

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

TOP SECRET

DATE: January 11, 1955

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SUBJECT: Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments

PARTICIPANTS: STATE
 Secretary Dulles
 Under Secretary Hoover
 Mr. Murphy, G
 Mr. Key, IO
 Mr. Wainhouse, IO
 Mr. Bowie, S/P
 Mr. Smith, S/AE
 Howard Meyers, UNP

DEFENSE
 Secretary Wilson
 Deputy Secretary Anderson
 Major General Loper

Chairman Strauss

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Mr. Dulles said the purpose of this meeting was to consider the reports on this subject prepared by the Department of Defense and by Mr. Bowie of the State Department, and to decide what recommendations should be made to the NSC.

Mr. Bowie noted that the basic issue posed by the Defense paper was that it was not in the security interests of the United States to have any disarmament for the foreseeable future. This proposition ought to be explored, as well as what headway might be made in this Special Committee on the disarmament problem, and finally whether decisions should be taken with regard to the meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee of Five which would soon commence in London.

Mr. Anderson said that the Defense position could be summarized somewhat as follows. Everyone would like to believe they could achieve true disarmament, with substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments of such nature that no country would go to war to settle its international disputes. There are two kinds of weapons: conventional and atomic. So far as the U.S. is concerned, basically we could be hurt most effectively by nuclear attack on the continental United States but had to take into consideration the fact that conventional armaments as well as atomic armaments could be used effectively on our allies. Consequently, a realistic disarmament plan could not divorce conventional and nuclear armaments. When considering a realistic disarmament plan, the Defense Department was concerned that the U.S. would probably adhere more conscientiously to a disarmament agreement than the Soviet Union. The nub of the problem was that, if it is not possible to have an effective control system which would be proof against evasions or violations, then was it in the U.S. national interest to agree to a disarmament scheme of lesser safety? The Defense Department did not believe it was in the U.S. interest to do this. Fundamentally there must be

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effective control which would insure that there was a balanced reduction of conventional and nuclear armaments. While it was difficult to achieve such an effective disarmament system, we must face up to this problem rather than taking a lesser system as our goal. The United States was now at a point where it could expand its armaments rapidly. If we now should disarm under a disarmament agreement to which the United States really adhered, this would cause us to lose the convertability factor now built up in our industrial system which enabled a rapid change over to manufacture of armaments. This situation did not hold true for a totalitarian state, which can make such changes more easily and more rapidly.

General Loper said that one of the major points which the Defense Department had tried to make was that any effective disarmament plan required the Soviets to accept a control system of such extensive nature that its acceptance involved a radical change in the attitude of the Soviet leaders toward the rest of the world. If the Soviets in fact were really to make such great changes in their political and strategic orientation, there were other areas than disarmament in which the Soviet intent could be more easily ascertained without raising the very great problems which disarmament posed because of its necessary infringements on national sovereignty. Among such other areas would be the renunciation of the Comintern, agreement on an Austrian State Treaty or on a unified Germany, and willingness really to support the concept of free trade. Soviet agreements in these other areas would make a disarmament agreement come almost as a matter of course.

General Loper believed that the purpose of the Special Committee of the National Security Council was not to develop a detailed disarmament plan but to review basic policy toward control of armaments set forth in NSC 112. This document stated the general principles upon which United States policy in this field was based. The Defense Department believed that NSC 112 should be revised in at least two respects:

(a) it was not possible to establish a balance of military power by agreeing to numerical limits on armed forces. This would be only a temporary balance and could easily be upset to the advantage of the totalitarian nations, as Mr. Anderson had indicated.

(b) the United Nations Atomic Energy Control Plan, or any other plan, could not actually guarantee that nuclear weapons would be eliminated because of the impossibility of accounting fully for past production of fissionable materials. If the United States continued to say it wished to eliminate nuclear weapons, this would actually endanger the free nations because of this fact. It had been suggested that perhaps we should support a plan to reduce the number of nuclear weapons instead of to eliminate them. For that purpose, an augmented United Nations Atomic Energy Control Plan would probably be appropriate.

General Loper believed that a number of working papers which had already been prepared in implementation of NSC 112 would be appropriate as the basis for a new disarmament plan.

Mr. Wilson remarked that history has demonstrated that armaments races have usually led to war, and there is also considerable evidence to support the argument that a disarmament agreement may create the same danger. He believed

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other issues must be settled before a disarmament plan could achieve its purpose. He did not see how there could be a partial disarmament plan which would be useful, because there was a great tendency to cheat in carrying out such an agreement. In this connection he referred to the Washington Naval Treaty and how the Germans developed pocket battle-ships as a means of getting around the limitations established in that treaty. If it were possible really to eliminate nuclear weapons, this might be all that would be needed in a disarmament agreement, but it must be recognized that if war should break out all nations which could do so would proceed to develop nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible despite any agreements previously reached to eliminate them. Thus, we were forced to consider the whole range of armaments and armed forces in developing a disarmament program. Mr. Wilson believed that we should not think that a disarmament agreement would be effective unless the causes of war themselves are eliminated. This conclusion led him to support the views previously expressed by Mr. Anderson and General Loper about the prior need for agreements in other fields before a disarmament agreement could be reached. He particularly wished to emphasize that the experience with the Communist countries after World War II and after the Korean armistice had made him most suspicious whether the Communists would keep any agreement which required such important restrictions on national sovereignty on their part.

Mr. Strauss said that the Atomic Energy Commission had examined this problem from the technical rather than from the philosophical point of view. He believed that complete technical disarmament was impossible because one could never assure that nuclear armaments had actually been eliminated. The AEC had developed a plan which was an attempt to find a middle ground between the positions taken by the Department of State and Defense. This had previously been circulated to the other departments (attached as TAB A). Mr. Strauss read the plan and then remarked that if a proposal by the United States of this general nature should be refused by the Soviet Union, it would place on the Soviets the onus for failing to make progress in the disarmament field. Moreover, he noted that this plan would not require the United States to make any reductions in the nuclear field until the completion of extensive disclosures of information in both the nuclear and conventional armaments fields and the verification of the accuracy and completeness of such disclosures. Thus, the most severe tests of Soviet intentions to honor a disarmament program would be provided before the U.S. began to limit its own nuclear capabilities.

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General Loper remarked that the plan described by Admiral Strauss was acceptable, except for certain relatively minor matters, as a basis for the preparation of detailed working papers. For example, he did not agree with the position taken by this Atomic Energy Commission Plan that it was possible to determine a balance of armed forces on the basis of percentage reductions across-the-board.

Mr. Dulles said that he had two basic thoughts about this situation. First, he doubted that the US could work out any disarmament plan with a powerful nation which we did not trust and which we believed had most ambitious goals. Second, he thought we had to keep trying to work out agreement on such a plan. He referred to past efforts in the disarmament field and how they had not really made progress because of the complexity of this problem. Moreover, if every last detail was not buttoned up, the Soviets would take advantage of any loopholes. Thus, between the complexity of the disarmament problem and the untrustworthiness of the Communists, he was not optimistic about any chances of success. On the other hand, this Special Committee could not decide that the problem was insoluble. The world would regard such a negative position as indication of US desire to maintain its nuclear superiority or even as indication of US intent to wage aggressive war. A decent respect for the opinions of mankind required us to try to solve the disarmament problem, as did our need to hold our allies with us. We could not in this group, however, pass on the details of such a disarmament plan but must probably be concerned with general principles and policies.

Mr. Wainhouse noted that we must try to solve this problem because, in addition to the points made by Secretary Dulles, the US could not afford to hand the propaganda advantage to the Communists by not doing anything about the disarmament problem.

Mr. Dulles emphasized that, while what Mr. Wainhouse had said was true, we should not allow our propaganda desires to influence us to depart from a realistic and conservative attitude on this subject.

Mr. Bowie thought it was important, both from a public relations view and from the standpoint of our security, to explore all possibilities. Particularly, if we could find a way of removing the nuclear threat, we should explore that. The heart of the matter appeared to be whether it was possible to establish an effective inspection system and the feasibility of such an inspection system on the atomic side was made more difficult as time brought larger inventories of nuclear materials. He wondered whether it was possible to take the narrow end of the wedge and to test inspection in a smaller area than that of across the board disarmament? Perhaps a possibility would be offered by examining an inspection system to assure the cessation of nuclear fuel production.

Mr. Dulles

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Mr. Dulles said that he was inclined to agree with General Loper's attitude with regard to Mr. Bowie's suggestion. He thought it was much easier for the Soviets to reach agreement with us in other areas than the armaments field.

Mr. Strauss believed that, theoretically, it might be easier to reach agreements with the Soviets in other areas than disarmament, but that in practice the Soviets appeared psychologically committed to maintain the Comintern and to hold to their attitudes on other political issues such as the German question. This made it harder for the Soviets to make concessions in these areas, while there might be a new inducement in the armaments field, if we could put the right kind of psychological pressure on the Soviets to make such concessions.

Mr. Dulles recalled that the President had said that if we could get rid of nuclear weapons, he would not be disposed to insist on reductions in the conventional armaments field. The reason for this was the President's belief that if we can insure that our industrial power could be kept intact, this would act both as a deterrent against a general war and as a major aid in winning a war.

Mr. Wilson said that he would like to hear the President bring this view up to date. He remembered that after the President realized the Soviets had a thermonuclear weapon, this had very much affected the President's views on many matters. He wondered what was the President's view on this subject now, particularly since it was clear that it was impossible to lose the secret of the atom and this meant that nuclear weapons would be developed and used eventually in another war.

Mr. Dulles asked what proposals should the Special Committee put up to the National Security Council at the January 20th meeting scheduled on the subject.

Mr. Bowie suggested that it might be wise to bring in a qualified man of national prestige to take the lead in reviewing this problem and focus on a detailed plan, because of the variety of views now presented by the three concerned agencies.

Mr. Strauss noted that the Special Committee was supposed to review NSC 112 which was a matter of basic principles and not of a detailed plan. Could not this be done?

Mr. Smith said that it would help the working level people, who would have to work out a detailed plan from such general principles, if it could be made clear whether or not the Special Committee supported the Defense concept put forth in General Loper's paper that such a detailed plan

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should be so developed as to make it most unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Wilson said he would not buy such an approach. He believed we should work out a fair plan which would be acceptable both to the US and to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Dulles assumed that all agreed that we should seek in all sincerity to find an effective disarmament plan. If this assumption was not correct, then this question would have to be taken to the President.

Mr. Strauss, Mr. Wilson and General Loper all agreed that this plan should be sought as an honest effort. General Loper explained that the point of view expressed in his paper sprang from the military services' belief that any disarmament plan would not be in the US interests without a basic change in Soviet intentions. However, this did not mean that we should proceed to develop a plan which was insincere and unfair.

Mr. Wilson suggested that the Special Committee should revise NSC 112 in broad terms, and then have working groups develop a detailed disarmament plan.

Mr. Dulles agreed and said that at this point, after the detailed plan had been developed, the Special Committee could examine the desirability of bringing in a new and top-level man to chair this review.

Attachment: *W.W.*

AEC Draft Paper on
"International Control of
Armed Forces and Armaments"
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FROM: Paris

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2833, January 5, 8 p.m.

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OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Control: 1705

Rec'd: January 5, 1955
6:49 p.m.

1-5-55 10:11 a.m.
CORRECTED PAGE ONE

LMS:LQF

SENT DEPARTMENT 2833; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 696, ROME 196, BONN 503, MOSCOW 257, BRUSSELS, HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG UNNUMBERED.

Embassy telegrams 1562, October 13, and 2438, December 8, 1954 and Embassy telegram 2819, January 5, 1955.

Course of assembly debate on Paris agreements indicates that, while reasonable optimism continues to be warranted, ratification is as yet far from assured.

We believe that idea of German rearmament has become increasingly accepted and that assembly vote will tend to consolidate this acceptance but that repugnance for it is still strong, widespread and, more important, sentiment which most politicians with eye on approaching elections are reluctant to back.

It is difficult to evaluate depth of desire and impatience for talks with Russians. As our recent press telegrams have indicated, press of all shades give impression that it has recently been paramount in public mind. On other hand, it was rarely mentioned in assembly corridors during debates. It probably looms much larger in minds of many of Mendes entourage and friends than among public generally.

How US and UK handle this problem will unquestionably have major effect on ratification. Washington's silence and detached posture during recent months have obviously been far more effective than any more active role. On other hand, Secretary's "agonizing reappraisal" statement of year ago and recent British statement that question, was not whether but how Germany would be rearmed have both, while bitterly resented by French at time, continued to have salutary effect. So has restraint of US Government in batting down Russian gestures. Icy reminder of Russian realities is needed here but should certainly not come from US. Churchill would be ideal source.

We believe that four numbered points in Embassy telegram 2833 continue to be applicable and suggest following additional one

(1) Discreet and unobtrusive reiteration, preferably by British

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2832, January 5, 8 p. m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2832 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 695 BONN 502
ROME 195 MOSCOW 156 BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG UNNUMBERED.

Re EMBTEL 2819, January 5.

We believe Jebb overly optimistic in thinking demarche would
so put Russians on spot that either favorable or unfavorable
reply would facilitate ratification. On contrary we believe
that Russian reply either proposing meeting in very near future
or implying strongly they would refuse to attend meeting after
agreements entered into effect could be damaging here.

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FROM: Bonn

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1946, January 7, 4 p.m.

Control: 2802

Rec'd: January 7, 1955
2:55 p.m.SENT DEPARTMENT 1946; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 437 MOSCOW
40 PARIS 453Reference Paris telegram to Department 2847 repeated Bonn 507
London 699 Moscow 159

At diplomatic reception of President Heuss this morning, Chancellor mentioned to me Mendes-France's memorandum re talks with the Soviets. I subsequently, on confidential basis, showed him text of Paris 2847 to Department. Chancellor took strong exception to any unilateral action on part of France and said it would be disastrous to western unity and would render his position much more difficult and might well furnish an excuse for further delay in ratification by Bundestag. However, Blankenhorn quotes him as having no objection to a "well formulated" three-power approach to the Soviets in due course. It should be essential to state in the note that the conference could take place only after entry into force of the treaties and following extensive preparation through diplomatic channels. With reference to ratification, Blankenhorn said that the final debates in the Bundestag had been set for February 9, 10 and 11 and that, after a meeting with his coalition leaders yesterday, the Chancellor thought there would be no difficulty re a favorable vote for ratification.

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

December 15, 1954

Mr. Robert R. Bowie
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Department of State

Dear Mr. Bowie:

Enclosed are five copies of a paper of December 15, 1954, on the subject of "International Control of Armed Forces and Armaments." This has been prepared by Dr. Paul C. Fine on a personal basis, as suggested in a meeting which you attended on December 8, and has no official status. Copies are also being provided to General Loper of the Defense Department.

Very truly yours,

John A. Hall, Director
Office of International Affairs

Enclosures
Cys 6A-10A as above

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

1954 DEC 15 11 12

Basic Assumptions

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1. The U.S. has and will continue to have considerably greater atomic strength (number and quality of atomic weapons plus means for their delivery) than the U.S.S.R.
2. The time is approaching when the atomic strength of the U.S.S.R. can do grievous damage to the U.S. and its allies.
3. The U.S.S.R. and associated countries are and will continue to be superior to the U.S. and its allies in existing strength of armed forces employing conventional armaments.
4. To be acceptable to the U.S., any plan for the control of armed forces and armaments must entail no greater risks to U.S. security than a continuation of present trends and preferably should entail lesser risks.
5. Any control plan put forward by the U.S. must have both the appearance and reality of fairness, so that it can command the support of neutral and allied countries.
6. No assumption of good faith on the part of the present government of the U.S.S.R. can be made.
7. Uncertainties in the determination by an international agency of past production of atomic materials would permit the U.S.S.R. to hide a number of atomic weapons sufficient to pose a very serious threat in a world where such weapons had otherwise been eliminated.
8. The quantities of atomic materials needed for peaceful uses during the next ten years or longer are considerably less than the total past production of such materials.

Available contains info on the efficiency of
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the
production of atomic materials.
U.S.S.R. has a considerable
advantage in the production of
atomic materials.

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Proposal

It is proposed that the plan outlined below would be in the interests of U.S. security and world peace.

1. An agreement on control of armed forces and conventional and atomic armaments would be negotiated by the principal powers and would be signed by all nations.

2. The agreement would establish an international agency with clearly defined duties and rights. The first step in the implementation of the agreement would be for the agency to be staffed and organized to carry out its functions. The basic principles, objectives, and phases of the control plan would be specified in the agreement, but the agency would be given sufficient flexibility to profit by experience and to meet changing conditions. Important modifications or extensions of the agreement would be referred to the signatory nations for decision.

3. The first phase of the control plan would include the disclosure by all nations of the number, location, and current changes of their armed forces, conventional and atomic armaments, and facilities for the development, production, storage, and utilization of armaments. The first phase would also include the verification by the international agency of the national disclosures, both as to accuracy and completeness. In order to accomplish this, the agency would have continued rights of access, inspection, ground and aerial surveys, surveillance, and interrogation. (For example, see Chapter 6 of the Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.)

4. The sequence of disclosure and verification would be specified in the agreement and would proceed from less to more sensitive items. (For example, see the U.S. working paper on proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments in Special Supplement No. 1. Second Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.) The agency would report to all nations whenever the disclosure by any nation was found to be significantly inaccurate or incomplete or whenever any nation interfered with the processes of verification. The other nations would then have the right to demand compliance or to terminate the agreement. It is realized that undisclosed armed forces and armaments might be maintained clandestinely by a nation without detection by the agency, and this possibility is taken into account in later phases of the control plan.

5. The second phase of the control plan would be the cessation by all nations of any increases in the number of armed forces and conventional and atomic armaments. Training of new military personnel and production of new armaments would be permitted only for replacement purposes. Facilities for the production of atomic materials, including fissionable and fusionable materials and other materials primarily related to atomic weapons, would be shut down. Continued inspection of these facilities would be required to

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ensure that they remained inactive. Operation of such facilities at some later time, if additional atomic materials were needed for peaceful uses, would be permitted only by decision of the signatory nations and would be carried out by the international agency.

6. The third phase of the control plan would be step-by-step reduction of armed forces and conventional and atomic armaments, but not their elimination. The ultimate level permitted would be determined on the basis that any nation maintaining clandestinely some armed forces and armaments, particularly atomic weapons, must not have a predominant military advantage. The level specified in the agreement might subsequently be lowered by decision of the signatory nations if experience indicated confidence in the national disclosures.

7. Armed forces and conventional and atomic armaments would be reduced at each step by a fixed percentage of their initial numbers, the percentage to be the same for all types of armed forces and armaments and for all nations. This is based on the idea that each nation has determined its distribution of armed forces and armaments to fit its own needs and capabilities and that a pro rata reduction would be a fair one. This removes the necessity of trying to negotiate an agreement by evaluating or balancing different kinds of military strength, item by item. The initial numbers of armed forces and armaments would be those disclosed by the nations in the first phase, if verified by the international agency, and would not include any increases between the times of disclosure and cessation. Any such increases would be eliminated by being included in their entirety as an additional reduction during the first step.

8. For purposes of discussion, a reduction of armed forces and conventional and atomic armaments at the rate of ten percent a year for seven years might be considered. For instance, if a nation initially had ten armored divisions, one would be disbanded each year and its equipment destroyed. If a nation initially had one hundred submarines, ten would be destroyed each year. If a nation initially had one thousand bomber aircraft, one hundred would be destroyed each year. In these examples, when the annual reductions had stopped after seven years, three armored divisions, thirty submarines, and three hundred bomber aircraft would remain.

9. The atomic materials made available by the percentage reductions of atomic armaments would be turned over to the international agency for safeguarding and for peaceful uses. These materials would be maintained in such locations and in such forms as to minimize the dangers of seizure and conversion to weapons. Limited amounts would be made available to nations for peaceful uses, subject to licensing and inspection. Power reactors utilizing or producing weapon-quality materials would be limited in size and number, and their design, construction, and operation would be subject to supervision by the agency. Facilities for fabricating or reprocessing fuel elements of weapon-quality materials would be operated by the agency itself. The controls on peaceful uses, as specified in the agreement, might subsequently be relaxed by decision of the signatory nations if experience indicated this could be done safely.

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in the proposed control plan. This has the advantage of eliminating the need for operation of such production facilities by the international agency and means that inspection would be a sufficient control to ensure that disclosed plants remained inactive. Thorough searches would still be necessary to determine whether any plants had not been disclosed.

4. It would not be feasible to shut down all plants that could produce armaments, because of the possibilities of conversion of industry between military and peaceful products. Moreover, since some armaments would be legally retained, replacements and improvements would have to be permitted. Plants engaged in the production of armaments for these purposes and other plants capable of producing armaments would be continually inspected by the international agency.

5. Rotation and replacement of armed forces at the permitted levels would be necessary. Reserve and para-military forces would have to be taken into account in the control plan. The prompt effectiveness of such forces could be limited by the level of armaments and the degree of training permitted.

6. The proposed control plan should be phased in such a way that its termination at any time would not jeopardize U.S. security. In the phase of disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments, security information would become available to the international agency and thus to the participating nations. The loss of U.S. information would be balanced by the gain of information on the U.S.S.R. Perhaps the most critical security aspect would be access to thermonuclear weapon design, and this should not come until the end of the phase. A sequence of disclosure and verification has been devised to accord with U.S. security in a U.S. working paper in the Second Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

7. The phase of cessation of any increases in the number of armed forces and conventional and atomic armaments would freeze the then existing military strengths of all nations, until the reduction phase began. The effects of this must be judged on the basis of estimates of the relative military positions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and the rates of change at that time, which would be at least several years from now. The U.S. and its allies might or might not be gaining then in the strength of armed forces employing conventional armaments, but it is assumed that the U.S.S.R. and associated countries will remain superior in this respect. It is also assumed that the atomic strength of the U.S. is and will continue to be considerably greater than that of the U.S.S.R., but that the capability of the U.S.S.R. to inflict grievous damage on the U.S. and its allies is increasing. The possibility of secret mobilization for surprise attack is a serious U.S.S.R. advantage, which would be reduced by the continued inspection of all military strength in this and other phases of the control plan. It would therefore appear that the cessation phase would be advantageous to U.S. security. If non-compliance by the U.S.S.R.

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Forced termination of the agreement, U.S. rearmament could proceed and U.S. atomic production facilities could be reactivated. Of course, precautions would have to be taken to prevent sabotage of these facilities while they were shut down.

8. The phase of reduction of armed forces and armaments would proceed gradually and with frequent tests of compliance by all nations. Since the reductions would be on an over-all percentage basis, the relative military positions would not change significantly. The chances of surprise attack by the U.S.S.R. would be further decreased because of the greater and more conspicuous efforts required to mobilize for war from the reduced levels. The ultimate level of permitted armed forces and armaments would have to be set so that U.S. superiority in atomic strength could still deter or counter aggression, but world tensions and world military expenditures could be considerably reduced. This should contribute to the maintenance of peace and therefore be in the interests of U.S. security. There would be risks in the proposed control plan, but it is suggested that these are no greater and possibly less than the risks in the continuation of present trends.

9. The proposed control plan would be very complicated and expensive and would require large numbers of trained personnel. However, if it worked, the reduction in funds and manpower presently devoted to military strength would eventually more than compensate for the costs of the plan.

10. The proposed control plan, in common with any effective plan, requires a degree of access to the U.S.S.R. that, if permitted, would represent a revolutionary change in the policies of the Soviet Government. It is unlikely that this would occur in the near future. However, a Soviet Government may some day decide that the risks of opening up the U.S.S.R. and complying with a control plan are less than the risks of continuing their present policies, which could result in the destruction of the U.S.S.R. by atomic weapons.

Paul C. Fine
December 15, 1954

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TUESDAY
January 4, 1955
5:51 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. MERCHANT

M. returned his call, and the Sec. asked if he got away the first week in February, could M. guarantee no crises. M. said no - but to go.

The Sec. asked if we have given a lot of thought to the German situation so we ~~what~~ do what needs to be done in advance - can we bolster Adenauer in this. M. said we have given it a lot of thought but we nor Conant have come up with anything specific. Jan. 20 is the date to talk re return of property. M. told re deJuniac misrepresenting the Sec.'s message re the Arms Agency during their talk. The Sec. said Bonnet told him Sunday the Embassy had been instructed to ask for assurance on troops. M. said a memo was on the way re this.

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2814, January 4, 8 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	DND 907435
By	By NARA. Date 11/1/95

Control: 1158
Rec'd: January 4, 1955
6:55 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2814; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 689;
BONN 498; MOSCOW 153; ROME 191; BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE,
LUXEMBOURG UNNUMBERED.

In conversation with Embassy officer last night Mendes-France
Acting Directeur du Cabinet, Soutou, had following to say in
reply to inquiry about reactions to Malenkov's New Years state-
ment to Telenews:

1. French Government was not at all impressed with what
Malenkov had to say as representing anything new or pro-
viding hopeful approach to 4-power meeting on Asian or
European affairs. Further negotiations on 4-power basis
on German and European security problems was still unfor-
tunately key political issue in France. Soutou said if Mendes
had not (repeat not) included in his UN speech part about
Austrian Treaty and May meeting of big four, Paris Accords
would certainly have been voted down in National Assembly.
He added Americans and British would soon be faced with
French demarche on subject of eventual 4-power meeting on
European (German) problems. He hastened to say there was
of course no (repeat no) question whatever of 4-power meet-
ing before final ratification of Paris Accords and French
Government and Mendes personally had no (repeat no) illusions
whatever about obtaining anything from Russians at possible
4-power meeting early next summer unless Soviet basic position
on Germany changed, which was unlikely.

2. Soutou was far from optimistic about rapid and favorable
action in Conseil de la Republique on Paris Accords. He
said Gaullist, Neutralist and other wishful thinking was
stronger in Conseil than in National Assembly and Conseil
might attach harmless-sounding resolutions about final try
with Moscow or other amendments to Paris Accords voted last
week by Assembly which could cause delays postponing final
ratification until midsummer. Soutou added Mendes-France
posture before Assembly and Conseil must continue to be that
of doing everything possible to seek negotiation with Russians.
Mendes and he were doing what they could to explain facts of

international life

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-2- 2814, January 4, 8 p.m., from Paris

international life to key Neutralist and wishful-thinking editors such as Bourdet of FRANCE-OBSERVATEUR and Beuve-Mery of LE MONDE as well as to key deputies and senators under their influence. Soutou remarked Mendes has studied "the Berlin dossier" and understood perfectly well 4-power conference on Germany and European security had taken place almost year ago and Soviet since that time had come up with nothing which would justify holding of another full-dress 4-power meeting.

3. Soutou commented that Bidault had done excellent job during Berlin negotiations but had neglected to followup upon his return to Paris. Bidault had not (repeat not) taken trouble to explain to National Assembly significance of Berlin Conference nor had Laniel Government done anything to inform French public opinion on hard realities of negotiations with Russians. This was main reason why Neutralist and ~~soft~~-headed thinking was still so prevalent in France and particularly among leftist "intellectuals" in Paris whom unfortunately exercise unwarranted and dangerous influence in French diplomacy.

USA
Embassy comment: While there is great deal in what Soutou says we are not (repeat not) yet prepared to admit situation is as gloomy as he presents it re ratification or that there will be major difficulties in Conseil de la Republique. We are seeing key senators and will cable analysis later this week of position in Conseil vis-a-vis Paris Accords.

During recent debates Mendes-France had great deal to say about France's position in Atlantic Alliance, necessity for unity in West before basic East-West issues could be negotiated with Moscow with any hope of success, etc. At no (repeat no) time did Mendes speak to point of why West had no alternative but to unite in face of ever-present Soviet-Communist threat. He has studiously refrained from characterizing Soviet system as implacable enemy of all Western world's basic philosophic and moral values. This part of picture has been filled in by Socialists and notably Guy Mollet. Mendes undoubtedly calculated and still does that his political support in Assembly was and is so tenuous and uncertain that he could not (repeat not) afford to alienate votes of Neutralist-Nationalists of the Right.

As Raymond Aron reiterates, danger to France's position as reliable member of Western alliance comes not (repeat not) from Communists themselves but rather from largely anti-American Neutralists who are most effectively supporting Communist international long-term objectives.

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Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : EUR - Mr. Livingston T. Merchant

DATE: January 4, 1955.

FROM : GER - Cecil E. Lyon

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

JAN 5 1955

SUBJECT: German Unification.

MR. MERCHANT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

We feel that if there is any coming event which is casting its shadow in advance, it is the subject of four-Power discussions with the Soviets sometime after completion of ratifications. We should guess that as the day approaches, the main issue, as it has been in the past, is apt to be that of German unification. This will necessitate a review of the subject, preparation of position papers, and probably the meeting of a Working Party well in advance.

It strikes us that the whole situation is a good deal more involved, or at least problematical, than it was in 1953 at the time of the preparation for the Berlin conference. At that time the Secretary gave the signal in July for intensive work on the preparation of position papers. This was more or less accomplished in the months of August and September, on the basis of work done in May and June in preparation for the Bermuda conference which did not come off. October was used up in the exchange of notes with the Soviets, and the better part of November and December was devoted to Working Party consultations on establishing tripartite positions. The whole process thus took about six months.

This raises several questions on which we should appreciate your advice, of which the main ones are as follows:

(1) When would it be useful, or permissible, to discuss the subject informally and at the working level with the British, French, and Germans? This has the drawback of getting them thinking about the matter, but is at some stage almost indispensable to us in order to learn what their inclinations are.

(2) What would be a reasonable time to begin work on position papers? This was done under Mr. MacArthur's supervision last time.

(3) It would be most useful to receive some indication of the Secretary's thinking on the subject, as guidance for the main lines of our position and general tactics.

It seems to us that there are four or five features in the problem which need to be especially borne in mind: (1) the anticipated pressure for four-Power talks with the Soviets; (2) the place

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of the German unification issue in any such talks; (3) past policy of the United States regarding unification; (4) policy of the British and French; (5) recommended US position in any forthcoming talks. A brief paper on these points is attached hereto as Appendix A.

Attachment:

Appendix A.

cc: EE - Mr. Thurston
WE - Mr. Tyler
BNA - Mr. Beale
S/P - Mr. Bowie

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APPENDIX A

GERMAN UNIFICATION

(1) Anticipated pressure for four-Power talks with the Soviets.

The atmosphere in Paris at the recent NATO meeting may perhaps have given the best sense of how much pressure exists for a meeting with the Soviets. In any event Mendes-France repeated his suggestion in the Assembly debate on December 21 that there should be a meeting with the Soviets in May, preceded by preparatory talks through diplomatic channels. Adenauer is reported as having expressed the view to his Foreign Office that there would probably be big-Power talks sometime next year.

The important point is the correlation between developments in Paris and Bonn: if the French demand talks with the Soviets, the German reaction will not be to oppose it, but to demand it all the more. In view of their divided country, the Germans feel that the subject strikes home with them more than with anyone else. The entire Opposition feels that negotiations with the Soviets should have priority over Western European integration or rearmament. To the extent that reports from other capitals suggest that talks with the Soviets may become a reality, no German politician can afford not to be on the bandwagon.

(2) Place of German unification issue in any four-Power talks with Soviets.

Although four-Power talks may be imagined in which limitations on armaments, or the Soviet suggestion of an all-Europe security system, or some other subject, might be the main topic, in practice the German question is apt to crowd most other issues into a secondary place. It would be difficult to prevent the Germans from making reunification the main issue if an attempt to by-pass it were tried. In this sense a recent pronouncement of ex-Minister of Justice Dehler (the head of the Free Democratic Party), however egocentric in tone, has a basis of fact and would be subscribed to by Germans of all shades of opinion. Dehler said: "Any discussion on co-existence which does not consider German reunification fails to deal with the central problem of co-existence."

(3) Past policy of the U.S. regarding unification.

The United States has consistently and in the most formal way maintained that a peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, and the achievement

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through peaceful means of a fully free and united Germany, remains an "essential aim" or "fundamental goal" of its policy. This was most recently stated in the London Declaration of October 3, and in the White House communique at the time of Adenauer's visit on October 28, which reads:

"We particularly addressed ourselves to the question of German reunification. The demand for a reunited Germany in freedom is viewed by us as the legitimate demand of the German people. We are agreed that this aim shall be achieved only by peaceful means. We are convinced of the necessity of continued efforts towards this goal and are agreed that such efforts will be made by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany together with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France."

(4) Policy of the British and French.

On the surface and as the result of careful coordination in advance, there has never been any noticeable difference between the governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France with regard to German reunification. No other policy would in fact have permitted us to obtain the confidence and cooperation of the German Government.

In unofficial conversations with French officials, in the popular press, and in statements by French legislators, the view is hardly disguised that to a great many Frenchmen the division of Germany does not appear to be a bad thing. It corresponds to a policy as old as Richelieu. The least that can be said is that there are obscurities in French policy towards Germany which have never yet been cleared up. In the recent Assembly debates on ratification of the Paris accords, for example, when the Gaullist deputy Soustelle pressed hard for German unification and rejection of German rearmament, it was evident that his interest in reunification is not exactly the same as the Germans, the British, or the United States, but is an interest in conditions of reunification compatible with the traditional Franco-Soviet alliance. Similarly when during the course of the debate Mendes-France stated that he would support no German "irredentism" aimed at regaining the 1937 frontiers, it was clear that his position on the Oder-Neisse line does not at any rate correspond to the Germans'.

The German unification policy of three Western Allies thus represents something like a promissory note on which, thanks to the Russians, we have never yet had to make payment. If the time comes

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when reunification should appear a real possibility, or if the Germans should become convinced that the Allies were flagging or insincere in their efforts to obtain reunification, serious differences might be revealed in the Western position.

(5) Recommended US position for any forthcoming talks with the Soviets.

GER's main preoccupation about any talks with the Soviets is that the potential differences on the subject of reunification among the three Allies, or between the Allies and the Germans, or between the French and the Germans, should be ironed out in advance, by preparatory talks among the four of us, rather than be revealed at the table with the Soviets.

The "German problem" is a short expression for a complex of questions, of which the main ones at this date are: determination of the Eastern frontiers, withdrawal of occupation troops, possible limitations on German rearmament, possible limitations on Germany's freedom of alliance, reunification through the establishment of an all-German government on the basis of free elections, and the conclusion of a peace treaty with that government. The subjects of economic measures, claims, and reparations, which figured so large in the earlier CFM discussions, have by now been more or less taken care of.

There are two ways of negotiating this complex of problems with the Russians: one, to proceed "one step at a time", as though each part were independent of the others; two, recognizing the interdependency of all these problems, to put up our total position for a German settlement against the Soviet total position, with the hope of finding some leeway for negotiation among the parts or of at least removing any uncertainty as to what the respective terms for a settlement might be. Hitherto only the first approach has been tried. In the popular mind the word "reunification" was seized upon as the desired result, and in Allied and German policy the position was adopted that if the Russians would agree first to free elections and establishment of an all-German Government, other questions might be taken up later in due order. This position, which may appear better calculated to ensure disagreement than agreement, served its purpose in delaying any productive discussions with the Russians until after the EDC issue was settled. It amounts to a demand on the Russians to give up the effective hold on their Zone before any agreement is reached on the points affecting their security (Germany's military alliances, frontiers, rearmament, and the presence of US troops in the Western Zones), for the satisfactory solution of which they are holding their Zone as a gage. There would thus appear to be some reason, if four-Power discussions are to be resumed, for an Allied reexamination of the old "first things first" position. Does it promise anything beyond a propaganda battle? Will a propaganda

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battle on familiar lines any longer seem very convincing in Germany? Would the pseudo-unification and perhaps pseudo-government, which might very well result from an agreement that left occupation troops where they are, accomplish much other than restoration of the old quadripartite Control Council in another form, something like the Austrian situation?

