

1/4/55



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

R. M. P. Jones LTH
CBA
W.B.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : EUR - Mr. Livingston T. Merchant *file*

DATE: January 4, 1955.

FROM : GER - Cecil B. Lyon *CL*

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

JAN 5 1955

SUBJECT: German Unification.

MR. MERCHANT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

We feel that if there is any coming event which is casting its shadow in advance, it is the subject of four-Power discussions with the Soviets sometime after completion of ratifications. We should guess that as the day approaches, the main issue, as it has been in the past, is apt to be that of German unification. This will necessitate a review of the subject, preparation of position papers, and probably the meeting of a Working Party well in advance.

It strikes us that the whole situation is a good deal more involved, or at least problematical, than it was in 1953 at the time of the preparation for the Berlin conference. At that time the Secretary gave the signal in July for intensive work on the preparation of position papers. This was more or less accomplished in the months of August and September, on the basis of work done in May and June in preparation for the Bermuda conference which did not come off. October was used up in the exchange of notes with the Soviets, and the better part of November and December was devoted to Working Party consultations on establishing tripartite positions. The whole process thus took about six months.

This raises several questions on which we should appreciate your advice, of which the main ones are as follows:

- (1) When would it be useful, or permissible, to discuss the subject informally and at the working level with the British, French, and Germans? This has the drawback of getting them thinking about the matter, but is at some stage almost indispensable to us in order to learn what their inclinations are.
- (2) What would be a reasonable time to begin work on position papers? This was done under Mr. MacArthur's supervision last time.
- (3) It would be most useful to receive some indication of the Secretary's thinking on the subject, as guidance for the main lines of our position and general tactics.

It seems to us that there are four or five features in the problem which need to be especially borne in mind: (1) the anticipated pressure for four-Power talks with the Soviets; (2) the place

SECRET

of the
FILED
MAR 28 1955

760.00/1-455
SECRET

762.00/1-455

877 448
10/29/54
AA

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

of the German unification issue in any such talks; (3) past policy of the United States regarding unification; (4) policy of the British and French; (5) recommended US position in any forthcoming talks. A brief paper on these points is attached hereto as Appendix A.

Attachment:

Appendix A.

cc: EE - Mr. Thurston
WE - Mr. Tyler
BNA - Mr. Beale
S/P - Mr. Bowie

EUR:GER:GPA:CKidd:erk
ck

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

APPENDIX A

GERMAN UNIFICATION

(1) Anticipated pressure for four-Power talks with the Soviets.

The atmosphere in Paris at the recent NATO meeting may perhaps have given the best sense of how much pressure exists for a meeting with the Soviets. In any event Mendes-France repeated his suggestion in the Assembly debate on December 21 that there should be a meeting with the Soviets in May, preceded by preparatory talks through diplomatic channels. Adenauer is reported as having expressed the view to his Foreign Office that there would probably be big-Power talks sometime next year.

The important point is the correlation between developments in Paris and Bonn: if the French demand talks with the Soviets, the German reaction will not be to oppose it, but to demand it all the more. In view of their divided country, the Germans feel that the subject strikes home with them more than with anyone else. The entire Opposition feels that negotiations with the Soviets should have priority over Western European integration or rearmament. To the extent that reports from other capitals suggest that talks with the Soviets may become a reality, no German politician can afford not to be on the bandwagon.

(2) Place of German unification issue in any four-Power talks with Soviets.

Although four-Power talks may be imagined in which limitations on armaments, or the Soviet suggestion of an all-Europe security system, or some other subject, might be the main topic, in practice the German question is apt to crowd most other issues into a secondary place. It would be difficult to prevent the Germans from making reunification the main issue if an attempt to by-pass it were tried. In this sense a recent pronouncement of ex-Minister of Justice Dehler (the head of the Free Democratic Party), however egocentric in tone, has a basis of fact and would be subscribed to by Germans of all shades of opinion. Dehler said: "Any discussion * on co-existence which does not consider German reunification fails to deal with the central problem of co-existence."

(3) Past policy of the U.S. regarding unification.

The United States has consistently and in the most formal way maintained that a peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, and the achievement

through

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

through peaceful means of a fully free and united Germany, remains an "essential aim" or "fundamental goal" of its policy. This was most recently stated in the London Declaration of October 3, and in the White House communique at the time of Adenauer's visit on October 28, which reads:

"We particularly addressed ourselves to the question of German reunification. The demand for a reunited Germany in freedom is viewed by us as the legitimate demand of the German people. We are agreed that this aim shall be achieved only by peaceful means. We are convinced of the necessity of continued efforts towards this goal and are agreed that such efforts will be made by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany together with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France."

(4) Policy of the British and French.

On the surface and as the result of careful coordination in advance, there has never been any noticeable difference between the governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France with regard to German reunification. No other policy would in fact have permitted us to obtain the confidence and cooperation of the German Government.

In unofficial conversations with French officials, in the popular press, and in statements by French legislators, the view is hardly disguised that to a great many Frenchmen the division of Germany does not appear to be a bad thing. It corresponds to a policy as old as Richelieu. The least that can be said is that there are obscurities in French policy towards Germany which have never yet been cleared up. In the recent Assembly debates on ratification of the Paris accords, for example, when the Gaullist deputy Soustelle pressed hard for German unification and rejection of German rearmament, it was evident that his interest in reunification is not exactly the same as the Germans, the British, or the United States, but is an interest in conditions of reunification compatible with the traditional Franco-Soviet alliance. Similarly when during the course of the debate Mendes-France stated that he would support no German "irredentism" aimed at regaining the 1937 frontiers, it was clear that his position on the Oder-Neisse line does not at any rate correspond to the Germans'.

The German unification policy of three Western Allies thus represents something like a promissory note on which, thanks to the Russians, we have never yet had to make payment. If the time comes

when

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

when reunification should appear a real possibility, or if the Germans should become convinced that the Allies were flagging or insincere in their efforts to obtain reunification, serious differences might be revealed in the Western position.

(5) Recommended US position for any forthcoming talks with the Soviets.

GER's main preoccupation about any talks with the Soviets is that the potential differences on the subject of reunification among the three Allies, or between the Allies and the Germans, or between the French and the Germans, should be ironed out in advance, by preparatory talks among the four of us, rather than be revealed at the table with the Soviets.

The "German problem" is a short expression for a complex of questions, of which the main ones at this date are: determination of the Eastern frontiers, withdrawal of occupation troops, possible limitations on German rearmament, possible limitations on Germany's freedom of alliance, reunification through the establishment of an all-German government on the basis of free elections, and the conclusion of a peace treaty with that government. The subjects of economic measures, claims, and reparations, which figured so large in the earlier CFM discussions, have by now been more or less taken care of.

There are two ways of negotiating this complex of problems with the Russians: one, to proceed "one step at a time", as though each part were independent of the others; two, recognizing the interdependency of all these problems, to put up our total position for a German settlement against the Soviet total position, with the hope of finding some leeway for negotiation among the parts or of at least removing any uncertainty as to what the respective terms for a settlement might be. Hitherto only the first approach has been tried. In the popular mind the word "reunification" was seized upon as the desired result, and in Allied and German policy the position was adopted that if the Russians would agree first to free elections and establishment of an all-German Government, other questions might be taken up later in due order. This position, which may appear better calculated to ensure disagreement than agreement, served its purpose in delaying any productive discussions with the Russians until after the EDC issue was settled. It amounts to a demand on the Russians to give up the effective hold on their Zone before any agreement is reached on the points affecting their security (Germany's military alliances, frontiers, rearmament, and the presence of US troops in the Western Zones), for the satisfactory solution of which they are holding their Zone as a gage. There would thus appear to be some reason, if four-Power discussions are to be resumed, for an Allied reexamination of the old "first things first" position. Does it promise anything beyond a propaganda battle? Will a propaganda

battle

SECRET

SECRET

- 1 -


battle on familiar lines any longer seem very convincing in Germany? Would the pseudo-unification and perhaps pseudo-government, which might very well result from an agreement that left occupation troops where they are, accomplish much other than restoration of the old quadripartite Control Council in another form, something like the Austrian situation?

It is GER's belief that the time to make a sincere attempt at reunification cannot be much longer postponed. The Germans are determined to obtain it, or at least to leave no stone unturned in the attempt. The present unnatural division of Germany into two armed camps of Soviet and Western military power will be the basic source of tension in Europe so long as it continues. There is good reason to believe that the Germans will eventually try to obtain reunification behind our backs if we do not assist them in accord with oft-repeated Allied promises. The practical question is to find a basis for discussion which provides the greatest flexibility for negotiation and leaves room for no doubt as to the sincerity of the effort. We believe that this can perhaps be most effectively accomplished by the Allies' putting all their cards on the table, something similar to the Secretary's plan in the case of the Japanese peace treaty. If there is any possibility of agreement with the Soviets, this seems to us to be the soundest foundation. If, as is more likely, the time has not yet arrived when the Soviets can afford to reach agreement on a German settlement, it will in any event convincingly demonstrate who is the party still retaining cards up their sleeve.

Whatever substantive positions and negotiating tactics are adopted, there is required a large measure of prior understanding with the Germans. This was done fairly satisfactorily before the Berlin conference, when the German Foreign Office's legal adviser, Dr. Grewe, participated in the Paris Working Group. If discussions this time will involve positions extending beyond the single issue of free elections, much more detailed coordination with Bonn will be required.

It is recommended that as soon as any preliminary work is undertaken with a view toward a four-Power conference, there should be an exchange of views with the German Foreign Office as well as the British and French, and German representatives should be included in any Working Party that may be set up.

SECRET



~~TOP SECRET~~
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 10, 1955

SUBJECT:

1.-Power Consultation on use of Nuclear Weapons

PARTICIPANTS:

M. Martin, First Secretary, French Embassy
 Gerard Smith, S/AE
 Joseph J. Wolf, EUR/RA

COPIES TO:

EUR, S/AE, RA, C, G, S/P, S/S, Defense, USRO

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61120-1

M. Martin called on Mr. Smith at his own request and referred to the 3-Power Meeting in Paris on December 16 and to Mr. Mendes-France's statement at that time that representatives of the U.S., UK and France secretly study the question of political consultation on the use of atomic weapons in various circumstances. M. Martin referred to the U.S. recommendation that the Permanent Representatives be used for this consultation and to the U.K. recommendation that Canada be included. He then referred to the Secretary's response accepting the proposal in principle, subject to obtaining the views of the JCS. Mr. Martin then stated that he was instructed to inquire whether the views of the Joint Chiefs had yet been obtained.

The U.S. representatives replied that they were uninformed as to the status of this matter.

M. Martin then went on to discuss (whether on a personal basis or not could not be determined) some of the aspects of the problem. He stated that some cases would clearly call for the use of atomic weapons and this authority could be delegated to SACEUR, while other cases would require political consultation. He referred to the measures governing the use of U. S. bases in the UK and Morocco, stating that they called for consultation wherever possible before use. He suggested that although use could be provided for in cases of atomic attack on the U.S. or on its foreign bases, a distinction could be made between tactical and strategical use. For example, an area 500 miles in depth might be established in which use of the weapons could automatically be permitted. He mentioned a working level draft paper at one time submitted by the U.S. in the Standing Group proposed automatic authorization on the basis of a time factor.

He stated that French representatives in Standing Group think the matter is now one to be studied at the political rather than the military level. The U.S. representatives commented on the dangers of rigid plans in this area and on the effects of leaks of such planning reaching the Soviet.

In conclusion, Mr. Smith stated that he would look into the matter and advise M. Martin further.

EUR:RA:JJWolf:1j


~~TOP SECRET~~

FEB 9 1955

4

Records Relating to Disarmament (58D 133)
 Box 87 / NATO - Nuclear Weapons 1954-56

218/55



NATO - (NUCLEAR WEAPONS)

668

TOP SECRET

FEB 8 1955

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You will recall that in our tripartite consideration of HQ48, the NATO "New Approach" paper, with the British and French in Paris on December 16, Mr. Mendes-France proposed that representatives of the U.S., U.K., and France secretly study the question of machinery for political consultation, prior to use of atomic weapons. On the suggestion of Mr. Eden, Canada was added as having special atomic interests.

Subject to obtaining the views of the U.S. military authorities, I accepted this French proposal as referendum and noted that we might use the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council of the four countries for this purpose. Attached for your information is a memorandum of conversation concerning the recent visit to the Department by a representative of the French Embassy relating to whether the U.S. position had yet been determined.

While I clearly appreciate that it would be desirable to avoid any such discussions between the four powers, I believe that this course is politically impracticable and would open the possibility of a major disagreement with our allies which might weaken the political unity and the deterrent strength of NATO. I, therefore, suggest for your consideration the following as the initial terms of reference for the U.S. Permanent Representative in any preliminary discussions with the British, French and Canadian Permanent Representatives:

1. The United States approaches the problem of attempting to define the circumstances under which armed attack covered by the North Atlantic Treaty might occur and the response that would be made under various assumed conditions with great reluctance. It does not appear feasible to attempt to set down all of the possibilities of political and military alignments and circumstances which might obtain at a future date. It does not seem prudent to place reliance on any such forecast.


2. However,

The Honorable
Charles E. Wilson,
Secretary of Defense.

TOP SECRET

Records Relating to Disarmament 1953-62
58 D 133 / DIV 83 / NATO - Nuc weapons
1954-56

WILSON, CHARLES E.



TOP SECRET

- 2 -

2. However, the United States considers that procedures could be established along the lines of the NATO alerts paper, which provides for categorization of the circumstances by recognizing two possible situations: (1) special procedures which call political level consultation before the forces of the respective NATO nations might be engaged in hostilities in case of sudden and extreme emergency, and (2) other circumstances, in which political level consultation would take place. In other words, as I stated in my April 23, 1954 statement to the North Atlantic Council, the United States would propose to consult in those cases where the circumstances permitted.

3. Any arrangements resulting from the discussions should be carefully worded so as to reflect that any indication of hesitancy in using nuclear weapons in any particular circumstances would to that extent vitiate the deterrent to Soviet aggression, as I already emphasized in my statement of April 23, 1954 to the North Atlantic Council.

4. Any consultation in advance of entering into hostilities that might be agreed upon would have to be without prejudice to the rights and responsibilities of each NATO nation thereafter to take such action as it may deem necessary in light of the circumstances then existing.

5. Whether or not any arrangements developed as the result of the Four-Power talks should be expanded into NATO-wide arrangements or should be considered as special separate arrangements should be the subject of further study by the United States Government, particularly in light of the substance of any such arrangements which might be evolved.

6. The U.S. Representative should be instructed to elicit specific views and proposals for study and comment by the Departments of State and Defense before in any way committing the United States to any form of political consultation other than under present bilateral arrangements.

I suggest that the U.S. Permanent Representative be instructed to make these preliminary views of the United States known at the first meeting of the four Permanent Representatives and that the responses of the United States to further counter-proposals be the subject of joint determination by our two departments.

In addition, the United States Permanent Representative should be instructed that it is our intention to discuss with the French, U.K. and Canadian Representatives only questions connected with armed attack on the forces and territory covered by Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In view

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 959245
 By SR NARA Date 3/11/97

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

In view of the importance of this matter, I believe that we should consult with the President before entering into any such quadripartite discussions and before coming to any final agreement therein.

I would appreciate having your views on the response which we should make and the position we should take with the British, French and Canadians with respect to any such discussions concerning political consultation on the use of atomic weapons.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN EUSTICE DULLES

S/S-RO

FEB 8 1955

A true copy of
 signed original.

EUR:RA:JJWolf:lj:et
 2/1/55

S/AC
 Mr. Smith

0

C

S/P

EUR

cc Sh. M. Bowser 2/1/55

TOP SECRET

4/26/89

396.1/4-~~155~~
155

TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

SECRET

OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER 14357

Rec'd: APRIL 26, 1955

1955 APR 27 AM 9 24 6:21 P M

tion

EUR

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

SMSA

P

OLI

TOP

CIA

OSD

ARMY

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4759, APRIL 26, 9 P M DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SENT DEPARTMENT 4759 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL 206
BONN 413

PARIS PASS EMBASSY.

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE.

FROM BEAM.

WOLF AND DALE MET APRIL 26 WITH HOOD, CHIEF WESTERN
ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT FOREIGN OFFICE AT LATTER'S
SUGGESTION. FOLLOWING DEVELOPED REFERENCE WORKING GROUP
FOUR-POWER TALKS:

1. ON ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT, HOOD CONFIRMED SUBJECT RAISED
RESULT CABINET DECISION WHICH HE SAID GIVEN NUTTING
SATURDAY. HE INDICATED DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR UK SEEKING TO ADD DISARMAMENT TO
FOUR-POWER AGENDA. DISCLAIMING ANY FURTHER KNOWLEDGE OF
WHAT UK OFFICIAL POSITION WILL BE ON THIS ISSUE, HE GAVE
AS HIS PERSONAL THOUGHT IDEA THAT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FOUR
FOREIGN MINISTERS MERELY RESULTING IN INSTRUCTION TO THEIR
DELEGATIONS IN UN TO PROCEED MORE WHOLE-HEARTEDLY ON
SUBJECT AND BREAK LOG JAMS SHOULD SATISFY UK REQUIREMENTS.
HE SAID UK CONSIDERS AGENDA ITEM OF DISARMAMENT AS GLOBAL
IN NATURE, NOT REGIONAL, QUALIFYING THIS AS PERSONAL
OPINION. HE ADDED AS HIS PERSONAL THOUGHT THAT PROBABLY
UK WOULD WANT TO KEEP DISARMAMENT WITHIN UN CONTEXT AND
IN UN FORUM FOR FURTHER DETAILED DISCUSSIONS, ADDING THIS
WAS HIS STRONG PERSONAL VIEW.

2. WE ASKED HIM WHAT BRITISH HAD IN MIND BY ITEM ON
EUROPEAN SECURITY. HE SAID THEY HAD NOTHING TO PROPOSE,
BUT MERELY WISHED TO BE PREPARED FOR SOVIET INITIATIVE
IN THIS AREA. HE ANTICIPATES SOME DUSTING OFF OF MOLOTOV

PERMANENT RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to OC/R central files with notation of action
REPRODUCTION OF COPY, IF CLASSIFIED

SECRET

PROHIBITED

SECRET

-2-, 4759, APRIL 26, 9 P M, FROM LONDON

NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE ON THIS MATTER BUT SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT SOVIETS WOULD RAISE.

3. HE ANTICIPATES WE WILL HAVE TO FACE VAN ZEELAND PLAN IN OLD OR SOME MODIFIED FORM AND REAFFIRMED UK OPPOSITION TO IT IN EITHER FORM. UK CONSIDERS THAT ANYTHING ALONG THAT LINE WOULD "START US DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE". THEY ARE ALSO ANTICIPATING SOME ITALIAN PROPOSAL ON WHICH THEY HOPE TO HAVE FURTHER DETAILS LATER.

4. ON GENERAL ISSUE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY HE STATED NATO MUST REMAIN BASIS OF OUR STRENGTH AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD IMPAIR NATO POLITICAL OR MILITARY SOLIDARITY AND STRENGTH.

5. AS TO TIME TABLE, HE INDICATED THAT THIS SERIES OF WORKING GROUP MEETINGS PRIOR TO NATO MEETING SHOULD DEAL WITH QUESTIONS OF TIME AND PLACE OF MEETING WITH SOVIETS AND THAT MEETING OF EXPERTS ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS SHOULD BE HELD ABOUT ONE MONTH PRIOR TO HOLDING OF TALKS WITH RUSSIANS. SAID THAT UK WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS UNTIL AFTER ELECTION. CONTEMPLATES TALKS WITH RUSSIANS ABOUT JULY, ASSUMING AUSTRIAN TALKS GO WELL.

6. INDICATED THAT WORKING GROUP TALKS SHOULD FIND UK AND US WAITING TO SEE FRENCH AND GERMAN POSITIONS AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT ANTICIPATE OR GO BEYOND PROPOSALS THEY MIGHT PRESENT. INDICATED NO KNOWLEDGE OF FRENCH THINKING AND ANTICIPATED NO PARTICULAR GERMAN PROBLEM AT PRESENT IN LIGHT ADENAUER STATEMENT 24 APRIL. SPECULATED SOMEWHAT ON LONG-RANG GERMAN PROBLEM IN RELATION TO WESTERN DEFENSE AND NATO, EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE OF NORTH GERMAN PLAIN FROM MILITARY POINT OF VIEW AND OF GERMANY AS REQUIRED LOCALE FOR STATIONING US AND UK FORCES. STATED GERMANS WOULD BE KEY ELEMENT IN PREPARATORY TALKS AND CONFIRMED THEY SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PERHAPS AFTERNOON APRIL 27.

7. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSION OF WEU AND ARMS POOL, HE INDICATED SATISFACTION WITH DEVELOPMENTS AND FEELING THAT
ARMS

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

-3-, 4759
ARMS POOL
WITH THOSE
COORDINATING
INDICATING

SECRET

3-, 4759, APRIL 26, 9 P M, FROM LONDON

ARMS POOL RESULT WOULD FIND WEU REPRESENTATIVES; IDENTICAL WITH THOSE HANDLING ARMS PRODUCTION MATTERS IN NATO, COORDINATING IN ATTEMPT TO GET GREATER STANDARDIZATION. INDICATED HOWEVER WEU MOVING SLOWLY TO BRING THIS CONCEPT INTO BEING. SAID UK CONTEMPLATED WEU ACTING ONLY IN SUPPORT OF NATO EFFORT.

ALDRICH

MGG/33

SECRET

SECRET FILE

5057

5250

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED.

