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH PLEASES CHANCELLOR. ALSO AT COPENHAGEN SECRETARY HAD INSISTED ON REUNIFICATION BEING ONE OF CHIEF TOPICS FOR SUMMIT DISCUSSION, BUT YESTERDAY BLANKENHORN INFORMED HIM U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD NOW DROPPED THIS POINT. WITHIN TWO WEEKS RAPID AND BASIC CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AS SO ILLUSTRATED MAKE HIM UNEASY OVER STEADINESS OF U.S. POLICY. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS HE HAD SAID COPENHAGEN POSITION OF SECRETARY WAS THE CORRECT ONE, NAMELY THAT CONTROLLED GENERAL DISARMAMENT IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN GERMAN REUNIFICATION THOUGH THE LATTER MUST ALSO BE INSISTED UPON. HOWEVER, BY CONTINUING TO STRESS REUNIFICATION IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIETS VIOLATING 1955 GENEVA COMPACT U.S. IS CREATING UNNECESSARILY BAD ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND MACMILLAN AGREES ON THIS.

IN REGARD TO ABOVE WHICH IS ALMOST LITERAL TRANSCRIPT OF CHANCELLOR'S SOMEWHAT RAMBLING OBSERVATIONS, I FELT OBLIGED TO INTERVENE AT VARIOUS POINTS, AS HAS PROVED NECESSARY ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, TO TRY TO CORRECT SOME OF HIS ERRONEOUS IMPRESSIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, I SAID NOBODY IN U.S. GOVT HAD DEVIATED FROM COPENHAGEN

CONCLUSIONS

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CONCLUSIONS WHICH HE HAD APPROVED, AND ASKED WHETHER BLANKENHORN HAD CITED ANY AUTHORITY FOR HIS STATEMENT ABOUT OUR ALLEGED CHANGES ON REUNIFICATION. HE SAID HE HAD NOT. I SUGGESTED HE EXAMINE FURTHER INTO THIS SINCE I CONSIDERED OUR POLICY HAD BEEN CONSTANT AND CONSISTENT. WE HAD ALWAYS INSISTED ON ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS; DID THE CHANCELLOR NOW BELIEVE THEM UNNECESSARY? HIS ANSWER WAS IN NEGATIVE, BUT WE WERE BEING TOO INSISTENT ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE LAST TIME I HAD SEEN HIM HE HAD EMPHASIZED (AS HE HAS DONE IN SPEECHES) HIS DESIRE TO HAVE THAT TOPIC INCLUDED UNDER HEADING OF "RELAXATION OF TENSIONS". HE AGREED HE HAD DONE SO, AND STILL FAVORED IT, BUT KNEW THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT DISCUSS IT. HE WANDERED OFF ABOUT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN LEWIS STRAUSS AND THE DEPARTMENT ON CESSATION OF TESTS. I TOLD HIM I HAD READ OF SUCH ALLEGED DIFFERENCES IN NEWSPAPERS, AND CONSIDERED ON SUCH A CRITICAL SUBJECT THERE COULD BE VARYING VIEWS AS THERE WERE AMONGST SCIENTISTS, BUT ONCE OUR GOVERNMENTAL POSITION WAS ESTABLISHED AND OUR ALLIES INFORMED AND CONSULTED THERE WOULD BE A FULLY SUPPORTED NATIONAL BASIS FOR DEALING WITH SOVIETS ON THIS ASPECT OF DISARMAMENT.

THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL MORE OF THE SAME WHICH EXPOSED SOME OF HIS INCONSISTENCIES UNTIL HE GOT OFF ON THE SUBJECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST, THE TURKISH FINANCIAL SITUATION (DID I KNOW WHETHER THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER WAS DISLIKED IN OEEC), AND HIS SUPPOSITION THAT THE FRENCH ARMY UNITS IN FRANCE WOULD BE LOYAL TO PFLIMLIN.

IN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THIS AND MY TWO PRECEDING CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM (EMBTTEL TO DEPT 3410 MAY 15, AND EMBTEL TO COPENHAGEN 65 MAY 6) AND HIS LONG MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY DELIVERED IN BERLIN, ONE MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO CONCLUDE WE WILL HAVE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CHANCELLOR. I AM INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THIS. HE IS VERY CHANGEABLE, IMPRESSIONABLE AND SENSITIVE, ESPECIALLY TO NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND GOSSIP, REGARDLESS OF THE LACK OF VERACITY. HOWEVER, HIS SUSPICIOUSNESS AND IMPULSIVENESS WILL FROM TIME TO TIME CAUSE US REAL TROUBLE, AND NECESSITATE SOOTHING MESSAGES, AS WELL AS MUCH PATIENT LISTENING.

1. I FEEL HE IS RELYING LESS AND LESS ON CONSULTATION WITH HIS FONMIN AND ASSOCIATES REGARDING FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHICH WILL MAKE

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WILL MAKE HIM MORE UNPREDICTABLE.

2. MENTALLY, HE APPEARS VERY ALERT BUT IS RATHER REPETITIVE AND DIFFUSE.

IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, I BELIEVE HE WILL ALWAYS SUPPORT OUR MAJOR EUROPEAN POLICIES, CERTAINLY AS DEFINED UP TO PRESENT. AS ALWAYS, HE SEEMS IN EXCELLENT PHYSICAL HEALTH AND IN FINE SPIRITS, EVEN WHILE EXPRESSING HIS APPREHENSIONS.