It is GER's belief that the time to make a sincere attempt at reunification cannot be much longer postponed. The Germans are determined to obtain it, or at least to leave no stone unturned in the attempt. The present unnatural division of Germany into two armed camps of Soviet and Western military power will be the basic source of tension in Europe so long as it continues. There is good reason to believe that the Germans will eventually try to obtain reunification behind our backs if we do not assist them in accord with oft-repeated Allied promises. The practical question is to find a basis for discussion which provides the greatest flexibility for negotiation and leaves room for no doubt as to the sincerity of the effort. We believe that this can perhaps be most effectively accomplished by the Allies' putting all their cards on the table, something similar to the Secretary's plan in the case of the Japanese peace treaty. If there is any possibility of agreement with the Soviets, this seems to us to be the soundest foundation. If, as is more likely, the time has not yet arrived when the Soviets can afford to reach agreement on a German settlement, it will in any event convincingly demonstrate who is the party still retaining cards up their sleeve.

Whatever substantive positions and negotiating tactics are adopted, there is required a large measure of prior understanding with the Germans. This was done fairly satisfactorily before the Berlin conference, when the German Foreign Office's legal adviser, Dr. Grawe, participated in the Paris Working Group. If discussions this time will involve positions extending beyond the single issue of free elections, much more detailed coordination with Bonn will be required.

It is recommended that as soon as any preliminary work is undertaken with a view toward a four-Power conference, there should be an exchange of views with the German Foreign Office as well as the British and French, and German representatives should be included in any Working Party that may be set up.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 28, 1955

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS:

German Ambassador, Dr. Krekeler
German Minister, Mr. von Kessel
U - Mr. Hoover

COPIES TO:

EUR - Mr. Merchant

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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The following topics were discussed at lunch today:

1. Ambassador Krekeler speculated on the Fernosa situation but made no substantive observations that were out of line with our own position. He seemed to feel that the Far Eastern situation would gradually stabilize itself and that the primary concern of the U.S. would again shift back to the European theater. I made no comments.

2. With regard to the WEU situation, the Ambassador made the following observations:

(a) He was returning to Germany, February 4, to gain a first-hand impression of German affairs. He has been asked to make several radio and television talks on American public opinion.

(b) It was his feeling that Mendes-France would be defeated in the near future but that this would not happen until after ratification of the WEU agreements. He reasoned that the French Parliament would keep him in power until after ratification so that any public reaction could be blamed on him. The Ambassador did not feel that if Mendes-France was defeated prior to ratification in France, it could have any substantial effect on the chances of ratification in Germany, one way or the other.

(c) He felt that it was necessary, from the German point of view, to engage in talks with the Soviets after ratification and implementation had taken place. He further stated that it would not be possible to have a conscript army

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in Germany until after the German people became convinced that the Soviet bloc would not alter their present position on reunification. It would be necessary to be satisfied with a volunteer army during the first stages of rearming.

(d) He seemed convinced that the Soviets would come up with still newer proposals for reunification of Germany within the next few weeks. He felt it was most important that the United States should not turn down any new proposals offhand, but that we should at least go through the motions of studying them. The effect on the German people would be bad if we were to act hastily in this regard.

(e) He seemed confident of German ratification of the WEU agreements.

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If you have to put foot soldiers in, then we can't hold anything in the world. I have no intention of putting American foot soldiers on Quemoy. A division of soldiers would not make any difference. If there should be a war, in the first three or four months I know perfectly well that we are not going to be deploying troops anywhere.⁵⁰

When it came to the actual test of strategic policy, Eisenhower preferred not to make clear plans for implementation. The atomic-conventional framework did not present options that were applicable the Formosa situation, or in Eisenhower's speculation above, to the first three or four months of general war. But in contrast to Radford and others, Eisenhower was unwilling in 1955 to assign nuclear weapons unlimited priority in contingency planning.

What did emerge from this murky speculation was a demand for a variety of options along the conventional-nuclear spectrum. A variety of options fit the idea of reserving initiative and selecting at least the terms of engagement. As Eisenhower wrote General Alfred Gruenther, a personal friend and currently SACEUR: "We must remain ready, until some better solution can be found, to move promptly against any communist force that is manifestly preparing to attack Formosa."⁵¹

~~Eisenhower's~~ reaction to atomic vs. conventional contingency planning showed that the atomic-conventional framework, and with it a significant portion of the administration's strategy, was in disarray. First the administration attempted to readjust the contingency problem, to lessen the chance of conflict or of a test of US strategy.

Searching for a "better solution", diplomatic efforts worked to secure Nationalist pledges to withdraw, and to enlist allied support for US intervention--failing on both counts. Another solution was to build up Nationalist forces and allow the US to back away from the prospect of engaging the PRC while defending the Nationalists. This option was pursued,

with Dulles, Nationalist Foreign Minister Yeh, Ambassador Koo, US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Robertson, FRUS.

49. See for example, Untitled paper in AWFIS, Box 9, File: Formosa Visit to CINCPAC.

50. Telephone Call Eisenhower to Radford, 1 February 1955, ACW Diary, Box 9, Telephone Calls Jan.-July 1955 (3), DDEL.

51. Eisenhower to Gruenther 1 February 1955 *op. cit.*

52. Efforts to persuade Chiang to withdraw the offshore islands garrisons were unsuccessful. See Memorandum from Wilson to JCS, 22 March 1955, FRUS.

53. "Notes Taken During Meeting" 11 March 1955, AWFIS, Box 9, DDEL.

54. Dulles trip 3-5 March

55. Undersecretary of State Hoover to Dulles FRUS 313.

56. "Notes Taken During Meeting" 11 March 1955 *op. cit.*

57. This was discussed in the January NSC meetings, and in the instruction to Goodpaster before his meeting with Adm. Stump.

58. Oral History Interview with Gen. A.J. Goodpaster 1982, DDEL, p. 24.

59. "Notes Taken During Meeting" 11 March 1955 *op. cit.*

60. Memorandum of Conference with the President, J.F. Dulles, etc., FRUS.

61. Memorandum, Eisenhower to J.F. Dulles, 7 March 1955, AWF Dulles/Herter series, Box 4, DDEL.

62. President's News Conference 16 March 1955 *Papers 1955*.

63. Eisenhower to J.F. Dulles 7 March 1955 *op. cit.*

64. Radford Briefing to NSC 31 March 1955 *op. cit.*

65. Untitled paper in AWFIS, Box 9, File: Formosa Visit to CINCPAC. The unusual spelling of Quemoy as "Kinmen" suggests this paper to be of US Nav JCS staff origin.

66. Diary Entry by James C. Hagerty, 28 March 1955, FRUS.

67. See Memorandum of a Conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles, 11 April 1955; and News Conference by Dulles, 25 April 1955, PRC, FRUS. At the Bandung Conference Chou En-lai announced that the US and the PRC should consider negotiations on lessening tensions in the Strait area. Chou's statement was regarded as a signal that the PRC had "backed down."

he had dinner, that he wanted a warm and friendly message containing strong reassurances sent to the Generalissimo. He did not want to leave the Generalissimo in any doubt as to the firmness of American support as most recently demonstrated by the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the area, and the stationing of a full Air Force wing of jet planes on Formosa.

The President had felt that we should not take a public position which departed from the language of the Joint Resolution. He did not want to seem to freeze a formal public position covering part of the "related area" which might seem in the circumstances to disregard the fluid nature of the situation and ignore the remainder of the "related area".

Ambassador Koo said that he felt that we should seek a formula acceptable to the President and to Congress, compatible with the language of the Joint Resolution, and capable of meeting President Chiang's need for a positive public declaration which would make more understandable to his military commanders and soldiers the unpleasant withdrawal decision. Ambassador Koo then proposed the following formula which he felt all elements could accept:

In the penultimate sentence of the Chinese Embassy draft of January 29⁴ he would insert the phrase "including Quemoy and Matsu" after "territories". Thus the penultimate sentence would read, "In furtherance of the close cooperation between our two countries in the securing and defending of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (Pescadores), the Government of the United States has indicated to the Chinese Government its decision also to join in the defense of such related positions and territories, including Quemoy and Matsu, the safeguarding of which the Government of the United States deems essential in assuring the defense of Taiwan and Penghu."

Ambassador Koo pointed out that this language still left the decision to the U.S. It confirmed that Quemoy and Matsu were included in "such related positions and territories".

Mr. Robertson mentioned that the Treaty hearings would begin on Wednesday, February 2, instead of Monday, February 7. He said the hearings had been moved forward at the request of the President in order to speed the ratification of the Treaty. Mr. Robertson cited this as another evidence of the earnestness and singleness of U.S. purpose. He mentioned that any official public statements regarding the Treaty area or the "related area" might have an effect on the Treaty hearings.

Dr. Yeh said that it might be worth while to explore the possibility of effecting an exchange of notes in regard to the defense of

Quemoy and Matsu. He was not proposing it but simply putting forward the idea informally for examination.

Mr. Robertson said that the formal inclusion of Quemoy and Matsu in the defense area would amount to an extension of the Treaty area. He said there was no question in his mind but that such an extension of the Treaty area would require Senate ratification. Even if such an understanding were merely embodied in notes, the documents would have to be sent up to the Senate as an amendment of the Treaty.

Dr. Yeh said that his Government would prefer some sort of bilateral understanding concerning the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, to a unilateral U.S. declaration.

Mr. Robertson hoped the Chinese representatives would impress on the Generalissimo that our position on the China issue was very different from that of the British. The positions were widely divergent. The Generalissimo must understand that our concurrence in the UN effort to bring about a cessation of hostilities was strictly pinpointed at the offshore islands and did not signify that we had succumbed in any way to British influence.

Mr. Robertson said that the Chinese did not have a better friend than the Secretary of State. Secretary Dulles grasped the magnitude and the nature of the Communist threat with a clear and far ranging vision. No one understood the needs of the present situation better than he. He had a profound understanding of the imperative need for the continued existence of Free China. He stood with the Chinese. The leaders of the Chinese Government need to understand the difficult U.S. political and diplomatic problems, curb their suspicions and negotiate on a basis of full confidence.

71. Letter From the President to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Gruenther)¹

[Washington,] February 1, 1955.

DEAR AL: The past two weeks in Washington have been a period of tension—reminiscent of the numerous "flaps" that used to plague us in the old War Department.

The principal cause has been the Administration's effort to clarify our people's understanding of the consequences of an attack by

⁴ Transmitted in Document 62.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret.

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the ChiComs on Formosa and its neighboring islands, and to obtain their expressed support of the government's plans to defend those islands effectively. An added difficulty, as is always the case, has been the extreme care with which the public relations angle of this effort had to be handled.

In the present case, we have a Europe that, speaking generally, is fearful of what some Europeans consider American recklessness, impulsiveness and immaturity in the foreign field. In Red China we have a dictatorial regime which seeks every opportunity to develop among its own people and all other Asiatics a deeper and deeper hatred of the West, particularly of the United States. In Formosa we have the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists who are suspicious of any move in the Far East that does not involve an "immediate direct and destructive attack on Red China."

At home we have the truculent and the timid, the jingoists and the pacifists. Underlying the whole is the most important fact of today's life—the irreconcilable conflict between the theories of the Communist dictatorship and the basic principles of free world existence.

Any military man can easily make clear distinction between the defense of Formosa and the defense of the so-called offshore islands. Not only are two different military problems presented, but in the one case we are talking about territories the control of which has passed from nation to nation through the years—and in the other case, about territories that have always been a part of the Chinese mainland both politically and, in effect, geographically. So the political differences are almost as plain as the military differences when we talk about the defense of these two territories.

If there were no other factors than the military to consider, you and I, for example, would study the problem and would very quickly reach a decision that we would permit no advance by the Communists beyond the offshore islands, but that in any struggle involving only the territory of those islands, we would see no reason for American intervention.

Such a solution would infuriate the Chinese Communists because of their announced objective to take Formosa; it would infuriate the Chinese Nationalists because the retention of the offshore islands sustains their hope that one day they will go back to their homeland. It would more or less please our European friends because it implies to them a moderate attitude on our part, and the responsible officials in those countries can see the danger to all of us if Formosa should fall to the Communists. (Not that Red China, in her present state, would be a direct threat to the United States, but with international Communism having thus penetrated the island barrier in the Western Pacific and in a position to threaten the Philippines

and Indonesia immediately and directly, all of us would soon be in far worse trouble than we are now.)

At home the hypothetical solution I mention would be accepted by most merely because it is simple to describe, although there is a certain pacifist element that wants us completely out of the Western Pacific. Some people seem to think that we can surrender to the Communists the Japanese productive capacity and all the richness of the South Pacific territories and still be perfectly safe in this country. There are people who did not believe Hitler's threats any more than they now believe those of Chou and the Kremlin.

Now, if the solution we adopt should state flatly that we would defend the principal islands of the offshore group (Quemoy and the Matsus), we would now please the Chinese Nationalists, but we would frighten Europe and of course even further infuriate the Chinese Communists. Not that I think this last particularly important, because they are going to be infuriated anyway.

By announcing this as a policy we would be compelled to maintain in the area, at great cost, forces that could assure the defense of islands that are almost within wading distance of the mainland. This defensive problem could be extremely difficult over the long term, and I think that the world in general, including some of our friends, would believe us unreasonable and practically goading the Chinese Communists into a fight. We could get badly tied down by any such inflexible public attitude.

On the other hand, as we consider the problem of defending Formosa, we understand how important to us is the morale of the Chinese forces on that island. Their willingness to fight and to keep themselves in a high state of readiness for fighting is one of the keys to the situation. Consequently, even though we clearly see that our major concern, *so far as territory itself is involved, does not extend beyond Formosa and the neighboring Pescadores*, yet the economical and efficient defense of these islands involves a concern for the areas from which it could most easily be attacked.

You probably read the Resolution that was passed by the Congress, at my request. The wording, as to areas outside Formosa and the Pescadores, is vague. In view of what I have just said, you can understand why this is so.

The Resolution, then, is our publicly stated position; the problem now is how to make it work. The morale of the Chinese Nationalists still remains important to us, so they must have certain assurances with respect to the offshore islands. But these must be less binding on us than the terms of the Chino-American Treaty, now before our Senate for ratification. We must remain ready, until some better solution can be found, to move promptly against any Communist force that is manifestly preparing to attack Formosa. And we

must make a distinction—(this is a difficult one)—between an attack that has *only* as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is *primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Formosa*.

I could go on and discuss a thousand different points, with shadings of each, that we have discussed and hashed over during the past two weeks. Basic conclusions were scarcely involved; there have never been any great differences within the Administration on fundamentals. Most of the talks centered around the question of "what can we say and how can we say it" so as to retain the greatest possible confidence of our friends and at the same time put our enemies on notice that we are not going to stand idly by to see our vital interests jeopardized.

Of course, only time will tell how successful we have been. Every day will bring its problems and many of these will cause much more talking and haggling—even some *thinking*! More and more I find myself, in this type of situation—and perhaps it is because of my advancing years—tending to strip each problem down to its simplest possible form. Having gotten the issue well defined in my mind, I try in the next step to determine what answer would best serve the *long term* advantage and welfare of the United States and the free world. I then consider the *immediate problem* and what solution can we get that will best conform to the long term interests of the country and at the same time *can command a sufficient approval in this country so as to secure the necessary Congressional action*.

When I get a problem solved on this rough basis, I merely stick to the *essential* answer and let associates have a field day on words and terminology. (I suppose that many of those around me would protest that even in this field I am sometimes something of an autocrat and insist upon the employment of my own phraseology when I consider the issue important.) However, I really do try to stay out of this particular job as much as my own characteristics, particularly my ego, will permit.

Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war.

I do not believe that Russia wants war at this time—in fact, I do not believe that if we became engaged in rather a bitter fight along the coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her own forces. She would, of course, pour supplies into China in the effort to exhaust us and certainly would exploit the opportunity to separate us from our major allies. But I am convinced that Russia does not want, at this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the bombing that we *could* conduct against her mainland. At the same time, I assume that Russia's treaty with Red China comprehends a true military alliance, which she would either have to repudiate or take the plunge. As a consequence of this kind of thinking, she

would probably be in a considerable dilemma if we got into a real shooting war with China. It would *not be an easy decision* for the men in the Kremlin, in my opinion.

In any event, we have got to do what we believe to be right—if we can figure out the right—and we must show no lack of firmness in a world where our political enemies exploit every sign of weakness, and are constantly attempting to disrupt the solidarity of the free world's intentions to oppose their aggressive practices.

Oddly enough I started out this letter with the complacent thought that I could point up, in one or two paragraphs, the salient features of my last two weeks' existence. Now I find that after all these words, I have only vaguely pointed out the biggest ones in this particular "can of worms."

When I see you in a couple of weeks, we can talk these things over more fully.

With love to Grace, and, of course, the best to yourself,

As ever,²

¹ Printed from a carbon copy which bears no signature.

Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State¹

Taipei, February 2, 1955—6 p.m.

511. Department's 421,² 422,³ 423.⁴ Upon receipt Department's 421, I decided to do as subsequently instructed in Department's 423 re United States position statement on off-shore islands. While asking yesterday afternoon for urgent appointment with President, I gave Acting Foreign Minister verbatim text of actual statement⁵ so

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-255. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 9:20 a.m. Repeated to USUN eyes only for Lodge, by the Department as Telegram 390 to New York, February 2, 1955.

² Document 69.

³ Telegram 422 to Taipei, February 1, reads as follows:

"Your 499 [Document 68] crossed our 421 which sets forth definitive US position. We are now considering what kind official statement can be made here consistent with position taken in 421 in the event President Chiang responds favorably to issuing statement recommended to him by Yeh. You will be further advised." (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1-3155)

⁴ Telegram 423 to Taipei, February 1, instructed Rankin to deliver formally in writing that portion of telegram 421 to Taipei which was marked as a statement. (*Ibid.*, 293.72/2-155)

⁵ A copy is *ibid.*, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Copy Number 9 of 21 copies, Series B.
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 9, 1955

SUBJECT: Review of NSC 112: Basic Disarmament Policy

Defense: Deputy Secretary Anderson State: Under Secretary Hoover
Major General Loper Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
PARTICIPANTS: CIA: Allen W. Dulles S/P - Mr. Bowie
AEC: Chairman Strauss IO - Mr. Key
Admiral Foster IO - Mr. Wainhouse
Dr. Fine S/AE - Mr. Smith
NSC Planning Board: Mr. Cutler S/P - Mr. Stelle
State: Secretary Dulles UNP - Howard Meyers

COPIES TO:

Defense: 1 Mr. Anderson State: OOR 1 S/AE
2 Major General Loper 9-10 S/S - 2 18-19 UNP (2)
3 Admiral Davis 11 H NSC 20 USUN
4 CIA 12 G 21 OLI
5-7 AEC: (3) 13-14 S/P (2) (21)
8 NSC Planning Board 15-16 IO (2)

Secretary Dulles said that the papers drafted by Defense and State on this subject did not seem susceptible of fruitful discussion in the NSC tomorrow, both being long and complicated. There were certain issues which had not yet received Presidential approval which could be separated out and presented to the NSC-- some agreed to by the members of the Special Committee and some concerning which there was disagreement. What the US did in the disarmament field to a large extent was influenced by political, psychological and other factors. He did not believe we could afford to put this Government in the position of being opposed to disarmament, particularly in the light of President Eisenhower's "Chance for Peace" statement of April 16, 1953 and "Atoms for Peace" address of December 8, 1953. For himself, he believed that limitations and reduction of armaments historically derived from a feeling of trust among nations and confidence that it was not likely that a war would commence, rather than from an agreement with a hostile power where there was mutual distrust. There were certain practical problems which required answers.

First, did we stand by the idea that the US favored disarmament? In his opinion this was necessary in view of the President's expressed approval of such a position.

Second, we had to be extremely careful in making proposals in the armaments limitation field not to walk into a trap, since we were dealing with the Soviet Union, whose Government we did not trust.

Third, would we continue to adhere to the position that the US should not consider limitations in the nuclear field except as linked to reductions of conventional armaments? He did not wish to suggest that the US should take the initiative in making such proposals at this moment, but at least should be prepared to deal with this issue should the question arise. He believed the President felt that, if it were possible to secure effective elimination

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elimination of nuclear weapons, then he would not worry so much about limitations in the conventional armaments field since such an agreement would protect US industrial power against the danger of severe damage through nuclear attack.

Fourth, were we prepared to proceed in a disarmament program on the basis of working out each stage at a time, entering upon the first stage without necessarily having developed and agreed upon the latest stages, and proceeding in developing the latest stages from the experience derived through carrying out each preceding stage.

Mr. Anderson explained that the Defense Department felt that it would not be possible to carry out the initial stage of a disarmament program with confidence unless we knew in advance what would come next. Moreover, if we should separate the nuclear and conventional aspects of disarmament and proceed on the kind of step-by-step development noted by Mr. Dulles, then the Soviets might seek to overcome the present US nuclear superiority by hiding nuclear weapons, and thus heighten the very danger felt by the President of being able to wipe out US industrial superiority through attack with nuclear weapons. Finally, Defense had not yet arrived at the conclusion that this limited approach to disarmament was a feasible or effective way of dealing with the disarmament problem.

Mr. Strauss said that he was afraid of the concept that the initial stage in a disarmament program should involve cessation of the production of nuclear fuels. The US had gone to great trouble and expense to develop the mining and milling of nuclear materials in this country, an operation which was now beginning to pay off most successfully. If we should agree to stop production now, we would probably never be able to start up this US industry again. We might also never be able to recover our present impetus in nuclear weapons production if the US accepted this limited approach suggested by Mr. Bowie and Secretary Dulles, then broke off further implementation of a disarmament program and started up production of nuclear fuels again. For these reasons, he wondered whether the President today would still hold to the view mentioned by Mr. Dulles, which implied willingness to abandon the present US approach of seeking across-the-board disarmament in favor of a limited approach in the nuclear field.

Mr. Bowie remarked that Mr. Strauss' objections regarding the difficulties of starting nuclear fuel production after once having stopped it would apply to any disarmament program, even existing US policy. All disarmament proposals have envisaged that if the other side did not carry out its agreements then rearmament would begin again.

Mr. Strauss agreed with this point but emphasized the difference was that Mr. Bowie's approach included no other limitations and therefore the Soviets might acquiesce in such a limited approach in the desire to hamstring our nuclear production without having to accept any other limitations on Soviet military strength.

Secretary Dulles remarked that the President, in his "Atoms for Peace" proposal, had already put forward the concept of a first limited step with the idea that successful implementation would enable proceeding further. Admittedly, a limited approach in the disarmament field involved more complicated questions than the

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than the "Atoms for Peace" approach, but this should be dealt with concretely and not as an abstract issue, in order to see whether the specific limited approach which might be developed would be in US interests.

General Loper stated that the Defense Department of course did believe in implementing any disarmament program on the basis of proceeding by stages from less sensitive to more sensitive items. Therefore, the inspection of nuclear production facilities was presently conceived of as coming in a later stage because of its sensitive nature. Should this present approach be reversed, he believed this would raise dangers for US security.

Secretary Dulles thought that at present the US was not confronted with any practical proposal of a limited nature, except the Indian proposal for a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. The NSC had decided to oppose this Indian proposal after careful consideration on the merits, and not on the ground that this moratorium proposal failed to cover the waterfront but because it was not practical. Therefore, in fact we had another precedent for examining a limited approach to disarmament which did not cover all aspects of this complex problem.

Mr. Anderson remarked that if he had written the present Defense paper on this subject, he would have placed greater emphasis on the need to explore this problem thoroughly to see if there was any possibility of developing a successful proposal in the disarmament field.

Mr. Strauss said that one of the difficulties of both the State and Defense papers was that they were drafted to meet an NSC deadline. Actually, much more time was required to examine these matters, and he suggested that perhaps the Special Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and himself, might be made a permanent body to continue such examination of basic disarmament policy.

Mr. Bowie thought that it would be better to continue this review under the direction of an individual of outstanding qualifications, since the members of the existing Special Committee had such demands on their time that they would not be able to devote an adequate amount of attention to this subject.

Mr. Anderson agreed with Mr. Bowie and said that the problems required further and continuing attention by a high level individual who would have access to the President and the ranking cabinet members concerned with these problems, being able to devote full time to these fundamental problems. He emphasized that the difficulties inherent in such a review did not minimize the necessity for expending great effort in this field.

Mr. Allen Dulles, while agreeing with the remarks of Mr. Bowie and Defense Secretary Anderson, urged that this individual who might be appointed to carry out this review should draw on the existing staffs of the concerned agencies, so that he could have the benefit of advice and aid from officers familiar with these problems. On the basis of experience, no one man would be able

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to cover all these issues and their relation to the political, military, and economic problems of the world which related to the disarmament issue and from which it could not be separated.

Secretary Dulles said that the disarmament problem was one of such gravity that he agreed with Mr. Anderson that the US must be in a position of trying to solve these issues.

Mr. Anderson said that even if a new man were to come in to direct a continuing review of disarmament, it might well be desirable to help him by giving him guidance from the Special Committee or the NSC on many of the great issues inherent in the disarmament problem.

Secretary Dulles thought that, in this connection, it would be possible to draw out from the two papers presented by State and Defense certain issues which could be presented tomorrow to the NSC for advice and determination.

First, the US must continue to examine the disarmament problem and seek a solution, despite any skepticism which might exist concerning the success of our efforts in this field.

Second, it seemed to be agreed that a top-level individual should be brought into the Government to spend full time in carrying out such a review of the disarmament problem, since the issues involved are so complicated that the heads of the agencies concerned with this problem are unable to give adequate continuing attention to them. These agencies should contribute experienced personnel to this man's staff, so that the review of disarmament would keep in touch with the realities of the world situation.

Third, so far as the forthcoming London meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission Subcommittee of Five were concerned, the US positions would be in accord with the basic policy established by NSC 112. This basic policy still linked conventional and nuclear disarmament in terms of reductions in either field, and it seemed to be advisable to raise this issue with the President to see whether we should continue to adhere to this concept at the London meetings in the event questions concerning this linkage should be raised during these meetings. Moreover, adherence to NSC 112 policy raised the question whether it would be possible to take any one limited step in a disarmament program without considering what the other steps should be. The conclusion of the Special Committee appeared to be that this question was one which could not be answered in the abstract, and that it was necessary to examine in specific terms what such a limited step might be, while recognizing the danger involved in going down the disarmament path without knowing where we would come out at the end.

Mr. Cutler explained that he had briefed the President the other day on these issues, explaining the conflict of opinion.

Mr. Anderson remarked that we should be cognizant of the difference between (:) agreeing to take a limited step which would be taken in the context of existing safeguards under a general disarmament program, or/ if such a limited step is taken with.

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with lesser safeguards but as an element complete in itself without reference particularly to a general program. If the second position were adopted, Defense might have a different attitude on this question than had previously been voiced.

Mr. Strauss stressed his feeling that even this second approach might nibble away the strength of our existing position step by step without obtaining a quid pro quo from the Soviets.

Mr. Bowie thought that there was no way to proceed in this area without risk, and that we would have to look at this problem in the sense of balancing off such risks against the undoubted risks to the United States if we continued to adhere to our present positions in the light of the growing nuclear power of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Cutler agreed that he would try to draft a statement of the issues arising out of this review of NSC 112, (basic disarmament policy), for NSC consideration at the February 10 meeting, in such manner that this statement would fairly represent the views of State, Defense and AEC.

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Authorized By: H. D. Brewster

August 4, 1975

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

This Document Must Be Returned To
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On January 15 Ambassador Hughes reported (POLTO 1331) an approach to him by the Alternate Permanent Representative of France to the North Atlantic Council. The latter expressed concern that the United States might have taken decisions on the organization of its forces which are not yet reflected in NATO military advice as to force planning and suggested that the United States make an early statement to the Council with respect to its force plans.

NATO governments, having read in the press the President's letter to you of January 5, 1955, may well believe that the decision to reduce U.S. forces was based on information which they lack but would like to have in order to develop their own force and budget plans. Presumably, they are tempted to seek reductions in the expense and manpower of their own forces.

It would be unfortunate if misapprehensions on the part of the other NATO nations lead to a cumulative substantial reduction in the defense effort of our Allies, and I consider it important that we be prepared to forestall such an undesirable occurrence. The relation of this problem to the London and Paris Agreements, both with respect to ratification and to the U.S. role in the defense of Europe under these agreements, is of prime importance.

It is understood that it was the President's intention that the reduction in forces which he has directed should not impair the U.S. obligations under collective security arrangements. The most definitive of these obligations is the NATO commitment.

I understand that our NATO military obligations fall into two general categories: (1) D-Day forces, the high priority of which is fully emphasized in MC-48, "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Defense

for the

The Honorable
Charles E. Wilson,
Secretary of Defense.

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for the Next Few Years" adopted by the North Atlantic Council last December, and (2) buildup forces, particularly for phases during the period between D-Day and D plus 180.

I assume that, while there may be some changes in numbers and organizations in U. S. D-Day forces in Europe as a result of current studies, no appreciable reduction in their effective strength is anticipated. Any weakening of the military capability to hold territory in Western Europe would have seriously prejudicial political effects, entirely apart from any military considerations. For example, the Soviets recently have been issuing veiled threats directed against the integrity of Austria. A major reduction in NATO-committed forces there might mislead the Soviets as to our policy with respect to Austria.

The 1953 Annual Review figures, upon which SACEUR's basic study (approved in MC 48 and 49) depends, contemplate a U. S. contribution in 1956 of not only 5-3/3 divisions at D-Day, but also of 8-3/3 divisions at D plus 30 and 17-1/3 divisions at D plus 180. The 1954 Annual Review figures call for a U. S. 1956 contribution of 5-2/3 divisions at D-Day, 8-2/3 divisions at D plus 30, 9-2/3 divisions at D plus 90 and 17-1/3 divisions at D plus 180. I recognize that the latter are "provisional" and not "firm" force commitments.

The European countries, I believe, attach major political significance to a U. S. force buildup shortly after D-Day. They do not wish again to be liberated after enemy occupation. Should we now indicate that we will not be able to provide our share of the post D-Day forces required, a major political problem will present itself.

I understand your Department is now studying the implications of the force levels set forth in the President's letter. I, therefore, would appreciate the opportunity of discussing with you, as soon as you have received and considered the views of your advisors, the implications of the present force ceilings upon the post D-Day NATO buildup.

In the meantime, I hope you will be able to give me early concurrence in instructing Ambassador Hughes to respond to the French or in the North Atlantic Council, if he believes the situation requires such action, along the following lines:

"The question has been raised informally as to whether or not the United States has already taken decisions with respect to the constitution of forces which cannot yet be made or reflected in other NATO country force planning.

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"It is of course true that the determination of the forces required to accomplish the concept of MC 48 will depend upon the establishment of refined military recommendations. This however will be an evolutionary process involving considerable study and appreciable time.

"Meanwhile, certain guidelines are already clear and have been accepted by the NATO members in MC 48. The sine qua non of MC 48 is the presence of fully effective D-Day forces in being. The SACEUR report, upon which MC 48 is founded, assumes the presence of forces generally as set forth in the 1953 and 1954 Annual Reviews.

"The United States is prepared to state that, while some adjustments in organization and numbers may be involved therein, present U. S. planning contemplates no substantial strength reduction nor any reduction in the effectiveness and capability of U. S. D-Day forces covered by the 1953 and 1954 Annual Reviews. Such changes as may occur will not prejudicially affect the fighting power of the D-Day forces, nor impair their capability to fulfill their role in the land battle. Indeed, an augmentation in net capabilities is contemplated. The details of organization and equipment of U. S. units is a matter of continuing study and review on the part of U. S. military authorities, and changes therein will be developed in conjunction with the forthcoming SACEUR recommendations.

"It is essential that the other NATO nations make every appropriate effort to develop the D-Day forces which are their agreed national contributions under the 1953 Annual Review to a similar level of effectiveness."

In view of the seriousness and immediacy of this problem, an early reply is requested.

Sincerely yours,

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The Secretary of State

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

March 11, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Before Meeting in President's Office

1. I showed to the President, and he read, the interpretation of NSC 162/2, paragraph 39b, contained in the January 4, 1954, memorandum concerning "Policy Regarding Use of Nuclear Weapons". He stated that he thought this interpretation was suited to the present situation. (Because NSC 162/2 has been superseded, a new superseding memorandum should be prepared for the President's approval).

2. I showed to the President, and he read, Section III of my memorandum of March 11, 1955. His reaction to it was that we should not ask the JCS to take on this task at this time. The decision to be taken would rest with him, on the basis of advice from JCS, Defense, and State. I said that the suggestion which I made in Section III was for the purpose of generally informing the Council Members, who were probably uncertain as to the current situation following yesterday's Council Meeting. As my idea did not at this time appeal to the President, I did not press it further.

Meeting in President's Office

3. At 3:30 p.m. today, a meeting was held in the President's office, attended by J. F. Dulles, A. W. Dulles, Radford, Twining, Carney, Goodpastor, and myself. I mention below the principal points which were discussed:

a. The President said that he had called the meeting because he wanted to discuss how to avoid direct U.S. intervention in the Formosa area, at a time while the Western European Treaties were pending; to limit U.S. intervention as much as possible if it became necessary to intervene; and to discuss what action the U.S. would take if we had to intervene.

b. Radford said there was considerable Chinese mainland build-up near Quemoy and near the Matsus, - artillery positions and tunneling. Twining said it was obvious that the Chinese were not going to attack Formosa at this time, because there had not been a sufficient build-up of mainland airfields. U.S.

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surface forces could not be conveniently used to defend against a Chinese attack on Quemoy, but could be conveniently used to defend against Chinese attack on Matsa. The Chinese with our help are planning to lay a cheap type of mine field in the Quemoy Channel, which would be generally effective. We have four destroyers constantly available on Formosa patrol.

g. Apparently the Chinese are putting in some 360 guns in tunneled emplacements around Quemoy. Because Quemoy is so much tunneled for defense, there is really only one particularly sensitive enemy artillery emplacement, - i.e., the emplacement which can fire directly on the landing beaches on Quemoy which provide Quemoy's logistic support. The Chinese do not have much offensive heavy bombing power. They do have two batteries of 155's. If these batteries were located on the high land in Quemoy, and fired at the Chinese gun emplacement which threatens the Chinese landing beaches, it ought to be possible to wreck havoc with such enemy emplacement. Radford thought we should encourage the Chinese to take action against this enemy emplacement. The President thought 155's were very accurate guns; and that attacking the enemy by artillery had the advantage of doing only what the enemy was doing itself. Therefore, he felt the Chinese should develop a fine counter-battery fire on this dangerous emplacement of the Chinese. The Military thought the Chinese had sufficient ammunition for 45-60 days, and that we could give them more if needed.

h. Garney said the principal problems facing the U.S. if we had to intervene during the next 6-8 weeks would be:

1. Communications, because of language difficulties and codes.
2. The defense of the Formosan airfields against Chinese retaliation, if it were necessary to attack Chinese mainland bases.