ING
GRAM

DATE: ☐ COLLECT
LARGE TO

Department of State

~~SECRET~~

Classification

1955 APR 12 PM 6 54

DC/T

SENT TO: Amembassy PARIS 3618
RPTD INFO: Amembassy LONDON 5205
HICOG BONN 2771

Origin

Info:

While I appreciate factors referred to in your 4388 I am not inclined to modify ~~inclined to modify~~ at this time position we have taken that Working Group should not assemble or be announced prior deposit ratification instruments. Moreover any time table such as Massigli suggested to Jebb for tripartite ministers meeting May 8 with deposit ratification instruments May 10 and NATO meeting May 11 is quite unacceptable. As I understand it, Permanent Council agreed in setting date for NATO Ministers meeting that it was contingent upon legal presence of Germans. Certainly I would not be disposed to leave for Paris prior to deposit of all ratifications with consequent possibility of last minute upset. For its preliminary report to Ministers I would not think Working Group would require extended period and assuming deposit all instrument end April ~~on first few days of May~~ there still would be sufficient time for Working Group assemble and prepare its report in advance of NATO meeting and any attendant tripartite ministers meeting. After all Faure has it in his power, as I see general situation to enable

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

Drafted by: EUR:LTMerchant:mt
4/11/55


Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: John Foster Dulles

Clearances: Cleared textually by: GER WE RA
LW LW LW

~~SECRET~~

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~

Classification

to enable Working Group to assemble by depositing French instruments, the British, Germans and ourselves being able and willing to do so for our part. I think it undesirable to belabor this point with Faure who obviously is in delicate frame of mind and you may wish to follow general line I took with Couve de Murville Apr 11. I asked him urgently to secure French government's views on items which they felt should appear or be avoided on agenda for later conference with Soviets. I said I was unaware of ^{French} views on this general subject and hesitated to crystallize our own positions in the absence of benefit British and French governments' ideas. I explained that in giving policy guidance to US Delegation for Working Group I wanted to be able to have taken fully into account French and British ideas obtained through normal diplomatic channels.

Dulles
* DULLES

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED	
100852424	
By <u>CC</u>	DATE <u>10/22/92</u>

NSC 5524

Sec 3

TOP SECRET

22 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Tripartite Working Group Discussions in
London on Subjects Other than Austria

1. As requested in a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), subject as above, dated 20 April 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views and recommendations concerning (a) the Department of State draft position papers referred to in that memorandum and (b) the broad military implications of a withdrawal of Allied and Soviet military forces from Germany under the provisions of a German peace treaty, particularly as they relate to the effectiveness of NATO as a military organization capable of carrying out its assigned mission.

2. Certain of the draft position papers deal with matters having far-reaching security aspects, which would require detailed and painstaking analysis for a definite determination of their full implications insofar as the security interests of the United States are concerned. Time limitations have not permitted such an analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their comments, deriving from a limited review, must, therefore, be considered as wholly tentative. In view of this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that they be afforded an opportunity for further comments on those subjects having military implications, as they are developed by the Working Group in London and prior to their presentation in the Tripartite Ministerial Conference.

3. FP (WG) D-1/4 "Scope of Working Group Discussions in London on Subjects Other Than Austria." The Joint Chiefs of Staff would have no objection to the general approach proposed in this paper, provided that the disclosures to the Russians, envisaged in subparagraph (2), regarding a solution to the German problem, represented the crystalized views of the United States Government after adequate study and the fullest coordination. However, for reasons stated immediately below, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with the proposal in subparagraph (4) of the paper pertaining to a European security system, and hence cannot support the inclusion of that proposal in matters to be disclosed to the Russians.

Annex C
to
NSC 5524

- 26 -

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~4. FP (WG) D-3 "General European Security Arrangements."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it illusory to expect that the WEU, whose effectiveness in the final analysis rests on the community of interests and good faith of the contracting parties, could now or in the foreseeable future be so adapted as to form a suitable basis for a European security system embracing both the Western and Eastern countries of Europe, with their totally dissimilar and conflicting aspirations.

*See
FWS
152*

a. The proposal appears to disregard the motivating reasons for the establishment of the NATO. This alliance had its inception in a mutual recognition (1) that the threat to the peace and security of Europe stems wholly from the aggressive political and military posture of the Soviet-Communist Bloc and (2) that only by pooling their strength and combined military resources could the member countries obtain an acceptable degree of security against this threat. The introduction of this proposal at a time when the NATO, at last, shows promise of the eventual attainment of real defensive strength, would in all probability create the false conception among some of our allies that the menace of Soviet aggression has indeed abated and that the achievement of NATO goals is no longer an urgent necessity. Further, the misconception would be heightened by the fact that the proposal is primarily directed toward achieving adjustments with the Eastern satellite nations, whereas the USSR which would largely be exempt from its provisions is, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the real menace to Western Europe.

b. The proposal, while titled a "General European Security Arrangement," is, in effect, a regional disarmament plan. The provisions in the proposal for the reduction or limitation of armaments which would be applicable to the European area, without any general disarmament agreement, are considered to be unsound and hazardous. The United States has consistently held that the first step in the field of regulation of armaments must be the achievement of an international agreement on at least the general principles involved. After almost ten years of negotiation, no such agreement has as yet been achieved. An approach to disarmament on a piecemeal basis, as proposed, could result in the establishment of detailed arrangements which would undoubtedly affect the consideration of the problem in its global aspects. Moreover, any reliance on the

Annex C
to
NSC 5524

- 27 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

efficacy of the control and enforcement provisions must pre-suppose freedom of movement throughout the area in the conduct of inspections and must assume at least a degree of good faith on the part of the contracting parties. Our experiences in Korea, and more recently in Indochina, indicate that there would be a complete absence of good faith on the part of the Communists, whereas the Western countries would faithfully discharge their part of the agreement. It would, therefore be inevitable that the "Iron Curtain" would make a mockery of any inspection system which could be devised.

c. Until the United States has had the opportunity to formulate a comprehensive plan for European security, and interested governmental agencies have had an opportunity to study thoroughly all of its implications, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it would be injudicious for the United States to introduce a proposal on this subject in an international conference. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the proposal contained in the draft paper does not meet these conditions.

5. FP(WG) D-3/1a "Some Aspects of European Security."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the views expressed in this position paper and consider that they should receive the fullest consideration in the formulation of any United States proposal for a European security system. They desire to point out, however, that their agreement in 1953, regarding the withdrawal of Allied forces from Germany, referred to in Section III A of the paper was predicated upon a number of conditions and qualifications. Prominent among these was the proviso that no military vacuum be created during the period of transition -- that Allied forces would be withdrawn only as German forces were created to replace them, and then only to positions on the continent west of the boundaries of Germany.

6. FP (WG) D-4a "The 'Eden Plan' for Free Elections."

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not in a position to assess fully the political implications of this paper, the recommended United States position is considered acceptable from the military point of view.

Annex C
to
NSC 5524

- 28 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~7. FP (WG) D-4/1 "Basic Position Paper on German Issue."

For reasons previously stated in paragraph 4 above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in the presentation of a European security arrangement based on general arms limitation by the Western European and satellite states as proposed in subparagraph (b) of the paper under the heading "Recommended Position". With this exception the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no objection to the recommended United States position set forth in this paper.

8. FP (WG) D-4/2a "German Peace Treaty." The provisions

of the Outline of a German Peace Treaty, contained in the Annex to this paper (Appendix "F"), are generally acceptable from the military point of view. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note, however, that Article 4 (a) provides that all occupation forces shall be withdrawn from Germany within six months after the coming into force of the treaty. This would only be acceptable from the military point of view if certain requisite prior conditions were to be achieved. On the assumption that a united and sovereign Germany would align itself with the West, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that no power vacuum, even of a temporary nature, be created in Germany by a premature withdrawal of occupation forces. They are of the opinion that the agreement of the Government of Germany should be sought to the retention in Germany of the allied forces necessary for the security of the area until such time as their withdrawal will not substantially impair the capability of the Allied Command, Europe, to execute its defensive mission.

9. The Broad Military Implications of the Withdrawal of Allied and Soviet Military Forces from Germany. In their memorandum to you dated 30 July 1953, subject: "Draft of a Proposed United States Position with Respect to Germany" the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in substance as follows:

It has been envisaged that with the accession of Germany to NATO, a more forward strategy could be developed which would extend the defense of Europe as far to the east of the Rhine as practicable. The establishment of a reunified and rearmed Germany would inject still other factors, including a number of intangibles, which would directly affect the defense concept, although the nature and extent of revision which might be involved cannot now be accurately forecast. Such revision would be influenced by, among other things: (a) the increased area to be defended; (b) the redeployment of Soviet occupation forces and their subsequent location outside Germany; (c) the redeployment of

Annex C
to
NSC 5524

- 29 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Allied forces, particularly United States forces, and their subsequent location outside Germany; and (d) the size of the German force contribution to NATO. A definitive statement of the adjustments in NATO planning which would be involved would require detailed study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. It appears, however, that the withdrawal of Allied forces from Germany will probably reduce the NATO capability to implement a forward strategy, although such withdrawal would be partly compensated for by the redeployment of the Soviet occupation forces outside Germany.

In the absence of a precise statement of the conditions which would surround such a withdrawal and the opportunity to conduct a more comprehensive study of the subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the foregoing views represent the best estimate that can be given at this time regarding the broad military implications of a withdrawal of Allied and Soviet military forces from Germany under the provisions of a German peace treaty.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the views contained in paragraphs 3 to 8, inclusive, constitute the basis for the Department of Defense position with respect to the draft Department of State position papers referred by the memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).

11. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

L. MATHEWSON
Lt. General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Annex C
to
NSC 5524

- 30 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

4/26/55

**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

1955 APR 30 PM 1 08

DC/T

For DCI use only

SENT TO: AmEmbassy LONDON 5586

FOR BEAM

Re Para B your 4760.

While your suggested formula much less objectionable than general broad item on disarmament, our basic position re inclusion subject four power agenda remains as stated DEPTTEL 5575 and in view difficulty keeping any discussion within strict wording of item, most of problems foreseen REFTTEL would still exist. Problem is not one of procedures in any event since existing procedures are the best devised for making progress thru private discussions interested countries if will to do so existed. Moreover introduction this subject, particularly procedural aspects, might give excuse to Soviets raise issue CHICOM participation. Additionally, four power discussion this matter would be particularly profitless in light probable schedule for UN Subcommittee continue until about May 12 and recess with probability reconvening later in New York plus expected later meetings full DC. This modified schedule UN procedures (Wadsworth Tel 4809) should satisfy UK concern re their domestic political situation which, according Hood (Your 4759) "solely responsible" UK desire include subject four power agenda.

This Document Must Be Returned to
DC/7 396.1/7-2655

CS/A

55
DULLES
KVC

Drafted by:

EUR:WPAllen:bw

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

EUR - Mr. Merchant

Clearance:

J. Reinstein
EUR
WPA

D.W.W.
IO per
WPA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

5250

CONFIDENTIAL
7396.1/4-2655

TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

SECRET

APR 27 AM 9 Control: 14365

Rec'd: APRIL 26, 1955

6:46 P M

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4760, APRIL 26, 9 P M

This Document Must Be Returned to
DC/R
Central 396.1/4-2655
Files

SENT DEPARTMENT 4760 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL 207
BONN 414

FROM BEAM

A. IN FIRST INFORMAL CONTACT THIS AFTERNOON WITH HARRISON, WHO WILL HEAD BRITISH DELEGATION, LATTER TOUCHED ON SOME OF ISSUES DEVELOPED EARLIER BY HOOD (EMBTel 4759). HARRISON STRESSED ELECTORAL POSITION UK GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT DEAL AT THIS STAGE WITH OTHER THAN PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, THAT IS, TIME AND PLACE FOUR-POWER MEETING WITH SOVIETS, TEXT OF INVITATION, ETC. HE INDICATED PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAD NOT DEVELOPED PLANS ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTER AND NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO SO BEFORE MID-JULY, WHICH HE ENVISAGED AS EARLIEST DATE FOUR-POWER MEETING. HARRISON CLAIMED WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR WORKING GROUP TO FORMULATE PRECISE POSITIONS AT THIS STAGE FOR FEAR THEY MIGHT LEAK TO SOVIETS. HE CONSIDERED GERMANS MIGHT LIKewise FACE SIMILAR UNCERTAINTIES AND WOULD WISH SOME WEEKS OPPORTUNITY EVALUATE EFFECTS ENTRY INTO FORCE PARIS AGREEMENTS.

I STRESSED OCCASION SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE TAKEN FOR EXCHANGE OF IDEAS ON GERMAN SITUATION AND POSSIBLE SOVIET MANEUVERS WHICH WEST WOULD HAVE TO COUNTER. I EXPRESSED HOPE OUTLINE OF CERTAIN POSITIONS MIGHT ENSUE WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL TO WESTERN MINISTERS AT PARIS.

B. AS REGARDS AGENDA FOR FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, HARRISON OPPOSED INCLUSION FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS AND THOUGHT FRENCH WOULD DO LIKewise. I REGISTERED FULL CONCURRENCE HIS VIEWS. HE STRONGLY FAVORED INCLUSION ARMAMENTS LIMITATION IN AGENDA, ALSO IN INVITATION TO SOVIETS. HE ARGUED DISARMAMENT BOUND TO ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH GERMAN SETTLEMENT AND WORLD OPINION WOULD EXPECT FROM CONFERENCE SOME DISCUSSION THERMO-
NUCLEAR THREAT. I OUTLINED TO HIM WADSWORTH'S RESERVATIONS

RE HIS

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to OC/R central files with notation of action taken.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED

SECRET FILE L W C

Copy in 2206-1355-1058

058 PERMANENT

~~SECRET~~

-2- 4760, APRIL 26, 9 P M, FROM LONDON

RE HIS PROPOSAL AND SAID WE WERE ASKING FOR GUIDANCE.
(EMBTel 4729). IN REPLY MY QUESTION, HARRISON SAID BRITISH
GOVERNMENT HAD NOT THOUGHT OUT MANNER IN WHICH QUESTION
MIGHT BE HANDLED WITH SOVIETS BUT HE THOUGHT EFFORT MIGHT
BE ADDRESSED TOWARDS BREAKING BOTTLE-NECKS IN UN TALKS.

I WISH TO STRESS THIS IS QUESTION WE MAY BE FACED WITH IN
WORKING GROUP IN NEXT DAY OR SO. AS POSSIBLE WAY TO LIMIT
SCOPE INCLUSION ITEM UNDER BRITISH PRESSURE, SUGGEST FOR
DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION SOME SUCH FORMULATION AS
"CONSIDERATION OF PROCEDURES TO ADVANCE DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS
IN UN".

C. AT FIRST FORMAL MEETING TOMORROW BRITISH AND OURSELVES
WILL ENDEAVOR ARRANGE GERMAN PARTICIPATION WORKING GROUP BY
THURSDAY, WHEN THEIR VIEWS WILL BE ASKED ON GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS
ALSO PROCEDURAL ITEMS IF FRENCH PERMIT. BRITISH AGREE NEED
INFORMING NATO CURRENTLY RE AGREED POSITIONS AND WE ARE IN
TOUCH WITH USRO.

AS REGARDS AUSTRIA, HARRISON MENTIONED INCIDENTALLY FOREIGN
OFFICE REQUESTING CABINET NOT FORECLOSE POSSIBILITY OFFERING
GUARANTEE OF INTEGRITY IF REQUIRED OBTAIN AUSTRIAN TREATY
BUT FOREIGN OFFICE HAD NOT AS YET DEFINITELY DETERMINED ITS
APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM.

E. SHOWN TO WADSWORTH DELEGATION. RE PARA C DEFENSE REPS
AGREE EMBTEL 4756 CONSIDERING IT UNLIKELY FOUR-POWER DISARMAMENT
DISCUSSIONS CAN BE LIMITED TO CURSORY EXAMINATION AS AT BERLIN.
DEFENSE REPS ADD IF ITEM MUST BE INCLUDED RESTRICTED FORMULA
ALONG LINES PARA C APPEARS ACCEPTABLE.

PARIS PASS EMBASSY

DEPT PASS DEFENSE

ALDRICH

MGG/33

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

4/28/55

Central file

396-1/4-155



INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE NM/R CENTRAL FILES
396.1/4-2855

HES

OFFICE OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON
24

396.1/4-2855

16-14

Action

EUR

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

SMSA

R

P

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4699, April 28, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4699, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY
LONDON 1080.

Re: London's 4785 to Department (TOPOL 209 to Paris)

Mergerie states French Foreign Office does not (repeat not)
like British proposal for top level four-power meeting
and implied that it would welcome US objections. He said
Faure would of course welcome British proposal and that for
time being knowledge of it in Paris had been limited to
Messigli and himself.

DILLON

MEM/16

File
Eur: ger: gpa/gerk
APR 28 PM 2 24
OFFICE OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON
24

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY * This copy must be returned to CC/R central files with notation of action taken.
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

FRNS

4/24/54
396-1/4-135

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

4-L

Action

EUR

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

L

P

OLI

IOP

CIA

OSD

ARMY

SECRET

Control: 15711

Rec'd: APRIL 28, 1955
6:55 P.M.

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4812 APRIL 28, 9 P.M.

SENT DEPT 4812 RPTD INFO PARIS 664-MOSCOW 202 BONN 421.

FROM BEAM.

AT MEETING WORKING GROUP THIS MORNING BLANKENHORN GAVE OUTLINE GERMAN POSITION RE NECESSITY FOR FOUR-POWER TALKS, IMPORTANCE OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION ISSUE AND DESIRABILITY WEST'S RECAPTURING INITIATIVE FROM SOVIETS (EMBTCL 4796). HE SAID AUSTRIAN DEVELOPMENTS HAD DEEPEENED GERMAN FEELINGS THESE SUBJECTS BUT ADDED GERMANS REALIZED AUSTRIAN SOLUTION UNTHINKABLE FOR THEM, AND CHANCELLOR NOT WILLING CONSIDER ANY FORMULA FOR NEUTRALIZING GERMANY. HE SAID BIG FOUR SHOULD NOT TOUCH NEWLY CREATED WESTERN TREATY SYSTEM SINCE GERMANY COMPLETELY DEVOTED TO ITS PRESENT OBLIGATIONS. HE MENTIONED THERE WAS STRONG GERMAN OPPOSITION BUT THIS NOT INCREASING AND CHANCELLOR CAN CONTINUE TO RELY ON BIG MAJORITY FOR SUPPORT OF TREATY SYSTEM.

ON AGENDA HE BELIEVED WEST SHOULD GO FURTHER THAN AT BERLIN AND MIGHT PROPOSE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM. IN REPLY FRENCH QUESTION BLANKENHORN, STRESSED GERMANS NOT NOW TABLING PROPOSAL THIS COMPLEX AND VITAL SUBJECT BUT LOOKING FORWARD DISCUSSIONS FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL PARIS. HE THOUGHT SUCH PLAN COULD BE DEVELOPMENT (THOUGH NOT EXTENSION) PARIS AGREEMENTS AND SHOULD INCLUDE ALL EUROPEAN STATES (INCLUDING SOVIET UNION) AS WELL AS US AND CANADA. WITHOUT GOING INTO FURTHER DETAIL HE THOUGHT PLAN SHOULD INCLUDE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: (1) MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION GUARANTEES; (2) MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BY ALL MEMBERS IF ONE MEMBER ATTACKED; (3) LOSS OF TREATY RIGHTS IF VIOLATIONS DISCOVERED; (4) ARMAMENT RESTRICTIONS AND CONTROLS; AND (5) EXCLUSION OF RESORT TO FORCE FOR SETTLEMENT TERRITORIAL DISPUTES. HE SAID IT IMPORTANT MAINTAIN SECRETARY DEVELOPMENTS HERE.

Copy No(s) 22

BRITISH

Destroyed in RM/R

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY

SECRET

This copy must be returned to OC/R central files with necessary action taken. COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED

This Document Must Be Returned To
DC/R
Central
Files
396.1/4-2855

SECRET FILE

LW C

SECRET

-2- 4812 APRIL 28, 9 P.M. FROM LONDON

BRITISH AND FRENCH AGREED WITH GENERAL OUTLINES GERMAN PRESENTATIONS AS DID WE, BUT NONE COMMENTED ON BLANKENHORN'S STATEMENTS RE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS EXCEPT TO ASK CLARIFICATIONS.

DISCUSSING SAME HYPOTHESES BROUGHT OUT BY SEYDOUX YESTERDAY, BLANKENHORN INDICATED STRONG FEELING SOVIETS WOULD NOT ACCEPT EDEN PLAN FOR FREE ELECTIONS AND WERE NOT PREPARED TO SURRENDER EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT UNLESS SOME HIGH PRICE SUCH AS US TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE OCCURRED OR IMPLEMENTATION MILITARY CLAUSES PARIS AGREEMENTS SUSPENDED. SEYDOUX RECOGNIZED DIFFERENCES WITH AUSTRIAN SITUATION BUT SAID FRENCH WERE ASTOUNDED SOVIETS WILLING WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM AUSTRIA AS THIS WAS FIRST TIME SINGLE SOVIET SOLDIER HAD EVACUATED OCCUPIED TERRITORY, AND HE THOUGHT THIS INDICATED INCREASINGLY FLEXIBLE POLICY WHICH MIGHT BE SHOWN IN GERMANY.

FRENCH AND GERMANS AGREED MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITY WAS SOVIET DECISION LEAVE GERMANY DIVIDED. IN THAT EVENT FRENCH REMAIN SERIOUSLY CONCERNED HOW FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE CAN APPEAR MAKE PROGRESS. BLANKENHORN SUGGESTED PERHAPS CONFERENCE CAN BE ADJOURNED WITHOUT BREAKING UP AND COULD APPOINT COMMITTEES STUDY EUROPEAN SECURITY PROGRAM. SEYDOUX AGGEEED WITH DESIRABILITY THUS KEEPING CONFERENCE IN BEING BUT STRESSED NEED THAT IN PUBLIC PRESENTATION IN FORTHCOMING WEEKS WE NOT INDICATE WE EXPECT NO IMMEDIATE RESULTS.

