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January 3, 1956

MEMORANDUM

ANALYSIS OF "COMMUNITY CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS"

I. What Is the Nature of the Problem?

1. To assess the proposal it is first necessary to define more specifically the problem to which it is addressed. As the proposal states, the sentiment against use of nuclear weapons is growing and will continue to grow. This trend involves three potential risks for the U.S.:

- a. that these attitudes may divide the U.S. from its Allies and uncommitted areas;
- b. that they may impair the deterrent value of atomic weapons; and,
- c. that they may inhibit the necessary use of these weapons under appropriate conditions.

2. Thus the proposal should be judged according to the following criteria:

- a. Will it help to maintain the cohesion between the U.S. and its Allies and of the free world?
- b. Will it bolster or impair the deterrent?
- c. Will it provide more or less flexibility

DECLASSIFIED in the necessary use of nuclear weapons?

3. In

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.5 (S)  
State letter 9/15/85  
NLE DATE 10/30/85

Activity MK 85-4327  
JHO  
NLE Date 10/30/85

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3. In applying these criteria it is necessary to consider the implications of the proposal if applied in several different areas:

- a. defense of NATO;
- b. defense in the Far East;
- c. defense in Southeast Asia;
- d. effect in other areas.

4.



## II. Implications of Application to NATO Europe.

### 1. Cohesion within NATO.

In general this proposal should tend to increase cohesion within NATO though it would create some


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offsetting factors. The NATO reliance on nuclear strategy has already created some problems of public opinion in Europe. This tendency is likely to increase as the horror of atomic war becomes more wide-spread and more deeply ingrained. The fact that the U.S. alone has the atomic weapons in quantity and control over their use seems likely to enhance neutralist trends resulting from a sense of exposure and helplessness between the two giants.

 In all these respects, therefore, it would tend to reinforce the cohesion and unity of NATO and to improve the prospects for its continuing vitality.

Three factors might, however, offset somewhat these benefits.

(1) The first arises from the presence of U.S.


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
forces in Europe, armed with atomic weapons.




Hence however settled, this problem might inject an element of discord into NATO.



(2) Second,



(3) Finally,




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
2. Effect on deterrent.

The net effect on the deterrent is extremely hard to estimate. The nuclear deterrent probably remains effective as long as the Soviets are uncertain as to whether aggression would be met by nuclear retaliation. The Soviets are not likely to be tempted if they think aggression entails material risks of their own country and its resources. Insofar as the proposal served to maintain or strengthen the unity and cohesion of NATO, it would enhance the deterrent. But insofar as it led to public dispute about the use of the weapons, it might encourage the Soviets in thinking that they could blackmail Europe with the threat of atomic war.



3. Effect on actual use.



As far as concerns Europe this is probably the least important aspect.




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Thus under the present strategy the issue actually is largely academic. Hence, the proposals would probably not affect the actual decision if the Europeans were prepared to fight at all.



### III. Implications

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
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III. Implications of Application to Far East.

1. Effect on cohesion.

The exposed nations here are Korea, Taiwan and conceivably Japan. Basically there is no real cohesion among these nations or between them and the other members of the Western Pacific group except the U.S. That is why our security treaties there are bilateral, except for ANZUS. The Koreans would surely object to the other nations having a voice in the reaction under the U.S.-Korean Treaty. The Chinats would take the same view under their treaty, as would the Japanese. Thus, as applied to these areas the proposal might well be rejected and would have a divisive effect on U.S. relations with the countries concerned.



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(b) It would also tend to sharpen the distinction between our allies and the uncommitted areas. This effect would be especially marked in the Middle East and South Asia.

This damage would be especially serious at a time when the USSR is seeking to blur distinction between the bloc and the neutrals.

The USSR might well take advantage of this reaction by calling a conference of its own on the use of atomic weapons and inviting the neutrals to attend. The purpose of such a meeting might be to make pronouncements in favor of limiting the use of nuclear weapons, such as an undertaking not to be the first to use them or for a unrestricted ban on their use. Such action would further tend to solidify the sense of common interest between the uncommitted areas and the Soviets.

(c) In the uncommitted States a meeting of the 40-some allies of the U.S. might well be viewed as an attempt

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V. Effects in Other Areas

1. Latin America

This issue does not seem to be a major one in this area. In giving the OAS further functions, the proposal might increase its importance and sense of unity within the hemisphere. The questions of deterrence and use seem rather academic here.

2. Baghdad Pact

The application to the Baghdad Pact raises the broader question of U.S. adherence to that security treaty.

This raises a whole range of problems not directly relevant to the other aspects of this analysis.

3. Effect of Omissions

As set forth the proposal would exclude nations not allied with us from the procedure. This would have three effects which might be damaging:

(a) In the case of countries like

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLICY PLANNING STAFF

January 4, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Sharing of Control  
of Atomic Weapons

In the attached memorandum, I have attempted to analyze in some detail the costs and benefits of the proposal [REDACTED] This analysis has led me to certain tentative conclusions:

1. General

(a) In seeking to combat growing hostility to the use of nuclear weapons, the proposal does not seem to me to strike at the root of this hostility. Its concept is to obtain "moral sanction" for the use of these weapons by making them a "community" asset.

This approach might be adequate if the hostility flowed from a "bad conscience" about such use against an aggressor. Sharing control of such use might then convince our allies that these weapons would be used only for defense and only as necessary. It would remove



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concern

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.2 (a)(5)  
State Letter 9/5/85  
NLE DATE 10/20/85

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By SLK NLE Date 10/30/85

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concern about unilateral U.S. resort to such weapons for improper purposes.

But this approach does not go to the heart of the growing hostility. That attitude is based mainly on the fear of survival if such weapons are used and the belief that such use will destroy the social order of all concerned. Our allies were not troubled by such concerns when we had the monopoly or were dominant in atomic weapons. Now, with the Soviet capability, some seriously wonder whether the game is worth the candle if this method of defense may entail annihilation. The issue does not really arise if an aggressor initiates the use of atomic weapons. The concern becomes acute, as the Soviets shrewdly estimate, if the defenders must be the first to use such weapons.

(b) An effort to obtain a moral sanction for such use does not seem to meet this central concern. That concern can be met only by measures which appear to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war.

For these reasons the proposal seems to me to have some unintended effects.

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(c) In view of the disastrous character of a general nuclear war, it seems essential to stress the deterrent value of these weapons rather than their use. The deterrent will probably be effective as long as the chance of use is kept open. But by focusing on the control of their use, the proposal may well provoke divisive debate on this issue. By posing the issue too sharply in advance it may thus impair the deterrent.

2. Effect on Cohesion

(a) The major value of the proposal would lie in dramatizing the concept of collective security.

(b) In NATO and SEATO, the procedure might contribute to greater sense of unity, unless it provoked a damaging debate on use.



3. Effect

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3. Effect on Deterrence

The net effect would, I think, be to impair the deterrent in varying degrees. The Soviets would probably feel that the weapons were less likely to be used than heretofore. In Europe, the deterrent would probably not be so impaired as to tempt the Soviets to military action. In the Far East, however, where aggression may be more of a risk, the effect might be enough to swing the balance for aggression in some areas.

The fact that the U.S. felt impelled to take such a move might be construed by the Soviets as a sign of the success of their propaganda to ban the bomb.

Hence, the Soviets would step up their campaign to create such opposition..


4. Effect on Use

The effect of the proposal on the ability of the U.S. actually to use the weapons, if necessary, seems on the whole to be the least important issue.

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5. Conclusions and Recommendations

(a) The proposal would have net benefits only in NATO and SEATO and there only if it did not provoke debate on the issue of use. Such an approach would probably not attain the primary purpose of the proposal, namely, to achieve a moral sanction for the use of atomic weapons. Accordingly, it is doubtful whether the risks and costs of putting it forward are justified by the possible benefits.

(b) To meet the primary concern about atomic weapons it will be necessary to direct our efforts to measures designed to protect against war and the necessity for resorting to atomic weapons.

(c) Consequently, a sound disarmament position demonstrating a real desire to bring these and other

armaments


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armaments under effective control must be a central feature of our position. In this connection, I seriously question the implication in the initial analysis of your memorandum that the free world could not defend itself if nuclear weapons were removed from the armaments of both sides.

(d) To deter local aggression, we must develop and maintain mobile forces capable of effective action with or without atomic weapons. Only in this way can we avoid putting to exposed countries and to our other allies the hard choice of using these weapons or not resisting at all.



Robert R. Bowie



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I.

Current trends with respect to nuclear weapons, unless counteracted, could become seriously unfavorable to the United States in the following respects:

1. The United States may be physically endangered.

The Soviet Union is developing a capacity to devastate the United States by sudden attack. The Soviet destructive power, in terms of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles may, in a few years, become so great that it could, at a single stroke, virtually obliterate our industrial power and the Soviets might calculate that it could simultaneously gravely impair our capacity to retaliate. Under these circumstances, our retaliatory capacity, even if far greater than estimated by the Soviets, would lose much of its deterrent influence. Thus, the United States might become endangered as never before.

Once this should become known as a real probability, that fact will unfavorably influence the relative power positions of the

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER PAPERS, 1952-59

SUBJECT SERIES

Box 4  
Paper on Nuclear Weapon  
1756(1)

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-1- Authority MR 82-128 #2  
By bc NLE Date 5/12/82

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United States and the Soviet Union. That is true even though we possess, at the moment of the attack, destructive power far greater than that of the Soviet Union. For it would be generally assumed that the use of our nuclear power is so restricted by constitutional and democratic processes and moral restraints that we would never be able to use it first; and conditions could be such that only the first use would have great significance.



2. Our world strategy may be brought into question.

In the event of major war, our present military strategy largely assumes that our allies on the Eurasian continent will hold the forward positions in sufficient strength to cause serious delay to an invader, while permitting nuclear attacks to be mounted by our Strategic Air Command against vital military, industrial and communications targets of the enemy.

Also, the United States is increasingly incorporating atomic weapons into its service for tactical use.

While the full use of United States power would of course be invoked

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in reply to a clear attack on the United States, repugnance to the use of nuclear weapons could grow to a point which would depreciate our value as an ally, undermine confidence in our "collective defense" concepts, and make questionable the reliability of our allies and the availability to SAC of our foreign bases.

3. Our moral leadership is challenged.

There is throughout the world a growing, and not unreasonable, fear that nuclear weapons are expanding at such a pace as to endanger human life on this planet, or at least vast segments of that life. The peoples of the world cry out for statesmanship that will find a way to assure that this new force shall serve humanity, not destroy it. They look above all to the United States to find that way, having an inherited faith in our spiritual power, our intellectual resourcefulness and our traditional dedication to peace. There is also a widespread feeling that President Eisenhower is uniquely qualified for leadership in this way.

The President's "Atoms for Peace" proposal evoked a great and

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favorable response because it seemed to mark the beginning of an effort to put fissionable material into a common fund, a "World Bank", where it would be available for good uses, but sterilized against evil uses.

The President's "open skies" proposal also won worldwide support because it seemed to prepare the way for disarmament which would include nuclear disarmament.

But both of these proposals have now largely lost their popular influence. It is realized that the "World Bank", if it is finally created at all, will not solve the problem of nuclear weapons, and that the United States has no broad plan for nuclear disarmament even if our "open skies" and other inspection proposals were accepted.

These circumstances create a "vacuum" into which the Soviet moves with its proposals to "ban the bomb", or to ban its use or to end the further testing of thermonuclear weapons.

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Intellectuals realize that these proposals are oversimplifications and contain fallacies and might trap the free nations into a dangerous imbalance of power. But the great masses feel that at least the Russians want to end the thermonuclear danger while we are represented as stalling and trying to think up good reasons for perpetuating the danger and making it even greater.

Thus, ironically, our moral leadership in the world could be stolen from us by those whose creed denies moral principles.

This development could have a profound, adverse consequence upon the outcome of the "cold war".

## II.

We face the triple danger above outlined because of certain basic facts.

1. Soviet promises are utterly undependable.

The Soviet-Chinese Communist world is ruled by men who, by their



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own admission, have no moral principles and who, if they once gained superior material power, would use it ruthlessly. It would be criminal to disarm the United States in reliance on mere promises by those who break promises whenever it serves their ends. But the world's masses are not aware, at least sufficiently, of this fact.



2. There are no dependable controls for totally eliminating atomic weapons.

Science knows no way to search out, find, or control and supervise fissionable material so as to assure that weapons quality material may not be secreted in sufficient quantities to give the possessor a decisive degree of military mastery over the world if these secreted quantities constituted a virtual monopoly. This lack of accountability applies to past, and perhaps to future, stocks of fissionable material.

3. There is no international organization which can be dependably entrusted with the task of enforcing peace and deterring war.

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The Security Council of the United Nations is given by the Charter "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", but the Security Council is crippled by the "veto power". This would, for example, enable the Soviet Union to prevent any Security Council action against aggression by it or its satellites. This same "veto power" has prevented the carrying out of Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter, which are designed "to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security".

4. Only atomic weapons provide the United States with the needed worldwide power at bearable cost. A centralized pool of manpower now about 900,000,000 controlled by the Soviet Chinese Communist bloc, coupled with the now well developed industrial power of the Soviet Union,

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constitutes a threat to the Eurasian peninsular and outlying positions which could with difficulty be countered by ground forces and conventional weapons, unless these also were brought under close control. The cost of attempting this type of defense would be very great in terms of the burden thrown upon the free economies if adequate ground forces are to be maintained in being. An exception is Western Europe, with its dense population, industrial power and military traditions. However, this Western European military potential probably cannot be achieved until there is a greater political integration in Western Europe than presently exists.

### III.

Under the conditions above outlined, there are inherent and almost insuperable difficulties in the way of meeting the problem through a technical disarmament program. It is highly probable that the Soviet Union will not admit of such thoroughgoing inspection as we would deem

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necessary for any substantial disarmament on our part. That probability

becomes a virtual certainty so long as we are not able to state

categorically in advance that if there were such an inspection, we would,

in fact, agree to a drastic treatment of the problem of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, while we should not relax intensive efforts to find acceptable

measures of disarmament, we should, I think, recognize that we are not

likely to find in disarmament measures alone an adequate reversal of the

current trends with respect to nuclear weapons, which, as pointed out in

Section I, unless counteracted, could become seriously unfavorable to the

United States. I suggest that the principal field for counteraction lies now

in the political field rather than in the technical field of disarmament. I

believe that only by a major and sustained initiative in the political field can

we find the way to an ultimate solution of the armament problem, and in

between them when they depend upon "inspection" and the proposal as top of page 11.

and stop a major move  
Another thought. Although inspection cannot be perfect, when we say it is not perfect, we are not giving as a basis for outlawing bond, and we are giving



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the interval give such respectability to the potential use of atomic weapons as is necessary to sustain the basic worldwide interests of the United States and the free nations generally.

Through a political offensive, the United States can establish leadership in developing an adequate program. Progress will doubtless have to be made by stages. However, the stakes are too great to allow, or seem to allow, admitted obstacles to preclude moving toward such international controls of nuclear power as will provide the human race with insurance against its self-destruction.

#### IV.

There are certain basic premises upon which any political program should be based:

1. Nuclear power which now approaches the power of annihilation should not be the weapons tool of individual nations. Since use for weapons

purposes by some nations cannot be wholly excluded by any disarmament program, a possession sufficient to be preponderant should, in principle, be accorded the United Nations as representative of the world community, and made to serve the interests of world order by becoming an impartial and effective deterrent to the international crime of armed aggression. This "preponderance" would be based on the assumption that inspection would be sufficiently effective to reduce greatly the magnitude of the risk of national action through the most rigorous possible verification of the use of fissionable material and control and elimination of such means of delivery as long range bombers, ballistic launching sites, and so forth.

2. There is what Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations calls the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense \*\*\* until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". This right cannot, and should not, be surrendered until the world community effectively provides genuine security.

3. In the period preceding effective action by the world community, the use of atomic weapons for individual or collective self-defense should nevertheless, to the greatest degree practical, take into account the concern of humanity with respect to a power which could annihilate.

#### V.

There are two sets of national groupings which have a natural concern




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with this problem

There are (a) the collective security organizations created pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter. Approximately 50 free-world nations are associated with arrangements under Article 51, and they depend to a large extent, for their security, upon the possible use of atomic weapons for their defense.

There are (b) the 76 nations which are members of the United Nations. All of them participate in the General Assembly, where the veto does not apply. The General Assembly under Article 11(1) is authorized to consider "the principles governing disarming and the regulations of armaments and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both".



The General Assembly has already taken cognizance of the dangerous situation resulting from the subjection of the Security Council to veto

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power. In 1950, with only the 5 negative votes of the Soviet bloc, the General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled "Uniting for Peace" which permitted the General Assembly to be convened in emergency session on 24 hours' notice if the Security Council failed, by reason of veto, to act itself to secure the peace. The Resolution furthermore called upon all member nations to maintain elements of armed forces available for service on behalf of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. Provision was also made for a Peace Observation Commission which could draw on a panel of field observers to patrol areas of potential danger and identify an armed aggressor.

The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution has never been implemented, but it and the collective security organizations of the free nations provide foundations upon which a further political advance can be made in



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building a structure for peace and control of nuclear weapons.

VI.

It is suggested that the United States, speaking through the President, should outline the following political program, supplementary to any technical "disarmament" program which we are then in a position to sponsor. This political program would contain the following features:

1. An ultimate goal.

The making of the United Nations into an effective agency to preserve peace. This would require amending the Charter so as to provide, among other things:

(a) An "international law" to be embodied in the Charter of the United Nations that armed attack on the part of one nation against another was an offense against the law of nations to be punished;

(b) A Security Council, or comparable security organ, free of veto as far as concerned the taking

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of action against armed aggression;

(c) Such membership of the Security Council as would make it dependable, and possessed of the will to act against an armed aggressor, whoever it might be;

(d) The prohibition to individual nations of atomic weapons, or of conventional weapons in excess of those to be determined under a limitation of armament program which would take account of the fact that primary and effective power to provide security of the nations was possessed by the Security Council.

(e) Control by the Security Council of sufficient atomic weapons, and means of delivery, as to overbalance any atomic or other weapons as might be surreptitiously retained by any nation.

2. An immediate interim measure.

Pending the taking of the steps indicated above, solemn recognition

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by the nations possessing nuclear capabilities that these weapons should serve only the interests of world order and would accordingly be kept available for use in accordance with any recommendations by the General Assembly pursuant to the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, and not used contrary to any recommendation of the General Assembly. (This would take a two-thirds vote) Any use, whether pursuant to or in the absence of General Assembly recommendations, would be in conformity with the basic principle that such weapons should be used, and only used, against a nation which committed armed aggression and then only to a degree bearing some reasonable relationship to the offense.

3. A further interim measure.

Agreement by the collective security groupings formed under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to establish regional councils to study and plan the means whereby nuclear weapons could most

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effectively be used to deter armed attack and to preserve peace in each region.

There already is a NATO group for Western Europe and the Mediterranean, and it has agreed that its military planning should assume that nuclear weapons would be used for collective defense. There might be established a group for the Americas, drawn from the Organization of American States, plus Canada; a Western Pacific group, representative of ANZUS, the Philippines, Japan, Korea and Formosa; a Southeast Asia group, representative of SEATO; a Middle East group, representative of the Baghdad Pact.



VII.

By taking a vigorous and sustained initiative along the foregoing lines, the United States could meet the Soviet propaganda line of "ban

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the bomb" by a constructive political program, supplementing such limitation of armament program as might now be judged feasible.

The Soviet Union may vigorously oppose the idea of vesting nuclear weapons in a vetoless Security Council. If so, it, and not we, will be in the negative position.



In the meantime, the United States, without giving up the right to use nuclear weapons for its own security purposes, will be doing all that it can to convert nuclear weapons into such service of the community as will give defensive use of those weapons a moral acceptability. The United States will be getting itself off the present vulnerable position where it has virtually the sole responsibility in the free world with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, and as to the scope of their use, a responsibility which is not governed by any clearly enunciated principles reflecting "decent respect to the opinions of mankind".

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The United States would then cease to be widely regarded as a principal obstacle to the carrying through of a program designed to protect humanity against destruction through nuclear weapons. Rather, we would be regarded as a leader in the struggle for durable peace and human safety.

The program, and its followup, would enable President Eisenhower to put his tremendous worldwide influence into bringing about a significant and concrete development of world order. This could, and I think would, mark a turning point in history.



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Current threat with respect to existing weapons, unless counteracted,

and the threat to the United States in the following respects:

1. Our Air Force is being seriously endangered.

The Soviet Union is developing a capacity to devastate the United States in a single stroke. The Soviet destructive power, in terms of nuclear weapons

intercontinental missiles may, in a few years, become so great that it

could, at a single stroke, virtually obliterate our industrial power and the

might calculate that it could simultaneously gravely impair our capacity

retaliate. Under these circumstances, our retaliatory capacity, even if far

greater than estimated by the Soviets, would lose much of its deterrent influence.

Thus, the United States might become endangered as never before.

Once this should become known as a real probability, that

it will unfavorably influence the relative power positions of the

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ENIES

Nuclear Weapons

DECLASSIFIED

-1- Authority MR 82-128 #2  
By h NLE Date 5/12/82

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That is, the power to devastate, at the moment of the attack, destructive power far greater than that of the Soviet

Union. [For it would be generally assumed that the use of our nuclear power]

is restricted by constitutional and democratic principles and moral restraints

that we would never be able to use it first; and conditions could be such that

only the first use would have great significance.

2. Our world strategy may be brought into question.

In the event of major war, our present military strategy largely assumes

that our allies on the Eurasian continent will hold the forward positions in

sufficient strength to cause serious delay to an invader, while permitting

nuclear attacks to be mounted by our Strategic Air Command against vital

military, industrial and communications targets of the enemy.

Also, the United States is increasingly incorporating atomic weapons into its service for tactical use.

While the full use of United States power would of course be invoked

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Massigli R / 96

Ambassade de France  
aux Etats-Unis

Washington, le 2 Février 1956.

( Cher Ambassadeur, )

Une communication officielle a rendu compte de mon entretien du 27 janvier avec le Secrétaire d'Etat au sujet de l'Euratom. Mais sur un point j'ai été dans ce compte rendu fort discret, tellement discret que vos services m'ont demandé des précisions: il s'agit des fabrications atomiques à des fins militaires. En réalité M. Dulles s'est expliqué à ce sujet plus longuement que je ne l'ai rapporté, et si je me suis contenté d'une allusion dans mon compte rendu officiel, c'est que les télégrammes sont très largement utilisés par le service de presse, et qu'il m'a semblé, dans une matière aussi délicate, qu'il fallait avant tout éviter des indiscretions, génératrices éventuellement de polémiques.

Les explications de M. Dulles ont commencé sur une remarque incidente de ma part que la question de l'interdiction des fabrications à des fins militaires serait sans doute une des questions importantes à régler, et qu'elle pourrait soulever des difficultés.

Le Secrétaire d'Etat a aussitôt répondu que puisque les Etats-Unis étaient fort en avance et fabriquaient à bon compte les armes atomiques, il n'avait jamais compris pourquoi les pays alliés dépenseraient de l'argent et consentiraient de grands efforts pour de telles fabrications. Le seul problème à ses yeux était le secret imposé par la loi américaine et l'interdiction des livraisons aux pays alliés. Il s'employait de son côté à faire modifier cette législation, et en avait parlé la veille même au Président. Il rencontrait de très fortes résistances, et le Congrès n'était certainement pas encore convaincu. Mais avec de la persévérance on y arriverait, et la création de l'Euratom elle-même fournirait une bonne raison. Si les pays membres venaient demander aux Etats-Unis de les aider, le Secrétaire d'Etat était convaincu que l'on parviendrait

Bon Excellence  
Monsieur René Massigli  
Ambassadeur de France



à obtenir les autorisations nécessaires. Il faudrait que le Gouvernement américain puisse approvisionner les armées de ses alliés européens en armes atomiques, peu importe qu'il y ait des livraisons immédiates ou constitution de stocks en Europe dont on disposerait le moment venu.

Ces propos montrent l'importance que le Secrétaire d'Etat attache à ces projets de coopération atomique européenne.

Ils ont aussi un autre intérêt : celui de soulever un problème essentiel, qui ne semble pas encore avoir été traité, ou du moins dont l'opinion publique n'est sans doute pas encore consciente. L'interdiction de fabrications des armes atomiques, envisagée dans le cadre de l'Euratom entraîne-t-elle, ou non, l'interdiction de détention et d'usage ?

Dans l'esprit des Américains, il ne devrait s'agir que d'une interdiction de fabrication. Ils y sont très favorables pour toutes sortes de raisons. Mais ils n'envisagent pas l'interdiction de détention et d'usage. Ils considèrent - M. Dulles a mentionné ce point dans notre conversation - que les armes atomiques se généraliseront de plus en plus jusqu'à devenir les armes normales. Et ce n'est pas par hasard que leurs militaires sont d'ores et déjà préoccupés du fait que les forces de l'OTAN - en dehors des forces américaines - ne disposent que des armes classiques, notamment dans le domaine tactique.

Ce problème en soulève immédiatement un autre : quid de l'Allemagne ? Je ne sais si vous vous souvenez de la question qui s'est posée, au moment de la ratification des Accords de Paris, de savoir si les dits accords interdisaient aux Allemands la détention des armes atomiques. Les textes de ce point sont pour le moins ambigus. Mais en tout cas du côté américain, comme d'ailleurs du côté anglais, on considère qu'il n'y a pas interdiction. Je ne suis pas certain qu'en France en général on soit conscient de ce problème ; ou si on l'est, on le tranche par la négative.

Vous voyez en tout cas que l'appui qui nous est offert spontanément et très sincèrement j'en suis sûr - par les Américains pose un certain nombre de questions qui sont importantes.

Votre dévoué  
C. G. W.

2/10/56 NSA 2/9/56  
TOP SECRET

February 10, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Conference of Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President  
8:30, 10 February 1956

(The President, Admiral Radford, General Twining, General Taylor, Admiral Burke, General Pate, Colonel Goodpaster)

The President opened the meeting saying that he welcomed the opportunity to bring the Chiefs together as a group, and re-emphasized to them the great importance of their work as a corporate body. The respective Services are staffed and organized adequately to handle their internal problems with relatively limited supervision from the Chief of Staff. A commander of a large force in the field, after establishing his organization, devotes most of his time and attention to contacts with outside agencies -- he fights for the supplies and the support that he needs, he argues for communications and landing craft, he advises and recommends as to operations and strategic questions which must be fitted into an over-all pattern. In short, the top man must form the union between his command and the people at home. There is an exception to this, of course, whenever trouble occurs, since he must then devote his attention to clearing it up.

In his judgment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff form the union between the military establishment and our country as a whole, its public, its government, etc. One of <sup>their</sup> ~~our~~ great tasks is the development of doctrine -- military doctrine in its over-all terms, its entirety, not in minute details of tactics and operational procedures. The doctrine to which he referred is for example the great decisions which increase or decrease the chance of war, which affect our basic relationships with other countries, which establish the best means of preserving peace. This doctrine deals with how best to unite military with psychological and other factors to the best interest of our country. This is where the Joint Chiefs are of greatest value to him. For convenience, Admiral Radford meets with him alone, but it should be fully understood that anyone of the Chiefs may meet with him at any time if he wishes it. Their task is therefore to hammer out a corporate idea -- they should put forward the over-all idea, but then work it down, or see that it is worked down, to doctrine and program.

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The President said that he involves himself in the selection of a Chief of Staff only to find valid thinking as to where we are going in over-all security terms, how we should solve our over-all problems, as distinguished from problems of internal management. In the latter, the Secretary of Defense must take principal interest.

He referred to the recent report of the George Committee. He said it left him with one over-all question -- how would we fight a war after the amount of devastation shown in that report, or even a small fraction of that amount, had occurred? What would we wish to do in those circumstances? He said we must have great decentralization of emergency operations. If the topechelon were eliminated, the next officials to take over must be identified. We must make the best plans we can, even though it is beyond our power to comprehend the situation fully. He said he wants to shove some of the problems of this kind on to the shoulders of the Joint Chiefs, and obtain their help. Referring to Operation Alert, he said he had declared martial law because of the amount of devastation estimated in the exercise -- and it was but a fraction of what might occur. If martial law were placed in effect in these conditions there would be great problems of meeting a situation of chaos and disorder, and the procedures should be very clearly in our minds. One of the questions the situation raises is that great armies, etc. in the field could be maintained only because of our great industrial system. If it is devastated, we are faced with an entirely different situation.



The President next said suppose neither side uses these weapons of tremendous destruction. Then the United States as such would not be in immediate danger, and we could build up much as in the past, expanding our power gradually. However, since we would never start a war, there was no question in his mind but that, if we were attacked, we would never hesitate to use these weapons against the attacker. He said this type of war is a war no one wins; we just "don't want to lose any worse than we have to."

Considerations of this kind are in the President's view what the JCS should be thinking about. They should not spend a lot of their time on their internal services. He suggested that they see if they cannot make their overseas trips at the same time, so that they have most of their time here in Washington together. He then went on to refer to a mistake of a previous President, who called on the Chiefs of Staff to speak out policy views in opposition to announced Administration policy.

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He thought this should never be done, and thought that the Chiefs should make every effort to avoid headline seeking in matters of this kind. He doesn't consider them as advocates of the Army, the Navy, etc. when they advise the President. They have this particular Service background, but they think and act as a body.

Reverting to our security problem today, the President said we want to have in hand what is needed to avert disaster, then we should develop what would be needed for further operations. He referred to his often-stated idea that we need social scientists to consider the question "what will people stand." Some refer to the bombed, almost obliterated cities in Germany. However, even at the close of the war these cities were producing in parts more than they had produced at any other time. The knocked-out transportation system prevented them from assembling these parts into what was needed. He said he has thought about the problem a great deal, and returns over and over to the question "what will people stand."

The Chiefs can do their great job in keeping the Government headed down the right line -- what in a military way is best for preserving peace, what is the best posture we can show to the world. He next referred to peripheral war, and said that he was not going to commit small packets of troops all around the periphery. That is why we have withdrawn as much force as we can from Korea. In NATO, as elsewhere, we should regard ourselves as the central keep behind the forward forces. We stand behind our allies to support them. In local wars, where the attack is clear, he felt sure that we would use tactical atomic weapons against local aggression. There might, however, be situations where political effects might be overriding and preclude such use, at least at the outset.

Admiral Radford thanked the President for his comments and said he had wanted an outline of the President's feelings in these matters, since there are great pressures on the individual Chiefs and Services -- even worse in peacetime than in war. The President said he very well recalled that officers in the Service would frequently disagree with the Chief of Staff, or press him in behalf of Service interests. The Chief of Staff will of course be sensitive to this, but must resist it.

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Admiral Radford said the Chiefs will soon be reviewing their long-range concept. He thought it would be well for them to go off for a week by themselves to think and talk about it. The President thought this was a splendid idea -- to get away from the conference table and staff people with, as he put it, their "buzz, buzz, buzz" in the ear of their principal. He said that if the Chiefs go to Broinquen, he might very well join them with his golf clubs and with his doctor for a week end. He thought they should provide the basic ground work and philosophy for the military program. Admiral Radford said staffs could then go ahead. The President said they should try to avoid trick words like "new look."

Admiral Radford said that about the 23rd, or soon after, the Chiefs would need an hour or an hour and a half with the President on the subject of the atomic stockpile -- of the types of weapons and how many of each type. Recent developments are tending to reduce flexibility, i. e., interchangeability of cores in various types of weapons, in favor of "optimized" weapons. The President said production is now so vast that it may be possible to have everything that is needed. Admiral Radford said that the numbers of weapons needed for anti-aircraft purposes would be very great, and must be very widely dispersed in anticipation of the first attack. After that attack it might be possible to redistribute, and even refabricate, some of the weapons.

Admiral Radford indicated he was thinking of the week of March 4-12 as a possible period for the Chiefs to go off for their study activity. The President repeated that he might take the week end to fly down, join them for some discussion and some golf, from Saturday noon to Monday morning. General Taylor, referring to the question of the atomic stockpile, thought that perhaps it should reflect the over-all concept of war developed in these discussions.

The President said that if we had confidence that neither side would use these weapons, then we would not be as alarmed as we are -- the problem would be the conventional one with which we are familiar. In case of a general war between the U. S. and the USSR, he was sure however that these weapons would be used. The argument is sometimes used that Hitler did not use his nerve gases developed in the latter part of the war. The reason, in his opinion, was that Hitler's air force was gone by this time, the Allied air force was in control, and could and would have used mustard gas on Germany.

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The President thought that the Soviet change toward economic warfare reflects fear of the atomic weapon. A dictatorship enjoys advantages in the use of resources for purposes such as this; they can choose the time and place, and they can act very quickly. Admiral Radford thought we should get some defections from their economic measures since there is nothing that alarms the Soviets so greatly as this. Referring to Soviet ability to act more quickly than we, he mentioned the reports of Soviet offers of wheat to Libya. The President thought that wheat was one item in which we ought to be able to outmatch the Soviets.

Discussing the balloon operation, the President said he had talked to Secretary Quarles in General Twining's absence a few days ago. Secretary Quarles thought the operation was useful, but not of vital importance in the results it was achieving. General Twining said that information is being acquired which will be very valuable for the future. He added that they have been stopped temporarily. The President said that if these balloons had been sent over us, we might be talking about mobilizing. When it was mentioned that Soviet balloons which may be similar have apparently been released (one having come down in Iran), the President thought it might be worthwhile to get one and hold a press conference on it if it had cameras, etc. similar to ours. His over-all feeling was that the balloons gave more legitimate grounds for irritation than could be matched by the good obtained from them.

General Taylor said it would be very useful to meet with the President and hear his philosophy. The President said the problem is rather to get the Chiefs to work out this philosophy, knowing generally how the President looks at the problem. They should be his mentors, working without too much regard for their particular uniform and without too much emphasis on a Service basis. He said he had heard arguments as to whether a future war might be a two-day or a two-year war. He thought that this type of argument was unsound. Real thinking about the problem would show that war would be of two phases, the first to avert disaster, the second to carry the fight to the enemy to a conclusion. It might well be that simply a stalemate, such as a thirty-years war or 100-years war might be the outcome. The Chiefs should bring to him the truths they discover and convince him as to their philosophy. There should be a composite approach made for the

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benefit of the President and the National Security Council. Their aims should be not so much a basic directive as a philosophy or broad doctrine to guide the development of programs.

A. J. Goodpaster  
Colonel, CE, U S Army



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February 28, 1956

2/27/56

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 277th Meeting  
of the National Security Council,  
Monday, February 27, 1956

At the 277th Council meeting the following were present: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Ralph Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; the Assistant to the President; Special Assistant to the President Anderson; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would like to comment at some little length on developments at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party which was concluding today at Moscow. The composition of the new Presidium (Politburo) had not yet been announced, but it seemed unlikely that there would be significant changes in the top personnel. 60% of the new Presidium consisted of members who had been re-elected; 40% were newly elected. Of the latter group, Khrushchev had obtained a large number of his own supporters. Mr. Dulles commented that it would be interesting to see whether Molotov would continue in the roster of the eleven full members of the Presidium. That he would was likely, although his position was weakening and he might disappear from power in a year's time.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 80-259 #9

BY LKS DATE 8/14/86

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (2)(1)(3)(4)(5)

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Mr. Anderson then went on with his briefing, and invited the Council's attention to paragraph 14, which dealt with the problem of U. S. military forces required to meet or to deter local Communist aggression. He pointed out that in the Planning Board's covering memorandum a recommendation had been made that the Department of Defense make a special presentation on the subject of our capabilities to deter or prevent such aggression in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in this recommendation.

When Mr. Anderson had finished reading paragraph 14, Secretary Robertson commented that the Defense Department felt very much about paragraph 14 as they had felt about paragraph 11, which seemed to be looking at peripheral and general war together.

The President said that he again found himself a little puzzled about the use and implication of the words "peripheral war". He reminded the Council that when his Administration had first come into office, back in January of 1953, our big complaint was the Korean war, which we were obliged to fight with handcuffs on. Under the circumstances, we could not win such a war, and that left us no option but to end the war. Then the President said that the point that he was trying to make was that in the future these peripheral wars must not be permitted to drag out. We must now plan to fight peripheral wars on the same basis as we would fight a general war.

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After all, there was no good reason for drawing distinctions between peripheral and general wars. Had we not made up our minds that if the Communists renewed their aggression against Korea we would go "all out" to meet it?

Secretary Humphrey said that this discussion again pointed to the necessity that the National Security Council reach a unanimous decision on what kind of a war the United States was going to be prepared to fight if it occurred. Mr. Allen Dulles said that in a kind of a way a peripheral war was now going on in Laos. The President said, however, that the kind of war we were talking about was one in which the United States was intervening. Secretary Dulles pointed out that by the terms of the SEATO treaty the United States was committed to protect the territorial integrity of Laos.

Mr. Anderson again pointed out the Planning Board recommendation that the Department of Defense should produce a full study and presentation of the problem of local aggression to the National Security Council. Admiral Radford commented that the Planning Board recommendation was all right with him, though he doubted that it would be very productive. Secretary Humphrey said with considerable warmth that it was simply not possible for the United States to fight just little wars. If we get into any war at all we must go in with the determination to clean the whole mess up. Admiral Radford added that at any rate we could not let such little wars drag on.

The President concluded the discussion by calling for agreement on the Planning Board's recommendation for a study and presentation to the Council of the local aggression problem.

Dr. Flemming asked if the Council would go back for a moment to paragraph 13. He believed that it would be useful to change the introductory phrase "As part of its military forces the United States must develop and maintain its effective nuclear retaliatory power, etc., etc." to "As a deterrent to war the United States must etc., etc.". The President agreed that Dr. Flemming's phraseology was an improvement.

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extend for 18 months. Admiral Radford was therefore at a loss to understand the apparent change in the German point of view.

Secretary Dulles replied that whatever had been said earlier to Admiral Radford, von Brentano had informed him no later than last Thursday that there was no chance of inducing the German Parliament to accept a period of 18 months' service for the German recruits. The issue had found the lines drawn on a strict party basis, and through the repeated concerned nant had said Admi healthy t

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od could never be got ent. Admiral Radford not seemed the least t that Ambassador Co-subject. Moreover, ned very well and

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event, Secretary Dulles believed that Stassen and the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems should now be asked to give the most urgent consideration to the nature of the U. S. response to the Soviet announcement. We must not be caught flat-footed when the Soviets made their move.

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Governor Stassen said that if the Secretary of State so desired, he would be glad to undertake consideration of this problem. Indeed, he had already talked to Under Secretary Hoover about the matter.

Apropos of the likelihood that the Soviets would announce a unilateral reduction of 1,000,000 men, the President commented that after all the Soviets would be doing nothing in the world, in making such a reduction, except to imitate what this Government had done earlier in connection with its formulation of the so-called "new look strategy". Agreeing with the President, Secretary Dulles further pointed out the heavy demands on manpower in the Soviet Union and the need of the Soviets to put more people into industry and especially into agriculture. This would certainly be a factor in inducing them to cut the level of their armed forces.

Secretary Wilson said he believed that such a Soviet unilateral cut would mark a definite change in the policy of the USSR, though the purpose behind the move was a different matter. In any event, of recent months the Soviets were trying to "mark down" their war talk. This was in the right direction, even though we did not clearly know the motives behind the change. It was certainly significant that the Soviets had not put on much of a military display at the recent May Day ceremonies. Secretary Dulles reminded the Council that there had been a fly-by of 20 Bisons in the preparation for the May Day celebration.

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After further discussion of this matter, the President counselled that we should do a lot of hard thinking on the meaning behind the anticipated Soviet move, and he indicated his agreement with the assignment of responsibility to Governor Stassen for preparation of a U. S. response to such a move. Governor Stassen should have the help of anyone he felt he needed to call upon for this task.

Thereafter, Secretary Dulles informed the Council of the widespread inclination among our NATO allies to downgrade in importance the role of the NATO ground forces because of their conviction that, at least in the initial phases of a future general war, the role of air atomic power would be crucial and ground forces would not have a very important part. On the basis of this reasoning they deduced that there was not much point in developing and maintaining large ground forces. This sentiment was strengthened by the fact that the Russians, while perhaps reducing the total level of their armed forces, were selectively strengthening these forces, particularly in terms of nuclear armament. Since our NATO allies do not have nuclear armament of their own, this fact contributed to the general feeling of discouragement. Finally, as a last discouraging note, Secretary Dulles commented on the current struggle to secure adequate German financial support for NATO forces based on West German territory.

Secretary Humphrey observed that these problems were the same that we have been facing for over a year's time, although they were now entering a more intense phase. We would be faced with a very serious problem if the Soviet Union really does undertake a unilateral reduction in the level of its armed forces.

Secretary Wilson referred to the difficulties he had experienced in recent days in defending the Defense Department programs before Congressional committees, which were critical of the adequacy of these programs. He complained that the American people and the members of Congress were engaged in comparing our present military position with the military position the Soviet Union would have in the year 1960. Of course, for security reasons we were in no position to reveal to the critics the nature of our program for a military build-up between now and 1960.

Apropos of further comment by Secretary Wilson on the effects of the recent Soviet economic offensive, particularly as it related to the underdeveloped nations, Secretary Dulles cited with some amusement the situation in Rangoon. The entire harbor of Rangoon and all the docks were choked with cement sent to Burma from the Soviet bloc and which the Burmese had not the slightest idea what to do with. Despite the amusing aspects of the matter, Secretary Dulles repeated his very serious concern about the Soviet tactics and the difficulty we were experiencing in competing with them.

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

at the 284th NSC meeting: The President of the United States; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in the action on Item 3); the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Anderson and Jackson; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

# 1. REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In his opening remarks, Secretary Dulles emphasized that the meeting just attended consisted of the Foreign Ministers of the military aspects of NATO, as the meeting as particular importance of the future of NATO. Secretary Dulles expressed a sentiment which had developed for greater political unity and had responded to this with subject and, indeed, his suggestion of the recent meeting. Secretary Dulles had among his colleagues more United States giving economic foreign policy for review by other NATO powers submitting a certain lack of solidarity at the meeting. As examples Secretary Dulles cited the fact that the subject had been discussed by the NATO

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (a)(4)(5)

NSC letter 9/30/46

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

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
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powers: The withdrawal of French NATO forces from Europe to North Africa; the Cyprus question; Middle East policy; and British action in Buraimi.

Secretary Dulles had pointed out to his colleagues at the meeting that the unity of the NATO powers could never be maintained if the issues and problems cited above were in each instance treated independently and unilaterally. If this continued to be the practice, the alliance of the Western powers would gradually fall apart, as had happened in the past as the aftermath of a war. As a result of Secretary Dulles' warning, and after a considerable battle, the NATO Foreign Ministers finally agreed to the establishment of a committee of three, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Norway and Italy, who were to confer with all the member governments of NATO and thereafter make a report, perhaps in the early autumn, on what could and should be done, through NATO or otherwise, to create an Atlantic Community Council with the objective of achieving greater unity in Western policy. Secretary Dulles thought that this was a good committee and one which would be sympathetic to the goals we have in mind.