BRUCE

DEM/23

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SENT DEPARTMENT 42, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 6, PARIS 8, BONN 5

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FRENCH AMBASSADOR GAVE ME FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF REYNAUD'S CONVERSATION WITH KHRUSHCHEV ON JUNE 28 AND MIKOYAN ON JULY 2 WITH REQUEST THAT THIS INFORMATION BE CLOSELY HELD AS HE HAD NOT EVEN INFORMED WASHINGTON AND LONDON EMBASSIES.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO WORK OUT AN ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COEXISTENCE WITH WEST BUT HE THOUGHT MR. DULLES BELIEVED US COULD WIN THE COLD WAR AND WAS THEREFORE NOT INTERESTED. HE REFERRED TO MCELROY'S REMARKS ON THE POSSIBLE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN LEBANON AND SAID HE SHOULD REALIZE THAT IF AN ATOMIC BOMB DROPPED ON ONE PLACE SUCH BOMBS COULD ALSO DROP ELSEWHERE. HE SAID THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN WHICH THE WORLD COULD BE DESTROYED BY THE MERE PUSHING OF A BUTTON COULD NOT BE CONTINUED.

REYNAUD EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO BRING ABOUT DISARMAMENT. EACH SIDE HAD THE POSSIBILITY OF DESTROYING THE OTHER. IT APPEARED POSSIBLE FOR ONE SIDE TO HIDE ENOUGH BOMBS TO DESTROY THE OTHER AND IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER SIDE COULD RELY SIMPLY ON THE WORD OF THE OTHER. IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO SETTLE POLITICAL PROBLEMS INCLUDING THOSE OF EASTERN EUROPE. HE DESCRIBED THE GREAT POSITION ACHIEVED BY LENIN IN BRINGING ABOUT THE REVOLUTION AND OF STALIN BY WINNING THE WAR AND SAID THE WORLD EXPECTED GREAT THINGS OF KHRUSHCHEV. HE SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT BY LIBERALIZING

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SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ARRIVING AT A SITUATION AKIN TO THAT OF FINLAND.

KHRUSHCHEV SAID THAT IF POLAND AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE WERE SOVIET SATELLITES THEN BRITAIN AND FRANCE WERE SATELLITES OF THE US. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION WOULD USE ALL NECESSARY FORCE TO DEFEND THEM AGAINST EITHER ATTACK OR SUBVERSION.

WHEN REYNAUD RAISED THE QUESTION OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION KHRUSHCHEV SAID HE COULD NOT BE CONVINCED THAT EITHER FRENCH OR BRITISH WANTED IT. HE SAID IN ANY EVENT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT WITH ANYONE.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE NEAR EAST KHRUSHCHEV SAID THEIR POLICY WAS ONE OF NON-INTERFERENCE. SOVIET UNION HAD ENOUGH OIL OF ITS OWN AND WEST SHOULD OBTAIN ITS SUPPLIES ON A COMMERCIAL BASIS. HE SUGGESTED THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF LEBANON WOULD BE FOR CHAMOUN TO TAKE A BOAT TO THE US. KHRUSHCHEV AGREED WITH REYNAUD THAT NEAR EAST WAS AN AREA IN WHICH WAR BY ACCIDENT WAS POSSIBLE.

KHRUSHCHEV EXPRESSED HIS SYMPATHY FOR FRANCE AND HIS HIGH REGARD FOR GENERAL DE GAULLE WHOM HE HAD MET ON A PREVIOUS VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH MIKOYAN LATTER EXPRESSED PESSIMISM ON SUMMIT CONFERENCE SAYING MR. DULLES DID NOT WANT IT AND BRITISH AND FRENCH WERE FOLLOWING HIS LEAD. PROOF OF THIS WAS THE PROPOSAL TO DISCUSS EASTERN EUROPE AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION AT SUMMIT CONFERENCE. HE SAID ADENAUER HAD MADE CLEAR TO HIM HE DID NOT WANT QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION TO BE AN OBSTACLE TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE. NEVERTHELESS THE AMERICANS WERE INSISTING UPON IT. HE CHARGED THAT FRANCE DID NOT HAVE ANY POSITION OF ITS OWN ON SUMMIT CONFERENCE MATTERS. HE SAID HE HAD URGED ADENAUER TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AS THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS TO GERMANY'S DISADVANTAGE.

ON AGENDA OF SUMMIT CONFERENCE REYNAUD POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET PUBLICATION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE MADE IT VIRTUALLY

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SECRET

-3- 42, JULY 5, 2 PM FROM MOSCOW

IMPOSSIBLE FOR WEST TO WITHDRAW QUESTIONS THEY HAD PROPOSED. REYNAUD PUT FORWARD THE PERSONAL SUGGESTION THAT SOME OF THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS MIGHT BE ELIMINATED FROM THE AGENDA WITH THE RIGHT RESERVED TO RAISE THEM AT SUMMIT MEETING. MIKOYAN AT FIRST TOOK A NEGATIVE VIEW OF THIS PROPOSAL BUT LATER IN THE CONVERSATION SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT AND PERHAPS LET REYNAUD KNOW THE SOVIET REACTION. HE URGED REYNAUD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MR. DULLES' TRIP TO PARIS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE.