ON DISCUSSION TIME, PLACE AND PARTICIPATION, BLANKENHORN INDICATED HE THOUGHT INVITATIONS MIGHT GO OUT BEFORE AUSTRIAN PEACE TREATY BUT APPEARED AGREE TRIPARTITE POSPTION THAT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION PREVENTED MEETING BEFORE JULY AT EARLIEST. AS TO PLACE, BLANKENHORN WAS AGREEABLE TO SWITZERLAND BUT STRONGLY OPPOSED BERLIN AND FOUND OBJECTIONS TO ALL OTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR VARIOUS REASONS. ON PARTICIPATION HE SAID, AS LAST RESORT, ADENAUER MIGHT PREFER PERMIT EAST AND WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENTS PRESENT SEPARATE STATEMENTS TO FOUR PARTICIPANTS RATHER THAN HAVE FEDERAL REPUBLIC ENTIRELY UNHEARD.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

~~SECRET~~

-3- 4812 APRIL 28, 9 P.M. FROM LONDON

ALL DELEGATIONS AGREE PAPER COVERING PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
AS WELL AS CERTAIN OTHER TOPICS SUCH AS SOVIET INTENTIONS,
FOR FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS TO STUDY SHOULD BE COMPLETED
BY MAY 6.

ALDRICH

LLB/32

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1955 APR 29 AM 9 34

SECRET
OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

5071

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2- 4818, APRIL 29, 1 P.M., FROM LONDON

BLANKENHORN EMPHASIZED COMPLETE UNACCEPTABILITY ANY FORM OF GERMAN NEUTRALIZATION. AS ADENAUER'S DIRECT SPOKESMAN IN THIS WORKING GROUP, HE IS IN FREQUENT TOUCH WITH CHANCELLOR, AND HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO US RPT US REPS THAT ADENAUER CONSIDERS IT OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE THAT GERMANY SHOULD FULFILL HER OBLIGATIONS TO NATO UNDER PARIS AGREEMENTS. (EMBTTEL 4796). BLANKENHORN'S STATEMENTS MUST THEREFORE BE VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT.

DURING WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS BLANKENHORN MADE IT CLEAR THAT "EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM" WOULD BE ON DIFFERENT PLANE FROM PRESENT REGIONAL GROUPINGS, SPECIFICALLY NATO, BUT WOULD CONFORM TO PRINCIPLES OF UN RPT UN CHARTER. PRESUMABLY CURRENT SOVIET DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN SATELLITIES WOULD ALSO BE UNAFFECTED BY THIS NEW ORGANIZATION.

BEGIN DEF. REP COMMENTS:

NEW SECURITY SYSTEM WOULD THEREFORE APPEAR TO BE LIMITED TO SUPERSTRUCTURE OF HIGH LEVEL SECURITY TREATY, WITHOUT FURTHER INTERNAL ORGANIZATION EXCEPT MACHINERY FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS LIMITATIONS THROUGHOUT THE AGREED AREA. ARMS LIMITATIONS MACHINERY WOULD BE CONTINUING TEST OF SOVIET PERFORMANCE, HOWEVER, SINCE IT COULD BE OPERATIVE ONLY IF USSR PERMITTED EFFECTIVE INSPECTION IN SATELLITES AND SOVIET UNION ITSELF. CONVERSELY, LEVEL OF ARMS LIMITATIONS COULD BE SET SUFFICIENTLY HIGH SO AS TO PERMIT NATO TO BE ABLE TO BRING COLLECTIVE STRENGTH TO BEAR AGAINST AGGRESSION. WHILE AGREEMENT FOR INSPECTION IN SATELLITES WOULD CONSTITUTE SOME BEACH IN CERTAIN, INSPECTION IN USSR ITSELF WOULD BE MUCH GREATER ADVANCE AND WOULD, UNLIKE INSPECTION LIMITED TO SATELLITES, BE OF SOME SECURITY VALUE. PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE USSR RAISES QUESTION OF WHETHER ARMS LIMITATION AND INSPECTION IN US RPT US PROPER AND CANADA TO BE INCLUDED, OR ONLY US RPT US AND CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE. LATTER APPEARS OBVIOUSLY PREFERABLE FROM US RPT US POINT OF VIEW. IF WEST'S PROPOSAL LIMITED TO LATTER, SOVIET WOULD PROBABLY SEEK

74
TO ADD US

~~SECRET~~

-3- 4818, APRIL 29, 1 P.M., FROM LONDON

TO ADD US RPT US AND CANADA PROPER. TO THIS, US RPT US MIGHT WISH CONSIDER WHETHER COMMENT MIGHT BE MADE THAT THIS RAISES QUESTION OF SOVIET ALLIES IN FAR EAST, AND THAT SUCH GLOBAL ARMS RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE HANDLED WITHIN UN RPT UN FRAMEWORK.

END DEF REP COMMENTS.

FOR FIRST TIME USSR IS INCLUDED IN PROPOSED EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENT. SINCE NATO WOULD CONTINUE, INCLUSION OF USSR APPEARS TO MEET IN PART THE POINTS RAISED IN PARA 4A, JCS RPT JCS MEMO OF APRIL 22, BUT OFFERS LITTLE NEW TO MEET JCS OBJECTIONS TO A REGIONAL DISARMAMENT PLAN IN ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED (PARA 4B, SAME MEMO) WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE PART OF PACKAGE.

BLANKENHORN HAS INDICATED TO US REPS THAT ADENAUER WISHES TO CONSULT SECRETARY DULLES BEFORE MAKING THIS VIEW KNOWN TO UK RPT UK OR FRANCE IN MINISTERIAL FORUM PRESUMABLY AT MAY 8 MINISTERIAL MEETING. THEREFORE RECOMMEND, AT DEF REPS SUGGESTION, THAT DEFENSE CONSIDERATION THIS PROJECT BE SO SCHEDULED THAT SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED IN SOME DEGREE TO COMMENT AT THAT TIME UPON THIS TYPE OF SECURITY PROPOSAL, WHICH CAN BE TAKEN TO REFLECT ADENAUER'S VIEWS.

ALDRICH

CES/32

~~SECRET FILE~~

5075

~~SECRET~~

4/13/15
396.1/4-155
Central files

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

SECRET

Classification

00967

1955 MAY 3 PM 8 44

DC/T

For DC/T use only

SENT TO: Amembassy LONDON 5629

RPTD INFO: Amembassy PARIS 3922
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 919
HICOG BONN 3063

TO BEAM

US Delegation positions outlined London's 4835 (rptd Paris TOPOL 215, Moscow 203, Bonn 423) generally accord with Department's views. This and other messages from Working Group delegation have been most helpful.

We are concerned by Blankenhorn suggestion reported your 4812 (rptd Paris 661, Moscow 202, Bonn 421) that European security question might be remitted to committees for study after close of Ministers meeting with Soviets. As we understand it, the suggestion is that, in order to avoid appearance of completely unsuccessful outcome of conference, there would be continuing discussion of European security at lower level without any agreement on this subject on part of Ministers. ~~It is not to be expected that any agreement on this subject will be reached at the present time. It is not to be expected that any agreement on this subject will be reached at the present time.~~ Unless Ministerial discussions provide basis for real expectation that further negotiations at lower level could reach useful result, we feel that they would be dangerous. To enter into discussions with Soviets on European security without some such basis would subject Western security

arrangements

5251

Drafted by: EUR:GER:GPA:Phoober:bw
5/2/55 EUR:JJReinstein

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

EUR:LTMerchant

Clearances:

GER - Mr. Lyen
RA - Mr. Palmer
WE - Mr. [unclear]
EE - Mr. Gray
BNA - Mr. Relph

SECRET

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED.

Central files
396.1/4-3065
OS/DLS
SECRET

396.1/4-155
Central files

Page 2 of telegram to AmEmbassy LONDON

~~SECRET~~~~Classification~~

arrangements to negotiations with and propaganda attacks from Soviets for no purpose. It would have highly misleading effect on public opinion giving rise to false hopes for eventual agreement with Soviets. If no basis for agreement with them has been found, there is danger that public opinion would be distracted from need for proceeding with necessity defense measures within Atlantic Alliance and that will to bear consequent burdens would be weakened.

Duller
LS

This Document Must Be Returned To

5252

~~SECRET~~~~Classification~~THIS
IS
100

46159
396-1/4-155

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

25
Action
EUR
Info
RMR
SC
C
SF
C
L
P
OLI
IOP
CIA
OSD
ARMY

OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER
SECRET

Control: 16884
Rec'd: APRIL 30, 1955
3:09 P.M.

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4833, APRIL 30, 6 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 4833 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS TOPOL UNNUMBERED
BONN UNNUMBERED.

FROM BEAM

FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT AGREED IN WORKING GROUP TO BE MADE
TO NAC AT EARLY MEETING. GERMANS WILL BE SHOWN TEXT THIS
MORNING AND STEEL WILL HAND CARRY BACK TO PARIS.

*AS THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ARE AWARE, A WORKING GROUP
OF BRITISH, FRENCH AND AMERICAN EXPERTS, ASSISTED BY GERMAN
EXPERTS IN MATTERS AFFECTING GERMANY, HAS BEEN MEETING IN
LONDON SINCE APRIL 27 TO MAKE A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THE
PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN PREPARING FOR FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE WORKING GROUP PLANS TO CARRY
ON IN LONDON UNTIL APPROXIMATELY MAY 6, AFTER WHICH IT WILL
COME TO PARIS TO ENABLE IT TO PRESENT ITS REPORT TO THE
THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND TO RAISE CERTAIN QUESTIONS FOR
THEIR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. IT HAS BEEN UNDERSTOOD FROM
THE OUTSET THAT ALL AGREEMENTS REACHED WOULD BE AD REFERENDUM.
THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL MEET IN PARIS ON MAY 8
IN ORDER TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR HOLDING A FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE.
THEY WILL ALSO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION WITH THE GERMAN FEDERAL
CHANCELLOR AND WITH THE MINISTERS OF THE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES.

AFTER PRELIMINARY EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION
WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM,
THE WORKING GROUP SET UP TWO SUBCOMMITTEES: THE FIRST TO
PREPARE AN APPRECIATION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET INITIATIVES AND
MOVES IN EUROPE, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMANY,
AND THE SECOND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE WESTERN
ACTION.

IN ADDITION

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R
CENTRAL FILES

396-1/4-3055

396-1/4-3055

RECEIVED

PERMANENT

SECRET

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to OC/R central files with notation of action taken
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED

SECRET

-2- 4833, APRIL 30, 6 P.M. , FROM LONDON.

IN ADDITION A DRAFT OF A PROGRAM FOR A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS IS BEING PREPARED. THIS WILL DISCUSS, INTER ALIA, SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE MOST SUITABLE TIME AND PLACE FOR A MEETING, AS WELL AS ITEMS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED ON AN AGENDA.

THE PARTICIPATING POWERS INTEND TO KEEP THEIR NATO PARTNERS FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE DISCUSSION OF MATTERS WHICH AFFECT THEIR COMMON INTEREST. THE COUNCIL WILL APPRECIATE THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE WORKING GROUP MUST NECESSARILY BE HIGHLY TENTATIVE UNTIL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE INITIAL RESULTS OF ITS WORK WHICH, DUE TO SHORTNESS OF TIME, WILL NOT RPT NOT BE COMPLETED UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO THE MINISTERIAL MEETING. NO DECISIONS WILL BE TAKEN DURING THE LONDON PHASE. IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT A RULE OF SECRECY RELATIVE TO THE PRESS WILL BE OBSERVED.

AS THE COUNCIL IS AWARE, SEVERAL OF THE ITEMS ON THE AGENDA FOR THE FORTHCOMING NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING DEAL WITH QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE APPRAISED IN PROPOSING A MEETING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL THEREFORE PROVIDE A PARTICULARLY VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION BEARING ON SUCH A DECISION."

ALDRICH

PZ/33

SECRET

396-1/5-255

URGENT TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

26
Action
EUR

Info
RMR

SS
G
SP
C
L
P
OLI

IOP
CIA
OSD
ARMY
AIR
NAVY

OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY CENTER

Control: 629

Rec'd. MAY 2, 1955
4:33 P.M.

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4853, MAY 2, 8 P.M.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MND 907436

By DA NARA. Date 10/29/85

SENT DEPARTMENT 4853 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 662 MOSCOW
204 BONN 424.

FROM DEAN.

TWO PLENARY SESSIONS WORKING GROUP TODAY DISCUSSED DRAFT
OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON "APPRECIATION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET
INITIATIVES AND MOVES IN EUROPE". CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS
MADE IN OBTAINING AGREEMENT SUBSTANTIVE PORTION REPORT
BUT CERTAIN SECTIONS REMAIN UNAPPROVED AND PLENARY WILL
DISCUSS REMAINDER TOMORROW.

2 SECOND SUBCOMMITTEE ON "WESTERN OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS"
ESTABLISHED AND WILL ATTEMPT PRESENT FIRST DRAFT TO PLENARY
TOMORROW AFTERNOON. HARRISON IS STILL AIMING TERMINATE
LONDON PHASE WORKING GROUP BY THURSDAY NIGHT.

IN OUTLINING TERMS REFERENCE SECOND COMMITTEE HARRISON
STRESSED NOBODY YET READY PUT FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
ON GERMANY OR EUROPEAN SECURITY. HE ALSO DISCUSSED TIMING
WHICH SHOULD BE ENVISAGED FOR WESTERN PROPOSALS. THERE WAS
GENERAL AGREEMENT SUBCOMMITTEE WORK SHOULD BE LIMITED TO
EXAMINATION VARIOUS HYPOTHESIS AND TO GIVING PROS AND CONS
OF EACH FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS TO EXAMINE. HARRISON INDICATED
SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD AT LEAST WISH GIVE POSSIBLE INGREDIENTS
FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY PLAN AND NOTED BLANKENHORN (WHO IS DUE
RETURN FROM BONN TONIGHT HAD ALREADY GIVEN JOXE GERMAN
THOUGHTS THIS SUBJECT. GERMANS AND FRENCH AGREED THIS
GENERALIZED APPROACH AS DID WE.

IT WAS AGREED PROPOSALS WORKING GROUP SHOULD NOT RPT NOT
IMPINGE ON PLANS ANY INDIVIDUAL NATION PREPARING REGARDING
EUROPEAN SECURITY. HARRISON SAID EUROPEAN SECURITY PLAN
SHOULD ASSUME REUNIFICATION GERMANY. IT WAS ALSO GENERALLY

5081

AGREED

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY * This copy must be returned to OC/R central files with notation of action taken
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED

This Document Must Be Returned To
DC/R
Central
Files
6.1/5-255

SECRET
LWC

SECRET

-2- 4853, MAY 2, 8 P.M. FROM LONDON

AGREED EDEN PLAN AND FREE ELECTIONS WOULD BE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR DRAFT AND WE COULD SEE LATER IF WE WISHED GO FURTHER THAN EDEN PLAN.

GERMANS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT HANDICAPPED BY BLANKENHORN'S ABSENCE IN TAKING POSITIONS BUT THIS HAS NOT RPT NOT DELAYED WORK OF GROUPWM SEYDOUX CONTINUES TAKE LINE WEST IN RELATIVELY ROSY POSITION AS RESULT RATIFICATION PARIS ACCORDS AND EVIDENTLY DESIRES EXTEND CONCILIATORY APPROACH TO SOVIETS INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE, HARRISON HAS RESISED THIS LINE AND HAS STRESSED PARIS AGREEMENTS ONLY POINT OF DEPARTURE.

BOTH SUBCOMMITTEE AND PLENARY MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR TUESDAY.

ALDRICH

LLB/32

AUG 1 1955

AUG 1 1955

5082

SECRET

740.5/4-155

Gen. File

TELEGRAM

Department of State

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

ACTION COPY

OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER
SECRET

Control: 5482

Rec'd: April 11, 1955
3:40 p.m.

FROM: Bonn (via pouch) 1955 APR 12 AM 7 35

TO: Secretary of State DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NO: Unnumbered, April 5.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: 27 NOV 87 7424

By: Jb NARA, Date: 10/29

SENT DEPARTMENT UNNUMBERED, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS,
LONDON, MOSCOW, BERLIN UNNUMBERED.

Major lines Federal Republic foreign policy in months ahead will, we believe be based on Paris Treaties and foremost preoccupation and objective will be German reunification notwithstanding that there is basic pessimism about chances of achieving it.

We believe Federal Government will seek give practical effect Paris Treaties and Western (particularly Western European) unity in political, economic and military fields. At same time, Government and Parliament will expect visible vindication in practice of government's contention during debate on Paris Treaties that latter will both (a) enable Federal Republic assume role of sovereign, equal partner, and (b) provide necessary basis strength (political, psychological, and military) from which West can negotiate with Soviets for reunification.

Regarding (a), importunities on Federal Republic's new allies may be expected in due course, initially in political and economic matters and, as military build-up proceeds, on military matters such as membership SG. (Regarding latter, there are several signs that build-up, beginning with passage of necessary laws, will proceed at moderate pace rather than crash basis. See our telegram 2865, April 1.) We estimate, however, that at least in near term Federal Republic interests in preserving hard won Western unity will constrain Federal Republic act with restraint. We do not believe there is any question now Federal Republic seeking evade restrictions in Paris Treaties; whether and how this question comes up in indeterminate future may well depend in large part on Federal Republic experiences of living with new allies in NATO and WEU.

United States is considered both in Government and Parliament Federal Republic's principal and most influential friend. This means inter alia that United States, and to less extent British, will be looked to to champion German causes in NATO and especially on reunification. Our policies and their consequences

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to OC/R central files with notation of action taken.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITEDThis Document Must Be Returned To
DC/R
Central
Files
740.5/4-555

FILED

SECRET FIVE

were copy in RM/R 450
destroyed

SECRET

-2- #Unnumbered, April 5, from Bonn.

at other points where United States and Communist interests are at issue (e.g. Austria and China) will be closely followed for what light they may cast on Germany's problem.

While many politicians in FDP and BHE, as well as, in opposition are full of ideas on how achieve reunification, many of them dangerous from our viewpoint, in government itself, especially in Foreign Office there is more realistic appreciation nature Soviet Union and its objectives. There is general recognition among professionals that Soviet Union is principal obstacle to German reunification and there is parallel strong pessimism regarding likelihood that Soviet Union will give up its zone of Germany under conditions even remotely acceptable to Federal Republic or its allies. Nevertheless, even though much of what politicians say about reunification and Soviet Union undoubtedly springs from political opportunism, rather than from conviction based on realistic assessment of facts, there is real risk these politicians (and they are not all in the opposition by any means) becoming trapped or hypnotized by their own rhetoric. This could lead to politically dangerous, but nonetheless, real postures which even a devoutly pro-Western Federal Government would have to take into account in its diplomatic relations. On balance, we estimate that in short term practical view Soviet Union and its relationship to Federal Republic will prevail, but if any cracks should develop in Western unity, or especially, if Federal Republic's allies appear unconcerned regarding reunification, domestic political pressures could lead to reduction United States and Western influence with Federal Government of the time and toward increasing susceptibility to blandishments of the Soviet Union.

At present, of course, German officials and politicians want Federal Republic be involved as equals in at least preparations for reunification negotiations. Such Federal Republic participation would help provide needed vindication government's policy; also, through committing Germans to substance Western position, could provide form of restraint against their subsequently attempting on their own deal with Soviets if Western efforts fail achieve reunification.

Along with calculations of importance of United States and USSR to Federal Republic's objectives, much German thought is given to principle of Franco-German rapprochement, to which government's policy is firmly dedicated. In fact, to extent that good relations with United States are taken somewhat for granted, some leaders devote more attention to problem of good relations with France than with the United States. Apart from appreciation of desirability in principle of improvement Franco-German relations, many Germans aware of political and economic importance thereof to them, and there was widespread unfavorable reaction to the suggestions, after French defeat

-3- #Unnumbered, April 5, from Bonn.

of EDC, that the Allies go it alone without France. Nonetheless, many Germans harbor distrust and disdain of French, which inhibit effective carrying out in practice of Franco-German arrangements, e.g. economic cooperation and joint enterprises in North Africa. These inhibitions increase when emotional issues, especially Saar, are publicly inflamed. Moreover, Germans suspect French will be obstacle to Federal Republic "equality of status" in Western Europe and to reunification of Germany. While such practical economic and political calculations likely have major influence on Franco-German relations for some time, joint endeavors in cultural field may prove helpful in long run.

CONANT

ARL

SECRET FILE

SECRET

396.1/5-255

6/25/55

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

6

OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

Action
EUR

Info
RMR

SS
G
SP
C
L

IO
SMSA
P
OLI

IOP
CIA
OSD
ARMY
AIR
NAVY

FOAS

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4874, MAY 3, 10 P M

1955 MAY 4

AM 7

Control: 1432

Res'd: MAY 3, 1955

6:32 P M

SENT DEPARTMENT 4874 REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 666 MOSCOW 206
BONN 426

PARIS PASS USRO.

FROM BEAM.

WORKING GROUP CONSIDERED THIS AFTERNOON MOST DIFFICULT PORTIONS SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT ON WESTERN TACTICS COVERING GERMAN PROBLEM AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. THERE WAS AGREEMENT FORM AND SUBSTANCE THESE SECTIONS WERE GENERALLY SATISFACTORY AND SUBCOMMITTEE WILL REPORT TOMORROW AFTERNOON TO PLENARY WITH REDRAFT THEREOF AS WELL AS REMAINDER REPORT. HOWEVER BOTH FRENCH AND GERMAN DELEGATIONS ASKED FOR MORE TIME STUDY REPORTS BEFORE GIVING FINAL APPROVAL AND WE ANTICIPATE CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONAL COMMENT ESPECIALLY FROM SEYDOUX. FIRST COMMITTEE ON SOVIET APPROACHES WILL ALSO ATTEMPT WIND UP WORK ON REMAINING UNAGREED PORTIONS ITS REPORT BY TOMORROW. HARRISON STILL INTENDS TERMINATE WORKING GROUP IN LONDON THURSDAY NIGHT THOUGH SEYDOUX HAS INDICATED HE WOULD PREFER CARRY OVER UNTIL FRIDAY IN CASE ANY SOVIET MOVES MADE AT LAST MINUTE WHICH WOULD REQUIRE REVISING REPORT.