Secretary Dulles said that in view of the fact that he would have to leave shortly to go down to Capitol Hill, he would like to mention at this time a point which he would normally have brought up in the course of Governor Stassen's report later on in the meeting, because it was related to the disarmament problem. His point, said Secretary Dulles, related to the prospect that the

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Soviet Union would in the near future possibly announce a unilateral reduction in the conventional armed forces of the Soviet Union. In the course of their visit to London, Bulganin and Khrushchev had given the British fairly clear evidence of the Soviet intention to make some such spectacular announcement, possibly involving a cut of 1,000,000 in the number of men in the Soviet armed forces. Some consideration had been given to this possibility in the course of the NATO discussions. The British, for instance, had indicated that they might have to respond, in some degree at least, to such a Soviet move if it occurred. Von Brentano, the German Foreign Minister, had stressed the adverse effect of such a Soviet announcement on the Federal Republic's rearmament program. Specifically, the Soviet move might force the Germans to limit the period of service of the soldiers in their new army to twelve months rather than to the eighteen months which von Brentano wanted. Over and beyond these difficulties, such a Soviet move would create a strong tendency for all the other continental NATO powers to reduce the length of service for their armed forces to twelve months. In general, a Soviet unilateral reduction of its forces would tend to strengthen neutralism and pacifism in Germany. There was no doubt in Secretary Dulles' mind that any Soviet move in this area would be focussed on the German situation, with the objective of upsetting Chancellor Adenauer's rearmament program.

Parenthetically, Secretary Dulles said that he had the impression that Chancellor Adenauer was showing some of the signs of age and illness. He appeared a bit cranky and difficult, and given to antagonizing unnecessarily the people with whom he came into contact. Accordingly, the situation was not running as smoothly in Germany as it had in the past, when Chancellor Adenauer was in full possession of his strength. In any event, the military situation, which the Foreign Ministers were not supposed to be discussing directly, was of such a nature as to underline the dangers and difficulties we would face in maintaining the vigor and effectiveness of the military alliance of the NATO nations. In Secretary Dulles' view, this made it all the more important to strengthen the non-military aspects of NATO.

When Secretary Dulles had concluded his report, the President wondered why the continental NATO powers expected the United States and Great Britain to enforce a period of 24 months' service for their military personnel stationed in Germany, if the other NATO powers reduced their period to twelve months.

Admiral Radford said that he had rather recently himself talked to Chancellor Adenauer and to the German Defense Minister. The Chancellor had told him that the length of service for troops in the new German Army would depend on the justification of the Defense Minister, who had in turn repeated firmly that this period would

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extend for 18 months. Admiral Radford was therefore at a loss to understand the apparent change in the German point of view.

Secretary Dulles replied that whatever had been said earlier to Admiral Radford, von Brentano had informed him no later than last Thursday that there was no chance of inducing the German Parliament to accept a period of 18 months' service for the German recruits. The issue had found the lines drawn on a strict party basis, and the proposal for an 18-months period could never be got through the upper house of the German Parliament. Admiral Radford repeated that the German Defense Minister had not seemed the least concerned about this problem, despite the fact that Ambassador Conant had questioned him very closely on the subject. Moreover, said Admiral Radford, Chancellor Adenauer seemed very well and healthy to him.

Secretary Dulles then warned that the expected Soviet announcement might well include a statement that all Soviet forces in East Germany would be removed. This was part of the British "educated guess" as to the contents of the Soviet announcement. In any event, Secretary Dulles believed that Governor Stassen and the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems should now be asked to give the most urgent consideration to the nature of the U. S. response to the Soviet announcement. We must not be caught flat-footed when the Soviets made their move.

Governor Stassen said that if the Secretary of State so desired, he would be glad to undertake consideration of this problem. Indeed, he had already talked to Under Secretary Hoover about the matter.

Apropos of the likelihood that the Soviets would announce a unilateral reduction of 1,000,000 men, the President commented that after all the Soviets would be doing nothing in the world, in making such a reduction, except to imitate what this Government had done earlier in connection with its formulation of the so-called "new look strategy". Agreeing with the President, Secretary Dulles further pointed out the heavy demands on manpower in the Soviet Union and the need of the Soviets to put more people into industry and especially into agriculture. This would certainly be a factor in inducing them to cut the level of their armed forces.

Secretary Wilson said he believed that such a Soviet unilateral cut would mark a definite change in the policy of the USSR, though the purpose behind the move was a different matter. In any event, of recent months the Soviets were trying to "mark down" their war talk. This was in the right direction, even though we did not clearly know the motives behind the change. It was certainly significant that the Soviets had not put on much of a military display at the recent May Day ceremonies. Secretary Dulles reminded the Council that there had been a fly-by of 20 Bisons in the preparation for the May Day celebration.



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After further discussion of this matter, the President counselled that we should do a lot of hard thinking on the meaning behind the anticipated Soviet move, and he indicated his agreement with the assignment of responsibility to Governor Stassen for preparation of a U. S. response to such a move. Governor Stassen should have the help of anyone he felt he needed to call upon for this task.

Thereafter, Secretary Dulles informed the Council of the widespread inclination among our NATO allies to downgrade in importance the role of the NATO ground forces because of their conviction that, at least in the initial phases of a future general war, the role of air atomic power would be crucial and ground forces would not have a very important part. On the basis of this reasoning they deduced that there was not much point in developing and maintaining large ground forces. This sentiment was strengthened by the fact that the Russians, while perhaps reducing the total level of their armed forces, were selectively strengthening these forces, particularly in terms of nuclear armament. Since our NATO allies do not have nuclear armament of their own, this fact contributed to the general feeling of discouragement. Finally, as a last discouraging note, Secretary Dulles commented on the current struggle to secure adequate German financial support for NATO forces based on West German territory.

Secretary Humphrey observed that these problems were the same that we have been facing for over a year's time, although they were now entering a more intense phase. We would be faced with a very serious problem if the Soviet Union really does undertake a unilateral reduction in the level of its armed forces.

Secretary Wilson referred to the difficulties he had experienced in recent days in defending the Defense Department programs before Congressional committees, which were critical of the adequacy of these programs. He complained that the American people and the members of Congress were engaged in comparing our present military position with the military position the Soviet Union would have in the year 1960. Of course, for security reasons we were in no position to reveal to the critics the nature of our program for a military build-up between now and 1960.

Apropos of further comment by Secretary Wilson on the effects of the recent Soviet economic offensive, particularly as it related to the underdeveloped nations, Secretary Dulles cited with some amusement the situation in Rangoon. The entire harbor of Rangoon and all the docks were choked with cement sent to Burma from the Soviet bloc and which the Burmese had not the slightest idea what to do with. Despite the amusing aspects of the matter, Secretary Dulles repeated his very serious concern about the Soviet tactics and the difficulty we were experiencing in competing with them.

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The President admitted that it was a serious problem, but it was in a certain sense a recent manifestation of an age-old problem--namely, the disadvantages which a democracy faced in trying to compete with a dictatorship, which could change its tactics with no more than a moment's notice. Look at Stalin. A year ago he had been a saint, and now he was a devil.

Secretary Humphrey said he disagreed with the President's statement that dictatorships could change their tactics and policy with impunity and very little notice. They really couldn't change over in a minute, and we should not be too worried. After all, American businessmen did not get very excited about a competitor until that competitor really began to bite into their market.

Speaking forcefully, the President looked at Secretary Humphrey and said there was one hell of a difference between what the Soviets were doing and business practice. The Soviets were engaged in the great game of international politics, and in that game they didn't have to show a cent of financial profit. Nevertheless, continued the President, it was hard to explain what advantage the Russians thought they were going to get from the indefinite building up of their war machine. After this war machine got to be a certain size and could do what was required, a further build-up seemed to be sheer waste. The President also expressed great concern about the progress made by the Soviets in their economic offensive to secure the allegiance of the uncommitted and underdeveloped nations. He wondered whether we were going to wake up some morning and find that Egypt, for instance, had slipped behind the Iron Curtain.

Secretary Dulles pointed out with emphasis that the delivery of Soviet bloc military supplies to Egypt moved a lot faster than any munitions which we shipped to foreign nations friendly to us. Secretary Wilson replied that we could provide these shipments just as rapidly as the Soviets did if we really wanted to do so. If that was the case, said the President, we certainly didn't seem to want to.

Secretary Dulles invited a comparison of the speed with which we delivered military assistance to Pakistan and the Soviets had delivered it to Egypt. Secretary Wilson replied that no one could tell him that we could not deliver \$100 million worth of military materiel to Pakistan in very short order if we really wanted to. Secretary Dulles then asked Secretary Wilson why in this case the Defense Department had not made rapid delivery to Pakistan. Secretary Wilson was unable to explain clearly the facts of the situation, but reiterated his conviction that prompt deliveries could be made by the Defense Department.

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The President pointed out that of course the United States had to move more cautiously than the Soviet Union in order to avoid antagonizing people. The Soviets did not have to give a thought to the problem of domestic political support. In a life-and-death struggle, democracy would prove itself superior to dictatorship, but in situations short of such a struggle, dictatorship has many advantages over democracy.

Secretary Wilson said that in any event the Defense Department would live up to the expectations and desires of the Secretary of State. The President pointed out further difficulties which afflicted our military assistance program, and the length of time required by the budget process, the pipeline, and the rest. Secretary Wilson agreed with the reality of all these difficulties, but said that if we really needed to get materiel to one of our allies, such as Pakistan, such materiel could be promptly taken out of the stockpile for the U. S. armed services if the President so desired. If Secretary Wilson were given authority by the President, he would be able to send promptly whatever it was thought desirable to send. The President said that he doubted if he could legally give such authority to the Secretary of Defense. In reply, Secretary Wilson cited the speed with which military equipment had been sent to Formosa at a time when it seemed likely that the island would be attacked by the Chinese Communists.

The President remarked that this was a unique situation, where Congress had provided the requisite authority.

In conclusion, Secretary Wilson said that he was obliged to admit that the carrying out of the military assistance program had been in past years the most poorly organized aspect of the business of the Defense Department. He desired and expected Secretary Gray to get this job done more efficiently than had been the case in the past. A major difficulty derived from the fact that, from the point of view of the military services, foreign assistance came last in terms of priority. He expected that Secretary Gray, following the model of the Secretaries of the military departments, would give first priority to the implementation of our military assistance program.

The President concluded the discussion of this agenda item by stating that it was not enough for the National Security Council to meet once a week to discuss this vital subject. The problem of foreign assistance should be constantly studied at all times by the responsible departments. Moreover, it would be desirable to bring in outside people--businessmen, educators, and others--to assist in helping to solve the problem.

At the end of this discussion, Secretary Dulles left the Cabinet Room, and his place at the table was taken by Secretary Hoover.

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The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed a report by the Secretary of State on the recent NATO Foreign Ministers Conference.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

Appropos of the Council discussion of cement supplies for Burma, the Director of Central Intelligence pointed out that while military supplies from the Soviet bloc to Egypt were moving on schedule, the Egyptians were encountering very severe trouble in learning to use the new equipment. There had been a number of crashes of aircraft, and considerable difficulty with the T-34 tanks which had been supplied to Egypt. The President commented that he was glad to hear this good news.

Mr. Dulles then commented on the continuing developments in the satellites following upon the downgrading of Stalin and the criticism of Stalinistic methods. He again emphasized that these developments in the satellites presented the United States with the greatest opportunity we have had in this area for the last ten years. For example, it was now rumored that the Hungarians had dismantled the barbed wire and mine fields along their border with Austria. If this proved true, there would be extraordinary repercussions. Moreover, dismissals of Stalinist officials and the new-style purges were continuing. All these developments deserved the most careful study as to the manner in which we can exploit them to our advantage.

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The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Egyptian difficulties in handling Soviet arms; recent developments in the European satellites; and Soviet activities in the Arctic.

### 3. U. S. POLICY ON CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

Governor Stassen indicated that his report to the National Security Council on the recent disarmament negotiations in London would be divided into three parts. The first would be retrospective, the second would discuss where we now stood, and the third would include future areas of concentration of disarmament activity.

In retrospect, one of the chief objectives of the U. S. delegation to the London meetings was to concert our policies with the Anglo-French policies, so that the British and French delegations would not officially table their own disarmament plan, many portions of which were unacceptable to the United States. As a result of negotiations with the British and French, the latter not only modified their disarmament plan, but agreed to put it forward as a working paper rather than as a fixed position of their governments.

The next big problem was the issue of the relation of German reunification to disarmament. This involved many consultations with the British and French, and Governor Stassen said that he had flown to Paris to deal particularly with the French on this subject. As a result of many conversations, it was finally agreed among the three Western powers that we would agree to commence a program for reducing the level of U. S. forces down to 2,500,000 prior to an agreement with the Soviet Union on a settlement of German reunification in freedom. However, it was the agreed position of the three Western powers that we would not reduce our forces below this level until the German reunification problem was solved along our lines. This agreement provided the basis for the four-power declaration on the German problem. The net result of these negotiations with the British and French was that there was no divisive issue among the four Western powers--the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada.

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Governor Stassen then moved on to the second portion of his report--namely, where we were at the present time. As for the Soviet position, Governor Stassen observed that, apart from the effort to divide the four Western powers, the real Soviet position, when thoroughly probed, consisted of the following three points: First, the Soviets were very firm indeed in opposing President Eisenhower's Geneva plan for aerial inspection and reconnaissance; the depth of their suspicion of this plan showed up very clearly. Secondly, the Soviets were rigidly opposed to any tying-in of the issue of German reunification and the reduction of armaments. Thirdly, the Soviets had made their most significant advance in our direction when they came forward with a much more open, detailed and satisfactory program for ground inspection. They had even agreed that this ground inspection system should be in place and operative before any of the powers began to reduce the level of their forces. Parenthetically, Governor Stassen declared that the U. S. delegation had made clear that if the Soviet Union could be prevailed upon to make as great an advance in the matter of aerial inspection as they thus had on ground inspection, there was real likelihood for progress in the control of armaments. Another significant advance in the Soviet position as it currently stood was their abandonment of the "ban the bomb" prerequisite in their disarmament program. Governor Stassen speculated that the Soviets at long last had realized that there was absolutely no hope of ever inducing the United States to agree to an immediate and outright banning of nuclear weapons.

Moving to the third portion of his report, Governor Stassen first indicated that when the United Nations Disarmament Commission met again in the middle of June, the United States would be in pretty good shape for the sessions.

As to the future development of U. S. policies with respect to disarmament, Governor Stassen emphasized that he was not now seeking from the National Security Council any decisions as to the character of our policy. He was merely going to point out that, from the point of view of U. S. policy on disarmament, there were five major areas on which our activity should be concentrated.


First, we must try to wear down Soviet opposition to President Eisenhower's aerial inspection plan. We would have to be gradual in this effort, but we must try to make every effort to move the Soviets out of their position of rigid opposition. At this point, again parenthetically, Governor Stassen indicated his skepticism as to the complete stability of the present leadership in the Soviet Union.

Secondly, there are many indications that the Soviets are presently going to make a considerable reduction in the levels of their own conventional armed forces. Indeed; it was from their hints to him that the British had derived their view to which Secretary Dulles had referred in his earlier report this morning to

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the Council. In any event, Governor Stassen pointed out the importance and the difficulty of the U. S. response to this probable Soviet move.

Thirdly, there seemed a clear prospect that if the Western powers and the Soviets continue much longer without any significant agreement respecting the control of armaments, other governments will make the decision to develop their own stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it must be an objective of the United States to try to get ceilings imposed on the development of further stockpiles of nuclear weapons and induce nations not now having such stockpiles to agree to abstain from manufacturing nuclear weapons and to devote their fissionable materials to peaceful purposes only. It seemed to Governor Stassen as much in the Soviet interest as in our own, to prevent the multiplication of stockpiles of nuclear weapons throughout the world.



His fifth and last point, said Governor Stassen, was concerned with psychological factors and the factor of U. S. leadership. He said he believed that the time had come for the President to seize the leadership on a program which might be described by the slogan "atoms-for-police". The object of this program would be to make use of nuclear power to prevent the occurrence of aggression anywhere in the world. Some portion of the weapons in the nuclear stockpiles of the several nations should be earmarked and set apart for support of the resolutions of the United Nations against aggression. The idea was to provide an atomic shield against aggression. Quite apart from its central purpose, such a program would have the advantage of freeing certain nations, such as Turkey, from the heavy burden of maintaining a large military establishment. The resources which nations like this were now compelled in self-defense to devote to building up their military forces, could be diverted to vitally needed economic development. Thus the atoms-for-police program would be an important factor in countering the Soviet economic offensive aimed at the underdeveloped nations of the world.

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In concluding his report, Governor Stassen expressed the belief that the program he had outlined was consonant with the views both of the President and of the Secretary of State on the subject of disarmament. He also indicated that subsequent development of a U. S. policy and program for armaments control would be formulated in complete collaboration with representatives of the responsible departments and agencies. Governor Stassen closed by stating that, despite the fact that the Soviets would continue to make propaganda out of the disarmament problem, they are at long last aware of the suicidal character of a nuclear war. In short, they are beginning to see the problem of a general war with nuclear weapons much as we see it in the United States.

After Governor Stassen had finished, the President expressed the thought that while the atoms-for-police proposal was an interesting one, it would have to be very carefully defined and developed. Where, for example, would one store the atomic weapons set apart for use in the event of aggression? From what bases would these weapons be launched in the event aggression occurred? Moreover, entering upon an atoms-for-police program would still require as a prerequisite an adequate inspection system in the nations which had stockpiles of atomic weapons. We would still have to have reasonable assurance of Soviet good faith. Nevertheless, the President assured Governor Stassen that all those around the table were well aware of what a difficult assignment he had and has. Everyone was also clearly pleased that the United States did not lose anything at the recent London discussions, and that the possibility existed that avenues of hopeful exploration for the future had been opened.

Admiral Radford expressed very great interest indeed in Governor Stassen's proposal respecting atoms-for-police. The notion of using nuclear weapons to prevent aggression had been part of the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1954. Admiral Radford, however, expressed, as he had many times in the past, his great concern that occasions might arise when aggressions occurred and the armed forces of the United States would not be permitted to use atomic weapons to meet such local aggression. He therefore again pleaded for a clear decision permitting the use of atomic weapons in defense against local aggression. If such a decision were not forthcoming, the Defense Department would have to continue an expensive program providing our armed forces with both conventional and nuclear armament. Accordingly, the right to use atomic weapons in instances of local aggression was still the key question, and the National Security Council could not continue to straddle it. The problem is not what we do in global war, but whether we can use nuclear weapons in military situations short of global war. We must be clear whether or not our armed forces can use nuclear weapons in this latter type of situation. Accordingly, Admiral Radford repeated his view that Governor Stassen's fifth point was by all odds the most important point. Certainly atomic weapons could be effectively used in defense against local aggression. But we must have the courage to make the decision to do so.

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Secretary Wilson said that he had been watching "this business" for three years now. We have moved ahead considerably in emphasizing the importance of air power. It had been quite a severe struggle. General Ridgway represented a serious problem with his demands for a much larger ground force. Despite everything, Secretary Wilson believed that General Ridgway could readily justify his views on our ground forces, on the simple basis of our military commitments worldwide.

Admiral Strauss said he would like to be heard briefly on the subject of Governor Stassen's fifth and last point. He said he had first heard the expression "atoms-for-police" some two years ago from a man named Marshall in New York. Since that time the idea of using our atomic capabilities as a shield against aggression had formed a consistent part of our thinking. Accordingly, if we were now suddenly to adopt the atoms-for-police tactic, making it look as though it were a brand-new idea, this course of action would be certain to give color to the presumption that hitherto we had been thoroughly selfish in our attitude toward our atomic weapons capabilities. Admiral Strauss repeated that the United States had always thought of its nuclear stockpile as a means of defending the free world against Communist aggression.

Governor Stassen acknowledged the reality of the danger alluded to by Admiral Strauss, but noted the need for additional impact on a program for using atomic weapons to prevent aggression. The slogan and program of atoms-for-police was a device for packaging an idea so that it would penetrate throughout the world. What was needed was an impact for this program similar to that provided by the President in his atoms-for-peace speech.

Secretary Humphrey said he wished to go back and discuss briefly the point that Admiral Radford had earlier made on the necessity for a decision on the use of nuclear weapons by the United States to deter or counter aggression. Secretary Humphrey said that Admiral Radford's point was of tremendous importance to the United States from the financial and budgetary point of view. It was quite possible that Admiral Radford's proposal might tie into the anticipated Russian announcement of the unilateral reduction of the level of the Soviet armed forces. Should we not, therefore, give very great thought as to how far the United States can go in matching this Soviet move? Could we not reduce numbers and increase the mobility of smaller U. S. forces, and at the same time assure that these forces would have the right to make use of their nuclear armament? Such small U. S. mobile forces, thoroughly equipped with nuclear weapons, should be our objective.

The President informed Secretary Humphrey that the matter was not nearly so simple as he imagined. For one thing, the United States would be obliged to overcome the strong opposition of some

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of the governments of its allies to the use of bases in their territory for launching nuclear attacks. While, said the President, he agreed with Secretary Humphrey's general theory, we could not overlook all the political problems which were involved in it. We must proceed so that we are sure of retaining the friendship of the free world.

Secretary Humphrey said he too understood the President's point; but could we not have as our own objective the proposal that Admiral Radford had made and that he, Secretary Humphrey, so strongly supported? He therefore counselled that we clarify our position on the use of atomic weapons for the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that they could take the necessary steps in the direction of the ultimate objective of smaller, more mobile U. S. forces equipped with atomic weapons and in a position to use these weapons in the event of peripheral aggression.

Admiral Radford said that he also recognized the political problems to which the President had pointed. Nevertheless, he said, it would make an enormous difference to us if, through a decision on the use of nuclear weapons, we could reduce the number of our soldiers around the world.

Governor Stassen commented that in addition to the points made by the President there was also a danger in this plan that if the United States continued to stress the reduction of ground forces we might have a much tougher time inducing the Soviet Union to agree to the reduction of strength in the air. To this Secretary Humphrey replied that he could not see why we had to be involved with the Russians. Could we not proceed unilaterally to cut the levels of our conventional armed forces? Why did we have to wait for the Russians to do it? He again advocated clarification of our instructions on this subject to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so that they could go ahead with such a program.

The President again warned that such a course of action should not be carried out in a hurry. The United States must move very slowly in this area. Even so, we had already made real progress in convincing our friends of the validity of our views on the use of atomic weapons. For example, the NATO powers were now clamoring that we share atomic weapons with them; whereas only a couple of years ago they had recoiled in horror from all thought of employing nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hoover said that he was aware that Governor Stassen had been devoting a great deal of thought and energy to the further development of American policy on the control of armaments. He hoped he would make a report to the responsible departments and agencies and would continue to work with them in further formulations of the U. S. position. He suggested that, in any case,

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there should be a thorough analysis of any forthcoming U. S. position on disarmament before this Government became committed to any new aspects of its disarmament policy, either publicly or internationally.

The President expressed his agreement with the suggestion made by Secretary Hoover.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the subject in the light of a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament on the recent disarmament negotiations.
- b. Noted the President's directive that the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, utilizing the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, prepare at an early date a report on the U. S. response to a possible Soviet announcement of a unilateral reduction of conventional armed forces and a reduction in or withdrawal of Soviet forces in East Germany.
- c. Noted that further recommendations as to additions or modifications in U. S. policy on control of armaments would be developed by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, utilizing the President's Special Committee on Disarmament Problems, for Council consideration prior to any public discussions or international commitments regarding such additions or modifications in policy.
- d. Noted that the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament would continue, in conformity with the President's letter of August 5, 1955, to advance understanding and support at home and abroad of established U. S. policy on control of armaments, utilizing the cooperation of the departments and agencies concerned.

NOTE: The actions in b, c and d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament for implementation.

*S. Everett Gleason*

S. Everett Gleason

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May 17, 1956

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: May 3, 1956

PLACE: Paris, France

PARTICIPANTS: United States

United Kingdom

The Secretary  
Ambassador Aldrich  
Mr. Merchant  
Asst. Secy of Defense Gray  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. McCardle  
Mr. Rountree  
Mr. Wright

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd  
Mr. Caccia  
Ambassador Jebb  
Mr. Young  
Mr. Hancock  
Mr. Hood

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/GDC/MR

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SUBJECT: Bilateral Talks with British  
NATO and Soviet Economic  
Offensive  
Germany and Disarmament

Text of these conversations were sent to the Department as SECTOS 19 and 20.

NATO and Soviet Economic Offensive

Mr. Lloyd at the outset referred briefly to the recent visit of Soviet leaders to London. He said that they appeared to be very confident and intended to proceed with their program for economic expansion.

The Secretary referred to his recent statement regarding NATO and said that a number of people had thought that he was suggesting that NATO assume responsibility for economic operations. That was not his intention. We were confronted with new types of problems with which NATO had a legitimate concern, and his suggestion was

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far more fundamental than proposing that NATO assume a new economic operating function. He observed that following Stalin's death the Soviet Government embarked upon a new line of: (1) exploiting differences between Western countries; (2) endeavoring to wean away newly independent countries through economic offers, and capitalizing upon latent prejudices in those countries, and (3) of trying to wreck the West through economic competition. We were now faced with a situation in which a totalitarian power was operating in competition with the free world economic system, where profits were essential to commercial enterprises. For political reasons the Soviets were using their industrial power, cutting down their own requirements and setting prices regardless of commercial considerations. The Secretary thought it essential that the NATO powers do some careful thinking about this problem and how to cope with the new Soviet policy.

Mr. Lloyd stated that he thought NATO could perform usefully in the exchange of information and planning, but he questioned whether it should have any role for economic action.

The Secretary agreed that it should have no operating role in this field. It was a good body to discuss, on a community interest basis, how the objectives might be achieved. The actual implementation of an action program would fall elsewhere.

Mr. Lloyd observed that one possible course in meeting this new Soviet challenge might be to rely upon the United Nations for the provision of international aid and to force the Soviets to do likewise. He would not favor this course unless it were essential. An alternative might be to set up an organization of "donors" who had capital surpluses available for aid to other countries. He inquired whether the Secretary would prefer this course or some other, such as the use of existing institutions like the IBRD and the creation of other organizations like the proposed African Bank.

The Secretary said that he had been thinking about this problem but had no firm views as yet.

Mr. Lloyd commented that he had discussed this question with Mr. Brentano and that the latter indicated that he likewise had no clear idea as to what would be the most suitable type of organization.

The Secretary stated that he hoped that out of the NATO Council discussion might come a small committee of Ministers who would study the matter over the next few months and come up with some sort of conclusions. We were studying it in the United States and the group engaged in this work would make its report about the middle of November so that it would be available before Congress met in January. He hoped that the NATO committee would be giving thought to the question at the same time. He thought it might be useful to have a special NATO Ministers meeting in the late fall or early winter to pursue the matter on the basis of the proposed Committee of Ministers report.

Mr. Lloyd

Mr. Lloyd commented that while he was impressed by the Secretary's ideas, he would much rather embark upon wider international discussions after he had made up his mind as to what he would want to do. He suggested the possibility of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada talking over the problem before bringing in all the NATO powers.]

Replying to Mr. Caccia's question, the Secretary said that the US would not necessarily desire to be a member of the suggested NATO committee to study the problem.

Responding to Mr. Jabb's query as to whether Mr. Pineau had expressed any views on the question, the Secretary stated that Pineau had given him an elaborate paper on May 2 which he had not yet had an opportunity to study, but he understood that the essence of his suggestion was using the UN and having NATO take initiative through the UN.

Mr. Merchant elaborated, saying that Pineau's proposal envisaged a global OEEC which would report to ECOSOC. It would involve standing committees on technical assistance, banking funds, etc., leaving a complete scope of freedom for the execution of such bilateral and multilateral arrangements as a Colombo Plan. He understood that the paper would be distributed to other delegations and that Mr. Pineau would speak to the Council on this subject on May 4.

Mr. Caccia observed that an advantage to forming a small committee, as suggested by the Secretary, would be that it could study the problem and submit a report to all the members of NATO consideration.

The Secretary, replying to a question by Mr. Lloyd, said that while the US did not insist upon being a member of the committee it would take an active role in consulting with the committee members.

Mr. Lloyd agreed that it would be much better to have a small committee, the members of which would come to us for ideas. He inquired whether the Secretary would put forward the idea at the Council meeting.

The Secretary replied that he would, and would like to rearrange the Agenda to have the matter discussed on May 4 rather than on May 5, to give more time for consideration.

#### Germany and Disarmament

The Secretary observed that the Germans were getting "jittery" about the relationship between disarmament and German unification. He was skeptical that it would be possible to reach an agreement with the Soviets upon disarmament. That did not necessarily mean, he said, that there would be no disarmament, but he felt that this would come about by events which would lead our countries to believe that their arms were not as effective as they used to be. The Soviets

would

would like to expand their industry to provide more consumer goods, and to have more to use in their economic warfare against us. In order to achieve this it was natural that they would desire to cut down on arms. They can do this, with some assurance, because they can feel a degree of certainty that they will not be attacked by us. Moreover, under their system they can reduce their manpower substantially and reactivate it on quick notice. On the other hand, we do not see the possibility of our agreeing to make reductions at this time in view of the general world situation, especially the situation in the Far East. Demobilization to us meant reintegration of our servicemen into the national economy and their remobilization was a long and difficult job. If the Soviets unilaterally should take action to disarm it would be for their own purposes. They would like to see us disarm, and if they felt that our response to Soviet disarmament was held up because of the German situation it would be unfortunate. Our ability to cut was, in fact, much affected by the question of unification of Germany.

Mr. Lloyd stated that Mr. Brentano had thought it necessary to take some further action this summer on reunification. The UK believed also that we should do something. He thought that the Soviets would not, in fact, want a disarmament agreement per se, since they did not want controls which would be imposed under such an agreement. They probably will reduce their forces in Germany by one-half, and make further reductions elsewhere, perhaps reducing the total forces to about three and one-half million men. He thought that we must stick to the principle of controls.

At this point Mr. Lloyd observed that the UK was greatly troubled about the "fourth nuclear power"; about the problems arising from the possibility that countries such as Egypt, India, etc., might in the future obtain possession of nuclear weapons. The Secretary said that this also had been troubling him a great deal. It was bad enough for three nations now to have nuclear weapons, two of which were democratic and moral states which would act in a responsible manner. But the possibility of nuclear weapons getting into the hands of reckless dictators driven by mobs, created an alarming and horrifying situation in which the whole world will be living in peril infinitely greater than that at the present time.

Mr. Lloyd said that he had put this matter squarely to Bulganin and Khrushchev. They had expressed concern and commented that the way to deal with the matter was to agree that no more nuclear tests would be made.

The Secretary observed that a complication was the fact that we were proceeding with training for nuclear weapons. In this way the same results can be obtained from one plane with one pilot as with 100 planes and 100 pilots using conventional weapons. Converting to conventional weapons would therefore multiply by at least 100 times the expense of maintaining a defense force which would give the same results.

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May 24, 1956

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
May 24, 1956; 10:30 AM

Others present: Admiral Radford  
General Taylor  
Colonel Goodpaster

The meeting was held at General Taylor's request. He started with the statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1960 before them at the present time. Through it, the JCS will give guidance to the staffs which will serve as the basis for programs and funds. The paper is now split, with the Army and Marines following NSC 5602, as he understands it, and with the Air Force, the Navy and Admiral Radford taking the view that all planning must be based upon the use of atomic weapons. He stressed that the plan pertains to 1960, by which time both sides will have developed large stockpiles of thermonuclear weapons. A situation of mutual deterrence must be envisaged. He recognized that a big war, under such conditions, might come deliberately, but thought it was more likely that it would come through "backing" into it through a succession of actions and counteractions. In view of the tendency of thermonuclear capacity to deter both sides from a big war, any war that occurred would seem more likely to be a small war.

Two differences of view have developed within the Chiefs. The first relates to the definition of general war used as the basis for the plan. This is defined to be a war between the United States and USSR, using atomic weapons from the outset without restriction. The emphasis is on war starting with large-scale attack on D-Day, whereas the NSC has considered that it might arise step by step from smaller action. He said that the Air Force and Navy members regard this as the worst possible case, and therefore state that it would provide for all the others. He is inclined to disagree with this. He feels that this concept would leave us less flexible, and that the programs for fighting a big war would absorb all available funds.

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MR 77-71 DOCUMENT NO. 3  
By MDA/OJH Date 4/22/77

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The second difference arises in the firm commitment for the use of atomic weapons -- in every case in a general war, and also in local wars where required for military reasons. He thought that this contravened the principle of "flexibility" which has been worked into NSC papers, and that it would result in tremendous atomic forces and defenses against them, tending to freeze out all other types of military forces -- and that these latter are what would be needed to handle small war situations.



*because they would have to preempt us? really fear of surprise*

The President said he thought General Taylor's position was dependent on an assumption that we are opposed by people who would think as we do with regard to the value of human life. But they do not, as shown in many incidents from the last war. We have no basis for thinking that they abhor destruction as we do. In the event they should decide to go to war, the pressure on them to use atomic weapons in a sudden blow would be extremely great. He did not see any basis for thinking other than that they would use these weapons at once, and in full force. The President went on to say that he did not care too much for the definition of general war as given. To him the question was simply one of a war between the United States and the USSR, and in this he felt that thinking should be based on the use of atomic weapons -- that in his opinion it was fatuous to think that the U. S. and USSR would be locked into a life and death struggle without using such weapons. We should therefore develop our readiness on the basis of use of atomic weapons by both sides. He recalled that the United States had never been "scared" until these weapons came into the picture, and it is this type of war which justifies the great peacetime efforts we are now maintaining.

As to local wars, the President thought that the tactical use of atomic weapons against military targets would be no more likely to trigger off a big war than the use of twenty-ton "block busters." In his opinion, we must concentrate on building up internal security forces and local security forces of the regions themselves. We would give mobile support, with the Air, Navy and Army supporting weapons, and perhaps put in several battalions at truly critical points. He was very clear that we would not, however, deploy and tie down our forces around the Soviet periphery in small wars. He thought that the support forces we provide would use the most efficient weapons, and over the past several years tactical atomic weapons have come to be practically accepted as integral parts of modern armed forces.

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The President went on to refer to the ideas of movement of large numbers of divisions in the early months of an atomic war. He thought it was very unlikely that they could be moved, and thought that military planning is now emphasizing the forces immediately available, with much less interest in those following by months. The incorporation of new weapons such as rockets and missiles into the ground forces, with small mobile combat groups integrating their operations closely with them, should be stressed. General Gruenther had told him that he badly needs the two U. S. divisions shown to be sent to Europe in the first thirty days, but that when the President asked him how they could be gotten there, he simply said that was his (the President's) problem. The President did not consider that anything like ten or twelve additional divisions in the first six months could be moved. If we have been heavily attacked, there would be neither the planes nor the air bases needed to take them there. He added that he thought Europe had come a great way toward this same manner of thinking.

Referring now to general war (the President used this term and "war between the U. S. and USSR" interchangeably), the President said that prudence would demand that we get our striking force into the air immediately upon notice of hostile action by the Soviets. Massive retaliation, although the term has been scoffed at, is likely to be the key to survival. He reiterated that planning should go ahead on the basis of the use of tactical atomic weapons against military targets in any small war in which the United States might be involved.

General Taylor drew attention to deterrence as the key factor in our present situation. We need diverse types of forces to deter large wars, and small wars as well. If we proceed on the basis of needs for actually fighting atomic wars, the needs for atomic striking forces and for continental defense are open-ended -- practically limitless. He thought we should first calculate what is needed for deterrence and provide that (rather than what is needed for fighting an all-out thermonuclear war) should then provide the requirements for flexible forces useable in small wars, and finally put what remaining effort we have into the requirements for fighting an all-out war.

The President said he was very understanding that the position he had described did not leave the Army the same great role in the first year of war in relation to the other services as formerly. In his opinion, in the initial stages the Army would be truly vital to the establishment and maintenance of order in the United States. He went on to say that

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the Chiefs of Staff still thought much too much each in terms of his own service. He thought that each service should have what the corporate judgment of the Chiefs thought proper. He said that if the Chiefs can't develop corporate judgment on the great problems that are facing us, the system as we now have it will have failed and major changes must be made. He referred to recent criticisms of the capabilities of carriers. He said that even if these charges are right, they should not be made in public; it is a matter that should be thrashed out in deepest security within the JCS. We shouldn't tell an enemy our weaknesses -- if they are weaknesses -- and shouldn't damage the confidence of our people and our allies in these weapons if they are as effective as he thinks they are. Similarly, the public criticism of the Nike is damaging to our country. If it is not a good weapon, we should determine that privately, and not notify the enemy but make our own corrections. Again, if it is a good weapon, we are harming the confidence of our public and our allies through this type of criticism. He recognizes that there are going to be differences of view, but considers that they should be worked out by the JCS. All should be thinking of the good of the country rather than attaining gains for a particular service. The President said he would like to see a Nike test firing, but has felt unable to do so because of the need to give psychological support to peaceful rather than military things.

General Taylor said that the decision of the President will initiate fundamental and rather drastic changes. The President did not feel that they would be too drastic. He said that, in any case, we are going to keep forces in the Far East and in Europe (even though the concept in Europe had been to have them there for a short period only -- now it looks as though they must stay almost indefinitely). He felt that in the emphasis he has given on the atomic weapons lies the greatest safety and security for our country. He did not claim to be all wise in such matters, but he was very sure that as long as he is President he would meet an attack in the way indicated. With regard to the budget, while stressing the need to maintain the economic soundness of the U. S. -- and specifically to avoid tax levels which would prevent the building up of capital productive industry, the President said he has told everyone that we must have what we need for security. He anticipates a fairly stable estimate which might be of the order, in his opinion, of \$37 billion. Admiral Radford said that the decision of the President, in his opinion, supported the majority view, and General Taylor agreed. Admiral Radford said that the decision will have some far-reaching effects. For example, we should now

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tell our allies that support will be as the President described. If they can plan on that, they could cut down some of their forces. It might well mean that we would put into their country units such as Honest John and missiles with atomic warheads as support elements. The President said that these changes and others to be made would not necessarily be radical, but could be gradually applied.

Admiral Radford referred to additional requests coming in for programs that would run above the "maintenance level" the Chiefs had spoken of on their return from Puerto Rico. The Air Force will be coming in for an increase in strategic air units, partly needed because the problem of penetrating to targets will be becoming increasingly severe. The President thought that the development of higher, faster aircraft relates to this purpose. Admiral Radford said we still have a big program to carry out regarding Continental Defense, dispersal of airfields, and provision of guided missile air defense. He said there has never been complexity equal to this in terms of military planning.

The President thought there was need for a group like the advisory board he constituted while Chief of Staff. That produced no memos but concentrated on thinking about the major problems of the military forces. They were, with one exception, retired officers having no further assignments in view. Such a group under the Secretary of Defense or JCS composed of senior officers divorced from service, with a few scientists added, would be of the greatest value.



A. J. Goodpaster  
Colonel, CE, U S Army

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the economic aspects certainly should not be abandoned, the need for closer collaboration in the North Atlantic area must, for the foreseeable future, depend to a greater degree on progress in the political field.

While we should continue to encourage the nations of continental Europe to seek closer integration among themselves, the time has come for us to ask ourselves whether we can really anticipate a significant degree of further progress toward such meaningful and desirable forms of European unity unless the United States itself is prepared to enter into a broader association with Europe in relation to common problems.

These needs are concretely illustrated by such circumstances as the following:

- (a) There is no clear evidence of community-wide dedication to the policy of bringing about the unity of one of the most important

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dist. 80. (no title) 5/24/56 draft #4 pp 6-7 only

members of NATO, i.e., Germany. Its continued division carries a threat to the wholehearted and lasting identification of Western Germany with the fortunes of the West. Thus, this situation is a latent threat of great gravity.



(b) There is no clear Community policy toward the European satellites. The political status of these nations, and economic relations with them, vitally affect Western Europe.

(c) There is no established procedure for assuring that the members of the Community may not deal individually with the Soviet Union and Communist China in those ways which fail to take account of the interest of the Community as a whole and which could undermine the unity and strength of the Community. Bilateral exchanges are no doubt inevitable and can be useful. But there is no adequate Community

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J.C.S. 2220/97

29 May 1956

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON J.C.S. 2220/97

[A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee  
on

[EXCHANGE OF ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION WITH THE  
UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 29 May 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
approved the recommendation in paragraph 7 of J.C.S. 2220/97.

2. The memorandum in Enclosure "A" was forwarded to the  
Secretary of Defense, dated 29 May 1956.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached  
as the top sheet of J.C.S. 2220/97.

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH  
DATE 48 Jan 77

RICHARD H. PHILLIPS,  
R. D. WENTWORTH,  
Joint Secretariat.

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Gen. Taylor (CSA)  
Adm. Burke (CNO)  
Gen. Twining (CSAF)  
Gen. Eddleman (DC/S, MO)  
Gen. Harkins (ADC/S, MO)

Gen. White (VCSAF)  
Gen. Everest (DC/S-Op, Air)  
Gen. Lindsay (Dir. Plans, Air)  
Gen. Alness (DD Plans, Air)  
Adm. Austin (D/JS)

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DATE 4 Jan 77

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

EXCHANGE OF ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION WITH  
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA

References: a. J.C.S. 2099/548  
b. J.C.S. 2101/224  
c. J.C.S. 2220/79  
d. J.C.S. 2220/80  
e. J.C.S. 2220/90

*See Decision on dtd 5-29-56.  
See Note to Holders dtd 7-26-56.  
See Note to Holders dtd 1-23-57.  
See Note to Holders dtd 2-20-57.*

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Gen. Wheeler (Dir, PD)  
Adm. Gardner (DNCO-P&P)  
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Adm. Austin (D/JS)  
Gen. Picher (DDSP)  
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EXCHANGE OF ATOMIC ENERGY INFORMATION WITH  
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA

THE PROBLEM 3/15/56

1. In response to a memorandum\* by the Secretary of Defense, to determine whether military considerations justify, at this time, an attempt by the Department of Defense to seek amending legislation to permit the United States greater latitude in dealing with its major Allies, notably the United Kingdom and Canada, in areas concerning atomic weapons, and nuclear power for military applications.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In a memorandum\* for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 9 March 1956, the Secretary of Defense pointed out the difficulties being experienced in implementing the Agreements for the Exchange of Atomic Energy Information with the United Kingdom\*\* and Canada,\*\*\* and in the exchange of information relative to military reactors. He requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding possible remedial legislation thereon.

3. On 2 March 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded\*\*\*\* a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense expressing the view that it is desirable to equip selected allied forces with new weapons including atomic capabilities, but noted that under existing legislation atomic weapons cannot be released to the custody of allied forces.

4. On 15 March 1956, the National Security Council (NSC) in NSC 5602/1# provided basic policy guidance to the effect that atomic energy legislation as it relates to weapons should be progressively relaxed to the extent required for the progressive integration of such weapons into NATO defenses to enable their

\* Dated 9 March 1956; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/90 ✓

\*\* Annex "C" to J.C.S. 2220/80

\*\*\* Annex to J.C.S. 2220/79

\*\*\*\* Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2099/548

# Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/224

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use by selected Allies upon the outbreak of war, and that the release of weapons or weapons systems to allied forces should be considered a separate problem in each case, in light of their contributions to the collective defense system and with full consideration of security, budgetary, and strategic factors.

DISCUSSION

5. For discussion see Enclosure "B".

CONCLUSION

6. Amending legislation, as outlined in Enclosure "A", to permit the United States greater latitude in dealing with its major Allies, notably the United Kingdom and Canada in the areas concerning atomic weapons and nuclear power for military application should be sought at this time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A", which reflects the above conclusion to the Secretary of Defense.

8. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this paper to commanders of unified or specified commands.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

*See on 5/29/56*

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Exchange of Atomic Energy Information with  
the United Kingdom and Canada

1. Reference is made to your memorandum\* dated 9 March 1956, in which you requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the question of seeking amending legislation which would permit greater latitude in dealing with our major Allies in the areas of nuclear weapons and nuclear power for military applications.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion, from a military point of view, that it is most desirable that selected major Allies now be assisted in the achievement of operational delivery capabilities with appropriate weapons systems compatible with U.S. stockpile atomic weapons, and that we now proceed with all necessary preparation to facilitate a controlled release of U.S. stockpile atomic weapons as may be required in an emergency. The weapons systems selected in each case should be chosen to meet the progressive needs of mutual defense, insofar as the political, economic and security factors permit. Similarly it is considered that selected Allies should be encouraged and assisted in the achievement of military nuclear power applications. Scientific and intelligence cooperation and the exchange of atomic information with our major Allies should be adequate to satisfy the needs of mutual defensive readiness, as have been outlined in general above. However, the extent of exchange of scientific information necessary to meet readiness requirements would not be comparable to the former full wartime cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada, in research and development activities dealing with the military applications of atomic energy.

\* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/90

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Enclosure "A"

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3. An operational delivery capability with atomic weapons, from the military point of view, requires the establishment of complete weapons systems in readiness for the delivery of atomic weapons on target as directed. In the case of allied atomic weapons capabilities supported by the United States this must include, though not necessarily be limited to, the following:

- (a) The compatibility of selected allied aircraft and missile systems with U.S. atomic weapons, or warheads.
- (b) The availability of appropriate supporting facilities for the accommodation, maintenance, and readiness of the complete weapons systems, including the atomic warheads.
- (c) The training and equipping of allied handling and delivery crews in all of the necessary elements of the stock-pile to target sequence.
- ✓ (d) The determination of atomic weapons requirements, the determination of weapons effects, and the preparation of detailed atomic operations plans, in support of current war plans.
- (e) The ready availability of the atomic weapons or warheads necessary to complete the weapons systems.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore are of the view that the Department of Defense should seek new legislation that would permit the following:

- (a) The exchange of atomic energy information with the United Kingdom and Canada to the extent necessary for the earliest possible achievement by those nations of operational delivery capabilities in suitable atomic weapons systems compatible with selected United States atomic weapons or warheads, including megaton yield systems.
- (b) The exchange of atomic energy information and nuclear materials with the United Kingdom and Canada to the extent necessary for the rapid development of military applications of nuclear power.

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Enclosure "A"

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(c) Scientific, development, and intelligence cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada, in the field of atomic energy to the extent required for the achievement of the above mutual defense readiness objectives.

(d) The exchange of atomic energy information with selected Allies other than the United Kingdom and Canada, to the extent necessary for the progressive development of operational delivery capabilities in suitable atomic weapons systems, compatible with selected United States atomic weapons or warheads, and for the development of military nuclear power applications. ||

(e) At the discretion of the President, the immediate availability of United States atomic weapons to selected allied nations, as may be required for the completion of established atomic weapons systems, and as may be considered necessary for the defensive readiness of the United States and its Allies. || ←

5. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, in view of the responsibilities of the Department of Defense in the implementation of allied readiness in atomic warfare, and in view of the history of administrative difficulties in matters of joint judgement with the Atomic Energy Commission regarding the releasability of information, new legislation should establish Department of Defense as the ultimate responsible authority for the release of information in the field of military applications of atomic energy, as may be required to meet the needs of allied mutual defense.

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Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "B"

DISCUSSION

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1. The limitations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,\* and the delays and uncertainties imposed by the required "joint determination" of the suitability of information for release, raise the question as to whether the act serves the best interests of the United States in meeting the problems of allied mutual defense.

2. An operational delivery capability with atomic weapons requires the existence of the complete weapons system in readiness for the delivery of atomic weapons on target as directed. In the case of allied atomic weapons capabilities supported by the United States this must include, though not necessarily be limited to, the following:

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a. The compatibility of selected allied aircraft and missile systems with U.S. atomic weapons, or warheads.

b. The availability of appropriate supporting facilities for the accommodation, maintenance, and readiness of the complete weapons systems, including the atomic warheads.

c. The training of allied handling and delivery crews in all of the necessary elements of the stockpile to target sequence.

d. The determination of atomic weapons requirements, the determination of weapons effects, and the preparation of detailed atomic operations plans, in support of current war plans.

e. The ready availability of the warheads or weapons necessary to complete the systems.

\* On file in Joint Secretariat

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Enclosure "B"

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3. The delays and uncertainties inherent in the requirement for a "joint judgement" between the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission regarding the releasability of atomic energy information, is seriously delaying the progressive development of allied mutual defensive readiness in atomic warfare. It appears that more positive progress in the implementation of this national security policy could be made if the Department of Defense were given the ultimate responsibility in the release and exchange of information in field of military applications of atomic energy as required to progressively meet the needs of allied mutual defense.

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Enclosure "B"

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June 7, 1956

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MEMORANDUM:

President Eisenhower's successful leadership at the Geneva Summit session, with his dramatic penetrating offer of a reciprocal exchange of military blueprints and mutual opening of the skies, building upon his earlier "ATOMS FOR PEACE" proposal, and furthering the combined effect of the comprehensive foreign, defense, and economic policies, has sharply reduced the dangers of deliberate world war in the immediate years. The Soviet announcement of an intention to make a one million two hundred thousand force level reduction indirectly emphasizes this conclusion and also poses new problems.



The greatest unmet dangers to the future security of the United States and to a durable world peace now center in two developing situations, which require further major U.S. initiative.

I.

First: Within a matter of months other nations will be deciding to build nuclear bombs of their own, and once they have so decided, it will be difficult to reverse their decisions.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

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PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (a)(5)  
NSC letter 7/14/56  
NLE DATE 11/6/86

MR 85-248-1

BY RLD DATE 11/6/86

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, Office of the  
Staff Secretary, Records 1952-61  
SUBJECT SERIES: ALPHABETICAL SUBSERIES  
Box 11, Disarmament [Vol I](6)



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Any nation that can marshal twenty-five million dollars in assets almost certainly can build elementary nuclear bombs in three years and thermonuclear bombs in five years, through the use of scientists and engineers employed from other countries, if not available at home.

Within a matter of three to seven years missiles capable of travelling through outer space for thousands of miles with a thermonuclear war head almost certainly will be perfected. *with reasonable accuracy* *will be developed*

Thus under current trends a relatively near future situation in which fifteen or twenty nations have nuclear bombs and both sides of the world have intercontinental missiles must be contemplated. Under these circumstances the potential for igniting a world war will be spread to many nations with varying degrees of stability and competence in government, and within each nation the authority to use modern weapons will be decentralized to more and more individuals to counter the estimated speed of possible attack.

Such a world development will be very adverse to the interests of the United States. It would increase the danger of major war and decrease the prospects of a stable and lasting peace. As the nuclear weapons stockpiles become larger and more numerous, not only is the danger of war multiplied, but also the danger increases that if

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a war loss break out it will be extremely devastating to vast areas of civilization. This is a trend that cannot be halted by an expansion of the U.S. defense budget nor even by doubling it. But it is a trend that is also adverse to the interests of the Soviet Union. And it is adverse to the interests of the people of all nations.

Thus, there would appear to be a reasonable prospect of changing the trend by a U.S. initiative intelligently conceived and effectively and promptly implemented. It is submitted that U.S. policy should be directed toward reversing this trend. Specifically it is recommended that the U.S., subject to necessary amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and to Constitutional processes, should propose, and pursue with active negotiations, the following program:



- A. An Agreement by the states which now have nuclear weapons (US, USSR, UK) to each provide to the United Nations a small force equipped with nuclear weapons, such as one squadron each, and to maintain such force under the United Nations flag at United Nations bases, for operation under the Security Council in accordance with Section 43 of the United Nations Charter and the United Nations General

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Assembly "Uniting For Peace" Resolution of 1950.

B. An agreement by all states that after July 1, 1957 all production of fissionable materials shall be subject to effective international inspection, and thereafter all such future production shall be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. The installation of the inspection system to be reciprocally instituted promptly and to be completed prior to July 1, 1957.



C. An arrangement be made with the United Kingdom to assure a reasonable UK posture of nuclear weapons prior to July 1, 1957.

D. All states possessing nuclear weapons on July 1, 1957 to negotiate an agreement for equitable reciprocal transfer of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production over to supervised peaceful purposes, thereby reversing the trend toward larger stockpiles of

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fissionable materials devoted to weapons purposes. A very substantial nuclear weapons capability would always be maintained by the United States (and by the USSR and UK) in the foreseeable and conceivable future.

E. All states to agree not to test nuclear or thermonuclear explosions after July 1, 1957 and to permit an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the commitment.



F. All states to agree that any research or development activity directed toward sending objects through outer space or travelling in outer space shall be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes, and shall be open to international participation on a reciprocal basis. Further provide that no outer space or long range missile tests will be conducted without appropriate international participation and that an effective inspection system be installed to verify the fulfillment of the commitment.

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- G. Continue negotiations in accordance with existing policy for the installation of the Eisenhower type aerial inspection system to be combined with the Bulgarian type ground control posts and with financial inspectors, for an effective method of providing against the possibility of great surprise attack; and to verify agreed reductions of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures on a gradual and safeguarded basis.
- H. All agreements to be subject to withdrawal upon a one-year written notice, and to be subject to suspension or partial suspension in such a manner as to safeguard against one-sided consequences of violations.
- I. A small elite NATO Force equipped with nuclear weapons to be established consisting of volunteer personnel from all NATO members, supported by financial contributions from all NATO members, and functioning under the direct command of SHAPE. This will help to maintain the spirit of NATO and will be a factor encouraging further integration of Europe.



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II.

Second: A major shift of the Soviet Union to economic competition, coupled with subversion and political action, if not successfully countered, could lead to a communist takeover of significant uncommitted or free areas and pose a major threat to the longer term security of the United States.

A. This second threat requires: a prompt reduction of the burden of semi-obsolete arms upon all free world countries; a greater reliance, as reflected above, on modern weapons, with added emphasis on research; and a more effective program of economic cooperation and development, including improved methods of trade, payment, and investment, between the five regions of Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and North America.



B. It also requires a shift in U.S. policy particularly directed toward decreasing the U.S. military dollar expenditure abroad, increasing the U.S. private investment in basic

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resources overseas, and bringing the total U.S. payments situation into balance - but all with special care to strengthen rather than weaken the position of sterling.

C. At the same time an economic action program is needed to maximize and accelerate the decentralizing and liberalizing opportunities afforded by the new Soviet policy within the Soviet bloc.

D. Cooperation with the U.S. in the immediate postwar period meant assistance in rebuilding war torn economies. From 1950 to date, when the military threat was uppermost, cooperation with the U.S. meant greater security. Now, with the shift to economic warfare, cooperation with the U.S. means an extra heavy defense burden to carry semi-obsolete arms, extreme restrictions on trade with the communist one-third of the world, and no special trade or payments benefits not available to all nations. An economic



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and political deal with the USSR by a third nation, made contrary to U.S. wishes, currently results only in economic advantages and no penalties. This situation cannot be permitted to continue for long if the economic-political competition is to be uppermost.

E. Access to the U.S. market is one of the most important economic privileges in the world. U.S. standards of economic and political cooperation need revision. After such revision, the violation of the standards must result in penalties, and the fulfillment must result in greater worldwide economic advantages, in all four non-communist regions.



F. In pressing its worldwide economic and political offensive, the Soviet will of necessity ease the penalties and the ruthlessness of its interior system. Unless this is accompanied by a rapid improvement in incentives and in freedom, the result may be an internal deterioration of the Soviet


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economic system and a political decentralization approaching anarchy within a decade. A Soviet attempt to recover absolute centralized power under these circumstances may present one of the most precarious situations and also one of the most favorable opportunities to reduce the long term threat to the U.S. and the free world.



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

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III.

Pending successful negotiation of an agreed opening of the USSR for inspection and control of armament, maximum feasible U.S. effort should be made on the following:

A.



B. Dispersing U.S. nuclear striking power very broadly and at all times, and maintaining a very strong military capability, but with an atmosphere of restraint to minimise an all-out arms race and to hold the free world leadership psychologically.

C. Improving Civilian Defense.

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D. Heavily backing research and development of both  
defensive and offensive weapons.



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6/13/56



UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

(USRO)  
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EO 11652: XGDS 1 2 ⑧ 4

Authorized By: H. D. Brewster

August 4, 1975

2 RUE ST. FLORENTIN  
PARIS 1, FRANCE

June 13, 1956

**SECRET**  
TOP SECRET (With Attachment)  
MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. B. E. L. Timmons  
Director, Office of European Regional Affairs

Subject: Need for NATO Ground Forces in Western Europe.

This is still a draft and not fully vetted here, but I wanted to get it back to you before Bob Kranich leaves as I should appreciate his comments. I enclose an extra copy for the SP group with whom I have had several valuable opportunities to discuss this kind of question.

*Edwin M. Martin*  
Edwin M. Martin  
Acting Chief of Mission

Enclosure:  
Two copies draft memorandum,  
"Need for NATO Ground Forces in Western Europe"

OES  
TS NO 2006  
Copy 1 of 4

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TOP SECRET (With Attachment)

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(V)

## MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Lane Timmons, EUR/RA

From: *Sumner*

Subject: Need for NATO Ground Forces in Western Europe.

I am having increasing difficulty justifying to myself the continued maintenance of NATO ground forces in Western Europe at present levels. Here is where I come out on the various arguments I have heard on their behalf:

## A. In cold war

1. As deterrent to general attack.

This is provided by our strategic bombing capacity with nuclear weapons. Fear of our present ground forces adds nothing substantial to it.

2. As shield for counter-attack bases.

The deterrent effect of the nuclear counterattack depends on our possession of an adequate number of properly dispersed bases. Neither in terms of the growing range of our bomber forces or in terms of the time period in which our counter-attack must succeed or fail are ground forces in Western Europe important to the deterrent. The real threat to the bases is from the air, not the ground. This situation might change if we became dependent on guided missile bases whose dispersion might make them less vulnerable to air attack and whose closeness to Soviet centers might be an important factor in their accuracy. However,

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Memo to Timmons 6/8  
(4 copies)

it seems doubtful that we would ever get into a position in which the Soviets could believe we were so dependent on such bases in Western Europe that their ability to overrun them on the ground quickly would deprive our deterrent power of its persuasiveness.

3. As deterrent to conventional attack under conditions of atomic stalemate.

I do not believe that we are apt ever to get the Soviets into the position of such confidence that we will not use nuclear weapons if they don't, that they will risk an attack confined to conventional weapons, giving us the possibility of nuclear surprise, no matter how weak our ground forces may be. Even if this were not so, it is pretty clear that the forces we now have, using only conventional weapons, are not strong enough to <sup>significantly</sup> deter a Soviet conventional weapon attack. In fact, they are being organized and positioned, on assumption they will not have to engage in conventional warfare, in <sup>a</sup> way which seriously limits their ability to fight without nuclear weapons.

4. As essential complement to nuclear deterrent as "plate glass window".

It is often suggested that these international forces must be maintained in Western Europe to insure that any attack will involve troops of principal NATO allies and ~~hence~~ give assurance they will all be in war from start. As corollary of this it is sometimes argued that presence of US and UK troops in particular is necessary to insure that strategic bombing forces of these countries will be triggered by any attack. Otherwise their deterrent value is reduced. This argument seems fallacious, not just because it disregards obligations undertaken by these countries

under NATO, but more importantly because it assumes the initial attack will be on the ground. Actually, except for the "brush fire war" case, treated later, it seems most unlikely that the "glass" will first be broken by ground action. Those responsible for air defense, especially of airfields, seem certain to have that honor.

5. As psychological reassurance to Western European peoples that their borders are defended.

Present forces have some value from this standpoint. However, it is believed that as peoples gradually become better and better informed of their real value, both to the deterrent and to their protection in case of war, they will feel less and less justified in continuing to put resources into ground forces at present rates. This would be less true if the pressure on resources were less, but it seems clear that the desire to cut defense spending and large expenditures which will be required to give Western Europe even minimum defenses against nuclear air attack will insure a strong desire to cut ground forces expenditures.

6. As deterrents to "brush fire" attacks.

Under present military policies these forces will have an integrated nuclear capability which will severely limit, if not remove entirely, the possibility of employing them as conventional forces against "brush fires." If employed with nuclear weapons our ability to keep the conflict to "brush fire" size seems likely to be reduced materially. In any case, it is very hard to visualize a "brush fire" attack anywhere in Western Europe which would not for broad political and strategic reasons expand immediately into general war. This likelihood that a "brush

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fire" attack could not be limited to that is the real deterrent, not the existence of ground forces with only very limited conventional strength.

7. As defense against occupation of Western Europe by Soviets in case of war.

This is perhaps most valid justification. But two factors reduce its importance. First is that under present technology failure to occupy will not in all probability mean failure to damage. All Western Europe is highly vulnerable to nuclear damage by air on a large scale. This will increase as guided missiles become more available and accurate. Hence the "protection" is somewhat marginal. More important, however, is the political judgment that general war is unlikely and will continue to be so at least so long as the West maintains adequate deterrent power. The greater danger is from economic-political subversion. Since, as noted under the preceding points, these ground forces do not make any significant contribution to that deterrent, it would appear wise to reduce expenditures on them and use these funds on forces contributing more directly to the deterrent and on strengthening the economic position of the West, both internally and in the non-committed areas.

If such a decision were taken, it would probably follow that there should be some adjustments in naval strength. Presumably one might also keep airfields farther to rear.

If it were accepted, I would hope we would use it to agree to some conventional disarmament without nuclear action, or, failing that, get a propaganda blow in as a NATO unilateral contribution to peace and disarmament.

DCM/EMMartin  
June 12, 1956

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

COPY

13 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Toward the Federal Republic  
of Germany, U. S. Policy Toward Berlin and  
U. S. Policy Toward East Germany

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments and recommendations with respect to a memorandum by the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated 12 June 1956, subject as above, in which the NSC Planning Board recommends adoption by the Council of the following draft action:

"Re-affirmed the great interest of the U. S. in obtaining an adequate German defense contribution, but agreed that, in the light of the developing political situation in Germany, the U. S. should not press for a German defense build-up in such a manner as would jeopardize the continuation of a moderate pro-Western West German Government."

2. Current United States policy with respect to Germany, formulated in August 1953 (NSC 160/1), includes five basic objectives and ten courses of action. One of the major objectives has consistently been ".....to enable Germany to participate in the defense of the West and make the greatest possible contribution to the strength of the Free World." Accomplishment of this objective has been long delayed, during which period increasing difficulty has been experienced in obtaining and maintaining national commitments to the military strength of NATO. A further delay in the build-up of German military forces could aggravate this situation. General Gruenther stated on 28th of May this year that he could not give assurance the NATO area could now be defended but when the German contribution is effective "I can tell you that we shall be able to give reasonable assurance in the positive." During the past eleven years, in the interest of the defense of the NATO area the United States has assisted in a major way toward the establishment of a politically and economically stable German state and has stockpiled large quantities of equipment, now available for transfer, to expedite its military build-up.

3. While the wording of the draft statement of action, recommended by the NSC Planning Board, appears on first reading to be innocuous, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are disturbed at its possible connotation. There would seem to be no need for the National Security Council to "Re-affirm the great interest of the U. S. in obtaining an adequate German defense contribution" "....." so long as the objectives and courses of action set forth in NSC 160/1 represent current U. S. policy. While they recognize it may be necessary to

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By

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modify the degree and timing of emphasis on the attainment by the Germans of an early and adequate defense build-up, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel it would be inadvisable to make this a statement of national policy, inasmuch as they consider the objectives set forth in NSC 160/1 are still valid.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff offer no objection to noting the concurrence of the Planning Board in the views of the Operations Coordinating Board, contained in the Progress Reports referenced in the memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the substance of paragraphs 3 and 4 above form the basis for the Department of Defense position with respect to this item, scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council on 14 June 1956.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

ARTHUR W. RUFFORD,  
Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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6/18/56

June 18, 1956

EYES ONLY

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 288th Meeting  
of the National Security Council,  
Friday, June 15, 1956

Present at the 288th Council meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 2); the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 2); Mr. Ralph E. Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 2); the Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration (for Item 2); the Chairmen, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (for Item 2); Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; the Secretary of the Army (for part of Item 2); the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force (for Item 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army (for Item 2); the Chief of Naval Operations (for Item 2); the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force (for Item 2); the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps (for Item 2); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Anderson and Dodge; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Robert C. Sprague, NSC Consultant (for Item 2); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY


The Director of Central Intelligence indicated that recent information pointed to remarkable developments in the industrialization of Communist China, especially in the areas relating to war potential. By the end of the calendar year, he predicted, the Chinese Communists will be producing their own jet fighter aircraft. This, however, will be largely an assembly job. The air frames will be produced in China, but the components and equipment will be of Soviet manufacture. The aluminum industry at Harbin is capable of

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supplying these air frames. Meanwhile, a major naval building effort is occurring in the shipyards at Shanghai under Soviet supervision. Besides a number of smaller craft, the Chinese have launched their first destroyer, modelled on the Soviet "Riga" class. The net of this intelligence, concluded Mr. Dulles, was to indicate some slight measure of Chinese Communist independence of Moscow in these industrial areas.



Mr. Dulles pointed out that the new Soviet Foreign Minister, Shepilov, will visit Cairo on the 18th of June as the ranking visitor during the week of celebration to be staged in Cairo on the occasion of the British departure from the Suez base area. The arrangements for Shepilov's visit had been worked out before he became Foreign Minister, and there is some evidence, said Mr. Dulles, that Nasser is slightly embarrassed over the fact that, despite his new status, Shepilov is nevertheless coming to Cairo. It is thought that Shepilov will bring pressure on the Egyptians to make some dramatic gesture during his visit. For example, Shepilov may try to induce the Egyptians to come to a new decision to accept Soviet assistance for the construction of the High Aswan dam. On this point Mr. Dulles added that this project is certain to cost a great deal more than the Egyptians have estimated to date.

Secretary Humphrey interrupted to express the wish that the United States were out of the High Aswan dam project altogether. While the Egyptians are holding an option on our assistance on the dam project, they are shopping around to see if they can get a better bargain elsewhere.

Continuing with his briefing, Mr. Dulles indicated that another possible Soviet move during Shepilov's visit would be an official announcement of Soviet support for the 1947 UN resolution on the Israeli state. This would, of course, be very embarrassing to the West. Yet another possibility was the announcement of some kind of treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other. In any event, concluded Mr. Dulles, fireworks were to be anticipated in the course of the visit.

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Mr. Dulles remarked that events of the past two months in Pakistan had served to highlight the great difficulties which this strong ally of the United States was encountering. Pakistan was suffering from great political stability as well as acute economic distress. Pakistan's relations with India and Afghanistan continued very bad. A new younger group of politicians was allegedly aspiring to the political leadership of Pakistan, but as yet there appeared to be no serious threat to the leadership of President Mirza, Pakistan's strong man. Meanwhile a near-famine situation existed in East Pakistan, and the Pakistani are hoping to obtain a million tons of relief food from the United States. Finally, the Pakistani plan to bring the Kashmir dispute with India before the United Nations shortly after Nehru's visit to the United States next month.

As the final and most important topic of his intelligence briefing, Mr. Dulles said that he would summarize the latest agreed National Intelligence Estimate with respect to the availability of fissionable material for the Soviet programs both for peaceful uses and for the development of a nuclear capability for war. Recent intelligence had resulted in revising the estimate of availability of fissionable material upward by a [.....]. Very great importance was attached to the estimate by the intelligence community, and accordingly, and because the subject was extremely complicated, Mr. Dulles said he would read the estimate. He touched upon weapons development since the airburst of November 22, 1955. He then discussed the estimated production of plutonium and of U-233. He then touched on the revised estimate of the Soviet production of U-235, which he emphasized had now been revised upward by a [.....]. In this respect he called attention to the dissenting view of two members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, who believed that the production of U-235 should be revised upward by a [.....]. [.....] Lastly, he mentioned the possible allocation of Soviet fissionable material among the various types and sizes of nuclear weapons. He noted the relation of this increased Soviet capability to the conclusions reached in the last study by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee on the net capability of the USSR to inflict damage on the United States by a nuclear attack. He also pointed out the impact of the revised estimate on the Soviet program for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses, both in the USSR and abroad.

Mr. Dulles summed up his findings with the statement that it was estimated that the Soviet Union now has a significant multi-megaton capability and will in the near future have a major multi-megaton capability. In concluding, Mr. Dulles suggested that other members of the Council might like to comment on this new estimate.

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Admiral Radford said he wished to remind the members of the Council of the possibilities of error in this new estimate, which possibilities he said were admitted by those who were responsible for the new estimate. Mr. Dulles said that the possibility of error was clearly admitted by the estimators, and Admiral Radford continued with a statement that the Council should not get the erroneous impression that they had been listening to undoubted facts with respect to the revised estimate of Soviet nuclear capabilities.

The Vice President speculated that [REDACTED] the new estimate might represent a Soviet effort to mislead the Western powers. Mr. Dulles said that for technical reasons it would not be easy for the Russians to fudge our knowledge of their stockpile. [REDACTED]

With reference to the views of the dissenting members of the IAC, the Vice President said that an increase in the Soviet stockpile of U-235 by a [REDACTED] was in itself so significant that he failed to see that it made any real difference whether the increase was by a [REDACTED] or by a [REDACTED], as the majority believed.

Admiral Strauss agreed emphatically with the Vice President that the estimated increase was of enormous significance, whichever estimate was correct. On the other hand, Admiral Strauss said, he was not greatly concerned over the effect of this increase in the amount of fissionable material on the Soviet program for the construction of power reactors for peaceful purposes. Indeed, said Admiral Strauss, he wished the Soviets would divert more of their fissionable material from their stockpile for the power reactor program, since this would mean less for their weapons program. However, he doubted that they would follow this course, and expressed the opinion that the Soviet power reactor program was "largely moonshine".

Admiral Strauss then referred to the so-called Killian Committee timetable with respect to the period at which the Soviet Union could be expected to achieve a multimegaton capability sufficient to launch a crippling or a decisive attack upon the United States. He insisted that when the Killian Committee's timetable had first come to the attention of the National Security Council, he had not believed that it was altogether realistic. He now believed even more emphatically than he had earlier that the critical period for the United States with respect to the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union would be reached at the end of 1957 or at the beginning of 1958, rather than in 1959 as initially set forth in the Killian Committee timetable.

Mr. Dulles then brought up the factor of deliverability of atomic weapons as a crucial part of the Soviet Union's capability to launch a nuclear attack on the United States. He suggested that Admiral Radford comment on this subject.

Admiral Radford replied that he had already pointed out the importance of the deliverability factor, in his 31 May memorandum to Mr. Anderson (transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 7) which the Council now had before it in connection with the subject of continental defense. Moreover, continued Admiral Radford, the so-called new intelligence on the size of the Soviet stockpile of U-235 was in one sense not really new at all. The National Security Council has known for a long time that the United States would at no very distant time have to face up to the situation which was now at hand if the revised estimate was correct. Indeed, in all our planning to date we have assumed that the Soviet Union would have a multimegaton nuclear capability at some future date. According to the new estimate, this date was now nearer rather than more remote.

Secretary Humphrey commented that the net of the new intelligence estimate which had been read by Mr. Dulles, was to emphasize a radical change in the estimate of the time at which the Soviet Union would achieve a multimegaton nuclear capability. Secretary Humphrey then inquired of Mr. Dulles whether the latter felt more secure about the reliability of this new estimate of availability than he had about the previous estimates on this subject. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative, on grounds that much more evidence was available to support this estimate than had been available for its predecessors. It was clear, he added, that the Soviets have been putting a lot more energy into their program for the development of nuclear weapons than they had previously. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the new estimate he had read did not go into the matter of deliverability of weapons because this matter had not been in the specific terms of reference of the new estimate.

Governor Stassen inquired whether if, as the estimate suggested, the Soviets were relatively short in the production of plutonium, this shortage would not be remedied by the securing of plutonium as a by-product of the processing of U-235 in Soviet power reactors. Such plutonium would then be available for the Soviet nuclear weapons program.

Admiral Strauss replied that this was probably true, but that the United States did a better job in this area by making use of a reactor specifically designed to produce plutonium rather than to secure it as a by-product. Admiral Strauss then went on to say that he had been so worried and concerned about the new intelligence on the Soviet stockpile of U-235, that he had gone over the findings

of the estimate with a fine-tooth comb. He added that he was convinced that the new estimate was as nearly correct as we could possibly expect. We were badly enough off if the availability of U-235 to the USSR must be increased by a [REDACTED]. It was much worse, of course, if the stockpile was [REDACTED] as large as we had estimated before the new intelligence became available. Dr. Flemming suggested that it was always possible that they might have even more than [REDACTED] as much as the new estimate suggested. Admiral Strauss admitted that Dr. Flemming might be right, but felt that this was less likely than that they had less than [REDACTED] the amount we had previously estimated that they had.

Mr. Dulles commented that while essentially he did not disagree with the views of Admiral Strauss with respect to the Soviet program for the development of power reactors, the Council should realize that the Soviets are quite prepared to resort to an uneconomic program for the construction of power reactors simply because of the political and propaganda advantages which they might derive from such a power reactor program. Admiral Strauss expressed great doubt that the Soviets would ever be willing to divert large amounts of fissionable materials from their weapons program to be used for their power program. In the same vein, Secretary Humphrey said that the Council did not need to get very excited about any economic activity that was not really economically sound in character.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to increasing Chinese Communist industrial potential; the situation in Israel; the forthcoming visit of the new Soviet Foreign Minister to Cairo; the situation in Pakistan; and the revised estimate of the Soviet stockpile of fissionable material and of the Soviet nuclear power program.

\* \* \* \* \*

As the discussion of the previous item drew to a close, the Vice President said that this discussion led naturally to a consideration of the next item on the Council agenda--namely, continental defense. He said, however, that he would like to interrupt the transition long enough to warn the Council of what bad shape the Administration's mutual security program was in, so



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far as Congress was concerned. Lyndon Johnson had informed him that at a recent poll of Democratic Senators, 31 of these Senators were recorded as favoring the billion-dollar cut made by the House, while only 17 were in favor of restoring at least part of the cuts made by the House.

With respect to this situation, the Vice President said he would like to make two suggestions. First, if General Persons called on any member of the Council to speak in favor of the bill to certain Senators, he hoped that this member would respond favorably. Second, if any member of the Council had any useful proposals to make on the subject, would he please get in touch with Governor Adams or General Persons.

The Vice President then went on to say that what was happening to the mutual security bill represented in a sense another failure on the part of Congress to follow the President's leadership. Despite the fact that the leadership in both houses of the Congress is behind the President's mutual security program, it was significant that while Sam Rayburn favored the Senate committee's proposal to restore part of the cut, all 21 Texas Representatives opposed restoration of the cut. The Vice President said that this vote represented a reaction by these members of the Congress to grass roots opposition to the foreign aid program. Accordingly, we must undertake the urgent job of convincing the Democrats, and especially of convincing the Republicans, to support the Administration's position.

\* \* \* \* \*

## 2. CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

(NSC 5408; NSC Actions Nos. 1417-c and 1430-i; Annex D of NIE 11-56; NIE 11-2-56; NSC 5606; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Implications of the Revised Estimate of Soviet Nuclear Capabilities with Respect to the Conclusions of the 1955 Net Evaluation", dated June 7, 11 and 13, 1956; Memo for All Holders of NSC 5606, dated June 8, 1956; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Continental Defense", dated June 13, 1956; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Status of National Security Programs and Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through Fiscal Year 1959", dated June 13, 1956)

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council in considerable detail and at great length on the contents of NSC 5606. (A copy of Mr. Anderson's briefing note is included in the minutes of the meeting.) At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson's briefing, the Vice President turned to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Secretary Humphrey said he wished to state that NSC 5606 represented a most timely development and one of the greatest possible significance. We were now face to face clearly with a situation that all of us had for a long time realized was a strong possibility. This derived not merely from the new intelligence on increased Soviet nuclear capabilities, but was also the result of the tendency of the National Security Council and the Executive agencies to construct piecemeal national security programs as we went along. As Admiral Radford had so often remarked in the Council, we have been adding on new requirements steadily, and they had now led to incredible future expenditures which were in fact far beyond anything which the Administration was actually contemplating. This particular report on continental defense policy very well illustrates the general point he had just been making, with this terrific jump in expenditures for the continental defense of the United States. Moreover, for the moment at least there was apparently no reduction contemplated in any other national security program to compensate for the proposed great increase in the program for continental defense. On the contrary, all the other national security programs were continuing to require increased expenditure. Accordingly, the President's recent request in connection with the annual reports on the status of each of the national security programs, as of the 30th of June, should contain three-year projections of costs, was absolutely essential. Only thus could the National Security Council at an early date get a glance at the over-all picture of our programs and their estimated cost over the next few years. If the picture for all these other national security programs looked like the picture presented by the present report on the continental defense programs, this would involve a drastic reconsideration of our national security objectives, where we are and where we were going in the future.

In short, continued Secretary Humphrey, the people of the United States haven't any idea in the world that their Government plans expenditures of the magnitude suggested by the estimates in NSC 5606. If we propose to make such expenditures in the future, this will involve drastic changes in our national security policies and a very great effort to readjust the thinking of the American people along very different lines. In point of fact, they are at present thinking in terms of a tax reduction rather than a tax increase. In fact, the Administration is going to have a real battle on its hands in trying to avoid a tax reduction this year. In conclusion, Secretary Humphrey repeated his view that the present report on continental defense policies was one of the most important things that the Council had ever done, and we must go on from here to get similar reports on the other major national security programs, in order that at long last we could see the over-all picture of where we are going and what we are going to do about it.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget then stated that he wished in the first instance strongly to support the position taken by Secretary Humphrey. Thereafter, however, Mr. Brundage said he thought that the reports mentioned by Secretary Humphrey should be supplemented by still other reports to make the over-all picture complete. Thus Mr. Brundage called for a report from Governor Stassen on the prospects for peace and disarmament. He called for a report by Secretary Dulles (who had joined the meeting when the subject of NSC 5606 came up) for a report on the diplomatic and political outlook. Finally, he called for a report "by our sociologists and educators" as to what kind of a country the citizens of the United States would like to have in the course of the coming years.

Dr. Flemming said that he would like to make two comments to the Council. First, he wished to state his complete agreement with the views just enunciated by the Secretary of the Treasury. Indeed, we did need the frame of reference for which Secretary Humphrey was calling, and Mr. Lay's directive that the June 30 status reports should each contain three-year cost projections was of great significance. These reports would provide the checklist of all our basic national security policies and programs. When we sat down and put all these together, we would know what we were doing and where we were going.

Secondly, Dr. Flemming said he wished to comment on the specific paper before the Council, NSC 5606. He felt that this report on continental defense placed before the National Security Council the most serious situation that the Council had faced since it had originally got together at the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration. This was especially true in terms of the so-called timetable. It was now clear that we had much less time than we thought we had before the Soviet Union will have achieved a capability to deliver a crippling or decisive attack on the United States. At this point Dr. Flemming summarized the so-called Killian Committee timetable, with particular respect to Period III-B, the period in which, unless our continental defense programs were fully effective and kept up, the Soviet Union would have achieved the capability of a decisive surprise attack on the United States. The Killian Committee had said that such a period as III-B could come as early as 1958. Dr. Flemming believed that it was now clear that this period could approach earlier than 1958, and might even now be imminent. Accordingly, the present paper must be considered by the National Security Council in the light of this possibility.

Dr. Flemming then said that he had appreciated the position taken by his representative on the NSC Planning Board, Dr. Elliott, when he had stated, contrary to the view of the majority,

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that even before 1958 the USSR may be able to develop a net capability to strike a possibly decisive blow at the United States; whereas the majority on the Planning Board had used the term "a crippling attack" (paragraph 1 of NSC 5606). However, Dr. Flemming went on to say that he was not concerned with arguing about wording, in view of the fact that the Council had heard in the last Net Evaluation Subcommittee report that casualties in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States would run as high as 24 million people. Even if casualties of this magnitude implied only a crippling rather than a decisive attack, such casualty figures were quite enough in their significance for Dr. Flemming.

Thereafter, Dr. Flemming pointed out that the proposed continental defense program in its entirety provided one of the most effective deterrents to war that could be imagined. Accordingly, it was essential that the continental defense program be kept strong. This, of course, raised the question of accelerating certain continental defense programs. This precise question was not before the Council today, and would only come before the Council in July, after reports by the Department of Defense on the vulnerability of SAC bases and other problems. Certainly, however, if the Council agreed that phase III-B of the Killian Committee timetable was likely to come earlier than 1958, then clearly the NSC must come to grips with the issue of accelerating the programs for continental defense. When this issue is thoroughly investigated, it may become clear that the main problem is the specific timing of expenditures for continental defense, rather than the amount of accumulating expenditure for continental defense over a long period of years.

Dr. Flemming concluded by stating his desire strongly to emphasize the significance of the new civil defense program. As he had suggested earlier, human resources may emerge as the limiting factor on the ability of the United States to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack. Despite this fact, the Council and the Administration had never really come to grips with the problem of civil defense. Dr. Flemming was sure that NSC 5606 was sound in calling for greater Federal emphasis and direction of the civil defense program. He urged that the issue of civil defense be met by the Council head-on, something which it had refused to do up to this point. Such a head-on confrontation was, of course, bound to have significant fiscal implications.

The Vice President commented that from his reading of the Financial Appendix to NSC 5606, the programs in which the rising costs were most notable for the future were in (1) the area of civil defense and (2) defense against air vehicles. Dr. Flemming agreed with the Vice President, but pointed out that the projected increase in civil defense would occur only after the policy set

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forth in NSC 5606 was agreed to by the Council and the President, and not otherwise. By and large, Dr. Flemming said; he thought the civil defense program was the single most important proposal in this new policy statement.

Mr. Ralph Spear then asked the Vice President's permission to give to the National Security Council the views of Governor Peterson on the civil defense program, explaining that, unhappily, Governor Peterson was unable to be present himself. Mr. Spear said that Governor Peterson felt strongly, as did Dr. Flemming, he judged, that this Administration had simply not come to grips with the civil defense problem in the United States. All kinds of studies had been made within the Government and outside. The results of nearly all of these studies agreed that a stronger Federal role was essential if civil defense was ever to be at all effective. With respect to the costly shelter program alluded to in NSC 5606, Mr. Spear pointed out that existing law places on the Federal Civil Defense Administrator responsibility for the development of measures to minimize casualties and damage. Governor Peterson felt that in this situation he had one of two major choices. On the one hand, he could put reliance on measures to evacuate people from our cities or to measures for dispersal. The other alternative was to provide shelter against the weight of nuclear weapons. These were the two alternatives, and certainly the present law contemplated some kind of shelter program, the costs of which were to be shared by the Federal Government and the States and municipalities. Unhappily, however, it had never been possible to get appropriations, up to now, for such a shelter program. Moreover, as we now look ahead to the period when intercontinental ballistic missiles might be employed, and when warning time would be a matter of only a few minutes, it seemed foolish to put very much reliance on measures of evacuation as opposed to the development of a shelter program.

Nevertheless, said Mr. Spear, Governor Peterson did not feel that if the Council adopted NSC 5606, paragraph 24 of that paper would give him carte blanche to start out on an extensive shelter program. Such a shelter program would, of course, go through the normal budgetary processes, just as did all other continental defense programs. Indeed the estimate of the cost of the shelter program, as set forth in the Financial Appendix to NSC 5606, could be described as so soft as to be virtually liquid. The truth of the matter was that FCDA simply did not yet have the basic figures on which to reach firm conclusions as to the probable cost of a shelter program. For example, they did not know as yet how much shelter was already available and at hand in many of our large cities. Findings on this subject could, of course, greatly influence the estimated cost figures for a shelter program. In point of fact, then, all that we really have at the present time are the rough

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estimated costs of beginning a shelter program; that is, Mr. Spear emphasized, the total costs to be borne both by the States and by the Federal Government. It could be that these total costs could reach ultimately a figure of \$20 billion. In conclusion, Mr. Spear repeated again that, regardless of Council action on NSC 5606, Governor Peterson would not regard such action as giving him a green light to proceed on an elaborate shelter program. He would, however, feel obliged to come up with a shelter program which would thereafter be subject to the normal budgetary process.

Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson said that in the Department of Defense it was felt that the approach of NSC 5606, in looking at the total continental defense program, was the wise approach. Moreover, he said, he agreed with Secretary Humphrey's point that other programs related to continental defense were bound likewise to show large increases. An example of this was the program for increasing the production of B-52 bombers. In regard to defense against air vehicles, Secretary Robertson said that the work of the Defense Department boiled down to three major areas: (1) provision of tactical warning of attack; (2) ways and means of destroying attacking enemy planes; (3) remedying the vulnerability of SAC. All three of these areas, continued Secretary Robertson, were now the subject of intensive study and work in the Defense Department. Even at this point in the study it had become clear that costs in all these areas would end up being substantially higher than originally estimated. Thus, originally it was estimated that the Distant Early Warning line would cost \$100 million. It was now estimated that the DEW line would cost \$400 million. In the face of facts such as these, the Defense Department was making every conceivable effort to eliminate duplication. Even so, we will have, predicted Secretary Robertson, very fundamental decisions to make in the near future.

With respect to these comments of Secretary Robertson, the Vice President observed that there was now in the Congress very strong pressure for increased strength and effectiveness of the nation's retaliatory striking power. This pressure came from both political parties. Secretary Robertson replied to the Vice President by stating that the Defense Department felt that the current program for increasing our retaliatory striking power was a sound program, in that it kept our striking power in harmony and in step with the development of our defenses against Soviet striking power.

At this point, Mr. Anderson suggested that the Vice President might wish to call on Mr. Robert Sprague, NSC Consultant on Continental Defense, who had made valuable contributions to the Planning Board in the course of the formulation of NSC 5606.

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Mr. Sprague said that it seemed to him that in analyzing this enormously complex problem of continental defense, there was one point which struck home most forcibly. Both in our basic national security policy, NSC 5602/1, and in this new proposed continental defense policy, NSC 5606, there was an underlying assumption from which everything else followed in logical sequence. This was the assumption that, as of mid-1956, the United States would have achieved the capability to launch a decisive attack on the USSR. Further in the assumption was the estimate that the USSR would be able by mid-1958, now up-dated to mid-1957, to launch a crippling attack on the United States, though it was assumed that the United States would be able to recover from such a crippling attack to the point of being able to retaliate against the USSR and to destroy it. Mr. Sprague said that as he understood our national policy and programs, there was little that we could do, in view of Soviet capabilities, to prevent the killing of millions of our people if the Soviet Union chose to launch an attack. We could, however, and it was indeed our policy to preserve our massive retaliatory capability and to be able to destroy the USSR if the latter should undertake to attack the United States.

This being the assumption underlying NSC 5602/1 and NSC 5606, Mr. Sprague went on to emphasize his conviction that if certain of our continental defense programs, as set forth in NSC 5606, were not promptly accelerated, the assumption would no longer hold good and the USSR would be in a position not merely to launch a crippling attack, but actually a decisive attack, not later than mid-1958 and possibly sooner. This was so vitally important that Mr. Sprague suggested a recognition of this importance should be made by the inclusion of new language in both NSC 5602/1 and NSC 5606. For this reason, he said, he had written out what seemed to him appropriate language.

Mr. Sprague went on to say that while granting the fact of an increasing nuclear capability on the part of the U. S. Navy, for instance, he was nevertheless sure that SAC was still the main reliance of the United States in carrying out its basic policy of being able to launch a massive retaliatory attack. Accordingly, the ability of SAC to retaliate must, above all other things, be made secure. After this, Mr. Sprague read to the Council the proposed language mentioned above, which he recommended should be included at the end of paragraph 1 of NSC 5606. In general, Mr. Sprague's language stressed the need to accelerate certain continental defense programs, because otherwise the USSR might be in a position to launch a decisive attack on the United States as early as mid-1958.