Garney felt that all other questions, such as coordination of Naval Operations, etc., were within our capabilities (if we attack these questions vigorously and imaginatively). However, to defend Formosa from air attack, it will be necessary for the U.S. to improve fire control and warning equipment on Formosa. The Formosa airfields require local anti-aircraft defense and more skilled operating personnel. The equipment might be obtained from our stocks in Japan, but it will probably be necessary to import operating personnel from the U.S. Garney thought that to defend Formosa adequately from air attack, and to improve intelligence,

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training, and command direction, would require augmenting U.S. personnel on Formosa from something over 1,000, as at present, to around 11,000.

g. Secretary Dulles cautioned that atomic weapons, if possible, should not be used during the ensuing 40-60 days, and the U.S. also should do its best to avoid intervention of any kind on Quemoy and Matsu. The President agreed that we could not use atomic weapons during this period without a bad impact on the European Treaties prospects.

f. Radford thought the U.S. ought to be able to set the stage so as to defer an effective Chinese attack during the next two months. Garney thought an attack on the Matsu would be easier to handle. He felt the Chinese attack would build up slowly, and would not come as a sudden overwhelming action; that the Chinese could hold off a slow build-up and slow attack. The President said if we are going to fight with conventional weapons, Napalm was the best thing to use against landing troops.

g. The President summed up by saying that the U.S. should do every practical thing that could be done to help the Chinese to defend themselves; that if it was necessary later for the U.S. to intervene, it should do so with conventional weapons; that the U.S. should improve the air defense of the Formosa air fields, but should avoid greatly augmenting U.S. troops on Formosa; that we should give the best possible advice and training to the Chinese about how to take care of themselves; that he recognized that if we had to intervene with conventional weapons, such intervention might not be decisive; that the time might come when the U.S. might have to intervene with atomic weapons, but that should come only at the end, and we would have to advise our allies first. He said that, if we possibly could, we should avoid involvement during the next sensitive weeks, because any U.S. direct involvement might critically damage us in Europe. Radford replied that Stump understood the point of view expressed by the President.

h. Communication between Washington and the tactical forces off Formosa is relatively rapid. The order on the Tachens was received in Taipei one hour and 53 minutes after dispatch, and one hour later it was in the hands of tactical units.

i. The President complained about conflicting intelligence information coming to him. He said he wanted steps taken to centralize and centrally evaluate all intelligence. It was agreed that the WIC should be "beefed up" and put on a 24 hour basis. Secretary Dulles said there are three aspects to intelligence:

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3/11/58

rapid communication of intelligence from the field
 coordination of intelligence in Washington

2. obtaining accurate intelligence as to Chinese loyalty on Formosa.

The President said that - under emergent circumstances like the present - he wanted (1) intelligence transmitted from the field to Washington very fast; (2) a prompt evaluation of such intelligence at a central point where all interested agencies were represented, so as to obtain a commonly agreed assessment as quickly as possible; (3) in the case of something "hot", a warning to himself and other key persons, pending such central evaluation.

A. W. Dulles felt that Chiang Ching Kuo was a key figure, and that the Generalissimo was losing stature. Radford said on his last visit he had been told by a leading Chinese General that Chinese army morale was very bad.

K. It was pointed out that there is a civilian population of 20,000 on Quemoy. Radford felt they would not necessarily be killed in the fighting, but could hide in caves and holes.

1. Secretary Dulles inquired what would be the effect in Japan of U.S. intervention. He felt the Communists might try to immobilize our air power in Japan by civil disturbance. The Military felt that this danger could be coped with.

M. The President concluded by saying that a number of questions should be accurately posed to Admiral Stump:

- (1) Is our assumption correct that present the greatest danger to Quemoy was Chinese artillery fire on the landing beaches? that the Chinese by counter artillery fire could destroy this threat? How would the Chinese react to this type of operation?
- (2) How much can the U.S. help out the Chinese without becoming directly involved?

The President then said to tell Stump that we are confronted with an extremely delicate situation, because we could not afford to be isolated from our allies in the world, and that our aim should be to delay Chinese attack in strength on Quemoy and Matsua, without thereby provoking Chinese attack. It was agreed that, if possible, a competent staff officer would be sent over to examine this whole matter with Admiral Stump in Hawaii tomorrow.

ROBERT GUTLER
 Special Assistant
 to the President

AEC
8-15

Nuclear weapons

2406

1947/2406
7/14/55

This document consists of 3 pages
Copy No. 4 of Series A

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 14, 1955



Dear Mr. President:

In my letter of February 5, 1954, I presented for your consideration thoughts concerning an attempt to negotiate a weapons test moratorium. May I take this opportunity of expanding on those thoughts, particularly in the light of the events of the past year.

The most important points to be considered in this connection are:

- (1) The United States is far ahead of the U.S.S.R. in the field of thermonuclear weapons.
- (2) Weapons testing is essential for rapid development.

As you know, the United States has exploded a total of fifty-six nuclear weapons. Of these, seven have been thermonuclear weapons with yields as high as fifteen megatons.

This testing has given us a weapons technology that is highly advanced. So much so, that we could accept a delay of a year or more in testing weapons of yields greater than a hundred kilotons without our progress being greatly hampered.

In contrast with this experience, our intelligence reports that the Soviets have exploded fourteen nuclear weapons. We know that at best only one of these was a thermonuclear device of approximately seven hundred and fifty kilotons yield exploded in August 1953.

Analyses of the 1954 Soviet tests indicate that, contrary to expectations, they did not include a thermonuclear device. On the other hand, our own 1954 tests did include thermonuclear devices and have enabled us to take tremendous steps forward in this field.

My second point is that testing is essential for the rapid development of nuclear weapons. Our scientists agree that, although some weapons development may continue without testing,

This document contains information which, if disclosed, could be injurious to the national defense. Its transmission or the disclosure of its contents is prohibited by law.

By Authority of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Per: Thos. C. Murray Date 3/14/55
Document No. C-46-1A



the absence of such tests would slow progress to an appreciable degree.

It is my deep conviction that a moratorium on the testing of large thermonuclear weapons would lengthen the time during which the United States would maintain its advantage over the U.S.S.R. Our experience is so much more extensive than that of the Soviets that we could use tests of small weapons and components to much greater advantage than they.

Then again, the United States does not plan to test large thermonuclear weapons for over a year. From what we have been able to detect of the Soviet pattern we should expect their next series to take place this Fall. Thus, if a proposal to defer the tests of large thermonuclear weapons is made soon, the Soviets would be the first to be affected. If the Soviets agree to the moratorium and then violate it within a year, our position would be unchanged. On the other hand, if the Soviets do not violate their agreement, our next tests of large weapons could be deferred as the time for them arrived. In any event, a Soviet refusal to consider this proposal would strengthen our position from a psychological viewpoint.

It has been suggested that an offer by the United States to limit tests to weapons with yields below a hundred kilotons would simply bring forth an attempt by the Soviets to whittle the upper limit to zero. This is described as placing the United States on a "toboggan slide". It seems to me that appropriate arrangements could be made which would prevent our being placed at a disadvantage in this way.

Another reason for such a moratorium follows from the fact that due to advances based on tests many nations, large and small, will eventually have thermonuclear weapons, because costs for such weapons are rapidly decreasing. The consequent threat to world peace is obvious. A moratorium on tests of thermonuclear weapons would tend to freeze technology and limit possession to nations now having them.

It is envisaged that a moratorium of the type proposed would include provisions for monitoring, preferably by the United Nations.

I continue to be a firm advocate of expanding our capabilities in the nuclear weapons field. Under this moratorium proposal preparations for tests next Spring would be continued with the same vigor as at present. Likewise we would continue with our intensive program of weapons development.

In conclusion, the information available to me supports the view that, with appropriate safeguards, a moratorium on the testing of large thermonuclear weapons would act to maintain and advance our weapons superiority over the Soviets, and thus would be in the interests of the United States. Moreover, it would be a forward step looking to eventual limitation of armaments.

Knowing of your strong interest and leadership in all that relates to world peace, I have taken this occasion to make my views known to you. I have already acquainted Chairman Strauss and Commissioner Libby with my intention to do so. It is my earnest and prayerful hope that these thoughts will be of assistance to you in your continual search for some solution to the ever mounting threat of atomic destruction.

Respectfully yours,

Thomas E. Murray
Thomas E. Murray
Commissioner



The President
The White House

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NSC 5515

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March 21, 1955

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on

STUDY OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE SOVIET ACTIONS

References: A. NSC Action No. 1260-c

B. NSC 5438

The enclosed Study of Possible Hostile Soviet Actions is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on March 31, 1955.

This Study was prepared, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1260-c, by the NSC Planning Board with the assistance of a Special Committee consisting of Mr. Jacob D. Beam, Department of State (Chairman), Colonel Weldon H. Smith, USAF, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency (Dr. Ray S. Cline, Alternate), and Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Because of the sensitivity of the information therein, this Study is being given a limited distribution; it is requested that special security precautions be observed in its handling and that access to it be limited on a strict need-to-know basis.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security.

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STUDY OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE SOVIET ACTIONS

SCOPE OF THIS STUDY

1. This study, based on a report by a special subcommittee of the NSC Planning Board, describes what possible Soviet action or series or group of actions (should leave no doubt in the President's mind as to the need for taking immediate military action to save the United States from the consequences of enemy attack, or to postpone, lessen or prevent imminent enemy attack.)

2. For purposes of this study, the term "military action by the U.S." includes action ranging from lesser measures (such as mobilization, redispotion of U.S. forces, a possible warning to the USSR accompanied by a limited demonstration of force, etc.) all the way to actual hostilities. The study is limited to consideration of the Soviet actions which might be taken; it does not identify the sources or methods by which intelligence or information of such actions might be derived; or identify the precise nature of the military actions (war plans) which might be taken. While refraining from dealing with the nature of U.S. counter-action, the study nevertheless does not imply that the U.S. response should necessarily be uniform in nature. The U.S. response would have to be adapted to the danger to the U.S. inherent in each instance, and might include actions other than military measures.

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3. Possible Soviet actions have been examined in terms of their bearing on the imminence and probability of an attack on the U.S. by the USSR. The possibility can not be excluded that certain actions, obviously acts of war, might be undertaken by the USSR without warning, such as a declaration of war on the U.S., a Soviet military attack on the continental U.S., or the detonation of a nuclear weapon in the U.S. However, such acts are outside the scope of this study, the purpose of which is to identify and anticipate Soviet actions preliminary to an attack.

4. Possible Soviet actions preliminary to an attack upon the continental U.S. are listed in the next section of this study under three categories according to the degree of certainty or imminence of such an attack.

5. There is no hard and fast dividing line between the categories of possible Soviet actions. It is probable that Soviet actions enumerated in category I would not occur in isolation from those listed in categories II or III. The impression of simplicity and precision given by the lists which follow should not be allowed to disguise the fact that a difficult and complex value judgment would be involved in determining the exact significance of certain of these actions within the context of the general situation existing at the time of their occurrence.

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6. This study can be considered valid only in terms of the current world situation and of Soviet capabilities as set forth in current National Intelligence Estimates. As the world situation and Soviet capabilities develop in the future, the significance of certain of the Soviet actions considered herein will doubtless change. Therefore, this study cannot be viewed either as a long-range or all-inclusive guide.

7. It is assumed that firm and conclusive evidence that the USSR had decided to undertake any of the actions listed below would be equivalent to the occurrence of the act itself. The order of listing in any category is not necessarily an indication of priority. Moreover, it should be noted that nothing in this study affects the responsibility of the Watch Committee of the IAC to report and evaluate all indications of hostile action.

POSSIBLE HOSTILE SOVIET ACTIONS

8. Although as previously mentioned the possibility of total surprise cannot be excluded, it is considered that Soviet actions immediately threatening the safety of the continental U.S. would probably occur against a background of increased international tension and a drastic change toward an offensive posture by Soviet military forces. Possible manifestations of such a change in posture are listed in the Annex.

Category I

9. Any of the following specific Soviet actions should be judged in and of itself as [clear evidence that Soviet attack upon the continental U.S. is certain or imminent]

a. Penetration of the continental air control and warning system by Soviet aircraft in a flight pattern indicating attack upon the continental U.S.

b. Introduction into or possession within the U.S. of a complete nuclear weapon, assembled or unassembled, or of the nuclear components of a nuclear weapon, [of Soviet origin or under Soviet direction.]

c. Soviet attacks against U.S. territories (Alaska and Hawaii), U.S. possessions, the Pacific Trust Territory, the Panama Canal Zone, U.S. armed forces or bases overseas.*

d. Soviet attack against the countries or territories covered by the NATO mutual defense guarantees.

e. Concentration of Soviet submarines in a position and in sufficient numbers to permit effective attacks on major U.S. ports.

f. Laying of Soviet minefields in approaches to U.S. ports or in coastal shipping routes (an action regarded as unlikely).

*The term "attack" as used in this study refers to offensive action undertaken for the purpose of destroying or overwhelming a strategic objective. An "attack" is distinct from a skirmish or armed reconnaissance.

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- d. Soviet attack against Yugoslavia.
- e. Soviet attack against Sweden.
- f. Soviet occupation of Finland.
- g. Soviet active assistance, either by the provision of organized offensive armed forces or nuclear weapons, to Far Eastern communist forces engaged in hostilities against any area covered by a U.S. defense agreement, or area related thereto.
- h. Setting up by Soviet-controlled or communist party-controlled personnel of signal devices for the purpose of directing bombing or guided missile attacks against the U.S., Canada or Mexico.
- i. Organized armed insurrection in the U.S. by communist party members or persons under Soviet direction (an action regarded as unlikely).
- j. Distribution in the U.S. of previously cached weapons, ammunition, explosives, or instruments capable of supporting enemy attack or insurrection, by communist party members or persons under Soviet direction.

ANNEX

MANIFESTATIONS OF A DRASTIC CHANGE TOWARD AN OFFENSIVE
POSTURE BY SOVIET MILITARY FORCES

1. Scheduling of Soviet long-range aviation flights which include turning points within airspace contiguous to the United States.

2. Refuelling operations by Soviet aircraft over the North Atlantic, North Pacific or Arctic Oceans, in airspace contiguous to the United States.

3. Exodus of substantial numbers of long-range submarines from land-locked areas.

4. Redeployment of ground forces and their tactical air units to jump-off positions adjacent to areas where U.S. forces are stationed.

5. Issuance of complete nuclear weapons, or of nuclear components of weapons, from central stockpiles to long-range air forces, to Soviet forces in Europe, to Soviet submarine units, or to clandestine agencies.

6. General mobilization (including industrial mobilization) in the USSR with formation of new military units on a large scale and bringing of existing units to war strength.

7. General alert of all Soviet military forces.

8. Preparation for immediate combat of Soviet troops in forward areas, such as hurried evacuation of dependents, complete camouflage, institution of stringent security measures.

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9. Skirmishes or armed reconnaissance (in context of other less conclusive indications of hostile action) against: Alaskan island chain, U.S. Pacific possessions, Pacific Trust Territory, Pacific off-shore island chain, NATO or Rio Pact countries, or U.S. armed forces or military installations outside the continental U.S. or areas under U.S. jurisdiction.

10. Unprovoked sinking of U.S. naval or merchant vessels.

11. Large numbers of Soviet submarines operating in shipping lanes used in supplying U.S. forces abroad.

12. Unusual and extensive interference with U.S. warning and signal communications.

13. Dispersal of the headquarters of the Soviet Government to safe locations.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

7/29/55
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COPY NO. 1

March 30, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Study of Possible Hostile Soviet Actions

REFERENCE: NSC 5515

The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the reference Study (NSC 5515) are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of the subject at its meeting on March 31, 1955.

James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security

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BY *DDH*

DATE *7/23/86*

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NSC 5515/1 - Hostile Soviet Actions
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

C O P Y

29 March 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Study of Possible Hostile Soviet Actions

Reference: NSC 5515

1. This study is based upon a report by a special subcommittee of the NSC Planning Board. Its stated purpose is to describe what possible Soviet action or series or group of actions should leave no doubt in the President's mind as to the need for taking immediate military action to save the United States from the consequences of enemy attack, or to postpone, lessen or prevent imminent enemy attack.

2. Possible hostile Soviet actions preliminary to an attack upon the continental United States are listed in the study under three broad categories; according to the degree of certainty or imminence of such an attack. Possible manifestations of a drastic change toward an offensive posture by Soviet military forces are listed in an Annex to the study.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the document when it is considered by the National Security Council, subject to the following changes:

a. Paragraph 7, page 3, last sentence - Change to read as follows:

"Moreover, it should be noted that nothing in this study affects the mission of the Watch Committee of the IAC, which is 'to provide earliest possible warning to the U. S. Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its Allies, which endangers the security of the United States.'"

Reason: For clarity and accuracy.

b. Paragraph 8, page 3, last sentence - Delete the last sentence.

Reason: Editorial.

c. Paragraph 9-e, page 4, last line - Delete the word "ports" and substitute the words "coastal target areas".

Reason: Accuracy.

*signed: Twining
(next page)*

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another version
follows

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FP (WG)

4/8/55

SUMMARY OF BRIEFING

Secretary's Office

Friday, April 8, 1955

Participants:

Secretary
Mr. Murphy
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Merchant

Mr. Bean (EE)
Mr. Palmer (RA)
Mr. Kidd (GER)
Mr. Tyler (WE)
Mr. Freund (WE)

Mr. Cottman (S/S)

Subject: Preparations for Possible Four-Power Meeting

The Secretary inquired about the mechanics of simultaneous deposit of ratifications in Bonn, Brussels, and Washington, which appeared to him as complicated as a Wall Street closing, particularly if an exchange of ratifications were necessary to make the deposits binding.

Mr. Kidd reported that he was informed by the legal officers that, in the case of multi-lateral agreements, the ratifications would become effective upon deposit in the appointed place, and that the depository power would attend to the exchange by distributing certified copies of the ratifications to the other signatory states. This would be the procedure followed in the case of the Bonn Protocol, the WEU Protocol and the NATO Protocol. He was informed that the Saar Agreement, as a bi-lateral instrument, would be handled by an exchange of letters between the Federal Republic and France, either at Bonn or at Paris, at the

time

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EO 12958, Sec. 1.3 (a)

EX-100 194

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discussion of Far Eastern questions, the Soviets would probably insist on participation of representatives of Peiping.

With regard to the question whether the United States' attitude should be primarily in defense of the status quo, or whether we should take the initiative, the Secretary said that we should endeavor to do the latter. He said that he did not see why we could not put the Soviets on the defensive with regard to the Satellite area, and suggested that the possibilities in this direction should be carefully studied. As he saw the situation, there were a great many latent tensions and sources of weakness in this area. Since they did not appear on the surface, it was not easy to judge exactly what was happening, but he was convinced that there were developments beneath the surface which might ~~expedite~~ erupt at any time, and he thought that this weakness in the other's' ^{psychologically} position should be ^{McCordis} exploited. Mr. MacArthur reported the information brought back by a recent visitor to Bulgaria. The Secretary asked whether it would be possible to include some such item as giving independence to the Satellite people. Perhaps the Satellite Treaty situation might be reviewed; this would certainly disclose a great number of failures to fulfill treaty obligations. Mr. Murphy commented that this might in turn lead to questions about the Italian Treaty. The Secretary suggested

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that in any event the possibilities along this line should be carefully examined. He felt that there was no need for the West to be placed in the position of mainly defending ^{it had} ~~the~~ steps ~~to be~~ taken.

With regard to the most suitable subject matter for taking the initiative, the Secretary said ~~that~~ he had had some thoughts about the possibility of extending the WEU pattern ⁷ ~~to~~ arms limitations to Eastern Europe. WEU represented the principles of arms limitations, a voluntary acceptance of such limitations, and a mechanism of operation, which permitted armaments control on a regional scale. Mr. Merchant said that he had already asked Mr. Reinstein, of the German Office, to take another look at the WEU papers with this thought in mind. The Secretary said ~~that the~~ Italian Foreign Minister Martino was already pressing for his own plan of armaments control, and once such discussions got going, something like the van Zeeland plan was likely also to be brought up again. We had had difficulty enough in urging patience upon Mr. van Zeeland this long. The Secretary thought that with these possibilities in the air, it would be well to examine what we might propose ourselves.

The question was raised as to the form of legislation in which the Germans were setting up their defense establishment. Mr. Bowie commented upon the ~~unusually~~ apparently genuine Soviet apprehension about any

reestablishment

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reestablishment of German military strength, and the fact that they would go to some lengths to prevent it so long as there were any possibility of doing so. This was an additional argument for making an effort to reach agreement on some acceptable form of arms limitations while there was still a chance with respect to Germany.

Mr. Merchant said that this discussion led to the really basic question whether, all things taken into consideration, we were satisfied with the status quo in Europe, including a divided Germany, or whether we would be prepared to make any concessions to obtain removal of Soviet troops from Germany. The Secretary said that he would be ^{prepared to} ~~inclined to~~ ^{consider} make concessions about troop withdrawal West if we could obtain German reunification and troop withdrawal East. He thought that a reunified Germany would be primarily on the Western side, and that reunification and removal of Soviet troops ^{would} ~~might~~ ^{profound} have repercussions toward the East. Mr. Merchant expressed his agreement and ^{raised the question whether} ~~stated his belief that~~ the advantages of reunification were possibly sufficient to permit us to make concessions on the free-election point, ~~for once and in the East~~

~~Long~~ so long as the outcome of an all-German election would reflect

Mr. MacArthur pointed out the adverse effect that would have in Vietnam. the majority in the West. The Secretary replied that he would concede

on anything if we might thereby win in the end, but felt that we need

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not be hasty about any concessions on the principle of free elections. He felt that if the Russians should ever bring ~~thix~~ themselves to surrender East Germany, they would do so not on the basis of details, such as election procedures: the inducement would be whether they are really interested in a broad neutralized barrier through Central Europe. Although it would be an advantage to remove Soviet troops from East Germany, any "demilitarized" belt should include besides Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Secretary said ~~that~~ it would be important to obtain the military thinking on this matter.

The Secretary said that some such demilitarization plan/^{as}~~is~~ that under discussion need not necessarily mean a manpower limitation for German armed forces, but might involve restrictions on the disposition of troops. He thought, moreover, there was nothing incompatible in this and the retention of our free-elections plan for the creation of an all-German Government. Mr. Merchant said ~~that~~ he would request his staff to work up a paper setting forth various alternative plans which could extend the pattern of reciprocal armaments control in Europe.

With regard to the paper on Austria ~~FP~~ (WG) D-27, the Secretary indicated a willingness to consider the concessions proposed therein if these would in fact really obtain an Austrian Treaty. He noted the

reservations

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Mr. Merchant stated that Mr. Reinstein, together with Mr. Bowie and Mr. Beam might work up a paper setting forth various alternative plans which could extend the pattern of reciprocal armaments control in Europe.

Mr. Bowie said that the Russians apparently fear German rearmament, perhaps inordinately so. In this case he suggested that the Russians might be willing to consider some bonafide plan which would serve to allay their fears.

In regard to German rearmament it was noted that the form of German legislation setting up proposed armed forces had not been given study.

Mr. Merchant said ^{in addition} that the problem of expanding ^{the} collective security arrangements appeared to ^{involve the following considerations:} ~~fall into three categories:~~ (1) ~~The suggestions outlined by the Secretary (above) and, if so, under what circumstances~~ (2) ^{the} question of whether the US should take the initiative on any ^{armament control} ~~disarmament~~ proposal and (3) ^{basic position} ~~the basic question of whether the US fundamentally~~ ^{or should imply maintenance of} ~~approves~~ the status quo re Germany.

Mr. Merchant continued, saying that the "Eden Plan" for free elections as proposed at the Berlin Conference 1954 was not adequate. He pointed out that it was unlikely that the Russians would agree in view of population factor favorable to the West, to free elections/ ~~as much as West Germany had the much larger population~~ ~~that the East Zone.~~ It might be possible to agree to some sort of controlled elections if the ^{Soviets} ~~Russians~~ would in turn agree to the withdrawal of the Red Army at least to the prewar Polish border.

However, Mr. MacArthur pointed out that this position might compromise our position in Viet Nam.

^{what our bargaining position might be}
The Secretary asked ~~could we contemplate compensating the~~

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it was determined that the Soviets
Soviets if they were ready to agree to withdrawing from East
Germany. He suggested that some demilitarization plan might
be mutually acceptable. He added that this would not necessarily mean a
man power limitation for German armed forces but might involve
restrictions on the disposition of troops. He suggested that we should attempt to determine the military
views on this question. he determined.

The question of timing for the Spring Nato Ministerial meet-
ing was discussed. The Secretary indicated that he preferred to
have the meeting held anytime after May 8. He said that, despite
previous engagements, he would be available to go as early as
May 1 or 2 if by that time German participation were assured. It
was generally agreed that under existing circumstances this was
not a possibility.

NATO Permanent Representative

Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Canadian had submitted a
broad agenda for the Spring meeting (Polto 1919, 2/30). The Secretary
indicated his agreement to the idea of a broad agenda.

The inclusion

It was noted that under Item 2 of the proposed agenda, at a

Mr. Merchant pointed out the question of having
indicated a desire to include ministerial discussion of General
Gruenther's effectiveness report. This report points up the serious
deficiencies by all NATO countries in meeting their agreed goals.
Discussion of this item would require the presence of Defense and
finance ministers. at least for one day.
It had been tentatively suggested that this
item be discussed on the last day of the proposed three day meeting.

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Page _____ of _____
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762.00/4-1455 P. 1
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AIR POUCH

COPY NO'1

TO : Department of State

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April 13, 1955

FROM : HICOG, Bonn

1/8
 REC'D ACTION
 4/18 EUR-4

DEPT. RM/R-2, CL-6, S/S-2, G-1, S/P-1, G-1
 CIA-7, OSD-4, ARMY-3, NAVY-3, AIR-3

SUBJECT: Federal Republic Foreign Office Planning for Four-Power Negotiations

While we have not wished to anticipate the work of the proposed US-UK-French working party by inquiring too closely as to specific Foreign Office ideas about a possible four-power conference, we gather from recent informal conversations that the Foreign Office is trying to find formulae which will satisfy the West German political requirement that a new conference not simply rehash the Berlin Conference, but has not yet been able to think of anything especially new to propose. Herbert BLANKENHORN said as much, as recently as April 9, and Franz KRAPP, who is coordinator under Blankenhorn of the Federal Republic's papers for participation in the working party, said on April 13 that a press report that the Foreign Office is preparing a memorandum containing concrete proposals on German unity does not correspond to the facts. He also commented that the Government has the problem of restraining excessive public expectations, and made the apparently personal observation that it would help in this problem if public reference to four-power negotiations could be to "talks" or to "discussions" with the Soviets rather than to a "conference". His thought seemed to be that at least Germans expect agreements to flow from a conference, but do not have similar expectations for a less formally designated meeting.

Otto BRAEUTIGAM, head of the Eastern Division of the Foreign Office, where much of the planning is being done, has said he has not been able to think of new ideas of what the West might say to the Soviets about the German problem. (In this connection, it may be recalled that the resolution adopted by the Bundestag when it approved the Paris Treaties, which will presumably be the political impetus behind the Government in international discussions, did not go substantially beyond the Eden Plan of the Berlin Conference. See HICOG Despatch 1907 of March 9.) Braeutigam thought, however, that discussion of European security provides the best opportunity for the West to put the Soviets on the defensive. He specifically excluded the idea which the Chancellor advanced in his National Press Club speech last October, and also excluded the idea of giving up NATO, but thought the West might challenge the Soviets to restore sovereignty to the Eastern European satellites as the first move in a discussion of security. He believes the recent Kersten Committee report provides most useful substantiation of the charge that the satellites are not independent; and while he admits the Soviet rebuttal of charges about the satellites would be relatively easy, he thinks, as he has suggested before, that making such charges would give the West a measure of desirable initiative. It is not clear whether Braeutigam has

Page _____ of
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Desp. No. _____
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(Classification)

Page 2 of
Desp. No. 2134
From HICOG, Bonn

P. 2

thought through the consequences of pursuing this line in four-power negotiations, although he does say he believes that the questions of Germany, European security, and disarmament are all interrelated.

(Comment: It should be borne in mind that these are the ideas of a specialist on Eastern Europe, and seem to fail to take account of broader domestic political considerations. It may be expected, therefore, that if the West Germans in fact put Braeutigam's idea forward, they would only do so in conjunction with proposals for a plausible showing that the Western powers are attempting to achieve German reunification.)

We shall attempt to report further on West German preparations for preparatory talks as opportunities arise.

Raymond E. Lisle

Raymond E. Lisle
Deputy Director

Office of Political Affairs

Distribution:

PA - 5
AmEmbassy, Paris - 1
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4/19/55

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PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

396.1/4-1955

APR 26 1955

FROM : AMEMBASSY PARIS

COPY NO 1

2230

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

April 19, 1955.

DATE

REF :

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	FOR	RTR
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	4/22	CIAH-7

SUBJECT: Reactions of Faure to Four Power Conference.

1. I have had occasion to see Faure several times in the past few weeks to talk about the proposed eventual Four Power meeting with the Soviets. During these meetings Faure has always gone out of his way to indicate that he was speaking with me as head of the government, and on one occasion he directly referred to a future Four Power meeting of Chiefs of State.

2. I think it is clear that Faure personally is very anxious to take a part, and a leading part, in a future Four Power Conference with the Soviets. France may very well, therefore, press for an eventual meeting at the summit, as differentiated from a Four Power Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

Douglas Dillon

Douglas Dillon

396.1/4-1955

cc: Bonn
 London
 Moscow

OFFICE OF
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1955 APR 26 AM 10 48

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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762 00/4-1955

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

00146-00148

From: NICOG-Bonn

Despatch No. 2221

To: The Department of State, Washington

April 19, 1955

Ref: 67

Reid-4-25 ACTION:- EUR-9
INFO:- RMR-2, OLI-6, P-1, UICP-1
CIA-7, USIA-10, OCB-2, ARMY-4
NAVY-3, AIR-3

Subject: CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER TILLMANN'S

The views of Minister Without Portfolio Tillmanns were solicited on the reunification problem since he is considered the CDU's expert on this subject within the Federal Cabinet. During the course of the conversation, Minister Tillmanns expressed his views on the current situation in Berlin in addition to proposals for a Western position at a future Four Power Conference.

I. REUNIFICATION

Minister Tillmanns began by explaining his views on how forthcoming discussions of German reunification should be handled. He expressed the belief that the best approach would be first of all to sound out Soviet intentions through normal diplomatic channels. If a Four Power Conference eventually takes place, (and he believes the West should take the initiative in calling such a conference), he recommended that the Eden Plan be the point of departure for the West. He believed, however, that in this conference ~~as opposed to the Berlin meeting of 1954~~, the question of Germany's future military and political status will be raised and should be discussed. He expects that this will be proposed by the Russians and sees no need for the West to raise the question first. Tillmanns feels it is necessary that the Western Powers be prepared to negotiate on the future status of the united Germany since it is so apparent that until this question is settled there can be no possibility of agreement on the other aspects of reunification such as free elections, which would always be a pre-requisite for any settlement. He anticipated that the two extreme positions which will be advanced are the Western demand for full German membership in NATO permitting stationing of NATO forces up to the Oder-Neisse and the Soviet demand that a reunified Germany be prohibited from military alliances. In Tillmann's view, the only solution possible of attainment lies somewhere between these two extremes. He alluded to the Chancellor's remarks that the Soviet feeling for a need of security must be taken into consideration. Tillmanns believes that the Russians' greatest fear is of a German military force combined with the tremendous American military potential, since he is sure that the Russians know they were able to defeat Germany in the last war.

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only as a result of the assistance they received from the Americans. To this end, he considers a compromise solution might be possible entailing some such formula as a neutralization of the present East Zone and a limitation on the size and armament of future German armed forces along the lines of those contained in the Paris treaties. With regard to the latter point, Tillmanns said that one of the greatest difficulties would be the question of controls. He considered that any solution which tended to revive political controls resulting in a reestablishment of a type of Control Commission would be completely unacceptable; but, he stated, some form of supervision over Germany's military strength through a neutral commission such as the United Nations would be acceptable. He was less precise on the question of how far, if at all, Germany would be prepared to accept controls over her industrial establishment in connection with the supervision of armaments, but adopted a rather negative attitude toward such an idea. Tillmanns felt that the Soviets would, of course, agree at any time to reunification at the price of neutralization. However, he completely rejected this concept and said that there can be no question of excluding Germany from the Western alliance system; at the most, he would recommend agreement to a modified membership in the alliance along the lines suggested above.

As for tactics, Tillmanns said that according to his analysis, the favorite Soviet approach is to proceed through a series of negotiations until they come to some minor point on which they can break up the conference charging that negotiations have failed because of Western intransigence on a minor issue. He considered this question of the breaking up of a conference as a critical one and said that the West must be prepared to negotiate every little item step by step regardless of the length of time involved. As a matter of fact, he expected that any negotiations which are to be successful from the Western point of view would require an extensive period of time to complete.

As for the prospects of achieving reunification, Tillmanns said this is an unpredictable item dependent on the needs and desires of the Soviet Union for a lengthy period of peaceful co-existence. Lacking detailed knowledge of the internal factors currently determinant for Soviet policies and uncertain as to the ~~modifications~~ of such crucial items as the relationship between the Soviet Union and Red China, he found it impossible to forecast what their intentions may be at the time a conference is held.

With regard to the Oder-Neisse line, Tillmanns said that no German Government would be able to endorse de jure the separation of the Eastern territories. Tillmanns said that his real concern was that the Oder-Neisse might be used in a somewhat different context, namely that the Soviet Union might eventually go so far as to offer a return of the Oder-Neisse territory in return for German neutralization. One bit of evidence on which he bases this surmise is a conversation which he had with Grotewohl at the time the SPD joined the Communist Party in the East Zone to become the SED. He said he asked Grotewohl why he had agreed to such a move. The latter replied that the Russians had told him that they would return Germany's Eastern territories only to a Germany which

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they could trust and that he was therefore taking this step in an effort to secure the eventual restoration of Germany's lost territories. Tillmanns also referred to another conversation with an East Zone functionary who called for better relations between Germany and the Soviet Union on the grounds that the two were "neighbors". Tillmanns stated that Jakob KAISER who was also present, interjected that Germany and the Soviet Union are not neighbors since Poland lies between them but that their contact simply shrugged off Poland as of no importance. Accordingly, Tillmanns went further to speculate that at some future date, the Russians might not be averse even to sacrificing Poland, or part of it, in return for German neutrality.

II. BERLIN

Tillmanns was in full agreement with the position taken by the Berlin Government that measures taken to alleviate the situation resulting from the increased taxes on truck traffic passing through the Soviet Zone properly rest with the Allies. He believed that one of the important reasons why the Soviets imposed this tax was in an attempt to better the difficult economic situation in the East Zone. Accordingly, he believed that if the Allies would institute a new "air lift" (although he said he by no means has anything in mind of the magnitude of the original air lift), he felt the Soviets would back down quickly. He recalled that the Communists had their fingers burned badly in the first air lift and added that in this instance they would be faced not only with a question of prestige but moreover would have to expect a deterioration of the financial situation in the Soviet Zone since they would have to count on a loss of the revenues from the normal truck taxes prevailing before the latest increase. Tillmanns said he is not expert enough to estimate whether sufficient pressure could be exerted through West German embargoes on interzonal trade to effect revocation of the increased taxes, but was doubtful that such measures offered prospects of success. In the first place, he said, he understands that only eight per cent of the trade of the Soviet Zone is with the Federal Republic, and secondly, he feels that the relationship between the increased truck taxes and interzonal trade is so obvious that the Communists must have considered, and discounted, this possibility of retaliation before taking their move.