THOMPSON

DT

SECRET FILE

SECRET

9/12/59

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By ROD NARS, Date 2/8/88

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3

A P E N D I X

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO (USCINCEUR AIR CONTINGENCY PLAN BERLIN)

next doc in file - approved by JCS 12 Sept 1958

1. Page 2, subparagraph 1 d (3). Change as follows: 1

"(3) In ~~combat~~ operations ~~short-of-general-war~~ envisaged 2
by this plan, U.S. forces ~~are-likely-to~~ may be solely 3
involved. ~~It-is-not-expected-that~~ U.K. and/or French forces 4
~~will~~ may not initially participate in operations . . ." 5

2. Page 2, subparagraph 1 d (4). Change as follows: 6

"(4) Should USAFE forces become overtly engaged with USSR 7
and/or GDR air forces, forces listed in Annex B are avail- 8
able for the conduct of ~~combat~~ operations ~~short-of-general~~ 9
war in support of this plan. However, only limited U.S. 10
military force (air) of sufficient magnitude to determine 11
definitely Soviet and/or GDR intention would probably be 12
employed." 13

3. Page 2, subparagraph 1 d. Add subparagraph (5) and 14
renumber subsequent paragraphs. 15

"(5) Large scale overt engagements between USAFE forces 16
and USSR and/or GDR air forces would probably lead to 17
general war." 18

REASON: The above changes are recommended in order to be con- 19
sistent with the mission and concept of operations of the plan. 20
The mission restricts USCINCEUR to a determination of Soviet 21
intentions and, if necessary, application of limited U.S. 22
military force (air) to maintain unrestricted U.S. air access 23
to Berlin. The assumption in subparagraph 1 d (4) implies 24
that the entire USEUCOM may be utilized in overt combat opera- 25
tions short of general war against forces of the USSR. This is 26
not in accordance with U.S. strategic concepts. 27

~~TOP SECRET~~

0-3 CF (1958) CCS 381 (8-20-49) 8-10-40

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By DOD Doc 5200.1
NARS, Date 2/8/88

of the...
1958...
the...
...
...

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BY:
DATE 4 Apr 1979

SM-663-58
12 SEP 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, EUROPEAN COMMAND

Subject: USCINCEUR Air Contingency Plan Berlin (U)

1. USCINCEUR Air Contingency Plan Berlin has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it is considered that the plan as written follows the guidance furnished and is adequate for the purpose intended. The plan is approved for planning subject to the following:

- a. Modification of the U.S. and Soviet objectives (paragraph 3, Annex "A") to conform with the mission and scope as reflected in your cover letter, dated 20 June 1958, paragraph 1, Annex "A" and paragraph 2, of the plan; and
- b. Revision of the force levels contained in Annex "B" to conform with the forces currently available to USCINCEUR.

2. The Appendix hereto, contains recommended changes in your assumptions (subparagraph 1 d, page 2 of the plan).

3. Recommendations on guidance requested by you in certain subject areas have been made to the Secretary of Defense for use in the development of the U.S. position. Pending action on these recommendations, this plan should not be implemented except by order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or higher authority.

DISTR:

- Chairman, JCS (2)
- DCSOPS
- Secy. to CNO (JCS)
- Director/Plans AF
- Marine Corps L/O
- Director J/S

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

(JCS 1907/156 - Approved 10 Sep 58)

H. L. HILLYARD,
Colonel, USA,
Secretary.

Enclosure

Arthur - 2-3/20

3 of 3
Pages each
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381 (8-20-45) ...
311 (5-20-43) ...

9-12-58

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By DoD DA-5200-1
RVD NARS, Date 2/8/88

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 SEP 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: USCINCEUR Air Contingency Plan Berlin (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum forwarded to you together with a copy of a memorandum to USCINCEUR, subject "Guidance Concerning Air Access to Berlin", dated 7 May 1958.

2. In response to guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff USCINCEUR submitted a U.S. Air Contingency Plan Berlin which has been reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, USCINCEUR has requested additional guidance in the following areas:

a. Recommendations for supplemental planning and implementation of subject plan including plan implementation date.

b. Latitude afforded commanders to effect immediate and aggressive protective and countermeasures, including if necessary and feasible HOT PURSUIT, in view of the proviso contained in subparagraph 4 (a), page 2, NSC 5604, dated 23 April 1956.

c. Degree and order of magnitude of U.S. limited military force (air) action authorized to counter Soviet and/or German Democratic Republic (GDR) restrictions on U.S. Air access to Berlin.

3. In view of the implications concerning U.S. national security involved in the implementation of USCINCEUR's Air Contingency Plan, it is considered that the guidance to be provided USCINCEUR should be a final U.S. position.

381 (8-20-43) 5.40

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DATE 4 Apr 1979

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Handwritten signature and date: 9-12-58

2 10-28-58

to Berlin. The assumption in subparagraph...
that the entire USEUCOM may be utilized in overt combat opera- 25
tions short of general war against forces of the USSR. This is 26

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By DOD 2/5/88
NARS, Date 2/8/88

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

13 FEB 1978

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. In developing the final U.S. position, it is recommended that the Department of State be consulted. The following considerations and recommendations concerning implementing guidance are furnished:

a. Implementation of the testing of intentions phase of USCINCEUR's Air Contingency Plan will be made at an appropriate date which is advantageous to the United States in achieving its cold war objectives. An early date is recommended due to the recent advent of the C-130 aircraft into the European theater and the fact that any delay in the initiation of the proposed flights above 10,000 feet would only tend to weaken our position.

b. Based upon the introduction of turboprop type aircraft (C-130) into USAFE, the USSR, through the Berlin Air Safety Center, will be notified of contemplated flights into the Berlin corridors in excess of altitudes normally flown by propeller type aircraft. This notification will be made with sufficient advanced warning to provide the Soviets/GDR an opportunity to revise their communications and air control procedures. The exact date of the initial flight would not be given, but they will be notified that after a specified date it is the intention of the United States to conduct flights within the Berlin air corridors as set forth above. However, the initial flights will be conducted under Visual Flight Rules. After initial visual flights, instrument flights above 10,000 feet will be initiated.

c. NSC 5604 provides appropriate policy guidance on U.S. actions in the event of unprovoked Communist attack against U.S. aircraft. The proviso contained in subparagraph 4 (a) of NSC 5604 is based on a situation in which a definite pattern of continued interference with or attacks on U.S. aircraft is encountered in areas outside Communist control. USCINCEUR should be governed by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the policy outlined in NSC 5604 until Soviet or GDR intentions have been disclosed and a pattern of substantial interference has been established.