In conclusion, Mr. Sprague commented on the vital importance that SAC be in a position to get the required percentage of SAC planes off bases and in the air within the estimated warning time of Russian attack. Mr. Sprague said that he did not know what the required percentage was--whether 50% of the planes on the ground, more, or less. But in any case, enough must be got off the ground so that they would not be destroyed and would be able to retaliate massively against the Soviet Union. That a sufficient percentage of SAC planes could thus be got off the ground within the estimated tactical warning time, was not likely under present programs and schedules.

When Mr. Sprague had concluded his observations, the Vice President said that his immediate reaction was to invite the response of the Department of Defense. The Vice President added that he understood that the Department of Defense would give its reactions to Mr. Sprague's recommendations in the course of next month.

At this point, Secretary Humphrey inquired of Mr. Anderson as to when the Council might ~~be~~ expect to obtain the reports of the so-called Prochnow Committee dealing with anticipated expenditures by the United States on military and economic assistance to certain foreign nations. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that the Council had now received a full report on the continental defense programs. It would get status reports on all of our Defense Department policies as of June 30 shortly thereafter. However, we did not have the status reports on foreign assistance, and until we got the whole picture the magnitude of the whole national security problem would not be clear. He then inquired of Mr. Anderson when the Defense Department status reports and the Prochnow Committee reports would come to the Council for consideration.

Mr. Anderson replied that the annual status reports on the national security programs of the various departments and agencies covering the period through June 30, 1956, would probably not be available for Council consideration earlier than August or September. To this information, Secretary Humphrey responded by stating that piecemeal status reports don't do very much good. Even this present report on continental defense, good as it was, wasn't much use to the Council except as a warning. Certainly these status reports wouldn't be really effective until all of them could be looked at together.

Agreeing with Secretary Humphrey, Dr. Flemming commented on the necessity of speeding up Council consideration of all the status reports on the national security programs. If the Council had to wait for all these reports to come in until next September, this might be too late a date for effective action in terms of the budgetary processes.



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The Vice President likewise agreed on the need for a speed-up in the receipt of these reports. He pointed out that if what the Council had been hearing this morning was correct, a decision on the continental defense policy of the United States certainly could not wait very long, especially if the Council proposed to accelerate the development of these continental defense programs.

Secretary Humphrey again inquired why the Council could not get the status reports earlier than next autumn. Could we not advance the cut-off date from June 30 to the present time and thus hasten the compilation of the final returns?

Mr. Anderson explained the great difficulties involved in getting out the annual status reports and the three-year cost projections. He was seconded by Secretary Robertson, who explained to the Council that the authorities in the Defense Department had just presented him with their first "look-see" as to the prospects for the Fiscal Year 1958 Defense Department budget. Although this look-see was in a very preliminary stage, a very great rise in expenditures, even greater than the Joint Chiefs of Staff had estimated, seemed to be in the cards.

Secretary Humphrey commented that the Financial Appendix to NSC 5606 indicated a rise in costs for continental defense from about \$3 billion currently to approximately \$11 billion in 1960. If this was the situation in continental defense, Secretary Humphrey deduced that the total expenditures for the Department of Defense would probably rise from their current \$40 billion a year to \$60 billion or \$80 billion in 1960 and thereafter. If anything like this really happened, the Administration would be faced with the gravest problems. The approach of the Administration to such problems, combined with achieving understanding of them by the American people, would be a tremendous undertaking. Accordingly, he repeated that at the very earliest possible date the Council must become aware of the trends of where our policies for national defense were going to lead us.

Admiral Radford expressed the feeling that there was no particular need to await all the details of the June 30 status reports in order for the Council to be in a position to tackle the problem just mentioned by Secretary Humphrey. In broad terms, at least, the relevant figures could be presented to the Council much sooner than next fall. Secretary Humphrey said that that was essentially what we needed and what he believed was possible. Admiral Radford went on to comment in the same vein that essentially he had heard nothing new about the situation in the course of the Council's deliberations on NSC 5606. He had anticipated everything that the Council had been listening to this morning about the magnitude of

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the problem. Secretary Humphrey agreed with Admiral Radford, but stressed the fact that it was important to get the conclusions on paper so that we could see where to go.

Governor Stassen commented that the Administration was currently carrying out in the military field a number of concepts, strategies, and preparations which were no longer valid, although they had been valid when first undertaken five or six years ago. Five years ago we had all believed that the first line of defense of the United States lay in Western Europe. Now, with what we know about the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union, we have come to feel that our front line is in our massive retaliatory capability and in the stability of the American economy. The situation currently in the air is a very different situation from that which existed five years ago. This indicates that we should contemplate a major shift in the emphasis of our defense programs and, accordingly, in our allocation of our resources for defense. We do not have to wait for the returns of the status reports to realize that we simply cannot carry out all of our military programs, both those that were valid five years ago and those that we deem valid now, without facing an absolutely impossible financial burden.

Secretary Humphrey said that Governor Stassen had put his finger on the essence of the problem. He again called for getting all the facts and figures together so that the Council could decide on what we could continue to do and what we could not do. Secretary Robertson said he believed that the requirements called for by Secretary Humphrey could be provided at least before August. Admiral Radford concurred in this opinion of Secretary Robertson.

Dr. Flemming said that he wished to be sure that these figures were to include all national security programs and not merely those national security programs for which the Department of Defense was responsible. Secretary Humphrey said that this was indeed the case, and called on Mr. Anderson to get all this material together as soon as possible and present it to the National Security Council.

Admiral Radford intervened to express his agreement with the points made by Governor Stassen in arguing that we have been following both old outmoded concepts of getting ready for a possible future war, as well as new and more valid ones. He also agreed that such a dual course of action was impossible.

Governor Stassen pointed out that when the results of the three-year projections of the costs of all national security programs had been put together and brought before the Council, these reports should have included in them the factors reflecting the growth of

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the U. S. economy and national income over the next three years. Otherwise the forthcoming reports would not be all-inclusive. Secretary Humphrey indicated his agreement with this suggestion, but pointed out that the rate of the growth of our economy and our national income had been much slower than the rate of our expenditures for national security.

The Vice President observed that it was all very well for the members of the National Security Council to discuss here what we should do and should not do with respect to getting rid of outmoded military concepts. On the other hand, the Secretary of State may well have something to say about what is feasible and what is not feasible from a political point of view with respect to dumping old concepts and defense strategies.

Dr. Flemming then expressed the hope that all these figures which the Council had been calling for could be got together in perhaps thirty days. Thereafter he recommended that the National Security Council have a two- or three-day meeting to consider all the implications of these figures.

Mr. Anderson then suggested an appropriate form of Council action on NSC 5606. He pointed out that NSC 5606 contained an estimated three-year projection of the costs of the continental defense policies that were recommended. He went on to say that the Council could and would obtain similar three-year projections for all the other national security programs by next month. Thus all the cost elements could be brought together in a single paper by late July. This being the case, Mr. Anderson recommended that the National Security Council postpone any action on NSC 5606 until this date.

The Vice President said that this seemed suitable to him if there were no objections from other members of the Council. Dr. Flemming interjected the hope that by this time the Federal Civil Defense Administration could have priced out more firmly the probable costs of its proposed shelter program.

The Vice President then went on to suggest that the Council might now set a target date for its meeting on the status reports on the national security programs. He pointed out that certainly the President himself should be on hand when the Council considered matters of such great significance. Accordingly, the Vice President suggested that this problem be scheduled on the agenda of the National Security Council for the first meeting at which the President would be available to preside. This he thought might well be some time around July 15 or 20.

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Governor Stassen said that he had one last thought to express before the Council finished its discussion. He referred to paragraph 26 of NSC 5606, which dealt with the problem of public education and participation in the continental defense effort. He invited the Planning Board to consider the kind of education the U. S. public should have--namely, to be convinced that whatever kind of attack would be made against the United States, the United States would survive the attack, win the war, and rebuild from the ruins. In short, we must instill courage and belief in victory in our people. We must exercise leadership. The people of the United States must know that their leaders are convinced that the country will come through any ordeal that it may be called upon to face.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5606, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to the reference NSC Actions, and the views of the Chairman, Net Evaluation Subcommittee, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, transmitted by the reference memoranda of June 7, 11 and 13, respectively; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 13 on "Continental Defense".
- b. Deferred action on NSC 5606 pending earliest practicable Council consideration of the estimated three-year projection of all national security programs and the fiscal and budgetary outlook thereon being prepared pursuant to the President's directive circulated by the reference memorandum on "Status of National Security Programs and Fiscal and Budgetary Outlook Through Fiscal Year 1959", dated June 13.
- c. Agreed that each department or agency responsible for preparing an annual status report should be requested to submit, not later than July 15, 1956, the estimated projection of its program for the next three years, being prepared pursuant to the President's directive; without awaiting the completion of the regular annual report on the status of its program as of June 30, 1956. The object of this action is to facilitate the early action contemplated in b above. Each estimated three-year projection should clearly identify and project the status of the principal elements of each program in achieving the objectives in applicable national security policies, particularly NSC 5602/1; together with expenditure estimates related to each of these elements.

NOTE: The action in c above transmitted to all appropriate departments and agencies for implementation.


S. Everett Gleason

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3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,  
U. S. POLICY TOWARD BERLIN, and  
U. S. POLICY TOWARD EAST GERMANY


(NSC 160/1; NSC 5404/1; NSC 174; Progress Report, dated January 7, 1955, by OCB on NSC 5404/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1303 and 1503-b; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 29 and June 12 and 14, 1956)

At this point there was some discussion as to whether sufficient time was left for Council consideration of the next item, which consisted of three Progress Reports on German problems. It was finally agreed that in any case there was sufficient time to deal with any policy recommendations which might arise in the course of consideration of these reports. Accordingly, Mr. Anderson commenced to brief the National Security Council with respect to progress in carrying out NSC 160/1, dealing with U. S. policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany.




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The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on NSC 160/1 transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 29, the views of the NSC Planning Board circulated by the reference memorandum of June 12, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 14; but agreed that it was not necessary or desirable to record the Action recommended by the NSC Planning Board in the reference memorandum of June 12.
- b. Noted the reference Progress Report on NSC 5404/1, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 29.

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- c. Noted the reference Progress Report on that part of NSC 174 relating to East Germany, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 29; and directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare for Council consideration a supplement to NSC 160/1 on U. S. policy toward East Germany, in accordance with NSC Action No. 1530-b.

*S. Everett Gleason*

S. Everett Gleason

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Document No. 1Unofficial Translation

Bonn, June 22, 1956

P e r s o n a lSee raw  
146

The Honorable

The Secretary of State of the  
United States of America,

John Foster Dulles,

Department of State ,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

There is talk here that after November Bulgarin and Khrushchev will be invited to Washington. As far as I can determine, this talk springs from Russian sources. I believe that I need not stress to you that an invitation of this type would be looked upon in Germany as a complete reversal of the foreign policy pursued by America up until this time and that the policies of the Federal Republic would be damaged thereby.

Even if I place no credence in this talk I still wished to express my views to you in writing on a strictly personal basis.

With cordial best wishes

Sincerely



DULLES, JOHN FOSTER PAPERS, 1952-59


SUBJECT SERIES

/s/ ADENAUER

(Adenauer)

Box 1, Adenauer

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June 30, 1956

Personal and Private

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Secretary Dulles, before leaving for a few days vacation, asked me to inform you on a strictly personal basis of a note which he received from Chancellor Adenauer. The note dated June 22, was delivered by hand in a sealed envelope by Ambassador Krekeler. The reply which the Secretary dictated and signed yesterday, will be delivered by me, also in a sealed envelope, today to Ambassador Krekeler for transmission to the Chancellor. Knowledge of this exchange has been limited in the Department to the Secretary and Mr. Hoover.

The Chancellor's note told of rumors he had heard regarding a prospective invitation which would be extended after the November elections to Bulganin and Khrushchev to come to Washington. The Chancellor stated that such an invitation would be regarded in Germany as a reversal of foreign policies pursued by the United States, and would be of great damage to the policies of the Federal Republic.

The Secretary in his reply assured the Chancellor that no such invitation was now being contemplated nor did he foresee any situation developing that would make such an invitation seem desirable. The Secretary added that if we ever reached the point where such an invitation was being given serious thought, the view which the Chancellor represented would be given great weight.

The Secretary went on to say that he had recently been giving much thought with respect to East Germany as a result of the recent developments in Russia and the satellites following the publication of the Khrushchev speech. The Secretary referred to his remarks in his press conference earlier this week to the effect that the Russians cannot maintain iron rule without terrorism, and yet they cannot reconcile terrorism with their new professions and their now public attacks on Stalin for his terrorism.

The Honorable  
James B. Conant,  
United States  
Ambassador,  
Bonn.

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Authority	ME 87-225 #1
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SUBJECT SERIES

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER  
Box 1, Adenauer  
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Personal and Private

- 2 -

The Secretary's reply indicated that he would be most interested in having the Chancellor's views regarding the current situation in East Germany.

Sincerely yours,



William B. Macomber, Jr.

S:WBMacomber, Jr.:jm

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Translation

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7/22/56  
Federal Chancellor K. Adenauer

Rhöndorf, 22 July 1956

Honourable John Foster Dulles,  
Secretary of State,  
State Department,  
Washington, D.C.



Dear Mr. Secretary of State,

In view of our friendly relations of many years' standing may I be permitted - Ambassador Krekeler, who came to see me at my request, having essentially confirmed recent newspaper reports - to present to you personally my ideas concerning the situation that seems to be developing.

1) Even though details have not yet been fixed and though the intentions and plans of the United States have not yet been submitted to NATO, the basic tendency of these intentions seems to be clearly discernible by now. This basic tendency consists in the perfection and increase of nuclear weapons accompanied by a neglect and decrease of conventional weapons. The latter are receding into the background while United States strength is concentrating upon nuclear weapons.

2) The Russians are thus being forced to proceed along parallel lines, i.e. to increase their potential in nuclear

Adenauer P/WHM/5/Mt95 w Pres. Aug Ann Dec 1956 (8)

F-PAV 55-57 26 p/199a - This letter not declassified (pub 1992)



weapons with all their strength, involving, if necessary, the neglect of conventional weapons. They are sure to attain parity with the United States in nuclear weapons before long.

3) In complete contrast to the policy pursued so far by the United States, this policy means the abandonment of disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons.

4) Since conventional weapons are receding into the background, any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, even if arising from a cause of no decisive importance in itself, will be a nuclear war, i.e. a war spelling complete annihilation for the major part of mankind.

5) In a nuclear war the first hour will probably be decisive. Nuclear war therefore implies preventive war.

6) As the Soviet Union, considering its whole mentality, will risk a preventive war more readily than the United States, the concentration of forces upon nuclear war means the annihilation of the United States, and over and above this, as I have already said, of the major part of mankind, particularly Europe including Britain.

7) No one whose basic attitude is determined by Christianity and ethics can justify such a development before God and his conscience. Everyone is committed by his Christian conscience to work with all his strength for a controlled disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons first and foremost. The German Federal Republic will take this attitude.

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8) Even the plans and intentions of the United States Government as voiced so far are having a disastrous effect in Europe. The Soviet Union may thereby gain its largest and perhaps decisive victory in the cold war because Europe including Germany is losing confidence in the reliability of the United States. - These plans are regarded as clear proof of the fact that the United States in arming for military defence does not feel strong enough to keep at least on a par with the Soviet Union. The political consequences will become apparent very soon unless the United States very decidedly abandons such plans.

I have, dear Mr. Secretary of State, described the entire situation and coming developments in as brief and precise a form as possible.

After most mature and conscientious examination I repeat that this policy cannot be reconciled with the principles of Christianity and Humanism. This is why I feel it incumbent upon me to write to you so earnestly and emphatically. I leave it to your discretion to use this letter, also as regards the President, as you see fit. I pray to God that He may guide and lead you.

Yours, as always, most cordially,

(sgd.) Adenauer

8/10/56

8/10/56

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 10, 1956

Personal and Political

SECRET

Dear Mr. President:

Particularly in view of General Gruenther's being here, I think you should see Chancellor Adenauer's personal letter to me about the United States military posture and the draft of the reply on which I am working now.

I think the Chancellor has been already somewhat "straightened out", but he is particularly sensitive because he feels that he is risking his political life on a program for German and conventional rearmament, while many of his political opponents, and indeed many within his own party, seem to feel that this is outmoded and that this is shown by United States policy.

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles

Enclosures

Draft reply

Letter from Chancellor Adenauer, July 22, 1956  
to Secretary Dulles

The President  
The White House

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 81-7#2  
By LIC 4/6/84

Dulles P / WHM / 5 / Mags & Pres. Aug - Dec 1956 (8)

8/16/56

Personal and Confidential

DRAFT #3 - 8/10/56

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Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I have received and pondered your letter of July 22. I wholly agree with you that the prospect of nuclear war is so terrible that all means should be taken to seek to avert it. You can be confident that that attitude pervades our Government. None of us enjoys seeing our nation in the business of making weapons which can so disastrously affect all humanity.

The question is what to do? We have done all that we can think of to bring about some agreed and dependable elimination of this threat.

You will recall that immediately after the end of the Second World War when the United States had a monopoly of atomic weapons we offered to give up that monopoly and to turn over to an international agency of the United Nations the entire control of the production and use of atomic energy

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Outlets P/WHM/5/Mtgs w Poles. Aug thru Dec 1956 (8)



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so as to assure that it could not be used for destructive purposes. This proposal the Soviet Union rejected, being determined itself to develop this field of atomic missiles.



The attitude thus expressed in 1946 has continuously been evident in our policies. You will recall that in December 1954, President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace" proposal where he asked the Soviets to agree with us to put fissionable material in a world bank for peaceful purposes. So far this proposition, now nearly two years old, is still in the debating stage, primarily because of Soviet refusals and equivocations.

Last March President Eisenhower proposed that after a date to be agreed upon, production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. The Soviets have never even taken note of this proposal which was personally made by President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin.

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We are earnestly studying further proposals that can be made, as suggested in President Eisenhower's letter of August 4 to Chairman Bulganin. We have not ceased, and never shall cease, to think of ways to meet the peril you refer to.



If only the Soviets would accept the type of strict and thorough international control which we have repeatedly proposed, then many other things would readily follow. Here again the Soviet Union has been obdurate.

For us to desist from making these new weapons on a one-sided basis would not contribute to the security of the free world or to peace.

Surely we would not wish a situation to exist where the Soviet Union had preeminence in this field and could use that preeminence to dominate the world and impose its will. I cannot think of any worse fate than for the world to acquiesce in a situation where this vast power was in the hands of men who profess to be atheists and materialists, who accept no moral

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inhibitions of action which might seem to promote their power.

Therefore, the United States is determined, unless and until there can be a dependable system of control, to maintain military power in these new weapons sufficient, we believe, to deter their use by the Soviet Union. In view of the rejection by Soviet leaders of moral restraints, these other deterrents must be provided.



We recognize, as you say, that the mentality of the Soviet rulers is such that they would risk a war when the United States would never do so. But we are taking constant steps to assure that if they should do so, the first hour would not be decisive in their favor. The situation is such, and we are confident and determined that it will remain such, that no initial strike could destroy our retaliatory power. And so long as that is the case, we believe that the Soviets will not strike.

You say that the Federal Republic will work with all its strength for a controlled disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons. I

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can assure you that we welcome this approach and can in this matter stand side by side. I beg you, however, not to assume that this is an easy task. We have been through ten years of frustration. But we are still determined and welcome your country as a comrade in this struggle.

You suggest that the development of new weapons and United States concentration upon maintaining a position of deterrence in this respect is leading us too much to neglect conventional forces.



It is, of course, true that our military establishment has constantly been adjusted and adapted over the last decade to take account of the changes in weapons and technology. President Eisenhower, in his press conference of August 8, had this to say:

"There is a streamlining coming about. I don't believe in talking of reduction because when you are talking about defense forces you are talking about their power, their effectiveness, their capability.

Personal and Private

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"And the mere fact that now one man can shoot a machine gun at the rate of 700 rounds a minute, and it used to take in the flintlock days about 1400 men to get off that many shots, it doesn't mean you have had any reduction of power because you have one man shooting them instead of 1400, does it?

"Well, now, that is the kind of thing that we ought to apply intelligently as we go along. Otherwise, we are being stupid, as I see it."

At the same time we have been constantly aware of the importance of maintaining flexible capability in responding to any aggression. We have maintained and will continue to maintain such capability.



Accordingly, I cannot see in our program any basis for Europe losing confidence in the reliability of the United States.

Personal and Private

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Never has any nation in history pursued so unswerving a course of enlightened unselfishness as has the United States during recent years. We have, contrary to our traditions and our instinctive desires, maintained a powerful military establishment, particularly since the Korean war showed that need. We have, through grants or loans, in the past decade given "foreign aid" in amounts which aggregate \$50 or \$60 billion. This year the Congress appropriated approximately \$1 billion more for "foreign aid" than last year, and this was during an election year where such appropriations are intensely unpopular. We are at the present time dedicating <sup>over</sup> approximately 10% of our gross national production to our military establishment and this figure is more apt to increase than to decrease. We are now maintaining about 3 million people under arms under a two-year conscription law. We are committed by treaty to common defense with 42 other nations of the world and there is no

Personal and Private  
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slightest evidence that we are not prepared to live up to our commitments.

If all this adds up to "undependability", I wonder how "dependability" should be measured; and also where it is to be found? Of course, we do not attempt to maintain in Europe, and in Asia, and in the Middle East, United States ground forces equal to any that could be thrown against these areas from the Soviet-Chinese land mass. For us to attempt that would be folly, and would add up not to strength but to weakness. We consider that our role is to maintain the strength which will deter open Soviet aggression in these areas. But such a deterrent would never be created if we scattered our strength all around the world, since we could not conceivably be strong enough at every point around the 25 thousand mile orbit of the Soviet-Chinese Communist world to match its striking power. To attempt that would be folly.

I do not believe for a moment that the need for ground forces has passed away. Recent developments in relation to the Suez reemphasize

Personal and Private

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that point. What we face is a problem of sharing responsibilities. The United States can take, and is taking, the main burden of keeping ahead of the Soviet Union with respect to non-conventional weapons. This is a very heavy and expensive task indeed. We are also maintaining, and will maintain, a substantial ground force. But as we carry the part of the task which seems most appropriate for us, should not the free countries of Europe and Asia, with their large reserves of manpower, carry the part of the task most appropriate for them? A particular responsibility, I feel, devolves upon the "divided" countries, because they can be subjected to so-called "civil war", as was attempted in Korea. Both the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam are responding to this responsibility and I believe that you are eternally right in urging upon your country that it also should respond. If it should fail to do so, then your great nation would, I feel, be lacking in its indispensable contribution to the common cause.



Personal and Private

SECRET



This letter is written in a very personal and spontaneous way.

It is not an official pronouncement of my Government, but it reflects my deep personal convictions and is written as a friend to a friend whom I deeply respect and admire.

Faithfully yours,

8/11/56  
H. J. ...

8/11/56

Personal and Private

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

August 11, 1956

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Saturday, August 11, 1956 - 8:30 a.m. - JFD



With General Persons in attendance, we discussed the Leadership Meeting called for Sunday noon. We discussed briefly and agreed upon the order and general nature of presentation of the President, myself and Mr. Flemming. It was agreed that the President might throw out the idea of our building the Nicaraguan Canal so as to have an alternative to the Panama Canal.

We discussed Senator Mansfield's change of position after having talked with Senator Lyndon Johnson and the desirability in the event of his present declination to urge Senator George to attend. It was agreed that this was desirable and that I would do this when I saw Senator George at 12:30.

At this point General Persons left the meeting.

1. I then showed President Eisenhower Chancellor Adenauer's letter to me of July 22 and a draft of reply. President Eisenhower said that Chancellor Adenauer's feelings were not very different from his own. He recalled that from the beginning he had taken the position that even though we had superiority in atomic weapons, we should, if it were practicable, bring about their elimination. He read the draft reply. He pencilled a few suggested additions and suggested orally one further addition at the end and said that he heartily concurred in the draft.

2. I told the President I had talked to Frank Nash as possibly heading up a study of our bases with a view to putting them on an "austerity" basis. The President expressed his concern about withdrawing entirely lest they should be taken over by the Soviet Union. I said that was not at all in our thinking but that our purpose was to find terms on which we could be better assured of continuity of possession. I said I was not sure Charlie Wilson would find Frank Nash agreeable although I knew he had tried to get him for various purposes. The President agreed we should get someone from outside and thought Frank Nash would be acceptable.

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Personal and Private

By SC NLE Date 12/11/51

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Bulls P/WRM/5/mtgs w Pres Aug-Dec 1956(8)

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TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

8/27/56  
h  
from  
Martin

August 27, 1956

8/29/56

Dear Bob,

I greatly appreciated the time which you gave me last Thursday to discuss the problem of NATO military planning. It was from my standpoint an exceedingly useful exchange.

I hope you were able to continue your holiday without further interruption.

I attach some notes about our problem based on our conversation but also incorporating some further thoughts I have had since returning to Paris and a certain amount of additional conversations here.

General Norstad is eager to talk to you about the basic policies involved in this problem. He plans to be in the US September 6 to 16th and will call you. I told him I was sure you would be glad to see him. I gather the paper I mentioned to you may no longer reflect his thinking accurately.

Looking forward to seeing you again in the not too distant future,

Sincerely,

Edwin M. Martin

Enclosure:

Memo from Mr. Martin

(1)

The Honorable

Robert R. Bowie,  
Assistant Secretary of State,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

(W)

21  
Paris, August 28, 1956

Bob,

This is best I could do with this thorny problem.  
Frankly I didn't know where I would come out in D until  
I got there. It wasn't where I wanted to be but I  
couldn't figure out any other answer. Over the longer  
run I of course hope the US and NATO will adopt a policy  
involving a thin trip-wire in Western Europe and strong  
conventional forces on flanks of NATO and available in  
US for use in other parts of world.

Think we are in complete agreement on this.

Edwin M. Martin

7.4. 40.5 / 4-27-56

TOP SECRET

A. PRESSURES FOR A REVIEW OF NATO POLITICAL-MILITARY GUIDANCE

1. There are those, principally in US and UK, who believe on grounds of military strategy and technology that strategic air with nuclear weapons provides an adequate deterrent and, if war came, could win it and quickly. The "shield" is needed solely to provide trip-wire to insure that any attempt to grab territory or attack NATO would start a real fight and insure intervention of SAC. Only issue is how many ground and air forces are needed to provide such a trip-wire. To implement this concept, deter becomes the key word in NATO political-military guidance with defense left to forces not under NATO command.

Advocates of this view refuse to worry about an all-out Soviet conventional attack, pointing out they would never risk our getting advantage of surprise with nuclear weapons. If they should miscalculate however, these advocates assume NATO would respond to conventional attack with nukes. They also point out that we have no alternative as NATO cannot under present circumstances prepare to meet a Soviet conventional attack with conventional forces alone. This is heart of MCh8 decision. Any attempt to distinguish between tactical nuclear warfare and strategic is viewed as unrealistic. In fact they merge and MCh8 assumes both are used.

The problem of brush-fire wars is more difficult under this thesis. One answer is that the horrors of nuclear warfare have grown so great that so long as NATO unity is maintained Soviets will not risk even nibbles for fear we will make them a pretext for all-out surprise attack. In addition for foreseeable future, weapons used by NATO forces will be nearly all dual-purpose, and while they could not mount successful conventional defense against all-out conventional attack, they can have strength and mobility to deal with nibbles. What forces this would require is another question for military to work on.

A modification of this approach involves restricting area in which nibbles assumed to be inconceivable because of risk of nuclear war to central theatre, and agreeing that adequate conventional shield forces to deal with nibbles - something more than trip-wire - needed on flanks. Not all of this school would agree to this, as some hold that any attack of any size should be met by use of nukes in strength required to defeat it. (The temptation to make a nibble will be, it should be emphasized, very great, because a successful nibble would have enormous political repercussions throughout Europe, if not the world.)

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2. There is feeling in many quarters that new Soviet political strategy has developed which requires reexamination of basis NATO politico-military concept. Though not all those advocating such a review are clear as to the outcome they seek, many (especially UK) would expect that for political reasons the result might be substantially similar to that described in #1 above. Two points are made. First is the fact, on which leaders of leading NATO countries have commented, that Soviets recognize threat of nuclear warfare to them and are resolved to avoid it. Hence to insure that NATO will not be attacked we need only maintain deterrent in form of nuclear strength. Their second point is that Soviets have turned their attention to non-European areas and to politico-economic rather than politico-military weapons. We need to increase our flexibility to parry these new types of thrusts. We must avoid tying up an undue proportion of our resources, economic or military in NATO, but rather, looking to the future rather than the past, cut our obligations there to the minimum and put ourselves in a position to compete with Soviets on the economic plane, but have adequate mobile conventional force in reserve in case brush fires threaten in these areas. Their existence will be an important deterrent.

For these purposes a fundamental review of NATO's military role is considered essential, even to point of taking some risks in NATO to avoid certain failure elsewhere.

3. NATO's ability to maintain present force goals, let alone undertake the tasks confronting its members in the Middle and Far-East, is sharply restricted in the view of many, especially in US and UK but also on continent, by increasing awareness that new weapons and weapons systems are becoming more and more costly rather than providing economies. Thus it is increasingly clear that present force levels cannot be maintained without increasing defense budgets. The present politico-economic atmosphere does not permit this. A new political justification for NATO military forces which secures and justifies cutbacks required for these reasons is considered necessary, both as guidance to NATO military planners and to use with Parliaments.

(Even reasonably accurate cost forecasts are not available but it seems clear that not only will additions to strategic reserves have to be at the expense of NATO strength but cuts in NATO forces will also be required to reduce future annual recurring costs. The cut-back in NATO strength can be minimized, though certainly not eliminated, by imaginative military planning for use of most efficient types of weapons and units in strategy fully reflecting nuclear warfare concepts.)

4. Public attention has been called to possible need for major changes in NATO military strategy by speeches and leaks in US and UK. Problem has been further emphasized by Adenauer public attacks on idea of withdrawal of forces from Germany or reductions in conventional strength. Without NATO action which could be represented as having dealt with this issue, public impression of split in NATO on future military program will be increased with consequent repercussions on support for NATO generally and its military effort in particular.

Many people also would feel that it was no service to NATO to beat drums about expansion of non-military activities at same time as crucial disagreement in military field, which is after all heart of NATO activity, was left untouched.

It is desirable also that Soviet leaders not believe there is any question about the unity of NATO in the strategic field.

5. NATO military authorities have been informally suggesting that political guidance may be out of date. They are in any case proposing revisions, which will probably be rather routine in character, in two basic guidance papers, MC14/1 and MC48 and 48/1. Thus they are opening the issue for discussion and inviting debate on whether or not their amendments are acceptable. There is a considerable disposition to want to accept this invitation because of a lack of confidence in the vigor and imagination of the NATO military authorities in adjusting their plans to the world of tomorrow, rather than of the day-before-yesterday.

It is fairly clear also that the NATO military authorities would press openly for new political guidance of drastic sort, rather than accept responsibility for proposing any appreciable cuts in the strength of NATO forces. Quite properly and understandably they consider this a decision which exceeds their competence and responsibility.

B. PRESSURES AGAINST ANY BASIC REVIEW OF NATO POLITICO-MILITARY CONCEPTS.

1. There are many who do not feel that new military techniques justify the reliance on nuclear air attack reflected in A-1 above. There is probably even wider reluctance to write off the risk of brush-fire wars in Western Europe. Some deny that there has been any change in Soviet intentions which justifies any decrease in NATO assigned strength.

Those holding these views, which includes most of the NATO military authorities, oppose a review for fear it would inevitably result in cuts they consider unwise.

2. Others oppose a review looking to cuts in strength, even though they accept them in principle, for fear that once a process of reduction starts it will become competitive and be impossible to stop. Alternative ways to meet the problem of cuts and forces flexibility are not clear, but perhaps they would anticipate a gradual process of informal attrition to take place, aided by gradual acceptance of reduced levels of strength in NATO military plans.
3. It is also felt by some that a review which could result in withdrawal of US and UK forces from Germany would have profound political effects in Europe, presaging a return of US to fortress America or preoccupation with Far Eastern issues.

It is also clear that for his own reasons Adenauer would oppose strongly any such development. Many in US and elsewhere would also oppose it, at least at this time, because of its effect on his election prospects. In fact he might on balance oppose any review as best means of insuring no change in NATO force plans and thus confirming need for German buildup and retention of US and UK forces in Germany.

4. There is opposition to general review at this time on ground no agreements could be reached and differences would further emphasize public impression of NATO dissension. Any decision to cut strength significantly is almost sure to arouse strong opposition, some of it probably public, from NATO military leaders. There would probably also be, on NATO-wide basis, some of the quarrels over the distribution of cuts between Services which have been going on in US. Moreover, most loudly expressed US and UK views to date are sharply at variance with those of Adenauer, and with German elections coming next year it is vital now to weaken his already weak position as sharp NATO debate would do.



5. Insofar as proponents are insisting that new political guidance be given by December 1956, it is objected:
  - a. That US cannot take major decisions involved until after elections, and then not enough time to get NATO decisions by December, even if no change in administration.
  - b. No decisions possible without examination of broad financial implications of force plans based on various political decisions and these two steps cannot be gotten through in time.
  - c. Various military factors such as air defense plans, organization of divisions, etc., still not far enough along to permit accurate appraisal of effect on strength or costs of various alternatives.
6. No need to decide now as cuts cannot take effect until German buildup well along, which will not be until end 1958, at earliest. There is considerable evidence UK does not expect cuts she has been seeking to take effect until 1958 or 9.

C. PROCEDURAL SITUATION IN NATO

1. The December meeting will face three papers dealing with military planning:
  - a. A reportedly routine MCL3/2.
  - b. A bringing-up-to-date of MCL4/1, last revised in 1952.  
It may be routine but SHAPE has suggested some amendments which would adapt NATO military planning further and faster to new weapons and tactics without, however, introducing any basic changes in the strategic concept, or, probably, costs. Some small cuts in costs as previously foreseen, and in force levels might result, but no net cut of costs below present levels is likely. (This is a long, fairly technical military document, has never been in the public eye, and as such might be best medium for moving military planning in new directions with minimum fanfare, if this is desired.)
  - c. A resolution on the 1957 AR, a document which has been used in past for politico-economic guidance on force planning.
2. The Perm Reps have on their agenda for active consideration a Canadian proposal which envisages a separate resolution on politico-military guidance for action at the December meeting, to be prepared by the NAC in consultation with NATO military authorities. US has taken no position on this idea which is scheduled to be on regular NAC agenda September 12, after an informal discussion September 6.
3. SACEUR and SACLANC are preparing new force plans, reflecting MCL3 concepts but applied to 1960 and just after. SG has said these might be available to NAC early in 1957 but SHAPE expects to send its proposals to MOD's around October 1 when they go to SG.

Not much is known here about SACLANC studies but they are understood to be routine. SACEUR present drafts reflect imaginative adaptation to new weapons without cutting strength. Cuts of 10 - 20% in various types of major air and ground units in Central Europe are envisaged plus a further echeloning in depth to avoid fall-out which involves withdrawal of perhaps half of ground forces from positions in Germany. It is understood that planners have envisaged in present draft cut of two US and *Two* UK divisions, possibly one French, and increase of one Dutch division and a considerable number of US special weapons battalions. These are not indicated by country and how country distribution of cut backs would be allocated is left open. SACEUR estimates that new forces will cost about same as present. This plan does not help on problem of high cost of keeping modern present forces in flank countries.

TOP SECRET

- 7 -

4. Normal NATO procedure would involve new strategic discussions to be followed by perhaps as much as year for development force plans called for and their approval by governments. Only then could changes in forces be started. Thus new goals could under most rapid procedure not be effective before calendar '58.
5. It would be desirable to have any substantial cuts in NATO ground forces initiated by Gruenther rather than be first important task of Norstad, an Air General.

TOP SECRET

**D. PROBLEMS FOR U.S.**

1. The first requirement is that U.S. see to it that neither US nor UK take precipitant action to pull out on a permanent basis forces assigned to NATO. It is also important that other countries not announce prematurely major cuts in their forces and that Germany pursue vigorously its build-up plans. Any other course of action will split NATO wide open.
2. The next most urgent requirement is for the U.S. to decide what it thinks the NATO military role over about the next 3 to 5 years should be in the light of the global politico-military situation foreseen, and what it thinks a reasonable US contribution to the implementation of this NATO role should be, taking account of our other responsibilities. It is exceedingly difficult to plan intelligently on what NATO should do in the next 3 or 4 months on this question without knowing where the US would like to come out in the long run. In solving this problem it may be necessary, in view of the conflicting considerations listed under A and B above, to reexamine the fundamental basis of our whole European policy, especially with respect to Germany, and our attitude toward general disarmament before any satisfactory solutions can be reached.
3. Logically the next step should be to decide what of our ultimate objectives we wish to accomplish by December and how to go about it. However I foresee little prospect of a firm US position on the issues involved in time for NATO action in December. The problems both political, military and economic are too complex and the difficulties of decision making in an election period too great. Moreover, even with a US position, the problems which NATO would have to solve, especially as affecting the Adenauer position in Germany, are too much to solve satisfactorily this December. Therefore it is a question of working out the most effective stall for time.
4. Assuming that the US can agree to postpone decisive action on NATO strategy beyond the December meeting, the tasks of persuading our Allies to accept this position and of convincing public opinion that basic NATO splits on the subject do not exist will be difficult ones. Early and vigorous diplomatic preparation, close and cooperative relations between NATO civil and military authorities, and avoidance of disturbing public statements by national leaders will all be required. It will also be necessary to agree to work quietly but vigorously during 1957 to prepare for debate and decision on fundamental issues by December 1957.

5. It seems also to be essential that the SACEUR 1960 force plans not be distributed to governments. With that in hand the urge to take the steps necessary to give it effect by 1960, if not sooner, will be very great in most countries. It gives an illusory appearance of economies which there are no figures to disprove as yet. If applied as SACEUR envisaged, it gives US and UK important new force flexibility by permitting each to withdraw two divisions. To all it will appear a welcome evidence of the imaginative and forward-looking military thinking for which they feel they have for long been looking in vain.

Yet it will also be most controversial, especially in its proposal to withdraw forces from Europe and within Europe from Germany. Germany and countries not greatly benefitting from the force reduction will object strenuously. Public opinion will be hard to keep in line in the absence of a new overall doctrine within the framework of which these changes can be explained. There will be a great hue and cry as to what SACLANC is doing about his forces. Adenauer may also worry about the public reaction to the increased shift to nuclear, or at least dual-purpose, weapons which make the cuts possible. And a great battle seems sure to arise over who will absorb the cuts, especially with Germans. Moreover, those who want to cut expenses will not be satisfied and will want to start with this and go on from there, which could create great confusion as well as leading to unacceptably deep cuts.

It seems essential for SG to direct SACEUR not to distribute it, perhaps on grounds need for reexamining it in light of expected December actions of MC14/2 and 48/2, need in such basic tactical new look to incorporate new division organization concepts, or need to integrate with SACLANC studies so that both can go to governments at same time, and as complementary, integrated proposals.

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This document consists of 15 pages.  
No. 2 10 Copies. Series A.A DETERRENCE STRATEGY FOR NATODowngraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL  
EO 11652: XGDS 1 2 (3) 4Authorized By: H. D. Brewster  
August 4, 1975 HDMIntroduction

The NATO military alliance is faced with the problem of implementing a strategic concept (MJ 48) which although still valid in its deterrent aspects is losing its significance in its defense aspects (assuming defense means both holding enemy forces from occupying territory and preventing large-scale destruction). This growing deficiency in the basic strategy stems primarily from the capabilities of new weapons, either in hand or shortly to be in hand, and, secondarily, from the political-economic unwillingness of the Western Alliance to devote more resources to the creation of military strength.

Capability to "Defend"

It is assumed that NATO forces can be maintained in sufficient strength over a considerable period of time to prevent or to contain or repel localized minor aggressions (whether Satellite or Soviet inspired). It is also assumed that there will be sufficient political stability within the NATO Governments to maintain internal security with the forces likely to be available. The major problems of strategy and force requirements arise in connection with the possibilities of all-out nuclear attack or all-out non-nuclear attack.

MJ 48 postulates that Europe can be successfully defended against all-out Soviet attack (either nuclear or non-nuclear) only by the employment of nuclear weapons, both tactically and strategically. If it is conceded in the first instance that Europe can be defended, this postulation is certainly valid for two reasons: First, nuclear attack requires nuclear retaliation; and second, large-scale Soviet conventional attack cannot be matched by the West (we won't pay the price) without resort to at least tactical use of nuclear weapons.

However, is it realistic to concede that Europe can be "defended" in a war in which nuclear weapons will be used by reason of Western necessity? The NATO military authorities say "yes" — if unfolding MJ 48 requirements are met. I submit that this is basically fallacious and that any extrapolation from this point of departure leads to suspect conclusions.

MJ 48 embraces three principal elements of doctrine: (1) hold against over-run, (2) defend against air-borne destruction, and (3) retaliation to destroy enemy war capability. If any one of these three functions becomes impossible to accomplish, the entire strategy, as a defense strategy, collapses. And this is precisely what is happening. Furthermore, neither science nor money can apparently correct the increasing indefensibility of Europe from air-borne destruction; planes today and probably IRBMs within the next three years, and ICBMs after that. There are no indications that

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NIEs, or better alert and warning, or any other currently known or anticipated measures will alter this trend; time and space are simply too limited in Europe (and will eventually become too limited in the United States). Under these conditions the "forward strategy" concept of 1950 as well as the "forward atomic strategy" concept of 1954 become meaningless as defense strategies. European concern for Soviet invasion is now over-shadowed by European concern for atomic destruction.

#### Capability to Deter

Traditionally defensive capability has been a major element of deterrent power. This interrelationship, however, is rapidly breaking down under the new dimension of nuclear destruction. The ability to save ones own skin is no longer a requisite to destroying the enemy, and thus to have at least one eloquent means to deter him from attempting aggression. Indeed, nuclear weapons may have produced such a high level of potential destruction that military art -- as a means of protecting life and property -- cannot adapt to such destruction. We may be approaching the point where strategy in the usual sense is bankrupt; nothing is left but the capability for mutual destruction.

If the nature of the new weapons make defense against destruction increasingly difficult to the point where defensive measures lose their significance as an element of deterrent power, it follows that under none but exceptional circumstances should these defensive measures have a first call on resources. To the contrary strategy should be consciously altered to de-emphasize the role of conventional defensive forces except those needed to support, protect, and insure the instantaneous response of the nuclear retaliatory capability, and to cope with localized aggression.

So long as we choose to operate within limited levels of resources, the logic of the new weapons will inexorably force NATO to reorient its forces around the support and protection of this retaliatory capability. This is heavily implied in recent SHAPE guidance to commands; it is manifested to some extent in unilateral United Kingdom, United States, and now Russian actions in altering the composition of their forces. Why then has it not become official NATO doctrine, boldly announced and expeditiously implemented?

#### Emphasis on Deterrent Power Alone

There appear to be several reasons why there is currently a lag in thinking through the implications of M3 48 in relation to the limited resources the alliance is willing to devote to defense efforts.

First, there is considerable reluctance, primarily for political reasons, to put all the eggs in the nuclear deterrent basket. It is argued that it is unpalatable to European public opinion for NATO to be able to fight only two kinds of wars: nuclear and brush-fires. In between NATO would have to take a calculated risk that the Soviets attach sufficient credibility to our posture and intentions that their risk of a large-scale conventional attack equates to the risk of a nuclear war.