Tillmanns was comparatively unconcerned about the question of increased contacts between the Federal Republic and Pankow regime. He emphasized that the whole question of what constitutes political recognition is extremely unclear and said he did not feel at all certain that even if negotiations should take place at a comparatively high level, such as that of State Secretary, that any recognition would be involved. Moreover, he expected that even if a West German minister should proceed to the Soviet Zone to discuss such matters as the increased transport taxes, nothing would come of it and that the Communists would exploit his visit to such a degree for propaganda purposes that he would find it impossible to accomplish anything of substance.


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Raymond E. Lisle

Deputy Director

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

62 Department of State

ACTION COPY

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OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

Action
EUR

FROM: Paris

1975 APR 22 AM 10 21

Control: 11878
Rec'd: April 21, 1955
10:47 p.m.

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 4579, April 21, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4579, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 1052, BONN
802, MOSCOW 244.

Soutou states Pinay yesterday approved French suggested agenda for London experts meeting and that it had been telegraphed to Washington and London. He mentioned that in past West had been safe in insisting on (Eden) formula of (1) free elections, (2) formation of all-German Government, (3) conclusion of peaceful treaty in knowledge that really free election would provide in effect referendum on Communism which would be overwhelmingly rejected. Following Austrian developments, however, Russians might succeed in turning elections into referendum on neutralization which might well obtain majority. He thought West would have to consider this problem most carefully, and that time would be working against West.

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MAY 25 1955

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pages. No. 1 of 2 copies.

TOP SECRET

SUMMARY OF MEETING

May 3, 1955
10:30-11:00 A.M.
Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: European Security and German Unification

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Mr. Murphy, G
Mr. MacArthur, C
Mr. McCardle, P
Mr. Phleger, L
Mr. Bowie, S/P
Mr. Merchant, EUR
Mr. Elbrick, EUR
Mr. Palmer, RA
Mr. Lyon, GER
Mr. Reinstein, GER
Mr. Fuller, S/P
Mr. Sherwood, S/S-RO

Mr. Merchant opened the meeting by bringing the Secretary up to date on developments touching on the general issue of European security. He said that, in accordance with the Secretary's request, study had been given to the possibility of working out some proposal on European security, and this has been going on in cooperation with the Defense Department. Some of the Department's early working papers on this subject had been referred to the JCS, whose comments had indicated a quite rigid position. He noted that the JCS recently replied to the Secretary's query as to their views, and indicated they have not essentially changed their position held in 1953, prior to the Berlin conference, although they reserved the right to review their position in the light of specific proposals. The JCS reaction to the idea of extension of the WEU concept had been entirely negative.

Mr. Merchant said that the London Working Group has not gotten into substantive matters such as European security, but Chancellor Adenauer's views on the subject have been given in a general way by Blankenhorn to our delegation. The Chancellor's ideas involve an arrangement including mutual non-aggression guarantees; mutual assistance in case one of the parties is attacked; loss of treaty rights when violations are discovered; and armament restrictions and controls. These points had not, however, been developed in any detail. A report had just been received that Adenauer and Pinay had agreed to a general approach to the problem in their recent conversations, which introduced the additional element of demilitarization of the Eastern Zone of Germany. Mr. Merchant felt the subject would have to be discussed substantively in Paris, and might come up on Saturday, May 7, in the course of the Secretary's individual meetings with MacMillan, Adenauer, and Pinay. Mr. Merchant recommended that the Secretary let them carry the brunt of any

discussion

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Page 13 (a)

TOP SECRET

-2-

discussion on European security inasmuch as our position is not yet clear. Mr. Merchant suggested we propose that a working group be set up following the NATO meetings to deal with the Eden Plan and other proposals aimed at European security. Mr. Merchant said he thought a good deal more work would have to be done in order to develop the U. S. ideas on this subject. The JCS had been asked by the Defense Department to examine the military implications of a situation in which foreign forces would be removed from Germany. He thought that the entire question of the probable position of a unified Germany not allied to the West through NATO needed to be looked at in the light of changes since 1953. He thought it would also be essential to study the possibilities of putting up proposals to meet a Soviet proposal for the neutralization of Germany.

Mr. Bowie agreed with Mr. Merchant that we should re-examine carefully our position regarding a unified, armed Germany which might not be allied to NATO, in the light of changes since 1950 and 1953. He pointed out that this might result from the Eden Plan. He also stressed the need for finding some way of meeting the legitimate Soviet concern with regard to unlimited German rearmament. He thought that the relevance of further steps towards the integration of Europe in the next several years in relation to the development of the German situation also called for study.

The Secretary raised a question as to whether we would be opposed to a united Germany with armed forces which was not a member of NATO. He suggested that our basic objective was to get the Soviets out of Europe. He had not thought that NATO was essential as a deterrent to war. The main deterrent was the USSR's knowledge that an invasion of Western Europe means a general war. It is, however, necessary that there be adequate forces among the Western European countries to oppose a Soviet invasion and to avoid a military vacuum.

The Secretary then asked what were the objections held by the U. S. military to limitations on an extension of the Brussels arms limitations. Mr. Merchant read the JCS views as expressed in their memorandum of April 22, and noted we would have to try and change the military's present line of thinking. The Secretary said he thought there was some misconception on the part of the military regarding the idea. It was certainly not suggested that we could rely on Soviet good faith. On the other hand, the line of thinking in the JCS memorandum would lead to the conclusion that any agreements with the Soviet Union are impossible and that therefore there are no grounds for talking with them. He said this is not United States policy. He said the President is prepared to enter into agreements providing for concrete results.

The Secretary then developed his thoughts on tactical handling of the Soviets on this question. For example, under the Brussels Treaty a limitation is set on the ABC weapons for a given area: why shouldn't we ask the USSR to exclude these weapons from comparable areas? We impose a limitation on

the number

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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the number of our troops in a particular area: why shouldn't we ask the USSR to limit the number of its divisions in comparable areas? In sum, we should point out our self-imposed restrictions and ask the USSR to limit itself in a similar way. Thus we would ask the Soviets to impose restrictions upon themselves matching those which we have imposed upon ourselves. These need not be permanently binding. If one side wished to increase its forces, it should give notice and the other side would be free to do likewise. No inspection would be required because any changes would presumably be known. In effect we would ask the Soviets to show their good faith by limiting their forces and establishing an equilibrium. The Secretary said this would allow us to take the initiative in a conference with the Soviets. We will be working for peace, for the limitation of armaments, and at the same time we will be putting a dilemma before the Soviets: should they refuse to answer our questions they would create adverse propaganda for themselves, and should they for any reason try and go along with the idea and subsequently exceed any self-imposed limitations, they would likewise be at a disadvantage propaganda-wise. This tactic will give us something positive so we can move ahead, gaining time to work on the complex problems of Germany and European security. He remarked that proposals such as that to demilitarize the East Zone would take a long time to work out.

EUR:GER:JJReinstein
S/S-RO: RK:Sherwood:emb

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5/13/55

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(Second series)

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SUMMARY OF MEETING

May 3, 1955
10:30-11:00 A.M.
Secretary's Office

SUBJ: European Security and German Unification

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary

Mr. Murphy, C
Mr. MacArthur, C
Mr. McCarville, P
Mr. Hoyer, L
Mr. Bowie, C/P
Mr. Merchant, LMR

Mr. Ellbrick, LMR
Mr. Palmer, RA
Mr. Lyon, C/P
Mr. Einstein, C/P
Mr. Fuller, C/P
Mr. Sherwood, C/P

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1)

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-2-

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Mr. Board agreed with Mr. Merchant that we should re-examine carefully our position regarding a unified, armed Germany which might not be allied to NATO, in the light of changes since 1950 and 1953. He pointed out that this might result from the Eden Plan. He also stressed the need for finding some way of meeting the legitimate Soviet concern with regard to unlimited German rearmament. He thought that the relevance of further steps towards the integration of Europe in the next several years in relation to the development of the German situation also called for study.

The Secretary raised a question as to whether we would be opposed to a united Germany with armed forces which was not a member of NATO. He suggested that our basic objective was to get the Soviets out of Europe. He had not originally thought that a large North Atlantic Treaty military establishment was essential as a deterrent to war. The main deterrent was the USSR's knowledge that an invasion of Western Europe means a general war and atomic attack. It is, however, necessary that there be adequate forces among the Western European countries so that a Soviet invasion would not be unopposed but could in fact mean fighting.

The Secretary then asked what were the objections held by the U. S. military to limitations on an extension of the Brussels arms limitations. Mr. Merchant read the JCS views as expressed in their memorandum of April 22, and noted we would have to try and change the military's present line of thinking. The Secretary said he thought there was some misconception on the part of the military regarding the idea. It was certainly not suggested that we could rely on Soviet good faith. On the other hand, the line of thinking in the JCS memorandum would lead to the conclusion that any agreements with the Soviet Union are unacceptable and that therefore there are no grounds for talking with them. He said this is not United States policy. He said the President is prepared to enter into agreements providing for concrete results.

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the number

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PPG/HDR by UJ 10/14/94

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-3-

the number of our troops in a particular area: why shouldn't we ask the USSR to limit the number of its divisions in comparable areas? In sum, we should point out our self-imposed restrictions and ask the USSR to limit itself in a similar way. Thus we would ask the Soviets to impose restrictions upon themselves matching those which we have imposed upon ourselves. These need not be permanently binding. If one side wished to increase its forces, it should give notice and the other side would be free to do likewise. No inspection would be required because any changes would presumably be known. In effect we would ask the Soviets to show their good faith by limiting their forces and establishing an equilibrium. The Secretary said this would allow us to take the initiative in a conference with the Soviets. We will be working for peace, for the limitation of armaments, and at the same time we will be putting a dilemma before the Soviets: should they refuse to answer our questions they would create adverse propaganda for themselves, and should they for any reason try and go along with the idea and subsequently exceed any self-imposed limitations, they would likewise be at a disadvantage propaganda-wise. This tactic will give us something positive so we can move ahead, gaining time to work on the complex problems of Germany and European security. He remarked that proposals such as that to demilitarize the East Zone would take a long time to work out.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LUR:CLR:JJReinstein
S/G-RD: RK:Sherwood:emb

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) 1
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THURSDAY
May 5, 1955
5:59 p.m.

None

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. MERCHANT

M. said they have a cable in on Article 33 from Thompson re withdrawal. The French have proposed a compromise which they think the Soviets will accept, and we should authorize him to go ahead. M. started to read it, and the Sec. asked him to bring it up.

pdb



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1/CDC/MR

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL

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Action
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TOP SECRET

Control: 7833
Recd: MAY 14, 1955
10:38 PM

FROM: VIENNA
TO: Secretary of State
NO: DULTE 46, MAY 15, 2 PM

See by President
16 May 1955

PRIORITY

EYES ONLY ACTING SECRETARY FROM SECRETARY FOR PRESIDENT.

Which Helen
May 2, 55

NO DISTRIBUTION.



"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT

HAVE JUST FINISHED FOUR-POWER DINNER DURING WHICH WE DISCUSSED MANY SERIOUS MATTERS.

I TALKED ALONE WITH MOLOTOV ABOUT THE CHINA SITUATION. HE SAID IT WAS VERY COMPLICATED. I REFERRED TO THE MENACING BUILD-UP OF AIRPOWER AND SAID HE MUST KNOW ABOUT IT BECAUSE IT WAS BEING DONE WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT. MOLOTOV SAID THIS WAS PURELY A CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIR. I SAID WE WERE EXERTING INFLUENCE ON THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS AND THEY SHOULD EXERT A COMPARABLE INFLUENCE ON THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS. I SAID THAT WE NEEDED A SITUATION WHERE AS IN GERMANY, KOREA AND VIETNAM, IT WAS AGREED THAT UNIFICATION WOULD NOT BE SOUGHT BY FORCE. MOLOTOV SAID THEY WANTED PEACE. HE SUGGESTED A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE. I SAID A SIX-POWER CONFERENCE WOULD BE BETTER. HE SAID THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WOULD NOT MEET WITH THE NATIONALISTS. I SAID WE WOULD NOT MEET WITH THE COMMUNISTS WITHOUT THE NATIONALISTS. I URGED THEM TO THINK ABOUT A WAY OF SOLUTION, AND HE SAID HE WOULD DO SO. I SAID TO COMMUNICATE WITH US EITHER THROUGH OUR AMBASSADOR AT MOSCOW OR THEIR AMBASSADOR AT WASHINGTON.

I DO NOT FEEL THAT MUCH CONCRETE PROGRESS WAS MADE, BUT I THINK THAT THE SOVIET MAY AS A RESULT OF OUR TALK PUT INCREASING PRESSURE UPON THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO AVOID WAR.

WE DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH THE INVITATION TO A FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE. ON BEHALF OF THE THREE WESTERN POWERS I EXPLAINED THE

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PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING

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Dulles, JF 6 May 1955
DULLES-PT-10-SERIES
Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers
President of the United States
1953-61 (Ant. Warrenton File)

TOP SECRET

-2- DULTE 46, MAY 15, 2 PM, FROM VIENNA

PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING IT. MOLOTOV SEEMED GENERALLY TO AGREE. WE ALSO AGREED THAT NONE OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM BRINGING UP ANY TOPIC WHICH HE THOUGHT CALLED FOR SOLUTION.

ONE OF MOLOTOV'S MOST SIGNIFICANT REMARKS WAS THAT THEY WOULD PROPOSE A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE. THIS CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT STIPULATE THAT THIS FIRST FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE SHOULD ITSELF BE A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE.

WE DISCUSSED TIME AND PLACE. MOLOTOV PRESSED INSISTENTLY FOR VIENNA. THE THREE WESTERN POWERS STOUTLY OPPOSED THIS. HE GAVE AS THE REASON THAT WE COULD NOT HOLD A CONFERENCE IN A COUNTRY WHICH WOULD STILL BE OCCUPIED. ACTUALLY WE FEEL THAT IT WOULD HAVE A VERY DISASTROUS EFFECT UPON GERMANY IF VIENNA, AS A REWARD FOR BECOMING NEUTRAL, SHOULD INSTANTLY BE MADE A CENTER OF EUROPEAN ACTIVITY, INCLUDING DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE OF GERMANY. WE STRONGLY URGED SWITZERLAND.

MOLOTOV SAID TO ME PRIVATELY AS HE LEFT THAT OUR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT VIENNA WOULD MAKE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. MY OWN FEELING IS THEY WILL ACCEPT SWITZERLAND, THOUGH HE INDICATED THEY WOULD WANT GENEVA RATHER THAN LAUSANNE BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO CONSULAR FACILITIES AT LAUSANNE.

AS REGARDS DATE, I SAID THAT WITHOUT TALKING WITH YOU, I COULD NOT SAY WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A DATE PRIOR TO THE ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS. THE MIDDLE OF JULY MIGHT PERHAPS BE POSSIBLE ENABLING YOU TO RETURN BEFORE CONGRESS ADJOURNED OR ELSE A DATE IN AUGUST AFTER CONGRESS ADJOURNED. HE DID NOT INDICATE THAT EITHER PERIOD WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, AND I GATHER THERE IS CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY AS TO TIME.

THESE ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS AS I DICTATE THEM EARLY SUNDAY MORNING. THE REST I CAN TELL YOU ON MY RETURN. FAITHFULLY YOURS, FOSTER.

DULLES.

HMR:33

TOP SECRET

00249

Papers of
DullesReel 8
UPA Box 11

5-1-55

The Papers of JFD

May 23, 1955

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR KNOWLAND
Monday, May 23, 1955 - 3:25 p.m.

I informed Senator Knowland on the President's thinking regarding the Four-Power Conference, particularly the intention to avoid dealing with matters of substance and to hold down the size of the delegation so as to avoid persons whose presence would suggest an intention to make substantive decisions and create hopes in this respect.

Senator Knowland then asked about Congressional representation. I said the President did not intend to have such representation as things now stood. If he were going to have it, I said I suppose George would be one fellow who would have to be there; and if George came along, then we would have to have Wiley. And if you follow that pattern, from the House you would have Richards; and if Richards came, you would also have Chipfield. I said if we could get good stout fellows like Knowland and Vorys, it would be fine, but I said I do not see any formula that would produce that result.



I discussed with the Senator the significance of recent Soviet reversals, particularly in Austria and Yugoslavia. Senator Knowland said that he wondered whether the Soviets would go to Belgrade without having some prior understanding that at least Yugoslavia would drop out of the Turco-Greek Alliance. I said I doubted that there was any such understanding. Certainly, I had been assured that there was not by the Yugoslav Ambassador just a few minutes before. Senator Knowland spoke highly of the Ambassador and said he had performed well on "Meet the Press" on Sunday.

We spoke of the danger of the Meeting leading the satellite people to feel they were abandoned. I said I felt it was of the utmost importance to offset this by actively bringing up free elections, etc. Also, I spoke of bringing up the role of the Soviet Communist Party and its affiliates in free nations.

The Senator seemed to be reasonably satisfied with the presentation and discussion. At least he made no positive criticism.

John Foster Dulles

JFD:ndb

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WEDNESDAY

May 25, 1955

2:46 p.m.

1306

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0232

TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE PRESIDENT

The Pres. got Nelson in and re Quantico - it has nothing to do with the 4-Power Mtg. He has appointed himself a consultative body to study foreign reactions to things - heads of ~~university~~ universities are on it. It advises on psychological warfare. (This sounds vague, but evidently they discussed it at lunch.)

C-
Dillon

The Pres. had Nelson call CD re what would make a good speech. In general (a) take the UN and the 10 years of its existence and give a brief review of its accomplishments and defeats; (b) give the principles this country follows in approaching international problems; (c) then in this framework list the problems the world has to face up to - the existing division of Germany, the Iron Curtain, Red China's determination to conquer Formosa, atomic arms race, overall question of armaments and military establishments. Talk briefly and say the US in approaching these problems will do so in the light of the principles above enumerated. The obvious effect would be to prepare ~~public~~ public ~~and~~ opinion here and abroad for the 4-Power Conference. This is the kind of thing that has to be talked about sooner or later. The Pres. has not read any draft and CD is working on a second draft - perfecting his idea. The Pres. does not suppose the form will be completely acceptable. What does the Sec. think of it? The Sec. said his first reaction is it would be somewhat dangerous to get into the question of an agenda for the 4-Power Mtg. The Pres. said as a matter of fact it would not be mentioned but the world has to face up to these problems. It does not go into the solution of them - it puts down our principles as Wilson tried to do with his 14 Points. It might be salutary though repetitious to bring together in one place some authoritative statement of what we are trying to do - and not minimizing what we have done. The Sec. thinks it is all right. They agreed not to have it tied into the 4-Power Mtg. The Pres. said if he is going to keep working on it, we have to say so now. The Sec. the Pres. said, could call Cabot and ask him if the Sec.-Gen. would invite him for the opening day instead of the last day. The Sec. suggested he see a draft first. It will be in tomorrow. By the time Cabinet meets Friday, the Pres. can tell the Sec. and can give him a copy too. They agreed to let it ride until then.



~~SECRET~~

5/25/55

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FROM: USNMR PARIS FRANCE FROM GEN GRUENTHER

TO: JCS WASH DC

NR: ALO 632 NOFORN

Reference JCS 980950, 6 May 55

This msg in 4 parts.

DECLASSIFIED BY: JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE: 16 Aug 1977
25 MAY 55

My comments and recommendations on the military implications of the withdrawal from Germany of United States and Allied Forces now stationed there, in accordance with your request in the reference message and the assumptions therein, are as follows:

Part 1.

The military and political implications of the withdrawal of United States and Allied Forces from Germany are so interrelated as to preclude a precise and separate analysis of military requirements. My views as outlined herein are tentative and subject to modification in the light of any subsequent changes in the related political facets of the problem or changes in present strategic concepts.

Part 2.

The present balance of military power, if not favorable to the Western powers, is at least sufficiently unfavorable to the Soviet bloc to serve as a deterrent to military aggression in the NATO area. In the context of the existing situation and under our present defense concept, a German military potential is vital to NATO security. Any proposals involving a German realignment must therefore be very carefully postulated to avoid tipping the present and future balance of military power in favor of the Soviet bloc. Withdrawal of Allied Forces, particularly United States Forces, from Germany will have far-reaching psychological as well as political and military impact upon NATO.

The present probability of increasing NATO military power through the addition of a West German contribution should considerably strengthen the bargaining position of the Western Powers in any forthcoming conference with the Soviets. Because

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PAGE 2

of this present and anticipated military posture of NATO, it would appear that the Western Powers are at least able to negotiate from strength. As the price for any withdrawal from Germany we should therefore make every effort to insure that, through one means or another, the German military potential can be aligned with the free nations in the event of aggression.

Part 3.

I feel that while we might, possibly with some over-all military advantage, realistically consider the possibility of repositioning our air forces, we should accept the high probability that if we withdraw our ground forces from Germany, at least a considerable portion of them will have to be relocated in areas outside of Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France. Such a situation, though perhaps under certain possible future circumstances not entirely unacceptable, would of course require a change in our plans and might well involve a basic alteration in NATO strategy, in MC 48, and perhaps in the statement by my mission.

Should we agree in principle at the conference table to a repositioning of Allied Forces outside Germany, later we might find that, for economic, financial and psychological reasons (entirely apart from the obvious political difficulties) such repositioning elsewhere in Europe is quite infeasible. In fact, particularly with respect to ground forces, the over-all project of creating in strategically acceptable locations in any other European areas the barracks, quarters, maneuver areas, recreation facilities and other installations on a minimal acceptable standard, as now available in Germany would certainly require a long period of time for its accomplishment, if indeed it could be done at all.

However, within the specific terms of your message and under the assumption that Four Power negotiations will lead to the withdrawal of US and Allied Forces from Germany, the following represents my response to the specific points raised in your message.

Repositioning within Allied Command Europe.

With regard to the first question concerning repositioning, the possible area withdrawal of Soviet Forces indicated, i.e., Czechoslovakia, Poland, or the USSR proper, present quite different situations. Any detailed answer must be made in light of more specific assumptions regarding the deployment adopted by the Soviet Forces and the nature of the military establishment, if any, within a realigned Germany.

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PAGE 3

It appears that the bulk of the land forces should be retained in the Central sector in the event of such a withdrawal. However, up to 2 divisions might be required in Denmark, the number being dependent upon the strength and alignment of German Forces. Some augmentation might also be indicated in the Mediterranean sector, depending on whether or not the new Soviet dispositions changed the situation in the Satellite areas.

With respect to air forces redeployed from Germany, a more balanced distribution of the Allied air order of battle along the entire arc from Norway to Turkey seems indicated. The majority of these forces, therefore, should be so distributed. This is particularly true since we already have a sizeable air effort based outside of Germany in the Central sector and which would not be affected by the need to withdraw. While we would lose the present air base complex in Germany, the provision of bases for the redeployment would not seem to be an insurmountable problem, although great difficulties would be involved.

There is no problem as such with respect to withdrawal of naval units from Germany. Such a withdrawal, however, would suggest the need to augment our naval capability in the Northern sector if we are to compensate for the loss of the German contribution in the Baltic and still strive to retain the straits.

Adjustments to MC 48.

Under your assumption that a militarily satisfactory redeployment could be accomplished, and if we could still count on full support from the German military potential in case of aggression, the basic principles in MC 48 would seem on first study, to remain valid. There might be increased exposure of the straits area and Denmark; however, the situation in the Southern sectors of Allied Command Europe would not seem to be unduly affected. In the center we might lose depth of radar warning due to the removal of present and planned radar screens from Germany, but the surprise probability with respect to ground operations would be materially eased, and interdiction possibilities enhanced as a result of the Soviet withdrawal.

The distances from Soviet bases to target in Western Europe will reduce the air threat as a result of the Soviet loss of forward bases in Eastern Germany. Any advance across Germany and an attempt to re-establish a base of operations therein would seem to expose the aggressive forces to effective atomic attack and interdiction. By the same token, should the Soviets respect German neutrality, the lack of close contact with Soviet Forces in the center should allow us greater flexibility in re-deploying our forces to meet any act of aggression on the flanks.

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PAGE 4

I would emphasize that this analysis concerning the applicability of the principles of MC 48 is valid only on the assumption that a united Germany either remains in NATO or is so closely aligned thereto that military discussions and at least some degree of joint planning with our NATO commands can be assured. In any situation where a united Germany would assume neutral status under which military association with the West is not practicable, then even if our redeployed forces could be stationed advantageously, a careful review of the MC 48 strategy would be necessary.

In summary, under the cited assumptions, the general principles outlined in MC 48 would be retained, but the conclusions with respect to the feasibility of a forward defense in the various areas would need reexamination in light of the specific situation created by the Four Power agreement.

Acceptability of Resulting Posture

During the cold war period the acceptability of the resulting position would seem to depend to a large extent on whether the ensuing military dispositions, when considered in conjunction with the release in international tension which must be postulated as basic to any withdrawal agreement, will provide as great, or a greater, feeling of security than is obtained under the present military posture. From the point of view of active war, Allied ability to maintain the integrity of NATO territories without a German contribution properly aligned and increased in strength would seem to have lessened, but the withdrawal from Germany does not affect the major base areas used for the Allied Atomic counter-attack in current plans.

German Strengths

The minimum forces acceptable in Germany would be those envisioned as a contribution to NATO. The optimum forces under terms of the agreement are difficult to define. To provide a force capable of effective delaying action in Central or Eastern Germany, thus permitting time for Allied Forces to move forward and join the battle, a force of perhaps 20 divisions with comparable air augmentation would appear necessary. Such a force, however, maintained by Germany in peacetime, would have serious repercussions in certain other NATO nations and it is doubtful that it could therefore be considered a worthwhile contribution to the peace, stability and solidarity of Western Europe.

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Part 4.

Personal comments.

The preparation of this analysis has caused me considerable agony. It is based on two important assumptions: The first one prescribed by you, that Allied troops in Germany can be redeployed satisfactorily on the continent; and the second one formulated by US, that the German potential can be related to the NATO system under all circumstances.

Knowing Europe, as I think I do, I am quite skeptical over the redeployment assumption. Nevertheless, we have tried to deal with the problem as you posed it. As for a relationship with the Germans which would permit a satisfactory degree of joint defense planning, I feel that will encounter considerable Soviet opposition.

You should know that our thinking here is very much in the tentative stage at this time. I would be grateful to you if you would send me from time to time any studies which are prepared by JCS teams on this subject, and I would hope that you would send them even before the JCS act on them. Such action may enable us to make a contribution as we find angles which we had failed to consider.

ACTION: SJCS

INFO: CJCS, DJS, CSA, CNO, CSAF

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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 13, 1955

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Chancellor Adenauer
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Blankenhorn
Mr. Merchant
Herr Weber. (the Chancellor's interpreter)

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The Chancellor by prior arrangement called on the Secretary at 4:30 this afternoon and remained for almost two hours.

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The Chancellor first referred to the invitation to visit Moscow which he had recently received. He said that in his opinion this had been designed to achieve two purposes. The first was to sow distrust among Germany's Western allies with respect to Germany's trustworthiness, and the second was to maneuver him personally into such a position that he would bear the personal blame and responsibility for any failure of the negotiation with the Soviets. The Chancellor said that domestic considerations made it necessary that he should go to Moscow. He did not, however, feel pushed as to the timing and therefore

the question

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the question arose as to when would be the best time. He was inclined to think September and in any event after the Geneva meeting of the heads of government. Meanwhile it was his thought that his Ambassador and the Soviet Ambassador in Paris should conduct the preliminary discussions since he felt it was important to have the groundwork carefully laid. Parenthetically he said that the Italian Foreign Minister Martino had urged him to go before the Geneva meeting but that he was clear in his own mind that it was better for him to wait until that was over. This was a subject which he would want to discuss with Macmillan and Pinay in New York. Meanwhile he would be grateful for any thoughts which the Secretary might care to express on the subject.

The Chancellor then raised the question of the President's reference at a press conference some weeks ago to neutrality from which it had been inferred that a position of neutrality for a unified Germany was open to consideration. He said that something similar had happened again at the President's press conference on June 8. He had been told that at the close of the latter press conference John Hightower of the Associated Press had told the reporter of the Frankfurter/^{Allgemeine} Zeitung that, "The President has given you full liberty and his neutrality statement three weeks ago was no slip of the tongue." He said that a French reporter who overheard this looked aghast and a Tass man broke into a broad grin.

The Chancellor

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The Chancellor went on to say that last week Ollenbauer had publicly said that the United States was ready to steer a milder course regarding Germany but that the Chancellor was stiff in his opposition. Then a few days ago a representative of the United States Embassy in Bonn in discussing the military legislation with a German official had suggested that if trouble was met on the legislation providing for volunteers, the legislation should be postponed until after the summer recess.

Then the Chancellor said that certain strange information comes in. General Gehlen, who was described as the head of the ^{German} ~~American~~ counter intelligence, had communicated these reports to the Chancellor and had described them as coming from the best and most reliable sources. The Chancellor then handed to his interpreter a file of reports from which he requested him to read certain marked passages.

The first report was given the date of October 8, 1954. It stated that after the London Conference the Soviets will negotiate with the United States so as to obtain a long-term treaty guarantee of the neutralization of Germany and the integrity of Central Europe.

A report dated March 9, 1955, stated that secret US-Soviet talks were going on in Vienna. The Soviets were represented by a military group close to Mikoyan. The question of the exchange

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exchange of goods for arms was under discussion. (At this point the Secretary inquired if these reports were attributed to Soviet sources. The Chancellor replied that he assumed so but that he had not asked this specific question.)

A report dated March 24, 1955, stated that confidential talks were being conducted at Stockholm on behalf of Bulganin and President Eisenhower. Secretary Dulles was stated to be ignorant of this fact. It was further stated that there was a split in the United States Government which was duplicated in various American embassies. A report dated April 22, 1955, confirmed that secret talks were going on in Stockholm. The Russians were said to be members of a secret unit which contained followers of Semenov. The points under negotiation were stated to be as follows. The Moscow proposals were taken as the basis for the talks. The purpose was to merge the Bonn, Pankow and Berlin governments, to be achieved not necessarily by officials but possibly by individuals representative of the "tendencies" in those capitals. Elections would then be held under the supervision of the Bonn and Pankow governments. All foreign troops were to be pulled out of both German areas except for those numbers necessary to watch over the elections. Then a peace treaty was to be negotiated which would provide that

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united Germany would enter no military alliance. Next a national assembly would be elected to form a new government for united Germany which would have a German national army within a specified limit (the Soviets were proposing one of between 400,000 and 450,000). Further the former German provinces now in West Poland would at some point after the conclusion of the treaty be turned over to the German government. All the foregoing was visualized as requiring a number of years for completion - 1960 or 1962 were suggested as the terminal date for achievement. The Soviets would then enter a peace guarantee for a term of 25 years, having abandoned (sic) the neutralization of Germany.

Another report dated some time in May 1955 stated that United States foreign policy was being conducted on two separate tracks. The Department at times did not participate in the formation of foreign policy. Certain figures on the White House staff were responsible for advising the President. These were alleged to be Milton Eisenhower (who was portrayed as a former associate of Harry Hopkins who was asserted to have been responsible for the naming of General Eisenhower to the Supreme Command in Europe during the War), Sherman Adams and Senator George. George Kennan was also considered influential in this group. The initiative for direct talks with the Soviets had come from this White House group which had a direct connection

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connection with Ambassador Bohlen. Senator George was portrayed as favoring the establishment of a neutral belt in Europe. Senator Knowland was depicted as thinking of resigning because of the appeasement course of policy. Far Eastern matters were said to dominate all Washington thinking.

At the conclusion of the reading of these reports the Chancellor said that he could not say if they were true. The sources, however, he considered good and he had thought it his duty to inform the Secretary frankly. He went on to say that if the United States loses interest in Europe then the Communists will take over control, including control of the German army. He concluded by saying that in his opinion the Soviets are now weak and we should not grant them the time to recover.

The Secretary responded by saying that there was no foundation for the suspicion that the President was carrying on a foreign policy of which he was ignorant nor was there, to his knowledge any difference in view between them. The Secretary said that he had every reason to believe that he had the President's complete confidence. If this were not true he would resign. There had been in the past 3 Secretaries of State who had been placed in the position of being ignored by the President in the conduct of foreign policy but he was not of that

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that breed. There were of course constant rumors such as these which the Chancellor had cited but he was absolutely certain that there was nothing to them. He cited as one example a reference in the report to the alleged intention of the President to take Senator George to Geneva. He said this was not the case. He then expressed his gratitude to the Chancellor for his frankness in having spoken as he had.

The Secretary then said that the Chancellor might be interested in his thoughts as to the reasons why the Soviets had changed their policies.

First of all he felt the Russians were faced by many serious problems and that they were anxious to relieve the pressures building up against them. One of these was the problem of leadership. The structure of government was that of a dictatorship but they now lacked a dictator. Khrushchev had power but impressed him as a man who talked without thinking. Bulganin was a stuffed shirt who could neither think nor talk. Molotov he felt was in a weakened and ~~unusually~~ uneasy position. He had been impressed by his lack of sure-footedness at Vienna as compared to past occasions. ~~SECRET~~

Secondly, the Soviets ~~had~~ faced a most difficult economic situation. The burden of armaments was heavy. Atomic development was ~~an~~ extremely expensive. Russian agriculture was in a serious state.

Finally the demands on the Soviets from China for armaments and the means to industrialize their country must be extremely

heavy

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heavy. The satellites had been squeezed and exploited. They were now economic liabilities rather than assets.

For all these reasons the Secretary believed that the Soviets had decided that they needed a pause to reduce the burden of armaments and to open up world trade, thereby permitting some increased satisfaction of consumers demands. He felt that recent actions such as ^{their} ~~the~~ reversal on the Austrian Treaty testified to the urgency of these problems. Likewise the pilgrimage to Belgrade which he thought comparable to a visit by the President and himself to Mao Tse-Tung in Peking with advance admission that the troubles between China and the United States rested on our doorstep. The question then arises, do we press the Soviets hard now or do we give them the relief that they seek. He feared that our allies were growing tired and might not be inclined to press strongly at this time. He believed, however, that if we stay strong and resolute it will be possible to ^{unification of Germany,} ~~attempt~~ accomplish the ^{thereafter} peaceful liberation of the satellites and ~~then~~ accomplish something substantial in the limitation of armaments. He was opposed to any proposal which seemed to confirm the right of Soviet domination of the satellites. He was anxious that we should not ^{bring} sell out our position cheaply.

The Chancellor interjected that he agreed fully with the Secretary's estimate of the Soviet position. He assured the Secretary that Germany was not tired.

The Chancellor said that he will discuss the general situation with Eden in London on his return from New York. He agreed that

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that the danger is that the West will abandon its positions unnecessarily and cheaply ("The Soviets don't deserve it.") He added that this was why he had been horrified to read of one speech by a high ^{United States} official to the effect that if the Geneva conference ends in failure then all is lost. The Secretary said that this was not the view of the United States Government.