JCS 1907/151

JCS 1907/153

DA IN 1388

JCS 1907/155

~~TOP SECRET~~

to Berlin. The assumption in subparagraph...
entire USEUCOM may be utilized in overt combat opera-

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 By DOD Di. Sec. 1
RVD NARS, Date 2/8/88

INFORMATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
 CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO COMBAT AIR
 IN OPERATIONAL AIR CORRIDORS

~~TOP SECRET~~

d. The degree and order of magnitude of U.S. military air action in this situation is dependent upon the reaction of the Soviets and/or the German Democratic Republic. If the USSR and/or the GDR were to establish a complete air blockade of the Berlin Air Corridors, full use of their jet fighters, anti-aircraft weapons, and electronic countermeasures might be required. Hostile acts of the magnitude required to establish a complete air blockade will indicate that general war is probably imminent and the action to be taken by USCINCEUR under such circumstances will be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. USCINCEUR should be delegated the authority to determine the air effort appropriate to cope with possible contingencies other than a complete air blockade of the Berlin air corridors.

f. Supplemental planning should cover anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) firing by the Soviet or GDR on allied aircraft from positions above ground located within or outside the corridor. It is considered that the HOT PURSUIT policy contained in NSC 5604 should be extended to include retaliatory action by combat aircraft against the AAA units concerned.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that they be informed of the final U.S. position at an early date.

DISTR:

- Chairman, JCS (2)
- DCSOPS
- Secy. to CNO (JCS)
- Director/Plans AF
- Admiral Tsiel

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(JCS 1907/156 - Approved 10 Sep 58)

N. F. TWining,
 Chairman,
 Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy to USCINCEUR

~~TOP SECRET~~

to Berlin. The assumption in subparagraph...
 that the entire USEUCOM may be utilized in overt combat opera- 25
 short of general war against forces of the USSR. This is

115/53

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 By DOT DA 5200.1
KVD NARS, Date 2/8/88

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 PRIORITY

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FROM: CGUSCOB BERLIN GERMANY
 TO: DA WASH DC, CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY
 INFO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE, USAMBASSADOR BONN GERMANY

NR: 150035Z

DECLASSIFIED BY: NOV 58
 DA PASS TO DEFENSE AND STATE JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

Ref nr: Unnr

DATE: 5 April 1979

[Handwritten signature]

1. Three US military vehicles and three US military personnel were detained at 1400 hours at Babelsberg (Berlin) checkpoint. Two were covered trucks and one a jeep with covered trailer. Berlin command not notified of detention until approx 1600 hours. Soviets demanded right of inspection, and not receiving it, refused to permit vehicles to proceed to Helmstedt or return to Berlin. Latter course of action unprecedented. Efforts were made to release these vehicles by visit of Provost Marshal officer to checkpoint demanding that they be released. Answer by Soviet officer (a new Lt Col) at checkpoint was that they will remain "until hell freezes over", insisting trucks must be inspected. Lt Col said he would not have to look himself but his Lt must at least peep under covers.

2. Strong protest was sent to Karlshorst and received by Soviets at 1925 (reported Bonn and Heidelberg). Provost Marshall officer returned to Soviet checkpoint with strong verbal protest and was told that neither vehicles nor personnel would be released. Mr Findley Burns, political advisor, and acting Asst Chief of Mission, Berlin was dispatched to Karlshorst to inform Soviet political advisor that we view this situation intolerable and demand that vehicles be released immediately. It is obvious this was a planned incident to check our reaction. Mr Trimble, who is in Berlin, and Mr Burns agreed with US Commander, Berlin that it would be a serious blow to US prestige particularly at this time if personnel and vehicles were permitted to remain in Soviet custody. Lt Soviet

381 (8-20-43) sec 4A

11-5-58
 usm

DA IN 169899

(15 NOV 58)

SCU FORM 35-3
 6 JUN 58


REPLACES OCS FORM 378-5, 1 AUG 51 WHICH MAY BE USED

[Handwritten] 2-359

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87



STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

NR: 151230Z

PAGE 2

answer to Burns was non-committal or in negative plan of US Commander, Berlin was to go in and extricate personnel and vehicles with armed military forces.

3. This plan was transmitted to CINCUSAREUR for approval and forces sufficient to accomplish mission were alerted in position and ready to move. While message to CINCUSAREUR was being transmitted, word was received by US Commander Berlin that trucks and personnel had been released by the Soviets.

4. At conclusion of Burns protest, he was notified that order to release trucks had been given shortly before. MP officer returning to checkpoint at this time, with food for drivers, told by Soviet Lt Col that he could take vehicles back to Berlin.

5. Additional pertinent information:

A. Soviets in Karlshorst were on apparent alert and keeping up with this situation minute by minute.

B. Babelsberg checkpoint is approximately 1 mile inside Soviet Zone of Germany.

C. There is no record of Soviets holding personnel at initial point of entry and not permitting them to return to point of origin.