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Many experts argue that the NATO countries, including the United States, cannot, on the basis of actions, attitudes, or otherwise, make a case for credibility, and that the Soviets may very well launch a full-scale non-nuclear attack on the assumption we are bluffing about our resorting to nuclear weapons. Whether or not this argument is valid is not to the point; unless parliaments appropriate considerably larger funds for defense, we have no choice but to use the nuclear weapons or capitulate. Whether they are used tactically, strategically, or in limited or unlimited quantities in their initiation makes little difference as the sequence of response leads inevitably to full-scale use on both sides. In addition, Soviet conventional attack passes the advantage of possible surprise nuclear attack (as a response) to the West.

Nonetheless there is still a potent body of opinion that believes if all the facts were properly presented to peoples and parliaments, the West would appropriate the necessary monies to develop a defensive strategy that could meet any kind of attack with a response in kind.

Secondly, to the extent defensive measures are de-emphasized to release resources for bolstering the nuclear deterrent force, the value of the direct contribution of our NATO partners (except United Kingdom) diminishes. Their primary contribution at the moment is indirect; it is forward geography from which to launch United States and United Kingdom nuclear attack. This indirect or passive contribution of space will nonetheless increase in importance as SAC and other forms of manned plane attack become increasingly neutralized by guided missile systems, either directed against the air bases or the planes themselves.

Assuming operational availability of 1,500 to 1,800 mile missiles by 1959, within four to six years NATO could become a vast complex of nuclear missile sites around the Soviet-Satellite perimeter, sited in or every Russian city, airfield, or military installation of importance. This perimeter space joined to the North American continent (and possibly Japan) would disperse the retaliatory capability to a degree that the Russian chance of successful surprise attack would become highly improbable. This is the military case for NATO for years to come.

However, this case for NATO means little to continental European countries unless they can share in the missile deterrent. Indeed, unless they too can have missiles with nuclear warheads they may be most reluctant to provide sites for United States operations. In the broader sense it can be expected that the NATO countries will become progressively more insistent that U.S.-U.K. monopoly of nuclear capability be ended. The consequence of any move in the direction of placing greater reliance on deterrent power will be European need to participate more directly in this form of power.

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Sharing nuclear capability with the Europeans, however, raises a host of problems for the United States -- constitutional, political, security, etc. Even though it is conceded that France will eventually become an atomic power (and if France does, Germany will inevitably follow suit), there is a good deal of wishful thinking that some how, perhaps through progress in disarmament or otherwise, we can put off or avoid this day of sharing. This United States reluctance to share nuclear weapons has been a potent brake on United States leadership in NATO efforts to reappraise the ultimate consequences of MC 48 doctrine on certain elements of conventional forces.

Thirdly, there is considerable confusion at the moment in NATO military circles concerning the effectiveness and missions of the new weapons, as well as the individual roles of the services in using these weapons. This confusion in large measure has been reinforced by a particularly virulent form of inter-service rivalry in the United States which because of United States leadership in the development of military doctrine has had a bewildering effect upon our NATO allies. All three of the United States services are enormous vested interests overlaid with a rather light veneer of civilian control. The basic struggle which involves primarily the Air Force and the Army over the control of the ground based missile program has spilled over into Congressional and public forums. The accusations and counter-accusatives on weapons and roles are indicative that in the United States at least the development of the military arts to assimilate these new weapons is going to be dangerously handicapped by considerations of vested service interests. Thus it is that the United States finds itself a very divided council when it comes to teaching its technologically lagging partners the implications of MC 48. The basic thought expressed in the President's budget message that weapons be so used to minimize the requirements for military personnel is not easy to accomplish. The JCS still allocates the MDAP program amongst the services on the basis of horse-trading with only cursory regard for the priorities amongst NATO war missions.

Finally, there is considerable opinion within the United States Government that new weapons development will shortly number the days for United States need for NATO as a military alliance against the Soviets. They hold the view that the ICBM will shortly follow the IRBM and that when the ICBM becomes operational from the North American continent the United States can withdraw from its advanced position in Western Europe. Thus they believe that without too great risk we can pass through an interim period, maintaining in the meantime ours and British nuclear strength as insurance as best we can, without involving ourselves in the difficult problems attendant to sharing nuclear capability more widely throughout NATO.

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### Expediting the Inevitable

The above thesis developed thus far can be summarized somewhat as follows. United States security (as well as that of our NATO allies) would without question be subjected to the least risk if all NATO Governments were willing to devote sufficient funds and manpower to build military forces which could meet in kind any form of aggression — nuclear, major conventional, or minor localized aggression in such a manner to minimize possible resort to use of nuclear weapons. Within the resources likely to be available in the present climate of international tensions, however, NATO cannot erect and maintain forces sufficient to respond in kind to all three of these forms of aggression. Assuming sufficient forces under any posture to meet minor localized aggression NATO is faced with the problem of allocating its limited resources to maintain forces which can deter and fight against both nuclear and large-scale conventional attack. Since, however, it is a foregone conclusion of present strategy that a large-scale conventional attack in Europe cannot be handled without resort to use of nuclear weapons, it follows that NATO forces must rapidly achieve an integrated nuclear capability. In view of the increasing indefensibility of Europe against air-borne nuclear attack it also follows that NATO forces will inevitably need be redesigned to further support, defend, and augment the capability to deter in the first instance (through threat of retaliation) the possible Soviet destruction of Western European populations and property which cannot be prevented in significant measure through employment of resources for active defensive measures.

If this thesis is sound, there is urgent need to expedite the inevitable evolution of NATO strategy to a recognized definable strategy of nuclear deterrence. Great resources which are now being wasted on conventional forces with traditional missions must be boldly reallocated to those forces, weapons systems, and measures which reinforce, protect, and support the nuclear capability in all its forms. The creeping changes in United States and United Kingdom military planning must be brought to a gallop, embodied in NATO doctrine, and made equally applicable to all except where specialized circumstances decree otherwise.

### Achieving the Deterrence Strategy

Acceptance of a strategy of undiluted deterrence will not be easy to achieve. Public opinion will not easily come to accept the notion that there is no mid-ground between peace and a nuclear holocaust. Government officials will be most reluctant to reveal to their peoples the ugly truths concerning the relative inadequacies of defensive measures. There is no ready assurance that the United States can induce the Western Europeans to help keep the deterrent up-to-date (and thus perpetuate pax atomica) when they know that if the deterrent fails they've had it.

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Virtually sole reliance on nuclear deterrent power will not be readily accepted by the military authorities either. The abandonment of traditional land force and naval roles will be bitterly contested by Army and Navy strategists. Air Forces will not quickly accept the implications of land based guided missiles on tactical air formations. The inevitable reductions in military personnel will be resisted by all services. Indeed, the new concept that the man must now fit the weapons, rather than the weapons fit the man, will be anathema to most professional soldiers.

But the strategy must and should be adopted and implemented as quickly as possible. The alternative is to perpetuate within NATO conventional forces which will be swamped unless they resort to nuclear weapons, and a nuclear retaliatory capability seriously jeopardized through want of adequate alert and warning, air defense protection, concentration in a small geographical area, and politically controlled completely by two members of a 15-nation alliance. At the moment NATO is neither fish nor fowl, and every day is a dangerously delayed day in which resources are not reapplied to strengthen the nuclear deterrent and thus best insure the perpetuation of nuclear parity or stalemate.

Unfortunately there is an elusive conceptual difficulty involved in shifting to a deterrent strategy. Country efforts are measured not only in terms of military expenditures but almost equally in terms of force commitments to NATO commanders expressed in traditional quantitative units, i.e., wings, divisions, numbers of minesweepers, etc. Thus it happens that quantitative reductions are considered in the public mind (and even by segments of the military depending on their points of view) as reductions in efforts per se, irrespective of possible compensating qualitative improvements which may result in a net increase in total power. Consequently the intelligent application of priority considerations to implement MO 48 runs aground on the sacred rocks of quantitative goals.

A reading of SACUER's Effectiveness Report for 1955 gives any sophisticated reader the impression that qualitative improvement even at the expense of numerical goals would leave NATO with a net increase in real strength. When added to this need for qualitative improvement of existing type forces are the new requirements for better A&W, air defense, new weapons systems, etc. it seems quite apparent that the interrelationship between quality and quantity must be clearly set forth. Secretary Dulles' explanation of Russian outbacks in manpower and divisions as not a decrease in real power raises the question for the Europeans as to why they cannot follow suit. I believe the United States tends to exaggerate the adverse political impact on European military efforts, the pace and magnitude of German rearmament, of squarely and openly reviewing the roles, missions, and quantities of conventional forces needed in a period of transition to what is essentially a nuclear deterrent strategy.

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Finally, it should be made clear that the form of deterrent power (nuclear retaliatory) which may serve in Europe to prevent aggression is probably of little value -- except as the Final Resort -- in Asia or the Near East. Conditions are totally different and the vitality of both United States and Soviet interests are of a completely different degree. Unlike in Europe limited but substantial conventional non-nuclear war is a distinct possibility in these areas, and in connection therewith the United States should maintain a force posture to best fight this kind of a war without having to resort to the employment of nuclear weapons. The joint possession of nuclear capability as a monitoring force will in itself restrain both sides from breaking the bounds of a contained conventional struggle.

#### Need for Haste?

The creation of an integrated nuclear capability in NATO, the modernization of forces, and the introduction of more advanced weapons system obviously cannot be a dramatic over-night accomplishment. Time and money are necessary to translate evolving doctrine, missions, and equipment requirements into the actualities of physical forces; at best the process can only be evolutionary and accomplished over a period of years. But there is a vast difference between undergoing a process and defining or clearly characterizing the process which is to be undergone. And it is the latter which NATO needs above everything else.

I firmly believe that unless the United States in conjunction with the United Kingdom can very shortly provide a real sense of military direction to the Alliance in terms of implementing MC 48 and dispell the present climate of uncertainty the military cement of the Alliance will crumble rapidly. There is good and reasonable cause for the minor powers in NATO to question United States military leadership at this juncture. These minor powers are uncertain about their marginal efforts in an era of atomic parity. They wonder about the validity of a U.S.-U.K. monopoly of nuclear capability when dispersal is becoming a premium. They are confused by contradictory claims amongst the United States services on weapons performance, roles, and missions. They read press accounts of Quantico thinking and compare it with the United States Annual Review submission and find no similarity. They are aware that the United States Congress itself has levelled strong attacks on the European military section of the MSP on the grounds that we do not know where we are going.

These reasons for uneasiness, coupled with the lessening of fear of war itself, can have no other effect than to produce a psychology of drift and relaxation that is already beginning to be reflected in lowered defense expenditures. This start can develop into a dangerous chain reaction and might quickly reach such proportions as to jeopardize the German rearmament program itself, which is now being "bulled through" by Adenauer on a slim political margin. I do not believe United States leadership or the dynamic personality

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of General Gruenther can stem this tide indefinitely unless there is a resort to more rationality in characterizing the job to be done than to keep repeating over and over that "we must maintain the forces we now have" and "altering these forces will be slow evolutionary task". The *States* yan to face the realities by NATO was blocked off by United Kingdom and British effort last fall. But now there is clear evidence that the United Kingdom also desires a fundamental re-examination of NATO strategy.

#### Major Measures

It would appear that the first step in expediting the inevitable evolution of MC 48 strategy into a full-blown strategy of nuclear deterrence for NATO would be to re-examine current doctrine in order to clearly define and delineate objectives, missions, and requirements. Part of the task of such a review would be to devise a program for informing and convincing the western public and parliaments that there was no alternative to such a strategy, except one involving substantially greater financial effort on the part of all. NATO citizens would need to reconcile themselves to the alternatives of peace or annihilation -- a difficult political task at best. The keynote for missions under the new strategy would be to favor with resources, on a priority basis, those vital to the first ten or fifteen days of actual combat operations; other missions would be rapidly deemphasized as residual claimants on resources.

Now this review should be conducted is not nearly as important as when it should be conducted. The review is basically the responsibility of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and whether conducted by them in the first instance and induced into NATO, or whether done on a broader basis of NATO participation from the beginning is a question to be decided in light of the then current NATO desires.

What is infinitely more important is that the United States should not participate in such a review until it has its own house in order. This means not only having sound conclusions about nuclear strategy and tactics, but also means settlement of the interservice struggle which appears to be the principal impediment to arriving at these sound conclusions. Present United States indecision and divisive influences must be largely eliminated before we sit down with NATO. As I see it this is a problem that can only be settled by the strong intervention of the President, and I can do no other but assume, for the purposes of this paper, that the compelling requirement to settle urgently the inter-service struggle for dominant control of the new weapons of power will result in such settlement.

A second measure in fully adopting a NATO strategy of deterrent<sup>6</sup> is to build the case for Russian credibility of our intention to use nuclear weapons, whatever the form of major aggression (ruling out, of course, the minor localized type). This involves not only the collective hardening of fifteen national wills, but may require new political forms in NATO that

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can insure instantaneous collective political decisions and their means of transmission to NATO commanders. The Russians must not only be convinced that we are not bluffing, but must realize there is an operable mechanism in NATO whereby immediate political decision can be translated automatically into military action. Alert measures and conditions for military responses will need further blueprinting and agreement in advance before collective NATO nuclear retaliation can emulate the singleness of purpose existing in joint U.S.-U.K. control of the nuclear capability.

Broadened NATO participation in the nuclear deterrent requires give and take on the part of both the Europeans and the United States. The United States will need to provide the weapons, and as a price for their participation the Europeans will need to assume the awesome responsibilities of military nuclear power. In acquiring a fuller voice in their own security they will at the same time need to be prepared to use that voice instantaneously and without hesitation for the collective good of the NATO community. The United States should insist on conditions of NATO control of the European complex of nuclear capability so that it is in fact a regional apparatus, multilaterally supported and under the exclusive command of NATO international commanders who will use it (1) automatically in response to nuclear attack and (2) by collective NATO political direction in response to less than a nuclear attack. There can be no last-minute withdrawals in a strategy of nuclear war.

This leads to the next major requirement which is a totally new order of military integration within NATO. Not only do the nuclear weapons require integrated multilateral control to offset any possible nourishment of divisive tendencies within the alliance, but those new measures now most critically needed to support and protect the nuclear retaliatory capability — such as AC&W, air defense missile systems, etc. — cannot be effectively developed, financed, or operated except through multilateral measures. The further extension of the infrastructure principle is a co-ordinate to the necessary development of weapons systems on regional or sector bases which transcend national boundaries and individual country operation. In keeping with this trend there should be a careful re-examination of the adequacy of SACEUR's present peacetime command responsibilities for all M-day forces — land, sea, and air, including the possibilities of expanding his area of command over logistical support.

Another major measure required to support the new strategy with optimum economy of the collective resources is to increase specialization among the NATO countries, and, as a necessary corollary, greater co-operation in all fields including development and production of improved types of material. Specialization will need apply to the provision of all forms of military resources — money, manpower, territory, research and development, production, as well as talent for particular military roles. An organized effort must be made to mesh European research and development to supplement and not duplicate United States efforts; the United Kingdom has eloquently pleaded this case. European military production for the first time is historically ripe

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to be co-ordinated as the new weapons emerge from the development stage. Their tremendous expense and very complexity forbid any margin of overlap of duplication. German productive capability must not be permitted to develop willy-nilly but only in the context of a rational all-European pattern.

Specialization is the handmaiden of standardization, and one of the most significant deficiencies (attributable primarily to the United States) is the lack of organized attempts at standardization on weapons. Apart from the de facto standardization created by United States grants of equipment, NATO has little to boast of beside the rifle, the fourteen-volt battery, and a common system of communication symbols. Serious effort must be made to establish the authority within NATO to select and recommend which of the new weapons being produced by the big three should be adopted by the rest of NATO.

Finally, new yardsticks must be accepted to measure effort. The maintenance of nuclear parity (or nuclear superiority, if possible) must never be jeopardized by sagging defense expenditures. Even though it is presumed that substantial economies will derive from greater specialization, further military integration, and the elimination of many national and NATO units in their present forms, there is every reason to believe the present level of aggregate NATO military expenditures must be maintained, and, if possible, increased in some percentage relationship as GNP grows. The costs of maintaining ever modern the atomic deterrent to diminish the prospects of a Russian technological breakthrough should not be underestimated.

In return for European long-range commitments to hold up their military expenditures the United States should be prepared to offer long-term commitments on the totality of its aid. We have an extended commitment in the form of forces committed to the European continent, but we have no comparable long-range commitment for providing military equipment. Both forms of aid are necessary, but not necessarily in their present proportion to each other over an extended period of time. It is conceivable that United States aid in the form of forces could be reduced, if the savings accrued to the United States could be returned to Europe in some other form of military aid. What appears to be needed is a formula relating total United States aid to total European NATO effort, expressed in terms of a percentage contribution to a joint enterprise. Such a formula would provide the element of predictability that is the sine qua non of long-range planning.

In considering the basic measures required to implement the logical consequences of MC 48 doctrine it is apparent that in fortifying the military cement of NATO one unavoidably must at the same time fortify the political amount of the alliance. Indeed, far greater political unity is both a prerequisite and a consequence of the measures described above. Greater military integration, SACEUR control of nuclear and other forces in peacetime, and the extension of the infrastructure principle require involvement of the sacred concepts of sovereignty. They cannot be achieved without considerable further melding of the political identities of the individual members of the

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alliance. It is well to keep ever in mind during this present period of preoccupation with Article II matters that military collectivity demands political cohesion of the first order, and the opportunities stemming from military evolution should not be overlooked.

#### Specific Tasks

Not being a military expert I have no precise factual basis for supporting the specific measures which will be set forth in this section. This handicap may, however, be more than compensated for by the fact that I am not a member of the military institution. Certainly my recommendations are not distorted by personal considerations of loyalty to any one particular service. Within the framework of the general measures set forth above the following specific tasks would seem indicated; they are not listed in any priority sequence as to importance.

A. Protecting the nuclear capability until the domination of offensive air power by missiles requires as an interim high priority the development of good AC&W and a NIKE system to supplement the plane interceptor system. Presumably SAGE will be required. Every effort must be employed to ensure that the retaliatory capability is not destroyed on the ground by surprise attack.

B. An IREM system must be installed in Western Europe as soon as feasible. It should be dispersed around the entire periphery of the iron curtain (from Norway to Turkey), be manned around the clock with nuclear warheads, and be the common property of the NATO alliance under the direct control of SACEUR. Such a system would offset the increasing vulnerability of SAC and minimize the impact of possible Russian development of the ICBM in advance of the United States.

C. The United States should take the necessary steps to make nuclear weapons available to NATO under conditions of control that will minimize their use except in accordance with the collective will. The ultimate objective should be unequivocal SACEUR and SACLANC control over truly internationalized and specialized units handling these weapons. Not one national command unit should be permitted to have custody of such weapons within its own national boundaries (except for the United States and United Kingdom for the defense of their respective areas). This concept comes very close to the EDG concept of international forces for the continent, but in this instance it applies only to nuclear forces. It should be noted that the provision of nuclear weapons by the United States may head off their independent national development and control by countries like France, Germany, and possibly Belgium.

D. National command forces, particularly where value is often largely prestige, must be pared to the bone.

E. There should be substantial reduction in land forces in the rear area (Portugal, Italy, Greece, France, Netherlands, Belgium, and United Kingdom). The forces remaining, however, should be clearly

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adequate to man the necessary missile sites, AA, and control civilian populations during the atomic strike phase. Resources saved from such a move should be reapplied to air power, air defense, greater infrastructure contributions, or various forms of mutual grant aid.

F. Land forces in the forward areas comprising a shield against penetration (Germany, Turkey, Denmark, Norway and United States, United Kingdom, French, and Belgium forces in Germany) should be slightly reduced in total number, but those remaining should all be M-day units, dispersed over the entire front and dug in, and prepared to fight for sixty days without resupply. All these units should have full tactical atomic capability.

G. Little military combat resources should be allocated for units not available by M + 15.

H. The present mission for using Army reserves or other late-readiness forces (anything beyond M + 15) as replacements for M-day units should be abolished. Instead the primary mission of reserve forces should be to cope with atomic destruction — maintaining the function of government and controlling civilian populations. This mission assumes tremendous importance during the nuclear exchange phase.

I. SACLANF's mission should become essentially two-fold: (1) kill submarines with atomic strike capability and (2) launch airborne nuclear retaliation from the high seas. What SACLANF now considers an equally primary mission — protecting shipping to Europe — should be eliminated. Favorable outcome of a nuclear war will have been secured within a relatively short period with resources in Europe at start, or the responsibility for re-supply of Europe will have largely passed to enemy hands.

J. In keeping with doctrine expressed in I above CHANCOM should have only a tail-end claim on any residual resources. The same is true with respect to national navies in the Mediterranean except to the extent they can support or protect the nuclear strike.

K. NATO should eliminate all mobilization activities in Europe and the United Kingdom, except those measures designed to cope with large-scale destruction, control measures and passive civil defense. Forces should plan to fight with what they have on hand. If they survive the shock period and our retaliatory force has done its job, there will be no problem. If we "lose" the nuclear exchange and do not have air and missile mastery over Europe, further military or industrial mobilization in Europe will be out of the question.

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L. There should be a reduction in tactical air forces (ground support) as missiles become standard in Army units. Generally there should be a pruning of TO&Rs to conform more closely with tactical assignments and greater fire power of new weapons.

M. To effect a new order of military integration, SACEUR's terms of reference should be significantly broadened to give him full time, direct, operational and training command over AC&W, air defense — both planes and missiles, all internationalized nuclear units, and all M-day Army forces deployed in the "shield area" (say, a three hundred mile zone back from the Satellite Soviet border). Forces committed to the shield area should not be available for withdrawal by countries without full concurrence of NATO.

N. Expanding SACEUR's control over forces and the extension of the infrastructure principle will require inroads on the current doctrine that logistics support is a national responsibility. Neither AC&W nor many elements of the air defense complex can be maintained on a purely national basis.

O. There will be a need for a multilateral public relations organization in NATO headed by a world-renowned and respected statesman to sell the new strategy to peoples and parliaments. An interesting commentary on this need is the fact that General Gruenther can move parliaments where governments fail. Part of this is of course due to Gruenther's extraordinary personality, but I also believe a good deal of it can be explained in terms of his being the voice of the collective NATO conscience, unhindered by narrow political, party, or national loyalties.

P. NATO also will need create a completely new organ of political control to provide instantaneous direction to military commanders in the use of nuclear weapons beyond the scope of tactical defense. The members of this body should be directly and personally responsible to heads of states, with the means to communicate directly with these heads at any time.

Q. There should be an organized effort within NATO to utilize more effectively European technical and scientific skills in the military technological race. The principle of the Air Defense Technical Center should be expanded to include multilaterally financed institutions for pure research on those sciences that support the military arts. The United States should participate fully and modify its security procedures to this end.

R. To ensure the rapid and orderly introduction of new weapons into the NATO military machine there should be created under SACEUR a

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weapons evaluation center whose primary function would be to select amongst the host of competing new weapons those upon which NATO forces could standardize. Mr. Gray of Defense has already indicated United States willingness to explore such a proposal.

3. Finally, the United States should prepare itself to propose some type of formulation for burden-sharing that would ensure fair efforts on the part of all and provide certainty as to the magnitude of collective resources upon which the Alliance could count over an extended period of time. United States aid, whether infrastructure, troops, or equipment should be presented and sold to the Congress as a contribution to the allied effort to protect the Western world community and thus ourselves. The onus of charity implied in an "aid" program should be eliminated. The components of such a contribution should be fungible to accommodate shifts in emphasis, but the totality of the aid should be in some fixed ratio to the totality of Western European and Canadian effort.

#### Conclusions

If the above analysis and proposals are adjudged fantastic, I submit they are no more fantastic than the hydrogen bomb — or God know what the scientists may turn up with tomorrow. I have no easy conviction that military strategy can actually adapt itself to the potential of today's destructive power, but I believe we have no choice but to try. It seems most apparent that the revolution in weapons begs for a concomitant revolution in the techniques and institutions for their control and use.

I believe I appreciate the incredible difficulties involved in shifting to and implementing a deterrent strategy in the manner described above. I wish I could believe that NATO could survive indefinitely as a house half atomic and half conventional, half national and half multinational, and half prepared and half unprepared. I also wish I could believe that nuclear parity between east and west could be maintained indefinitely on the Western side solely through United States efforts.

But these wishes or hopes are not probabilities. France, Germany, perhaps Italy, Belgium and others will become atomic powers. The new weapons will revolutionize military strategy and tactics. The United States cannot indefinitely smother the dynamic requirement for a fundamental review of NATO strategy. To me the only question is whether the United States will lead NATO through this review into a new order of political-military integration that will minimize the risks involved in sharing the nuclear weapons and at long last utilize Europe's tremendous military potential.

The United States will need to give up much, but the Europeans will be giving up far more to the collective entity. Europe's defense will equate to NATO; the United State because of its geographical position and responsibilities

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in Asia and elsewhere will always have an independent defense capability. What is to be feared most is that the political-military doctrinal lag behind weapons development is just so enormous that it cannot be closed. Western public opinion will need major reorientation. Parliamentarians will have to be convinced that giving an inch of sovereignty will return a yard of security. Maybe the Western world, when it fully assimilates the new dimension of nuclear destruction, and the slim chances of preventing it irrespective of budget outlays, may decide that communism is preferable alternative.

To repeat, the problems are enormous, but unless we collectively decide as the supreme edict of the Alliance to continue to drift the logical consequence of NS 48 doctrine is to consciously adopt and implement for NATO a strategy and effective posture of nuclear deterrence, creditable to the Russians and vigilantly maintained by the West until the blessings of disarmament become manifest.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Chancellor Konrad Adenauer  
Mr. James B. Conant  
Mr. Donald A. Quarles

On September 10, 1952, at 12 noon, Chancellor Adenauer received the American Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Donald A. Quarles, for a conversation in which the American Ambassador in Bonn also participated.

First, the American Ambassador conveyed greetings from President Eisenhower to the Chancellor. He had had an opportunity to speak with the President on the preceding Friday and the President was concerned about the situation in Europe. In response to the remark of the Chancellor that he would be happy when the American elections were over, the American Ambassador declared that the elections play no great role and there was no doubt but what the President would be reelected. In the opinion of the Chancellor, the election constituted a handicap for President Eisenhower and the Republican party.

Then the Chancellor gave some highly confidential information on a resolution of the NATO Standing Group taken on September 5 or 6. A spokesman of the Standing Group had declared before the NATO Council that the previous intention to pursue the so-called "forward strategy" in case of a Soviet attack could no longer be maintained after the withdrawal of the French and British troops and that the defense points would be moved back to the Rhine and the IJssel. This meant a complete declaration of bankruptcy by NATO. If this fact should become known, it would have an extremely crushing effect in Europe and particularly in Germany. During the discussion of this plan by the NATO Ambassadors, it was learned that two Ambassadors, the American and the Greek, were without instructions from their Governments. According to information given by Mr. Blankenhorn, the American Ambassador to NATO frequently was without information or instructions from his Government. For example, the nomination of Senator George was announced to the press but not to Mr. Perkins himself so that he was forced to state that he did not know whether or not he was Ambassador to NATO.

The reason for his remarks were to show that only the United States could assume the leadership of the Free World and that if it did not maintain this leadership, then that is the end.

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The Chancellor then spoke of news which he had received the previous day (Sept. 9) according to which a subcommittee of the American Senate for Disarmament had heard 78 individuals, the majority of whom expressed the opinion that the armament of the Federal Republic increased tension and would make an international agreement on disarmament difficult. This appears in an interim report of the Committee which was published in Washington on the weekend. All the persons who appeared before the Committee favored a cessation of experiments with atomic and hydrogen bombs on the basis of an international agreement. The witnesses supported the view of the American Government according to which disarmament should only be accomplished step by step, but at the same time they recommended that the United States should pursue a unilateral policy of disarmament in case an international disarmament agreement could not be reached in the near future.

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W. A. T. V.  
As a third point, the Chancellor named the differences of opinion concerning the East which exist between the United States, England and France. If the three afore-mentioned facts are considered together, it is not too much to say that it is all over with NATO. This is a serious situation and the Soviet Union is thereby rendered the best possible service. The report on the reduction of armed forces is completely destroying Adenauer's policy.

He sees as the reason for these events the fact that American politicians and also numerous members of the American Government are not able to comprehend what a dictator, a dictatorial regime, and especially a communist regime mean. In America, the belief appears to prevail that if one treats another person decently the other person must for his part also conduct himself decently. Germans have had experience with dictatorship and know that nothing a person half way is always regarded as a sign of weakness. For this reason, the danger is so great and the entire work which the United States has in the past, thank God, accomplished, threatens to be destroyed.

If the Mollet Government should fall, the only alternatives would be a dictatorship or a popular front. Mollet is an excellent man and Adenauer himself does not know what would become of France if Mollet should fall. Such a development would then extend to Italy where the Fascist and Socialist Socialists are already closer together. If Mollet should fall, Eden would also fall at the same time.

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Under these conditions, it is impossible for him to succeed in introducing a period of military service of 18 months; and if the Federal Republic does not introduce this, all other NATO States would eliminate their 18-month period of service. The only way out which he sees is to introduce a 18-month period of service for certain branches of the armed forces and an 18-month period for others. He could perhaps also say that he must discuss the question again with experts in the Defense Ministry, but the planning now is for a 18-month period of service coupled with two or three month periods of training in succeeding years.

Mr. Charles then responded to the remarks of the Chancellor and referred to the report of the Senate Committee which he had not seen. He pointed out that there are many people in the American Government with very different views, that this is an election year, and that the opposition party constitutes a majority of the Senate. Regrettable though it is, it is necessary to take into account that the Senate will express views which are not in accord with the Government.

Mr. Charles assured the Chancellor that President Eisenhower, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense do not share the views presented in this report. He is certain that everyone who occupies a responsible political position would accept the validity of the statements by the Chancellor concerning the soundness of the situation, the unreliability of a dictatorship, and the necessity to remain firm. The United States is determined to remain firm. This determination is given its expression in its military progress and in the defense budget, which are constantly becoming greater. In this regard, the United States is motivated by the desire to strengthen its own position and, at the same time, to help its Allies strengthen their positions. Mr. Charles further assured the Chancellor that both political parties support these efforts. With regard to the defense budget, there had been differences of opinion, but the budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1 was greater than that for the previous year and, although the budget for the following year has not yet been fixed, he is of the firm belief that this will be larger than the present one.

The United States now finds itself in the midst of a revolution of its military structure which is based on the development of atomic weapons. In this connection, the Army, Navy and Air Force are affected. As a result of the development of these weapons, through the great increase in strength, speed and striking range of modern planes as well as the application of the more modern electrical

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equipment for the use and control of these planes, the fire power and striking power of the individual soldier has been substantially increased. With the further development of fire power, consideration is being given to an appropriate reduction in the strength of the personnel.

The Chancellor again referred to the interim report of the Senate Committee to which the American Ambassador replied this involved personal views of the witnesses, who are not experts.

Mr. Charles then mentioned two fundamental principles of the American defense position. In the first place, it is a matter of keeping the border of the Free World strong enough so that a Soviet or communist aggression would have to be massive enough in order to overcome the power of the Free World which has been built up on its border. However, if a Soviet aggression were so massive, then the intention underlying this would be clear, and if it were clearly established that the Soviet Union planned to undertake such a massive aggression, then the United States is determined to respond to this wherever necessary with all of the strength at its disposal. It is therefore a question of maintaining the periphery strong enough in order that the intention of the opponent will be revealed in case of an attack.

The second principle is that one must have sufficient retaliatory power so that any aggression would a priori constitute a risk for the opponent. He believed that if the Free World stands firm on the periphery and if it maintains the possibility of waging a massive retaliatory blow against the Soviet Union once its intention to begin a massive aggression has become known, then this serves as a deterrent which will keep the Russians from even thinking about aggression. Of course, it is known that the Soviets are attempting to expand their sphere of influence through subversive activity, infiltration and economic warfare. He believed, however, that the United States together with the Federal Republic and all of its other Allies is strong enough and that the system of the Free World is good enough to counter this danger. If the Russians can be prevented from resorting to massive aggression, then in his opinion it would also prove possible to protect the system of the Free World against the evil system of communism.

The Chancellor responded to Mr. Charles' remarks as follows: To be sure, nuclear weapons and deterrents must be placed in the hands of the Army. It is also correct to say that the fire power of the

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individual soldier is much greater than before. If it should ever be possible to fire nuclear shells from conventional cannons, then it would be possible to think of a reduction in the armed forces. But this should not be suggested until the situation has progressed so far, that is, before nuclear munitions are developed to such an extent that they could, for example, be fired from conventional cannons and their effectiveness reduced to a smaller radius. The article which appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES concerning the reduction of the American armed forces by 800,000 men would mean that all bases outside the United States would have to be given up.

*arms race  
level*

The Soviet Union is living on the hope of disunity in the West. Therefore, everything must be avoided which nourishes this hope. The Chancellor recalled his conversations with Bulganin and Khrushchev, in which the question of whether the West could stick together played a decisive role. Khrushchev openly admitted that because of arduous social burdens have become so pressing that they wish to reduce their armaments. Now, for example, if the proposal is made that the United States disarm unilaterally, the position of the Russians in power would thereby be strengthened although great dissatisfaction exists in their own land. The Chancellor saw only one possibility, namely, that the Russians must not be given a respite.

In so far as the development of pilotless aircraft, nuclear weapons and guided missiles are concerned, the Soviet Union will also one day reach a point when it will be able to project such missiles onto the United States. A dictator is always more ready to use such a method without a declaration of war than a democratic statesman. The Soviet Union would therefore have an advantage over the United States because it could utilize such weapons suddenly. Hitler, for example, did not recognize the concept of law and international law. He had no conscience, and the only thing which counted for him was power. Therefore, the Chancellor saw in the present development a serious danger for the United States.

Mr. Quarles informed the Chancellor that the United States is already able to use atomic shells of the type which the Chancellor mentioned. This is particularly true for the Army and the Air Force. Such weapons could be utilized by tactical aircraft or with rockets or could be fired from conventional cannons. Weapons of this kind exist in various sizes so that their usage can be adapted to the appropriate target in a particular theater of action. These

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weapons are now ready for use. It is practically a question of advanced conventional weapons.

In so far as the reduction of forces by 800,000 men is concerned, stated Mr. Quarles, this was a matter of a staff proposal which was prepared for discussion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan had neither the approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, nor had it been officially presented to the Government. In working out the draft paper, the question under study was an examination of how the strength of the forces could be adjusted to the constantly increasing costs which arise from equipping the individual soldier with the newest weapons. In view of the increased costs and the accompanying increase in striking power, one could not maintain the same number of soldiers under arms. It was therefore a question of establishing a balance between these two factors, whereby Mr. Quarles explicitly pointed out that there is a tendency toward a constant increase in the total expenditures for military purposes.

Mr. Quarles believed that the Russians are genuinely interested in disarmament and reduction of costs since they are spending a greater portion of their national income for armament than the United States, and this must constitute a substantial burden. Everything that the Russians had done thus far in the field of disarmament, nevertheless, is of little value with regard to modern weapon technique and he doubted the sincerity of their intentions. He is convinced that the strength of the Free World depends upon its solidarity and he attached particular importance to a continuation of this solidarity with the Federal Republic.

The Chancellor replied that the fact must be taken into account that some day the Russians will also be in a position to deliver modern weapons on the U. S. They are already in such a position. In the event that the Russians undertake a major aggression, it is believed that they would begin with a massive air attack on the U. S. in order to destroy the centers of American striking power in their own land. It is not expected, for example, that the Soviets would set their land forces into motion in the direction of the Rhine because they would thereby betray their aggressive intentions toward America and would thereby renounce the possibility of a surprise attack on the United States.

The Chancellor believed that in the light of the present-day strategic situation, the statements of the Standing Group do not have too great significance.

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The Chancellor observed that this statement had not failed to make an impression and that NATO had thereby been weakened. One could say that NATO would then be superfluous.

Mr. Quarles interjected that the view expressed in this statement was not in accord with the thinking of the Defense Ministry in Washington since in its opinion it is not reasonable.

The Chancellor continued that if one said that the Soviet Union would not undertake a local aggression because it feared retaliatory blows then the question arises why German forces should be raised. Furthermore, account must be taken of the fact that such local aggression could be started not only by the Russians but also by satellite states. The United States would also think over the situation several times before it determined to utilize its entire armed forces.

Mr. Quarles again referred to the two basic principles of the American defense position. Strength on the periphery can only be created when the German armed forces are strong enough to oppose attacks by guerrilla forces of the East Zone. It is necessary to make a distinction between guerrilla activity and a massive Soviet aggression. Strong German forces are indispensable if one is to oppose all aggressions which are less than a massive attack of the entire East Bloc.

The Chancellor observed that in such a major conflict the first hour would be decisive and he feared for the previously mentioned reasons, that the Soviets would have the advantage.

Mr. Quarles disagreed with this. The Americans, in their planning, are prepared to grant the Soviets the advantage of the first blow since they believe they have achieved such a strong position that it would be possible to wage a decisive retaliatory blow, despite a surprise attack, which would make any massive Russian aggression a risk. Therefore, not the first day but the first week is decisive.

The conversation ended at 1:25 p.m.

/s/ WEBER

Bonn, September 11, 1956

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October 11, 1956

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Dear Elin:

Jacques got off last night in the inevitable last-minute flurry. His parting words were to ask me to acknowledge your letter of October 4 with which you transmitted a copy of the translation of Secretary Quarles' talk with the Chancellor. We have found the record extremely interesting as an explanation of the Chancellor's attitude.

We are now engaged in tracking down the reference to "a subcommittee of the American Senate for Disarmament" about which you asked and should be able to send you an explanation within a very short time.

I have been a very bad correspondent partly because I have been very busy in attempting to learn something of the work before Jacques' departure. Please give my best to everyone at Bonn. I hope to be in frequent touch from now on.

As ever,

Raymond E. Lisle  
Acting Director  
Office of German Affairs

Elin O'Shaughnessy, Esq.,  
Counselor of Embassy  
for Political Affairs,  
American Embassy,  
Bonn.

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November 16, 1956

Dear Elin:

In your letter of October 4 you mentioned the interest of the Ambassador in tracking down the report of "a subcommittee of the American Senate for Disarmament" to which the Chancellor referred in paragraph 1, page 2, of the memorandum of conversation between the Chancellor and Secretary Quarles.

I enclose herewith a copy of the report to which the Chancellor referred, that of a subcommittee on disarmament headed by Senator Humphrey. You will note references to the point in question on pages 6 and 7. It should be emphasized that the particular view that "rearmament of Germany will increase tension and make disarmament more difficult to achieve" is one of many views enumerated as being given by some 75 private witnesses. These private witnesses were volunteers and like volunteers in most Congressional hearings reflected the views of special interest groups. They are rarely representative of public opinion as a whole. There is nothing in the report to indicate that this particular view was expressed by any stated number of the private witnesses, let alone a majority of the 75, as the Chancellor had been informed. You might have some opportunity to have this brought to the attention of the Chancellor.

Sincerely yours,

Raymond E. Lisle  
Acting Director  
Office of German Affairs

Enclosure

Elin O'Shaughnessy, Esq.,  
Counselor for Political Affairs,  
American Embassy,  
Bonn, Germany.

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October 5, 1956

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION (No. 2)

Ambassador Blankenhorn, German Permanent Representative to NATO  
and  
Edwin M. Martin, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO

SUBJECT: NATO and US-German Relations Matters

Ambassador Blankenhorn invited me to lunch at his apartment. There were no other guests present. He emphasized the desire for a frank and informal talk for which he said there was no substitute for maintaining friendly relations. He took up the following matters relating to NATO and US-German relations:

1. Coming to second apparent purpose of luncheon, Blankenhorn referred to most unfortunate misunderstanding of past summer between Bonn and Washington with respect to NATO military matters. Regretted he had not been around as he thought he might have been useful in explaining to Adenauer what was going on. However, situation now understood at last and Government had made decision that essential to collaborate even more closely with the US than in past and abandon all suspicions and recriminations. As one evidence of this, would not propose any further WEU Meetings to discuss military plans in essentially anti-American spirit. Would like rather to propose that US become permanent observer in WEU and be closely associated with its activities. Might wish to continue to promote WEU as useful instrument for European cooperation in certain fields but no longer in any anti-American sense which he agreed there had been for a while. Would also want to press ahead with closer British and French collaboration but again in framework of more intimate relations with US. Also were considering proposing that NATO Ambassadors of WEU countries attend all future WEU Ministerial Meetings to ensure closest possible collaboration between NATO and WEU. Stressed several times in course of luncheon and discussion afterward decision of Government to establish closest possible relations with US as a major shift in policy.

I said that I was speaking quite informally and personally but I felt sure that Washington would welcome, as it always had, closest possible collaboration with Germany. We did not object to building up WEU as such though we had been concerned about some statements which seemed to indicate a feeling that WEU was a political consultative group whereas NATO dealt only with technical military matters. This we thought was not correct. I thought on the whole while there was always danger of development through European cooperation of a third force which would have neutralist tendencies, the development by this cooperation of a strong Europe, fully recovered from the material and physiological shocks of the war, had nevertheless been considered a cardinal point in US policy and we had encouraged it by all means available to us. A third force which was strong and independent was a desirable asset

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in our fight with the Soviet Bloc, more useful than a weak and disunited Europe, even though with its strength Europe might disagree with us more often. Risk that such an independent grouping would go neutralist would seem to be worth taking. With respect to the specific proposals I thought US Delegation at Paris talks had felt that, though it was none of its business, would be preferable for WEU headquarters to be in Paris so that NATO Reps could also be WEU Reps, and therefore anything which would give NATO Ambassadors greater role in WEU would be considered good thing. I of course did not know Washington's views but I had some questions about making US permanent observer. If WEU were dealing entirely with matters of no interest to NATO that might be all right. If, however, WEU, as was quite likely, went into a good many NATO matters, other NATO Members such as the Scandinavian Countries, might resent this apparent bloc within NATO and it might do more harm than good. He seemed to understand and appreciate this point and commented that of course they had always hoped that WEU might be enlarged at some time. He also seemed to concur with comments made about third force, emphasizing that neutralism was possibility but should not be considered serious danger.

2. In connection with his emphasis on closer German-US cooperation, he stressed a number of times desire to find means both here and Paris and Washington and Bonn for intimate and frequent contacts between top level personages of our two Governments.

3. The discussion of the difficulties of the past summer led to a brief review of the NATO reappraisal situation. I pointed out that the fundamental US position on strategy was one which we were particularly glad to reach because we felt it met one of the major concerns which the Chancellor had had with respect to the availability and use of conventional means to meet really limited attacks if they should come. Nevertheless it was important to realize that large-scale attacks by conventional means could only be met by an integrated nuclear capability as was provided for in MC48 decisions. I realized this was difficult for some to accept and it might take time to sink in but after long study NATO had found no other answer. I also emphasized that present force levels were reached with full anticipation of having an integrated nuclear capability and a German force equipped with modern nuclear weapons could not be smaller than 12 Divisions by reason of this fact. All 12 are still urgently needed. He admitted that the Germans were having trouble with both of these questions and that it probably would take Strauss some time to become indoctrinated in the whole background and realize limits these factors put on his plans. He felt he was learning and would continue to learn if we give him a little time. Thought the AR session had gone well and I agreed Strauss had taken a very sound approach to his problem. He suggested that it might be highly desirable after Strauss has had chance to become better acquainted with some of his problems, say February or March, if

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he could be invited to the US for discussions with our top political and military people. In the course of this discussion I also had an opportunity to emphasize the problems which the US was facing in finding the funds to maintain the nuclear deterrent including its defenses which we thought was the most essential task of all. I indicated that this problem and efforts to find solutions to it were at the basis of much of the newspaper speculation which had so disturbed them. It was a real problem to which we had to find answers and these were not yet clear. However, I thought that a solution to it was of great interest to the whole Alliance and should be appreciated as such. He seemed to understand the point and to agree fully with the importance of keeping this deterrent and having its bases defended.