SEYDOUX TODAY MADE LENGTHY STATEMENT IN WHICH IT WAS CLEAR FRENCH WISH EXAMINE ALL AVENUES ACHIEVE POSSIBLE DETENTE WITH SOVIETS EVEN IN EVENT LATTER REFUSED GIVE GROUND ON GERMAN ELECTIONS OR REUNIFICATION, THOUGH FRENCH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS HOW THIS WOULD BE ACHIEVED LACKING. HE ADDED WE SHOULD ATTEMPT SEEK AGREEMENT SOME EUROPEAN SECURITY PLAN AND LIMITATION ARMAMENTS EVEN IN ABSENCE REUNIFICATION. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY FROM BLANKENHORN, SEYDOUX INDICATED FRENCH WOULD HOWEVER OPPOSE ANY MEASURES WHICH TEND "PETRIFY" DIVISION OF GERMANY.

BLANKENHORN

PERMANENT

5085

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to OC/R central files with notation of action taken

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED

SECRET FILE

LWC

FILED

AUG 8 1955

396.1/5-355
Central
DC/R
Files
This document must be returned to

Destroyed in RM/R

Copy No(s)

22

Date

8-25

SECRET

-2-, 4874, MAY 3, 10 P M, FROM LONDON

BLANKENHORN TOOK LINE GERMAN REUNIFICATION IS BURNING PROBLEM OF EUROPE AND THAT WE CANNOT HAVE EUROPEAN SECURITY IN FACT WITHOUT IT SINCE ELEMENTS FOR SECURITY ARE LACKING. FRENCH AND GERMANS AGREED THERE WERE CERTAIN INTERIM MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE STUDIED IF SOVIETS REFUSED ADVANCE TOWARDS FREE ELECTIONS AND REUNIFICATION BUT THAT THEY SHOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED IN NATURE (I.E. ALLEVIATION PRESENCE SOVIET TROOPS ON GERMAN SOIL BY FORCE LIMITATIONS, WHICH ALREADY EXIST IN WEST THOUGH NOT IN EASTERN ZONE).

SEYDOUX ALSO CONTINUED LINE SUBCOMMITTEES SHOULD STUDY CAREFULLY POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES WEST MIGHT FACE IF SOVIETS ACCEPTED EDEN PLAN EVEN THOUGH HE CONSIDERS SUCH SOVIET ACCEPTANCE UNLIKELY. IN GENERAL SEYDOUX IS PUSHING ASSIDUOUSLY TACTIC THAT NO RPT NO DOOR MUST BE CLOSED ON NEGOTIATING WITH SOVIETS EVEN IF LATTER FAIL TAKE NEW POSITION ON FREE ELECTIONS AND REUNIFICATION. ON GROUNDS DIFFICULTIES IT WOULD CREATE IN FRENCH POLITICAL CIRCLES, HE PERSONALLY PLED YESTERDAY FOR OMISSION US SUGGESTION THAT REPORT STATE THERE COULD BE NO REAL DETENTE AS LONG AS DIVISION OF GERMANY AND SOVIET DOMINATION OF SATELLITES EXISTED. WE HOPE SEYDOUX'S ATTITUDE MAY BE TO SOME EXTENT PERSONAL ONE RATHER THAN FIRM FRENCH GOVERNMENT POSITION SINCE HE SELDOM REFERS TO FOREIGN MINISTRY'S INSTRUCTIONS.

BLANKENHORN INCIDENTALLY MENTIONED CHANCELLOR STRONGLY FAVORS INCLUSION DISARMAMENT ON FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE AGENDA. OUR OBJECTIONS THIS ITEM AS WELL AS INITIAL TOP LEVEL MEETING NOW INCORPORATED IN DRAFT REPORT.

ALDRICH

MGG/32

AUG 1 1955

5086

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

May 3, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: European Security System.

In London discussions of the Working Group for German unification and European security, exploratory conversations have taken place relative to possible proposals which the West might make concerning European security. It has been reported that Chancellor Adenauer feels that proposals on this subject should be made in the forthcoming meeting with the Soviets. The Chancellor's ideas, which he intends to raise during the Paris meeting, have not been indicated in detail but include assurances on non-aggression guarantees; mutual assistance by all parties if one party attacked; loss of treaty rights if violations discovered; armament restrictions and controls; and exclusion of resort to force for the settlement of territorial disputes. (Two telegrams from London outlining the Chancellor's views as far as they are known are attached). It has been reported from Bonn that in recent conversations between Chancellor Adenauer and French Foreign Minister Pinay, they have agreed that the demilitarization of the Soviet Zone of Germany should also form a part of such a proposal.

It seems likely that further and more detailed discussion of various approaches to this subject will be discussed after the Paris meeting in preparation for a meeting with the Soviets. It is not possible at this time to indicate the probable form in which proposals might be developed after the Paris meeting. In order that the United States position can be properly developed on this subject, it is desirable to have the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a form which will enable the development of United States

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NND 907435
By CC Date 10/22/92
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

396.1-6E/5-355
576.1-6E 5-355

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

United States views on various elements or proposals which might come under discussion.

What will be given -

It may be assumed for the purposes of this study that any proposal would be linked to the accomplishment of the reunification of Germany on terms which would contemplate, or at least permit, a united Germany to be a member of NATO. A central element of the arrangement would probably be the limitation of German forces on a basis not substantially different from that provided for in the Brussels Treaty Protocols. The Department of State considers that such a limitation will not be acceptable to the Germans unless it is a part of limitations applicable in some form to other countries both in Eastern and Western Europe.

Chancellor Adenauer's suggestions as revealed thus far contemplate that limitations of forces and armaments would be applicable to all European nations including the USSR, and to the United States and Canada. The State Department's preliminary thinking is that any proposal of this breadth would impinge upon discussions going on in the United Nations and it is far too broad. It does not consider it feasible to include within a European security arrangement limitations applicable to United States forces except as those stationed on the European continent might be affected. Under these circumstances the State Department considers it doubtful that limitations within the territory of the USSR could be brought within the scope of the arrangement. This probably would mean that any European security system would have to be directed primarily toward an arrangement limiting the forces which could be deployed

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
NND 907435	
By <u>CC</u>	DATE <u>10/24/92</u>
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES	

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

deployed in face of each other in Central and Eastern Europe. What is needed is an analysis of the military feasibility of such an approach, which could assume different forms.

It would be most helpful if the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be given on the feasibility from a military viewpoint of the acceptance of limitations on the number of forces, armaments and deployment within Europe, in the NATO area// including the present zones of occupation of Germany, on the alternative assumptions:

a) That ~~the~~ Soviet forces are withdrawn from the Eastern Zone of Germany.

b) That ~~the~~ Soviet forces are withdrawn to the Soviet borders. The following questions are suggested as the type of consideration which might be usefully developed.

1) What are the military implications of withdrawal of Soviet forces under the alternative assumptions, i.e., in terms of Soviet capability of attack on Western Europe?


2) What deployment of forces, in terms of general areas and numbers would be required by NATO under the alternative assumptions stated to permit NATO to defend present NATO territory (i.e., inclusive of the Western zones of Germany but exclusive of the Eastern Zone)?

3) What would be the military implications of agreeing to limitation of NATO forces to those estimated to be required?

4) What would be the military implications of a demilitarization of the Eastern Zone of Germany, assuming that military forces required

for

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

for internal security purposes were permitted in the area but ~~that~~ no others?

5) What would be the military implications of a ban on the possession of atomic weapons by forces in defined areas of Germany and Eastern Europe?

EUR:GER:JJReinstein:am

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
NND 987435	
By <u>CC</u>	MAINT. DATE <u>10/23/92</u>
REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES	

396-1/5-255

05/4/55

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER
~~SECRET~~24-D
Action
EUR

1955 MAY 5 AM 7 26

Control: 2077
Rec'd: MAY 4, 1955
4:40 PM

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3384, MAY 4, 6 PM

PRIORITY

SS
G
SP
C
L
IO
SMSA
P
OLISENT DEPT 3384 REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY LONDON 744,
PARIS 807.REF DEPTTEL 5629 TO LONDON RPTD BONN 3063 PARIS 3922 MOSCOW
919.IOP
CIA
OSD
ARMY
AIR
NAVY

AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED MANY GER POLITICAL AND GOVT LEADERS BELIEVED THAT FROM VIEWPOINT PUBLIC OPINION THERE ARE ADVANTAGES TO PREVENTING REPETITION OF FOUR-POWER CONF ALONG BERLIN PATTERN ENDING WITH DRAMATIC DEMONSTRATION OF FAILURE. THEY THINK SUCH DRAMATIC FAILURE TO ACHIEVE ANY PROGRESS TOWARDS REUNIFICATION WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO CHANC, WHO HAS CONSTANTLY SAID RATIFICATION OF PARIS TREATIES WOULD INCREASE CHANCES FOR REUNITIFICATION. THEREFORE MANY COALITION LEADERS WOULD PREFER TO PREVENT A CLEAN BREAK-OFF. THEY BELIEVE THAT WITH HURDLE OF PARIS TREATIES OUT OF WAY, THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY IN IMPLEMENTING REARMAMENT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CONTINUATION OF PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS ON LOWER LEVEL. IN THEIR OPINION MOST GERS WOULD CONSIDER IT POLITICALLY SMART TO BUILD UP GER STRENGTH AT SAME TIME NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING ON BECAUSE GER BARGAINING POWER WOULD THEREBY BE CONSTANTLY INCREASING. THEY VIEW SUCH TACTICS AS ADVANTAGEOUS BECAUSE THEY THINK IT WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SPD TO CHARGE THAT GOVT SACRIFICED GER REUNIFICATION ON ALTAR OF PARIS TREATIES AND THAT ADENAUERS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT SPD "NON-ALLIANCE" POLICY HAD ENDED DISASTROUSLY. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT CHANC FOR YEARS HAS PUBLICLY BEEN JUSTIFYING PARIS TREATIES BECAUSE THEY WILL INCREASE THE CHANCES FOR REUNIFICATION, POLITICIANS CONSIDER GER PUBLIC WILL BE DEEPLY SHAKEN IF FOUR-POWER CONF SEEMS TO END IN COMPLETE IMPASSE. (DESPITE FACT THAT CHANC PERSONALLY BELIEVES THERE IS NO HOPE OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER GER DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN FULLY RAISED, HE HAS NOT FOUND IT EXPEDIENT TO EXPRESS THIS VIEW PUBLICLY IN RECENT MONTHS.)

This Document Must Be Returned To
DC/R
Central
Files
396.1/5-45

His argument

PERMANENT

5088

IN ADDITION

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to central files with notation of action taken. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED

SECRET
1955

7

Destroyed in RM/R

SECRET

-2- 3384, MAY 4, 6 PM, FROM BONN

IN ADDITION, GER POLITICIANS ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER PROBABLE REACTIONS IN SOV ZONE TO A COMPLETE FAILURE OF A FOUR-POWER CONF TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS. THEY ANTICIPATE UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES A WAVE OF DESPAIR MUCH GREATER THAN THAT WHICH FOLLOWED THE BERLIN CONF.

* THESE CONSIDERATIONS PERHAPS HELP EXPLAIN BLANKENHORNS POSITION IN LONDON WORKING PARTY.

BASING OUR VIEWS SOLELY UPON CONSIDERATIONS OF GER PUBLIC OPINION WE ALSO SEE DEFINITE ADVANTAGES TO PERMITTING DISCUSSIONS TO BE CONTINUED ALONG LINES OF PROTRACTED DISCUSSIONS OVER AUSTRIAN TREATY IF HIGH LEVEL TALKS FRUITLESS.

GERMANS CONSIDERED THE BERLIN CONFERENCE TACTICS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF NECESSITY TO CREATE A SITUATION WHICH WOULD CONVINCE THE FRENCH THAT GERMAN REARMAMENT COULD NOT BE AVOIDED. NOW THAT LEGAL BARRIERS TO REARMAMENT REMOVED, THEY SEE NO REASON FOR REPETITION THESE TACTICS. THEY ARE CONVINCED DECISION TO REARM NOW RESTS IN THEIR HANDS, AND THEY CAN COUNT ON GOVT AND BUNDESTAG TO PRESS AHEAD WITH REARMAMENT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE USSR. WE SHARE THEIR VIEW THAT THE CHANCE IS IN POSITION TO PRESS AHEAD WITH GER REARMAMENT EVEN THOUGH DISCUSSIONS OF THE SORT THAT BLANKENHORN SUGGESTS SHOULD BE IN PROGRESS.

FURTHER IF FOF MIN CONF FAILS ACHIEVE PROGRESS PRESSURE WITHIN GER FOR DIRECT TALKS WITH MOSCOW WILL INCREASE ACCORDINGLY, AND ATTRACTIVE OFFERS MIGHT BE MADE BY KREMLIN. CONTINUANCE OF LOWER LEVEL DISCUSSION WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR FED GOVT TO REJECT SUCH BLANDISHMENTS ON GROUNDS CONF IN PROGRESS AND ANY OFFERS CAN BE MADE THERE; AND IF SUCH APPROACHES ARE MADE ANYWAY, THEN DISCUSSION GROUP WOULD PROVIDE GOOD FORUM TO EXPLORE AND EXPOSE SUCH MANEUVERS. OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IS FACT THAT ACTIVITY ON REUNIFICATION PROBLEM BE CONTINUED IN SOME FORM TO SALVE GER CONSCIENCE THAT THEIR POLICY OF REARMING WITH WEST IS CORRECT AND HAS NOT DESTROYED POSSIBILITY EVENTUAL ATTAINMENT GER UNITY.

OF COURSE WE NOT IN POSITION HERE TO ESTIMATE WHAT REPERCUSSION CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSIONS WOULD HAVE IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

5089

PAF/32

9961 1 508

CONANT

DECLASSIFIED
By R.D. NARS, Date 2/17/88

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
TOP SECRET PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
PRIORITY CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING
NO UNCLASS REPLY OR REF IF DTG IS QUOTED

JCS WASH DC LESTER J JOHNSON COLONEL
USAF 55234

Additional Dist.
OSD
State
WH
SJCS
CMC

TO: USNMR PARIS FRANCE

INFO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE

NR: JCS 980950

NOFORN

6 MAY 55

EXCLUSIVE FOR GRUENTHER

From JCS. Secretary sends.

1. In preparation for a probable four power conference to consider German reunification and European security, the JCS have now under study the military implications of the movement from Germany of United States and allied forces now stationed there. It is requested that your comments and recommendations with regard to such movement be provided not later than 18 May. These comments should include, but not necessarily be limited to the following:

- a. The possibility of repositioning United States and allied forces now in Western Europe within Continental European NATO nations, by country locations, in response to withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany to Poland and Czechoslovakia, or to within the borders of the USSR;
- b. Necessary and feasible adjustments to MC 48;
- c. The degree of acceptability of the resultant allied military posture in Western Europe; and
- d. Minimum and optimum strengths of German forces, under a limited German rearmament, required for Germany on the withdrawal of United States, allied, and Soviet forces from Germany, assuming that a united Germany (1) becomes a member of NATO, or (2) elects to remain outside NATO.

2. Your study of this matter should be predicated upon the following:

- a. Under the most favorable circumstances, it is estimated that a minimum of three years, from the conclusion of four power agreement on a German reunification procedure will be required for Germany to reunify and regain its sovereignty as a nation. At the end of this three year period, it may be necessary for United States and allied forces, along with those of the Soviet Union, to withdraw from Germany.

JCS 980950

J. C. S. FILE COPY
(MAY 55)

3

JCS FORM 375-4 REPLACES OCS FORM 375-4, 1 MAR 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EXCLUSIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

092 Germany 1955

DECLASSIFIED

By

R.D.

NARS, Date

2/17/88

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE~~SECRET~~

NR: JCS 980950

PAGE 2

b. No consideration should be given to the political feasibility or nonfeasibility of repositioning the withdrawn forces in Western Europe outside of Germany. This problem will have to be judged in the light of the numbers of forces involved and the locations chosen.

c. It should be assumed that a unified Germany will not, in the immediate future, acquire an atomic capability.

*C is reply
6/23*

ORIGIN: GEN CARNS (SJCS)

DISTR: GEN MATHEWSON (DJS), ADM RADFORD (CJCS), ADM CARNEY (CNO), GEN TWining (CSAF), GEN RIDGWAY (CSA)

JCS 980950

(MAY 55)

DTG: 062118Z

rbp/9

OCS FORM
1 AUG. 51

375-4

REPLACES OCS FORM
375-4, 1 MAR 51, WHICH
MAY BE USED.~~TOP SECRET~~REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED

JSSC 31 - 35

22155

DECLASSIFIED	
By <u>DOD</u>	Date <u>5200.1</u>
By <u>RVD</u>	NARS Date <u>2/17/88</u>

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

~~TOP SECRET~~
PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING
NO UNCLASS REPLY OR REF IF DTG IS QUOTED

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

G3 DA WASH DC LT COL L J LEGERE JR
G3 PLANS DIV INT'L BR 52971

DATE 21 May 55
TO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE, CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG
GERMANY

NR: DA 981964

23 MAY 55

From G3 sgd Adams re CINCUSAREUR's SX 3417 dtd 21 May 55. This msg in two parts. Part one to CINCUSAREUR, info to USCINCEUR. Part two to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAREUR.

Part One. The Chief of Staff considers that instructions to force commanders must be explicit to the effect that fire is to be employed only if fire is opened on our troops, and desires that you modify the instructions of the force commanders accordingly.

Part Two. The following is for your information.

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the reference message with particular attention to defining the term "limited military force" as used in paragraphs 1f and 1g of Annex "A" to SM-1108-54 dtd 29 Dec 54. The planned forces under Plan A were considered appropriate within the provisions of the national policy on which SM-1108-54 is based. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the view that it is not possible militarily to state the order of magnitude appropriate for the military force which should be employed under the provisions of para 1g of Annex "A" to SM-1108-54. The conditions produced by the political, psychological, mobilization, and alert measures which would have been taken following the use of the forces under Plan A would have to be evaluated prior to determining the size and composition of forces that should be employed.

b. The Joint Chiefs further took the view, and so recommended to the Secretary of Defense, that the use of military forces to assist in removing restrictions on access to Berlin would be only on specific order emanating from the highest level of the US Government, and must be explicit as to the latitude allowed the commander in opening fire.

NOTE: SX 3417 is DA IN 141766. J. C. S. FILE COPY
ORIGIN: G3
DISTR: OCS, -G2, DEPLOY, JCS, NAVY, AF
DA 981964 (MAY 55) DTG: 232232Z wem/7

375-4 REPLACES OCS FORM
375-4, 1 MAR 51, WHICH
MAY BE USED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED

6-10-55

381 (f-20-43) S. 24

5-23-55

NSC 5524 sec 1 ✓

5/31/50

MR 88-32
NFJ Case # NSC 5524
Document # 3

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

NSC 5524 sec 1 ✓

SECRET

COPY NO. 53

May 31, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy for Four-Power Meeting

REFERENCES: A. NSC Action No. 1406
B. Record of Planning Board Meeting, May 25, 1955.

The enclosed draft report, "Policy Issues Facing the U. S. in Relation to Prospective Negotiations", prepared by State with the exceptions of Sections II and III which were prepared by CIA, is transmitted at the request of the State Member for early Planning Board consideration.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 880049
By HRM/hw NARA, Date 7/18/61

28456

SECRET

MR 88-82
 NNFJ Case # NSC 5524
 Document # 2

~~SECRET~~

Policy Issues Facing the U. S. in Relation
 to Prospective Negotiations

- I. Basis for policy review
- II. Soviet objectives
- III. Allied attitudes and Policies
 - A. General
 - B. Great Britain
 - C. France
 - D. Federal Republic of Germany
- IV. Disarmament
- V. Germany and European security
 - A. The present U.S. position on Germany
 - B. Position on a united non-aligned Germany
 - C. Continuation of the status quo
- VI. The status of the Soviet satellites
- VII. The International Communist Movement
- VIII. Far Eastern issues

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 880049
 By HRM/pw NARY Date 7/18/91

SANITIZED COPY
 SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED

DP
 deletion
 pp 18, 19, 20, 22,

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT~~SECRET~~FOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY

May 31, 1955

(Report by the Planning Board
to the NSC pursuant to NSC Action 1406)DF
249+4POLICY ISSUES FACING THE U.S.
IN RELATION TO PROSPECTIVE NEGOTIATIONSI. Basis for Policy Review

1. In recent months the USSR has made a number of moves which constitute an unfreezing of earlier positions rigidly held. The Soviet leaders decided to conclude the Austrian state treaty on terms more favorable to Austria than the Western powers were ready to accept a year ago; in the closing stages of the negotiations the USSR showed an unexpected readiness to give up previously held positions in order rapidly to conclude the treaty. The new Soviet omnibus proposals on disarmament, troop withdrawals and bases include possibly significant concessions to Western viewpoints. In regard to Germany the USSR has made no concrete new proposals but has at least strongly hinted at the applicability of the Austrian solution to Germany. The visit of the highest Soviet officials to Yugoslavia, whatever its actual motivation, indicates a new flexibility and initiative in Soviet policy of which the U.S. will have to take account. Soviet acceptance of a four-power meeting, without Communist China, is evidence of greater realism and possibly of a serious intention to negotiate.