6. This message regraded UNCLASSIFIED 14 November 1961.

ACTION: DCSOP

INFO: OCS, OSA, TAG, CLL, CI, ACS I, ACS I (STATE)

DA IN 169899

(15 Nov 58)

der/11

116158


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By RVD NARS, Date 2/8/88

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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FROM: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE
TO: SEC DEF WASH DC
DATE: 5 April 79

INFO: CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY, CGUSCOB BERLIN GERMANY,
USAMBASSADOR BONN GERMANY, USNMR PARIS FRANCE

NR: EC 9-6071 152348Z NOV 58

TO: MCELROY AND TWINING FROM NORSTAD.

Refs: A. USCOB 150035Z dated 15 Nov 1958,
B. SX 7679, dtd 15 Nov 58.
C. SX 7691, dtd 15 Nov 58. (Quoted herein)

This msg in 2 parts.

Part 1: Ref C received from Hodes at 151804Z Nov 1958 reads as follows:

1. Refs: A. USCOB T00 150035Z Nov 58.
B. SX 7679.
2. In view of the strong protest today ref B and the necessity for allowing for reaction time, we have deferred sending this operational convoy back today. However, unless we are willing to accept a voluntary blockade, accede to inspection or undergo a period of detention with unacceptable political and military consequences, the Soviet intentions must be tested. When tested, if detention occurs, we should be prepared to recover our men and equipment by force.
3. This headquarters intends to direct US Commandant Berlin to dispatch a normal convoy Berlin-Helmstadt in the near future, timing and complement to be determined by USCOB. Request authority for USCOB to extricate US military personnel and equipment by the minimum force necessary if Soviets detain and prompt protest does not effect early release.
4. For your information, Burns (USCOB POLAD) informed by Major Shilov (Soviet counterpart) last night at the time

ACTION

J-3

INFO

CJCS

Dir JS

Secy JCS

Dep Secy

J-1

J-2

J-3

J-4

J-5

J-6

AD

JES

JWR

JSSC

M/C File

DA IN 169995 1

(16 NOV 58)

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

38 036

DCS FORM 1 Aug 51

375-4

REPLACES DCS FORM 375-4 1 MAR 51 WHICH MAY BE USED

KA W2-359

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By DOD DA 5200.1
NARS, Date 2/8/88

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STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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NR: EC 9-6071

PAGE 2

of informing Burns of release of vehicles to return to Berlin, that detention due to failure to comply with procedures. Soviet right of inspection established by Commander in Chief Soviet Forces and Soviet will continue exercise right of inspection. Major Shilov stated only difficulties with US authorities; no difficulties this respect between British, French and Soviet.

USAREUR comment: This latter statement is incorrect since it is tripartitely agreed that inspection of vehicles will not be permitted."

Part II. I concur with para 3, ref C, that we must react within 4 or 5 days of the 14 Nov incident. Unless otherwise directed by you I propose to inform Hodes at 181200Z Nov that I wish him to proceed to carry out para 3, ref C quoted above.

NOTE: 7679 is DA IN 169888 (15 Nov 58) DCSOP
150035Z is DA IN 169899 (15 Nov 58) DCSOP
OTHER REF NOT IDENTIFIED.

ACTION: OSD

INFO: CJCS

IN 169995

(16 Nov 58)

hlw/2

14-558

REPLACES GCS FORM 30, MAR 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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By RVD NARS, Date 2/8/88

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

SM-918-58
19 November 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Twining
General Taylor
Admiral Burke
General White
General Pate

Subject: Berlin Situation

Enclosure: Draft Message

Attached hereto is a clean version of the message on this subject which you approved for clearance with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State prior to dispatch.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 5 April 79


H. L. Hillyard
H. L. HILLYARD,
Brig. General, USA,
Secretary.

- Distr:
- Adm. Dennison (3)
- Gen. Moore (3)
- Gen. Gerhart (3)
- Gen. Roberts (3)
- DCSOPS (3)
- Secy to CNO (JCS) (4)
- Dir/Plans, AF (3)
- Mar Corps L/O (2)
- Dir J/S (3)
- Dir J3 (3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS eF 1458 / cc 5781 (8-20-49) ser 41

211cc



ENCLOSURE to memo, 19 Nov 58 42

DRAFT

*JCS approved for clearance
w Secdef & Secstate*

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

FROM: JCS
TO : USCINCEUR
INFO: CINCUSAREUR, HEIDELBERG GERMANY
USCOB BERLIN, GERMANY
USNMR PARIS, FRANCE

FROM JCS. NOFORN

References: a. JCS 951106 dtd 17 Nov 58
b. JCS 951105 dtd 17 Nov 58
c. EC 9-6071 dtd 15 Nov 58
d. EC 9-6124 dtd 18 Nov 58

1. The resumption of normal military motor convoys between West Berlin and Western Germany is authorized. The use of covered versus uncovered vehicles will be determined by ordinary considerations of comfort of personnel and protection of cargo. If the Soviet authorities hold up a convoy or individual vehicles for unauthorized inspection or for any other unacceptable pretext, the convoy or vehicles will return to the starting point. They will disregard Soviet orders to remain at the inspection point unless the Soviet authorities use force to detain them. It is important to establish the fact that any detention of men and equipment is by force. For this contingency, a carefully instructed officer should accompany all convoys which may be subject to challenge.

2. If in spite of these efforts the U.S. military personnel and equipment are detained, the action of the Soviets will be promptly protested on the spot and preparations made to extricate the men and equipment by minimum military force. If these protests do not effect release of U.S. military personnel and equipment within a reasonable time, you are authorized to employ the minimum force required to extricate men and equipment.