Edwin M. Martin  
Deputy Chief of Mission

cc - GER  
RA  
~~NEA~~  
Mr. G. Burke Ellick

Amb. Perkins  
Mr. Nolting  
Mr. Knight  
Mr. Trimble

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Abschrift Mr. Quarles

Aufzeichnung

Der Herr Bundeskanzler empfing am 10. September 1956 um 12 Uhr den amerikanischen Minister für die Luftstreitkräfte, Mr. Donald A. Quarles, zu einer Unterredung, an der auch der amerikanische Botschafter in Bonn teilnahm.

Zunächst überbrachte der amerikanische Botschafter Grüsse von Präsident Eisenhower an den Herrn Bundeskanzler. Er habe Gelegenheit gehabt, am vergangenen Freitag mit dem Präsidenten zu sprechen, der über die Lage in Europa besorgt sei. Auf die Bemerkung des Herrn Bundeskanzlers hin, er werde froh sein, wenn die amerikanischen Wahlen vorüber seien, erklärte der amerikanische Botschafter, die Wahlen spielten keine grosse Rolle und es bestehe kein Zweifel daran, dass Präsident Eisenhower wiedergewählt werde. Nach Auffassung des Herrn Bundeskanzlers stellten die Wahlen für Präsident Eisenhower und die Republikanische Partei ein Handicap dar.

Der Herr Bundeskanzler machte sodann einige sehr vertrauliche Mitteilungen über einen von der Standing Group der NATO am 5. oder 6. September gefassten Beschluss. Ein Sprecher der Standing Group habe vor dem NATO-Rat erklärt, dass die bisherige Absicht, im Falle eines sowjetischen Angriffs die sogenannte forward strategy zu verfolgen, nach dem Abzug französischer und britischer Truppen nicht mehr aufrechterhalten werden könne und dass die Stützpunkte an den Rhein und die IJssel zurückgelegt würden. Dies bedeute eine vollkommene Bankrotterklärung der NATO. Wenn diese Tatsache bekannt würde, hätte dies in Europa und besonders in Deutschland eine niederschmetternde Wirkung. Bei der Erörterung dieses Planes durch die NATO-Botschafter habe sich herausgestellt, dass zwei Botschafter, der amerikanische und der griechische, ohne Weisung ihrer Regierung gewesen seien. Nach Informationen von Herrn Blankenhorn sei es häufiger der Fall, dass der amerikanische NATO-Botschafter keine Informationen oder Weisungen von seiner

Regierung erhalte. So sei beispielsweise auch die Ernennung von Senator George der Presse mitgeteilt worden, nicht jedoch Mr. Perkins selbst, so dass er erklären musste, er wisse nicht, ob er überhaupt noch NATO-Botschafter sei.

Der Grund für seine Darlegungen sei darin zu erblicken, dass die Vereinigten Staaten allein die Führung der freien Völker übernehmen könnten, und wenn sie die Führung nicht behielten, dann sei das Ende da.

Der Herr Bundeskanzler sprach sodann von einer Nachricht, die er am Vortage erhalten habe, wonach der Unterausschuss des amerikanischen Senats für Abrüstung 75 Persönlichkeiten in "hearings" gehört habe. Die Mehrheit dieser 75 Persönlichkeiten vertrete die Auffassung, dass die Aufrüstung der Bundesrepublik die Spannung verschärfen und ein internationales Abrüstungsübereinkommen erschweren werde. Dies gehe aus einem Zwischenbericht des Ausschusses hervor, der am Wochenende in Washington veröffentlicht worden sei. Alle vom Ausschuss gehörten Personen seien für eine Beendigung der Versuche mit Atom- und Wasserstoffwaffen auf dem Wege eines internationalen Abkommens eingetreten. Die gehörten Persönlichkeiten hätten die Auffassung der amerikanischen Regierung, wonach die Abrüstung nur schrittweise verwirklicht werden solle, unterstützt, jedoch auch empfohlen, dass die Vereinigten Staaten eine Politik der einseitigen Abrüstung verfolgen sollten, falls ein internationales Abrüstungsabkommen in nächster Zukunft nicht erzielt werden könne.

Als dritten Punkt nannte der Herr Bundeskanzler die zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten, England und Frankreich bestehenden Meinungsverschiedenheiten hinsichtlich des Suezproblems. Wenn man die drei genannten Tatsachen zusammen betrachte, sei es nicht zu viel gesagt, wenn man behaupte, mit der NATO sei es aus. Dies sei eine ernste Situation und man leiste damit der Sowjetunion den besten Dienst. Der

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Bericht über die Herabsetzung der Streitkräfte mache ihm seine ganze Politik kaputt.

Den Grund für diese Ereignisse sehe er darin, dass die amerikanischen Politiker und auch zahlreiche Mitglieder der amerikanischen Regierung sich nicht vorzustellen vermöchten, was ein Diktator, ein diktatorisches Regiment und besonders ein kommunistisches Regime bedeute. In Amerika scheine man zu glauben, wenn man einer Person anständig gegenüber trete, müsse diese Person auch ihrerseits ein anständiges Verhalten an den Tag legen. In Deutschland habe man mit der Diktatur Erfahrungen gemacht und wisse, dass Entgegenkommen von einem Diktator stets als Schwäche ausgelegt werde. Deshalb sei die Gefahr so gross, und die ganze Arbeit, die die Vereinigten Staaten bisher Gott sei Dank geleistet hätten, drohe zusammenzufallen.

Wenn die Regierung Mollet gestürzt werde, gebe es nur die Alternative Diktatur oder Volksfront. Mollet sei ein ausgezeichnete Mann und er selbst wisse nicht, was aus Frankreich werde, wenn Mollet stürze. Eine solche Entwicklung werde dann auch auf Italien übergreifen, wo die Nenni- und Saragat-Sozialisten bereits einander nähergekommen seien. Wenn Mollet stürze, werde gleichzeitig auch Eden stürzen.

Unter diesen Umständen sei es ausgeschlossen, dass er in Deutschland eine Wehrdienstzeit von 18 Monaten durchbringe und wenn sie die Bundesrepublik nicht einführe, würden sie alle anderen NATO-Staaten abschaffen. Er sehe nur den Ausweg, für gewisse Waffengattungen eine 12monatige, für andere eine 18monatige Dienstzeit vorzusehen. Er könne vielleicht auch sagen, er müsse die ganze Frage noch einmal mit Sachverständigen des Verteidigungsministeriums erörtern oder aber man sehe eine 12monatige Dienstzeit vor und gleichzeitig 2- oder 3monatige Übungen in den folgenden Jahren.

Mr. Quarles antwortete sodann auf die Ausführungen des Herrn Bundeskanzlers und ging zunächst auf den Bericht des Unterausschusses des Senats ein, den er selbst noch nicht gesehen habe. Er wies darauf hin, dass es in der amerikanischen Regierung viele Menschen gebe, mit sehr unterschiedlichen Auffassungen, dass man sich in einem Wahljahr befinde und dass die Mehrheit des Senats von der Oppositionspartei gebildet werde. So bedauerlich es auch sei, man müsse damit rechnen, dass der Senat Auffassungen zum Ausdruck bringe, die denen der Regierung nicht entsprächen.

Mr. Quarles versicherte dem Herrn Bundeskanzler, dass Präsident Eisenhower, der Aussenminister und der Verteidigungsminister die in dem Bericht wiedergegebenen Ansichten nicht teilten. Er sei sicher, dass alle, die eine verantwortliche politische Stellung bekleideten, die Gültigkeit der Aussagen des Herrn Bundeskanzlers über den Ernst der Lage, die Unzuverlässigkeit einer Diktatur und die Notwendigkeit, fest zu bleiben, anerkennen würden. Die Vereinigten Staaten seien entschlossen, fest zu bleiben. Dies komme in dem militärischen Fortschritt und in den Verteidigungshaushalten zum Ausdruck, die ständig grösser würden. Dabei seien die Vereinigten Staaten von der Bemühung geleitet, ihre eigene Position zu stärken und ihren Verbündeten zu helfen, ihre Position ebenfalls zu festigen. Mr. Quarles versicherte dem Herrn Bundeskanzler ferner, dass die beiden politischen Parteien diese Bemühungen unterstützen. Hinsichtlich des Verteidigungshaushaltes hätten sich zwar Meinungsverschiedenheiten ergeben, doch sei der Haushalt für das Steuerjahr, das am 1. Juli begonnen habe, grösser als der für das vorangegangene Jahr, und obschon der Haushalt für das folgende Jahr noch nicht vorgelegt <sup>worden</sup> sei, rechne er fest damit, dass dieser wiederum grösser als der gegenwärtige sein werde.

Die Vereinigten Staaten befänden sich inmitten einer Revolution der militärischen Struktur, die sich auf die Entwicklung der atomaren Waffen stütze. Davon würden die Armee, die Marine und die Luftwaffe betroffen. Durch die Entwicklung dieser Waffen und durch die sehr grosse Erhöhung der Stärke, Geschwindigkeit und des Flugbereichs der modernen Flugzeuge sowie durch die Anwendung modernster elektronischer Geräte für den Einsatz und die Kontrolle dieser Flugzeuge sei die Feuer- und Schlagkraft des einzelnen Soldaten wesentlich erhöht worden. Mit der Weiterentwicklung der Feuerkraft denke man an eine entsprechende Verminderung der Mannschaftsstärke.

Der Herr Bundeskanzler verwies noch einmal auf den Zwischenbericht des Unterausschusses des Senats, worauf der amerikanische Botschafter erwiderte, es handle sich dabei um persönliche Ansichten der Gehörten, die keine Sachverständigen seien.

Mr. Quarles erwähnte sodann zwei Grundlagen der amerikanischen Verteidigungsposition. Zunächst komme es darauf an, an den Grenzen der freien Welt stark genug zu sein, so dass eine sowjetische oder kommunistische Aggression massiv genug sein müsste, um die an den Grenzen aufgebaute Macht der freien Welt zu überwinden. Wenn aber eine sowjetische Aggression so massiv sei, werde die dahinter stehende Absicht klar und wenn eindeutig feststehe, dass die Sowjetunion eine so massive Aggression durchführen wolle, seien die Vereinigten Staaten entschlossen, ihr, wo immer nötig, mit aller ihr zur Verfügung stehenden Stärke entgegenzutreten. Es komme also darauf an, an der Peripherie stark genug zu sein, um im Falle eines Angriffes sofort die Absicht des Gegners zu enthüllen.

Die zweite Grundlage sei, dass man über eine ausreichend starke Vergeltungsmacht verfüge, damit für den Gegner jede Aggression von vornherein ein Risiko darstelle. Er glaube,

wenn die freie Welt an der Peripherie fest zusammenstehe und wenn sie sich die Möglichkeit erhalte, einen massiven Vergeltungsschlag gegen die Sowjetunion durchzuführen, nachdem deren Absicht, eine massive Aggression zu starten, zu Tage getreten sei, so wirke dies als Abschreckungsmittel, das die Russen davon abhalten werde, überhaupt an eine Aggression zu denken. Selbstverständlich sei bekannt, dass die Sowjets versuchten, durch subversive Tätigkeit, Infiltration und wirtschaftliche Kriegsführung ihren Einflussbereich zu erweitern. Er glaube jedoch, dass die Vereinigten Staaten zusammen mit der Bundesrepublik und allen anderen Verbündeten stark genug seien und dass das System der freien Welt<sup>gut</sup> genug sei, um auch dieser Gefahr begegnen zu können. Wenn man die Russen daran hindern könne, zu dem Mittel einer massiven Aggression zu greifen, werde es seiner Ansicht nach auch gelingen, das System der freien Welt gegen das üble System des Kommunismus zu schützen.

Der Herr Bundeskanzler ging auf die Darlegungen von Mr. Quarles wie folgt ein: Sicher würden die nuklearen Waffen und Abschreckungsmittel in die Hände der Armee kommen müssen. Es sei sicher auch richtig, dass die Feuerkraft des einzelnen Soldaten sehr viel grösser sei als bisher. Wenn es einmal möglich sein werde, nukleare Granaten aus normalen Kanonen abzufeuern, dann könne man auch an eine Verminderung der Streitkräfte denken. Davon sollte man aber nicht sprechen, ehe es nicht so weit sei, d.h. ehe die nuklearen Geschosse nicht so weit entwickelt seien, dass sie beispielsweise aus gewöhnlichen Geschützen abgefeuert werden könnten und ihre Wirkungskraft auf einen kleineren Radius beschränkt sei. Der in der New York Times erschienene Artikel über eine Verringerung der amerikanischen Streitkräfte um 800.000 Mann würde bedeuten, dass alle Stützpunkte ausserhalb der Vereinigten Staaten aufgegeben würden.

Die Sowjetunion lebe von der Hoffnung auf die Uneinigkeit des Westens. Daher müsse alles vermieden werden, was dieser Hoffnung Nahrung gebe. Der Herr Bundeskanzler erinnerte an seine Gespräche mit Bulganin und Chruschtschow, in denen die Frage, ob der Westen zusammenhalte, eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt habe. Chruschtschow habe offen zugegeben, dass wegen der Rüstung die sozialen Lasten so drückend seien, dass man aus diesem Grund wünsche, zu einer Abrüstung zu gelangen. Wenn nun beispielsweise vorgeschlagen werde, dass die Vereinigten Staaten einseitig abrüsten sollten, so stärke man dadurch nur die Position der russischen Machthaber, obgleich in ihrem eigenen Lande selbst grosse Unzufriedenheit herrsche. Er sehe nur eine Möglichkeit: man dürfe den Russen keine Atempause geben.

Was die Entwicklung unbemannter Flugzeuge, nuklearer Geschosse und ferngelenkter Geschosse angehe, so werde die Sowjetunion eines Tages auch so weit sein und dann derartige Geschosse auch auf die Vereinigten Staaten abwerfen oder abschiessen können. Ein Diktator sei immer schneller und leichter entschlossen, ohne Kriegserklärung von solchen Mitteln Gebrauch zu machen, als ein demokratischer Staatsmann. Die Sowjetunion werde also gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten im Vorteil sein, weil sie plötzlich solche Waffen einsetzen könne. Hitler habe beispielsweise auch den Begriff Recht und Völkerrecht nicht gekannt, auch habe er kein Gewissen gehabt, das einzige, was bei ihm gezählt habe, sei die Macht gewesen. Er sehe daher in der Entwicklung auch eine ernste Gefahr für die Vereinigten Staaten.

Mr. Quarles unterrichtete den Herrn Bundeskanzler davon, dass die Vereinigten Staaten bereits heute in der Lage seien, atomare Geschosse der Art, wie sie der Herr Bundeskanzler erwähnt habe, einzusetzen. Dies komme vor allem für die Armee und die Luftwaffe in Frage. Derartige Waffen könnten von taktischen Flugzeugen aus eingesetzt ~~xx~~ oder mit Raketen oder aus gewöhnlichen Geschützen abgefeuert werden. Waffen dieser

Art bestünden in verschiedener Grösse, so dass ihr Einsatz auf das jeweils in Frage kommende Ziel im Kampfgebiet abgestellt werden könne. Diese Waffen seien bereits einsatzbereit. Es handle sich praktisch um fortgebildete konventionelle Waffen.

Was den Plan einer Truppenverminderung um 800.000 Mann betreffe, so führte Mr. Quarles aus, dass es sich dabei um einen Stabsentwurf gehandelt habe, der für die Erörterungen der gemeinsamen Stabschefs vorbereitet worden sei. Dieser Plan habe weder die Billigung des Vorsitzenden der gemeinsamen Stabschefs, Admiral Radford's, gehabt, noch sei er bisher offiziell der Regierung vorgelegt worden. Bei der Ausarbeitung habe es sich um die Prüfung der Frage gehandelt, wie die Mannschaftsstärke den ständig anwachsenden Kosten angepasst werden könne, die durch die Ausrüstung eines jeden Soldaten mit den neuesten Waffen entstünden. Man könne im Hinblick auf die steigenden Kosten und die damit verbundene Erhöhung der Schlagkraft nicht die gleiche Zahl von Soldaten unter Waffen halten. Es handle sich also darum, ein Gleichgewicht zwischen diesen beiden Faktoren herzustellen, wobei Mr. Quarles ausdrücklich darauf hinwies, dass die Gesamtausgaben für militärische Zwecke eine steigende Tendenz aufwiesen.

Mr. Quarles war der Auffassung, dass das Interesse der Russen an einer Abrüstung und Herabsetzung der Kosten echt sei, da sie einen grösseren Teil ihres nationalen Einkommens für die Rüstung aufwendeten als die Vereinigten Staaten, was eine beträchtliche Belastung darstellen müsse. Alles, was die Russen jedoch bisher auf dem Gebiet der Abrüstung getan hätten, sei im Hinblick auf die moderne Waffentechnik von geringem Wert und er zweifle an ihren ehrlichen Absichten. Er sei davon überzeugt, dass die Stärke der freien Welt abhängen von ihrer Solidarität, und besondere Bedeutung komme einer Fortsetzung dieser Solidarität mit der Bundesrepublik zu.

Der Herr Bundeskanzler habe darauf hingewiesen, man müsse damit rechnen, dass die Russen eines Tages auch moderne Waffen auf die Vereinigten Staaten abwerfen oder abschiessen könnten. Sie seien hierzu schon heute in der Lage. Falls die Russen eine Aggression grossen Stils starteten, rechne man damit, dass sie zunächst einen massiven Luftangriff gegen die Vereinigten Staaten führen würden, um die Zentren der amerikanischen Schlagkraft im eigenen Lande zu zerstören. Man erwarte nicht, dass die Sowjets ihre Bodestreitkräfte beispielsweise in Richtung auf den Rhein in Bewegung setzen würden, weil sie damit Amerika gegenüber nur ihre aggressiven Absichten verraten würden und sich der Möglichkeit eines Überraschungsangriffs gegen Amerika begeben würden. Er glaube den Erklärungen der Standing Group komme bei der heutigen strategischen Situation keine allzugrosse Bedeutung bei.

Der Herr Bundeskanzler bemerkte, dass diese Erklärung ihren Eindruck nicht verfehlt habe und die NATO dadurch geschwächt würde. Man könne sogar sagen, sie werde dann überflüssig.

Mr. Quarles hob hervor, dass die in dieser Äusserung vertretene Auffassung nicht den Gedankengängen des Verteidigungsministeriums in Washington entspreche, da sie nach dessen Ansicht nicht vernünftig sei.

Der Herr Bundeskanzler führte weiter aus, wenn man sage, die Sowjetunion werde keine örtliche Aggression anfangen, weil sie Vergeltungsschläge fürchte, so ergebe sich sofort die Frage, warum deutsche Streitkräfte aufgestellt werden sollten. Ausserdem sei zu berücksichtigen, dass solche örtlichen Aggressionen nicht nur von den Russen, sondern auch von anderen Satellitenstaaten gestartet werden könnten. Auch würden die Vereinigten Staaten es sich drei Mal überlegen, ehe sie sich entschliessen, ihre volle atomare Kraft einzusetzen.

Mr. Quarles wies noch einmal auf die beiden Grundlagen der amerikanischen Verteidigungsposition hin. Die Stärke an der Peripherie könne nur geschaffen werden, wenn die deutschen Streitkräfte stark genug seien, Angriffen durch Guerilla-Streitkräfte der Ostzone zu begegnen. Man müsse unterscheiden zwischen einer Guerilla-Aktivität und einer massiven sowjetischen Aggression. Starke deutsche Streitkräfte seien unerlässlich, wenn man allen Aggressionen entgegentreten wolle, die weniger seien als eine massive Aggression des gesamten Ostblocks.

Der Herr Bundeskanzler bemerkte, in einer solchen grossen Auseinandersetzung sei die erste Stunde entscheidend und er befürchte, dass aus den vorerwähnten Gründen die Sowjets im Vorteil seien.

Dem widersprach Mr. Quarles. In der amerikanischen Planung sei man bereit, den Russen den Vorteil des ersten Zuges einzuräumen, da man glaube, eine Position erreicht zu haben, die so stark sei, dass man trotz eines Überraschungsangriffes noch einen entscheidenden Vergeltungsschlag führen könne, der jede massive russische Aggression zu einem Risiko werden lasse. Entscheidend sei also nicht der erste Tag sondern die erste Woche.

Die Unterredung wurde um 13.25 Uhr beendet.

Bonn, den 11. September 1956

gez. Weber

F.d.R.d.A.

H. Zimmermann  
(Reg.-Ob. Insp.)



# EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION

Dr. Peter Fischer

Florenz, den 10.7.1991

Robert Wampler  
10314 Malcolm Circle, Apt.F  
USA-Cockeysville, MD 21030

Dear Bob!

Attached you find a copy of the German record of the conversation between Adenauer and Quarles on Sept.10, 1956. I hope that you find somebody to translate the essential parts into English. If you want to quote from this document, the reference is: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Nachlass Blankenhorn (NL-351). Let me again express how much I appreciate your work. I am looking forward to a future exchange of ideas and results of our research.

With all best wishes from Florence  
Yours

*Quarles on 10/25  
Adenauer on 10/25*

*011-39-55-68.0380  
Peter Fischer from phone #*

9/21/56

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

CJC Watson:mle

Return to Mr. Paul Kearney  
Office Chairman JC3  
Room 2-B-000, The Pentagon

CM-377-16  
21 September 1956

CJCS 471.6 (21 Sep 56)

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)**

**Subject: Provision of Nuclear Capability to U.S. Allies**

- References:**
- a. Chairman, JCS Memo dtd 29 May 56
  - b. SecDef Memo dtd 24 Jul 56
  - c. Chairman, JCS Memo dtd 10 May 56
  - d. Chairman, JCS Memo dtd 27 Jul 56

DECLASSIFIED BY:  
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH  
DATE 24 Nov 78

1. I have reviewed your memorandum of 11 September and its Enclosure, a draft memorandum on the above subject.

2. The stated purpose of the draft "is to initiate the development of information, policies, and plans necessary to secure agreement within the Executive Branch on legislative proposals consistent with the recommendation contained in reference a above, to form a basis of presentation to the Congress, and for the commencement of negotiations with foreign governments and regional security organizations on the general subject matter." In my view, however, the proposed draft goes considerably beyond the desired objectives stated in reference a and approved by the Secretary of Defense in his memorandum of 24 July 1956.

3. It should be noted in reference a that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested the Department of Defense for specific legislation only with respect to the United Kingdom and Canada, which would go as far as the exchange of nuclear materials. Another requirement is authority for the exchange of atomic energy information "with selected Allies other than the United Kingdom and Canada, to the extent necessary for the progressive development of operational delivery capabilities." Legislation was also requested to authorize the President at his discretion, to make immediately available U.S. atomic weapons to selected allied nations. To date, the only other countries for which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made recommendations for bilateral agreements in this field are France (reference c), Australia and New Zealand (reference d). The draft memorandum, however, would require the

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CJCS Radford 471.6 (1 August 1956)  
106-218

Joint Chiefs of Staff to hurriedly prepare a great amount of information of a very sensitive nature with respect to all our Allies, based upon assumptions of future conditions which are difficult to predict.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that atomic energy legislation as it relates to weapons should be progressively relaxed. However, the advisability and practicability of the release of such information and a weapon or weapons system to allied forces should constitute a separate problem in each case. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be prompt to make such recommendations when deemed appropriate.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are mindful that with the increasing availability of new weapons, strategic concepts must be kept current, and their most recent statement (SM 423, dtd 23 May 56) of strategic concept has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. It will be used for planning purposes by the Services and field commanders. It is recognized that with the progressive implementation of these policies that there will be changes in force requirements and MDA Programs. These factors are being given due consideration in the preparation of the FY 57 and FY 58 programs and all military planning.

6. Accordingly, I recommend that your draft memorandum be revised to request only that information which is necessary to support the legislative proposals which are immediately required. I need not emphasize to you the urgency with respect to Canada in order to attain an early joint air defense.

(Sgd) Arthur Radford



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NLE MR Case No. 87-81Document No. 5~~TOP SECRET~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

London  
September 21, 1956MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH SIR ANTHONY EDEN  
September 20, 1956

Following the Selwyn Lloyd dinner last night, I went into another room and talked alone with Anthony Eden for about half an hour. He expressed great appreciation for my efforts. He said they had now altered their military planning so that instead of having the fixed date, they were able to hold the military threat in status quo without any prohibitive expense. [Here followed matter not to be committed in writing.] The French have been cooperative and discreet. Both they and the French remained determined that Nasser should not win a victory out of his action. Eden said that the British were unwilling to adapt themselves for any long period to the denial of the Canal route because it was too costly. When I pointed out that the military operation would be more costly, he said perhaps for a short time, but they had hopes that that phase would quickly be over. I said that military action might disrupt the pipelines as well as the Canal. Eden said he was not sure of this. In any event the interruption would be short-lived. I expressed some scepticism of his optimism.

I said that the United States fully agreed that Nasser should not come out ahead, and I thought that he would not. I reviewed his deteriorating economic situation and the increasing concern of other Arab countries. I felt that Nasser had already slipped. I said, however, I thought this could be promoted by closer cooperation between us. Perhaps we should set up a working party to work out plans in this respect. Eden seemed to think this would be a good idea, but no actual decision was taken.

John Foster Dulles

S:JFD:pdh

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MR 87-81-5

By

NLE Date

9/20/80

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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☐ Declassify in part and declass as shown  
 EO 12356, Sec. 1.3(a)

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SUBJECT SERIES

PAPERS, 1956-59

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER

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Personal and Private

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10/1/56

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 1, 1956

(Approved by the President, October 2, 1956)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: United States Position on Review of NATO Strategy  
and Force Levels



I.

Following his conversation with you prior to departure for Europe, Senator George told the Foreign Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg that the Administration would not withdraw any forces from Germany; that there might conceivably be some streamlining reducing the number of men in a division, but no overall reductions or withdrawals. You will recall that prior to my departure for London on September 17, I reported this to you and asked whether this called for any corrective action. You thought not and confirmed that what Senator George had said was in accordance with your views. As you requested, I informed the Secretary of Defense accordingly.

When Senator George saw Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn on September 28, he said he wished to give the Chancellor the complete assurance of the President that there is no intention of withdrawing or reducing our forces so long as their presence is agreeable to the Germans and to the rest of the NATO group.

Pressures in the North Atlantic Council for the immediate commencement of a review of political guidance to the NATO military authorities have now become irresistible, and our failure so far to present the United States position has generated much doubt and confusion as to U.S. intentions and purposes. There has been a serious deterioration in the situation, which, if uncorrected, can have a serious adverse effect on the whole NATO structure.

It is therefore proposed that the United States position be stated promptly in the North Atlantic Council. Prior thereto, we are obligated to present our views to the British, who have proposed a major reduction in NATO conventional forces.

II.

Our presentation to the Council and to the British would be based on the following:

1. The NATO military mission now includes the defense of the NATO area against all types of aggression, including any local attack, by a satellite force for

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WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE - GENERAL 1956 (4)  
DALLS, JOHN FOSTER: FA 100, 100239



example. The maintenance of an effective shield for these purposes must include sufficient conventional ground forces to avoid inflexibility.

2. Accordingly, we find unacceptable any proposal which implies the adoption of a NATO strategy of total reliance on nuclear retaliation.

3. Despite reports to the contrary, the United States has no present plan for withdrawing divisions from Europe. In the light of developments in materiel and techniques, a streamlining of forces appears desirable and will permit economies in manpower without weakening NATO's defensive strength.

4. The United States will continue to carry out its undertakings of October 1954 to "continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area."

What constitutes a "fair sharing" of burdens among the members of NATO is not static. The burden on the United States of maintaining the nuclear deterrent, of assuring the defense of the North American portion of the North Atlantic Treaty area, and of maintaining naval forces to keep the sea lanes open, is steadily and rapidly increasing with the growing complexity and cost of these programs.

Accordingly, it seems only fair that the European nations should increasingly assume a greater share of responsibility for the ready forces required on the Continent to provide the shield which NATO strategy envisages.

5. We recognize the desirability of adjusting European thinking as rapidly as possible to the application of the "fair share" concept, but we would exercise discretion in the timing and nature of our presentation so as to avoid collapsing NATO as a result of any misconception of our purpose.

6. We would, however, urge a prompt restudy of the political and military situation by the NATO Permanent Representative with a view to assuring the fullest possible understanding by all NATO members of the current need and justification for the continued defense effort.

7. We believe that this review should be conducted by the Permanent Representatives, calling upon the NATO military authorities for advice as required. On the basis of the Permanent Representatives' study, political guidance to the NATO military authorities should be agreed at the Ministerial Meeting in December.

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8. In the course of the review, consideration should be given to urging the NATO military authorities to accelerate the adjustment of their plans to take account of modern weapons and techniques so as to reduce manpower and materiel requirements to the extent consistent with security.

9. Secrecy with respect to the conduct of the review is politically imperative until final conclusions are reached.

10. Under the current treaty limitations, we could not agree to the UK-French proposal regarding the role of NATO or its members in event of hostilities solely outside the NATO area.

### III.

If you approve this course, we would immediately inform the British Ambassador on the basis of the foregoing and advise the UK of our intention to speak in the North Atlantic Council along the above lines at an early date. We would also inform the UK of our hope that they would accept our views, but that we feel it necessary to proceed promptly in the Council in any event. Shortly thereafter, the United States would make a statement in the North Atlantic Council on the basis of the foregoing.



John Foster Dulles

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- 2 -

## II.

Our presentation to the Council and to the British would be based on the following:

1. The NATO military mission now includes the defense of the NATO area against all types of aggression, including any local attack, by a satellite force for example. The maintenance of an effective shield for these purposes must include sufficient conventional ground forces to avoid inflexibility.

2. Accordingly, we find unacceptable ~~the United Kingdom proposal~~ <sup>any</sup> <sup>which</sup> ~~if, as seems to be the case, it implies the possible adoption of a~~ NATO strategy of ~~almost~~ <sup>near</sup> total reliance on nuclear retaliation.

3. Despite reports to the contrary, the United States has no ~~intention of withdrawing divisions from Europe at this stage.~~ <sup>intent</sup> In the light of developments in material and techniques, a streamlining of forces appears desirable and ~~may~~ <sup>will</sup> permit ~~some~~ economies in manpower without weakening NATO's defensive strength.

4. The United States will continue to carry out its undertakings of October 1954 to "continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area."

What constitutes a "fair sharing" of burdens among the members of NATO is not static. The burden on the United States of maintaining the nuclear deterrent, of assuring the defense of the North American portion of the North Atlantic Treaty area, and of maintaining naval forces to keep the sea lanes open, is steadily and rapidly increasing with the growing complexity and cost of these programs.

Accordingly, it seems only fair that the European nations should increasingly assume a greater share of responsibility for the ready forces required on the Continent to provide the shield which NATO strategy envisages.

5. We recognize the desirability of adjusting European thinking as rapidly as possible to the application of the "fair share" concept, but we would exercise discretion in the timing and nature of our presentation so as to avoid collapsing NATO as a result of any misconception of our purpose.

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6.

Dulles Memo for the President, "U.S. Position on Review of NATO Strategy & Force Levels," 10/1/56 - <sup>rev</sup> ~~orig~~ by DDE 10/2/56 - dec. 1985  
 Hs/WMM/3/WH Cor. - 6/1956 (1)

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October 2, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Summary record of meeting, 2 October 1956

Present:	The President	Secretary Robertson	Col. Goodpaster
	Secretary Dulles	Secretary Gray	
	Mr. MacArthur	Mr. McNeil	
	Mr. Elbrick	Admiral Radford	

In the meeting today, the President indicated he thought there should be no decrease in U. S. divisions in Europe for the present, and no statement indicating that such decreases are planned.

Nevertheless, he considers -- as he has from the beginning of the NATO build-up -- that the U. S. reinforcements sent to Europe were provided to bridge the crisis period during which European forces were building up; however, practical considerations have limited, and still limit, action or policy statements initiating withdrawal.

The President considers that significant manpower savings can and should be made by reducing the manpower strength of divisions, and by cutting down on administrative overhead and support elements. In addition, he feels that economy should be sought in other priority military programs.

The President indicated general agreement with Secretary Dulles' memorandum of October 1, 1956, subject to revision of Section II thereof as agreed in the meeting. With these revisions, no objection to the provisions of the outline was indicated by those present. The memorandum as revised is attached.

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MR 85-52743

BY LHO DATE 8/15/82

A. J. Goodpaster  
Colonel, CE, U S Army  
Staff Secretary

Copy to Secretary of Defense

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# 678

cy of Sec State memo to Pres. 10/1/56 with enc

Staff Secy / In T to M / 9 / NATO ALE no 2 (2)

10/2/56(2)

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October 2, 1956

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT  
October 2, 1956

Others present: Secretary Dulles  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Elbrick  
Secretary Robertson  
Secretary Gordon Gray  
Mr. McNeil  
Admiral Radford  
Colonel Goodpaster



The meeting was concerned with views relating to any reduction of U. S. force strength in Europe, and possible statements to NATO regarding such reduction and related matters, including questions of NATO strategy raised by the British and French.

The President opened by saying that he felt very definitely that we cannot take divisions out of Europe at this time. The effect on Adenauer would be unacceptably damaging. He could not agree with a Defense position contemplating such reductions, and statements to this effect at this time. He recalled that he had always supported the idea of reducing our forces after the initial period of crisis was over -- he had always considered that they had been sent over to add strength temporarily while European forces were developed. Referring to recent reference indicating that Senator George had implied a sixth division might be established in Europe out of manpower saved through streamlining, he indicated that these comments seemed to reflect a misunderstanding. He did not plan to go above five divisions, but he did feel that the strength should be maintained at five divisions.

The President went on to say that we must make use of every art of statecraft to bring the Europeans to an understanding of our way of thinking regarding our forces there, but for the moment we could not remove major units. He felt we should examine closely all of our other high priority programs. He mentioned the earth satellite, initially estimated to cost \$22 million, now at \$60 million, with this latter figure "only a beginning." He noted that we had not yet dropped any of the four lines of development of ballistic missiles. (Secretary

WHITE HOUSE  
Staff Secretary: Records, 1952-61  
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NATO File No. 2(2)

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (a)(1)(5)

DOD 1/18/85, State 10/21/85  
12/6/85

7/13/85-35 #3  
BY DJH DATE 1/17/86

Robertson pointed out the figure is now five.) He referred to the major programs of the Air, the Navy, ground forces, and Marines, and thought we should look them all over.

Secretary Robertson said that to get within a reasonable budgetary range, it appears we must be ready to go down to a strength of about 2.6 million. Careful studies are being made with the aim of cutting overhead. The President broke in to say he agreed strongly on cutting overhead, and particularly on cutting down the strength of the Army division. Secretary Robertson said that even if we were to cut out 4,000 men per division in Europe, and make reductions in administrative overhead and support, plus reductions in tactical air strength, and reduction in families accordingly, it will be hard to find the needed savings. He said he wants to keep digging. The President said he has felt since the first atom bomb was dropped that the infantry division should be substantially cut -- it shouldn't be over 12,000 men. He felt that support echelons could be cut down (not incorporating all of the units cut out of the division) since it would be possible to deploy some support units in time of war.

Secretary Robertson thought we should tell our allies what we are doing. Information would, in any event, leak out during the budget hearings.

The President said he had always insisted that the Europeans should develop ground forces to replace ours. Also he had supported off-shore procurement so that they would develop an ability to produce capital equipment and not depend entirely on us. As events developed in the past, however, there was always an unwillingness to put the matter squarely to the Europeans and now it has become extremely difficult.

Admiral Radford said that the trends discussed in the Defense paper are well reflected in NATO papers going back all the way to 1950. It is apparent that Adenauer has not read these papers. Admiral Radford referred to the problem of cutting off spare parts. Each time this has been proposed, it has been necessary to postpone this action.

Secretary Dulles said that we must be fairly specific in our ideas very soon, because the NATO Council will be taking this matter up. He proceeded to a discussion of the points in Section II of his memorandum to the President dated October 1, 1956. There was general agreement on the desirability of streamlining our forces in Europe, and paragraph 3 of the Secretary's memo was revised to meet the views of the Defense representatives.



There was next discussion of paragraph 2 which also resulted in some revision to make it acceptable to the whole group. In the discussion, Admiral Radford said the original version overstated the U K position. They were simply adopting the new look, which we had already adopted. Secretary Dulles indicated that it was one thing for us to rely on the new look, not being subject to insurrectionary or conventional attack as the Europeans are, and it is something else to propose it for the Europeans.

The President next suggested that we should send someone to discuss these matters with Adenauer, whose understanding of the problem is apparently incomplete and possibly in error in some respects. An explanation should be given as to how we plan to use atomic weapons. Admiral Radford agreed that this would be useful and said he would like to do it himself sometime. The President thought it might be well to have the discussion before General Gruenther comes back since he has Adenauer's confidence.

Admiral Radford next pointed out the tremendous increase in the fire-power of military units that has occurred over the last several years -- with one division having a strength much greater than many divisions had in the past. A good deal of cutting down could be considered. Secretary Robertson suggested that streamlining would not go far enough; further cuts would be required. The President thought that substantial savings could be found through streamlining, but that reduction in number of divisions does not look practicable at this time.

Admiral Radford referred to paragraph 10 of the Secretary's memo, and indicated he pre-judged the matter on which a position had not yet been developed in the U. S. government. The Secretary and the President pointed out that the proposal seemed to go beyond the scope of the treaty and its legislative history. Admiral Radford said the Chiefs see some merit in the proposal. It is now up for consideration in a Standing



per week on 100,000, not 100,000,000

to know on affair

Re Radford would brief A. over Rpt's lead to dry!

~~TOP SECRET~~

Group paper, and the United States has reserved its position in the matter. The President indicated that the matter could be brought up for consideration, including consideration of possible treaty revision, and suggested an amendment which would leave the matter open for this purpose. No further objections were indicated to the outline of presentation set forth in the Secretary's memorandum.

A. J. Goodpaster  
Colonel, CE, U S Army



10/2/56

10/2/56

Copy of document prepared in  
 (Col. S. Goodpaster)

October 2, 1956

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(Goodpaster)

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 344

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 E.O. 12958, 1.3, 1.4 (b)

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FOUO - SEC 1.3 (b) (1) (5)

DOD 1/18/85; State/NIC 10/31/85

27A25-35 #3

BY DJA 1/17/86

12/6/85

Staff Secy (DNTT+M/3/NATO File NO 2(2)

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This document consists of 4 pages  
Number 1 of 8 copies, Series A

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 10/4/56

SUBJECT: German Defense Contribution and US-German Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Chancellor Adenauer  
Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy *RM*  
Mr. Trimble (for part of discussion)

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762A.5/10-456 CS/G

During the course of a two-hour conversation with Chancellor Adenauer, who seemed to be fully prepared for the discussion, he gave me a review of the features which led to his expressed doubts regarding shifts and changes in the American attitude and policy. I opened the conversation by extending warm congratulations over the successful conclusion of the Franco-German negotiations on the Saar. The Chancellor beamed with satisfaction and described his meetings with Mollet as extremely satisfactory. He said that he had formed a high opinion of Mollet's ability and character, and had felt that Mollet would continue to make a real contribution to Franco-German cooperation. I told Chancellor Adenauer that I had always regarded Franco-German rapprochement one of the major keys to European peace and unity. He declared that there is no doubt about that, and that he felt that the successful conclusion of the negotiations marked a tremendous step forward in the direction of European integration. He felt that it would also promote a more affirmative attitude on the part of the British, would stimulate achievement of EURATOM and work toward the establishment of the common market.

The Chancellor having been alerted by Hallstein and others as to my interest in discussing his remarks regarding the "Radford Plan" and his doubts about a trend in the United States towards isolationism and "Fortress America," the Chancellor launched into a lengthy description of the reasons which he said led him to serious entertainment of these doubts.

He referred

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He referred to his meeting with Secretary Dulles in June, at which time, he said, he received absolutely no indication of the "Radford Plan" or any change in our policy. I suggested that it would have been difficult for the Secretary to have referred to these things as they were simply non-existent. The Chancellor then referred to the spate of newspaper stories on the subject, especially the Tony Leviero article in The New York Times in July and a number of other articles, a collection of which he had before him. He referred especially to The New York Times and to Time. He said that these articles could not have appeared at a more unfortunate moment. Before their appearance, he said, there was no question whatever that the Bundestag would have passed a law calling for an 18-month period of military service in West Germany. After the appearance of these articles, it was utterly impossible to obtain the required support for an 18-month period of service, and this led to the Cabinet's decision to support only a 12-month period.

During the course of the discussion, reference was made to the Chancellor's letter to the Secretary of August 11. I expressed the opinion that the Secretary had been hurt by the Chancellor's reference to American unreliability. The Chancellor vehemently asserted that it was not his intention in any sense to be critical of the Secretary, and that it was only because of his close association with and affection for the Secretary that he wrote the letter on a personal basis. He asserted that it did not form part of the official files in his office, and that he regarded it strictly as a personal communication. Nevertheless, his conviction remained that there had been a change in our policy which he thought was engineered by others than the Secretary. He said he had mentioned some features of his doubts to the Secretary last June. He felt that there were forces at work, perhaps in the Pentagon and in the White House, which were not in harmony with the Secretary's views. It was clear from his remarks that he labored under a certain apprehension that a Russo-American agreement would be worked out which at one point might leave our NATO Allies, including Germany, "high and dry."

See 9/10/56!  
p 7

The Chancellor then referred to his conversation on September 11 with Secretary Quarles and Ambassador Conant. What Quarles had told him about American inability to meet the enormous expense which is attached to the development of our Nuclear Power and Guided Missile Programs and the maintenance of military personnel in its present magnitude had greatly disturbed the Chancellor. Quarles, he said, had also made the fantastic statement (in which Ambassador Conant seemed to concur) that the American strategic plan would permit a whole week to elapse in the case of an atomic strike against the United States by the Soviet Union. I insisted that the Chancellor must have misunderstood Mr. Quarles' remarks, and assured him that American planning did not envisage any such absurd proposition. He continued to insist that it did, that Mr. Quarles had been quite clear, and that Conant had concurred. I told him I would consult Ambassador Conant who was ill in bed, but with whom I had talked before seeing the Chancellor, and I could again assure him that he had misunderstood, and that the American reaction would be counted not in terms of one week, but in a matter of minutes or hours, at the most. At the end

of

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of our conversation on this point, which was lengthy, the Chancellor's fears seemed to be allayed. It was clear to me, however, that in view of the rather lengthy litany of fears and anxieties which he expressed throughout our conversation, ~~that~~ he is in need of additional briefing which will give him a clear understanding both of the American power position and a better notion of American strategic planning.

In brief, the Chancellor seemed to have arrived at the conviction that there had been a fundamental change in American policy which contemplated withdrawal of forces from abroad, especially Germany, and a reduction in the national defense effort. He felt that there were forces at work in Washington looking to an understanding with the Soviet Union, and that there is substance to the American reports regarding a planned reduction in American military personnel. He also seemed to believe that the American strategic concept relating to the possibility of Soviet attack against the United States is deficient. All of this added up in his mind to the conviction that NATO is in serious danger of disintegration, and that if this were all true, the German defense effort is a futility.