The Chancellor then referred again to his invitation to visit Moscow and said laughingly that he had only read the text of it on the aircraft coming over to this country. He expressed his happiness at the frankness of ^{this} talk.

The Secretary then inquired as to the prospects of the legislation for military volunteers/ in Germany. The Chancellor said that the Bundesrat had had no right to reject it. One of his Ministers had talked too much. The matter will be straightened out and the bill will be passed before the recess of the Parliament on July 18.

The Secretary said that he thought it extremely important that it be passed before the Geneva conference and the Chancellor's visit to Moscow. The Chancellor assured the Secretary that he could count on its passage by mid-July, on which note the discussion closed.

EUR:LTMerchant:mt

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to _____
☐ With concurrence of _____
☒ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown

EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (

FOUO/HDR by CJ

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REG 2-73

NSC 5524/1 July 11, 1955 and 6/82
OK'd at NSC mtg, 7/1/55

B's Example

Group withdrawal not ruled out - idea to work a
free Gen voluntarily covering U West

more a 'wish list' than a serious policy

Donald A/

6/19/55

3311

Adenauer Plan - 1955

6/17/55

INDEX

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Personal and Private

- A Memo 7/12 to the Secretary from Adm. Radford with copy of memo from Radford to the President 7/9 re conversation with General Adolf Heusinger.
- B Memo of conversation 7/9 between Adm. Radford and Mr. Merchant.
- C Memo of conversation 7/7 between Gen. Heusinger, his aide, Mr. MacArthur and Mr. Merchant.
- D SUM MC-4 - memo of conversation with the British 7/7, 2:30 p.m. re European Security.
- E SUM MC-2 - memo of conversation with the British 7/1 re Germany and European Security.
- F Memo of conversation 6/28 between Adm. Radford and Mr. Merchant re Gen. Heusinger.
- G Memo 6/17 from Mr. MacArthur re Adenauer-Macmillan conversation.
- H Memo for the President 6/17 from Admiral Radford re demilitarized zones in Central Europe.
- I Memo to the Secretary 6/15 from Mr. Merchant re Mr. Merchant's private conversation of 6/13 with Chancellor Adenauer
- J Memo of conv. 6/13 between Chancellor Adenauer, Amb. Blankenhorn, Herr Weber and the Secretary and Mr. Merchant

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE AND MEMORANDA SERIES

DULLES JOHN FOSTER PAPERS 100-23

Box 2, Strictly Confidential A-B (1)

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Personal and Private

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: MR 87-227-8
 Date: 2/5/88
 NLE Date

6/14/55

Box 11
cc 5-16

CONFIDENTIAL

June 14, 1955

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE
PRESIDENT
7:45 A. M.

I reported on my talk with Adenauer. I referred to the campaign which he reported as being conducted by the Soviet in Europe to give the impression that there was a division between the President and myself and that the President with Senator George and Milton Eisenhower represented the "soft" line whereas I represented the "hard" line. I said to the President that prior Presidents, notably Wilson and FDR, had in the past operated independently of their Secretaries of State, which made this kind of a line plausible. The President said he would seek an appropriate occasion to try to correct any such impression.

FOR THE RECORD
100-100000-100000
JSC:ZMR 9/16/54
DATE 9/16/54

* I said that, in my opinion, the Soviet Union was overextended, particularly in terms of its weak governmental leadership and was desperately looking for a respite. He said he had the same feeling.

I said that Mrs. Luce had turned down the suggestion that she be a delegate to the United Nations Assembly.

I spoke of our meeting with Menon and suggested that I could take up detailed negotiations with him in the afternoon and that the President would perhaps principally want to listen to what he had to say. We spoke of the practice of the Communists in holding on to captives to use them at some subsequent appropriate date.

We spoke briefly of the President going to England. He indicated a desire to see the Queen again, but realized it would set up many

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6/16/57 6

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2. Acceptor of info - info - immen. calculation
REPORT OF ROBERT E. SPRAGUE (NSC CONSULTANT)

(F)

to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Section 144.D, Atomic Energy Act, 1954.

CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

June 16, 1955

Details



INTRODUCTION

1. My reports to the National Security Council of July 1 and November 24, 1954, reviewed three elements of danger which had come into being since the approval of our Continental Defense policy (NSC 5408):

First: The probability (based on our recent Pacific tests of nuclear weapons) that the Russians might have within the next few years, - and possibly as early as mid-1957, - a significant stockpile of 5 to 15 MT bombs, deliverable by long-range Russian bombers on our Continent.

Second: The devastating hazard to unprotected personnel from radioactive fall-out resulting from ground bursts of multi-megaton nuclear weapons.

Third: The increased problem of providing a U.S. air defense system with adequate early warning, interception, and kill of modern long-range Russian bombers.

2. Latest intelligence indicates that the Russian long-range bomber program is about one and one-half years further ahead than anticipated at the time of the last meeting of the National Security Council on Continental Defense (November 24, 1954). It is now estimated that by mid-1957 the Russians will have operational:

650 medium jet bombers (like our B-47s)
200 heavy jet bombers (like our B-52s)
150 turbo-prop bombers (no U.S. counterpart)
Total 1000 modern bombers (including 350 heavy long-range bombers)

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AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO ITS DECLASSIFICATION.

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DATE 9-25-01
BY SP4C DATE 7/3/97

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Section 144.D, Atomic Energy Act, 1954.

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3. The significance of this new intelligence is indicated by comparing it with the intelligence available in November 1954. It was then estimated that by mid-1957 the Russians would have operational:

650 medium jet bombers (like our B-47s)

50 heavy jet bombers (like our B-52s)

0 turbo-prop bombers

Total 700 modern bombers (including only 50 heavy long-range bombers)



4. Since 1954 there is no change in intelligence estimates of Russian atomic and nuclear capabilities, although it is now considered highly probable that Russia will test her first modern multi-megaton weapon during 1955.

5. The importance to Russia (and increased hazard to us) of her achieving such a multi-megaton capability was clearly brought out in the study and first report to the Council of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee (this report was made to the Council on November 4, 1954). // This report made obvious that a knockout blow to America cannot be delivered by the use of even large numbers (within Russia's net delivery capabilities) of 5 kiloton and 60 kiloton bombs delivered on target. // For example, in the postulated high altitude attack 85% of the casualties resulted from the two 10 megaton bombs detonated on target, and only 15% of the casualties from the other 70 bombs (of which about half were 5 KT and half 60 KT bombs) detonated on target. // Also the Subcommittee's report makes clear that it did not attempt to even estimate the large number of additional casualties which would certainly result from radioactive fall-out from the two 10 megaton bombs detonated on target, and also possibly from some of the fourteen 10 megaton bombs brought down fairly near large populated areas before they reached their targets.

6. In the postulated low altitude attack, approximately 45% of the casualties resulted from only one 10 megaton bomb detonated on target, with the remaining 55% of the casualties resulting from the 170 60 KT bombs which landed on target.

7. These new elements of danger enormously increase the threat to our national survival in the event of a Soviet surprise attack against the continental United States: (1) after the Russians have accumulated enough 5 to 15 MT bombs of a size deliverable on continental U.S. targets by modern Russian jet and turbo-prop bombers (now in series production), and (2) after the Russians have developed an operating capability for in-flight refueling, or even without refueling on one-way missions of heavy jet and turbo-prop bombers staged from the Kola and Chukotski Areas.

8. As a result of those elements of added danger which had occurred prior to the July 1, 1954 report to the National Security Council, the President on August 7, 1954, approved Paragraph 7 in NSC 5422/2:

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"The U.S. should accelerate its military and non-military programs for continental defense set forth in NSC 5408 to the fullest extent deemed feasible and operationally desirable and give to these programs very high priority, having in mind that it is estimated that the Soviets will reach a high capability for strategic nuclear attacks by July, 1957."



9. On March 17, 1955, the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee (Killian Committee) submitted its report to the President, which report, I understand, will be considered by the National Security Council at an early date. A portion of this report includes extensive recommendations with regard to continental defense.

TIME CHART.

10. At the meeting of the National Security Council on November 24, 1954, I also presented a Time Chart as a possible "basis for determining national policy", pointing out that it appeared important to "identify and recognize four different periods". Also that:

✓ 8/1991
"The second period shown on the chart and starting about 1956 was the one during which we could exert greatest pressure on Russia. It will be a relatively short period, however, and not continue longer than 2 or 3 years after Russia detonates her first modern multi-megaton weapon, which may occur at any time."

✓
"The third period is our period of greatest danger - when Russia will have a large enough stockpile of multi-megaton weapons and the means for delivering them on continental U.S. targets - provided, in the meantime, we don't further accelerate needed steps to meet a really high altitude attack, or a really low altitude attack."

✓
"If we do what has to be done to obtain certain early warning and a defense adequate to impose a very high attrition on Russian attacking forces and before she builds up an adequate stockpile of multi-megaton weapons; and we continue to increase our defenses as Russian attacking forces also continue to increase -- then period two may continue for a number of years, and the arrival of period three may be correspondingly delayed."

✓
11. The report of the Technological Capabilities Panel (Killian Committee) includes a similar timetable, spelled out in much greater detail, but with no significant change in the starting dates or lengths of the four periods described.

DEFENSE PROGRESS REPORT (as of April 15, 1955)

12. I want to again express my admiration of the presentation made by the Defense Department in its current progress report. It indicates continuing progress in our defense posture and contains some very encouraging information. It also records a few sl...

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✓ 13. (It further) clearly indicates, in the light of more rapid Russian advances in achieving a modern fleet of long-range bombers than had previously been anticipated, that our defense programs urgently need to be accelerated and early consideration should be given to revising NSC 5408, the basic NSC paper on Continental Defense.

Radios 40,000 ft - 45,000 ft

✓ 14. Briefly stated, our defenses are inadequate to meet the threat of either a very high altitude (at present NIKE is our only effective defense against enemy bombers coming in over 48,000 feet), or a very low altitude attack made by modern Russian bombers. Also over half of our air defense command interceptors (the F-86Ds) have much too low a kill probability (around 20%) to cause a sufficiently high attrition to enemy bombers carrying multi-megaton weapons.

✓ 15. While all of these problems are being worked on actively, I would suggest, in view of greatly increased Soviet capabilities, that at a minimum, early consideration be given to further acceleration of the following specific programs needed to achieve an adequate defense against high altitude and low altitude attacks of modern Russian bombers by mid-1957:

which I will detail in this meeting - include

a. Modify our fixed and semi-mobile ground radars to achieve high altitude coverage up to 60,000 feet (AN/GPA-27 modification already underway).

achieving 60,000 ft + 40,000 ft

b. Complete all phases of gap-filler radar program for low altitude surveillance (program underway in four phases).

1) 40,000 ft - 45,000 ft

c. Modify existing manual aircraft control and warning system so that it will have the capacity to handle a mass raid by completing installation of interim equipment (AN/GPS-T2 and AN/GPA-37).

2) 45,000 ft - 50,000 ft

d. Complete at an earlier date than presently planned the Hawaiian end of the seaward extension of the early warning system, from Kodiak to Hawaii, to prevent an end-run around the Alaskan sector of the barrier now planned for completion in 1957.

3) 50,000 ft - 55,000 ft

e. Modify airborne search and intercept radars to achieve low altitude coverage down to 500 to 1,000 feet (possibilities include use of lower frequencies, improved antennas and MTI).

4) 55,000 ft - 60,000 ft

f. Modify interceptors and/or associated armament to achieve a high altitude weapons capability up to 55,000 feet (possibilities include "snap-up" technique and rocket assist).

g. Modify armament of F-86Ds to increase kill probability to 50% (possibilities include much larger number of smaller diameter rockets and rocket employing a new VT fuze fragmenting warhead, BIRD DOG).

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h. Equip our interceptors and our anti-aircraft with weapons having atomic warhead to vastly increase kill probabilities (DING DONG air-to-air rocket and nuclear warhead for NIKE).

i. Double fire power of NIKE by completing program for "double-sitting" (double fire power for about 15% added cost).

j. Complete development of anti-aircraft weapon with a high kill probability at very low altitudes (possibilities include modification of NIKE control system, also HAWK and PORCUPINE developments).

✓ 16. After considering the Killian Report, you may conclude to make considerable revision of policies and programs for the national defense. However, I submit that in the interim, and pending full and final action on that report, the foregoing suggestions should be considered on an urgent basis. It should be noted that there is little, if indeed anything, in following out these suggestions which would conflict, or be inconsistent with, any broader action which might be taken at a later date with regard to the Killian Report.

CONCLUSION

✓ 17. NSC 5501 sets forth our present BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. Paragraph 31, page 11, states one of the key Military Problems as an Element of National Strategy:

9/19/57
"As part of its military forces, the U.S. must develop and maintain its effective nuclear-air retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The U.S. must also continue accelerated military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and security of the USSR."

✓ 18. At the present rate we are going, as set forth in the latest Department of Defense Progress Report, we will not, by mid-1957, be able to "keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise."

✓ 19. I believe that it is of imperative national importance that we are able to do so by that date.
7 million lives in the event of an attack

Robert C. Sprague
ROBERT C. SPRAGUE
Consultant to the
National Security Council

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Time Chart
of

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Relative Gross Capabilities to Deliver a Decisive Nuclear Attack
("Decisive" meaning the elimination of the ability of the nation attacked to recover sufficiently to undertake a major war effort, thus obviating the necessity of the attacker to conduct a long war to win a conclusive victory)

	<u>Period</u>	<u>U.S. vs. Russia</u>	<u>Russia vs. U.S.</u>
a)	1. Now	NOT DECISIVE (even with surprise attack)	NOT DECISIVE (even with surprise attack)
a)	2. About 1956	DECISIVE (with surprise attack)	NOT DECISIVE (even with surprise attack)
c)	3. Starting about 1957-1958 and continuing for a presently undetermined number of years	DECISIVE (with, and possibly even without, surprise attack)	DECISIVE * (with surprise attack)
d)	4. ?--might never arrive --but probably will-- could be within a decade	DECISIVE (with or without surprise attack)	DECISIVE (with or without surprise attack)
*	If Russia discovers the secret of a modern megaton weapon in the years immediately ahead, and unless in the meantime we develop distant early warning and control and fighter-interceptor and anti-aircraft artillery defenses, effective against both very high and very low altitude attack.		
a)	Kiloton bombs not adequate to do the job. U.S. only starting to build up stockpile of megaton weapons.		
b)	U.S. will have adequate stockpile of megaton weapons and Russia will not.		
c)	U.S. will have more than adequate stockpile of megaton weapons and Russia could have adequate stockpile of megaton bombs if she discovers secret of their design in the years immediately ahead.		
d)	U.S. and Russia will have much more than an adequate stockpile of megaton weapons (era of "nuclear plenty") and very sophisticated means for delivering them; one example of which could be an Inter-continental Ballistic Missile with Multi-Megaton Warhead.		

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to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

June 16, 1955

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First: The probability (based on our recent Pacific tests of nuclear weapons) that the Russians might have within the next few years, - and possibly as early as mid-1957, - a significant stockpile of :::::::::: bombs, deliverable by long-range Russian bombers on our Continent.

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Third: The increased problem of providing a U.S. air defense system with adequate early warning, interception, and kill of modern long-range Russian bombers.

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NLE Case 84-42243

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Details

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6/16/55

4. Since 1954 there is no change in intelligence estimates of Russian atomic and nuclear capabilities, although it is now considered highly probable that Russia will test her first modern multi-megaton weapon during.....

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programs for continental defense set forth in NSC 5408 to the fullest extent deemed feasible and operationally desirable and give to these programs very high priority, having in mind that it is estimated that the Soviets will reach a high capability for strategic nuclear attacks by July, 1957."

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advances in achieving a modern fleet of long-range bombers than had previously been anticipated, that our defense programs urgently need to be accelerated and early consideration should be given to revising NSC 5408, the basic NSC paper on Continental Defense.

14. Briefly stated, our defenses are inadequate to meet the threat of either a very high altitude (at present NIKE is our only effective defense against enemy bombers coming in over 48,000 feet), or a very low altitude attack made by modern Russian bombers. Also over half of our air defense command interceptors (the F-86Ds) have much too low a kill probability (around 20%) to cause a sufficiently high attrition to enemy bombers carrying multi-megaton weapons.

15. While all of these problems are being worked on actively, I would suggest, in view of greatly increased Soviet capabilities, that at a minimum, early consideration be given to further acceleration of the following specific programs needed to achieve an adequate defense against high altitude and low altitude attacks of modern Russian bombers by mid-1957:

a. Modify our fixed and semi-mobile ground radars to achieve high altitude coverage up to 60,000 feet (AN/GPA-27 modification already underway).

b. Complete all phases of gap-filler radar program for low altitude surveillance (program underway in four phases).

c. Modify existing manual aircraft control and warning system so that it will have the capacity to handle a mass raid by completing installation of interim equipment (AN/GPS-T2 and AN/GPA-37).

d. Complete at an earlier date than presently planned the Hawaiian end of the seaward extension of the early warning system from Kodiak to Hawaii, to prevent an end-run around the Alaskan sector of the barrier now planned for completion in 1957.

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f. Modify interceptors and/or associated armament to achieve a high altitude weapons capability up to 55,000 feet (possibilities include "snap-up" technique and rocket assist).

g. Modify armament of F-86Ds to increase kill probability to 50% (possibilities include much larger number of smaller diameter rockets and rocket employing a new VT fuze fragmenting warhead, BIRD DOG).

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h. Equip our interceptors and our anti-aircraft with weapons having atomic warhead to vastly increase kill probabilities (DING DONG air-to-air rocket and nuclear warhead for NIKE).

i. Double fire power of NIKE by completing program for "double-siting" (double fire power for about 15% added cost).

j. Complete development of anti-aircraft weapon with a high kill probability at very low altitudes (possibilities include modification of NIKE control system, also HAWK and PORCUPINE developments).

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CONCLUSION

✓ 17. NSC 5501 sets forth our present BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. Paragraph 31, page 11, states one of the key Military Problems as an Element of National Strategy:

✓ 19. I believe that it is of imperative national importance that we are able to do so by that date.

ROBERT C. SPRAGUE
Consultant to the
National Security Council

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bowie

Chancellor Adenauer
Ambassador Krekeler
Blankenhorn
Mr. Weber (interpreter)

Mr. Macmillan
Sir Roger Makins
Sir Harold Caccia
Lord Hood

M. Pinay
Ambassador de Murville
M. Sauvagnargues
M. Crouy-Chanel

Mr. Andronykov

Secretary's Suite at the Waldorf, 2:10 p.m., June 17, 1955

The Secretary opened by explaining to the Chancellor that the three power talks had considered primarily procedural matters. He referred to the Molotov dinner, the selection of chairmen, rotation of chairmanship, translations, etc. The three Western powers will try to conduct the meeting on a serious basis and not as propaganda. The heads of government will keep their speeches short and businesslike. These matters will be discussed with Molotov in San Francisco.

We expect that the heads of government will consider as the main problems German unification, European security, and global disarmament. They would also bring up as principal causes of tension (1) the activities of the Communist parties in various countries and (2) the deprivation of freedom in the satellites. While we recognize the Soviets are not likely to agree to discuss these topics or to create any forum for pursuing them, we could not omit bringing them up for they constitute, at least for the United States, the

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☐ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a)
10/12/1994

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Thus, by doing everything feasible to avoid dampening undue hopes for quick action, we must try to produce some results within about a year. The public will probably be tolerant for that period, but will expect concrete results within it. The President tried to create a sense of the time and patience which will be required. He has referred to "years" and even "generations", but in practice we will have to produce results in about a year more or less or break off on the ground that the Soviets are not serious. At present the West may have a stronger negotiating position and can be reasonably expected to later on. ~~There~~ Our own political and economic situation is relatively stable in contrast to the Soviet difficulties. This should enable us to negotiate effectively now. Our ^{relative} position is not likely to improve materially over the coming years. Secondly, the Secretary wished to comment on the matter of disarmament. From a propaganda view it is necessary to ~~revive~~ revive and keep alive the fact that the West desires progress in this field. In his UN speech, the President may refer to his earlier proposal (the Secretary has not seen the latest draft) but as a ^{practical} ~~political~~ matter there may be great difficulties in making progress. Our experts ~~will~~ advise us that the possibility of diverting nuclear material poses serious problems for effective control and may require new concepts. Mr. Stassen is studying the matter and trying to bring together the divergent views within our government, especially among Defense, State and AEC. Today the US is ^{not} in a position to make concrete proposals but we can reaffirm our general support for disarmament as in the 1953 speech. This problem is extremely complex not only technically but in its political consequences. Some measures ~~might~~ for disarmament might protect others more remote from

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hostile areas like the United States, but not benefit those more exposed to hostile land forces. He is not optimistic about achieving global disarmament for a considerable time, possibly years. It may even be that no progress will be possible until increased confidence brings about de facto reductions in military forces.

~~Theoretically,~~ however, he considers that European security measures can be separated from global disarmament. Some moves toward balance of forces in Europe is more manageable. Indeed it is probably essential to achieve German unity. ^{The} Soviets are not going to agree to turn over East Germany to be armed against them as part of the Western alliance. Hence German unity may be closely tied to some balance of forces concept which will remove the Soviet fear of being damaged by agreeing to unity. Now is probably the best time to push ahead on these two related ideas ~~for~~ of German unity and European security. He hoped that the heads of government might then produce a new effort in either a single forum or in parallel forums. Perhaps the matter of trade could be used as a lever, as part of a package involving Germany unity and European security, especially freer trade in primary materials and food stuffs as distinct from manufactured strategic materials.

The Secretary joined Mr. Pinay and Mr. Macmillan in approving the Chancellor's proposed method for handling the Soviet invitation. He felt that it would ~~be~~ not be difficult to schedule any Foreign Ministers meeting after Geneva so that it would follow a visit to Moscow and leave an interval to explore

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Soviet intentions in that way. Mr. Pinay and Mr. Macmillan seemed to acquiesce in this view.

The Chancellor wished to comment briefly on the view that the Soviets would not agree to German unity if it increased German war potential. In his view while unity would add 18 million Germans to the West, it should not result in an increase of German divisions above the twelve now planned. This should not be stated however, unless negotiations with the Soviets were making some progress. Moreover unity would not add to real German strength for many years. West German resources would have to be used to improve conditions in the East Zone. This task would absorb large resources for many years. The net effect of unity would be to reduce the increase of West German strength during that period.

The Secretary said that the four of them appeared to be in general agreement on the matters they had discussed. Mr. Pinay said that he shared the views of the Chancellor and had been delighted to hear them. Mr. Macmillan had nothing to add and considered that the meetings had been most useful. T

The four then approved the draft communique which had been circulated and authorized its issuance at once. The meeting ~~was~~ ended at four o'clock.

RRBowie:cjp

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No. 1 of 14 copies, Series A.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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MEMORANDUM

To: The Acting Secretary

Through: S/S #3

Subject: IE-76: Probable Reactions to an Assumed Soviet Offer to Unite Germany

The attached paper which was prepared by our Estimates Group, arrives at the following conclusions about the manner in which the Federal Republic on the one hand and France and the UK on the other would respond to a Soviet bona fide offer to create a united and neutral Germany.

1. If the USSR made a bona fide offer to join in creating a united and neutralized Germany, the West Germans would, in the long run, wish to accept that offer unless they believed that this would deprive them of US protection. Their estimate of US intentions in this regard would be based not only on US statements but also on their appraisal of US self-interest, which they would expect to run strongly in favor of maintaining the US military presence in Western Europe.

2. The Western Europeans' reaction to such a Soviet offer would be mixed, but their desire to relax tensions would almost certainly be greater than their fear of a united Germany. If, nonetheless, the West rejected the Soviet offer, this would be considered an act of intransigence by many Europeans, and would become an added argument for neutralism, especially in France.

microfilmed by RMD

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Att: IE 76

cc: G - Mr. Murphy
C - Mr. MacArthur
S/P - Mr. Bowie
IO - Mr. Key
EUR - Mr. Merchant
FE - Mr. Robertson
NEA - Mr. Allen
E - Mr. Waugh
P - Mr. McCardle
S/MSA - Mr. Nolting
U/OP - Mr. Bishop

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NO: 5642, JUNE 23, 1955

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SENT DEPARTMENT 5642, REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW 300.

I DINED LAST NIGHT AT JACQUINOT'S AND VINOGRADOV WAS ALSO PRESENT. AFTER DINNER I HAD LONG AND ANIMATED CONVERSATION WITH HIM IN PRESENCE OF NUMEROUS FRENCH GUESTS. FOLLOWING ITEMS MAY BE OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST. CONVERSATION WILL BE REPORTED IN GREATER DETAIL BY DESPATCH.

1. DISARMAMENT. ON THE QUESTION OF CONTROLS VINOGRADOV ADMITTED THAT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT, AS ANY INSPECTION THAT WOULD BE THOROUGH ENOUGH TO GIVE ASSURANCE MIGHT INVOLVE UNACCEPTABLE INVASION OF NATIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS. THEREFORE, HE SUGGESTED AS ALTERNATIVE THAT NO ONE WOULD MAKE USE OF ATOMIC OR THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH THEY MIGHT POSSESS. HE SAID THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO SOVIETS AND WITH SUCH AN AGREEMENT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO MOVE AHEAD ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THEIR RECENT PROPOSAL.

2. UNIFICATION OF GERMANY. VINOGRADOV STATED THAT SOVIETS WERE NOW (REPEAT NOW) PREPARED TO ACCEPT FREE ALL GERMAN ELECTIONS SUBJECT TO STRICT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, PROVIDED ONLY THAT FOREIGN TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM GERMAN SOIL PRIOR TO THE VOTE.

3. CULTURAL EXCHANGES. VINOGRADOV LAID GREAT STRESS ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND EXCHANGE OF PERSONAL VISITS. HE SAID THAT SOVIET UNION NOW WELCOMED TOURISTS OF ALL SORTS SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CAPACITY OF SOVIET HOTELS. HE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT IT WAS NOW (REPEAT NOW) FAR EASIER FOR A FOREIGNER TO ENTER THE SOVIET UNION THAN TO ENTER THE U.S. HE SAID THAT FAR AS VISITS FROM FOREIGNERS WERE CONCERNED, THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY IRON CURTAIN ON THE SOVIET SIDE BUT THAT TITLE "IRON CURTAIN" WAS MUCH MORE APPLICABLE TO U.S. VISA REQUIRE-

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3971

July 1, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THROUGH: S/S

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Proposed European Atomic Pool.

Rtd S/A E
7-6

In a memorandum of this date, Mr. Merchant recommends that you agree in principle that we would treat a European atomic energy authority (modeled on the Schuman plan) in the same way as we would treat a national state. He also recommends that the President make a positive statement along this line in his forthcoming message to Congress on atomic energy cooperation; that we explore modifying our atomic energy agreement just signed with Belgium to remove bars to integration; and that we hold up any more power reactor bilaterals with Schuman plan countries pending further study of integration.

S/AE does not concur with these recommendations. We have checked informally with the Atomic Energy Commission and are advised that the Atomic Energy Commission is also not prepared to agree with the proposed position at this time.

Atomic power cooperation has just been initiated with the U.K., Canada, and Belgium, the three countries with whom we have been most closely associated in atomic energy development since the war. In studying possible atomic power cooperation with any other country, difficult problems arise, and greater problems appear if multilateral cooperation under the Atomic Energy Act is considered. As a practical matter, it is not clear that the Act envisages any multilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy except with an International Atomic Energy Agency. The attitude of the Schuman plan countries toward atomic energy integration has by no means been officially established--especially in France and Belgium--despite enthusiastic favorable statements by individual officials. While atomic energy integration is an attractive goal, there are only vague concepts at present as to what it would mean.

With regard to modifying our just concluded agreement with Belgium, this agreement is most important to our national security and to defense of the Free World, and is also considered highly important by the Belgian Government. Modification may not prove consistent in important respects with either our national interest or the Belgian interest.

In view of these and other uncertainties, we should not at this point adopt a policy of support for a European atomic energy authority, even in principle, or make an announcement of such support which we may find it difficult to implement. We need first to make sure that integration is practical and is desired by the European countries, and also that the U.S. is in a position to cooperate with such an authority.

by to EUR w/return
of # 3971

S/AE:PJFarley:lab:mki

[Redacted]

Gerard C. Smith

cc: L - Mr. Phleger, EUR - Mr. Merchant, RA - Mr. Palmer

via S/AE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NSC

REFERENCE: NSC 5524, "Basic US Policy in Relation
to Four-Power Negotiations"

INTELLIGENCE COMMENTS ON NSC 5524

The following intelligence comments are submitted
on NSC 5524:

1. The Soviet leaders have tried in a conspicuous way
over recent months to give the impression that they are
earnestly seeking an improvement in the international
atmosphere. The most recent indication is their unpre-
cedentedly conciliatory attitude over the Bering Sea plane
incident. However, no real evidence has yet appeared that
they have altered their view that there is an inradicable
hostility between the Communist and free worlds, or that
they have abandoned their ultimate aim to expand the
sphere of Communist power. Their unyielding attitude to
date in the Japanese treaty talks in London reveals their
unwillingness to surrender positions they consider important.
What we have been witnessing, therefore, is probably a new
phase of Soviet tactics, not a fundamental change in policy.

Internal

2. The absence of a dominant figure like Stalin has
raised serious problems for policy-making in the Soviet
totalitarian system. Although Khrushchev seems to have
been the most influential figure since the fall of Malenkov,
he does not possess decisive power and following his un-
satisfactory performance in Belgrade his position may even
be somewhat shaken. The new "collective" leadership has evi-
dently been concerned to avoid decisions involving any very
high degree of risk and to exercise a greater degree of
tactical flexibility than Stalin.

3. The Soviet leaders have themselves declared that
the burden of military expenditures is weighing heavily on
their economy, and there seems good reason for taking their

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Date 1 MAR 1985

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Policy Review
NSC 5524
Four-Power Negotiations (1)

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expression of concern at face value. If programs for acquiring a modern air defense and strategic air force, nuclear weapons, guided missiles, and submarines are pushed forward, along with modernization of ground forces to adapt them to atomic warfare, the burden of Soviet military expenditures will continue to increase substantially.

4. This rising burden of military costs comes at a time when there are other pressing claims on Soviet resources. Along with continuing primary emphasis on heavy industry, the USSR is currently engaged in a major effort to increase agricultural output. There is not now a critical food situation in the USSR. However, the Soviet leaders recognize that, unless they can overcome the near stagnation in agricultural production, the pressure of their growing population on the food supply will eventually confront them with a most serious problem. To meet this problem will require heavy investment for a number of years and could involve special strains in the event of serious crop failures.

5. Communist China, and to some extent the Satellites in Eastern Europe, are also claimants on Soviet resources. The USSR is committed to support their military power and assist their economic growth. If the risks of war in the Far East should increase, the burden of military aid to China would probably rise sharply.

6. The impact of all the various claims on Soviet resources may have reached a point at which it threatens to reduce substantially the rate of economic growth. Since rapid economic growth, particularly in basic industry, has always been viewed by the Soviet leaders as a primary objective, associated with their desire to "overtake and surpass the capitalist countries", they must view with concern an international situation which forces them to devote so large a part of their resources to unproductive military purposes.

External

7. The Soviet leaders must now recognize that their previous policies stimulated a strong Western reaction and led to a growth and consolidation of Western strength. They probably feel that such policies have passed the point of diminishing returns. A shift to more flexible tactics probably seems necessary to give new impetus to their long-standing efforts to divide and weaken the Western alliance while avoiding risks of general war.

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8. The Soviet desire to avoid general war has probably now been strengthened by a new ingredient -- belated recognition of the consequences of nuclear conflict. Progress in their own development of nuclear weapons may have convinced the Soviet leaders, as Western statesmen have already been convinced, that the dangers inherent in any major war are now vastly greater than ever before. These leaders may be particularly concerned over their relative disadvantage during the next few years until they have acquired a nuclear weapons of delivery capabilities sufficient to counterbalance those of the US. However, they almost certainly recognize that even such a growth in their own nuclear capabilities will not remove the danger to the survival of their own system in event of nuclear conflict. They may therefore desire a prolonged reduction of tensions.

9. If indeed the Soviets are now more keenly aware of the dangers of nuclear war, they must have regarded recent mounting tensions in the Formosa Straits with real apprehension. Despite the many ties between Peking and Moscow, the USSR must be worried over the possible unpredictability of their Chinese ally, and the chances of its taking action which would undesirably involve the USSR. Even local hostilities in the Formosa Strait might require greater material support from the USSR and might involve great danger of embroiling the USSR itself. On the other hand, failure to aid the Chinese in such circumstances would threaten the loss of an alliance which has become an essential element of the USSR's position as a world power.

10. Even more important, the ratification of the Paris Accords must have seemed to the Soviet leaders to be a major reversal. The rearmament of West Germany, fought so bitterly by Soviet propaganda and diplomacy since 1950, is probably regarded by the Soviet leaders not only as adding substantially to Western strength, but also as increasing the burdens and dangers of the cold war. They probably believe that, in the absence of a Soviet initiative, tensions might further increase, and therefore that their own military effort would also have to increase.

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SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN NEGOTIATIONS

11. It appears from the foregoing that the USSR, for various reasons, almost certainly desires some reduction in tensions. This conclusion is not inconsistent with any of the four hypotheses in NSC 5524, as to the course which Soviet policy will pursue in the coming negotiations. However, hypothesis C, and to a lesser extent D, appear to be the best estimates of Soviet courses of action, but it is unlikely that Soviet policy has as yet settled exclusively on any one of these four courses. As pointed out in NSC 5524, all four may figure in a tentative way in the calculations of the Soviet leaders.

12. The following comments are advanced on the four hypotheses:

- a. "The USSR has no real willingness to alter previous positions in any substantial respect, but is engaged solely in diplomatic and propaganda maneuvers, having particularly in mind the present 2-3 year period of marked Soviet military disadvantage."
No doubt the Soviets wish to hold down risks of general war while they increase their nuclear capabilities, and they probably believe they can do so without making major concessions. If this minimizing of the risk of war is all the Soviets want, they can get it merely by insuring that Communist nations refrain from aggressive action. However, it will not ease their economic problems, or markedly improve the international situation. Moreover, the Soviets almost certainly recognize that even when their nuclear capabilities approach those of the US, the dangers inherent in full-scale nuclear warfare to the Communist system will not be appreciably reduced. Finally the USSR cannot realistically expect to achieve its positive objectives of preventing or slowing down West German rearmament and otherwise undermining Western strength without a more forthcoming policy.

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- b. The USSR, in order better to exploit the situation in the Far East, wishes to bring about an immediate easing of tensions in other areas. While such tactics might serve to isolate the US in the Far East and will therefore probably figure in the Soviet approach to negotiations, the USSR is almost certainly also concerned to avoid risks of war in Asia. The general motivations which appear to be behind current Soviet policy would dictate some relaxation of tensions in the Far East as well as Europe, since the Soviets probably recognize that the problem of world tensions is essentially indivisible. That the Soviets do take this view is supported by some indications that the USSR has tried to exert a moderating influence on Peiping in recent months.
- c. The USSR considers that the present time affords an opportunity for flexible exploitation of the possibilities of settling selected outstanding issues and reserves its decision as to ensuing moves and attitudes pending the outcome of these negotiations. This hypothesis seems the most plausible. As noted above, the Soviet leaders are worried by their internal difficulties and by trends in the world situation, and desire some reduction in tensions. It would be consistent with the Soviet technique of negotiating for them to proceed carefully, exploring such opportunities as might develop. Therefore, the development of Soviet policies as the negotiations proceed will to a considerable degree depend on the positions taken by the Western powers.
- d. The USSR has decided to bring about a substantial and prolonged reduction in international tensions and is willing to alter previous negotiating positions appreciably to this end. It is possible that the USSR does want a substantial reduction of tensions for a prolonged period and is willing to

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alter previous positions to this end. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether Soviet concern over internal problems or over trends in the world situation has reached the point of willingness to surrender any assets of real importance to the Bloc merely to improve the international atmosphere. The USSR might make substantial concessions, but only for what it would regard as an adequate quid pro quo.