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By DoD Du. 5200.1
NARS, Date 2/8/88

11/21/58

MESSAGE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY RECORD SECRET STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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(INFO ADDEES PRIORITY)

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

JCS WASH DC FRANK R BUEGET LT COL
USA ASSISTANT SECRETARY

DATE 5 April 79

- ACTION
- INFO
- CJCS 2
- Dir JS 1
- Secy JCS 1
- Dep Secy 2
- J-1
- J-2 2
- J-3 2
- J-4 2
- J-5 2
- J-6
- JMAAD 1
- JNSC/JCS 1
- JWE 1
- JSSC 1
- M/C File 2

INFO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY, CGUSCOB BERLIN GERMANY, USNMR PARIS FRANCE

NR: JCS 951312 21 NOV 58

NOFORN

FROM JCS

Ref COB 133, 20 Nov 58.

Mo 47/w/Refs

1. Statements of Khrushchev and Gromyko to effect that all Soviet control functions in Berlin and East Germany are shortly to be turned over to GDR pose immediate problem which we must face in that GDR probably will not feel bound by any existing quadripartite agreements. Political implications this situation now being considered on governmental level.

2. US Ambassador Bonn has set forth instructions governing guidance to be furnished US civilians (including dependents) who are traveling from West Germany to Berlin through check points manned by Soviets and East Germans and indicate intention to amend these instructions should East Germans completely replace Soviets at check points. It is noted that CG USAREUR is issuing similar instructions to US autobahn check point officials and to US train commanders.

3. With reference to situation presented in para 1, above, your views and recommendations are requested on:
a. The following courses of action open to us:
(1) Ignore the East German control personnel and crash the barrier.
(2) Turn back if stopped.
(3) Accept the East German control personnel as agents of the Soviets.

JCS 951312

(Nov 58)

OCS FORM 375-4 1 AUG. 51 REPLACES OCS FORM 375-4, 1 MAR 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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381 (8-20-58) Jan 59

381 (3-20-58) Jan 59

11-21-58
Wam

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By DoD Du. Sec 1
RVD NARS, Date 2/8/88

123158

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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MASTER FILE

FROM: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE

~~TO:~~ JCS WASH DC, CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY, CINCUSAFE
WIESBADEN GERMANY

J-3

- ~~INFO~~
- ~~NR:~~
- ~~JCS~~
- ~~DE J3~~
- ~~JCS~~
- ~~DE J3~~
- ~~JMAAD~~
- ~~NCS/JCS~~
- ~~JVE~~
- ~~J3~~

NR: EC 9-6265

FOR TWINING FROM NORSTAD

231252Z NOV 58

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

DATE: 5 April 79

References:

- A. JCS 951312 dtd 26 Nov 58
- B. Bonn-AmConGen Bremen 26 dtd 18 Nov 58
- C. COB 141 dtd 22 Nov 58
- D. EC 9-6071 dtd 16 Nov 58
- E. Berlin-Bonn 268 dtd 11 Nov 58
- F. Paris-State 1911 dtd 21 Nov 58

1. In reference A you request my views and comments with reference to the prospect that Soviets will shortly turn over to GDR all Soviet control functions in Berlin and East Germany and that GDR will not feel bound by any existing quadripartite agreements. The problems stated of course are far broader than that of access to Berlin.

2. In my view it is essential to inform the Soviet immediately and preferably without public announcement that we do not intend to recognize or deal with GDR; that we will not allow the GDR to impede the exercise of any right we presently hold; that we will not accept any control by the GDR over our movements to and from Berlin; and that we will use force if necessary to enforce our rights.

3. But at the same time, we should try to seize the initiative while we have the chance and broaden the base of allied support by proposing a four-power conference on Germany (I repeat on Germany not solely on Berlin). See message to State, reference F.

4. Obviously it is of the highest importance that France and Britain take the same unequivocal line. A major break between allies on this subject could lead to worse disaster than the loss of Berlin itself.

5. Unless we are willing to begin a humiliating process of yielding step by step to the GDR, we must draw the line now

DA IN 171903

(23 NOV 58)

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AUG. 51

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375-4, 1 MAR 51, WHICH
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381 (8-20-95) Jan 41
351 (8-20-95) Jan 41
11-23-58

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 By DoD 2/5/88
RUD NARS, Date 2/8/88

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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NR: EC 9-6265

PAGE 2

and the Russians must understand we will use force to support this position if necessary. As for the tactics to be employed regarding access to Berlin: First, I suggest that the instructions which Embassy Bonn issued to cover individual travel to Berlin by Autobahn (reference B), and their instructions covering train travel (reference C) be applied on the broadest basis possible; second, we should continue to operate US military convoys as in the past so long as the checkpoints are under Soviet control, to the extent of even one Soviet representative being present on whom the responsibility can be placed. While we must maintain our rights, we should not now seek to force a test of Soviet control, in light of the larger problem which is developing. Third, if the checkpoints have been turned over completely to GDR control, we should choose a time and place to force the issue promptly by dispatching a test convoy supported by appropriate force. [It is not a question of the US forces in Berlin being able to defeat any force that could be brought against it, but of forcing into the open the fact that the GDR, backed by the Soviet, is using violence to deprive the US of its established rights.]

6. If an attempt is made to replace Soviet personnel with GDR personnel in BASC, the East Germans will be asked to leave and if need be, escorted out; and flight information on western aircraft continue to be made available (reference E). The problems which may be anticipated incident to continued air travel between West Berlin and Germany include refusal of civil aircraft to enter into Berlin, with possible manning by US military crews, interference with radar and navigational aid, saturation of corridors by GDR and Soviet aircraft, attempts to force aircraft to land and even interference with aircraft in flights.