- 1 -
DRAFT~~SECRET~~

3. These events do not require any change in basic U.S. objectives and national strategy set forth in NSC 5501. In-
deed, failure to proceed on that basis would result in the
loss of such advantages as the U.S. may be able to gain
from the present situation. Changes in Soviet tactics and
the imminence of high-level talks between the USSR and the
Western powers should not affect the steady development of
strength and confidence on the part of the U.S. and the
free world coalition. NSC 5501 prescribed negotiation with
the USSR as one aspect of this national strategy, not as a

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

substitute for those measures for maintaining strength and confidence so necessary for the success of any negotiation. The U.S. should, therefore, proceed without interruption in carrying out the policies laid down in NSC 5501.--

4. The question at hand is how the U.S. can use present conditions, and the opportunities they may offer, to enhance its own and free world security, prevent further Communist gains, and reduce the proportions of the Soviet-Communist threat, while continuing to deter resort to force. In so far as recent developments have improved the West's relative power position, the U.S. should seek to exploit that situation, to probe Soviet intentions, and to seek advantageous settlements.

5. In any approach to negotiations with the USSR, the U.S. should retain sufficient flexibility to be able to extract maximum advantage whatever the direction of Soviet policy may be. Thus, if Soviet moves are primarily of a cold-war and propaganda nature, with no real prospect of leading to agreements acceptable to the U.S., then the U.S. should itself take positions that will expose Soviet intractability and bad faith and will maintain or advance the Western cause in the cold war. If, on the other hand, it becomes apparent that the Soviets are in fact prepared to negotiate seriously, then the U.S. should be ready with appropriate proposals, and with a clear conception of what it wants to gain and what it can afford to concede in return,

*Open Skies
Proposal
Unacceptable
Commit*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to the end of reaching settlements advantageous to U.S. interests. Because in the early stages it probably will not be clear whether the USSR intends to wage a propaganda battle or to engage in serious negotiation, initial U.S. positions should be such as can be further developed to meet either contingency.

6. U.S. positions should also take account of possible Soviet uncertainty and probing regarding U.S. intentions. In deciding on proposals, as well as on how and when to put them forward, the U.S. should take account not only of their acceptability in substance but also of their effect on Soviet attitudes and intentions. It will be important to give the Soviets the impression that there is in fact a continuing basis for serious negotiations and that if they will make real concessions, the U.S. will also be ready to make concessions. Even though major issues may not be able to be settled at this stage, the U.S. should seek such progress as can be made and avoid ending a specific effort at negotiation with the impression that further progress is hopeless, unless Soviet intransigence leaves no other alternative.

7. In reviewing our policy, we should take stock of probably Soviet intentions and proposals, of the attitudes of our allies, and of the alternative policies open to us. The review should be focused on the principal problems likely to arise in early negotiations with the USSR: disarmament; Germany, and European security; the Soviet satellites; international communism; and Far Eastern issues.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

II. Soviet Objectives

8. Despite its recent conciliatory moves, the USSR remains basically hostile toward the non-Communist world, and especially toward the U. S. as the power center of that world. Nor has it modified its belief in the ultimate triumph of Communism. However, the USSR will almost certainly avoid pursuing this long term goal in ways which jeopardize its overriding objective of maintaining the security of the regime and its control or influence over the Communist Bloc.

9. The Soviet leaders are aware that the advance of Communist power in Central Europe and Asia has called forth an increasingly stubborn and unified Western counteraction, culminating in the recent agreement to rearm West Germany with NATO. These leaders are probably also increasingly aware of the formidable hazards to the survival of their system if East-West tensions should lead to nuclear war. Notwithstanding the growth in the USSR's own nuclear capabilities, they will probably still not be confident that they could attack the U. S. with nuclear weapons without exposing the USSR to an even more devastating counterblow.

10. There are at least three hypotheses as to the current motivation of Soviet international policy and their goals for the pending series of diplomatic interchange with the west. Broadly stated these are:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

a. The USSR, realistically appraising the threat of annihilation of its system implicit in maintenance of the current cold war and nuclear arms race, has decided to bring about a substantial and prolonged reduction in international tensions.

b. The USSR, estimating that it is at a serious military disadvantage for the next 2-3 years and that recent and foreseeable near term developments (e.g. German rearmament and the Formosa Straits crisis) contain great risks to its security, has decided to buy time for a few years by disingenuous diplomatic maneuvers while it engages in a major armament effort and consolidates its internal position.

c. The USSR, believing that a rough equilibrium of forces exists and will persist between east and west, considers that the present time affords an opportunity for flexible exploration of the possibilities of settling selected outstanding issues and reserves its decision as to ensuing moves and attitudes pending the outcome of these negotiations.

11. Soviet objectives which are common to all three of the above positions include:

a. Prevention of the effective rearming of Germany as a member of NATO.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b. Withdrawal of U. S. offensive bases from the eastern hemisphere.

c. Relaxation of East-West trade barriers.

d. Neutralization of Japan.

12. Soviet attitudes toward the following issues would vary widely depending on which of the three basic decisions it had made:

a. Reunification of Germany

b. Neutralization of some or all satellites

c. Disarmament, particularly inspection and verification

d. Cominform and activities of Communist Parties in free world

e. Selection of Far Eastern issues for discussion and position with regard to each.

13. In addition to the evidence available at meetings with the USSR, its basic attitude will be disclosed at least in part by:

a. Communist propaganda, external and internal

b. Actions in the satellite areas particularly East Germany

c. Internal evidence of the pace of its military programs

d. Allocation of economic resources as between heavy and light industry and long or short-term investments.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

14. At this date () one thing only is certain: it is not yet possible to ascertain how the USSR intends to behave at the forthcoming meetings. The Western leaders will have to be prepared to cope with an extremely wide range of Soviet positions and maneuvers. A skeleton tabulation of issues and the attitude of the Soviet position under the possible comprehensive goals set forth in paragraph 10 follows:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

	<u>a</u> USSR "Serious"	<u>b</u> USSR "Stalling for time"	<u>c</u> USSR "Exploring"
Reunified Germany			
NATO link	Yes	No	No
Arms Controlled	Yes	Yes	Yes
Free Elections first	Yes	No	No
Divided Germany			
Withdrawal all foreign forces	Yes	No	Possible
All European Security system	Yes	Yes	Yes
Withdrawal Sov Forces from all satellites in exchange for US with- drawal Western Europe	Yes	No	Possible
Disarmament	Yes-reasonable attitude toward specific issues	No-Impossible conditions	Slow development of 10 May Psn.
East-West trade barrier removal	Yes	Yes	Yes
Far East	Serious discus- sion of specific issues	Insistence on referring every- thing to a 5-Pws mtg.	Attempt to find face saving formula for further exploration
Japan	Resume relations while Japan maintains pres- ent ties to US	Renunciation of US ties and recognition ComChina pre- requisites	Relations resumed with minimum settle- ment of issues fol- lowed by efforts to foster Jap relations and trade with ComChina
Membership	Admission of all current candidates to Assembly	Insistence that ChiComs get ChiNat seat on SC as price of any other ad- missions	Limited package deals not including China and SC

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

III Allied Attitudes and Policies

A. General.

15. The objectives and positions of our chief European allies with respect to the Four-Power Conference will be greatly influenced by widespread public desires for a reduction of tensions and some form of East-West settlement which will reduce the risks of nuclear war. Recent Soviet moves, especially the Austrian settlement, are widely regarded as an indication of Soviet intention to seek such a detente and there is a new climate of expectation for a prolonged easing of tensions.

16. The UK, French, and West German governmental reactions have been more cautious, but these governments face a difficult dilemma. On the one hand they wish to stand firm against any Soviet initiative which would weaken the West's position of strength and promote dissension within the alliance. On the other, they feel compelled by popular pressures and their own concern over the risks of nuclear war to explore all avenues toward a settlement of East-West issues. This desire and the need to take account of popular expectations may give rise to frictions between the US and its allies over positions to take in negotiating with the USSR.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

European desires to meet the Soviets halfway might be intensified if the USSR makes further conciliatory moves designed to create the impression that settlements are possible.

B. Great Britain

17. Prompted by public pressure, the British government believes that a conference at the summit must seek to achieve concrete, if limited, results and be more than a propaganda exercise. The Eden cabinet probably feels that it must make an effort to pay off on its campaign promises to the electorate. It is apparently prepared to contemplate a prolonged series of negotiations, even if the prospects for results appear dim. However, it appears to believe that the new flexibility of Soviet policy offers some hope that at least some piecemeal settlements can be achieved. Some UK officials have suggested that the West should be prepared to be more flexible than it was at the Berlin conference. However, they have stressed that no impairment of NATO's position can be considered.

ET

a. The German question. The British remain officially committed to the Eden Plan for reunification only after free elections. They expect that the USSR might itself propose the Eden Plan. In any event they consider the presence of US and UK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

forces in West Germany as vital to NATO strategy and are unlikely to accept any plan for neutralization.

b. All-European security pact. The UK expects a dusting off of the Molotov Plan but is cool to any Locarno-type proposal. It would almost certainly reject any plan calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Europe.

c. Disarmament. The UK is adamantly opposed to any weakening of the West's nuclear deterrent power, but regards continued negotiations on disarmament as essential. It will insist, however, on adequate control and inspection.

C. France

18. The French in general appear to be more hopeful than the other NATO allies that recent Soviet moves betoken a real shift in Soviet policy, and hope the Four-Power Conference will increase the prospects of achieving an international detente. France's attitude and likely positions will be more ambivalent than those of the UK because of the greater fragmentation of French parliamentary and public opinion and lingering French hopes for some form of German settlement which will restrict German rearmament. On the other hand, many Frenchmen feel that West Germany should share the costs

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of Western defense and not be left free of this burden on its economy. Foreign Minister Pinay will attempt to pursue a pro-NATO policy, but further indications of a more flexible Soviet position may encourage France to go further toward seeking "settlements" with the USSR than her allies.

a. The German question. Articulate non-Communist French opinion is divided between the groups like the MRP, which flatly opposes German neutralization, and the neutralists or die-hard anti-Germans who favor a German settlement along the Austrian model. Premier Faure and Pinay have publicly rejected neutralization, however. France would probably reluctantly go along with any reunification proposal acceptable to the US and UK but it fears the power of a united Germany and would prefer a continued division with limitations on the armed forces of both parts.

b. All-European security pact. The French would probably favor a loose security pact if it does not conflict with the above positions, but would not risk a break with the US on this issue. Like the UK, France would oppose any withdrawal of US forces from Europe or abandonment of NATO.

c. Disarmament. The French are anxious to explore any possible avenues to disarmament. In view of the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

apparent Soviet concessions, they will probably favor more Western concessions to meet them halfway. If some limitations on armaments could be arranged within the context of any all-European security arrangements, France would probably favor them.

d. Other issues. The French have hinted that the conference should cover other than "European" issues, i.e., world-wide problems, such as in the Far East, which would be included in a general detente.

D. Federal Republic of Germany

19. While ultimate reunification remains a primary West German objective, the Bonn government is caught between popular desires for every effort to achieve reunification and its own fear that unity could only be achieved at the price of West German security. Chancellor Adenauer's chief objective seems to be to insure that his Western allies will not sacrifice the position of the Bonn regime. At the same time he hopes that the Western powers will seize the initiative to prevent the USSR from making propaganda capital and to reassure the West German public that something is being done on unity.

a. The German question. Adenauer's recent statements make it clear that he strongly opposes neutralization of the two German regimes and insists that a reunified Germany be free to make alliances

~~SECRET~~

T

~~SECRET~~

in its own defense. Only in the event of what appeared to the Germans to be a genuine Soviet offer of reunification after free elections, might Adenauer lose control of the situation and German opinion force him to accept neutralization as the price.

b. All-European security pact. To reassure the USSR against the military threat of a reunified Germany, West Germany suggests the allies propose a European security organization based on a series of non-aggression pacts and mutual guarantees, but not replacing NATO. The West Germans oppose a NATO troop withdrawal which would leave them defenseless, but might accept some limitations on the forces of ^{the} two parts of Germany.

c. Disarmament. Although there are signs of growing concern that West Germany would be an initial target area in any nuclear war, disarmament has so far not been a very live issue and Bonn is probably prepared to follow the US lead.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~IV. Disarmament

20. (to be considered in the light of Governor Stassen's preliminary report to the Council and its study by departments and agencies)

V. Germany and European SecurityA. The present U. S. position on Germany

21. The position presented at the Berlin Conference in 1954 (free all-German elections; freedom for united Germany to choose its own alignment) should be reviewed to determine whether it is still the best position in the light of--

a. U. S. security interests if the USSR should
(i) accept it, or (ii) reject it.

b. probable trends in Germany and in Western Europe in case the proposal is rejected.

22. The USSR would almost certainly not agree to our Berlin proposals, sacrificing its control of the Soviet zone and taking the great risk that the united Germany would join NATO, unless substantial inducements were offered. Theoretically, such inducements might be unrelated to the German problem. Practically, it is logical to consider what might be offered as a means of giving reasonable assurances to the Soviet Union against the possible dangers from a rearmed united Germany. In this connection, the U. S. must settle its policy on such questions as--

*later
on, p. 24
See "no"*

~~SECRET~~

I

~~SECRET~~

a. What kind of European regional security arrangements (a comprehensive treaty, or a Locarno system of guarantees, or one or more non-aggression pacts, or a series of unilateral pledges and declarations) could the U. S. accept?

b. Could German rearmament be limited through (i) adoption of a general disarmament scheme, or (ii) an agreement of limitation of European armaments, e.g., through extension and adaptation of the WEU limitations to united Germany and the Soviet satellites?

c. Could the Western powers, including Germany, agree that, after German reunification, no NATO or German forces would be stationed (i) in the former Soviet zone, or (ii) within a wider slice of Germany on the West and a comparable slice of Polish-occupied territory on the east?

d. Could the West agree not to station any non-German forces on the territory of reunited Germany, whether or not Germany might belong to NATO?

e. What further withdrawal, if any, of U. S. forces from advanced position in Europe could be traded for a withdrawal of Soviet forces to the USSR frontiers?

~~SECRET~~

I

~~SECRET~~VI. The Status of the Soviet Satellites

25. Present policies (NSC 174) set as an ultimate

objective the elimination of Soviet control over the satellites. The current objectives are to disrupt the Soviet-satellite relationship, to minimize satellite contributions to Soviet power, to undermine the satellite regimes, and to conserve and strengthen assets which may contribute to U.S. interests and to the ultimate freedom of the satellites. These objectives are to be pursued "by appropriate means short of military force," including "if possible, negotiation with the USSR." In any forthcoming negotiations, therefore, the U.S. should seek every opportunity to reach agreements which will relax or break the Soviet grip on part or all of the satellite area. The U.S. should be prepared with proposals for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, for neutralization of the satellite states, or for free elections and freedom of choice as to their alignment, for use as the situation demands. Even if Soviet acceptance of such proposals is unlikely, it may well be profitable to make them, as a means of keeping initiative in the cold war,

~~SECRET~~

F 87393*1
 DP and FRU 5 5254
 vol VII p. 113
 see also
 IV SE-57
 Vol IV
 p 298

2,

ET

~~SECRET~~VII. The International Communist Movement

27. The U.S. should make use of the issue of Soviet manipulation of Communist parties and other activities in the free world, whenever it proves advantageous to do so. No agreement with the USSR is likely on the subject, nor would an agreement be worth much, as the history of such accords in the past will show Moscow has always taken refuge in the position that the Soviet government has no responsibility for or connections with the Communist parties of other nations.

28. For propaganda purposes, it may be desirable publicly to tax the Soviet leaders with their responsibility for this obstacle to international relaxation and normal relations, and to keep them on the defensive. On the other hand it must be recognized that the propaganda return may be of dubious value, as such a move will certainly provoke the Soviets into renewed denunciations of our own "subversive" activities in the Soviet bloc and proposals for the muzzling of VOA, RFE and other channels from the free world to the subject peoples of the Soviet empire. In any case, it will be desirable to let the Soviet leaders know, privately or publicly, that the U.S. will regard their actual conduct on this issue as a test of their intentions.

- 23 -

~~SECRET~~

DELETED

*deleted
pp 18, 19, 20, 22*~~SECRET~~

I

~~SECRET~~VIII. Far Eastern Issues

29. The U.S. should continue to oppose expanding --
any four power talks to include Communist China, on the
grounds (a) that such talks spring from the obligations
of the four powers with respect to Germany and Europe;
(b) that no such comparable obligations exist with
respect to the Far East; and (c) that in any case the
current major Far Eastern problems directly concern
other nations, including the Republic of China,
besides the five.

30. In addition, the U.S. should consider
what its position should be on the broader question
of methods of settling Far Eastern issues, and their relation
to the settlement of European or general questions.


- 24 -

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

I

F020007-0251

20

~~TOP SECRET~~

PACG MC-16

June 6, 1955

This Document Must Be Returned to
Central
Files
396.1-GE/6-655

PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETING OF CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT

Memorandum of Conversation

Place: The Secretary's Office

Date: June 4, 1955, 11:00 a.m.

Participants: The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Murphy, G
Mr. MacArthur, C
Mr. Merchant, EUR
Mr. Bowie, S/P
Mr. Sullivan, Defense
Mr. Reinstein, GER
Mr. Stolle, S/P
Mr. McAuliffe, S/S-RO
Mr. Appling, S/S-RO

Mr. MacArthur said that he had reviewed with the Secretary the proposed note to the Soviets and press release about the tripartite meetings in New York.

Mr. Bowie said that the British had given us their thinking on the general plans and substantive issues for the Summit meeting and sought our views. They had indicated that Mr. Macmillan had not expressed any firm position but thought that all the problems raised merited careful study. The British anticipated that the meeting would open with a full statement by each representative of his views, including an analysis of the sources of international tensions. The British thought this might include:

(a) Soviet restrictions on access to their people (radio jamming, refusals of visas, press censorship).

(b) Soviet subversive measures abroad.

(c) Obstacles

298434

~~TOP SECRET~~

from 396.1-GE
1-1355

DC/R

Anal 71

Rev

Cat

FILED
JUN 6 1955

396.1-GE/6-655
IN: SUMMIT FILE

F820007-0252
~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

(c) Obstacles to normal trade relations raised by the imbalance of the Soviet economy and tendency to economic autocracy.

(d) Soviet bad neighborliness (abuse of Western states, bullying of less powerful neighbors, breaches of the satellite treaties avoiding emphasis on military aspects because of the Italian case.)

Mr. Bowie said that the British envisaged as the principal general topics of discussion the German problem, European security, disarmament and the Far East. They would not seek solutions at this meeting but expected a thorough exchange of views which might ultimately get at the question of the interrelationships of the principal problems.

The British, Mr. Bowie said, appeared to accept as basic principles:

(a) The continuance of NATO is taken for granted and is not a subject for discussion; that this would continue to be true no matter what agreements might be reached on any of the principal problems.

(b) The membership in NATO of a unified Germany.

(c) The question of foreign bases should not be discussed except in the framework of disarmament.

The British considered that the present time is propitious for negotiations with the Soviets. (The West had, with the coming into force of the Paris accords, a position of strength which would probably not be greatly improved in the near future. At the same time the Soviets appeared to be under certain strains such as internal differences, economic problems and difficult relations with the satellites.) A disintegration of the Communist world was not anticipated but the Soviets might under existing circumstances be willing to negotiate seriously. With time this might no longer be true. Mr. Macmillan was giving thought to the question of whether this was not the time to abandon the bit by bit approach to our problems and to consider a package solution.

In answer to the Secretary's question, Mr. Bowie said that the British had spoken only very briefly about the Far East, saying that they would leave the initiative in this matter to the Soviets. He said he guessed that the British thought we could dispose of any inevitable

Soviet

~~TOP SECRET~~

F. 1007-0253

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

Soviet proposal of a five-power conference. They might, however, be concerned that Soviet proposals on the Far East may go beyond this and call for a further response. The British seemed willing to leave the Far Eastern problems largely to us. Mr. Hoover asked if they could be expected to support our position. Mr. Bowie replied that we had no indication of their position.

The British had suggested that the German problem might only be soluble in the framework of a plan for limitation of armaments. It was clear that they were taking the Soviet May 10 proposals very seriously. Mr. Bowie noted British comment that both sides were anxious to lessen the economic burden of armaments but that they also looked favorably on disarmament as a possible framework for solution of problems of Germany and European security. The British had put forward thoughts about WEU controls, supplementing a global disarmament plan, but when pressed had not explained this position clearly. Mr. MacArthur said that the British appeared to think that some supplemental armaments control plan in Europe would provide the Soviets with a greater sense of security. Mr. Bowie stressed that a basic British thought was that there should be no discussion of plans assuming that Germany would not be unified. They appeared to think German public reaction to such discussion would be grave. Mr. Bowie thought the British looked to our joining them in repressing any French tendency to discussion on the assumption of a divided Germany.

Mr. Bowie stated that the British had indicated some details of their thoughts. They felt it was necessary for us not only to put forward the Eden plan but to add further proposals to meet legitimate Soviet concerns for their own security of the USSR. This British position was in part responsive to their own public opinion but also took into account the need to keep the Germans from losing faith in the West's readiness to put forward plans which had some chance of Soviet acceptance. Mr. Bowie outlined the nature of the British suggestions for mutual withdrawal in Central Europe and said that the military implications of these plans were under study by the British. Our own JCS views were available.

Mr. Bowie then explained that the British, in addition to these "physical" measures had considered such "verbal" measures as treaty guarantees or mutual assistance pacts. They doubted that the Soviets put much faith in these but thought it desirable that we do something to indicate our flexibility. The British had described a possible five-power pact (US, UK, USSR, France and Germany) providing for mutual assistance in the event of an attack by one signatory on another. They noted that this was inadequate in the event of a conflict between a satellite

and

TOP SECRET

F820007-0254

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4 -

and Germany. Extension of this five power pact to provide for mutual consultation in the case of a satellite attack on Germany would block prompt NATO action in the event of such attack. Mr. Bowie said that these British ideas seemed to be put forward with a view to provoking thought and were not definitive views.

With respect to the satellites, the British saw three objectives:

- (a) To liquidate all forms of Soviet penetration and control.
- (b) To hold free general elections.
- (c) To achieve withdrawal of Soviet forces.

They did not see any immediate hope of achieving the first two, although they might come about by evolution under favorable circumstances. The third objective was doubtful of achievement but worth trying for if there were any chance. Mr. MacArthur noted that the British believed there were 22 Soviet divisions in East Germany and two each in Poland, Rumania and Hungary.