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13. The principal Soviet objectives in the negotiations will be (a) to prevent or at least to limit West German rearmament, and (b) to weaken the Western alliance and if possible to obtain the withdrawal of US forces from bases around the periphery of the Bloc. The Soviets probably calculate that if the cold war seemed to be coming to an end, there would be great reluctance in the West to continue the effort to maintain military strength, there would also be renewed opportunities for diplomatic maneuvers which might open up a new phase of political warfare.

SOVIET TACTICS AND POSITIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS

14. The initial Soviet position in the negotiations appears to have been laid down in the note of 10 May 1955 and confirmed by Molotov's speech to the UI on 22 June. It seems evident that the USSR wishes to gain the initiative by focusing the talks on its disarmament proposals and on its scheme for a security arrangement in Europe.

15. The USSR will probably lay great stress on the disarmament issue and may be prepared to carry out some limited form of agreement in this field. However, the Soviets will almost certainly not accept Western requirements for full freedom of access for international inspectors. The USSR would be unlikely to accept even the more limited form of inspection it has itself proposed unless it obtained some such concession as a substantial US withdrawal from bases in Europe and Asia. If the West were willing to accept an arms limitation arrangement without inspection, but providing for agreed levels of armament for West Germany and for mutual reduction of occupation forces in Germany, the USSR would probably welcome an agreement.

16. The USSR probably hopes to avoid discussion of German reunification, and in particular of the Western plan to accomplish this through free elections, by making its demands for a disarmament and security agreement on its own terms a condition precedent. The Soviets must be on the horns of a dilemma about Germany. Although they are anxious to keep reunification dangling before West German eyes, and may even regard their forward position in East Germany as becoming less vital in an age of nuclear weapons, they are probably greatly concerned lest withdrawal from East Germany endanger their position in the Satellites. They probably believe that the West could not provide adequate guarantees against the threat of a reunified Germany. In addition, they may be reluctant to lose East Germany's substantial industrial contribution to the Bloc.

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17. Therefore, the USSR probably prefers at this time to continue the division of Germany. It will probably offer to reduce its forces in East Germany to "limited contingents," and at the same time propose interim steps toward unification through negotiations between the two Germanies. It probably hopes that such an offer will confuse West German opinion, and thereby prevent the Adenauer government from pushing forward with rearmament. If such an effect is not achieved, however, the possibility cannot be excluded that, at some stage of a prolonged negotiation on Germany, the USSR would agree to German reunification in return for Western pledges to guarantee Eastern Europe against German aggression.

18. As additional, but secondary issues the Soviets will probably raise at least the following: (a) admission of Communist China to the UN; (b) a separate five-power, or larger, conference on Far Eastern affairs; (c) expansion of East-West trade; (d) banning of war propaganda; (e) broadening of cultural relations.

/s/ ALLEN W. DULLES

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of
Central Intelligence

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(21)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

July 5, 1955

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MEMORANDUM

I read Mr. Merchant's memorandum on US Policy towards proposed European Atomic Pool . I have also read Mr. Smith's dissent from Mr. Merchant's recommendations.

I agree with recommendations (1) and (2) . I agree with (3a), with emphasis on "assist Belgium". I do not think we should pressure Belgium.

With reference to (3b), I do not think we should use delay as a means of coercion. I do not think we should rush these other bilateral arrangements but should go ahead in an orderly way with the understanding that if the pool is agreed upon, we should treat them in the same way as we treat the Belgian agreement.

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July 8, 1955

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 254th Meeting of the
National Security Council, Thursday,
July 7, 1955

Present at the 254th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Admiral Donald B. Duncan for the Chief of Naval Operations; the Vice Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistants to the President Anderson, Dodge, Rockefeller and Stassen; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

BASIC U. S. POLICY IN RELATION TO FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS

(NSC 5524; Annexes to NSC 5524; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 1 and 5, 1955; NSC Action No. 1419)

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs commenced his briefing of NSC 5524 with a description of the first paragraph ("Basic U. S. Approach"), with particular reference to the additions to this paragraph proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the form of two new paragraphs. (For the text of these new proposed paragraphs, taken from NSC 5501, see the subsequent Record of Action.) Mr. Anderson then explained the significance which the Joint Chiefs of Staff attached to their proposed additional paragraphs. In the first place, they raised a question as to the seriousness of the Soviet desire to reach any settlement of basic issues between itself and the West. Secondly, the paragraphs were intended to suggest that the U. S. approach to the Geneva Conference should be based on the view that the position of the Soviet Union was weakening and that we should accordingly

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The results of some of these polls, said the President, indicated popular attitudes in France and even in Great Britain which were actually alarming. These could not be ignored.

Mr. Anderson proceeded with a briefing of the next paragraph, dealing with U. S. objectives at the forthcoming conference. Apropos of this paragraph, (Secretary Dulles said that he had read earlier this morning a very interesting statement which pointed out that in the Russian language the phrase "negotiating from strength" carried with it an offensive rather than a defensive connotation. Indeed, the Russians used the same words to mean "rape". It was accordingly not hard to understand the Russian anxiety about our use of the phrase "negotiating from strength", and this fact should be borne in mind (laughter).

The President continued with his earlier thought, and said that the same public opinion polls indicated to him how very touchy was this matter of "an increase in allied strength, unity and determination". He then cited the verdict of the polls taken in Western Europe on the subject of possible withdrawal of U. S. forces. These polls indicated a considerable popular opinion in favor of such a withdrawal of U. S. forces under certain circumstances and safeguards. This view, said the President, contrasted sharply with the U. S. position that we were wholly opposed to the withdrawal of U. S. forces at this time.

Mr. Anderson continued his briefing by reading verbatim the statement of specific U. S. objectives with respect to Europe. When he had reached sub-paragraph c, which indicated that the U. S. and the UK should maintain forces in Germany "to the degree and for the time required by the security interests of the U. S. and its allies, including Germany", Secretary Dulles said he wished to make a comment. It was of vital importance, he believed, that we should succeed in getting the French to work along together with the Germans. At the moment the French are weak and they are accordingly fearful of the revival of German military strength. Reconciliation between the French and the Germans could accordingly only be achieved if we and the United Kingdom continue to station sufficient forces in Germany which would permit the French to send necessary armed forces to North Africa without fear of the Germans. The French would never agree to accept any significant increase in German military strength if the U. S. withdrew its forces from Europe. Indeed, in such a contingency the French might even agree to make a deal with the Russians in order to keep the Germans down. Perhaps, continued Secretary Dulles, the point he was trying to make was already implicit in this sub-paragraph, but he believed that it would be a good idea to make the thought explicit. In short, our forces were not stationed in Europe solely in relation to a Soviet threat, but as a means of reassuring the French against the Germans. It was agreed to include Secretary Dulles' point after the President had cited additional USIA public opinion polls in France on this subject.

The President then pointed to sub-paragraph g, which read: "The continued presence of the U. S. in Europe, maintaining such forces there as are necessary, and U. S. participation in the defense of free Europe at least so long as a measurable threat to the peace and security of Europe exists." The President thought that the phrase "such forces as are necessary" was ambiguous. Moreover, the whole thought in sub-paragraph g should not be set forth as a U. S. objective in Europe, but rather as a U. S. concession to Europe. Secretary Dulles, agreeing with the President, said that of course our true objective was to get out of Europe, but we cannot do so for the time being because our presence is necessary to tide Europe over its insecurity. The President said that he was probably more sensitive on this point than most of those present, since it had fallen to his lot to negotiate and to deal with the committees of the Congress with regard to the dispatching of U. S. forces to Europe in the first instance. Despite everything, we should look on the presence of U. S. armed forces in friendly countries abroad as invariably an emergency measure rather than as a normal aspect of United States policy. The Vice President suggested, and the Council agreed, to delete the first part of sub-paragraph g down to "U. S. participation".

Mr. Anderson resumed his briefing with comments on the section of the paper dealing with the general subject of "Germany and European Security". He noted that the several paragraphs composing this section included statements which were supplements to or elaborations of existing U. S. policy. When he reached the paragraph under this heading dealing with "Security Arrangements", he pointed out that the United States should be prepared to consider possible regional security arrangements encompassing both the free world and the Soviet bloc countries, including such things as non-aggression declarations or pacts, mutual consultation pacts, guarantees of frontiers, etc., etc., as set forth in this paragraph. The Director of Central Intelligence said he felt that the United States would encounter very grave difficulties if it permitted itself to become involved in the guaranteeing of frontiers and in entering into non-aggression pacts with the countries of the Soviet bloc. Such U. S. action would have serious repercussions in the satellites, and he doubted the wisdom of U. S. entry into a European regional security arrangement which involved either non-aggression pacts or guarantees of frontiers.

Secretary Dulles quickly added that he was about to make the identical objection to the wording of this paragraph. He said that he felt the strongest objection to U. S. involvement in any non-aggression pacts with the USSR. The history of the Soviet use of non-aggression pacts as an entering wedge for aggression was only too well known. There was already sufficient cover for non-aggression undertakings in the Charter of the United Nations. Any additional search for safety from aggression by virtue of non-aggression pacts with the Soviet Union would only provide the free world with a quite false sense of security. As to the matter of guarantee of frontiers, the United States had never been willing to do so, and had most recently indicated its unwillingness to do so in the case of Austria.

The President asked Secretary Dulles to cite instances of violation by the Soviet Union of non-aggression pacts into which it had entered with other nations. Secretary Dulles cited a number of instances; beginning with the Baltic states.

Further discussion resulted in an appropriate revision of the paragraph on security arrangements.

Mr. Anderson then turned to the next paragraph, which dealt with the subject of "Armaments Limitations", and explained the split views in sub-paragraph c, with the State Department on record as favoring the establishment of arms limitation and controls in Eastern Europe "comparable to the WEU system, possibly with provision for exchange of information and verification of such information"; while the other agencies were recorded as being opposed to U. S. agreement to any proposals for a system of regional arms limitation involving West Europe together with the Soviet satellites. Mr. Anderson explained the anxiety of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lest the State proposal lead to a situation in which the Soviet Union might obtain a voice in decisions as to the level of armament in the countries composing WEU, a matter which these countries now controlled themselves.

The President said he was less worried over the point which bothered the Joint Chiefs of Staff than he was over the possibility that such a regional arms limitation arrangement might give recognition to the existing situation in the Soviet satellites.

With respect to the position taken by the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Dulles stated with emphasis his belief that it was wrong for the National Security Council to declare flatly against any security arrangements which involved Eastern Europe. This was certainly an area in which we would be obliged to consider the views of our allies. Furthermore, if limits could be set on the armaments of the Eastern European countries, this would be a very good thing, provided an inspection system functioned properly to see that the agreements were observed.

Governor Stassen said that the great danger here was that if we agreed to any extension of WEU to cover the East European countries, we might well give the Soviet Union a voice in the management of Western European Union itself. The Soviets might well see in this an opportunity to prevent the rearmament of Germany. If they succeeded in this we would be handing them something that they desperately want in return for the very slight gain which we might achieve in limiting the military power of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Secretary Dulles replied with feeling that we would never succeed in our objective of a united Germany if we insisted upon limitation of the level of German armament, which level was wholly controlled by the Western powers--that is, the unification of Germany

would be impossible unless it was achieved under some sort of international control in which the Soviet Union would have a voice. The Soviets would never simply throw East Germany into the pot to be added to West Germany and the united Germany to be further rearmed against the Soviet Union itself.

Governor Stassen replied that if we went so far as to yield to the Russians any considerable degree of control over the rearmament of Germany without getting in return some degree of control over the level of the armaments of the Soviet Union itself, the United States would suffer a net loss to its security.

With some heat, Secretary Dulles answered that he was perfectly agreeable to having the present paragraph concerning armaments limitation state that this was a problem into which the U. S. must go with great care and caution; but he again warned that if we say flatly "no" to any European regional security arrangements we might just as well give up all hope of unifying Germany. Moreover, by such a course of action we would be bound to suffer a severe loss of support from the UK, from France, and from Germany itself. This was a hopeless position for the United States to take. Furthermore, if, as we were discussing at last week's Council meeting on disarmament, there might be conditions under which we would let the Soviet Union send inspectors of armament to the United States, why must we be so afraid to permit Soviet inspectors to verify the level of armaments in Germany?

Governor Stassen reiterated his fear of any Soviet control over Germany. The President added that in this sphere our hand would in all probability be forced if all the rest of our allies desired to enter into such a regional arms limitation agreement. The President said he thought that for the United States to say precisely what it would do in this matter and to make up its mind to refuse to budge from this position, was an impossibility.

Secretary Dulles added that it was certainly highly unrealistic to think that the United States was going to secure a degree of control over the level of armaments in the Soviet Union merely by virtue of some deal respecting the rearming of West Germany.

Governor Stassen repeated his great fear of a Communist voice with respect to the ceiling on the armaments of the Western European powers. There was very little gain if all we got in return for this was a voice in the ceilings which were to be placed on the armaments of the satellite countries. What we really needed to secure was a voice in the control of armaments in the Soviet Union itself.

In reply to Governor Stassen, Secretary Dulles said "Suppose the Soviets state that they will agree to the unification of Germany provided the present limits of German armaments are made permanent.

Could we turn down such a Soviet proposition?" Secretary Humphrey answered Secretary Dulles by arguing that at the present time we were in a position among the Western powers to make any agreed changes in the level of German armament. We would no longer be in a position to make such changes if the Soviets were in a position to veto these changes. How could we offset this great Soviet advantage? Could it be offset if the Western powers secured a similar veto on any upping of the level of armaments in the satellite nations?

Secretary Dulles indicated again his strong opposition to a flat NSC veto against European regional security arrangements, and said that this kind of statement by the NSC would tie the U. S. delegation hand and foot in this very delicate area of negotiation at the forthcoming conference. Secretary Wilson commented that despite his dislike of the idea of such a regional arms limitation agreement, he agreed completely with the reasoning of the Secretary of State. Secretary Dulles said that he didn't like the idea of such a regional armaments limitation agreement either, but it was a subject about which he might very well have to talk at Geneva.

The President said that it seemed to him that all the points that Governor Stassen had made in his exchange of views with Secretary Dulles had actually been included in the version of sub-paragraph c which was favored by the State Department. Secretary Dulles said that in any event he had never for a moment entertained the idea of agreeing to any such European arms limitation agreement involving West Europe and the Soviet satellites unless Germany were first rearmed and unified. He believed that Governor Stassen did not seem to realize that all his argument had been based on the assumption of the prior unification of Germany. The President said that this thought should be made explicit in the paragraph.

Admiral Radford said that the phrase to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff took most objection in the State Department version of sub-paragraph c was the phrase "comparable to the WEU system". The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that we could not afford to become involved in any arrangement with the satellites like WEU, which was a voluntary association, because to do so would provide the Soviets with a degree of control over Western rearmament which was unacceptable. Moreover, he added, the Chiefs believed that the State draft of sub-paragraph c was by no means clear on the important subject of inspection and control of any European regional arms limitation system.

The President at this point indicated a desire to get on with the remainder of the paper. Secretary Wilson again repeated his support for the views of the Secretary of State, as did Secretary Humphrey, who insisted that those who were going to have to negotiate at Geneva must be given reasonable leeway. This was inherent in any paper prepared in support of the U. S. negotiating position. The argument was settled when the President indicated that it would be best

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Action
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FROM: PARIS

Info
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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 120, JULY 8, 9 P.M.

OC
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SENT DEPARTMENT 120, REPEATED INFORMATION BONN 3, LONDON 4.

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE.

FROM BEAM.

AT FIRST PLENARY MEETING TODAY GREWE GAVE DETAILED EXPLANATION OF BONN WORKING GROUP REPORT ON EDEN PLAN, WHICH WILL BE REFERRED TO GOVERNMENTS FOR APPROVAL. BRIEF REFERENCE TO MAIN POINTS OF REVISION OF EDEN PLAN WILL BE INCORPORATED IN GERMAN UNIFICATION SECTION OF PARIS GROUP'S REPORT.

REST OF MEETING DEVOTED TO ELUCIDATION OF PROCEDURAL POINTS (AS AGREED IN WASHINGTON W.G. REPORT) FOR BENEFIT OF BLANKENHORN AND EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF RELATION OF GERMAN UNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES.

THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT GERMAN PROBLEM CAN NOT BE SEPARATED FROM EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEM. BRITISH, HOWEVER, QUERIED POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESSING WITH BOTH PROBLEMS "AT SAME TIME", SINCE WE HAVE A PUBLISHED (EDEN) PLAN ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION WHEREAS THERE IS AS YET NOT AGREED PLAN ON SECURITY. BRITISH FELT THAT IF SOVIETS WERE COY ABOUT DISCUSSING GERMANY, THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN PRESSING GERMAN REUNIFICATION ISSUE FOR ITSELF. WE SUGGESTED THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION SHOULD BE PRESSED AS MOST URGENT ISSUE AT GENEVA ALTHOUGH WE DOUBTED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO GET INTO DETAILS OF THIS QUESTION, MUCH LESS SECURITY QUESTION. WE COULD, HOWEVER, URGE THAT WORK ON BOTH PROBLEMS BE REMITTED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHICH WOULD PERMIT A MORE DETAILED STUDY AND CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES NECESSARY ESPECIALLY RE SECURITY. TACTICS AT SUBSEQUENT MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

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-2- 120, JULY 8, 9 P.M., FROM PARIS

WOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS PRESSING FORWARD SIMULTANEOUSLY ON BOTH POINTS.

FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMANS DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THIS POSITION, BUT FELT THAT IT WOULD NOT MEET PROBLEM THAT WOULD BE PRESENTED IF SOVIETS TOOK INITIATIVE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY SCHEME, PERHAPS SKIPPING OVER THE UNIFICATION PROBLEM. FELT THAT IT WOULD THEN BE NECESSARY FOR WEST TO HAVE POSITIVE RESPONSE, PERHAPS IN NATURE OF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (AS BLANKENHORN SUGGESTED) OR SUMMARY OUTLINE OF WEST SECURITY PLAN (AS BRITISH AND FRENCH PROPOSED). THEY OBSTENSIBLY AGREED THAT IF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES WERE PRESENTED AT GENEVA, IT WOULD NOT BE FOR PURPOSE OBTAINING AGREEMENT THEN AND THERE BUT AS INDICATION OF LIMITS WITHIN WHICH WEST PREPARED TO EXAMINE SECURITY PROBLEM AT SUBSEQUENT CONFERENCE. FRENCH CHAIRMAN COMMENTED THAT UNLESS WE HAVE AT LEAST THIS MUCH, WE WOULD BE GOING TO GENEVA WITH EMPTY HAND AND POCKET. WE EMPHASIZED THAT ANY GENERAL DISCUSSION POSSIBLE WITHIN GENEVA TIME LIMITS SHOULD BE CONFINED TO SCOPE NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY PROBLEM FOR FURTHER STUDY. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT ELEMENTS WESTERN SECURITY POSITION SUCH AS THOSE OUTLINED PAGE 16 WASHINGTON W.G. REPORT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. HEADS OF DELEGATIONS MEETING TOMORROW MORNING FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT.

DILLON

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NOTE: PASSED DEFENSE 7/9/55, 5 A.M. WLB

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7/9/85



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

9 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


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NLE Case 89-249 #1
By 246 NLE Date 12/27/90

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I asked General Heusinger as to when he expected the new German armed forces would actually come into being. He gave me the following estimate: In about two or three weeks the Bundestag should enact a law authorizing the recruiting of approximately 6,000 volunteers during this year. It was hoped that in October or November of this year the "Soldiers Law" would be passed which would authorize the recruiting of approximately 80,000 volunteers to complete the Regular Army

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cadres. By May of 1956 a law should be passed authorizing the conscription of the quotas necessary to bring up to full strength the authorized German forces. The training of the cadres should be completed by the end of 1956. They will be so organized that, in the event of an emergency, they could be formed into combat units. In early 1957 the twelve divisions will be formed simultaneously. No attempt will be made to select and accelerate the training of a lesser number of divisions as a token force. By midyear 1957 all of the divisions should be fully organized and undergoing progressive training.

Arthur Radford



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1955 JUL 20 PM 11 18

July 20, 1955

FROM: GENEVA

TO: SECSTATE SECTO 50 PRIORITY, July 20, 11PM

REPT INFO: Amembassy LONDON 20
Amembassy PARIS 24
Amembassy MOSCOW 7
Amembassy BONN 14

At 11:00 A.M. meeting Western Ministers forcefully developed logic their position on Germany and European security but Molotov simply fell back on previous Bulganin statements, adding nothing thereto.

Chairman Macmillan made clear urgency Western DELS attach German reunification. Soviet DEL had explained its system and plan for reaching same objective. Soviet plan seems to west distant and prolonged process whereas Soviets may consider our suggestions called for too rapid action. German reunification and European security closely linked together and solution of first may lie in solution of second.

Molotov said Soviet views on Germany fully stated yesterday. Would listen with interest to Western observations on Bulganin's remarks re European security.

Secretary explained we feel prolonged German division threat to European security whereas Soviets apparently feel division can be prolonged without

Concurrences:

Mr. Phleger

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danger to European security provided certain supplementary measures are adopted which they suggest. US ready accept apparent sincere Soviet conviction German unification would not repeat not bring increased security. We are equally sincere in wishing German unification occur under conditions which would increase security for all. Two sincere positions might possibly be drawn together if we could ascertain basis for Soviet feeling German unification would be danger. If Soviet Union, for example, fears German unification would mean advance eastward of threatening bases and military position, that is specific fear we could understand even though we did not agree. Same true regarding Soviet fear of enlargement German military establishments. If Soviets made their apprehensions clear in specific terms we could deal with them in specific practical way. US eager to find common ground since does not wish create new cause of insecurity by eliminating one cause.

Pinay said task seek acceptable formulae part of four power responsibility for German unification. Bulganin had indicated no objection based on free elections and Molotov at Berlin had suggested adoption Weimar electoral law.

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Elections could be held quickly under control and supervision neutral commissions. Impossible restore unity otherwise, given differences which have developed West and East Germany. Prolonged process suggested by Soviets dangerous since would perpetuate cleavage and would make every step dependent on two regimes with possible East German veto.

Molotov replied must keep in mind two real facts: ratification Paris Agreements and start of German militarization within Western grouping. Soviet answer given yesterday by Bulganin. Wished Western powers comment on Soviet proposals for European security.

Macmillan said useful bases established future study and Governments should seek contemporaneous solution which would avoid disadvantages of both a too distant solution and one too rapid for Soviets. European security had two aspects: (1) treaty aspects involving exchange assurances such as Eden suggestion for pact between four powers plus United Germany. Bulganin had suggested all-European pact with some twenty-six members. Possibly should study something in between, containing obligations enforceable under UN authority; (2) practical aspects in terms of action bearing one size and location of

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forces and armaments. Paris Agreements had provided examples practical arms control such as checking stocks and prohibiting manufacture certain weapons. Regarding location of forces security could be helped by reducing contact at most sensitive points as suggested Eden's demilitarized area.

Secretary said President yesterday had given clear and eloquent comment on one of Bulganin's central proposals on security, namely, that security could be enhanced by withdrawal of foreign forces and reestablishment pre-World War II situation. President had spoken with triple authority as US Commander-in-Chief, as former leader Western portion victorious coalition, and as first NATO commander. President had expressed solemn and considered conclusion general security is promoted by integration different national forces which cannot operate offensively without a unanimous conjunction of will by independent states which in fact would be unobtainable. President had indicated presence in FEDREP of UK, US, French and Canadian forces integrated with prospective FEDREP forces will constitute great security for all. We should avoid reproducing conditions prior to World War II out of which war

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itself came and NATO liquidation suggested by Bulganin would not in fact promote security. US like USSR not member Brussels Treaty which Bulganin suggested also be liquidated but by way of analogy Brussels Treaty served both US and USSR security purposes by ensuring against type of Western Europe division which produced last two wars. US realizes NATO and WEU could be perverted although unlikely and can understand USSR not happy to have its security depend in part on arrangements to which it does not belong. USSR could usefully consider elements. Western nations could for their part usefully study elements in Bulganin opening statement such as adoption mutual commitments not to use armed force and obligation hold mutual consultations in event threat to EUR peace.

Pinaï pointed out Bulganin had accepted Paris Agreements as established fact and this being so security plans should be based on recognition this fact. Bulganin's reference to foreign troops and bases in EUR not pertinent since whole represents a consolidated system with pooling resources member countries. In order to make headway could we have clear answer from Soviet DEL whether they in fact favored German reunification.

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Molotov said clear reply given Bulganin's statement yesterday and should satisfy Pinay. Valuable views have been exchanged on European security and USSR will study them. Grateful for statement yesterday by President for whom Bulganin had expressed highest appreciation and respect. USSR in turn wished ask question: how would security of states such as Poland and Denmark be assured under British five power pact.

Pinay said not satisfied with Molotov answer since Bulganin described Paris Agreements as fact. German unification should, therefore, recognize that fact.

Molotov recalled Bulganin had pointed out Western Germany now member NATO and WEU. Because of these facts German unity could not be accomplished immediately but must be solved gradually step by step.

Macmillan answering Molotov question said he supposed wise Foreign Minister would have nothing to add to what his head of government had previously said. Would, however, take risk and say that should Soviets propose extending pact to include security requirements of others UK might be ready study something between a pact limited to five and one including all European states.

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Molotov indicated German discussion exhausted under Item 1 and afternoon meeting should proceed to second item, namely, European security.

Meeting agreed brief communique should be concerted by press officers.

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Drafted by:
JDBeam:all

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*Timetable - I be against
missile war*

be released right away. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that if this were done the question of the size of the weapons the Soviets had exploded might be raised in the press conference. The President stated that he could simply say that we would have to await the further results of scientific tests before we knew the answer to this question. Governor Stassen noted, however, that if a thermo-nuclear weapon had been exploded we would have known it right away. He therefore suggested that the President simply refer to the AEC statement if the question arose.

Mr. Allen Dulles turned to Commissioner Libby and asked whether it was AEC's opinion that it was not necessary to wait Commissioner Libby said that that was the Commission's view, and that he would put out the statement right away.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to developments in the Sudan; the Israeli election results; the situations in Formosa and Singapore; and the new Soviet nuclear tests.
- b. Noted the President's authorization to the Atomic Energy Commission to make an immediate public announcement of the new Soviet nuclear tests along the lines discussed in the meeting.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, AEC.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES PANEL OF THE SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ODM
(Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, dated February 14, 1955; NSC 5522; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 26 and August 1, 1955; NSC Action No. 1355)

The Council discussion was introduced by a briefing by Mr. Dillon Anderson on the Killian report and the agency responses. Following a general introduction of the subject he proceeded to a paragraph-by-paragraph discussion of the proposed Council action (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).

In connection with paragraph a of the proposed action, Dr. Flemming inquired whether the Planning Board's recommendation meant that the Planning Board would report back to the NSC on the Timetable before it completed its review of NSC 5501. The President stated

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that since the Timetable affects the other Panel recommendations, he assumed that the Planning Board would make such a report prior to completion of its review.

Secretary Dulles noted that Governor Stassen's presentation on disarmament had also included a timetable, and it had been the Secretary's understanding that this Stassen timetable would be a guide to what our disarmament program should be. He inquired of Governor Stassen as to whether this was not correct.

Governor Stassen confirmed the Secretary's statement, and stated that his timetable was one covering ten years. It is the second five years which we would like to avoid. Any speed-up of the timetable would therefore be of significance to our disarmament policy.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that he didn't want to leave the impression in this discussion that our international policy was determined and enforced by obliteration and warfare such as was envisaged in the Timetable and the Panel's recommendation. Governor Stassen thought that that was not what the Panel had in mind. The Panel's premise was that the Soviets would be more amenable during the period when they had, and knew that they had, a lesser power position, than they would be later. It didn't mean that we should use our relative military advantage for military purposes.

The President said that he assumed that what was intended here was the same thing that we meant when we talked about negotiating from strength. He also believed that Secretary Dulles' view was correct.

Governor Stassen suggested that the Soviets might desire a period of peace during which they could pull their manpower out of the army and put it into agriculture while they concentrated their military effort on such things as the missiles program.

The President said that in everything we have placed reliance on the Timetable; it should therefore be reviewed and a report made back to the Council. The Council should be notified of any radical change in the Timetable while the work is still going forward on the revision of basic policy. Mr. Anderson pointed out that the Planning Board planned to examine the policy implications of the Timetable and report back to the Council on them. The President said that that was true, but there should nonetheless be a report back on the Timetable itself which would indicate the changes that should be made in the various periods described.

Mr. Sprague told the Council that the Panel members concerned had recently reconsidered Period II.

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(NOTE: The following portion of this memorandum was dictated by Mr. Ley from Mr. Johnson's notes.)

Mr. Anderson spoke from his briefing notes regarding paragraph g. He added that prior to revision of NSC 5501, the Planning Board would be submitting, within the next thirty days, related policy recommendations as to U. S. action in the event hostilities are renewed in Indochina.

The President said he wished to issue one word of warning. From the beginning, the U. S. has pursued a policy of supporting the free world economically and militarily, and has regarded itself as a central reserve ideologically, militarily and industrially. However, we do not want to get the idea that wherever there is a peripheral war we will send off U. S. expeditionary forces. Ground forces for such wars will have to be supplied indigenously, and we are trying to build them up. Support will come from us with our mobile reserve of naval and air forces and logistic support. If this sort of aggression, however, gets to be too common, we may have to fight a major war because we can't go around wasting our strength.

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Governor Stassen said there was one aspect which affected his disarmament studies. He noted that the heartland of the free world was the East-Central industrial triangle of the United States. One of our strengths is that this area is so much further from the Russians than their targets are from us. A 1500-mile missile is therefore more important to us than to the Russians. Governor Stassen felt that having this project a component development of a 5500-mile missile is not enough, particularly in a matter where we are as far behind as we now know. He thought we should make the 1500-mile missile a special objective rather than a part of the 5500-mile missile development.

Secretary Wilson noted that the decision was made some years ago not to push the 1500-mile missile. Defense is now reviewing five plans and will come up in December with its choice. We now have additional information we didn't have at the time the original decision was made.

Governor Stassen believed that if we just look at the 1500-mile missile as part of the ICBM program, it would not move as fast as if it were a separate project. Yet the 1500-mile missile would cancel out the advantage the Russians would otherwise gain by achieving the 5500-mile missile first.

Secretary Wilson pointed out that there are other developments for the 1500-mile range such as pilotless ships that will fly faster and more accurately and can do the trick better than a missile.

General Twining pointed out that we may not always have our overseas bases to launch the 1500-mile missile. Governor Stassen nevertheless thought that there should be another project on the 1500-mile missile if we assume our bases are available. On such an important matter Governor Stassen felt we needed to bet on two or three possibilities.

The President said he agreed in general with Governor Stassen's point. However, if the Russians can fire 1000 a day at us and we can fire 1000 a day at them, then he personally would want to take off for the Argentine. Governor Stassen commented that we still need them in order to keep the Russians from starting to use them against us. The President agreed that we do need some of these missiles as a threat and a deterrent; but we don't want to produce them in quantity because we can't fight that kind of a war.

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Secretary Wilson said that he was worried about the number of new projects we have already. Once they get started, we can't stop. Congress will always vote for new stuff (such as opposing the reduction of Marine strength), but it will never eliminate old projects or provide the taxes to pay for new ones.

Governor Stassen thought that the decision made earlier on the 1500-mile missile was now shown to be wrong. General Twining pointed out that availability of bases had been an important element in that decision. Secretary Wilson said that big rockets cost twice as much or more than a plane, and can only be used once.

The President agreed to the December 1st reporting date on the 1500-mile missile. However, he thought that Governor Stassen's point was valid; that we should exploit the advantage now of our overseas bases. At some future time we may have to take account of the possibility that they will not be available, and so the ICMI must also be pushed.

Mr. Sprague pointed out that both the long- and medium-range missiles aren't going to replace manned bombers, for three reasons: First, they are one-way devices; secondly, they can carry a much smaller warhead, but are also expensive in fissionable material; and third, their accuracy is less. On the other hand, they are a nasty thing to defend against, and therefore we need that program. He said that the Panel agreed with the Planning Board's recommendation for delay until December 1st to pick the best approach.

The President stated vigorously that, if this is the only means of waging war, he would never wage it. If we wage such a war to establish respect for free government in Europe and Asia, we won't have that type of government left ourselves. He thought we should develop a few of these missiles as a threat, but not 1000 or more. The nature of conflict has gotten beyond man. We are getting to the point where it is no longer worth while to have the operating staffs study such a war.

Secretary Dulles commented that, as we approach this period, peripheral wars will become more important as general war is no longer possible. Then what do you do? The President thought that when you start a little fight there is every chance that it will get larger. Korea stayed a little war, and we have criticized others for their action to keep it so.

Secretary Wilson thought that little people can fight little wars, but big people such as us cannot fight little wars.

The President expressed the hope that the future character of war will repel men from the use of force. In a few years it may be possible to build these weapons to threaten us. The

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President noted that Mr. Baruch brought up this possibility to the USSR in 1946 or 1947 in trying to sell them on atomic controls. Mr. Baruch pointed out that might be able to make these weapons in the future, and they would be more willing to fight the USSR than the United States. The President said that research reactors are being put up in every country, and they may soon be able to build bombs.

With regard to the split views as to another Killian-type study, Dr. Flemming said that he withdrew his split and supported the majority.

The President said that he would like to see some social scientists brought into our security planning to study how long civilization can take these weapons developments.

Mr. Anderson said that the Planning Board would make some recommendations on how that might be done.

The National Security Council:

- a. Study of the FCP Timetable and its Policy Implications: With respect to General Recommendation 1, directed the NSC Planning Board to examine in the light of recently available intelligence the validity of the "Timetable of Change in our Military Position Relative to Russia", and its policy implications, as a part of the Planning Board review of key aspects of basic national security policy; and to report to the Council promptly any significant changes which, during the course of such examination, the Planning Board believes should be made in this "Timetable".
- b. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program: Noted that, with respect to General Recommendation 2 and Specific Recommendation A-1, the Planning Board will prepare at an early date a recommended Council action, based upon the Defense briefing of July 28, and formulated in the light of the recommendations of the Department of Defense.
- c. Development of a 1500-mile Ballistic Missile: Noted that, with respect to Specific Recommendation A-2, the Department of Defense concurs in principle, has five development plans under consideration, and will report to the Council not later than December 1, 1955, on the status of these plans, indicating, if possible, which of these plans it proposes to implement and an estimate of the time when such a missile might become operational.