7. The more I study this question the more I become convinced that we must take a very firm position in support of our rights and obligations in Berlin, and that this position be made known to the Russians. We may hope, as we do, that a show of determination may ease the situation but we cannot expect it to solve the problem. Therefore, we must balance our over-all position, we must make an effort to gain the initiative by more fundamental, longer range action as well. With all its apparent pitfalls and dangers, the idea of conference as suggested in reference F gains weight as we consider the consequences, the strengths and weaknesses of other

331 (8-20-45) Sec 47

DA IN 171903

(23 NOV 58)

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By DoD Du-5200.1
By RWD NARS, Date 2/8/88

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

SECRET

NR: EC 9-6265

PAGE 3

courses of action. Finally, whatever we decide to do must be done quickly if it is to have any chance of success.

NOTE: COB 141 is DA IN 171685 (22 NOV 58) DCSOP
26 is DA IN 170599 (19 NOV 58) STATE; (ARMY DCSOP)
EC 9-6071 is DA IN 169995 (16 NOV 58) OSD
1191 Received from STATE via SDLO; on file DCSOP
Other references not identified

ACTION: JCS

INFO: CSA, CSAF, CNO, CMC

DA IN 171903 (23 NOV 58)

jgd/4

381 (8-20-43) Jan 5/4

FORM 375-4 REPLACES OCS FORM 375-4, 1 MAR 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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OCS FORM 375-4 REPLACES OCS FORM 375-4, 1 MAR 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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NND 822900
By RS/VH DATE Date 2-11-88

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Department of State

NOV 26 PM 6 02

11948

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET
Classification

VERBATIM TEXT

SENT TO: CIRCULAR

Origin
Info
Dist. Desired
(Offices Only)
XR 7405
71615611
XR 7615612
100

1) Considerable attention has been paid in US press in last few days to question of QTE arming the German Federal Republic with nuclear weapons UNQTE. In view of fact subject may be raised with you by officials of governments to which you accredited, this message designed provide you with essential general background for ~~background~~ use in confidential discussions.

(see text of Communique)

2) As NATO Foreign Ministers noted at their meeting in Bonn in May 1957/ Soviets have consistently opposed modernization of defense forces of NATO countries. Soviet objectives are to secure for Soviet Union monopoly in nuclear weapons on European continent and/or exclusion of nuclear weapons from central Europe. Exclusion of nuclear weapons from central Europe would leave this area threatened by superior Soviet conventional forces as well as by Soviet missiles with nuclear warheads which could still be launched from Soviet territory. It has been and continues to be position of NATO countries that availability of most modern weapons of defense is of fundamental importance in deterring any attack on member countries and is necessary to meet such an ~~attack~~ attack should it occur. In a recent statement in the

S/S CR

North

NOV 26 1958 P.M.

Drafted by: WJL
EUR:RA:WJLehmann:GFS:BELT:immons:zb

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Livingston T. Merchant

- GER - Mr. Vigderman
- P - Mr. Kretzmann
- EE - Mr. Eliot
- S/AE - Mr. Courtney

- Defense - Col. Billingslea
- Defense - Miss Leigh (substance)

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Classification

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762A.5611/11-2658

WJL 7615612

NND 822900
BY RS/VH DATE 2-11-88

Page 2 of telegram to CIRCULAR TO ALL NATO POSTS, RPTD INFO GENEVA, MOSCOW

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North Atlantic Council, German PermRep stated in part as follows: QTE. A renunciation by the Federal Republic of the equipment of the forces with the most modern weapons would considerably weaken the NATO shield and would frustrate the strategic concept based on it. The resulting threat to the security of the Federal Republic and NATO as a whole would be further reinforced by the withdrawal of allied forces from the Federal Republic which might make it impossible for the US forces to remain in Western Europe since the territory west of the Federal Republic would not possess sufficient depth UNQTE.

3) Need to achieve most modern pattern of NATO military defensive strength taking into account most recent developments in weapons and techniques was reiterated by NATO Heads of Governments at their meeting in Paris in December 1957 (see paragraphs 18 through 20 of Communique).

4) Real cause of tension in Europe is continued Soviet effort to impose its system on Soviet zone of Germany and on Eastern Europe and to deny peoples of these areas right to choose their own form of government. Manifestations of this tension are continued existence of unsettled political issues in Central Europe since end World War II including continued artificial division of Germany now lasting 13 years. Real causes of tension are therefore responsibility of Soviets and can under no RPT no circumstances be ascribed to determination NATO countries provide modern defense pattern for their forces.

5) As may be necessary and desirable you should make clear ~~there is a distinction~~ between delivery ~~of~~ ~~systems~~ ~~(such~~ ~~as~~ ~~Honest~~ ~~Joans~~ ~~Corporals~~ ~~Matadors~~ ~~etc)~~ and ~~the nuclear~~

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MLA 211/112/5-X

NND 822900
BY RS/VH MARK Date 2-11-88

Page 3 of telegram to CIRCULAR TO ALL NATO POSTS, RPTD INFO GENEVA, MOSCOW

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that may not
/the nuclear warheads themselves. / ~~transfer~~ according to U.S. law. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ may not be transferred to custody of other nations.
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

SEND TO THE FOLLOWING POSTS:

- Amembassies ANKARA (POUCH)
- ATHENS (POUCH)
- BERN (POUCH)
- BONN
- BRUSSELS (POUCH)
- COPENHAGEN
- LISBON (POUCH)
- LONDON
- LUXEMBOURG (POUCH)
- MADRID (POUCH)
- OSLO
- OTTAWA
- PARIS (FOR EMBASSY AND USRO)
- REYKJAVIK (POUCH)
- ROME
- STOCKHOLM (POUCH)
- THE HAGUE (POUCH)
- VIENNA (POUCH)

Dulles
LJ

7B4

RPTD INFO: AmConGen GENEVA (PASS NUSUP AND EMSAS)
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy WARSAW

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Classification

MA-0111.42950

14156

DECLASSIFIED
DOD Du. 5200.1
By RVD NARS Date 2/8/88

8 - DEC 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Berlin Situation (U)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 4 APR 1979

JCS CF 1958/CCS 881 (3-20-43) 872

381 (8-20-43) Du 88

1. Reference is made to your memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject as above, dated 5 December 1958, and to the proposed memorandum for the Secretary of State enclosed therewith.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that your proposed memorandum to the Secretary of State coincides with their views on the situation in Berlin and agree that you should inform the Secretary of State along the lines of your proposed draft.