With respect to disarmament, the British appeared to take the Soviet May 10 proposal as a starting point. They were not satisfied with the Soviet proposals for controls nor with the introduction of extraneous problems. They would, however, like to probe the Soviet position. They seemed to feel that the UN Disarmament Subcommittee was the appropriate forum for further consideration of disarmament proposals but recognized that disarmament was linked to other problems might need separate four-power consideration.

Mr. Bowie said that he asked the British, as a passing personal thought, whether bilateral negotiations on disarmament with the Soviets might be useful. They thought that it might at some point be useful for one power alone to sound out the Soviets quietly but this should certainly not turn into a real bilateral negotiation.

Mr. MacArthur said that the British want to use the meeting to probe the Soviet position on disarmament. We have indicated to them that we were not willing to go into detailed substantive discussions. They had understood this but hoped to go far enough to get some indication of Soviet willingness to separate the German question from disarmament, and generally to explore the Soviet position in order to decide how

further

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 5 -

further to handle the principal problems. Mr. Bowie added that the British want to be sure that there is sufficient substantive agreement on the Western side to guide our probing of the Soviet position. He thought the British also saw in the Summit meeting an opportunity to expose Soviet leaders to the fundamentals of Western policy. He saw no tendency on the part of the British to turn this into a bargaining session.

The Secretary asked that a careful study be prepared by experts on Communism of the recent Yugoslav-Soviet meeting. He believed that much could be learned from this meeting about the probable pattern of future events and relationships in the Communist world and in their relations with us. Mr. Beam said that such a study was under way and would be carried out.

* The Secretary said he thought the basic British approach was sound, that this was an occasion where we should try to lay on the line our views of the causes of troubled relations and what must be done to improve them. He might put slightly different emphasis on those causes. For example, Soviet jamming of radio broadcasts was a defensive measure. If we complained about jamming, the Soviets could be expected to respond with a request that we drop our propaganda. This in turn would be related to complaints against Soviet subversive activities. With respect to restrictions on movement, we had to bear in mind that we applied some similar measures. There was agreement with Mr. Merchant's suggestion that we should compile a good selection of recent broadcasts from the Voice of America and possibly Radio Free Europe. Mr. Bowie voiced some doubts about bringing RFE into consideration.

The Secretary gave to Mr. Bowie an outline which he had prepared pertaining to the basic issues between us and the Soviets and which he thought did not differ widely from the British views. He thought that these issues did not lend themselves to resolution by formal or contractual sorts of agreement. He pointed to the Litvinov Agreement which while carefully drawn was easily circumvented. He thought that if the Soviets ceased their subversive and propagandistic efforts around the world, if they did release the satellites from their controls and not try to push their borders into the middle of Europe, if they did reduce barriers to trade, the basic picture would be changed and we would naturally react constructively to these opportunities to improve relations.

The

~~TOP SECRET~~

F820 007-0256

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 6 -

The Secretary asked if we were not considering bilaterally or trilaterally the technique of the Summit meeting. Mr. Merchant pointed out that the Macmillan package idea, for instance, could lead to prolonged sessions of the Foreign Ministers. It was noted that Mr. MacArthur was giving consideration to these problems.

Mr. Bowie said he thought the British were willing to have disarmament studied in the UN Subcommittee and, for instance, the German question elsewhere, but bearing in mind that decisions taken in either case might be made contingent on the other. The Secretary said that the question of unification of Germany should not be made contingent on anything. It was important that we isolate it, keep it clear and hammer at it as our number one issue, a point on which the Soviets were maintaining an unnatural and wicked situation. He pointed to the Austrian Treaty as a case in which we had used a similar technique with success. The Secretary recognized that we must, at the same time, deal with other key questions and that settlement of any one would make easier a settlement of others. We should not, however, build up a case for interdependence of the issues. He had no objection to raising the problems together in a general presentation on the basic causes of trouble. Solutions of individual issues would depend on what the Soviets were willing to do. We would have to see whether their actions justified negotiations on specific questions.

The Secretary said we do not want to discuss the Far East at this meeting. We know that the Soviets will propose a five-power conference. We oppose this and hope the British will join us in doing so. On Far Eastern problems for the present, we should continue to feel our way, striving for such results as the de facto cease-fire in Formosa. The more we formalize the Far Eastern situation, the more difficult it becomes. "The situation there has got to grow." In this connection, the Secretary added that he was somewhat troubled by the possibility that Mao would present elaborate plans for the area.

Mr. Sullivan summarized the estimates of the JCS on military implications of a withdrawal from Germany. He pointed out that the covering letter to the Secretary from Secretary Wilson brought out the latter's views that if U.S. forces were withdrawn from Germany, they should be brought home and that, since the NATO system could not operate without U.S. and U.K. forces, we should not agree to German unification on a basis which would require withdrawal of our forces from that country. Mr. Sullivan explained that Mr. Wilson's view is based largely on the costs of repositioning. Mr. Bowie also pointed out the political questions arising from stationing additional large numbers of U.S. forces in other

European

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 7 -

European countries and the possible public impact of our withdrawal from Germany. With respect to costs, he pointed out that if we remained in Germany additional facilities would have to be created for new German forces. If we withdrew, the Germans could use our facilities but that we would have to spend for new U.S. facilities elsewhere. Mr. Reinstein said that the Germans estimate that new construction would be needed for four-fifths of the new German forces now planned. In answer to Mr. Murphy's question, Mr. Sullivan explained that it was the JCS view that our forces should only be withdrawn as German forces built up. Mr. Merchant asked if the loss of support costs as well as the cost of new facilities were in the JCS mind. Mr. Sullivan said yes but primarily the latter. Mr. Hoover asked whether the question of refueling in relation to bases was considered. Mr. Sullivan said it had not entered into this study.

The Secretary asked whether the British had discussed with the French as with us their general line of thinking. Mr. Bowie said so far as we knew they had not.

S/S-RO:HGAppling

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR 88-32
NNFJ Case # 150-5524
Document # 15

NSC 5524

Sec 2

6/10/55
158
153
SECRET

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

COPY NO. 55

June 10, 1955


MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: Basic U.S. Policy for Four-Power Negotiations

REFERENCES: A. NSC Action No. 1406
B. Memos for Planning Board, May 31, June 2
and 6, 1955

The enclosed "General Considerations" prepared by the Board Assistants on the basis of Planning Board consideration of Sections I, II, and III of the May 31 State draft on the subject, are transmitted for Planning Board consideration.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary



26733

(DF)

SECRET


MR88-32
 NNFI Case # ~~NSC 5524~~
 Document # 14

~~SECRET~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BASIC U.S. POLICY ON FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS

	<u>Page</u>
<u>General Considerations</u>	1
Introduction.	1
Soviet Objectives	2
Attitudes and Policies of U.S. European Allies. .	5
Basic U.S. Approach	6
<u>Policy Conclusions</u> (to be prepared).	7
<u>Appendix A</u> - Issues and Possible Soviet Positions. .	8
<u>Appendix B</u> - Attitudes and Policies of U.S. European Allies	10

~~SECRET~~

6/10/55

DRAFTSECRETFOR NSC STAFF CONSIDERATION ONLY

(NSC PLANNING BOARD)

June 10, 1955

BASIC U.S. POLICY ON FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONSGENERAL CONSIDERATIONSIntroduction

1. In recent months the USSR has made a number of moves which indicate a marked change in Soviet attitudes or tactics:

a. Conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty on terms favorable to Austria.

b. Submission of new Soviet omnibus proposals on disarmament, troop withdrawals and bases.

c. Hints that the solution of the Austrian problem might be applied to Germany.

d. The visit of the highest Soviet officials to Yugoslavia.

e. Soviet accent on the inc.

t" meeting without

These moves d.
* bility, a retr
great firmness,
viewpoints.

USSR a new flexi-
sly taken with
proach to Western

*Why we're
surprised -
NSC DPP 55
p12 - 1A might
control*

DRAFTSECRET

~~SECRET~~Soviet Objectives

2. Despite its recent conciliatory moves, the USSR remains basically hostile toward the non-Communist world, and especially toward the U.S. as the power center of that world. Nor has it modified its belief in the ultimate triumph of Communism. However, the USSR will almost certainly avoid pursuing this long-term goal in ways which jeopardize its overriding objective of maintaining the security of the regime and its control or influence over the Communist bloc.

3. Recent Soviet moves are probably in part a response to the firmer position of the West, and particularly to the prospect of German rearmament. The entry into force of the Paris Agreements, bringing the Federal Republic of Germany into the Western alliance, marks a significant setback for the USSR. These agreements remove the major obstacles to German rearmament even though it may take time to materialize. The Soviets face the prospect, therefore, that in the absence of counteraction by them Western Europe will now become stronger militarily, more secure against Soviet attack, and more capable of exerting influence on Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe.

4. The Soviet leaders are probably also increasingly aware of the formidable hazards to the survival of their system if East-West tensions should lead to nuclear war.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Notwithstanding the growth in the USSR's own nuclear capabilities, they are probably not confident that they could attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons without exposing the USSR to an even more devastating counterblow. Moreover, the USSR is confronted with a series of internal problems, arising largely from the high cost of modern armaments, the lag in agricultural production, and possibly a jockeying for position among the top Soviet leaders.

5. The Soviet leaders are aware that the advance of Communist power in Central Europe has called forth an increasingly stubborn and unified Western counteraction, culminating in the recent agreement to rearm West Germany within NATO. On the other hand Western counteraction has not been equally stubborn and unified in Asia, where vulnerability to Communist expansion and neutralism is greater.

6. There are at least four hypotheses as to the current motivation of Soviet international policy and Soviet goals for the pending series of diplomatic interchanges with the West. Broadly stated these are:

- a. The USSR has no real willingness to alter previous positions in any substantial respect, but is engaged solely in diplomatic and propaganda maneuvers, ~~X~~ having particularly in mind the present 2-3 year period of marked Soviet military disadvantage.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b. The USSR, in order better to exploit the situation in the Far East, wishes to bring about an immediate easing of tensions in other areas.

c. The USSR considers that the present time affords an opportunity for flexible exploration of the possibilities of settling selected outstanding issues and reserves its decision as to ensuing moves and attitudes pending the outcome of these negotiations.

d. The USSR has decided to bring about a substantial and prolonged reduction in international tensions and is willing to alter previous negotiating positions appreciably to this end.

None of the above hypotheses are mutually exclusive in their entirety, and in all likelihood, the complex pattern of Soviet motivations and objectives contains some elements of all four.

7. At this date one thing only is certain: it is not yet possible to ascertain how the USSR intends to behave at the forthcoming meetings. The Western leaders will have to be prepared to cope with an extremely wide range of Soviet positions and maneuvers. A skeleton tabulation of issues and possible Soviet positions under the possible comprehensive goals are set forth in Appendix A.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Attitudes and Policies of U.S. European Allies

8. The objectives and positions of our major European allies with respect to the Four-Power Conference will be greatly influenced by widespread public desires for a reduction of tensions and some form of East-West settlement which will reduce the risks of nuclear war. Recent Soviet moves, especially the Austrian settlement, are widely regarded by the publics as an indication of Soviet intention to seek such a detente and there is a new climate of public expectation for a prolonged easing of tensions.

9. The UK, French, and West German governmental reactions have been more cautious. These governments wish to stand firm against any Soviet initiative which would weaken the West's position of strength and promote dissension within the alliance. They also feel compelled by popular pressures and their own concern over the risks of nuclear war to explore all avenues toward a settlement of East-West issues. Popular European desires to meet the Soviets halfway might be intensified if the USSR makes further conciliatory moves designed to create the impression that settlements are possible. Conceivably this pressure could create a dilemma and give rise to frictions between the U.S. and its allies over positions to take in negotiating with the USSR.*

*For a more detailed discussion of Allied attitudes and policies, see Appendix B.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Basic U.S. Approach

10. In the light of the above, no change is required in the basic U.S. objectives and national strategy set forth in NSC 5501. Indeed NSC 5501 contemplated negotiations of the kind we now face, and provided for maintenance of that free world strength and confidence which is essential to the success of any negotiations. Accordingly, the U.S. should without relaxation continue the steady development of strength, confidence and military readiness in the U.S. and the free world coalition.

11. The question at hand is how the U.S. can use present conditions, and the opportunities they may offer, to enhance its own and free world security, prevent further Communist gains, and reduce the proportions of the Soviet-Communist threat, while continuing to deter resort to force. In so far as recent developments have improved the West's relative power position, the U.S. should seek to exploit that situation, to probe Soviet intentions, and to seek settlements consistent with U.S. objectives.

12. The U.S. should approach negotiations with the USSR with a clear and positive program which will further the fundamental interests of the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. should advance its proposals promptly and straightforwardly at the negotiations both to indicate its affirmative intentions and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to require Soviet response and reaction -- rather than permitting the Soviets the initiative to which the U.S. would then have to respond.⁷*

13. The U.S. should maintain sufficient flexibility to be able to extract maximum advantage from negotiations with the USSR, whatever the direction of Soviet policy may be. The U.S. must have an affirmative position which will enable it (1) to negotiate seriously if the Soviets are prepared to negotiate seriously, (2) to expose Soviet propaganda if Soviet moves are primarily of a propaganda nature, and (3) to encourage the Soviets to negotiate seriously if their approach is primarily one of exploration. Moreover, the U.S. should not assume from failure to reach agreement at any particular conference that peaceful settlement is impossible or that a change in basic U.S. policy is necessarily required.

14. On the basis of the above general approach, the following review of policy issues is focused on the principal problems likely to arise in early negotiations with the USSR: disarmament; Germany and European security; the Soviet satellites; international communism; and Far Eastern issues.

POLICY CONCLUSIONS

(to be prepared)

*Defense proposal.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~APPENDIX AISSUES AND POSSIBLE SOVIET POSITIONS

	USSR "Stalling" (a)	USSR "Easing European Tensions" (b)	USSR "Exploring" (c)	USSR "Desires Prolonged Ten- sion Reduction" (d)
Reunified Germany				
Freedom of alliance	No	No	No	Possible
Arms control or Demilitarized Zone	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Free Elections first	No	Possible	Possible	Yes
Withdrawal of Foreign Forces	Limited only as to Soviets, or to Poland only	Possibly Total	Possibly Total	Possibly Total
Divided Germany				
Withdrawal of Foreign Forces	Limited only as to Soviets, or to Poland only	Possibly Total	Possibly Total	Possibly Total
All-European Security System	Yes for all, but almost all propaganda if <u>a</u> .			
NATO to continue	No	Possible	Possible	Yes
Withdrawal Sov Forces from all satellites in exchange for US with- drawal Western Europe	Possible	Possible	Possible	Possible
With freeing or neutralization of Satellites	No	No	No	Possible

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ISSUES AND POSSIBLE SOVIET POSITIONS (Cont'd)

	USSR "Stalling" (a)	USSR "Easing European Tensions" (b)	USSR "Exploring" (c)	USSR "Desires Prolonged Ten- sion Reduction" (d)
Disarmament	No-Impossible conditions	Slow development of 10 May Psn.	Slow development of 10 May Psn.	Yes-reasonable attitude toward specific issues
East-West trade barrier removal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Far East	Insistence on referring every thing to a 5-Pws mtg.	Insistence on referring every thing to a 5-Pws mtg.	Attempt to find face saving formula for further exploration	Serious discussion of specific issues
Japan	Renunciation of US ties and recognition ComChina prerequisites	Relations resumed with minimum settlement of issues followed by efforts to foster Jap relations and trade with ComChina	Relations resumed with minimum settlement of issues followed by efforts to foster Jap relations and trade with ComChina	Resume relations while Japan maintains present ties to US
UN membership	Insistence that ChiComs get ChiNat seat on SC as price of any other admissions	Limited package deals not including China and SC	Limited package deals not including China and SC	Admission of all current candidates to Assembly

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~APPENDIX BATTITUDES AND POLICIES OF U. S. EUROPEAN ALLIESGREAT BRITAIN

1. Prompted by public pressure, the British government believes that a conference at the summit must seek to achieve concrete, if limited, results and be more than a propaganda exercise. The Eden cabinet probably feels that it must make an effort to pay off on its campaign promises to the electorate. It is apparently prepared to contemplate a prolonged series of negotiations, even if the prospects for results appear dim. However, it appears to believe that the new flexibility of Soviet policy offers some hope that at least some piecemeal settlements can be achieved. Some UK officials have suggested that the West should be prepared to be more flexible than it was at the Berlin conference. However, they have stressed that no impairment of NATO's position can be considered.

a. The German question. The British remain officially committed to the Eden Plan for reunification only after free elections. They expect that the USSR might itself propose the Eden Plan. In any event they consider the inclusion of Germany in NATO as essential and the presence of US-UK forces in Western Germany as desirable.

b. All-European security pact. The UK expects a dusting off of the Molotov Plan but is cool to any Locarno-type proposal. It would almost certainly reject any plan calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Europe.

c. Disarmament. The UK is adamantly opposed to any weakening of the West's nuclear deterrent power, but regards continued negotiations on disarmament as essential. It will insist, however, on adequate control and inspection.

FRANCE

2. The French in general appear to be more hopeful than the other NATO allies that recent Soviet moves betoken a real shift in Soviet policy, and hope the Four-Power Conference will increase the prospects of achieving an international detente. France's attitude and likely positions will be more ambivalent than those

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of the UK because of the greater fragmentation of French parliamentary and public opinion and lingering French hopes for some form of German settlement which will restrict German rearmament. On the other hand, many Frenchmen feel that West Germany should share the costs of Western defense and not be left free of this burden on its economy. Foreign Minister Pinay will attempt to pursue a pro-NATO policy, but further indications of a more flexible Soviet position may encourage France to go further toward seeking "settlements" with the USSR than her allies.

a. The German question. Articulate non-Communist French opinion is divided between the groups like the MRP, which flatly opposes German neutralization, and the neutralists or die-hard anti-Germans who favor a German settlement along the Austrian model. Premier Faure and Pinay have publicly rejected neutralization, however. France would probably reluctantly go along with any reunification proposal acceptable to the US and UK but it fears the power of a united Germany and would prefer a continued division with limitations on the armed forces of both parts.

b. All-European security pact. The French would probably favor a loose security pact if it does not conflict with the above positions, but would not risk a break with the US on this issue. Like the UK, France would oppose any withdrawal of US forces from Europe or abandonment of NATO.

c. Disarmament. The French are anxious to explore any possible avenues to disarmament. In view of the apparent Soviet concessions, they will probably favor more Western concessions to meet them halfway. If some limitations on armaments could be arranged within the context of any all-European security arrangements, France would probably favor them.

d. Other issues. The French have hinted that the conference should cover other than "European" issues, i.e., world-wide problems, such as in the Far East, which would be included in a general detente.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

3. While ultimate reunification remains a primary West German objective, the Bonn government is caught between popular desires for reunification and its own fear that unity could only be achieved at the price of West German security. Chancellor Adenauer's chief objective

~~SECRET~~

seems to be to insure that his Western allies will not sacrifice the position of the Bonn regime. At the same time he hopes that the Western powers will seize the initiative to prevent the USSR from making propaganda capital and to reassure the West German public that something is being done on unity.

a. The German question. Adenauer's recent statements make it clear that he strongly opposes neutralization of the two German regimes and insists that a reunified Germany be free to make alliances in its own defense. Only in the event of what appeared to the Germans to be a genuine Soviet offer of reunification after free elections, might Adenauer lose control of the situation and German opinion force him to accept neutralization as the price.

RET

b. All-European security pact. To reassure the USSR against the military threat of a reunified Germany, West Germany suggests the allies propose a European security organization based on a series of non-aggression pacts and mutual guarantees, but not replacing NATO. The West Germans oppose a NATO troop withdrawal which would leave them defenseless, but might accept some limitations on the forces of the two parts of Germany.

c. Disarmament. Although there are signs of growing concern that West Germany would be an initial target area in any nuclear war, disarmament has so far not been a very live issue and Bonn is probably prepared to follow the US lead.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

6/10/55

NSC 5524
Sec 11

MR 88-32
NNFJ Case # NSC 5524
Document # 6

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 880049
By HRM/HW NARA, Date 7/18/98

Quantico, Virginia
June 10, 1955

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Dear Mr. Rockefeller:

At your invitation, a group of eleven persons knowledgeable in many fields important to the American-Soviet Struggle, have met as a Panel at Quantico, Virginia, from 5-10 June, to explore methods of exploiting Communist bloc vulnerabilities at this crucial state of world affairs. As your designated Chairman, and on behalf of my colleagues, I am herewith transmitting the reports and recommendations of our group.

All of us appreciate the freedom of action you gave us to develop our own guidelines of investigation. We soon discovered that several significant vulnerabilities could be identified and that fruitful courses of action could be developed only if we looked at the total political and security problems facing the U.S. at this juncture.

We have no expectation that we have produced either a magic formula for positive U.S. action or a substitute for the staff considerations currently under way in the responsible Government Departments. We offer these recommendations and the papers that underlie them as a supplement to those considerations. It is our hope that responsible officials will find our efforts constructive and that use can be made of the many concrete suggestions included in the Panel results.

The over-all report of the Panel and its four appendices represent a general group consensus. We had neither the time nor the data to make, as individuals, definitive commitments of judgment on all the recommendations and on every line of text. But we forwarded these documents confident that they deserve serious consideration by the Government. We are also submitting ten papers prepared by individual Panel members. Many ideas from them have found their way into our joint recommendations; but time did not permit the Panel to evaluate the texts fully. I personally deem them an extremely interesting product of the week's work.

All of us appreciate the contributions made by governmental representatives toward this Panel and, in particular, the willing help of the responsible officials from your office, the Departments of State and Defense, of CIA, USIA, NSC, and OCB, who took of their precious time to join us periodically in our discussions.