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Personal and Private

8/10/55

August 10, 1955

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy (translation) of a personal letter which I have received from Adenauer. I think this deserves your reading. It is, I think, unduly pessimistic, and I shall try to buck him up. However, there is no doubt an element of validity to his thesis.

I feel that if this situation were in our own hands alone, i.e., the U.S., we could deal with it effectively. Our main trouble is going to come from the need of cooperating with the British and the French, who have always been willing to make a deal on the basis of the status quo.

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles

Enclosure

The President,

The White House.

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Authority MR 87-59 #1

By bc NLE Date 4/15/87

Dulles / GCM / 2 / 1



Adenauer. Chancellor. Homed

Box 2
Strictly Confidential A-8(1)

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE AND MEMORANDA SERIES

1485/143

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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
THE PRESIDENT
2:15 A.M.



1. I showed the President a copy of the translation of Adenauer's letter to me, delivered August 10, which the President read. He expressed himself as disturbed. I said what I felt confident that Adenauer was wrong and had not yet adjusted himself to the new possibilities which I felt made more likely than ever before the unification of Germany. I said that it was difficult for a man of Adenauer's age - about 60 - to adjust himself to a new line of thinking after he had been dedicated to another line for so long.

I expressed the view that the new atmosphere meant not a perpetuation of the status quo but rather the greater opportunity for change. The "security" arguments of the Soviet Union had been downgraded and they did not have the same justification of "security" for holding on to East Germany and the satellites. The important thing, I said, was to make it perfectly clear that we did not identify increased hope of peace with increased solidification of the status quo but rather the contrary, and that we now expected there to be changes in the European situation, as evidenced by the unification of Germany and greater freedom for the satellites. I referred to my book "War, Peace and Change" as indicating my great belief that we could not have peace for long unless there was peaceful change.

The President expressed himself as in complete agreement with this philosophy and said he felt it would fit well into a speech he was planning to make in honor of George Marshall about August 25. He said he would take a look at the speech from this standpoint and then send it over to me to work on.

I said I expected to write to Adenauer and also probably to ask Livie Merchant to go over to talk to him before he went to Moscow. I said that Adenauer obviously felt nervous about his forthcoming Moscow trip; that he had no Embassy to take refuge in and no place to talk without almost certainly being overheard by various devices.

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WLE MR Case No. 87-58
Document No. 1

August 18, 1986

3308

My dear Chancellor:

I have your letter bearing date August 9. I am indeed happy that you feel free to write me so intimately about your preoccupations. I value it highly that we should always keep in close and understanding contact with each other.

It may not be entirely beside the point for me to recall sentiments which I had when, shortly following the Armistice, I saw the destruction which had been wrought in Germany. If I have told you before, it nevertheless bears repetition. I had at that time been reading Toynbee's "Study of History", in which, reviewing the ages, he develops the thesis of "challenge and response". I felt that few people had ever confronted a challenge more severe than that which confronted the German people at that time. I said to myself that if the Germans met that challenge, then indeed they will have proved their greatness.

The challenge has been met, largely under and through your leadership, and I bestow the tribute of greatness.

I also have great confidence in the dependable qualities of my own nation.

I believe that if our two peoples can work together for the future as, happily, we have during recent years, then we can look hopefully to the future.

Your letter portrays one interpretation of the Geneva Conference. It may be, no doubt it is, the interpretation which many are giving it. It is not, however, the interpretation of the President and myself, and I do not think that it is the correct interpretation.

His Excellency
Konrad Adenauer,
Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany,
Bonn.

REVIEWED BY <u>[Signature]</u> DATE <u>7-23-87</u>	
FORWARDED BY <u>[Signature]</u> DATE <u>7-23-87</u>	
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BUFILE JOHN FOSTER PAPERS, 1979
GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

Box 2
Strictly Confidential A-8 (1)

Let us first of all remember that the present policies of the Soviet Union are born not out of its strength, but out of its weakness; not out of its successes, but out of its failures. It was they, not we, who made extraordinary efforts to bring the Summit Conference about.

Mr. Molotov, in his San Francisco speech, listed the steps which they had taken - the Austrian Treaty, the pilgrimage to Belgrade, the May 10 disarmament proposals, the invitation to you and the offer to make peace with Japan. Also, concerted, all Soviet officials changed their demeanor to one of cordiality toward Western officials. It may be said that much of this was spurious and without substance. Of course it was. But even so, the sum total is a striking measure of their anxiety for a change of pace.

Why did they want this?

The reasons, I think, are fairly obvious. Their foreign policies of toughness and hostility had failed. The resiliency and unity of the free nations had been increasingly demonstrated through eight years of cold war. The climax was their effort to bring about the defeat of the London-Paris Accords, and when this effort failed, it was obvious that they had to resort to different policies.

This need was accentuated by their domestic situation, where there was obvious strain. They were trying to maintain a military establishment which would equal that of the United States in terms of modern weapons and means of delivery, and they were also trying to maintain a vast army of foot soldiers. At the same time, they were trying to develop, in a spectacular way, their capital plant.

All of this involved an abnormal diversion of productivity away from consumers' goods - manufactured and agricultural. While perhaps no immediate crisis existed, it was obvious that they could not maintain their present pace indefinitely, and that they needed at least a respite during which they could give their people more of what they craved. They needed what we in NATO two years ago called a "long haul" policy as against emergency policies which were an excessive drain on the economy.

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Personal and Private

-3-

If it was the Soviets who particularly wanted the "spirit of Geneva" - and that, I think, is demonstrable - it is probable that they will pay something more than the prepayments Molotov listed in order to preserve this spirit. How much they will yet pay remains to be seen. But it is certainly the intention of the United States to press them in this respect.

The President and I do not consider that the "spirit of Geneva" means acquiescence in the status quo or the perpetuation of present injustices, notably the partition of Germany, the satellite rule and the reduction of hundreds of millions of people to what, by our standards, is slave labor. It is our intention to make our views in this respect perfectly clear. The President will, I think, soon speak out on this subject. Above all, we expect to make the unification of Germany the touchstone. If it is not possible to make some concrete progress along this line at the October Geneva Conference, then there will be a serious question as to whether the "spirit of Geneva" can be preserved so far as we are concerned.

You mention the fact that the present Soviet mood is less favorable to the unification of Germany than it was at Berlin. That is not my estimate of the situation. The "spirit of Geneva" has deprived the Soviets of their stock arguments for holding on to East Germany for purposes of "security". The fact that the Soviets are announcing a large reduction of their armed forces because, they say, tension has been relaxed not only proves their need for a greater productive labor force, but also provides us with a cogent argument for the unification of Germany because, by the Soviets' own admission, the "security" situation has been improved.

I do believe that the Russians are worried about how to dispose of the GDR and are fearful that, if they pull the rug out from under the GDR, that will greatly weaken their position in all of Eastern Europe. They are, I think, the more concerned because their "peace" with Tito may encourage Tito in the thought that some of these satellites, e.g. Hungary, may be brought to follow his example and establish, in association with Yugoslavia, a Communist nationalistic bloc competitive with the bloc that Moscow rules.

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I believe that the unification of Germany is, as I put it at a recent press conference, "in the air" and that we must keep it there. I was struck by the fact that, in Chou En-lai's recent major speech of July 30, he talked about the unification of Germany in terms quite different from that of the Soviet Union. He put the unification of Germany first and European security second. I enclose a copy of that part of his speech in case you do not have it.

Let me mention, in passing, that we do not have any confirmation of what you refer to as the news that the Russians are stalling troops in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia. Even if this were true, which we doubt, it would be an evidence of fear not of confidence.

I, too, have spent some time in studying Russian history, particularly since 1917. I agree that they reckon with long periods - as Lenin and Stalin often put it, "an entire historical era". But it is also true that they teach the tactics of retreat, in order to gain a respite, and if they now want this respite, which seems to be the case, we have, I think, a possibility of getting the unification of Germany as the price they must pay. Whether, and how quickly, they will pay that price remains to be seen. But I think there is a good chance that unification, on your terms, can be achieved in a couple of years if we are stout.

So far as the United States is concerned, we do not intend "the spirit of Geneva" to mean either that the Soviet rulers can conduct covert aggression with impunity, or that we should abandon our strength and vigilance and thus expose ourselves to future overt attack, or that we should abandon our collective security arrangements, or that we should accept the growing une of injustice, of which a most glaring example is the division of Germany.

I do not yet know how fully the United Kingdom and France will make their policy accord with ours but so far there is every reason to hope and believe that they will, particularly if you yourself give the lead. If we can all work together in this spirit, then I feel confident that we are on the eve of better things.

It occurred to me that it might be useful if David Merchant should come to Bonn to have private and informal talks with you before you go.



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Personal and Private

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to Moscow. He is very experienced in these matters and played a leading part in the Geneva Conference, ranking on our Delegation only after the President and myself. I would like to come myself but I am afraid that would be a bit too conspicuous, and embarrassing rather than helpful. But Livia can speak from intimate knowledge of our highest-level thinking.

If you think Merchant's trip would be useful, I suggest you send me a private message as to what day would be convenient for him to be with you.

I talked over all of these matters with President Eisenhower yesterday (Sunday) before he left for Denver. We are in complete accord on the point of view which I express here. The President has asked me to transmit to you his very warm greetings and his expression of great confidence.

With my own best wishes, I am, dear Chancellor Adenauer,

Always faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles

Enclosure:

Excerpt from Chou En-lai's
speech of July 30, 1955.



*Given personally to Amb. Kiehl
8/16/55*

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Dulles

MONDAY
August 29, 1955
1:09 a.m.

8/29/55

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TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. MAC ARTHUR

The Sec. said Phleger was with him and they were discussing the fact that the British may be putting forward their German security position at the UN. M. said they delivered two papers this morning and indeed one of these papers deals with inspection in a fairly limited area in Western Europe. They said this a.m. that Nutting, who is presumably in touch with Stassen, was going to put forward in general terms - make reference to the PM's statement in Geneva and generally go over this thing. M. said we said it had great dangers unless it was handled in a general way and not pursued in discussion. Apparently Eden is insistent since he made the proposal and since the Directive mentions it. The Sec. said he told Stassen we felt any disarmament proposals that were regional as distinguished from global and which related to Germany and Western Europe should be dealt with at the FM's Conference and not at the UN. The theory is as the Directive said that unification of Germany and European security were inextricably connected. If you deal with security where you are not able and competent to deal with German unification, then you accept separability. M. said their argument will be they are doing a pilot model there. Eden linked the two in discussing disarmament at Geneva. M. thinks he should punch hard now. They may at least say something general.

Webster's
problem



M. said a problem worrying him in re the European Security Treaty is it will be said no wonder the Soviets reject it - it provides the basis for advancing the NATO shield to the Polish frontier. We have been trying to smoke the others out by asking how it affects them - what is worrying them. M. said we should have your thinking on it before we get away.

pdb

BRIEFING NOTES

SUBJECT: Agenda Item No. 2 - "New Weapons, Including Atomic, for Allied Forces"

1. The Secretary of Defense will appear before the NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting on 10 October. This meeting has on its agenda SACDUR's Effectiveness of Forces Report which indicates several areas of deficiencies in the effectiveness of forces assigned to him to perform his mission.

2. Last December the NATO Council of Ministers approved the concept of MC 48 "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years", as a basis for NATO planning. To this extent, SACDUR's plans are being developed based on weapons, weapons systems and information thereon, including atomic, currently available to him on an international basis.

3. The Standing Group Liaison Officer (SGLO) has advised that at the forthcoming meeting Secretary Wilson may be asked the following question - "In the implementation of MC 48, to what extent is the United States planning to make new weapons available to NATO?" Attached is the background discussion and recommended reply to this question prepared for Secretary Wilson. (Tab A)

4. In preparation for this meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff views and recommendations were requested in a memorandum with regard to the strategic requirements of allied forces for new weapons and information thereon, including atomic, dated 2 September 1955. (Tab B)

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 30 September 1955 with a recommended first increment (Tab C). Their recommendations provide a basis for the more general statement proposed for Secretary Wilson. This statement is consistent with paragraph 6, NSC 5504, "Basic National Security Policy", NSC 151/3, "Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied Countries", and the Atomic Act of 1954, and the approved U. S. position established by the Secretary of State at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1954.

6. a. An Armed Forces Policy Council recommendation is required on the question of whether new weapons and information thereon, including those having atomic capability, should be made available to NATO in furtherance of U. S. national policy.

b. In connection with the above, a determination should be made of the extent to which the Secretary of Defense should inform the NATO Defense Ministers of the U. S. policy on new weapons at the forthcoming NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting, your views on the proposed reply (Tab A) prepared for the Secretary of Defense in response to queries on new weapons at the Defense Ministers' Conference are pertinent to this determination.

c. The above recommendations are dependent in part upon the availability of resources and supply of specific items as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE
Staff Secretary, Records, 1955-60

SUBJECT SERIES: DEFENSE
Box 6 Military Navy 1954-55 (4)

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FOOTNOTES LISTED
TO THE SECRETARY

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a. Improved HEAT Round for 75mm Rifle M20

(1) This item is of interest to every European NATO nation equipped with the M20 75mm recoilless rifle.

(2) This item should be offered to France or Belgium for completion of development and manufacture.

(3) This item is an improved high explosive antitank round for the standard U. S. Army 75mm recoilless rifle.

1986/2569

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Suggested Reply to the Question: "An Implementation of MC 48, to what extent is the United States planning to make new weapons available to NATO?"

DISCUSSION:

The use of the term "new weapons" often has the connotation of atomic and nuclear weapons. As discussed herein, the term applies only to conventional weapons which are being modernized. Data regarding atomic weapons and the exchange of information pertaining thereto is covered in the NATO Agreement for the Exchange of Atomic Information.

In the course of the 1954 Annual Review, the Deputy Secretary of Defense made statements to the effect that the U.S. End Item Assistance and Training Program will be, over a period of time, reoriented towards the demonstrated needs which will result from the continuing studies of the new concepts of warfare and that future programs will take into consideration the increasing industrial capabilities of NATO nations which will make possible an increase in their individual contributions to combined strength. It was also pointed out that there are many items of equipment which can most effectively be produced in Europe.

The very heart of this particular problem lies in the field of obsolescence and one in which the magnitude of cost has so preoccupied nations, including the United States, that little progress has been made in the past years.

There is no question but what the provision of more modern weapons, if properly utilized, would improve the overall defense capability of NATO. However, there are limiting factors of technology required for their operation and maintenance, and the financial aspects of added cost to recipient countries. These problems can be solved on nation-by-nation, item-by-item strategic evaluation to determine the overall military value to be received by the expenditure of a given amount of U.S. dollars.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff currently have under preparation a study which lists possible eligible recipients for new type conventional weapons. It appears, however, that strategic and military considerations on a case-by-case basis will be necessary and that the inclusion of major item listed would necessitate provision of additional funds for their programming at the expense of older type weapons and spare parts unless increased financial responsibilities are assumed by recipient countries.

RECOMMENDED U.S. POSITION:

- a. That remarks be directed toward improved conventional weapons, some of which are capable of being utilized as Atomic delivery vehicles.
- b. As previously reported, the United States has under study its End Item Assistance Program with a view toward reorienting it to the concepts expressed

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- (2) These fuels form the basis of a program for the bilateral exchange of information in this field with Norway.
- (3) These are napalm type fuels.

NAVY

1. General Comments - The items listed below are in current Navy inventory and also under current production except as noted in specific cases.

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in MC-48. As you know, the United States is testing new type combat unit organizations and will utilize the results in connection with a re-evaluation of the assistance program. It is expected that the organizational test will be completed during 1956.

c. The United States currently has under active consideration items of modern equipment that are now in production for the U.S. forces which might be programmed for NATO nations. These items include, but are not limited to, improved Sonar, land mines, combat vehicles (including self-propelled artillery) and new type aircraft. Our analysis is based upon a strategic evaluation within the limits of available funds as to how these weapons may best be utilized. The U.S. will seek and give full consideration to the recommendations of SACEM in this matter. In this connection, the U.S. expects to be more definitive at the December Ministers' Meeting of NATO.

d. The U.S. is desirous of assisting, to the extent practicable, in resolving the shortcomings and deficiencies depicted by SACEM in his Effectiveness Report. Current NATO studies pertaining to land force organization and to European Air defense will, in addition to unilateral U.S. studies on these subjects be of material assistance in determining the types of equipment various national forces should maintain.

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with no delay or penetration feature, and (3) an explosive general purpose head with a delay feature.

c. BQS-2 (Echo Ranging Sonar for SS)

(1) The phasing of delivery should depend upon MAAG and country recommendations.

(2) NATO nations considered eligible for this item:

United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Turkey.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

Reply to I-14,647/5
International Security Affairs

September 2, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Strategic Requirements of Allied Forces for New Weapons
and Information Thereon, Including Atomic

1. The rapid and continuing developments in strategy, tactics and weapons by the Soviet make it necessary to carefully review R&D policy and plans to insure continued effectiveness of allied forces. I consider it essential that every effort be made within realistic budgetary and security limitations to prevent deterioration of the military capabilities of allies which would reflect itself basically as a reduction in U. S. security. In this connection, I am concerned that current policies and procedures on release of military information and new weapons, including atomic, to our allies and regional organizations have a deleterious impact on our over all efforts to help our allies achieve and maintain an adequate degree of strength in consonance with basic national security policy.

2. This review must be on a continuing basis to fulfill its purpose and must take into consideration a number of factors, including:

a. Compliance with Paragraph 33, NSC 5501, dated 6 January 1955.

b. The requirements for more modern equipment on the part of our allies than is currently programed under MMAP.

c. The time-phased capability of our allies to absorb and utilize effectively new type weapons and related essential equipment with due consideration given to manpower, reorganization, training and budget elements.

d. The security risk incurred in providing information, weapons, and weapons systems to foreign forces relative to the benefit in the common defense and security which will be derived from such transfer.

e. The source of procurement, the current and prospective availability from production under present U. S. programs, the potential availability under increased programs if required, with emphasis on items currently in production and which will be in production in the foreseeable future.

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(4) Available from production.

f. Mark 32-2 Torpedo

(1) The phasing of delivery should depend upon
MAAG and country recommendations.

(2) NATO nations considered eligible for this item:
Netherlands, France, Italy, and United Kingdom.

(3) This is an active acoustic aircraft or surface
vessel launched torpedo for use against submarines. It

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f. The advantages and disadvantages of procurement of new type U. S. equipment from foreign sources with emphasis as indicated in g above.

g. The procurement in foreign countries of new type weapons and weapons systems developed in such countries based on indigenous development or on data and characteristics supplied by the U. S.

3. The first essential element in the review, discussed in paragraph 1 above, is a list of weapons and related essential equipment and weapons systems and information thereon on a country by country basis which would satisfy known and prospective requirements of allied forces and the regional defense organizations. Therefore, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), furnish the Secretary of Defense with such a list (excluding those items previously released to foreign forces) currently available to U. S. forces in inventory, production, or prototype development, together with your views on the factors stated under paragraph 2 above as may be pertinent to any given item. In specific cases where release of information, weapons and related essential equipment, or weapons systems is not recommended because of security considerations, your reasoning thereon would be desirable.

4. In view of the magnitude of this task, it is believed that such a list should be submitted in increments, taking as a first increment those weapons and related essential equipment in inventory or in sufficient production, and information thereon, which could be potentially programmed for NATO forces in FY 57. The first submission is desired by 1 October 1955. Further, the list should be divided into categories of recipients who have a similar or common requirement for weapons or weapons systems, or information thereon.

5. The information requested by this memorandum will be used by the Secretary of Defense:

a. To provide a basis for discussion in the Armed Forces Policy Council of the revisions to procedures for release of weapons and information which may be necessary or desirable;

b. To ensure that the optimum over all capabilities of our allies to contribute to U. S. security interests are realized;

c. To permit orderly programming in the procurement and delivery of such new type weapons as may be released; and,

d. To allow the inclusion in allied strategy of military information essential to realistic planning.

(signed)

Gordon Gray
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

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(3) This system is designed for installation on destroyer types and permits improved AA weapon coordination. Maximum designation range - 60,000 yards. Number of targets tracked and designated simultaneously - 4, and has an integrated tactical display.

(4) There is a current inventory of 275 and a production rate of 8 per month. Production has been scheduled through December 1955. This system cannot be effectively employed

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

30 September 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Strategic Requirements of Allied Forces for New Weapons
and Information Thereon, Including Atomic.

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 2 September 1955, subject as above.

2. The data contained in the attachment is a listing of weapons and related essential equipment in inventory or in sufficient production, and information thereon, which might conceivably be programmed for NATO forces in FY 1957. The assessment as to eligibility of a potential recipient nation to receive items of equipment has been determined against the criteria of the requirements for more modern equipment and a general consideration of the time-phased capability to absorb and effectively utilize the equipment, subject to confirmation by USCINCEUR and the MAAG concerned.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out that while from the military point of view it would be desirable that selected allied forces be equipped with certain of the new weapons listed herein, each weapon constitutes a separate problem and should be studied on its own merits, both from strategic and budgetary considerations, when considering the desirability of its release to allied forces.

4. The inclusion of major items from the attached listing in future MDA Programs would, because of the greatly increased unit costs, necessarily have the following effects, singly or in combination:

- a. Require additional funds of considerable magnitude.
- b. Result in smaller numbers of units of equipment delivered.
- c. Require cut-back in production of certain types of currently programmed items and spare parts therefor.

5. The modernization of our own forces, within the resources made available, is a continuing problem of primary importance. In this light, and as a matter of policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the MDA Programs should furnish a readily available medium which supports and enhances our own military readiness. As more advanced weapons, systems and equipment become available for operational use by U.S. Forces, the less modern counterparts should be released to appropriate allies, especially in those cases where such release would improve over-all allied readiness.

SECRET For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(signed)
ARTHUR RADFORD
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure

SECRET

(3) These bombs will supplement conventional general purpose bombs in the 250 lbs., 500 lbs., 1000 lbs., and 2000 lbs. series. There is a 15 percent reduction in the charge weight ratio for low drag bombs which will provide a slight increase in range to jet aircraft carrying external ordnance.

(4) Inventory and production status is as follows:

Inventory	Production
-----------	------------

250 lbs.

11,000

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(3) The 280mm gun is a heavy artillery piece transported by wheeled carrier components at front and rear of the mount. It has limited mobility and fires a projectile to ranges in excess of 25,000 yards. It is capable, with special weapons ordnance support, of firing an atomic shell.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Special Handling Required

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Authority NLS 84-45
By 113a NARS, Date 12-16-85

JCSM-693-56
27 OCT 1966

approx 30 min / box

TO w Gen Wilson 4/19/54

say "effective" retail instead of M.R. -
but an A. fields & even century

apparently some speech by Summerfield, 100 Gen., -
shared "fervently" [TO w Gen Humphrey
4/18/54]

Box 3 - nothing

✓ Box 4 - Sept 29, 1955 (5013) -

[TO = telephone call]

TO to Gen Wilson -

'w said Wilson may be prepared to
take too much, but doesn't know what
you can do about that'

TO from Mr Hoover & Ohio 9/30/55

Leamy objects to 'open shop' - no real
protection against surprise attack - 'no could
mount a surprise attack against Russia
no matter how much daylight was going on'

Box 5 Jan 17, 1956 - Allen Dulles 'worried' about 'Life
article - brink of war thing' makes JFD sound
belligerent

Box 6 TO to Roswell Barnes Feb 19, 1957 deploring
Jewish influence -

some friend throughout doores.

eq Feb 11, 1957 TO from Mr Luce, etc

Box 7 TO from H.F. Armstrong Aug 5, 1957

F.A. art really drafted by Bowie & his people - 'just
marked it up'

TO to Murray Snyder (before) Aug 6, 1957

Gen White had not cleared speech w State - 'one of
other constant problems'

TO to Adam Badger, July 15, 1957 - away report.

3238

10/14/55

COPY of a Tissue Copy forwarded by
Mr. John Hanes, Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State, RECEIVED:
10/15, 12:35 PM

~~SECRET~~

October 14, 1955

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing you this brief note to confirm what I said to you on the telephone this afternoon regarding General Fox's letter of October 12 to Mr. MacArthur on the subject of European security.

As I said to you, I think we all recognize that there is a risk involved in giving a reunited Germany freedom of choice with regard to alliances. This risk, however, is implicit in the fact, recognized by the three Western powers and the Federal Republic, that the only type of reunification now practical is one which will, in effect, constitute a new State not bound by the commitments of the Federal Republic. Therefore, as a matter of law, it makes a fresh choice with respect to its international relations. Thus, the present problem is essentially one of devising arrangements which would be most conducive to united Germany exercising her choice in the direction we want. In the final analysis this involves a judgment as to the course of action which will be most effective in influencing German opinion. I believe we must be guided in this respect to a very great extent by the judgment of the Chancellor and his associates who seek the same goals as we do. I believe that we should not take a definitive position on the phasing of the coming into effect of the various provisions of the proposed European Security Treaty until we have had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the German Foreign Minister at Paris.

You and I will clearly need leeway in deciding at Paris and Geneva the best way to deal with this problem so as to create the conditions which will be most conducive to a united Germany joining NATO. As I indicated to you, I think we should take this matter up at the NSC meeting on Thursday. I am therefore sending copies of this letter to Dillon Anderson and Admiral Radford.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

The Honorable

Charles E. Wilson

Secretary of Defense

Washington

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, Office of the Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs
Records, 1952-61 SPECIAL ASSISTANT SERIES
CHRONOLOGICAL SUBSERIES

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Authority MR 85-420-1

By DL NLE Date 9/17/85

Box 2, October 1955 (3)

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

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10-27/55

October 28, 1955

MEMORANDUM


SUBJECT: Discussion at the 263rd Meeting of
the National Security Council
Thursday, October 27, 1955

Present at the 263rd Council meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Robert Matteson for Mr. Harold Stassen, Special Assistant to the President; Admiral Paul Foster for the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 3); Mr. Ralph Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (Item 3); The Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Secretary of the Army (Item 3); the Secretary of the Navy (Item 3); the Secretary of the Air Force (Item 3); Assistant Secretary Gray of Defense (Item 3); the Deputy Director, Office of Defense Mobilization (Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Item 3); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (Item 3); Admiral Donald B. Duncan for the Chief of Naval Operations (Item 3); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (Item 3); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (Item 3); the Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistants to the President Anderson, Dodge, and Rockefeller; The White House Staff Secretary; the Naval Aide to the President (Item 3); the NSC Representative on Internal Security (Item 3); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY


Mr. Anderson said that before the scheduled items on the agenda of the Council were taken up, the Director of Central Intelligence had a brief report to make.



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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)	
Agency Case	NSC F87-389
NLE Case	87-72#4
By	2/2
NLE Date	2/7/90

AWP (NSC) 10


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* * * * *

Secretary Hoover said he thought that the Council would be interested in hearing his most recent reports from Secretary Dulles. Secretary Hoover proceeded to read a report of a discussion between Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Macmillan on the situation in the Middle East. This had become so extremely serious that the possibility existed that Iraq might be permitted to take action against Syria where Communist influence had reached such a serious point.

With respect to Secretary Dulles' conversation with Prime Minister Sharett, [REDACTED]



With respect to a conversation with Senator George, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Dulles had told Senator George that in his opinion the problem of Israeli-Arab relations had been handled by the prior administration wholly in terms of domestic political considerations and without reference to the true national interest of the United States. He added that he himself intended to handle the problem in the light of the national interest. Senator George had seemed to comprehend and sympathize with this point of view.

By way of further comment Secretary Hoover pointed out that border incidents between the Israelis and the Egyptians continued. The latter were apparently responsible for the latest incident and a much heavier Israeli retaliatory attack must now be awaited. The situation was extremely serious.

Finally, Secretary Hoover reported that he had had a message from Secretary Dulles in Paris to the effect that the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed that they would seek to conclude the Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting by November 19. They believed that in the absence of any serious Soviet agreement, prolongation of the meeting beyond this date would be bad.

Mr. Allen Dulles commented briefly on the forthcoming vote of confidence in the French Assembly and suggested that the timetable agreed to by the United States and the United Kingdom for concluding the Geneva Conference might be thrown out of gear by a fresh crisis overtaking the Faure Government.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence regarding British-Saudi Arabian relations and the forthcoming vote of confidence in the French Assembly.

- b. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Acting Secretary of State on conversations regarding the developments in the Near East which the Secretary of State had recently had with the British Foreign Secretary, the Israeli Prime Minister, and the Turkish Foreign Minister.

2. U.S. OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NEAR EAST
(NSC 5428; NSC Actions Nos. 1447 and 1460; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States", dated October 17, 21, 24, and 26, 1955)

Mr. Dillon Anderson explained the revisions in Paragraphs 10 through 13 in the Supplementary Statement of Policy in NSC 5428 which had been agreed to by the Planning Board in the light of the discussion of the paper by the National Security Council last week and in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out that the three sub-paragraphs of Paragraph 10A, dealing with financial and economic sanctions against an aggressor or a potential aggressor, had been agreed to at last week's Council meeting. With respect to the establishment of a blockade or further military action against Israel or an Arab State, he pointed out that there was still a split in the present revised draft.

At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson's briefing, the Vice President inquired whether an embargo could be established against an aggressor in the Middle East by the Executive Branch of the Government on its own initiative and without Congressional authorization. Mr. Anderson replied that he understood this to be the case and that the authority of the Executive Branch derived from two acts of Congress: The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and the Export Control Act of 1949. The Attorney General commented that whether or not the Executive Branch could legally resort to a blockade without further specific Congressional authorization, a serious policy question remained as to whether we would want to do so.

Referring to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the new revised paper, Mr. Anderson suggested that either Secretary Robertson or Admiral Radford might wish to comment further on these views.

Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff preferred their own paragraph with respect to the possibility of resorting

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to a blockade. Personally, however, Admiral Radford said that he did not believe there was much to choose between the Joint Chiefs' language and the paragraph proposed by the Department of State. He pointed out that it was unrealistic and impossible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to formulate plans which contemplated U.S. military intervention beyond the phase of a blockade. Such further military intervention could not be planned for until developments between Israel and one or more of the Arab States had reached a point where we could determine which of the Arab States was going to attack Israel. Accordingly, concluded Admiral Radford, if the limitations on the capability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make plans to meet all the possible contingencies in a war between Israel and the Arab States were clearly kept in mind, he would be willing to accept either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the State versions of the disputed paragraphs. In any event, the present new draft was a great improvement on its predecessor.

The Vice President said that he judged from Admiral Radford's statement that with certain qualifications the Joint Chiefs would be willing to accept the State version. He then asked if there were any further comments on this point.

Secretary Hoover explained the reasons why the State Department felt quite deeply that their own wording in Paragraph 10B was preferable to the wording proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wording seemed to the State Department to make a blockade more or less mandatory. State, on the other hand, felt that, looking at the matter practically, any U.S. move to impose a blockade on an aggressor would first have to come before the National Security Council for a decision whatever the circumstances then prevailing. Accordingly, Secretary Hoover felt that the State Department's language, calling merely for a study of the feasibility and desirability of a blockade, was preferable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff version.

Secretary Humphrey said, that as he understood the problem from Admiral Radford's remarks, any studies of this problem undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be strictly confined to advance planning but would not comprise any military or naval movements or any allocation of forces or additional expenditures until such time as the actual outbreak of war occurred. Admiral Radford replied that in the matter of a blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be in a position to formulate very detailed plans which could be implemented very promptly. Secretary Humphrey said he very much preferred the plan proposed by State to that proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford added that he shared Secretary Hoover's opinion, that none of the major decisions set forth in National Security Council policy papers were ever actually made in


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advance of the occasion. You decided on what course of action to take at the time you were faced with the necessity for decision. That was why he had so strenuously objected to the courses of action with respect to hostilities between Israel and the Arab States set forth in the original Supplementary Statement of Policy in NSC 5428.

Dr. Flemming and Director Hughes said that they were willing to go along with the language proposed by the State Department although Mr. Hughes said that his agreement depended upon a clearer understanding that the military study called for in the State Department paragraph would not involve the actual allocation of naval vessels or additional military forces. Admiral Radford re-assured Mr. Hughes that in response to the language in Paragraph 10B, the Joint Chiefs would simply proceed to make a general appraisal of the situation in its studies and plans. Secretary Humphrey, however, felt that the qualifications on military planning which he and Mr. Hughes had been speaking of should be made clearer so that no military plans would proceed to the point of actual programming as opposed to planning in the strictest sense.

Secretary Hoover pointed out that the courses of action set forth in the present paper would gradually become known down the line in the staffs of the various responsible departments and agencies and accordingly were likely, ultimately, to leak out. He therefore wanted to make the courses of action as tough as they could feasibly be. He believed that if there were mental reservations among the members of the Council as to the proposed courses of action, such mental reservations should be made explicit and discussed by the Council. Dr. Flemming agreed with Secretary Hoover and said that he did not want the language presently set forth in the State Department's proposed Paragraph 10B to be watered down further by qualifications on the kind of studies and plans that the military would make for possible military action. He believed that such studies and plans should be promptly carried to their conclusions in order that the United States could act quickly if developments between Israel and the Arab States made such action necessary. Secretary Hoover said that naturally we hoped that we would never be called upon to take the courses of action outlined in the paper but, in point of fact, we might be compelled to and, accordingly, he agreed with Dr. Flemming's point of view.



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The Vice President

thought the present draft was essentially what the Council had asked for and desired provided the Council kept clearly in mind that in certain instances we were talking about courses of action which we are very unlikely ever to take although we might threaten to take such courses of action as a deterrent.

Admiral Radford stated that if the Council had now agreed to accept the State Department Paragraph 10B on the study of desirability and feasibility of taking military action, he would like to suggest certain changes in Paragraph 11B. There ensued a considerable discussion of language appropriate to revising Paragraph 11B, the upshot of which was Council agreement to accept a revision of Paragraph 11B suggested by Mr. Dillon Anderson.

The National Security Council:

Agreed to recommend to the President the revision of the Supplementary Statement of Policy contained in NSC 5428 by substituting the following for paragraphs 10 through 13 thereof:

"10. a. In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab States, the U.S. should be prepared to take the following action against the state or states which are determined by a UN finding or, if necessary, by the U.S. to be responsible for the conflict or which refuse to withdraw their forces behind the Palestine Armistice line of 1950:

(1) Discontinue U.S. Government aid.

(2) Embargo U.S. trade

(3) Prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control.

b. Because the actions in paragraph 10-a above may not be sufficient to end the hostilities promptly, study the desirability and feasibility of taking military action, including a blockade.

c. Take the following actions either before or concurrent with measures outlined in paragraph 10-a:

(1) Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take action similar to that of the United States.

(2) Make every effort to secure United Nations sanction and support for all such actions.

"11.a. In collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans to support the measures in paragraph 10-a above.

b. Make the studies regarding military action referred to in paragraph 10-b above unilaterally. At such time later as it may be indicated that combined military action will be taken, be prepared to collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations.

"12. At a time and in a way he deems most likely to be effective, the Secretary of State should inform Israel and the Arab States privately that the United States, in accordance with existing policy, will seek to prevent resort to armed aggression by either Israel or the Arab States and, if it should occur, will seek to stop it quickly.

"13. As appropriate, enlist Congressional support for the measures in the above paragraphs."

NOTE: The above action subsequently approved by the President. The revised paragraphs subsequently circulated for insertion in all copies of NSC 5428.

3. NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT (NSC 5511)

Mr. Anderson said that the next item on the agenda would be the Net Evaluation Subcommittee's report which would be presented in the Broadcast Room of the White House. Admiral Radford commented that the Net Evaluation report which the Council was about to hear had been much more difficult to prepare than its predecessors. Moreover, it went further into very highly classified intelligence information, although not as far as General George, who had directed the preparation of the report, had wanted to go. Admiral Radford also expressed the opinion that the National Security Council directive establishing the Net Evaluation Subcommittee was too broad in its terms. He likewise warned that the Council would be hearing statements made in the course of the forthcoming presentation which he hoped the Council would not accept as altogether factual. Many of the conclusions of the Net Evaluation report would actually be approximations based on certain assumptions. If one changed these assumptions, and it was quite reasonable to do so, one would get different answers. Finally, Admiral Radford expressed considerable doubt as to the value of the exercise performed by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee in view of the immense amount of work and the considerable expense involved in the months which were consumed in preparing the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee.

The Council then moved from the Cabinet Room to the Broadcast Room of the White House.

Mr. Anderson opened the discussion on this item, advising that the purpose of the meeting was to hear a briefing on the first annual report by the Council's Net Evaluation Subcommittee which was established pursuant to a new directive recommended by the Council and approved by the President on February 14, 1955. He recalled that the directive established a permanent procedure (in the form of a Net Evaluation Subcommittee) to provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental U.S. and U.S. installations overseas, and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those net capabilities. Mr. Anderson mentioned the make-up of the Subcommittee and the fact that the President had appointed Lieut. General Harold George, USAF, retired, as the Subcommittee's staff director. Mr. Anderson also indicated that in addition to the regular attendants at this Council meeting, there were present for this briefing the members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, General George and the members of the Subcommittee staff, and the Planning Board members and advisors. Mr. Anderson then called upon Admiral Radford, as Chairman of the Subcommittee, to make any additional comments he deemed appropriate.

Admiral Radford observed that the report the Council was to hear today was an interesting and highly sensitive one. He requested that details of the briefing which was to ensue not be covered further in any debriefing in the several departments and agencies

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concerned. He indicated that General George has been engaged in intensive work on this project since his appointment by the President last February. He noted that earlier in the week the Subcommittee had heard the briefing which was about to be put on for the Council and that insofar as he, Admiral Radford, knew, the Subcommittee members were in unanimous agreement on the report. Admiral Radford indicated that while the individual members of the Subcommittee were responsible for elements of the report falling within their respective jurisdictions, that only the Chairman is responsible for the report as a whole. Admiral Radford concluded with the opinion that the Subcommittee staff has done an excellent job, whereupon he called upon the staff director to initiate the briefing.

General George outlined in brief the general approach taken by the Subcommittee staff to the implementation of NSC 5511. He indicated that two basic plans were worked up by members of the staff who simulated the role of war planners in the Kremlin. In brief, the first plan (Plan A) assumed a Soviet surprise attack on the United States with no strategic warning. The second plan (Plan C) assumed a Soviet attack preceded by sufficient strategic warning to place U.S. military and civil defenses in a condition of full alert in order to initiate U.S. retaliatory action. General George then called upon the Deputy Director of the staff, Major General Gordon B. Rogers, who introduced the following individuals: Colonel Worth Kindred, USA, and Colonel Edward Herbes, USAF, who gave the briefing on Plan A and on the war-gaming of that plan, including U.S. retaliatory action as well as estimated damage effects resulting from the Soviet attack and the U.S. retaliatory attack.

Plan C was thereupon presented, along lines identical to Plan A, by Colonel George W. Criss, USAF, and Captain Frank Turner, USN.

Next Dr. Ludwell Montague, CIA, briefed the Council on various aspects of the threat to the United States posed by the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons by the USSR.

Colonel Criss thereupon briefed the Council on significant variables which could substantially alter the estimates and conclusions reached by the Subcommittee in its war-gaming of Plans A and C. These variables included basic questions as to (a) the size and make-up of the Soviet nuclear stockpile (b) fallout effects (c) the psychological impact upon the populace of large scale nuclear weapons (d) strategic warning and (e) programmed U.S. military posture at the time of attack.

The formal briefing was terminated with the presentation of the conclusions reached by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. These conclusions were presented by Colonel Richard Ross, USMC.

The Vice President, at the suggestion of Mr. Anderson, invited the Council members to comment on the briefing and to raise any questions that they might have with the Subcommittee.

Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that when the Subcommittee received the briefing by General George's staff earlier in the week, questions had arisen and were answered at that time. As a consequence, Mr. Dulles had no questions to put to the Subcommittee today. He wished to mention, however, that all of the member agencies of the Subcommittee did not participate in the war-gaming covered in the formal briefing.

Dr. Flemming said he had no questions and he expressed appreciation to General George and his staff for the excellent work performed by them.

The Vice President said that he appreciated not only the great effort and many hours which the staff had devoted to this project, but also the excellent and concise manner of presenting their very complicated report. He said that he assumed that the Subcommittee's evaluations were based on the best evidence available as to the contemplated capabilities of the USSR in 1958 and Admiral Radford advised that his assumption was correct.

The Vice President then inquired whether the Soviets were aware of our nuclear and delivery capabilities and if not, he wondered whether it would be in the interest of the United States to create such an awareness on the part of the USSR. Admiral Radford responded that the USSR probably had much better intelligence on our nuclear stockpile and delivery capability than we had on theirs. In fact, he said, we publish a considerable amount of information relating to aircraft delivery and fighter capability, all of which is readily available to the USSR.

The Vice President observed that up to a point there could be substantial benefit accruing to the United States if the USSR were cognizant of our great nuclear and delivery capability.

The Vice President noted that the portion of the briefing which dealt with clandestine attack appeared to be the closest thing to a recommendation made by the Subcommittee and he inquired whether the Subcommittee had further recommendations to make with respect to clandestine attack or to other aspects of the subject. Admiral Radford said that the Subcommittee was not asked to make recommendations; that General George's people had some recommendations but that it was his (Admiral Radford's) view that in lieu of Subcommittee recommendations as such, each member of the Subcommittee should suggest any action in his particular area of responsibility which he considers appropriate.

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Dr. Flemming observed that the evaluations and briefing provided by the Subcommittee are basic to the Council's thinking on numerous subjects and problems which are constantly arising in the field of national security. He noted that many of these problems are being re-examined regularly by the Council and he expressed the view that today's briefing would substantially aid the Council in its thinking on such problems as they come up for discussion at future Council meetings.

Secretary Humphrey, observing that it did not appear that the DEW Line seemed to serve any particular purpose in terms of the attacks contemplated under Plans A and C, asked what value, if any, the DEW Line seems to have in terms of enemy attack. General George responded that the DEW Line is of great importance, particularly in terms of a surprise attack such as is envisaged under Plan A, because it would be the one means of alerting for such purposes as getting planes off the ground to meet such an attack.

Mr. Rockefeller inquired why, in terms of clandestine nuclear introduction, the Mexican Border was not considered just as vulnerable as shipments via the diplomatic pouch or other shipments under diplomatic seal. Admiral Radford responded that both means of introduction were considered by the Subcommittee, but time did not allow of the staff going into detail thereon at this particular briefing.

Secretary Herbert Hoover inquired whether the Subcommittee considered in its evaluations the possible use of intercontinental ballistic missiles and General George responded in the negative, stating that such missiles were not deemed to be programmed and operational by the 1958 date used as the basis for the Subcommittee's studies.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that one of the basic questions which remains unanswered at the present is whether the USSR will have megaton weapons for use by 1958.

Mr. Dodge inquired whether it would be likely that the Soviets would develop and stockpile such large weapons without testing them and Admiral Foster, AEC, responded that it is the consensus of atomic energy officials both in the United States and the United Kingdom that it is unlikely that the Soviets would risk the chance of failure which could flow from stockpiling untested high yield thermonuclear weapons.

Mr. Anderson, reverting to the references made earlier in the meeting with respect to clandestine introductions indicated his understanding that a report on the diplomatic pouch problem would be forthcoming from the Council's internal security committees in the near future. He thought it desirable that the Planning Board

consider that report in the light of the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee and in the light of the Council's discussion of the diplomatic pouch problem.

The Vice President commented on the great amount of work which has gone into this study and referred to the need for following up on national security problems highlighted by the study. He said, where appropriate, he assumed the Planning Board would follow through on these problems.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the first annual report by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, pursuant to NSC 5511.
- b. Noted that each responsible Executive department and agency would review its program in the light of the above-mentioned report, and submit any resulting policy recommendations to the Council through the NSC Planning Board.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the responsible Executive departments and agencies.

S. Everett Gleason

C O P Y

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

November 8, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Characteristics of the Timetable of
Change in our Military Position Relative
to Russia.

1. Reference is made to a memorandum from the
Executive Secretary, NSC, to the National Security Council,
dated 2 November 1955, subject as above.

2. The comments and recommendations of the National
Security Council Planning Board, as contained in the
referenced memorandum, are acceptable from the military
point of view.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

ARTHUR RADFORD,
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Declassified by
OJCS 19 Nov 86

ADVISORY BOARD OF SPECIAL AGENTS
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
Records, 1952-51

Box 16, NSC 5522 - Technological Capabilities Panel (1)

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Authority

MR 85-289-11

By

LNO

NLE Date

12/11/86

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WDR

363

NSC SERIES Box 7
266th Meeting of the
NSC, 11/15/55

11/16/55
TOP SECRET
November 16, 1955

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 266th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Tuesday, November 15, 1955

Present at this Council meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. H. Chapman Rose for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President; Brig. General Theodore W. Parker for Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

1990/363
Time table
The Director of Central Intelligence referred in the first instance to the French electoral situation. Recent developments have put the Faure government "in a box". Its votes of confidence and its tenure of office were secured only through the agency of Communist support. The majority of the other parties in the Chamber are against Faure, and it is likely now that, as a result of disagreements as to electoral reform measures, elections in France will not be held during December. There was also serious question whether the Faure government itself can last.

Mr. Dulles described the results of the elections in the Philippines as a striking victory for Magsaysay as well as for U. S. policy vis-a-vis the Philippines. The opposition charge that Magsaysay was a particular friend of the United States had assisted rather than harmed Magsaysay. Some of the satisfaction which the U. S. should derive from the elections has been qualified by the fact that Laurel has decided to join hands with Recto and will lead the opposition to Magsaysay in the Philippine Senate.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case ERS-369 (NSC)
NLE Case DR 77-93 402
By DOH NLE Date 7/18/89

TOP SECRET

in terms of what was actually being done, as opposed to offers which were dangled before the underdeveloped countries, the program was quite small. Accordingly, Secretary Hoover suggested the advisability of putting a price tag on each of the items which made up the Soviet Bloc program of assistance to the underdeveloped countries. Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the picture would not be complete without the addition of the recent Soviet Bloc arms deal, and Secretary Wilson wished to have incorporated in the revised report some reference to the problem of the ultimate ownership of factories and installations provided to the underdeveloped countries through U. S. economic assistance programs. Secretary Hoover endorsed Secretary Wilson's suggestion, and added his own opinion that in many instances our assistance programs were actually subsidizing state socialism in the underdeveloped areas.

Admiral Radford raised the question of the desirability of having a study as to why the Soviet Union seemed to gain so much influence with so small an outlay of resources, as compared to the United States. For example, we have been assisting India to overcome its economic problems for a number of years and with quite considerable funds, and yet we received absolutely no credit in India for the assistance which we had been rendering.

The Vice President wondered whether Mr. Hollister might not have something to say on this problem after he returned from his trip to the Far East.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the French political situation; the Philippine election results; the situations in Brazil and Argentina; and a summary of the apparently coordinated program of Soviet Bloc assistance to underdeveloped areas, particularly in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TIMETABLE OF CHANGE IN OUR MILITARY POSITION RELATIVE TO RUSSIA

(Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM, dated February 14, 1955; NSC 5522; NSC Action No. 1430-a; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 2 and 9, 1955)

Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the background of the reference report from the NSC Planning Board (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting). At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Anderson indicated that Secretary Wilson wished to make a statement.

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Secretary Wilson stated that the various recent reports and recommendations, such as those of the Killian Committee, were putting a very expensive load on the budget of the Defense Department. This underlined the necessity of evaluating, first, how much money we can appropriately spend on the defense of the United States and, second, how to determine the correct allocation of funds between the requirements of the offense and the requirements of the defense. It might come, he added, as a considerable shock to the members of the National Security Council to learn that, according to the unilateral estimates of the Services, it would cost approximately \$45 billion a year for some years if the Defense Department were to carry out the recommendations of the Killian Committee together with the regular military and military assistance programs.

All this, continued Secretary Wilson, would provide the National Security Council with some idea of the great difficulty which he was encountering in attempting to determine the over-all figure for the Defense budget for the Fiscal Year 1957. He wondered whether the Council would consider a figure of \$38.5 billion as a reasonable ceiling for the Fiscal Year 1957. Actually, Secretary Wilson said that he was presenting to the Services the figure of \$34 billion, but it could be safely anticipated that there would be vigorous protests on it. In any case, when the Council talked about the various programs recommended by the Killian Committee, it should be better aware of the problem posed by the costs of implementing these programs. Certainly every effort must be made to try to establish some priorities among all these conflicting programs. On the one hand, it was impossible to disregard the factor of costs. On the other hand, it was likewise difficult to determine a certain top figure and then simply tell the Services to carry out what programs they could while keeping within the figure selected. In addition to all this, there was the problem of ever-increasing costs. Steel was up \$7 a ton over last year.

Admiral Radford pointed out to the Council that in point of fact the Defense Department had established some priorities based upon agreed national policies. The difficulty was that these papers gave rise to directives to the military services, and they felt obligated to carry out these directives, though sometimes, as in the case of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, the costs of carrying out these directives were greater than anticipated.

At this point the Vice President called on the Acting Director of the Budget. Mr. Brundage stated that the Administration seemed to encounter very great trouble in putting an end to old projects and programs when it got into new projects and programs. This was true not only in the area of national defense and foreign policy. It was likewise true of the whole range of domestic programs. Although much that Secretary Wilson said seemed to be correct, the fact remained that there was no priority "on stopping things".

Dr. Flemming then said that he wished to be heard on this subject. He first reminded the Council of the President's great interest in the so-called Killian Committee Timetable when it had first been considered by the National Security Council last summer. If, said Dr. Flemming, he correctly understood the contents of the Planning Board's report now before the Council, the members of the Planning Board regard the Killian Committee Timetable as of greater importance now than when it had initially been considered. If one links all this up with the recent Soviet moves and maneuvers in the Middle East, Dr. Flemming said he could not avoid a strong feeling that the United States is going through a period which was tantamount to a parting of the ways in terms of national security policy. Of course, continued Dr. Flemming, he was as anxious as anyone to hold expenditures down. But he did hope that no doubts as to national security programs would be resolved in favor of some fiscal advantage unless there were very sound reasons for such a resolution. Let us not set some ceiling figure and say that we will do all that we can for the defense of the United States within the limits of this figure. Instead, we should carefully evaluate our national security situation and decide in each case which programs were required and what was the relative risk involved. The Administration must do all that it could to maintain the U. S. on the offensive and not permit it to be shoved into the defensive.

Dr. Flemming went on to express strong approval of the President's directive accelerating the program for the achievement of an intercontinental ballistic missile. He said he also believed that the high priority now being accorded programs for continental defense was thoroughly justified. Finally, we must not lower our sights at the wrong time with respect to our programs of military and economic assistance to friendly nations. The Secretary of Defense, concluded Dr. Flemming, should be made to feel the wholehearted support of the National Security Council if he decides that the figure for the Defense budget for FY 1957 must be advanced to \$38.5 billion.

Secretary Wilson commented that he was not sure that the Defense Department could do a reasonable job even with the figure \$38.5 billion. Admiral Radford certainly did not believe that it could, and it was at any rate going to prove a rough job to carry out the necessary programs with an FY 1957 budget of \$38.5 billion.

Secretary Hoover said that it was advisable to point out to the Council here that Secretary Dulles had just requested that the Administration not freeze the figure for U. S. military and economic assistance programs for the coming fiscal year until he could return and take part in the discussion of these programs.

The Director of Central Intelligence said that further examination of the recent Soviet nuclear test might have some bearing

on the Killian Committee Timetable problem.

Admiral Strauss said that he had a somewhat different interpretation of the implications of the Soviet test than had the Director of Central Intelligence. It was Admiral Strauss' feeling that what had occurred might well turn out to have been the test of a warhead on a ballistic missile.

Moreover, continued Admiral Strauss, if the Soviets were successful in cutting the lead time for the production of a ballistic missile as rapidly as they had succeeded in cutting the lead time for the production of their recent aircraft types, the date of mid-1958 might actually be too late as marking the end of Period II of the Killian Timetable, during which the United States would enjoy a period of maximum military advantage over the Soviet Union. Admiral Strauss said he preferred to believe that the end of Period II might come as early as mid-1957.

Secretary Wilson interrupted to say that he believed that it was a safe assumption that any technological achievement of the United States would be duplicated by the Soviet Union within a period of two years. Somehow or other they seem to have "infiltrated us" to such a degree.

Admiral Strauss continued his remarks on lead times by pointing out that the Soviet Union had achieved the Bison bomber in five years, starting from scratch. It had taken the United States seven years to build the B-92 bomber. The Soviets cut out a lot of excess detail and cut out a lot of testing of their aircraft and weapons. Admiral Radford agreed with Admiral Strauss' conclusions, but pointed out that of course the Russians cared nothing whatever about accidents. We had to be careful of human life and accordingly more careful in our testing.

Admiral Strauss then stated his belief that instead of approving the Planning Board report on the Killian Timetable at this time, the National Security Council would be well advised to await further data on the most recent Soviet nuclear test. He repeated his belief that if his fears were borne out it might be necessary to advance the date at which the end of Period II of the Timetable would be reached.

Mr. Dillon Anderson pointed out to the Council that the action called for by the Killian Timetable report was simply noting. The report could be readily revised at any later date if any developments pointed to the desirability of revision.

The Vice President observed that, so far as he understood, the implications of the Killian Committee Timetable were to be taken into account by the National Security Council in recommending a revision of the basic national security policy (NSC 5501). To the Vice President, "the big news" from the present report on the Killian Committee Timetable was that the years constituted the period of maximum military advantage for the United States over the Soviet Union. Perhaps, indeed, these years constituted the last period of such advantage that we would have over the Soviets. He asked Secretary Hoover whether he was right in this deduction and whether this meant forceful diplomatic steps by the United States to take advantage of its opportunity. Secretary Hoover replied that the Vice President was correct, but pointed out the difficulties which confronted the State Department in the area of diplomatic action. We simply could not make use of our ultimate military force as a means of carrying out our diplomatic moves. To this the Vice President replied that when one sees what the Soviets have been able to achieve throughout an era in which their atomic strength was much less than that of the United States, one dreaded to think what they might do when their atomic strength came to equal that of the United States.

Admiral Radford said that all he could add was a conviction that sooner or later we must "get tough" with the Soviets and tell them bluntly that there were certain things they could not do.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the results, as set forth in the report enclosed with the reference memorandum of November 2, of the Planning Board's review of the validity of the "Characteristics" in the "Timetable of Change in Our Military Position Relative to Russia" contained in the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee.
- b. Noted that the Planning Board, on the basis of its review of the validity of the "Characteristics", will analyze the "Effects" and policy implications of the Timetable in connection with its current review of basic national security policy; subject to any changes which may be required in the "Characteristics" following evaluation of the recent Soviet atomic tests.

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November 22, 1955

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 267th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Monday, November 21, 1955,
at Camp David, Maryland.

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Anderson, Rockefeller and Dodge; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

The Director of Central Intelligence referred briefly to growing Communist pressures on Berlin, and to the likelihood that new French elections would now be postponed from December to some time between January and March, 1956.

Mr. Allen Dulles then referred to the question asked by the Vice President at the previous meeting of the National Security Council, as to why, with much smaller resources than were made available by the U. S., the Soviet programs for assistance to underdeveloped countries seemed to make a more substantial impact on the governments and peoples of these countries than the larger U. S. programs. Mr. Dulles asked the President's permission to read his answer to the Vice President's question. He singled out the issue of the former colonial status of many of the underdeveloped countries as providing part of the explanation. Another part was the inferiority complex which many of these countries displayed in their dealings with the United States.

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driven to the point of being obliged to defend their negotiating position in the final terms of preserving the East German regime and the Communist system which they had created in East Germany. Of course, these tactics now deprived them of negotiating arguments which they could have used in any direct negotiations with the West Germans for reunification. For example, they could not agree with the Federal Republic to settle for a reunified neutral Germany outside NATO. Secretary Dulles went on the point out that Chancellor Adenauer's fears had been allayed to a considerable extent by the lengths to which the Soviets had gone in order to prevent any genuine discussion of German reunification. So while the USSR had created great problems for itself with respect to the future of Germany, the problems of the Federal Republic had been somewhat reduced.

These thoughts led Secretary Dulles to the question of the future of Germany, and indicated what the United States must be prepared to do--namely, everything that it could do effectively to develop the integration of Europe. If there was to be no unification of Germany in the foreseeable future, it was incumbent on the United States to provide the Federal Republic and its people with the strongest possible sense of their future close relationship with Western Europe. In this connection Secretary Dulles said that he wished to touch on NATO. He said he believed that the most important thing that we could do was to give the Federal Republic some sort of vested interest in NATO through the development of a West German military establishment which was integrated with the West. Perhaps this military agency, NATO, was not the ideal way to reach this objective, but in point of fact NATO was the great magnet of free Europe. For over-all political rather than mere military objectives, we must make use of this military magnet to attract and retain the Federal Republic in integration with the free world. Accordingly, it was perhaps of very great importance that the United States provide more information to the NATO powers on our new weapons. This was one means of keeping alive the morale and spirit of NATO.

While NATO was thus, in Secretary Dulles' opinion, the instrument which today is most effective in holding Western Europe together, we must also seek to develop alternatives to NATO in case the fear of overt aggression and general war continues to decline with the resulting effect of further lowering the sense of solidarity of NATO. Perhaps the Coal-Steel Community was an alternative which offered significant possibilities, but almost any instrumentality was desirable if its use could develop the European principle rather than the national principle. All these things would help keep West Germany a part of the Western community of nations and make more enduring for the Germans the continued division of their country.

At any rate, Secretary Dulles was confident that there was much that could

he must hold his job. The Army was the key to holding the job, and the Army was demanding armament. Accordingly, there was no clear demonstration yet that Colonel Nasser actually proposed to turn his back on the West and cast his lot with the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, he may become involved in such a course if forces are unleashed that he was incapable of controlling.

After a brief pause, the President said that he had a few remarks to make on the subject of Western Europe. Smilingly he said that all the members of the Council realized that this area was one of his pets. Moreover, nearly all those present around this table had been engaged in work with large human organizations. Accordingly all knew the great value to be attached to the morale factor in large organizations. It was by working with the group that the individual achieved his greatest satisfaction and success. Secretary Dulles had just touched on NATO as an organization which U. S. policy should support harder than ever in view of the fact that Germany was not likely to be united for some time to come. Actually, said the President, the Secretary of State really underestimated the case he had made. The unity of Western Europe today, continued the President, would solve the peace of the world. A solid power mass in Western Europe would ultimately attract to it all the Soviet satellites, and the threat to peace would disappear.

Continuing in this vein, the President said that there was one thing that all of those present could do as individuals to forward the objective he had just mentioned. Whenever occasion arose for any member of the National Security Council to talk in public about foreign policy, that talk should stress the great advantages of a more nearly united Europe--cultural, economic, moral, and otherwise. The President referred to his own speech, made on July 3, 1951, at the English Speaking Union in London, on the general subject of a United States of Europe. After that speech, the President said, he had gotten the warmest compliments of no less a person than Winston Churchill, who said that the speech, from the point of view of logic, was the best speech which had been delivered in this generation.

At this point, with even greater emphasis the President repeated his view on the desirability of developing in Western Europe a third great power bloc, after which development the United States would be permitted to sit back and relax somewhat. To help to produce such a development it must be demonstrated to all the countries of Western Europe individually that each and every one would profit by the union of them all and that none would lose. The President cited the development of the American historical pattern as an illustration of the point he was making.

Turning next to NATO specifically, the President exclaimed "For God's sake let us not be stingy with an ally." We should, for instance, give our NATO allies the chance to use some of our modern weapons. NIKE, for instance, should be made available, although, said the President laughingly, NIKE was obsolete--but he didn't wish to be quoted thereon. In point of fact, however, instead of being generous, we treat many of our NATO allies like stepchildren, and then expect them to turn around and commit themselves to fight with us. By such actions we cut our own throats. Our allies certainly ought to know more about our new weapons. Our policy was in great contrast to the generosity which the British had shown in sharing with us their discoveries about radar at the beginning of the second World War.

General Twining pointed out to the President that we were making fairly good progress in carrying out the views which the President had just stated. Secretary Dulles said that of course we were inhibited from sharing our atomic weapons with our allies by our own legislation, though Secretary Dulles believed that we could do a lot more in other weapons fields than we are currently doing to share some of the benefits with our allies.

After repeating once more his suggestion that at every opportunity in public statements and addresses the members of the National Security Council should stress support for the idea of European integration (but should clear their speeches with the Secretary of State), the President terminated this phase of the discussion and inquired whether any member of the Council had any other matters which he wished to bring up for discussion.

Secretary Wilson said that he had a certain number of things to talk about, but he was not sure that this was the time to bring them up. Important budgetary decisions would have to be made in the next three weeks.

The President, in response to Secretary Wilson's statement, said that it would be well to bear in mind the old adage, "Be not the first by which the new is tried, nor yet the last to put the old aside." While, said the President, he could see a lot in what Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford had said to him the last time they saw him in the hospital at Denver, he was still convinced that the Administration had the means at hand to make budgetary cuts in the Defense Department if we actually had the courage to go ahead and make these cuts. For example, continued the President, do we really need to have as much air and sea lift as we think we need to have in order to transport our forces rapidly to various trouble spots?

Secretary Wilson then said that what troubled him with respect to our national security policy, was the fact that we had taken on such a "lot of losers" as allies and clients--for example, Korea, Formosa, and Indochina. The Near East, in Secretary Wilson's opinion,

Mr. Palmer
R. W. Barnett

Authorized By: R. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975

HMB

11/28/55

Uses of Atomic Energy

Attached is a draft memorandum which could be sent forward to
Merchant under a covering note from you, or otherwise as you
deem appropriate.

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MEMORANDUM

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Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and European Integration

This memorandum is prompted by the NSC action of November 21, (Tab A) and the Secretary's memorandum to Mr. Hoover of November 22, (Tab B). Its discussion and recommendation have been influenced by extensive RA conversations with officers in the AEC, S/AE, the EEC regional offices, OIR, ICA, and by the views expressed at our Paris meeting of September 22 by representatives from our European Missions, including USRO and CSC-Luxembourg. This memorandum has not been shown to anyone outside of RA.

The President has expressed the conviction that "European integration, with West Germany playing a part, would be a major contribution to world peace; that a unified Europe (achieved by strengthening and expanding into other areas the concepts of NATO, the Brussels Pact, and the Coal and Steel Community) would constitute a focus of power, in addition to the US and USSR, which would greatly advance the material and moral well-being of European peoples and the security interests of the United States." We would elaborate this thought by the observation that, despite present surface evidences of recovery, boom prosperity and growth in Western Europe, the USSR will, by 1975, have overtaken Western Europe aggregate GNP, unless political and economic decisions are made to increase its power and accelerate its growth. We would also add that unless the United States and Western Europe develop new resources, and implement a plan for making them available to underdeveloped parts of the world, these areas may well look upon the Communist bloc rather than the West as example and prototype, and look to it for leadership and help, for the growth and development processes they believe they must set in motion. It is in the context of these potentialities and the dangers that the form and purpose of European integration should be considered.

Between defeat of the EDC by the French Assembly and the Meeting of the G-6 Ministers at Messina in June, European leadership of the integration movement was quiescent. Very widely in France, but not only there "supranationalism" became political anathema. Under Spaak's leadership in Brussels, representatives of the Community of Six governments are now studying possibilities for new initiatives in the field of European integration with its most significant one focusing on atomic energy. Apart from this, Harnet has organized a political action group dedicated to the support of the concept of a United Europe; it comprises, notably, the leadership of the socialist parties in all of the six countries, including leaders previously opposed to EDC. The USSR is, meanwhile, exploring new fields of cooperative action, including the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The European leaders of the integration movement are recovering their voices. On numerous occasions key leaders have advised us to give them our moral support, but to let them, without overt U.S. intervention, set their pace and work out their difficulties. That this has been their plan has been in a sense, providential: had they asked otherwise we would not have known what to do. But for us to remain comfortably mute for much longer presents certain possibilities. For Germany, at least, a failure of the present drive toward integration could remove all restraints upon those special interests capable

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even now of exploiting East-West tensions in a bold gamble to advance narrow German nationalist purposes. Rampant and successful German nationalism could hardly fail to breed predatory and competitive nationalism elsewhere in Western Europe, from which only the Soviet Bloc could benefit. To forestall such a disastrous, perhaps irreparable, setback to Free World strength and unity, the United States should be prepared to respond promptly, concretely, and favorably to an initiative coming out of Europe.

Discussion of European integration revolves around the concept of peaceful uses of atomic energy. It is a magic, and only partially understood, concept. But it is, we think, well understood that integration in this field could, and probably would, set in motion ancillary and concomitant developments which would lead, over time, towards a real United States of Europe. It is also understood, at least by the leading European participants in planning its use, that peaceful uses of atomic energy cannot, for technical reasons, be dissociated from potential possession of atomic power for military purposes. European countries acknowledge and respect generally the problem faced by the Atomic Energy Commission in working out arrangements with other nations for sharing atomic energy information and materials. They know that real and possibly catastrophic security risks are entailed in improper handling of atomic knowledge and materials. The German industrialists who, today, are pressing for the establishment of a bilateral arrangement between the United States and Germany must be doing so because they think that it would serve their self-interested nationalist aspirations that such a bilateral could be concluded quickly, and that security difficulties could be easily overcome; this would be an understandable position for industrialists to take in every European country. It would become immediately untenable if it could be made known that the United States was ready to participate in arrangements involving the United States on one side and a group of integrated countries on the other and that this relationship would best serve the interests of all from every standpoint including security.

The very rapid advances in declassification of information on atomic energy which have taken place in particular since the August Conference in Geneva has come to mean that the United States no longer occupies the monopolistic position it once held. Of the various forms of cooperation available to the United States - educational exchanges, provisions of libraries, financing of research reactors, and even supply of know-how and materials needed for operation of power reactors - it is improbable that any except cooperation in the erection of isotopic separation facilities for uranium could, today, constitute a United States initiative which would fundamentally influence the form and purpose of European development in the atomic energy field. Europeans believe that there is the scientific knowledge and there are the resources in Europe for Europeans themselves to have reached within a few years, and unassisted, the stage in atomic energy development where the United States and the USSR now stand today. Advocates of European integration maintain that, if unified, Europe's rate of progress will be very rapid, but even if European nations make their advances separately and on a national basis, they will, in due course, possess all of the "secrets", military and peaceful, of atomic energy.

The United States has failed for two reasons to exploit fully its potential for effective and constructive leadership in the field of atomic energy as related to our objectives in Europe. The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission have not spoken with one voice. The Department has been quietly encouraging European leaders to press forward towards a supranational organization of atomic energy programs in Europe, but has not said it would refuse to enter into negotiation of bilateral arrangements. Simultaneously, representatives of the AEC have

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encouraged the Europeans to come forward for bilateral negotiations. Not until 1950 October were we even able to say, authoritatively and with support of the AEC, that we could treat a pool of European countries on roughly the same basis that we could treat a single country. Our second difficulty has been lack of precise agreement within the State Department, and among our representatives in Missions abroad, as to what could be conceived as the most promising and realistic form of integration we had in mind when talking about that word. Not until last May had we made it clear that by integration we meant supranational authority and responsibility, and that arrangements less binding were merely cooperative. Even after this distinction was drawn and accepted, however, there has been no agreement that in practical political terms there was sufficient promise in real accessions of authority and responsibility to the Coal and Steel Community of Six to justify according to this Community greater attention and support than to the geographically broader, functionally more diversified, but legally and politically looser association of countries in the OEEC. At our Paris meeting on September 22, vigorous differences of judgment on this question were expressed. The complexity of resolving these differences has not been eased by activity of the Working Committees of the Spaak Steering Committee in Brussels. They have not yet come forth with clean cut recommendations of new supranational institutions. By and large they have handled their problems very much as would have been done in the OEEC.

The magnitude of the difficulties and the opportunities which confront us as we consider the possible role the United States might play in using its atomic energy resources to assist in European integration suggest several conclusions. We cannot, ourselves, materially contribute to objectives we desire by words alone. Perhaps no single factor so greatly contributed to acceptance of the Western European Union as the United Kingdom's troop commitment. This was an unprecedented and real change in the United Kingdom's relationship to Western Europe, conceptually and practically. This action - as no amount of moral encouragement or philosophic explanation could have done - made possible a change in Franco-German relations. A second conclusion is that it is almost inconceivable that the United States can contribute to a comparably revivifying action by Europeans without itself reaching comparably far reaching decisions. Our action must be one which would require overcoming the anxieties of the Congress and preconceptions, uncertainties, and irresolution within the Administrative Branch. If European integration is in the interest of Free World strength, unity and security, and if we want to influence its accomplishment, we must expect our leadership to be measured by the difficulties we face, and these must be seen to be as sensitive and as fundamental as those faced by European leaders urging their peoples to sacrifice national integrity and self-determination for a common goal and good. Our act of faith must match their:

RECOMMENDATION:

The Secretary should, against the background of the foregoing consideration persuade the President to direct the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Stassen, and the Department of State to prepare, on a highly classified basis, for consultation with key members of the Congress, and subsequently with M. Spaak, the following program of United States action:

1. The United States Government will make available the know-how, the blue-prints and the technical assistance, lend the financial resources beyond capacity of the Europeans to provide, necessary

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Community of Six European nations
contribution to assist w/ atomic
energy

the establishment of facilities for the isotopic separation of uranium at an appropriate location in Europe* provided:

a. The Community of Six establishes by treaty an institution of sovereign authority and responsibility to administer this facility;

b. This authority would enter into treaty relations with the United States which would give both parties assurance, through development of an effective system of control and inspection, that the product of these facilities would be used for peaceful purposes only;

c. This authority by bringing into association other qualifying states in a treaty relationship (perhaps, similar to the U.S. treaty of association with the CBO) and by its participation in cooperative association with European and world groupings of countries (e.g., the OECD the International Atomic Energy Agency, etc...), would endeavor to broaden the benefits for world welfare and security of its activities in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy;

d. This authority would, in amounts and at times specified by treaty, reimburse the United States for its initial financial contribution.

2. To avoid the risks of European criticism of U.S. intervention or excessive influence, the foregoing program when approved by the President should be conveyed to M. Spak, and, if necessary key leaders in the Six countries, in such terms that the Community could formulate a concrete proposal to the United States Government to which this would, in effect be a response.

*We believe that the location of these facilities in the Saar would have certain political advantages, but this possibility should be explored further both from the political point of view and technical feasibility.

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