3. The last sentence of paragraph 2 of your proposed memorandum to the Secretary of State does not appear accurate in view of a State Department message from Bonn, dated 21 November 1958, which indicates that tripartite air contingency planning is proceeding. Accordingly, it is suggested that this sentence be amended as follows:

"It is understood that Unilateral-U.S. contingency planning on the maintenance of access to Berlin through the air corridors and for air supply of military garrisons in Berlin is currently in progress in Europe. and we will advise you when we are in a position to discuss this subject on a tripartite basis."

Distr:

- Chairman, JCS (2)
- DCSOPS
- Secy to CNO (JCS)
- Dir/Plans, AF
- MarCorps L/O

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

N. F. TWining,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(JCS 1907/160 - Approved 8 Dec 58)

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72W 1218-58

12-8-58

12/17/58

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By DoD Di. 5200.1
RVD NARS, Date 2/8/88

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



THE JOINT STAFF

J-5 (PLANS AND POLICY) DIRECTORATE

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

J-5 M 99-58
17 December 1958

DATE 4 April 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject: State-Defense-JCS Ad Hoc Working Group
Report on Possible Courses of Action on
Berlin (U)

- References:
- a. J.C.S. 1907/157
 - b. J.C.S. 1907/160
 - c. Joint State-Defense Message, State to Bonn No. 1236, dated 11 December 1958

1. On 28 November 1958, the subject report* was referred to the J-5 for comment and recommendation. In view of the actions described below it is considered that a requirement for comment and recommendation on the subject report has been overtaken by events.

2. On 24 November 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by their action on reference a:

a. Noted position papers concerning the implications** involved should it become necessary to use military force to maintain allied rights and position in Berlin, and the implications*** of a Berlin airlift in support of allied military forces in Berlin, and authorized their use as Joint Staff position papers in the State-Defense-JCS Ad Hoc Working Group.

b. Agreed to forward a memorandum,**** together with its appendix, to the Secretary of Defense which recommended, among other things, that British and French agreement be sought to inform the USSR that we do not intend to recognize or deal with the GDR; that we will

- * Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/158
- ** Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1907/157
- *** Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 1907/157
- **** Enclosure "C" to J.C.S. 1907/157

~~TOP SECRET~~

SLA 1459

JCS CE (1958) CCS 381 (3-20-58) 802 42

381 (8-20-58) 42

10-17-58

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RVD NARS, Date 2/8/88

not allow the GDR to impede the exercise of our rights; that we will not accept any control by the GDR over our movements to and from Berlin; and that we will use force if necessary to enforce our rights. It was also recommended that British and French accord be secured to seize the initiative by proposing a four-power conference on Germany.

3. On 8 December 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by their decision* on reference b. forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense which noted that a proposed memorandum** by the Secretary of Defense for the Secretary of State coincided with their views and agreed that the Secretary of Defense should inform the Secretary of State along the lines of the proposed memorandum.

4. Accordingly, on 9 December 1958, in a memorandum for the Secretary of State the Acting Secretary of Defense stated that the State-Defense Ad Hoc Working Group Report*** had been reviewed by the Department of Defense in light of the Soviet note of 27 November 1958, and expressed**** the Department of Defense views that action should be taken without delay in the following respects:

a. Revision of tripartite contingency plans to eliminate all dealings with GDR officials.

b. U.S. official personnel traveling to and from Berlin should be instructed not to accept control of their movements by East German personnel.

c. Presidential approval should be obtained which will authorize action to test GDR and Soviet intentions by dispatching a convoy supported by appropriate force if checkpoints are turned over to the GDR.

d. Informing the Soviet Government; with British, French and West German agreement; that the Western Allies do not intend to deal with the GDR; will not allow the GDR to impede the exercise of rights; will not accept any GDR control over movements to and from

* Decision on J.C.S. 1907/160 A

** Appendix to Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/159

*** Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/158

**** N/H of J.C.S. 1907/160, dated 11 December 1958

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By DoD Div. 5200.1
RVD NARS, Date 2/8/88

Berlin; and will use force if necessary to enforce our rights.

The memorandum also expressed the view that an airlift should be undertaken as a last resort and the hope that the United States can seize the initiative early in the present situation.

5. On 11 December 1958, a message (reference c.), cleared at the NSC Meeting on 11 December 1958, was dispatched to the American Embassy in Bonn which delineated an approved U.S. course of action in consonance with the foregoing views and the recommendations contained in the subject report.*

6. In light of the foregoing it is concluded that there is no longer a requirement for comment and recommendation on the subject report.*

7. I recommend that the requirement directed in J.C.S. 1907/158, dated 28 November 1958, be withdrawn, and that the subject report* be circulated for information. J-3 concurs.

Douglas V. Johnson
DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON
Major General, USA
Director, J-5

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/158

~~TOP SECRET~~