46585

Rpt (in red binder) ~~SECRET~~ filed loose in folder

PD
P
V P21-72

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The one impression which stands out in my mind is the unanimous belief of the Panel members that the U.S. now enjoys a significant but transitory period of over-all strength vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. The next two or three years afford the United States the opportunity to negotiate from a strong position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice of essential positions of strength. Such negotiation, along with a vigorous and urgent development of potential Free World strength, could create the conditions for victory in the cold war.

May I express our appreciation for having had this opportunity to serve.

Dr. Frederick Dunn
Director, Center of International Studies

Mr. C. D. Jackson
TIME LIFE

Dr. Ellis A. Johnson
Director, Operations Research Office

Dr. Paul Linebarger
School of Advanced International Studies

Dr. Max Millikan
Center of International Studies, MIT

Dr. Philip Mosely
Director, Russian Institute

Dr. George Pettee
Deputy Director, Operations Research Office

Dr. Stefan Possony
Air Intelligence Specialist, Department of the Air Force

Dr. Hans Speier
RAND Corporation

Dr. Charles A. H. Thomson
Brookings Institution

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow
(Center of International Studies, MIT)
Panel Chairman

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONSQUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

PURPOSE. This report (1) makes recommendations regarding operational positions and actions the U.S. might take vis-a-vis the USSR (as for example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will permit the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) offers suggestions for related actions advantageous to the U.S.

The Panel assessed the current strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. It concluded that the next several years afford the United States the opportunity to act from a strong position and to exact from the enemy genuine concessions without sacrifice of deterrent strength by us. A full exploitation of the enemy's transitory position of relative weakness and the Free World's actual and potential foundations for strength requires a wide range of U.S. initiatives and actions which transcend the area of negotiation with the Soviet Union.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of this assessment we develop in our submissions a strategy and a broad tactical line for the forthcoming conferences and we submit the following specific recommendations:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

A. Actions Prior to the Conference.

1. The United States should insist that the Soviets lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.
2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK, and to France, that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.

B. Actions During the Conference.

1. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals designed to move towards the control of armaments. These include:

a. Discussions of:

- (1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of military installations, forces, and armaments, without limitations provisions.

- (2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes.
(Proposed with reservations noted in the text.)

- b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR; after rejection of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the arms race as the safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a satisfactory arms convention.

2. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals concerning exchange of persons, information and goods, covering:

- a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade.
- b. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

c. A convention providing for free and unhampered international communications for the exchange of information and ideas, conditioned on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement.

d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy and a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the under-developed areas.

3. The United States should pursue the following sequence in dealing with German matters:

- a. Rapid implementation of rearmament provisions.
- b. Proper conditions for free elections.
- c. Free elections.
- d. Unification of government.
- e. Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germany's international status.

*Giving
nothing*

f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany has reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO, she should be permitted to rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs.

4. The United States should take the following actions to bring about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy, and to worsen difficulties between the Soviet Union and Red China:

- a. Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-Peiping alliance.
- b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the conference.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

c. At least once during the conference, the Department of State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese Government on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the Conference.

C. Actions Outside of the Conference.

Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or subsequent to it, the United States should take the following actions:

1. General

a. Propose an international scientific conference of all powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger of radioactive fallout.

b. The United States should convene at an early date an exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic and other non-military provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.

c. Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power and treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy.

2. In relation to Europe, the United States should:

a. Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime and postwar agreements relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding inspection to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements.

b. Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air defense, passive and active, for our European allies.

c. Seek the establishment, organization and support of research and development in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

d. Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing the flow of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in behalf of a Free World.

e. Request SHAPE to make a maximum effort to find tactical solutions to NATO defense which minimize the possibilities of civilian casualties.

f. Explore seriously concrete recommendations designed to reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.

g. Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for accelerated economic growth in the underdeveloped countries of the Free World.

3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:

a. Greatly increase the flow of investment resources to the underdeveloped countries, including Japan, South Asia and Southeast Asia.

b. Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its good relations in the South and Southeast Asia are a matter of interest to the U.S. U.S. diplomatic and other agencies in Formosa should openly sponsor informal news and cultural connections there.

c. Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and willing to deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression.

d. Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern Vietnam.

e. In order to convert a major free world problem into an asset, launch a positive U.S. political and economic program for Formosa.

~~SECRET~~


6/0/55

June 10;

SECRET

NSC Registry

NSC folder
5524



MR 88-	
NNFJ Case #	16
Document #	16

* * * * *

REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

* * * * *

NND 880068
HAWTH 4/28/62

NSC 5524

DECLASSIFIED	
AUTHORITY	NND 880068
By	mark NARA, Date 2/24/62

SECRET

28885

~~SECRET~~

REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I	PURPOSE	1
II	THE GENERAL SETTING	1
III	THE OBJECTS OF AN AMERICAN STRATEGY	7
IV	GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STRATEGY	8
V	RECOMMENDATIONS	13
	Appendix A - <u>Estimate of the Situation</u>	
	Appendix B - <u>Proposals to Test Soviet Willingness to Make Concessions and to Improve the U.S. Position</u>	
	Appendix C - <u>The German Question</u>	
	1.- Preliminary Diplomatic Action in Preparation for the Summit Conference	
	2.- U.S. Guidelines for a German Settlement	
	3 - German Elections	
	4 - Possible Proposals for German Unity	
	Appendix D - <u>A Proposal for Graduated Disarmament</u>	

* * * * *

Summary of Individual Supporting Papers

- Tab 1 - "Soviet Estimate of the Situation"
- Tab 2 - "The Requirements for U.S.-NATO to Win in the Arms Race with the USSR"
- Tab 3 - "Alliance and Coalition Problems"
 - (a) "Does NATO Have a Position of Strength?"
 - (b) "Asia Policy"
 - (c) "Japan"
 - (d) "Measures to Cope with Free-World Fears of the Bomb"
 - (e) "Air Defense of the United States and Western Europe"
 - (f) "Factors Influencing the Morale of Allies"
- Tab 4 - "Straining the Sino-Soviet Alliance" with Annex
- Tab 5 - "An Institute for the Study of Peace"

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1955

REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANELI. PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is (1) to make recommendations regarding operational positions and actions the U. S. might take vis-a-vis the USSR (as for example at the coming round of East-West conferences) that will permit the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, and (2) to offer suggestions for related actions advantageous to the U. S.

II. THE GENERAL SETTING

A. The current disposition of the Soviet leaders to sit down at the "summit" cannot be traced to a genuine interest on their part to ease any tensions for the sake of peace and harmony. It must be traced to a specific Communist interest in improving the Soviet position in the international struggle for power.

They are afraid of the transitory American superiority in strategic airpower, stockpile, and delivery capabilities. They have realized that this superiority is sufficient to be a guarantee of victory in a major war. In addition, they may be afraid that American strategic airpower will be used in the form of a surprise attack against the Soviet Union. (There is evidence that in recent months Soviet leaders have abandoned the time-honored principle of Soviet military doctrine that mass rather than surprise is the decisive factor in war.) The Soviet leaders may be ready to attribute to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the U. S. the intention of preventive war which they might indeed hold themselves, if the balance of power were reversed. The apprehension of the Soviet leaders is aggravated by their estimate that a lost war would mean the end of Communism.

In view of this grave outlook, the Soviet leaders are interested in gaining time. They need time to achieve nuclear parity--a goal which they can hope to achieve, for all practical purposes, within three to five years. More generally, they need time to shore up their political position, repair their agricultural difficulties, and develop their economic organization.

B. Assuming that this evaluation of the situation is correct, the United States would play into the hands of the Soviet Union if it were to approach the conference with the primary purpose of easing tension. It should meet the Soviet leaders with the intention to force them to retreat.

Even if the foregoing evaluation of the situation is not correct, the United States cannot lose anything by acting at the beginning in the conviction that the Soviet Union is prepared to make concessions.

For years it has been United States policy that we will negotiate with the Soviet Union only from positions of strength. It is not only true that we now occupy such a transitory position of strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union but also likely that the Soviet leaders act at the present from fear of this position of strength. We should, therefore, exploit this strength by pressing resolutely for an improvement of our position in the international struggle of power.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

For years, it has been United States policy that we are ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union only if its leaders show by action rather than words that they are willing to work with us toward the preservation of peace. The Soviets did this in the case of Austria; we should now press this policy further.

Instead of meeting the Soviet leaders on their terms and permitting them to center the discussion around issues of primary interest to them, such as the delay of German rearmament and the splitting of NATO, and reduction of the U.S. atomic advantage through disarmament, the United States should seize the initiative by presenting the Soviet Union with heavy demands for major concessions on their part at a price that is tolerable to us.

The conference may present a unique opportunity to the United States for inflicting a diplomatic defeat upon the Soviet Union, to reassert the ideals of the Free World and to buttress peace under American leadership.

C. Moscow's possible private estimate of military weakness is accompanied by public evidence of Soviet internal difficulties. Soviet leaders may find this profoundly disturbing, since it could lead to the weakening or even the destruction of Communism's ideological momentum and mystique both in Russia and abroad.

Specifically:

1. Communist agricultural policy, a key element in Communist theory and practice, is proving ineffective or worse from one end of the Bloc to the other.

2. The withdrawal from Austria, the performance in Belgrade, unusually rapid vacillations in Soviet policy, and improvements in the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

relative military, economic, and political position in Western Europe have sharply raised expectations in Eastern Europe that the satellite structure might change and Soviet power recede from Eastern Europe.

3. The performance of Soviet leadership since Stalin's death has muddled the Stalinist image of inevitable advance and of Communism as the wave of the future, an impression strongly reinforced by recent Soviet diplomatic actions.

4. It is fundamental that the U.S. should seek in the coming months to exploit to the hilt this perhaps transitory position of Soviet political vulnerability, together with weaknesses in the Soviet's own estimate of their position of which we are not aware, but which we may be able to probe out and capitalize by negotiations from an attitude of strength. Yet our actions must be tempered by realization of the facts that there is no indication that the top Soviet leadership has lost effective control over the Russian or the satellite peoples, and that Soviet military strength is great and on the rise.

D. Schematically, the purposes of Moscow's current moves appear to be:

1. To weaken the American military and political position in Europe and Asia by inducing further U.S. troop withdrawals and depriving us of the use of our present air bases;
2. To weaken or destroy NATO;
3. To induce a cut in military outlays of the U.S. and its allies;

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4. To separate us from our allies by widening the area of "neutrality"; and

5. To maximize the gap between the American and the allied policy positions in Europe and in Asia.

E. The major lines of action the Soviets may attempt to follow are:

1. With respect to German unification:

a. To propose German unification through free elections coupled with the withdrawal of occupation troops, and to put the blame of failure on supposed American unwillingness to withdraw troops;

b. To accept Western terms for free elections in Germany at the price of German withdrawal from WEU and from NATO and to confront us if not now, at some time in the future, with the possibility of German acceptance; or

c. In any case, to present proposals for German unity designed to unhinge the American military position in Europe, including NATO and our air bases.

2. With respect to international control of armaments, either:

a. To press hard their current position on control of armaments in an effort to separate the United States from the British and the French; or

b. To offer more complete inspection terms of a kind difficult for the U.S. to refuse.

- 5 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3. To press for recognition of Communist China and support Communist Chinese steps in the Far East designed to separate the United States from other countries.

F. An appreciation of the opportunities open to the United States in the coming months requires an understanding of the following strengths and weaknesses. Strengths include our present decisive superiority in the arms race; satisfaction on balance in Western Europe with the present NATO-WEU structure; a desire in the Free World that the U.S. should not withdraw its forces from Germany and Europe; relatively greater progress in Western than in Eastern Europe; our "open society"; the continued improvement in the Free World position in the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma; the potentialities of strengthening the political, economic, and military position of Japan and Formosa and the SEATO powers; and the potentialities of strengthening the political and economic position of India and the other Colombo powers.

G. Free World weaknesses include a sense of vulnerability to atomic attack brought about by the fear that the U.S. might initiate or stumble into atomic war as a result of Communist provocation; a sense that the U.S. must respond to Communist aggression either by total war or by inaction; the possible attraction to the opposition in Germany of a Soviet proposal that Germany be reunified by truly free elections at a cost unacceptable to us; lack of an agreed allied position on the Far East; Japanese economic uncertainties; seeming Soviet possession of the initiative in easing tensions; disagreement in the Free World over economic policies and strategic matters; economic uncertainties arising

- 6 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

in raw materials and food-producing countries from U.S. commodity price fluctuations; and imperfect confidence in U.S. policies and plans.

(The foregoing appraisal of purposes, strengths and weaknesses is expanded in Appendix A.)

III. THE OBJECTS OF AN AMERICAN STRATEGY

A. The next two years afford the U.S. the opportunity to negotiate from a strong position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice of deterrent strength by us. Such negotiation can create the essential conditions for the winning of the Cold War.

In the conduct of its negotiations, the U.S. should keep in mind the continuing objectives of United States foreign policy:

1. To continue to hold the military balance of power in our favor which requires not only that we neutralize our adversaries' striking power in weapons of mass destruction and the many implementing weapons systems, including air defense and electronic warfare, but also that we continue to develop flexible capabilities to undertake military action short of total war and maintain the will to do so.

2. To increase the military, economic and political strength and unity of the Free World and thus be prepared to forestall, check or defeat Communist efforts at erosion conducted by limited military means, and through propaganda, subversion, and diplomacy.

3. To determine and execute our policies in such a way as to maximize the possibility of changes within the Soviet bloc favorable to the

- 7 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

U. S. interest, by effectively denying to Moscow the possibilities of consolidation and by steadily holding out peaceful alternatives not incompatible with the Russian national security interest, and at the same time encouraging the Soviet satellites and Communist China to support their own national interests wherever the latter come into conflict with Soviet demands on them.

4. To appreciate and act upon the dramatic new opportunities for maneuver opened to us by the current Soviet defensive posture so that our constant goal, a roll-back of Soviet power in Eastern and Central Europe and in Asia is steadily brought nearer and a Free Europe is brought to life.

IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STRATEGY

In pursuing the objectives outlined above, we should be guided by the following general principles, which govern the mood and attitude with which we approach the conference. Some of these principles should probably be enunciated by the President early in the course of the meeting at the summit. Others relate to our behavior as the conference and the negotiations, which presumably will follow it, proceed. The decision as to how much of what follows should be explicit from the start must depend on professional detailed staff work and the judgment of the responsible negotiators.

1. We will achieve the maximum political and psychological impact from this conference if the U. S. delegation contributes at the outset and maintains throughout a mood and positions of high diplomatic seriousness.

- 8 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2. The Cold War has not been a contest of our choosing. We disarmed after the war in the hope that we could place reliance for our security on a system of international agreements. Bitter experience has taught us that this hope was illusory, and that for the present our security would have to be based on our own strength and that of those who allied themselves with us. We should speak and act from our conviction that we are now in a position of relative strength. We should stubbornly maintain and expand this position of strength in cooperation with our allies and other friendly countries until the very day that effective measures are actually in operation which give us solid assurance that we and our allies are safe from the threat of attack. However tempting the prospect of a relaxation of tensions may be, we shall not again make the mistake of confusing talk about a relaxation of tensions with progress toward a fundamental solution of world problems. We should take concrete measures to emphasize our strength and confidence, such as those suggested below.

3. While we are quite prepared to live with the Cold War indefinitely, if necessary, we are determined to explore seriously every real possibility of moving, whether by large or small steps, toward reduction of fundamental conflicts. Continuation of the arms race is imposing heavy costs on the entire world. A large fraction of the world's resources are being diverted from serving the welfare of the peoples of the world to building military establishments which we, and perhaps the Soviets, regard as necessary to security. There are many constructive tasks of building the Soviet civilian economy and raising the standard of

- 9 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

living of the Soviet people which they have been unable to get on with because so large a part of their energies have gone into the production of weapons. With the further development of modern methods of warfare, these burdens will increase.

4. Even more important, the world has hanging over it the shadow of destructive nuclear warfare, which, as Mr. Malenkov has rightly said, could destroy modern civilization. We shall leave no stone unturned in the pursuit of ways to effect a real reduction in this threat. We have a series of proposals we should make at the appropriate time for taking what we believe to be constructive first steps toward a system of arms limitation. As explained in more detail in Appendix D, we are prepared to accept certain of the May 10 proposals of the Soviets; for example, a reduction of ground forces. We have proposals for the development of a workable inspection system for control of armaments. We also have proposals for considering alleviation of the effects of radioactive fall-out.

5. A fundamental solution to the problem of freeing the world from the spectre of atomic holocaust must be based on a genuinely free Europe, with no occupation troops and no interference in the internal affairs of any country by any outside power. Such a Free Europe, composed of the countries from Turkey to Norway, from Poland to Spain, is a long-run goal of American policy. Only when such a community of nations exists, each free to determine its own course in accord with its own culture and historic traditions, each free to engage in

- 10 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

economic and cultural intercourse and political association with all other members of the European community of nations, will it be possible to attain European security and cooperation based on common trust and interest.

6. The United States wishes to move toward such a Free Europe just as rapidly as possible. The question is how fast and far the Soviet Union is prepared to go and to what extent our Allies are prepared to support such a policy. We still hold to U.S. policy that the wartime and postwar agreements concerning the Soviet satellites for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the holding of free elections in all the countries should be honored. It is our hope that in agreeing to the conference the Soviet Union had in mind the discussion of serious steps toward a Free Europe.

[Some members of the group believe that there is a real possibility that the Soviets will concede the withdrawal of some or all of their forces even though we are unwilling to discuss the abandonment of NATO. Others believe the likelihood of this is negligible, and any attempt to force this issue diplomatically may lead to a successful concentration of attention by the Soviets on the issue of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Europe which would be most damaging to American interests.

There is, therefore, some disagreement among the members of the group on how far to proceed diplomatically beyond the enunciation of long range American purposes. Some feel we should press diplomatically for the withdrawal of Soviet troops only from Eastern Germany and not from Eastern Europe; others for a total withdrawal from both areas. In connection with withdrawal from either area, we shall press for free

- 11 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

elections. Some suggest a diplomatic initiative on free elections only. Others hold that to raise this issue at the conference would be unworkable and possibly damaging to Allied unity.]

7. The Soviets are likely to raise suggestions for the unification of Germany. A recommended position for the U. S. to take is formulated in Appendix C.

8. With respect to the control of armaments, we should emphasize that some degree of understanding and even trust is essential to any effective armaments control scheme. We suggest a series of proposals for the control of armaments which take into account the Russian proposals of May 10, 1955. Our proposals also look to the improvement of relations and the free exchange of people, ideas, and goods. These proposals call first for the initiation of a system of mutual inspection of armaments, including forces and production facilities without, in the first instance, any provisions for arms limitation. Ultimately, an inspection system, to be effective, should provide for free overflights of aircraft by reciprocally inspected aircraft, however sensitive the USSR may be on this subject.* Proposals also include those for an expansion of economic relations and for free exchange of information and ideas, both by the flow of written materials and by unobstructed radio broadcasting, and a proposal for the freer access of persons to all countries. These are all spelled out in more detail in Appendixes B and D.

*Note: Aside from our general assumption that before implementation all these suggestions will be considered carefully by the Departments, it is recommended that this proposal be examined with particular skepticism by the Department of Defense.

- 12

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~V. RECOMMENDATIONS

On the whole range of questions we examined in accordance with the objectives defined in para. III A above, we wish to make the following suggestions for action related to the forthcoming Four Power conference:

A. Actions Prior to the Conference.

1. The United States should insist that the Soviets lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the conference.

2. Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the UK and to France that they should be prepared to exchange ratifications of the Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference.

B. Actions During the Conference.

1. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals designed to move towards the control of armaments. These include:

a. Discussions of:

(1) A proposed agreement for mutual inspection of military installations, forces, and armaments, without limitations provisions. (Appendix B).

(2) A convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes. (Proposed with reservations noted in the text. See Appendix B.)

b. Proposal of a disarmament plan to the USSR (Appendix D); after rejection of the plan, the U.S. to make every effort to win the arms race as the safest way of forcing the Soviet Union to accept a satisfactory arms convention.

- 13 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2. The United States should be prepared to make a series of proposals concerning exchange of persons, information and goods, covering:

- a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade. (Appendix B).
- b. An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes. (Appendix B).
- c. A convention providing for free and unhampered international communications for the exchange of information and ideas, conditioned on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement. (Appendix B).
- d. Further exploration of peaceful uses of atomic energy and a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of the under-developed areas. (Appendix B).

3. The United States should pursue the following sequence in dealing with German matters:

- a. Rapid implementation of rearmament provisions.
- b. Proper conditions for free elections.
- c. Free elections.
- d. Unification of government.
- e. Conclusion of a peace treaty not predetermining Germany's international status.

- 14 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

f. Withdrawal of troops only after a unified Germany has reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of NATO. If Germany abstains from joining NATO, she should be permitted to rearm to a level sufficient to meet her security needs (Appendix C).

4. The United States should take the following actions to bring about greater Allied unity on Far Eastern policy, and to worsen difficulties between the Soviet Union and Red China:

a. Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-Peiping alliance. (Tab 4)

b. Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the conference (Tab 3c).

c. At least once during the conference, the Department of State should obtain for the President the advice of the Japanese Government on a specific Far Eastern point at issue in the Conference. (Tab 3c).

C. Actions outside of the Conference.

Outside of the conference, either concurrently with it or subsequent to it, the United States should take the following actions:

1. General

a. Propose an international scientific conference of all powers producing atomic weapons on the problem of reducing the danger of radioactive fallout (Para IV above. See also Tab 3(d)).

b. The United States should convene at an early date an

-15-
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

exploratory conference to discuss implementation of the economic and other non-military provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.

c. Accelerate the revival of Japan as a great power and treat her as a diplomatic equal in developing Far Eastern policy. (Tab 3(c)).