I emphasized that these views are in direct conflict with what I believe are the facts, and certainly seem to conflict with the views of Secretary Dulles. He again said that he had no doubts regarding Secretary Dulles' position, but that he is convinced that others in the American Government entertain different views. He cited remarks of Secretary Wilson, for example, and Mr. Stassen, and referred to information which he had to the effect that the White House might be directly in contact with Moscow, by-passing the Department of State. I quizzed him on the sources of information which he did not identify but which he seemed to feel are reliable.

I explained to the Chancellor that it is considered unfortunate that in making references to American policy, he and his government should publicly rely on newspaper reports as though our relations were not sufficiently close and dependable. He was obviously embarrassed, and agreed that this was unfortunate and should be avoided in the future. Throughout this conversation, I was not unaware of the Chancellor's domestic political problems and the possibility that he and his party's leadership found it convenient to peg the decision for a twelve-month period of military service on allegations that American policy changes made it impossible to call for an 18-month period. I pointed out that we were on a 24-month basis, and that in proportion to both population and resources, the American effort far exceeded the proposed German program, citing the comparative figures and ratios. In addition to the German delay in launching any program at all, what they proposed to do as the

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maximum in point of manpower, when accomplished, represented only about one-half of the American manpower effort, and that in relation to their budgetary planning, American expenditures represented three or four times the proportion to resources for which the German plan would call. This seemed to impress the Chancellor who gave a long explanation attempting to prove that greater reliance on a volunteer system by the Germans would lead to a higher quality professional army, and that there would be many exceptions to the 12-month rule calling for longer periods of service on a voluntary basis in a number of categories. The Chancellor repeatedly assured me that we had no cause for anxiety regarding the German rearmament effort, and that the German Federal Republic would make its full contribution to the NATO effort. I also drove home the point that the German decision would be bound to have an impact on the programs of other members and might prove injurious to the Alliance. On this he disagreed and declared that the NATO partners would soon be satisfied and agreeably surprised by the efficient results his Government would achieve in the military field.

I also referred to that part of the Chancellor's conversation with Senator George in which the Chancellor asserted that there was lack of coordination in NATO and that Ambassador Perkins was not kept adequately informed by the United States Government. I pressed the Chancellor for his reasons in making these assertions to Senator George and inquired if it were not indiscreet whether he could indicate the source of his information. The Chancellor replied that his principal source was Blankenhorn but that there was common talk to the effect that Perkins was neglected by his Government. For example, it was well known that Perkins was totally unaware that Senator George was to be appointed to his present assignment. This created an unfavorable impression generally. Then again he said in connection with the Suez discussions in the NATO Council, when it came to Mr. Perkins' turn to speak he had nothing to say. This was also the subject of adverse comment and the implication that there was a lessened American interest in NATO affairs.

The conversation broke up for dinner with profuse expressions of the Chancellor's regard for and understanding of the Secretary's support. He was particularly pleased with the Secretary's remarks at his press conference in which he endorsed the Chancellor's Brussels statement regarding European integration.

G:RMurphy/vh  
10/8/56

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DZ 10/16/56

~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OCTOBER 16, 1956  
2:21 PM

EYES ONLY

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM AMBASSADOR CONANT

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

EDITORIAL APPEARING NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG (USUALLY HIGHLY FAVORABLE U.S. POSITION) AND REPRINTED DIE WELT SATURDAY, JULY 21, SUMS UP WIDESPREAD REACTION AT THAT TIME.

"THE CHANGE IN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THINKING--A CHANGE WHICH IS DUE TO ELECTION POLITICS--HAS CAUSED DEEP CONCERN IN BONN. FOR MONTHS THE WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS HAVE BEEN EMPHATICALLY TOLD BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITIES OF NATO AND BY TRAVELING MILITARY MEN FROM BEYOND THE ATLANTIC OCEAN THAT TWELVE GERMAN DIVISIONS ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND ESSENTIAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF GERMANY AND OF EUROPE; WELL-FOUNDED ARGUMENTS. CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE WERE OFFERED FOR THESE CLAIMS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PASSED A CONSCRIPTION LAW TO CARRY OUT ITS PROMISE AND TO FULFILL ITS DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS. THE LAST ECHO OF THE BITTER PARLIAMENTARY FIGHT CONCERNING THIS CONSCRIPTION LAW HAS HARDLY DIED OUT AND THE INK IS HARDLY DRY ON THE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPPORT COSTS FOR ALLIED TROOPS, WHICH BONN CONCEDED VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL OBLIGATION. NOW WE HEAR FROM WASHINGTON A MESSAGE FROM THE MILITARY MEN, WHICH WAS SECONDED BY SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES, THAT THESE TWELVE DIVISIONS WILL PROBABLY NOT BE NEEDED AND

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NLE Para 86-38972  
By [signature] NLE Date 5/2/85

1989/2579  
 Robert D. Eldredge, Plaintiff  
 v.  
 Republic of the United States,  
 Defendant.  
 BNL, Dulles Foster. Oct '56(1)

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-2- 1456, OCTOBER 16, 5 PM FROM BONN

THAT AMERICAN TROOPS ARE TO BE REDUCED IN NUMBERS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS REPORTED THAT LONDON IS CONSIDERING REDUCING TROOPS STATIONED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

"THE MAN WHO BASED HIS POLICY TO SUCH A HIGH DEGREE ON THE ASSURANCE AND THE LOYALTY OF HIS WESTERN PARTNERS MUST TODAY HAVE THE PAINFUL FEELING OF HAVING BEEN DISAVOWED. WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THIS POLICY, IT IS DIFFICULT, AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, TO KEEP FROM WRITING A BITTER SATIRE ABOUT THE COORDINATION OF WESTERN POLICY."

WHETHER OR NOT CHANCELLOR JUSTIFIED IN NURSING THIS GRIEVANCE, HE HAS BEEN UNDOUBTEDLY AIRING THE GRIEVANCE PUBLICLY TO A LARGE EXTENT IN ORDER TO COUNTERACT ANTICIPATED CRITICISM FROM U.S. AND OTHER NATO SOURCES CONCERNING HIS DECISION TO INSTITUTE 12 INSTEAD OF 18-MONTH DRAFT. YOU WILL RECALL YOUR CONVERSATION WITH BRENNANO IN PARIS IN APRIL CONCERNING DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO IF GERMANS INSTITUTED ONLY 12-MONTH DRAFT. POLITICAL SITUATION HERE IN GERMANY HAS MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT CHANCELLOR TO PUT THROUGH 18-MONTH PROPOSAL AND UNDOUBTEDLY NEWS AND DISCUSSIONS IN NEWSPAPERS JULY 16 TO JULY 25 INCREASED HIS DIFFICULTIES. AS EXPLAINED TO YOU IN MY PERSONAL LETTER IN JULY, THE CASE FOR 12 DIVISION GERMAN ARMY HAS BEEN BASED LARGELY ON GRUENTHER'S TESTIMONY THAT ONLY WITH 12 PLUS PRESENT BRITISH, AMERICAN, AND FRENCH STRENGTH ON CONTINENT COULD FORWARD POSITION BE HELD. THEREFORE, WHAT APPEARED TO BE REVERSAL IN THIS POSITION ON PART OF U.S., AND WAS CERTAINLY AN OFFICIAL DOUBT RAISED BY BRITISH ON OR ABOUT JULY 20 BY DOCUMENT READ TO NATO MEETING, HAS BEEN SERIOUS BLOW TO CHANCELLOR'S PUBLIC POSITION ON DEFENSE MATTERS. RESHUFFLE OF HIS CABINET TODAY WITH STRAUSS REPLACING BLANK MAY WELL MEAN FURTHER DELAYS GERMAN DRAFT WHICH IN TURN WILL BRING FORTH FURTHER CRITICISMS FROM U.S. AND NATO PARTNERS. CHANCELLOR AND HIS FRIENDS WILL BE INCLINED TO BLAME U.S. STILL FURTHER FOR ALLEGED CHANGE IN STRATEGIC PLANNING AND FAILURE TO NOTIFY HIM AT TIME OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST JUNE.

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-3- 1456, OCTOBER 16, 3 PM FROM BONN

UNLESS AND UNTIL SOME OF BASIC PROBLEMS OF STRENGTH AND NATURE  
GROUND FORCES REQUIRED IN EUROPE CAN BE DISCUSSED AND SETTLED IN  
NATO, BELIEVE THE U.S. AND FEDERAL REPUBLIC ON UNCERTAIN  
BASIS IN REGARD TO COOPERATION IN FUTURE DEVELOPMENT GERMAN  
ARMY. THEREFORE, I HOPE U.S. WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN FUNDAMENTAL  
DISCUSSIONS NATO ON SIZE AND ARMAMENT GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE  
FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE AND RELATION THE TASK OF THOSE FORCES  
TO MISSION OF SAC. UNTIL SITUATION CLARIFIES HERE AFTER  
STRAUSS TAKES OVER BLANK'S POSITION, WOULD ADVISE AGAINST ANY  
FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS TO THE CHANCELLOR ABOUT MISUNDERSTANDING  
LAST JULY OR GERMAN DEFENSE EFFORTS. CHANCELLOR HAS ALREADY  
RECEIVED A PERSONAL COMMUNICATION FROM SENATOR GEORGE WHICH  
SHOULD HAVE RESOLVED HIS DOUBTS.

I SHALL BE SEEING CHANCELLOR NEXT WEEK IN CONNECTION WITH EURATOM  
AND QUESTIONS ARISING FROM UNDER SECRETARY MURPHY'S DISCUSSION,  
AND MAY HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN FURTHER OF CHANCELLOR'S  
REACTION ON ALL THESE MATTERS WITHOUT OPENING SUBJECT  
MYSELF.

CONANT

DT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action  
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Control: 10705

Rec'd: OCTOBER 18, 1956

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FROM: LONDON

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2129, OCTOBER 18, 5 PM

OCB  
CIA  
OSD  
ARMY  
NAVY  
AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 2129 REPEATED INFORMATION BONN 70

DURING CONVERSATION WITH ECMIN AT OPENING CALDER HALL REACTOR, FEDERAL MINISTER DEFENSE STRAUSS MADE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS.

1. ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS HE WOULD DO WHEN ASSUMING OFFICE AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE, WOULD BE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF TANKS FOR GERMAN FORCES. HE GAVE CLEAR IMPRESSION HE WOULD DO HIS BEST PREVENT PURCHASE M 47 AND INSTEAD BUY CENTURIONS. REASONS HE GAVE WERE:

A. M 47 COULD ONLY FIRE 11 SHOTS BEFORE HAVING TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM FRONT LINE FOR RELOADING, WHEREAS CENTURION COULD FIRE 20.

B. U.S. FORCES HAD NOT HAD AS MUCH EXPERIENCE IN ACTUAL FIGHTING WITH TANKS AS BRITISH AND GERMANS, SINCE THEY HAD ONCE HAD AIRCRAFT TO DO MOST OF THEIR FIGHTING FOR THEM. HE THEREFORE TENDED RELY MORE ON GENERAL BRITISH DESIGN.

C. LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR CENTURIONS WOULD BE EASIER.

HE WOULD, OF COURSE, ACCEPT THE M 47'S OFFERED AS GRANT AID AND WOULD BUY ENOUGH ADDITIONAL TO EQUIP THE FORCES WHICH WERE GOING TO USE THEM, BUT HE PREFERRED CENTURIONS FOR HIS FORCES THAT WERE GOING TO FIGHT IN THE NORTH WITH BRIT AND BENELUX FORCES EQUIPPED WITH CENTURIONS.

HE WAS ANXIOUS TO START A JOINT PROGRAM WITH THE BRITISH FOR DEVELOPMENT OF TANK CHARACTERISTICS AND PARTICULARLY TO DO HIS BEST TO "OVERCOME THE OIL COMPANIES" AND GET A DIESEL TANK WHICH WOULD NOT EXPLODE WHEN HIT

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--2-- 2129, OCTOBER 18, 5 PM, FROM LONDON

HIT. HE FELT THIS TO BE MOST IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICALLY. IN ANY EVENT, HE FELT THAT THE M 47 WAS OBSOLETE AND THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE FOR THE U.S. WAS TO SCRAP THEM OR SELL THEM TO THE GERMANS. AS FOR DELIVERY, HE FELT THAT THE BRITISH COULD EASILY MAKE DELIVERY OF THE MORE MODERN TYPES OF THE CENTURIONS BY THE TIME HIS FORCES WOULD BE READY TO USE THEM.

HE STATED THAT THE MOS RPT MOS HAD MADE HIM AS OFFER FOR CENTURIONS WHICH WAS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

2. STRAUSS KEPT STRESSING THE THEME THAT IT WAS VERY MUCH MORE IMPORTANT FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE TO HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF REALLY QUALIFIED TROOPS THAN A LARGE NUMBER OF BADLY-TRAINED AND INADEQUATELY EQUIPPED TROOPS. HE DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE ARMY OF 500,000 MEN WITHIN FOUR OR FIVE YEARS. HE POINTED OUT THAT HITLER HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO SO EVEN WHEN HE HAD ABSOLUTE POWER AND 200,000 MEN OF HIGHEST MILITARY QUALITY, OF WHOM THE PRIVATES WERE READY TO BE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS WERE COMPETENT ENOUGH TO BECOME LIEUTENANTS. WHEN ASKED IF HE THOUGHT HE COULD DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE FORCE WITH 12 MONTHS CONSCRIPTION HE SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS AND SAID THAT MOST OF THE GERMAN TROOPS IN WORLD WAR II WERE SENT TO THE FRONT WITH 8 WEEKS TRAINING OR LESS.

3. HE OBSERVED THAT A LARGE CONVENTIONAL WAR IN EUROPE WAS IN HIS OPINION QUITE IMPOSSIBLE, BUT THAT THERE STILL WAS REAL NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR ELSEWHERE.

4. HE EXPRESSED UNBOUNDED ADMIRATION FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OFFICERS, MEN AND EQUIPMENT OF THE US SIXTH FLEET, WHICH HE HAD RECENTLY VISITED. HE SAID THERE WAS A VERY GREAT DEAL THAT THE GERMAN NAVY WOULD HAVE TO LEARN BEFORE IT COULD COME UP TO THE STANDARDS OF COMPETENCE

4. HE EXPRESSED UNBOUNDED  
NESS OF THE  
SIXTH FLEET,  
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HAVE TO LEAR

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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THE US  
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HE STANDARDS  
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CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 2129, OCTOBER 18, 5 PM, FROM LONDON

OF COMPETENCE AND PREPAREDNESS WHICH HE HAD SEEN IN THE  
SIXTH FLEET. HE WAS IMPRESSED PARTICULARLY BY THE  
GENERAL ATTITUDE OF OFFICERS AND MEN TOWARD THEIR  
WORK.

ALDRICH

ABL

Confidential File

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)  
Agency Case NSC F 88-1251  
NLE Case MA 88-26671  
By 0514 NLE Date 1/7/91

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11/19/56


November 19, 1956

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EYES ONLY COLONEL GOODPASTER FROM GENERAL GRUENTHER

Will you please pass the following message to the President.

This morning I paid my farewell call on Prime Minister Mollet. After preliminary exchanges he asked me if I would carry an oral message from him to the President of the United States. I took no notes, but the following paragraphs represent approximately what he said:



SECRET  
EYES ONLY

Page 1 of 5

AWP/Rut/12/Mollet, Guy (3)

SECRET

EYES ONLY

I told you earlier I would say why I think the President understands the problem, but possibly not all his advisers. The story I am about to relate is known only to a very few people. On the day when the crowd attacked the Humanite Building, which was the same day that I addressed our Assembly, I received a telephone call from Eden at about 3:00 P.M. saying that he had talked to President Eisenhower on the telephone about a meeting in Washington, and that as a result of that conversation he was going to leave for Washington that night accompanied only by Lady Eden and one secretary. Eden then said, "Now, what about you?" I replied that I was heavily committed in Paris, but that I would change everything and take off at nine o'clock that night. At about 5:30 that afternoon, I received another call from Eden saying that the trip had been cancelled because the President felt



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
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
it would be inappropriate to have this conference prior to his meeting with the Congressional leaders. It would appear that some of his counselors recommended against this important meeting.



100-100000-100

EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY



I told Prime Minister Mollet that I would not arrive in Washington

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EYES ONLY

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UNCLASSIFIED  
EYES ONLY

until shortly before noon on November 23rd, and that I did not know when I would see the President. However, I added that as soon as I did see him, I would try to reproduce the sentiments he had expressed.

My comments.

Once again I am embarrassed to serve as a messenger on this level and especially so twice in the same day. Only one copy of this message has been made and it will be shown to Ambassador Dillon later today. Mollet was calm, very sincere, and extremely articulate. He showed no bitterness. It was clear to me that he has great faith in you and that he is deeply distressed that you are seriously displeased because of the action taken by the British and French Governments. It was also evident that he very much wishes to have a meeting with you as soon as practicable.

My only additional comment is that it is fortunate that Gruenther is about to leave Europe. Otherwise he might find himself spending more and more of his time acting as a messenger, and messing up the normal diplomatic procedures. For this extra curricular service by me I trust that you will require all Governmental hot shots to contribute an extra amount to the Red Cross when it conducts its campaign fund next March.



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EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

J.C.S. 2220/111

21 November 1956

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON J.C.S. 2220/111

A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee  
on

PROVISION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES TO U.S. ALLIES

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 21 November 1956, after making amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation in paragraph 9 of J.C.S. 2220/111.

*dove* 2. Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised pages 725, 726, and 727, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages by burning.

3. The memorandum in Enclosure "A" was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, dated 21 November 1956.

4. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of J.C.S. 2220/111.

R. D. WENTWORTH,


H. L. HILLYARD,

Joint Secretariat.

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*Recd 11-30-56.*

J.C.S. FILED

*350,055 (3-16-48) Jan 7. 015*

*X2 1/P*

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COPY NO. 48

J.C.S. 2220/111

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

15 November 1956

Pages 723 - 728, incl.

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

PROVISION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES TO U.S. ALLIES

References: a. J.C.S. 2056/87  
b. J.C.S. 2220/97  
c. J.C.S. 2220/109

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has requested that the information contained herein be furnished not later than 23 November 1956.

DECLASSIFIED BY:  
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH  
DATE 23 JUL 1978

*See Decision on dtd. 11-21-56.*

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Gen. Cary (DD Plans, Air)  
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Gen. Wentworth (S/JCS)  
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Secys, JSPC  
Gen. Coiner (AFOAT)

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JCS 2220/111

- 723 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

357.05 (3-16-1956) Sec 8 0918

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*ca 11-28-56.*

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PROVISION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES TO U.S. ALLIES

THE PROBLEM

1. In response to a request\* by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to comment upon policy guidance for review of the Atomic Energy Act.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 29 May 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed\*\* the Secretary of Defense that the Department of Defense should seek new legislation that would permit greater latitude in dealing with major Allies in the areas of nuclear weapons and nuclear power for military applications. On 24 July 1956, in a memorandum\*\*\* to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense approved the objectives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and stated that action was being initiated.

3. On 29 October 1956, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved\*\*\*\* terms of reference,# as requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,## for measures (1) to furnish the Royal Air Force with United States atomic weapons in the event of general war and (2) to coordinate the atomic strike plans of the United States Air Force with the Royal Air Force.

4. On 5 November 1956, in a memorandum\* to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Deputy Secretary of Defense forwarded policy guidance for review of the Atomic Energy Act. He stated that any comment which the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have thereon should be communicated to his office by 23 November 1956, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be prepared to contribute information on this matter to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) as he may require for presentation to the Congress.

\* Dated 5 November 1956; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/109

\*\* Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2220/97

\*\*\* See Note to Holders of J.C.S. 2220/97, dated 26 July 1956

\*\*\*\* See Note to Holders of J.C.S. 2056/87, dated 7 November 1956

# Enclosure "C" to J.C.S. 2056/87

## Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2056/87

11/21/58  
am

Subject: Provision of Nuclear Capabilities  
to U.S. Allies.

3. The achievement of an integrated defense of the North American continent, with atomic weapons, is a problem of immediate concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this connection, it would be desirable for the President to have the discretion to furnish air-to-air, surface-to-air, and antisubmarine atomic weapons to Canada in an emergency. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the view that, in seeking remedial legislation, the objective of U.S.-Canadian defense should be given priority.

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 permission of the issuing office.

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DATE 23 Feb 1978

pg 218

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4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to contribute information on this matter to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), as he may require for presentation to Congress of proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- 1 -

ARTHUR RADFORD,  
Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Distr:  
Chairman, JCS (2)  
DC/S, Mil Op  
Secy to CNO (JCS)  
Director/Plans, AF  
Director J/S  
as amended  
(JCS 2220/111 - Approved/21 Nov 56)



11/29/56

NG TELEGRAM

Department of State

617

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SECRET

Control: 20228  
Rec'd: November 29, 1956  
8:10 p.m.

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 1263, November 29, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

Regarding TOPOL 898.

Following is preliminary USRO analysis key political questions that may come up at NATO ministerial meeting, both in general discussions and in bilateral conversations. Am sure Department is aware limitations on our ability comment in detail on views individual NATO governments on matters most preoccupying them at moment. Suggest desirability circularizing embassies in NATO capitals for similar analysis regarding individual governments, if this not (repeat not) already being done. Would appreciate having any such reports repeated USRO for information.

Basic preoccupation which is obviously on minds every member of alliance is current divided state of alliance, particularly as arising from major differences on Middle East situation. Opinion among certain European governments, for example BENELUX and possibly Germany, as reflected in council discussions, has shown increasing sympathy for British and French predicament. Desire to re-cement alliance at meeting is uppermost in minds of most delegations, particularly smaller nations. Netherlands has given clearest expression of importance accorded this objective but it is shared by all. Language of committee of three report, especially transmittal letter, suggests Italy, Norway and Canada hope action to (#) breach. Canada in particular, torn by her ties to UK and US, perhaps most deeply concerned with present divisions in alliance and hopeful frank discussion of international situation and committee report will lead way to renewed unity in NATO.

Of almost equal concern, and certainly most immediate problem facing European NATO members, is economic setback from closing of Suez Canal and sabotage Iraq pipeline. Oil is burning issue in this field and there will be heavy pressure at ministerial

meeting

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-2- POLITO 1263, November 29, 7 p.m. from Paris

meeting for more effective US measures to assist Europe. American financial assistance to Europe likely to become important aspect of this problem.

Again related to Middle East crisis, not (repeat not) only in Egypt but in threatening developments coming to light in Syria, is question of adequacy NATO role in connection with policies and actions in areas outside but adjacent to NATO territory. Problem is most often referred to as outflanking action by Soviets through Middle East and North Africa. Concern on this problem runs through entire alliance and relates to all aspects of Western interests in this area, political, economic and military. UK and France are obviously most deeply implicated and concerned. Germany and Italy have indicated worry with damage recent events have inflicted on European position generally in Asia and Africa and may wish to discuss roles which they and we can play as major NATO nations least contaminated by recent events. Turkey is deeply concerned by what it considers political and military threat to its security from Syria, as well as need for US adherence to Baghdad Pact to strengthen anti-Communist forces in area. Specifically, they will be preoccupied with potential threat to Turkey in Communist efforts to establish themselves in Middle East and with inadequacies of Turkish defenses and of NATO preparedness deal with emergency in eastern Mediterranean.

Another matter which will be of great interest to most delegations will be our views on Soviet policy and intentions generally, particularly domestic Soviet significance of continuing turmoil in satellites. This likely to be particularly true of Germany, Italy and certain of smaller European nations which are anxious to know our "inside" views on goings-on in Kremlin and satellites. There is some feeling of concern and of frustration at NATO impotence in Hungarian situation, and desire to find a NATO course of action, but no clear ideas as to what this course should be. Our attitude on recent Soviet disarmament statement will be of continuing interest to most countries, especially Norwegian Government which for domestic reasons probably anxious see further initiative in disarmament field looking to ban on H-bomb tests.

In connection with certain items on existing agenda there are several military matters of political significance which will be on minds some delegations. Included in these will be: (1) US attitude on availability nuclear weapons for NATO forces (Norway and Denmark have made clear they expect full discussion political aspects of providing such weapons to NATO forces, especially

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-3- POLTO 1263, November 29, 7 p.m. from Paris

especially Germans); (2) reliability of satellite military forces as element in total picture Soviet military capabilities and intentions; (3) effects of rising defense costs and ways of dealing with this problem; (4) conflicting views on need for greater NATO military activity with respect to adjacent areas and implications for NATO of use of national forces there; (5) how NATO decides to use nukes\* is bothering several delegations and we may not (repeat not) be able prevent it coming up (Netherlands has recently emphasized its belief nuclear war now more unlikely and risk of conventional war in NATO area consequently increased. This view shared by several other delegations.); (6) though not (repeat not) recently evident, general concern about US attitude toward NATO may revive desire for reassurances about US intentions with respect to its forces in Europe.

Other specific problems which may come up, particularly in bilateral conversations, are Greek preoccupation with Cyprus and their relations with UK and Turkey; general concern with continued uncertainty of Icelandic situation, with growing emphasis on economic factors; possible threat to our access to Berlin.

MARTIN

JPT/14

\*As received. Will be serviced upon request.  
(#) Omission. Correction to follow.

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11/27/56

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 27, 1956

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11/27/56  
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SUBJECT: Adenauer-Mollet Conversation of November 6, 1956.

~~SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. J. J. Reinstein, GER

(b)(1)  
STATE

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WE - Mr. Tye.  
Ambassador Diller (through WE)

GPO 903504

wished to make available to me the  
record of what Chancellor Adenauer had said about the United States in his  
conversation with Premier Mollet in Paris on November 6. He read to me substantial  
parts of minutes of the meeting, omitting those parts of the record  
dealing with the Middle East crisis.

During the course of the conversation, the Chancellor set forth at great  
length and with considerable emphasis his analysis of the American position. Many  
of the points which he made he repeated on several occasions. The following is a  
summary of the minutes.

The meeting was attended on the French side by M. Mollet, M. Pineau, M. Faure  
and the French Ambassador to the Federal Republic M. Couve de Murville. On the  
German side it was attended by Chancellor Adenauer, Herr von Brentano, Dr. Grewe,  
and the German Ambassador in Paris, Herr von Maltzan.

The Chancellor said that the United States believed that it and the Soviet  
Union were in a position, as the two powers possessing the decisive weapon, to  
maintain the peace of the world. The Americans were determined to find some  
way of maintaining peace and were seeking to come to an understanding with the  
Soviet Union for this purpose. Part of the arrangement would be the withdrawal  
of American forces from Europe. The shift of American military strategy to  
reliance on nuclear weapons fitted into this picture.

The Chancellor said that he was convinced that there had been informal  
exchanges of correspondence between the US and the Soviet Union over the past

two

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EUR: GER: J. J. Reinstein

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two and one-half years. These exchanges were not conducted through the State Department. He had informed Secretary Dulles that he was aware of this fact and Mr. Dulles had not denied it. The Chancellor cited as evidence that such exchanges were going on the message sent by Bulganin to the President proposing joint Soviet-American intervention in the Middle East for the purpose of ending hostilities in the area. He said that such a proposal would not have been made had the Soviets not felt there was some possibility that it might be accepted. He pointed out that the proposal had not been rejected by the U.S. At this point, M. Pineau said that it had been rejected. The Chancellor denied this. M. Pineau then produced the text of the statement made by a White House spokesman. The Chancellor pointed out the rejection had been by a spokesman and not by the President.

The Chancellor said that the Americans were engaging in double-talk (parlant a double-voix). They said one thing in their official statements and acted differently. He thought that a consistent pattern could be found in the things that he had mentioned and in the Radford Plan, which clearly indicated American thinking.

The Chancellor indicated that he considered the American ideas extremely dangerous. The Americans would in fact shrink from taking the initiative in using the atomic bomb and starting World War III. However, the Soviet Union, which is a dictatorship, would not do so. This placed Europe at the mercy of the Soviet Union. He said to the French that the Americans would not use the atomic bomb to defend them from attack by the Soviet Union. The French said that if France were attacked it would not be America which would start a third world war but the Soviet Union. At this point, and also on one other occasion, when a discussion took place within the German delegation which was not translated, Herr von Brentano indicated that he did not agree with the Chancellor's analysis.

The Chancellor said that it was important that the French and British conduct themselves in the Suez Crisis in such a way as not to lose face. He repeated this thought several times during the conversation. He said that the Americans were determined to carry out their plans without regard to the desires and interests of the Europeans. He felt it essential that the Europeans unite against America. He thought that after the election and the selection of the new Secretary of State, the Europeans should approach the US and demand a clear statement of American intentions and policy. He thought this should be done in January.

Aside from the two comments noted, the French did not respond to the Chancellor's remarks.

showed me a telegram

commenting on the current state of

German opinion with regard to the international situation.

said

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- 3 -

said there had been a development of feeling in Germany that the Middle East crisis opened up possibilities for the Germans to step in and take advantage of the loss of position by the British and French, particularly in the economic field.                      commented that he had not noticed such a disposition in official circles as yet.

(b)(1) STATE

RUR:GER:JJReinstein:maf

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12/6/56  
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SPECIFIC TOPICS THAT MAY ARISE AT MINISTERIAL MEETING

1. Payment of Support Costs by Germany in Future. Although there is no legal obligation on Germany to pay further support costs, we should urge the Germans to be forthcoming with the British on support costs. Not only are the British having very hard times financing, but the Germans are doing very well and their financial share of the defense effort is much less than they can afford. The United States is prepared to forego any support costs on its part.

2. Turkish Position on Political Situation in Middle East. The Turks are expected to introduce a paper and probably make a statement on the Middle East situation.

3. Air Defense of Turkey. A few weeks ago the Turks were very concerned about Soviet over-flights of Turkish territory. None of these rumors was confirmed. However, in their memorandum mentioned above, the Turks asked our assistance with respect to the air defense of Turkey. We are working on various proposals, which are not yet ready for discussion with the Turks.

4. Iceland Defense Arrangements. It is believed that the negotiations with Iceland will have been completed and the North Atlantic Council notified prior to the Ministerial Meeting.

5. Making National Intelligence Available to SACEUR. At the time of the Palestine crisis, it became apparent that there was an inadequate flow of intelligence of national authorities to SACEUR. The Council urged that this flow be increased. The United States is taking all steps it can to keep the flow of intelligence to SACEUR prompt and high. The Norwegians may be expected to raise this point.

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6. How the Alliance Goes to War. The question may be raised as to whether the Alliance is organized to deal with a sudden outbreak of hostilities. In this connection, some quarters of opinion are concerned that the United States might be reluctant to use nuclear weapons at times some of the Europeans might think it wise to do so, and other quarters are afraid the United States would use them at times the Europeans would not want. How the Alliance goes to war is not a question which can be blue-printed. Events will control. The alerts procedures and the Secretary's statement of April 23, 1954, make it clear that on the questions of: (a) taking preparatory measures, (b) embarking on hostilities, and (c) deciding to use nuclear weapons, there should be consultation in the Council if circumstances permit, but that national freedom of action must remain open in case circumstances would not safely permit consultation.

7. Replies to East Bulgarian Letter on Disarmament. We have advised the Council that we believe there should be an exchange of views on the positions governments receiving the letter would propose to take. Our own position is still under course of development.

8. Lessons of the Present Crisis. This will probably not be raised at the Ministerial Meeting. Lord Ismay, as the result of the Palestine crisis, introduced a paper into the Council which pointed up the necessity of the Council being prepared to deal with emergency situations. His paper calls for twenty-four hour contact between the missions to NATO and their respective governments; "hourly" reports of developments and positions; and the development of procedures required in case the seat of the government of France is moved from France. In principle, we favor the measures suggested, but doubt the feasibility of "hourly" reports on developments and positions.

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9. Higher NATO Military Organization. This will probably not be raised at the Ministerial Meeting. A number of non-Standing Group countries have been pressing to obtain a larger voice in the NATO military set-up. Some of the smaller countries also would like to see the Standing Group moved to Paris, some would like to see it expanded to include all fifteen nations, and some would like it to become an advisory body to the Permanent Representatives. We see serious problems with these suggestions and believe that the present composition, authority, and location of the Standing Group should be continued, although we are suggesting through the Military Committee that there be an expansion of the participation of the non-Standing Group military authorities to a limited extent. Admiral Radford will wish to brief you on late developments on this subject at the Military Committee Meeting that will immediately precede the Council Meeting.

10. Effects of Rising Defense Costs. This subject is of major concern to all. How nations will be able to superimpose the costs of modern weapons systems over the mounting costs of maintaining the defense efforts they now have is the major problem of NATO. The orderly approach to the problem requires that this be put aside until the requirements of the NATO military authorities are re-studied in light of the political directive. We should recognize the problem but seek to avoid having "the gap" spotlighted for attention. From our point of view, it is essential to maintain progress toward NATO defense goals even if the attainment of them is long postponed.

EUR:RA:JJWolf:cah

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12/10/176  
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D.C.

10 December 1956

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:

At 1500, 10 December 1956, Admiral Radford held a conference with Minister of Defense Strauss, Ambassador Blankenhorn and General Speidel at Ambassador Blankenhorn's office, 5 avenue Pierre I de Serbie. Mr. Strauss and General Speidel were late in arriving from Bonn and joined the conference at approximately 1515. Rear Admiral Griffin attended with Admiral Radford.

Conversations with Ambassador Blankenhorn covered general subjects including the possibility of Admiral Radford's visiting Bonn at the conclusion of the Ministerial meetings. Admiral Radford pointed out that he would be unable to make this trip since Secretary Wilson had requested him to return to Washington in connection with Department of Defense budget matters. Ambassador Blankenhorn pointed out that Chancellor Adenauer was very pleased with the way the Political Directive had turned out since he was opposed to the British ideas which were contained in their Aide Memoire.

The conversation then turned to conditions in East Germany and the Satellite states. Ambassador Blankenhorn pointed out that the conditions in East Germany were influenced considerably by the situation in the Satellites, particularly in Poland. The Germans want Gomulka to stay in power in Poland while he is certain that the Russians do not. If Gomulka stays in power the situation in Poland will improve gradually (from a Western point of view). If on the other hand Gomulka is thrown out by the Soviets, there might also be trouble in East Germany and the over-all situation in the Satellites could become extremely critical. He went on to point out that the Poles were extremely nationalistic and religious and that their church leaders, so far, had handled the situation very well, principally by refusing to enter the political arena. He said that Chancellor Adenauer recognized that the Russians will try to bring about a fear of German resurgence in both Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to mask their own objectives. The West German thought is to do everything they can to promote a feeling of friendship for the West in the Satellite areas, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia. A key element in this is to avoid having the regimes in the Satellite area move too fast toward democratic forms of government. Recent events have demonstrated that, no matter how long oppression continues, the love of freedom is so strong that, if handled properly, they can be counted on to move slowly out of their Satellite status. Too rapid movements in that direction will give the Russians the excuse they need to take repressive action such as in Hungary.

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## Memorandum of Conversation

10 December 1956

At this point Minister Strauss and General Speidel joined the group. Mr. Strauss stated that he would like to comment on two points which had been raised in NATO documents: (1) the reduction in length of service of German military personnel, and (2) the so-called slowness by the Germans in producing forces. In a long exposé of these subjects, he pointed out that the situation now is quite different from that situation which existed prior to July 1955 in that the new German conscription law gives the military a sound basis on which to build. He pointed out that under the new law military personnel are in three categories: (1) draftees from 12-18 months; (2) volunteers; and (3) the professional group of unlimited military service. He pointed out that West Germany must plan on a sound basis and that their original Army plans were not sound. Their principal deficiency is the lack of experienced young officers and NCO's. In the original Army plan (prior to July 1956) the percentage of draftees versus long-service personnel was 54%; in the new plan the percentage of draftees is 40%. He felt that it did not do much good to get a large number of bodies in too fast. In view of the fact that the percentage of long-service personnel is increasing rapidly, he felt that the reductions in length of service which had received so much attention was relatively unimportant and he further stressed the flexible provisions of the new conscription law. They hope that a large percentage of men drafted will elect 18 months' service which they must do if they are to get technical training or serve with units of their choice. Mr. Strauss stated that he felt that the original force goals were very unrealistic. Under Hitler and with a much better base on which to build, it took longer (1933 - 1939) to build an army than their schedule now calls for. He pointed out that it was a question of quality rather than quantity. He could get older people but they could not do the job and, therefore, the divisions which they would have on paper would be in fact paper divisions only. Another factor which had entered into the difficulty of building up German forces rapidly was the fact that Chancellor Adenauer had forbidden his MOD people to take any preliminary steps prior to the change in the constitution. The Chancellor did not want to destroy French confidence in Germany. They therefore had to start from scratch and on a realistic basis. Their new plan would provide the first five divisions by June of 1957 and an additional two divisions by January of 1958. These would be followed by an additional ~~ten~~ five divisions (he was not specific as to when these additional five would be ready but presumably in accordance with original time table). He again stressed that to set up in three years what Hitler could not do in five years is a most difficult job -- particularly when no preliminary steps had been taken. Here he mentioned that if Germany had been allowed to build up the Federal police force in 1950 -- the situation today would be much improved from his standpoint. But -- the Allies had vetoed this build-up!

When Admiral Radford asked what were other major problems in the build-up, Mr. Strauss indicated that they were lack of accommodations (barracks) and lack of training areas. He pointed out that there was really no problem in

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10 December 1956

regard to barracks but that the problem of training areas was not easily solved. He felt that the United States forces were using their training areas efficiently but that the French and British were not. The problem of training areas was a very complex one since it must be understood that West Germany was a highly industrialized, heavily populated area and that they had had to assimilate some ten million refugees from the East German Zone.

Admiral Radford stated that we would like to help in any way possible with the training of young officers and ECO's. Mr. Strauss commented that the Americans were already helping them very much, however, they would be glad to send us a memorandum on this subject and, if it were possible to do anything additional, they would appreciate that also. Admiral Radford said that we would be glad to investigate any proposals which the Germans would care to make, but that he was thinking principally in connection with the question of training technical people, both young officers and non-commissioned officers.

At this point Ambassador Blankenhorn made a very strong plea that Admiral Radford use his influence to prevent a long series of questions coming up at the Plenary Session in connection with either the length of service or force goal timing subjects. He pointed out that, as Admiral Radford had seen, these questions could be answered but that the answers were rather complex and detailed, and questions in the Plenary Session on these subjects would result in long detailed speeches which might obscure other subjects and lengthen the conference entirely too much.

Mr. Strauss again emphasized the lack of training areas, and Admiral Radford suggested that maybe schedules for use of the training areas should be controlled by a central authority, perhaps SACSur. This suggestion seemed to meet with approval by Mr. Strauss.

Mr. Strauss then brought up the question of the strength of the central part of the shield force and stated that both General Norstad and Chancellor Adenauer wanted 30 divisions in the center (the Chancellor simply agreed with Norstad). In this connection he noted that General Norstad had indicated that each of the 30 divisions in the 1960-62 period should have atomic capabilities and asked that, if it is the intention to carry through with this thought, the Germans should not be excluded in the provision of atomic weapons. Admiral Radford pointed out that this was a rather complex question and subject to legal limitations in the United States at present. He did not know the answer but suggested that possibly the United States might provide the atomic capable units with the divisions.

Admiral Radford then went on to say that he wanted to make sure that it was understood by the Chancellor that much of the US contribution to NATO is actually outside of the European area. He mentioned the strategic striking force, the air defense of the North American industrial base and

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Memorandum of Conversation

10 December 1956

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Mr. Strauss then stated that West Germany would soon have to make friendly gestures to Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to put down any latent fear of German military resurgence and then that he hoped their friends would not misunderstand their reasons for so doing which were simply to keep the Russians from playing on the Satellite fears of a resurgent Germany.

Admiral Radford proposed a hypothetical question as to how best to come to the aid of West Berlin in the event East German forces attacked. Mr. Strauss taked around this question for some time and, outside of making the point that atomic weapons should not be used, he did not answer the question. He did, however, point out that in his opinion the East German military machine was no good. They do not have modern equipment because the Russians do not trust them.

The conversation terminated with an expression of opinion on the part of the Germans that the British had handled the Suez situation very poorly. They did not question so much the action itself but did question the inability of French-UK forces to do more faster after they got in. They suggested that perhaps it would have been better to have let the Jews defeat the Egyptians.

Mr. Strauss stated that he would talk to the Chancellor on his return to Germany and give him the results of this conversation. The discussions terminated at about 1745.

cc: Secretary Wilson  
Assistant Secretary Gray  
Mr. Martin

C. D. GRIFFIN  
RAdm USN

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S E C R E T

NMP x-7a

December 7, 1956

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NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING  
PARIS, DECEMBER 1956

POSITION PAPER

Development of NATO Nuclear Capability

The attached revision of the paper on the development of NATO nuclear capability was prepared by EUR-RA - Mr. Unger. It has been cleared by S/AE, - Mr. Smith, L/EUR - Mr. Yingling and RA - Mr. Timmons. It is being distributed to the following only:

The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Beam  
Mr. Timmons  
Mr. Smith  
Mr. Yingling  
Mr. Stelle  
Mr. Wolf (2)  
Mr. Unger

This paper is included in the stripped-down briefing book.

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From Dulles briefing book  
for NATO meeting, 12/3/56

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PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF A NATO NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

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Discussion in the Ministerial Meeting of the Political Directive, may well lead to the raising of questions by other countries as to U.S. intentions about the provision by the U.S. to NATO forces not possessing an atomic capability of new weapons and of training in the use of nuclear delivery systems, and about the availability of atomic war heads to the forces so trained. NATO planning over the past two years, following the adoption of MC48, has clearly envisaged a greater sharing of nuclear capability, and most countries are looking forward to some U.S. initiative in this field.

Under agenda item 4 Secretary Wilson will, it is expected, announce the allocation in FY1957 of about \$300,000,000 for advanced weapons for NATO countries, including several kinds of delivery systems which can employ atomic war heads or bombs. We will also state our intention of requesting appropriations in FY1958 to permit larger amounts of funds for this purpose. Finally, he will state our readiness to make available samples and production data on advanced weapons to NATO countries having the necessary capability to manufacture.

These announcements will be generally welcomed in NATO, but they too may well open up questions regarding U.S. intentions about training and the availability of war heads, if and when required. You will recall that our present plan, still subject to further coordination and approval in the U.S. Government, is to review with the Canadians, British, French (because of their sensitivity concerning Germany and atomic weapons) and Germany our plan to make an announcement on this subject at a regular NAC meeting early in January. On that occasion we would offer to train NATO forces (including German)

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German) in the employment of atomic weapons, subject to priority as established by the NATO military authorities and in connection with delivery systems made available by the U.S.

With regard to availability of atomic war heads, we expect that Defense will shortly propose that we and AEC join them in recommending to the President that the Congress be asked during this session to amend the AEC Act to permit the transfer to Canada in peace time of custody over atomic weapons because of overriding considerations of North American defense. Defense will also note the desirability of making provision for such transfer to other allies in time of emergency. Secretary Wilson will probably be discussing this with you in the next few days. With regard to countries other than Canada, the Defense proposal would envisage the storage of war heads under U.S. custody adjacent to the delivery systems in which they would be used in war.

Should specific questions on these subjects be asked at the December meeting, it can be stated that the delivery by the U.S. to NATO forces of advanced weapons will call for the prior training of these forces in their use; this will, in due course, have to cover not only their use with conventional but also with atomic war heads. The United States hopes that it will be able to make certain proposals in this regard early in the new year.

Should you conclude, in the course of discussion, that something need also be said with regard to the availability of weapons, a recommended answer is: In time of war weapons could be made available on Presidential decision to the forces of allies trained in their use. Availability of atomic war heads in advance of hostilities raises a number of complex legal and other problems for the U.S. Government. These are under continuing and close examination,

568 and the U.S. is hopeful of finding an acceptable solution at an early date; we will return to this matter in the Council in due course.

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Despite the general desire in NATO to achieve a broader atomic capability, there is an undercurrent of serious doubt in certain quarters, particularly Scandinavia. The Norwegians and/or Danes will probably express their reservation about the making available of new weapons and training, to say nothing of war heads. A recommended reply would be to note our earnest efforts in the disarmament field and state our conviction that until these bear real fruit, it is still true that the existence of a strong NATO, which means one with atomic capability, is our best assurance against the outbreak of general war. A more specific reservation may be raised by these same countries, and possibly also France and others, about Germany's eventually acquiring an atomic capability. It can be pointed out that NATO has frequently recognized the fundamental importance to its collective defense efforts of a German contribution. In the light of the weapons possessed by the Soviets, the question of atomic capability for all NATO forces in Germany is of vital importance to all of us. We are, of course, prepared to consider this whole problem in the Council.

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
to the  
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
PARIS, FRANCE, DECEMBER 11-14, 1956

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 10, 1956

Time: 3:00 P.M.

Place: Amb. Blankenhorn's  
Office

Participants:

United States

Admiral Radford  
Rear Adm. Griffin

Fed. Rep. of Germany

Defense Minister Strauss  
General Speidel  
Amb. Blankenhorn

Subjects: 1. Conditions in Eastern Europe  
2. German Military Build-up  
3. US Military Contribution to NATO

Copies to: Amb. Perkins  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Timmons  
Mr. Nolting  
Mr. Wolf

Secretary Wilson  
Mr. Gray  
Lt. Gen. Johnson  
Mr. Sullivan

Dept: S/S, G - Mr. Murphy, C, S/P, EUR, NEA

See attached memorandum.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D.C.

10 December 1956

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION:

At 1500, 10 December 1956, Admiral Radford held a conference with Minister of Defense Strauss, Ambassador Blankenhorn and General Speidel at Ambassador Blankenhorn's office, 5 avenue Pierre I de Serbie. Mr. Strauss and General Speidel were late in arriving from Bonn and joined the conference at approximately 1515. Rear Admiral Griffin attended with Admiral Radford.

Conversations with Ambassador Blankenhorn covered general subjects including the possibility of Admiral Radford's visiting Bonn at the conclusion of the Ministerial meetings. Admiral Radford pointed out that he would be unable to make this trip since Secretary Wilson had requested him to return to Washington in connection with Department of Defense budget matters. Ambassador Blankenhorn pointed out that Chancellor Adenauer was very pleased with the way the Political Directive had turned out since he was opposed to the British ideas which were contained in their Aide Memoire.

The conversation then turned to conditions in East Germany and the Satellite states. Ambassador Blankenhorn pointed out that the conditions in East Germany were influenced considerably by the situation in the Satellites, particularly in Poland. The Germans want Gomulka to stay in power in Poland while he is certain that the Russians do not. If Gomulka stays in power the situation in Poland will improve gradually (from a Western point of view). If on the other hand Gomulka is thrown out by the Soviets, there might also be trouble in East Germany and the over-all situation in the Satellites could become extremely critical. He went on to point out that the Poles were extremely nationalistic and religious and that their church leaders, so far, had handled the situation very well, principally by refusing to enter the political arena. He said that Chancellor Adenauer recognized that the Russians will try to bring about a fear of German resurgence in both Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to mask their own objectives. The West German thought is to do everything they can to promote a feeling of friendship for the West in the Satellite areas, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia. A key element in this is to avoid having the regimes in the Satellite area move too fast toward democratic forms of government. Recent events have demonstrated that, no matter how long oppression continues, the love of freedom is so strong that, if handled properly, they can be counted on to move slowly out of their Satellite status. Too rapid movements in that direction will give the Russians the excuse they need to take repressive action such as in Hungary.

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10 December 1956

*Strauss  
ag. 1/2  
reunification*

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When Admiral Radford asked what were other major problems in the build-up, Mr. Strauss indicated that they were lack of accommodations (barracks) and lack of training areas. He pointed out that there was really no problem in

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Memorandum of Conversation

10 December 1956

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Memorandum of Conversation

10 December 1956

*Agree with Strauss  
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*note to  
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*Berlin*

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cc: Secretary Wilson  
Assistant Secretary Gray  
Mr. Martin

C. D. GRIFFIN  
RAdm USN

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

21

DATE: December 12, 1956

Participants: SUMPE : General Norstad  
General Schuyler (not for entire time)

UNITED KINGDOM: Sir Anthony Head  
Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Under-Secretary  
of the Ministry of Defense  
Marshal of the R.A.F., Sir William F. Dickson

Copies to: Gen. Norstad  
Gen. Schuyler  
Mr. B.E.L. Timmons, USDEL  
Mr. Joseph J. Wolf, USDEL  
Mr. Edwin M. Martin, USRO

State Distribution: Defense:

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6 G	10 EUR	15, 16, 17, 18 + 19
7 C	11, 12 + 13 RA (3)	
9 S/P	14 GER	

At his own request, the British Defense Minister, Mr. Head, called on SACEUR at 11:00 o'clock this morning.

The purpose of Mr. Head's call was to stress the financial plight of the UK and the resulting requirements to reduce appreciably British Forces stationed in Germany. Specifically, he desired to explore with General Norstad the best way, from SACEUR's point of view, to effect a reduction of British ground forces in Germany from their present strength of about 90,000 to 50,000 or less. As one possibility he suggested the retention of the present four British divisions, but on a greatly reduced scale, with the understanding that SACEUR might accept these reduced forces as equivalent in fighting capacity, since they would have an integrated atomic capability not now present.

General Norstad stated emphatically that he could not take such a position. He indicated that some slight personnel saving might accrue if the British were to reorganize their infantry divisions on the basis of the new U.S. 13,500-man division. He felt, however, that any such reduction as contemplated by Mr. Head, amounting to almost 50 per cent of current strength, could not possibly be regarded as providing a fighting capacity equivalent to that now present in Germany.

Early in the conversation he seized upon an opportunity to describe at some length the purpose and importance of "the Shield." Inter alia, he clearly pointed out that the present requirement in ACE for 30 divisions is far less than our 1952 estimates, and that this figure already takes fully into consideration our full atomic capabilities for the immediate future. Somewhat to General Norstad's surprise, much of this, particularly in connection with the Shield, seemed to be somewhat new to Mr. Head.

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Sir Richard Powell then took it upon himself to question the requirement of 30 divisions for ACE "particularly as there will be no war."

Sensing that Sir Richard Powell might be one of the causes of trouble in this particular problem, SACEUR felt it advisable to take exception to both the former's military judgment concerning the 30 division requirement, and his categorical evaluation of the prospects of war.

General Norstad explained that he was both conversant and sympathetic with the British financial-economic plight, but ventured the opinion that the least unfortunate results for NATO as a whole would be caused by the UK following a frank and open policy in explaining exactly why they had to reduce their forces. This SACEUR believed, would be definitely preferable to any course of action designed to justify the British step based on a compromise NATO-wide theory, strategy, or justification. In the latter case, of course, the damage would be compounded since instead of being restricted to the UK and its forces, it could all too easily spread throughout NATO.

Mr. Head objected that this course of action would be unacceptable to the British because they would have to justify their financial plight in EU, this would further weaken the pound, endanger British financial stability, and prove generally damaging to Britain's economic situation.

General Norstad rejoined by saying that while this was none of his business, he thought that Britain's Allies do not need to be convinced of Britain's financial and economic difficulties since these are well known, and that consequently it should be possible to comply with the WEU requirement with a minimum of publicity.

SACEUR stressed his hope that the maximum possible will be done in order to solve the problem through obtaining additional support from the Germans before taking a step which could only be harmful to NATO's military position.

General Norstad concluded by saying that if, notwithstanding everything that precedes, the British still feel they have no other course open to them but to reduce their forces in Germany, he felt that a frank statement to this effect at an early stage in their planning might well be made to the Council. He would then, of course, "seek to be helpful" so as to minimize and limit the harmful effects in NATO. In this connection he thought that for obvious reasons, action through the Permanent Representatives would be preferable than at the current Ministerial Meeting with its large membership, attendant publicity, etc.

Ridgway E. Knight

Ridgway E. Knight/C. V. R. Schuyler:ss

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EPR/HOR/BJ CV 10 128194



# UTGOING TELEGRAM

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS

CONTROL: 531

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TOP SECRET

December 12, 1956.  
10PM

Sent to: Secstate Washington DULTE 14

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT.

Dear Mr. President:

The NATO Council spent this morning mostly in a wrangle about Cyprus which was inconclusive. However, during noon recess I had a good talk with the Greek Foreign Minister. He strikes me as being very reasonable. He indicated that the Greeks were prepared to support the constitution, which presumably will be proposed by the British and apparently not rpt not press at this time for any action on self-determination. He said however that the result would depend very much upon whether Makarios supported it or not. He said if Makarios supports a bad settlement, his view will prevail, and if he opposes a good settlement, then, too, his view will prevail. He was very anxious that the British should consult Makarios and said they would, if permitted, send someone to Makarios to urge him to come out in support of the present British plan. Also, he indicated that if the Turks wanted partition, the Greeks would be willing to consider that.

I hope to get a chance to talk to Selwyn Lloyd about this before we break up.

This afternoon we dealt at the NATO ~~meeting~~ meeting with the Report of the three Ministers on improving our procedures.

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I made a statement on behalf of the US indicating certain reservations but supporting in general. There was a general disposition to accept, but Pineau raised a number of technical questions, so that action was deferred ~~mk~~ until tomorrow.

Following our afternoon meeting I had a very confidential talk alone with Harold Macmillan. He said he recognized that there had been a certain loss of confidence on the part of you and me and others in the ~~MM~~ US in the British governmental personalities because of the Suez operation and the deception practiced upon us in that connection. Harold indicated that he personally was very unhappy with the way in which ~~it~~ the matter was handled and the timing but that Eden had taken this entirely to himself and Macmillan had no real choice except to back Eden. Macmillan did not rpt not disguise the fact that he had always favored strong action, but the point was that he did not rpt not like the manner and timing particularly vis-a-vis the US. He obviously hopes for some shift of government that may make him or Rab Butler Prime Minister, but is not rpt not certain this will happen. He said that after Eden returned there would be a question as to whether he would resign at once on account of ill health. If not, he would probably hold on for six months, but "as a constitutional minister, not aping Churchill and Roosevelt".

We are having some little problems as between Humphrey, Wilson, Radford, and myself with reference to the Political Directive to be

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CONTROL: 531

given the military and the statement which Wilson will make.  
However, I expect we shall work this out without need to appeal  
to you. Faithfully yours, Foster.

DULLES

FD:f

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

12/14/56  
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Control: 9447

Rec'd: DECEMBER 14, 1956  
5:48 P.M.

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 1422, DECEMBER 14, 7 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF FIVE)

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*Discussion of Political Directive*THIS IS REPORT OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DECEMBER 13  
RESTRICTED SESSION 3:30 P.M. ON AGENDA ITEM IV: POLITICAL DIRECTIVE.

SESSION OPENED WITH INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING PRESENTED BY GENERAL JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN SGN. BRIEFING EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE TALKING DISARMAMENT, SOVIET HAD INCREASED MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN MANY WAYS. RE RECENT DISTURBANCES IN SATELLITES, SAID SOVIET CAPABILITY TO MOUNT ATTACK NOT AFFECTED, AS SOVIET ABILITY DEPENDS ON LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PRESENT SITUATION DID NOT REDUCE CAPABILITY LOC SUPPORT SOVIET EFFORT BEYOND ALREADY EXISTING LIMITATIONS.

ON MIDDLE EAST SAID THAT LARGE SOVIET BLOC DELIVERIES TO SYRIA WOULD BE SURPLUS TO INDIGENOUS SYRIAN REQUIREMENTS. PRESENT STOCKS HAVE NOT REACHED THAT LEVEL. WHILE NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO NATO OFFERED, SOVIETS GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT ASSETS IN DANGEROUS WAY, PARTICULARLY RE BASES AND OIL. NO (REPEAT NO) INTELLIGENCE CONFIRMATION SORTIES OF OVERFLIGHTS OR LARGE NUMBERS OF TANKS OR AIRCRAFT. POSSIBLE SOVIET "VOLUNTEERS" AND ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES MAY APPEAR IN AREA.

INCREASED THREAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE NATO LOC AND MIGHT OUTFLANK NATO. SOVIET MAY BE ADVERSE TO SUPPLYING VOLUNTEERS, BUT ALREADY HAVE NUCLEUS VOLUNTEER CORPS THERE IN FORM OF

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-3- POLTO 1422, DECEMBER 14, 7 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF FIVE),  
FROM PARIS

NETHERLANDS SPOKE NEXT. SAID NETHERLANDS PUBLIC OPINION  
INTERESTED IN THESE QUESTIONS WHICH ADDS TO IMPORTANCE OF  
DIRECTIVE. STATEMENT ON ASSUMPTION OF STATIONING OF  
FORCES OF U.S., U.K. AND CANADA IN EUROPE OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE.

HOWEVER, SHIELD FORCES ARE TOO WEAK AND ONLY WAY TO STRENGTHEN  
THEM IS WITH ATOMIC WEAPONS. PUBLIC OPINION RECOGNIZED  
THIS, AND AVAILABILITY OF TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS NECESSARY  
TO GIVE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE. LIMITATIONS IN U.S. ATOMIC  
LEGISLATION FULLY RECOGNIZED BUT IT NECESSARY THAT ALL NATIONAL  
FORCES HAVE ATOMIC WEAPONS AT THEIR DISPOSAL. BUT ATOMIC  
WEAPONS SHOULD BE IN EUROPE SO THEY CAN BE USED OPERATIONALLY  
AT WILL OF NATO COMMANDERS. THEY SHOULD BE INTEGRATED  
AT CORPS OR ARMY LEVEL, AND WARHEADS COULD REMAIN IN HANDS  
OF NATIONS NOW POSSESSING THEM.

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO 1422, DECEMBER 14, 7 PM (SECTION 2 OF 5)

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Rec'd: DECEMBER 14, 1956  
4:07 P.M.

STRAUSS SPOKE FOR GERMANY. SAID TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE DOWN TO DIVISIONAL LEVEL. AGREED ON NETHERLANDS IDEA OF DECISION BY SUPREME COMMANDERS. } 4 Pgs

TAVIANI SPOKE FOR ITALY. AGREED WITH PART 1 OF PAPER WHICH HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY RECENT EVENTS. SHIELD FORCES MUST HAVE HIGH EFFICIENCY. THIS REQUIRES CONSTANT MODERNIZATION FOR BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NEW WEAPONS. ONLY COMMON EFFORT CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS, AND IT SHOULD INCLUDE COMMON EFFORT IN PRODUCTION FIELD. SETAF IS EXCELLENT EVIDENCE OF INTEGRATION, AND ITALY HOPES THERE WILL BE MORE SUCH UNITS IN CENTRAL SOUTH SECTORS.

BOURGES-MAUNOURY SPOKE FOR FRANCE. SAID EVERYONE AWARE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT FORWARD STRATEGY WHICH IS NECESSARY IF EUROPE NOT TO BE OVERRUN. A STRONG AND SOLID SHIELD OF FORCES OF ALL ALLIED NATIONS IS REQUIRED. ONLY THUS CAN SURPRISE ATTACK WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, ACCEPTED AS POSSIBILITY IN PART 1 OF PAPER, BE DETERRED. WE MUST REALIZE THAT A SWIFT OCCUPANCY OF WESTERN EUROPE MIGHT LEAD TO HESITANCY TO USE ATOMIC WEAPONS.

ANALYSIS IN PART 1 OF PAPER STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF FIRMNESS OF INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BULGANIN TELEGRAM TO MOLLET OF 17 NOVEMBER 1956 SAID THAT BALANCE OF FORCES WAS NOW SUCH THAT SOVIETS COULD SUCCESSFULLY ATTACK WITHOUT

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS. [THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT ATOMIC WEAPONS WOULD BE USED. FRANCE WILL SUGGEST CERTAIN AMENDMENTS TO PARAGRAPHS 4 B. AND 4 D. OF DIRECTIVE.] 2

TURKEY SPOKE NEXT. [SAID PAPER WAS GOOD, AND EMPHASIZED ANY AGGRESSION BY SOVIETS SHOULD BE MET WITH ATOMIC WEAPONS.] 8 PM 4

MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD CONSTANTLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NEW THREATS TO NATO AREA SUCH AS SYRIA. THESE SHOULD NOT BE SEPARATE IN OUR THINKING OR IN THE DIRECTIVE AS THEY MENACE NATO ITSELF. THEY MAY REQUIRE MILITARY PLANNING CHANGES. NATO CANNOT IGNORE DISASTROUS EFFECTS IF SOVIET BECOMES DOMINANT IN MIDDLE EAST. IF COMPETENCY OF NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES LIMITED TO NATO AREA, AUTHORITIES SHOULD KNOW MAGNITUDE OF SOVIET THREAT TO NATO AREA AND DEAL WITH IT PERHAPS IN FRAMEWORK BAGHDAD PACT. TURKISH PRIME MINISTER HAS SAID WE MUST HAVE CONTACT BETWEEN NATO AND BAGHDAD PACT. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD STUDY THIS SUGGESTION.

MACMILLAN (U.K.) SPOKE NEXT: NATO WAS CREATED IN 1948 TO MEET PRESSING AND IMMEDIATE DANGER AND HAS SO FAR BEEN SUCCESSFUL AS RUSSIAN ADVANCES IN EUROPE HAVE BEEN HALTED ALTHOUGH NOT REVERSED. LAST FORWARD MOVE WAS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. INTERVENING YEARS HAVE BROUGHT IMMENSE CHANGE IN CHARACTER OF NATO. INSTEAD OF OCCUPYING ARMIES NOW HAVE PERMANENT ALLIANCE BASED ON EQUALITY MAINLY FOR DEFENSE BUT ALSO FOR OTHER PURPOSES JOINING NATIONS OF EUROPE WITH TWO GREAT NATIONS OF NORTH AMERICA.

BUT FOUNDERS OF NATO COULD NOT HAVE REALIZED FULL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS. THERE ARE DIFFERENT EFFECTS ON DIFFERENT MEMBERS. THESE DEPEND NOT ON FORCES WHICH ARE MADE AVAILABLE, BUT ON CHANCE OF LOCATION OF WHERE THESE FORCES ARE TO BE STATIONED. THIS IS BASED ON MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES THEREOF ARE VERY IMPORTANT.

U.K. FORCES

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-3- POLTO 1422, DECEMBER 14, 7 PM (SECTION 2 OF 5), FROM PARIS.

U.K. FORCES ARE STATIONED OVERSEAS IN GERMANY. THIS REQUIRES LOCAL COSTS OF 60-70 MILLION POUNDS A YEAR. ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUPPORT COSTS EXPIRE SOON, AND UNLESS SOME FRESH ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE SOON, FOREIGN EXCHANGE BURDENS WILL FALL SOLELY ON U.K. THIS POSES VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR U.K. AND NATO.

U.K. HAS HAD SOME PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH FEDREP WHICH SHOWS GERMANS RECOGNIZE PROBLEM AND ARE PREPARED NEGOTIATE SOLUTION. U.K. HOPEFUL SOLUTION FOR THIS SHORT TERM PROBLEM WILL BE REACHED THROUGH NEGOTIATION AS IT CANNOT ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE PAYMENTS. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS PARTICULARLY FITTING AS FEDREP FORCES NOT YET IN BEING.

EVEN WHEN FEDREP FORCES ARE AVAILABLE, PROBLEM WILL EXIST RE TROOPS STATIONED ABROAD. THIS PROBLEM SHOULD BE STUDIED IN NATO AND SOME EQUALIZING FUND OR OTHER MULTILATERAL SOLUTION FOUND TO LONG TERM PROBLEM. SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING THAT UNLESS LONG TERM SOLUTION FOUND, FUTURE OF OVERSEAS FORCES JEOPARDIZED.

ON GENERAL U.K. DEFENSE EFFORT, SAID U.K. SPENDING 1.5-1.6 BILLION POUNDS A YEAR. THIS HIGHEST PROPORTION OF MONEY FOR ANY EUROPEAN MEMBER.

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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Action

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Control: 9416

Rec'd: DECEMBER 14, 1956

4:35 PM

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RMR

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: POLTO 1422, DECEMBER 14, 7 P.M. (SECTION THREE OF FIVE)

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POUCHED ALL NATO CAPITALS AND EMBASSY MOSCOW

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U.K. SUPPLIES 120,000 MEN FOR NATO AND ALSO BOMBER FORCE IN U.K. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OUTSIDE NATO AREA ARE 160 MILLION POUNDS A YEAR. TWO-THIRDS OF U.K. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ELEMENT IS FOR DEFENSE. FIFTEEN PER CENT OF METAL GOODS PRODUCTION IS FOR DEFENSE AND THIS AFFECTS INDUSTRY AND EXPORT. FOR LAST FOUR YEARS U.K. HAS SPENT 400 MILLION POUNDS A YEAR FOR UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, HELPING NATO GENERALLY. THIS TOTAL TREMENDOUS EFFORT HAS TWO DANGERS. BY REASON LARGE CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE, U.K. DEVOTING LESS TO INVESTMENT THAN ANY EUROPEAN MEMBER. OTHER DANGER IS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DIFFICULTY. INEQUITY JEOPARDIZES MOVEMENTS TOWARD ECONOMIC UNITY ON WHICH U.K. HOPES TO MAKE POLICY STATEMENTS SOON. FOR ALL THESE REASONS U.K. REVIEWING EXPENDITURES AND MANPOWER PROBLEMS AND WELCOMES NATO REAPPRAISAL. WHILE NATO SUCCESSFUL IN CONTAINING RUSSIAN ADVANCES, MUST RECOGNIZE DANGER OF OUTFLANKING OF NATO. REAPPRAISAL MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF DEFENSE BURDENS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF MEMBERS.

MACMILLAN CONCLUDED, SAYING HE HAD SPOKEN LONG AND FRANKLY AT TURNING POINT OF WESTERN ALLIANCE. WHILE HE HAD LISTED DIFFICULTIES TO BE FACED, HE COULD GIVE ASSURANCE U.K. WOULD CONTINUE LARGE DEFENSE PROGRAM ALTHOUGH ITS COMPOSITION WOULD BE CHANGED. SO LONG AS EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENT REACHED, U.K. WILL PROVIDE FAIR CONTRIBUTION.

SECRETARY SPOKE NEXT. SAID SECRETARY WILSON WILL TALK LATER

ON ANNUAL

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FROM PARIS.

ON ANNUAL REVIEW AND GIVE DETAILS CURRENT U.S. APPROACH.

ON DIRECTIVE, SECRETARY SAID HE SHARED VIEW OF MACMILLAN THAT THOROUGH REVIEW NATO DEFENSE PLANNING NEEDED TO DETERMINE HOW WITHIN RESOURCES LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE DEFENSE EFFORT OF ALLIANCE AND EACH INDIVIDUAL MEMBER CAN BEST ACHIEVE MOST EFFECTIVE PATTERN OF FORCES. PROBLEM OF RESOURCES LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE IS DIFFICULT ONE. CONSIDERATIONS MACMILLAN HAD REFERRED TO MUST REALISTICALLY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

U.S. PLANS CONTINUE VERY LARGE EFFORT, AND PERHAPS OVERALL EFFORT APPRECIABLY GREATER THAN LAST YEAR IN TERMS OF DOLLARS. HOW TO DO THIS TO BEST ADVANTAGE PARTICULARLY RE NATO IS DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

SECRETARY REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 3 OF DIRECTIVE, TO EFFECT FULLY EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR RETALIATORY FORCE PROVIDED WITH ALL NECESSARY FACILITIES MUST BE MAINTAINED AND PROTECTED. SAID HE FULLY AGREED. THIS IS AREA WHERE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY RESTS ON U.S. MAINTENANCE AND ALSO PROTECTION OF THIS FORCE IS VERY HEAVY BURDEN AND PART OF CONTRIBUTION U.S. CAN APPORIATELY MAKE. RECOGNIZED U.S. HAS FACILITIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE WE RELY ON ASSISTANCE AND GOOD WILL OF ALLIES AS CONTRIBUTION TO THIS PART OF DEFENSE EFFORT.

SECRETARY REFERRED TO LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 RE ASSUMPTION U.S., U.K., CANADIAN FORCES WILL CONTINUE BE STATIONED IN EUROPE. SAID IT IS INTENT OF U.S. TO CONTINUE STATION TROOPS IN EUROPE AND FULLY COMPLY WITH SPIRIT AND UNDERSTANDING OF STATEMENT UNDER WHICH THEY ARE HERE. IN THIS RESPECT HE REFERRED TO PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCES OF MARCH 10, 1955 AND READ PARAGRAPH 3 THEREOF.

RE REFERENCE TO "FAIR SHARE" IN PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCES, SECRETARY STATED FOLLOWING FIGURES (1955 CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS):

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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Control: 9415

Rec'd: DECEMBER 14, 1956  
4:32 P.M.

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FROM: PARIS

Info

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TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: POLTO 1422, DECEMBER 14, 7 PM (SECTION 5 OF 5)

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CHAIRMAN TURNED TO DRAFT DIRECTIVE, CM(56)138. SAID PART 1 EXCELLENT AND TURNED TO PART 2. ON PARAGRAPH 4 B., PINEAU FOR FRANCE SUGGESTED CHANGING "HOSTILE ACTIONS" TO "INCIDENTS" AND "ARMED ATTACKS" TO "LOCAL ACTIONS". HE SAID THERE WERE PROBLEMS IN FRENCH TRANSLATION OF "ARMED ATTACK".

SECRETARY DULLES SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT "LOCAL ACTIONS" MIGHT MEAN ACTION INSIDE SOVIET ZONE, SUCH AS HUNGARIAN AFFAIR. THEREFORE, U.S. HAD SUGGESTED LANGUAGE WHICH FRENCH PROPOSED TO AMEND. PINEAU SAID HE DID NOT INTEND TO INCLUDE TYPE OF ACTION SECRETARY CONCERNED ABOUT AND SUGGESTED PHRASE "HOSTILE LOCAL ACTIONS". SAID POINTS WERE IMPORTANT BECAUSE PARAGRAPH 4 B. REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 5. CHANGE OF "LOCAL HOSTILE ACTIONS" TO "LOCAL INCIDENTS" AND "ARMED ATTACKS" TO "HOSTILE LOCAL ACTIONS" ACCEPTED.

FRENCH SUGGESTED DELETE "SERIOUS" IN PARAGRAPH 4 D. SECRETARY SAID HE HAD DIFFICULTY IN AGREEING WITH CONCEPT WE ARE COMMITTED TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ANY FORM OF AGGRESSION. PARAGRAPH 4 B. ALSO DEALS WITH AGGRESSION. THERE MIGHT BE INCIDENT SUCH AS CUTTING ACCESS TO BERLIN. QUESTION WAS DO WE WANT TO PLAN ON USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNLESS AGGRESSION IS OF MAJOR SERIOUS CHARACTER. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION, SECRETARY SUGGESTED USING PHRASE "TO DEAL WITH ARMED AGGRESSION OTHER THAN AS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 4 B." THIS WAS ACCEPTED.

NO COMMENT

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-2- POLTO 1422, DECEMBER 14, 7 PM (SECTION 5 OF 5), FROM PARIS.

NO COMMENT ON ANY OTHER PARAGRAPH OF DIRECTIVE WHICH WAS  
ADOPTED AS AMENDED. MEETING ADJOURNED UNTIL 10:30 DECEMBER 14.

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RBW

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-3- POLTO 1422, DECEMBER 14, 7 P.M. (SECTION THREE OF FIVE)  
FROM PARIS.

TOTAL U.S. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES WERE \$40.5 BILLION OR 11.2 PERCENT GNP. OF 13,700,000 MALE POPULATION 18-30 YEARS OLD, THREE MILLION OR 21 PERCENT UNDER ARMS. U.S. HAS 24 MONTHS PERIOD OF SERVICE. U.S. GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE CONSTITUTE ONE-THIRD OF M-DAY GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA. U.S. SUPPLIES 75 SQUADRONS OR 1,605 AIRCRAFT WHICH IS 25 PERCENT OF NATO AIRCRAFT IN ALL EUROPE.

WE NOW HAVE TASK TO ADAPT NATO DEFENSE TO NEEDS OF MODERN WARFARE. MUST HAVE ATOMIC WEAPONS FOR NOT ONLY STRATEGIC CUT ALSO TACTICAL PURPOSES. BUT THIS BURDEN CANNOT BE ADDED TO BURDEN ALREADY ASSUMED.

U.S. PROCEEDING TO STREAMLINE ITS DIVISIONS TO MAKE THEM FIT EFFECTIVELY INTO PATTERN OF MODERN WARFARE, A PRACTICE BEING GENERALLY ADOPTED. MAYBE PRESENCE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND UNITS MAY PERMIT REDUCTION IN MANPOWER WITHOUT LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS. THAT IS FOR MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO CONSIDER. BUT THIS CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL DEFENSE BURDEN TO ONE THAT ALREADY EXISTS.

GIVEN CONDITIONS THAT MAY ARISE IN EUROPE, NATO SHOULD NOT RELY WHOLLY ON ATOMIC WEAPONS, ALTHOUGH PROPER TO SAY WE HAVE PRIMARY RELIANCE ON THEM. CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE NECESSARY, AND BURDEN OF SUPPLYING CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD INCREASINGLY BE ASSUMED BY EUROPEANS. THIS WILL, OF COURSE, BE CONSEQUENCE OF GERMAN BUILDUP.

U.S. HAS NO PRESENT INTENTION OR PLANS CUTTING ACROSS POLITICAL DIRECTIVE, WHICH WE SUPPORT. U.S. BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE ACTED ON WITH ALL SPEED.

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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Control: 9448

Rec'd: DECEMBER 14, 1956  
5:50 P.M.

EUR

FROM: PARIS

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: POLTO 1422, DECEMBER 14, 7 PM (SECTION 4 OF 5)

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THERE REMAIN PROBLEMS THAT CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED AS WE GET RESPONSES TO DIRECTIVE. GIVEN UNITY OF SPIRIT, DETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION BY ALL MEMBERS TO BUILD COMMON DEFENSE TO DETER WAR AND IF NEED BE TO REPEL ATTACK, TREATY PROGRAMS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT IMPAIRMENT OF ECONOMY OF ANY MEMBER. IMPAIRMENT OF ECONOMY COULD HAVE AS SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AS LACK OF MILITARY PREPARATION.

NEW WEAPONS, COSTS AND CONCEPT ALL REQUIRE REVIEW. IF ADEQUATELY FOLLOWED UP, U.S. WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ENABLE US TO MAINTAIN AN EQUAL AND FAIR PARTICIPATION IN THIS ESSENTIAL TASK.

GREECE SPOKE NEXT. SAID FORWARD STRATEGY SHOULD BE USED IN SOUTH, INCLUDING GREECE, AND EXPRESSED HOPE THIS COULD BE STUDIED.

STAF SPOKE FOR NETHERLANDS. WAS CONCERNED AT PROBLEM OF NATO INTELLIGENCE WHICH WAS INSUFFICIENT IN RECENT CRISIS. NATO COMMANDERS LACKED NECESSARY INTELLIGENCE BECAUSE THEY WERE DEPENDENT ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. UNDERSTOOD COMMANDERS WERE MAKING PROPOSALS ON THIS SUBJECT AND URGED ALL TO MEET NATO NEEDS TO GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

FURTHER, NATO GOVERNMENTS DID NOT GET SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FROM NATO ON WHICH TO BASE NATIONAL ACTION. NETHERLANDS HAD HAD TO TAKE DECISIONS BY ITSELF WHILE HAD EXPECTED GUIDANCE

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FROM NATO. ALSO, ON INCREASE OF FORCES ISSUE, HAD RECEIVED ADVICE FROM COMMANDERS AFTER SPECIFICALLY REQUESTING, BUT SPECIFIC REQUEST HAD BEEN NECESSARY. NEW PROCEDURE IS REQUIRED TO GIVE GUIDANCE TO SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS AND DEFENSE MINISTERS AFTER CONSULTATION IN COUNCIL.

SACEUR IS PHYSICALLY AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION WITH COUNCIL, BUT NOT SACLANT AND CINCPAC. SOLUTION SHOULD BE FOUND TO THIS. REQUESTED SECRETARY GENERAL PUT ISSUE TO PERMANENT COUNCIL.

BRENTANO FOR GERMANY SPOKE TO MACMILLAN'S STATEMENT. SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED PROBLEM WITH MACMILLAN YESTERDAY AND CONSIDERED THAT THEY COULD SETTLE IT IN FRIENDLY WAY.

STRAUSS FOR GERMANY SUPPORTED DUTCH ON INTELLIGENCE QUESTION.

SACEUR ASKED TO SPEAK. SAID REGRETTED FIRST APPEARANCE WAS TO PLEAD GUILTY TO INEFFICIENCY. SHAPE HAD ANTICIPATED INTELLIGENCE BREAKDOWN IN TIME OF CRISIS AND FOR OVER FIVE YEARS HAD EMPHASIZED TO COUNCIL NEEDS OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES. IN VIEW THEREOF RESPONSIBILITY DID NOT LIE WITH SHAPE. NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE DOES NOT HAVE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, AND DID NOT THINK NATO SHOULD HAVE IT, AS WOULD BE BEYOND OUR CAPACITY. MILITARY AUTHORITIES DEPEND ON INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED BY MEMBERS. IN NORMAL TIMES THIS IS SUFFICIENT. BUT IN CRITICAL TIMES, COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY LARGE ONES WHO ARE PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE, BECOME PREOCCUPIED WITH OWN REQUIREMENTS. DURING RECENT SENSITIVE AND CRITICAL PERIOD THERE HAD BEEN COMPLETE BREAKDOWN ON RECEIPT USEFUL INTELLIGENCE AT SHAPE. HE HAS RAISED THIS DIRECTLY WITH MOD'S AND HAS HAD IMMEDIATE RESPONSES WHICH HE BELIEVES WILL BEAR FRUIT. IS TAKING ACTION TO PROVIDE POSITIVE LINK SO FLOW WILL BE PROMPT AND ADEQUATE PROVIDING ALL SUPPORT. STRONGLY PREFERS AND URGES NATIONS TO MAKE INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE ON COSMIC BASIS SO IT CAN BE DISTRIBUTED TO ALL. HOWEVER, UNDERSTANDABLE SOME MAY WISH TO PROTECT CERTAIN

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DATA AND EXPRESSED HIS ANXIETY TO RECEIVE SUCH DATA ON PRIVATE OR RESTRICTED BASIS IF THIS NECESSARY, WHICH LIMITATIONS HE WOULD OBSERVE. ON STAFF'S COMMENT ON LACK OF GUIDANCE FROM SHAPE, SAID IT TRUE THAT FOR FIRST FEW DAYS DID NOT SUPPLY GUIDANCE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN. MAJOR REASON WAS LACK OF INTELLIGENCE AND IN ADDITION HAD NOT RECOGNIZED NEED FOR ADVICE EARLY ENOUGH. HAD GIVEN ADVICE ON THIRD DAY EVEN THOUGH ONLY ON BASIS LIMITED INTELLIGENCE AND CONTINUED GIVE GUIDANCE CONSIDERED NECESSARY.

MADE STRONG PLEA TO COUNCIL TO GET BEHIND PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS REQUIRED. EMPHASIZED THAT ALL NATO EXPENDITURES ON MEN, MATERIAL, AND INFRASTRUCTURE WAS USELESS UNLESS HE HAD INTELLIGENCE ON HOW TO EMPLOY IT.

CHAIRMAN, ON BEHALF COUNCIL, THANKED NORSTAD AND OFFERED HIM BEST WISHES. ISMAY ADDED THAT DURING CRITICAL PERIOD COUNCIL HAD MET 23 TIMES AND KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MILITARY. OBVIOUSLY, MANY FAULTS IN MACHINERY EXISTED, FIRST THING AFTER CRISIS HAD BEEN POST MORTEM BY PERMANENT COUNCIL WITH VIEW TO CURE DEFECTS.

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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12/14/56  
R AME IN EMBASSY, PARIS

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EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

The work of the Council is now over except for preparing the communique which as you know is always troublesome and will be so this afternoon.

I believe the results have been all that could reasonably have been expected. The Recommendations of the Three Ministers for developing NATO have been unanimously adopted including a proposal for settlement of disputes between members.

The directive to the military which this year was particularly serious and controversial has been adopted. Wilson's annual statement on the military/review made today was, I think, a good statement, at least as could have been made given the internal differences of opinion. I fear we are getting into trouble by insisting on the one hand that almost any kind of aggression must be met by nuclear weapons and on the other hand that we alone will have the nuclear weapons. I fear this is going to leave us carrying the bag alone so far as the defense of Europe is concerned.

We have in informal talks done much to regain the sense of unity which was dissipated by the attack on Egypt although obviously some scars and resentments still remain.

Ismay's resignation was accepted in which connection I expressed on your behalf your personal regard for him and his services. Spaak was elected to succeed him.

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PAGE TWO OF DULTE 19

As always at these conferences the informal contacts between the Ministers have provided the most profitable aspect of the meeting.

I shall report more fully when I see you soon.

Faithfully yours, FOSTER

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Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers  
President of the United States  
1953-61 (Ann Whitman File)

*306th Meeting gmc*  
December 21, 1956

NSC SERIES

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 306th Meeting  
of the National Security Council,  
Thursday, December 20, 1956

Present at the 306th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; Mr. Amos J. Pease for the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; Mr. R. R. Roach for the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security; the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps. The following members of the NSC Planning Board also attended the meeting: Mr. Robert R. Bowie, State; Mr. Gordon Gray, Defense; Mr. William Y. Elliott, ODM; Mr. Andrew N. Overby, Treasury; Mr. William E. Foley, Justice; Mr. John Lippmann, Disarmament; Capt. John H. Morse, Jr., USN, AEG; Lt. Gen. F. W. Farrell, USA, JCS; Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., CIA; Mr. Ralph W. E. Reid, Budget; Mr. Elmer B. Staats, OCB; and Mr. Ralph E. Spear, FCDA. The following members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff attended the meeting: Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.), Director; Col. Edward A. Herbes, USAF; Col. Straughn D. Kelsey, USAF; Col. Worth L. Kindred, USA; Col. Joseph D. Raney, USA; Mr. Ludwell L. Montague; Col. Richard P. Ross, USMC; Capt. Alvin W. Slayden, USN; Capt. W. E. Stevens, USN. The following members of the FCDA Staff attended the meeting for Item 2: Messrs. Emil Reutzel, Gerald Gallagher, Jack Greene, Edward Saunders, and Philip Baldwin. Also attending the meeting were the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

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Authority *MR 78-99#3*  
By *SC* NLE Date *7/15/80*

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Following the completion of the formal presentation by the Subcommittee Staff, Admiral Radford stressed the following points concerning the 1956 net evaluation: (a) The evaluation was based upon an immense effort by the Subcommittee Staff and by member agencies of the Subcommittee, which effort he was sure warranted commendation; (b) in the preparation of the report each of the members of the Council's Subcommittee acted only within the area of responsibility of his own agency, and members of the Subcommittee did not participate in, nor judge the validity of results of, the military operations analysis which is the basis of the 1956 report; (c) certain of the information in the report is highly sensitive in nature and therefore necessitates the exercise of special security precautions in the handling of the report and the ancillary submissions on which it was based; (d) the report indicates a very detailed study of the U. S. Air Defense system and highlights weaknesses in that system; (Admiral Radford indicated that a committee has been set up to restudy and to report by next July on the Air Defense system) (e) the assumptions on which the report is based can vary widely, as emphasized by General Thomas, and as a consequence the Net Evaluation Report of 1956 should not be considered as a factual report. (Admiral Radford said that if the United States were subjected to a nuclear attack, the results might be along the lines indicated in the report; on the other hand, they might be either considerably worse or considerably less severe.)

The President indicated that the Subcommittee's presentation prompted several observations on his part. He queried as to why we should put a single pixel into anything but developing our capacity

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EO. 12055, Sec. 1.301 (b)(1)(c)(d)

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to diminish the enemy's capacity for nuclear attack. Rather than worry too much about the submarine menace, protecting shipping on the seas, etc., the United States should continue to concentrate on producing a force that is so good and so well distributed that the Soviets will not attack; and if they do attack, we should have also concentrated on our defenses so that we will be capable of knocking the enemy down.

The President stated that in considering the magnitude and gravity of the problems covered in the Net Evaluation study, we come to the point of asking how much can or will the United States stand. He thought that the picture of the terrific destruction resulting from a nuclear attack warranted taking a look at the whole matter in terms of determining how much destruction the United States and its people can absorb and still survive.

#### The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the annual report for 1956 of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to paragraph 4 of NSC 5605, as presented orally by the Director and other members of the Subcommittee Staff.

## 2. FY 1958 LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATOR

Governor Peterson initiated FCDA's oral briefing on the subject by reading the highlights of pertinent sections of the FCDA report entitled "Civil Defense Legislative Program" (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting, other copies to be distributed to the Council members in accordance with the oral request made by Governor Peterson at the time of this presentation).

After covering the highlights of the report, Governor Peterson introduced Mr. Jack Greene, who gave an oral briefing on the effects of exposure to radioactive fall-out. He pointed out that the destructive results from radioactive exposure are extremely severe, and that the solution to this problem may be found only in "evacuation, meaning distance, or shelter, meaning shielding." He indicated that the FCDA studies reflect that evacuation is not practicable as the primary solution to the problem, and as a consequence the FCDA has

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 1.301 (1)(c)(d)

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Alphonse-Pierre Juin, Marshal of France, and General Maxime  
Weygand. Confirm date and time delivery. Request your  
advice urgently whether original signed by President for  
delivery to addressee(s) necessary or desirable.

QUOTE December 26, 1956

My dear Sirs:

I have given the views expressed in your letter of  
November 30 my serious consideration. Your frankness and objec-  
tivity in describing your preoccupations as to the present and  
future viability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are  
deeply appreciated.

I have been keenly aware of and concerned by the feeling  
current in France that, because of our respective differences  
of opinion on the Suez crisis, the United States might not in  
the last analysis stand behind its obligations under the North  
Atlantic Treaty. It seems to us that the fact that the United  
States, despite its deep sympathy for France and Britain, lived



Recommendations  
against  
see Paris  
3150, attached

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E.O. 12355, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 89-63 #1

BY DATE 3/22/90

Dtd.  
Postred

(Office  
Only)

Drafted by:

S/S

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

S/S - Joseph N. Greene, Jr.

Clearances:

Brig. Gen. Goodpastor  
The White House

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12/26/56

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up to Article I (renunciation of force) provides added assurance, not less assurance, that we shall live up to Article V (resistance to armed attack). Secretary Dulles during the recent Ministerial meetings in Paris has been most specific in endeavoring to clarify our position. United States support for NATO and our determination to further its strength and cohesiveness remain and will continue to remain as strong as when the alliance was formed.

There are indeed many grave problems in adjacent areas which have a direct bearing on NATO security. As to the appropriate solution to some of these problems, we may not always be in complete agreement, more particularly on the modalities rather than on the substance and ultimate objectives. We must in any case consult together in an effort to seek jointly the solutions which are in the long-term interests of NATO and of our two countries.

The events in Hungary have given confirmation, if such were ever needed, of the necessity for the North Atlantic Treaty. Let us turn to the principal task facing us and work together in strengthening the ties of our alliance, which is the defense of Western civilization and world peace.

Sincerely,



Dwight D. Eisenhower UNQUOTE

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