2. In relation to Europe, the United States should:

a. Invoke the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, and the provisions of other wartime and postwar agreements relating to the limitations of arms in Eastern Europe, demanding inspection to determine compliance with the limitations of these agreements (Appendix B).

b. Take early and forceful steps to assure improved air defense, passive and active, for our European allies (Tab 3(a), 3(d), 3(e)).

c. Seek the establishment, organization and support of research and development in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale (Tabs 2, 3a and 3 c).

d. Relax to the maximum restrictions preventing the flow of necessary technical intelligence to European scientists working in behalf of a Free World (Tab 2).

e. Request SHAPE to make a maximum effort to find tactical solutions to NATO defense which minimize the possibilities of civilian casualties (Tab 3e).

- 16 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

f. Explore seriously concrete recommendations designed to reduce present fears in NATO nations concerning atomic weapons.

(Illustrative, see Tab 3(b)).

g. Develop with NATO countries a joint policy for accelerated economic growth in the underdeveloped countries in the free world.

(See Tab 3(b))

3. In relation to Asia, the United States should:

a. Greatly increase the flow of investment resources to the underdeveloped countries; including Japan, South Asia and Southeast Asia (Tab 3(b)).

b. Advise the Chinese Nationalist Government that its good relations in the South and Southeast Asia are a matter of interest to the U.S. U. S. diplomatic and other authorities in Formosa should openly sponsor informal news and cultural connections there. (Tab 3(b)).

c. Convince Asians that the U.S. is capable and willing to deal by means short of major war, with Communist military aggression (Tab 3b).

d. Prevent a Communist take-over in Southern Vietnam (Tab 3(b)).

e. In order to convert a major free world problem into an asset, launch a positive U. S. political and economic program for Formosa (Tab 3(b)).

- 17 -
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C
to Report of
Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel

The German Question

This appendix consists of four companion papers relating to various aspects of the German unification issue. These are:

- I. Preliminary Diplomatic Action in Preparation for the Summit Conference.
- II. U. S. Guidelines for a German Settlement.
- III. German Elections.
- IV. Possible Proposals for German Unity.

These proposals are consistent with the general strategy advocated in the basic paper.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

I. A PRELIMINARY DIPLOMATIC ACTION IN PREPARATION FOR
THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Very frequently in preparation for a strong position at international conferences, the Soviet Union has made systematic displays of strength, and it is doing the same at the present time. These demonstrations of strength have included fly-bys in Moscow, and particularly, the imposition of a camouflaged blockade on the free sectors of Berlin. These actions are designed to put the U.S. on the defensive and to wear out American negotiators even beforehand. A secondary consideration in imposing the blockade was to force bilateral conversations between Bonn and Pankow.

It is, therefore, necessary even before the commencement of the conference, for the U.S. to make it clear that it will not assume a defensive posture; but that, on the contrary, it will put the Soviets into a defensive frame of mind. Since Germany may be a central topic at the conference, it is indispensable that the U.S. demonstrate from the very beginning that it will not tolerate Soviet skullduggery. Without such an American demonstration of strength, public opinion support in Germany may not be entirely secure.

It is suggested that without delay a secret, preferably three-power, note be dispatched to Moscow demanding that the various blockade measures inhibiting the Berlin traffic be lifted forthwith and that any payments made in compliance with those restrictions be reimbursed. (It may be possible to ask that such a reimbursement take the form of financial support to East German refugees in Western Germany.) The note should state

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 2 -

that the fate of the conference will depend upon Soviet compliance and it should intimate that if no such compliance were forthcoming, the U.S. may not attend the conference. Concurrently with the secret note, we might state publicly that the U.S. is willing to use its engineer forces to rehabilitate the road into Berlin, the alleged poor condition of which furnished the justification for the toll.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 3 -

II. U.S. GUIDELINES FOR A GERMAN SETTLEMENT

There are a number of basic issues affecting unification of Germany. The combinations of solutions to each of these issues, including the sequential order in which individual issues may be solved, are so numerous that greatest care is required to prevent the Soviets from exploiting the complexity of an opaque situation.

What are the Basic Issues?1. Elections

This problem is discussed in detail in a companion paper.

Desirable - The elections are to be held after an initial democratization of the East German Government, and after the means of pressure by the Soviets and the East German Communists have been reduced or eliminated. The electoral system which is in force in West Germany should be applied throughout the entire country, and the East German electoral system should be scrapped. International supervision is another indispensable condition. The elections are to be held as a first step in the unification of Germany.

Acceptable - The initial democratization of the East German Government, including the reconstitution of parties, is an essential condition of free elections, but does not require a reconstitution of the East German Government. If the Western German electoral system is unacceptable, an entirely new election law should be negotiated.

Unacceptable - Any situation in which the full freedom of elections is impaired. The principle of free elections cannot be bargained away with the Soviets for any purpose.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 4 -

Timing - During the negotiations for elections and during the election period, the rearming of West Germany must be pursued actively and American troops must not be withdrawn.

2. The Rearming of West Germany and All German Security.

Desirable - West Germany must be rearmed as presently planned. It is imperative that enabling legislation in the German Bundestag provide for the implementation of the Paris Agreements to the full. If possible, the time schedule for West German rearmament should be accelerated. Moreover, a strong NATO air defense system must be created with dispatch and the German component of this system be recognized as crucial. Provision shall be made upon unification to integrate individual members of the growing East German forces into an all-German military establishment.

Acceptable - In general, even minor reductions of the rearmament program and minor stretch-outs should be resisted, not encouraged, although their effect would not be disastrous. It is a matter of quantities.

Unacceptable - A substantial stretch-out or the abandonment of the present program for West German rearmament must be resisted strongly, as this might encourage Kremlin belief that Western German rearmament could be blocked by repeated negotiations.

Timing - The fastest West German rearmament is the most desirable. Any discussion of limiting or slowing down the West German rearmament effort prior to, or as condition of, free elections is to be avoided. The rearmament of West Germany should be completed in the period of clear-cut American military-air superiority.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 5 -

3. Status of Foreign Military Forces in Germany

Desirable - Any change in deployment levels (except as outlined in the accompanying proposal concerning the establishment of a free corridor to Berlin) should be rejected. The Western allies must decide firmly that during the transition period their forces will not be reduced, let alone withdrawn.

Acceptable - Within each zone the foreign forces may be redeployed to limited areas. All sides agree to a proportionate relation of total force levels in both East and West Germany, based on the area and population of each of the two zones. It would be less desirable but still acceptable, if there were an eventual agreement to reduce foreign forces to token strength, provided that German rearmament proceeds at a rapid pace and that this reduction in foreign forces be delayed until a large German Force has come into existence.

Unacceptable - A reduction of foreign forces and involving the de facto elimination of American and other Western armed strength from the German rearmament, is totally unacceptable. (Due to geographical conditions, a Western withdrawal from Germany cannot be paired with a Russian withdrawal from Eastern Germany to Poland but must be paired with a Russian withdrawal behind the Russian border.)

Timing - Western deployment in Germany in whatever form decided upon, must be maintained until the formation of a unified government with which a peace treaty can be signed.

~~SECRET~~

Never
USSR
agree

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 6 -

4. The National Structure of Germany

Desirable - Germany should be reconstituted as a free, sovereign, democratic, self-reliant and fully unified nation.

Acceptable - As a temporary measure, the existence of two Germanies is acceptable, especially if it should be possible to hold democratic elections in East Germany. The maintenance of the present status is acceptable for a limited period, provided the United States gives convincing evidence that it favors the early unification of Germany, and will work actively for this objective.

Unacceptable - Any direct or indirect encroachment by East Germany or Soviet Russia on the West German Republic, including any attempts to limit the West German Government's freedom of action and interfere with the German participation in the NATO alliance, must be guarded against.

Timing - The unification of the two German governments must follow and should not precede all-German free elections. However, it would be desirable if the East German Government, prior to elections, would assume gradually the character of a coalition government.

5. German Borders

Desirable - The U.S. does not recognize present East German boundaries as fixed. The definitive delineation of German borders must take into account both Polish and German national interests. The Saar also poses a difficult question but no comments on this issue will be made in this paper.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 7 -

Acceptable - The present Eastern frontier is left intact, provided the unified German government consents to a provisional status quo. In this case, a stipulation should be made that the frontier will be subject to future negotiations within a specified time limit.

Unacceptable - Any permanent acceptance and legalization of Germany's Eastern frontier.

Timing - The frontier question should be brought up only after Germany has been unified and an all-German government is able to assume responsibility for any settlement.

6. Limitations on German Sovereignty

Desirable - Ultimately, German sovereignty must be fully restored. Limitations on this sovereignty, if any, should be highly temporary or be identical with limitations placed upon the sovereignty of other nations by mutual consent. No sovereignty limitations should be placed on Germany without the German Government concurring as a full and free partner.

Acceptable - The Western powers, acting jointly with the West German Government, might undertake to offer some security safeguards subject to ratification by an all-German parliament. Such safeguards would be designed to allay Russian fears about the reconstitution of German offensive military strength. However, it is important to protect the right of the all-German government to participate in NATO. As a variant, if Germany were to abstain from joining NATO, it must not be prevented from acquiring defense forces deemed adequate by her to satisfy all German security needs. Faced by this alternative, the Soviets might prefer a relatively weakly-armed

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 8 -

Germany as a member of NATO, as against a very strongly armed but neutral Germany.

Unacceptable - Any limitations imposed upon Germany unilaterally precluding German rearmament or limiting her freedom of political choice should be rejected flatly. Similarly, any temporary limitations on armaments designed largely to allow the Soviets to gain or increase technological time lead must be rejected.

Timing - The question of armaments limitations of any form should not be considered before the formation of an all-German government.

7. The Timing of the Peace Treaty

The peace treaty should be negotiated after the reconstitution of a unified German government. Preferably, in order to avoid pressure, the peace treaty should be negotiated after the levels of foreign troops stationed in Germany have been balanced by prior agreement. (See above under Status of Foreign Military Forces in Germany)

General Timing

The following sequence seems to lie in the Russian interest: abandonment of West German rearmament plans -- the immediate end of occupation -- elections without prior establishment of proper conditions -- the unification of the two governments without prior elections -- the establishment of a unified government with strong Communist participation -- the right to reoccupy Germany -- and the conclusion of a peace treaty predetermining and limiting the international status of Germany, and imposing stringent armaments limitations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 9 -

The following sequence seems to lie in the American interest: rapid implementation of the Western German rearmament program (Paris agreement) -- creation of proper conditions for free elections (including, perhaps, the creation of a free zone around Berlin) -- free elections -- the unification of the government -- the conclusion of a peace treaty which does not predetermine the international status of Germany -- the end of the occupation at a time when Germany has reemerged as a strong military power and has become an integral part of NATO.

The above U.S. conditions for settlement could possibly be abandoned if the Soviet Union were willing to pay a heavy price for the prevention of German rearmament. With the concurrence of West Germany, the United States, Britain and France could agree to release Germany from its NATO obligations and to consent to a strongly rearmed and neutral Germany, provided the Soviet Union evacuates the territory of the European satellites and commits itself not to interfere in the political affairs of the reconstituted satellite governments. Further, the Soviet Union must consent to genuinely free elections throughout the satellite areas, leading to the establishment of democratic and sovereign governments (these elections to be organized in a similar way as outlined in the paper on German Elections), and it must give up all reoccupation rights.

It is doubtful whether the Soviets would agree to such a massive reversal. It is more likely that they will try to achieve a Western withdrawal from West Germany and merely agree to withdraw to the Polish border. This "solution" would be contrary to American interests.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 10 -

III. GERMAN ELECTIONS

The mere proclamation of free elections will not, by itself, insure that elections will be held in such a way as to reflect the true opinions of the voters. The East Germans at the present moment are unaccustomed to vote. Despite the absence of Soviet pressure, if this could be achieved, they may be psychologically handicapped and fearful of reprisals, may vote the Soviet ticket. Furthermore, there are many technical difficulties which must be faced explicitly in order to avoid Soviet traps.

free elections means nothing

In view of these difficulties it is considered inadvisable simply to agree on free elections and to disregard the prior establishment of proper conditions. It is believed that the elements outlined below may serve in the development of a U.S. plan.

As a first step, the occupying powers should declare that they will not interfere in the domestic affairs of Germany, either East or West, and that during the pre-election month they will enforce very stringent curfew regulations preventing free circulation of troops among the German population.

Both German governments (which in practice means the East German Government) should promulgate a bill of rights, including strong safeguards against arbitrary police actions and unwarranted arrest.

Elections should be preceded by the establishment of a Four Power Commission which shall have the right to review the cases of all imprisoned persons under sentence or detained for investigation, and to order the release of those imprisoned for political motives. Simultaneously, a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 11 -

general political amnesty and the dissolution of all detention camps will be put into effect. All subsequent political arrests and all complaints of pressure and discrimination will be reported and adjudicated by this Four Power Commission voting by majority, and not unanimity.

Concurrent with the elaboration of such a protective system, political parties should be reestablished in Eastern Germany, with the right to hold meetings, publish and distribute political literature, use free radio time, etc. It would be necessary to allow those political parties to become going concerns before elections can be held in fact. Candidates and other spokesmen certified by the Commission shall receive full freedom of movement and be guaranteed immunity against unreasonable restrictions in all parts of Germany.

It would be useful to grant immunity not only to those candidates who are actually elected, but even to candidates so that they cannot be punished for political acts perpetrated in the period of their candidacy, even if they should fail to get elected.

As a most desirable variant, it may be suggested that the East German Government should be enlarged to include members of other parties. In particular, the ministries of justice and interior, and the police shall be responsible to the government as a whole and be administered by impartial civil servants appointed by the government as a whole.

It might be inadvisable to hold political elections without testing first the safeguards of the new machinery. Hence, prior to all-German parliamentary elections, free elections for municipalities and Lander

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 12 -

governments, etc., should be held.

All-German elections must not only be free but also secret. They should be supervised by the occupying powers jointly, each supervisory commission operating under the chairmanship of a neutral power who also would be in charge of counting the ballots and certifying the results. (Prior to election, these commissions should be in charge of drawing up the lists of persons eligible to vote; this census will make it possible to identify persons detained by the Soviets and, subsequently, to ask for their release.)

Although the procedure, as outlined, seems cumbersome, it ought to be recognized that intermediary steps will have to be taken between the date of the agreement on free elections and the elections themselves. According to this procedure the negotiations for a basic agreement will be lengthy, and this time should be utilized fully to speed the re-arming of Western Germany. However, once the agreement on free elections has been reached, it should be implemented as rapidly as possible, at the latest within six months; provided that all the required preparatory steps be accomplished before the elections, and according to a tight timetable.

As a further variant to be proposed only in the event that agreement cannot be reached on the holding of all-German elections, consideration should be given to the question of holding elections for two German parliaments, under the same safeguards as outlined above. Once there are two democratic German governments and legislatures, the modality of the unification of Germany could be left up to them for determination.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 13 -

As to the electoral system, the United States should press for the adoption of the electoral law valid in the Federal Republic. In case of determined resistance, a different electoral system might be considered.

The Four Power Commission shall establish schools for the training of German officials in the conduct of free elections.

It must be understood that the agreement on elections will be invalidated by the Four Power Commission voting by majority if and when the various steps stipulated are not being carried out.

The United States should leave no doubt that it will accept the results of those elections only if they were genuinely free and not vitiated by fraudulent practices.

~~SECRET~~

What USA
might give

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 14 -

IV. POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR GERMAN UNITY

1. The problem of German unification probably cannot be unravelled by one spectacular diplomatic stroke. The problem is to bring about, by a series of orderly steps, the establishment of a unified, free, sovereign and self-reliant Germany without endangering the present security position of the United States and the Western Allies in Europe. The United States should propose a program containing the precise steps through which the orderly and democratic unification of Germany can be accomplished.

On the assumption that a general solution for German unity will not be reached, the United States might have available several fall-back positions designed to demonstrate our intention to proceed with a realistic program for German unification. Two such proposals follow.

2. A Limited Approach to German Unification

Evacuation of Berlin

Berlin shall be evacuated by the military forces of the West and the Soviet Union. Berlin is defined to mean the city within its historical limits plus an area of 5 to 10 kilometers beyond the city limits.

A corridor, 50 km in width, shall be established between Western Germany and Berlin, and all Soviet forces shall be withdrawn from this corridor in which free circulation of Germans shall be allowed.

The corridor and the Berlin enclave shall be declared a free zone in which neither the government of Western Germany nor that of Eastern Germany, nor any occupying power, shall have any jurisdiction. (While there is agreement that it would be in the U.S. and German interests if

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 15 -

the Russians permitted the establishment of a free corridor to Berlin, no agreement was reached on the evacuation of military forces from Berlin. Some hold that the withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin would undermine German confidence in U.S. intentions to stay in Germany. Some hold that the establishment of a free Berlin would be hailed as a symbol and token of the future reunification of Germany.)

Establishment of an All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly (Wirtschaftskammer) which shall have jurisdiction over domestic trade, transportation, and postal communication.

Membership in the Assembly should be determined by universal, nationwide suffrage and secret ballot. (See separate proposals on elections.)

The All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly should not possess jurisdiction over any matter except domestic trade, transportation, communications and similar purely practical fields, and must not interfere with the prerogatives in all other, and particularly political matters of the governments of Western Germany and Eastern Germany.

Administration of the Berlin Free Zone

The All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly shall have the responsibility of organizing the administration of the Berlin free zone and supervising the administration of the municipalities located therein, with due regard for the traditional autonomous rights of those municipalities.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

- 16 -

The relations between the free zone and the governments of Western Germany and Eastern Germany, respectively, shall be conducted through non-political organs established by the All-German Commerce and Postal Assembly.

Levels of the combined Western-West German and Combined Russian-East German Military Forces in Germany.

The combined Western-West German and Russian-East German military forces in Germany shall be brought into an equilibrium designed to stabilize the respective forces on a numerical basis proportionate to the population and area of each of the two parts of Germany. If, as a result of these negotiations, force quotas are established, they will give Western Germany considerable leeway to build up its military forces in fulfillment with the Paris Agreements.

After the combined forces have been brought into a proportionate equilibrium, the agreed-upon fixed quotas shall not curtail the freedom of each party to increase the proportion of the German component within the force levels authorized: for example, for an American division or aerial unit withdrawn, a German division or aerial unit may be substituted; a Soviet division or aerial unit may be replaced by an East German division or aerial unit.

3. The Two-Government Approach.

A second compromise solution could be as follows: A minor slow down in West German rearmament -- the possible establishment of a free zone of Berlin -- free elections for a German Economic and Postal Assembly --

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

-17-

after a lapse of time, all-German free elections -- the establishment of two democratic rather than one unified democratic German government, with the proviso that unification may be accomplished through negotiations between these two governments -- after such hypothetical unification, conclusion of a peace treaty and predetermination of the German international status in the form of strongly armed neutrality -- end of the occupation.

Whatever compromise solutions the U.S. suggests, it should be made clear that these solutions are provisional. The United States must continue to press for German unification and the reconstitution of German sovereignty, and must do so in such a manner that the U.S. policy would be recognized clearly by the population of both Germanies.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 12, 1955.
10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Four-power meeting

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Ambassador to NATO (Germany)
Mr. MacArthur, C

COPIES TO: EUR, Mr. Merchant
GER, Mr. Kidd
EE, Mr. Beam
G.-Mr. Murphy
BNA
WE
S/S



1-1493

On Saturday Mr. Blankenhorn requested to see me over the weekend, and in compliance with his request I met with him for about an hour this morning. The discussion for the most part related to the forthcoming four-power meeting of Heads of Government. I brought Mr. Blankenhorn up-to-date on the work of the US-UK-French Working Group and told him that the Working Group was not discussing substantive solutions to the pressing problems in which Germany was interested such as German unification, European security, and disarmament, but rather was preparing for the Ministers' meeting with Molotov in San Francisco, where we would discuss with him procedures and the conduct of the four-power meeting.

Mr. Blankenhorn understood that the meeting of Heads of Government was not to discuss solutions to problems but rather to identify them and to agree on methods of tackling them. However, I told him there were several points which I thought would inevitably come up in his meeting with the three Foreign Ministers in New York and on which the German views would be of interest. These were:

1. At Geneva, what method should the Allies propose for looking into the German problem at a later meeting at Foreign Minister level? Would the German Government wish to participate in a Big Four meeting if it meant that the GDR would also be represented? Would the German Government wish not to participate but to make a statement to a four-power Foreign

RM/R
Anal
Rev
Lat

~~SECRET~~

Minister
FILED
MAR 26 1959

395.1 GE/S-1255

CJC

396.1-5

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Minister Conference on the assumption that this would mean the GDR would make a statement also? Or, would the Federal Government prefer to keep in close consultation with the three Western powers in a four-power meeting designed to explore German reunification as at Berlin? I said that before Geneva we should certainly know the views of the Federal Republic on this matter, since they would largely control the position the three Western powers took.

2. I said I understood Chancellor Adenauer would not come to Geneva to be standing by in the wings, as it were, during the four-power meeting. I personally agreed with this position. On the other hand, I believe it would be extremely useful for the Federal Republic to have an official in Geneva who had the Chancellor's confidence and with whom we could keep in touch with respect to matters which might arise at Geneva relating to Germany.

3. I said my British and French colleagues in the Working Group had already told me that at New York their Minister would be interested in the Chancellor's views as to the significance of the recent Bundesrat action with respect to the raising of German military forces.

After the above discussion, Blankenhorn said to me that it was most important for the Chancellor to meet privately with the Secretary with only one adviser each. This would enable the Chancellor to explore with the Secretary the Chancellor's preliminary thinking with respect to certain proposals which might eventually be made regarding German reunification at a later meeting at Foreign Minister level some time following Geneva. He said the Chancellor wished to proceed slowly on this matter and not rush it at Geneva. Blankenhorn said it would be better to exchange views with respect to this and certain other matters in a meeting with only one adviser present on each side. I said Mr. Merchant was endeavoring to set up such a meeting.

Blankenhorn then said the Chancellor felt that the general approach to Germany and European security should be through discussions on disarmament. Blankenhorn said he did not agree with this view, but the Chancellor held it quite strongly. He asked my opinion. I said I personally did not agree that it would be wise to try to approach the complex of problems we have with the Soviets under the heading of disarmament. It seemed to me that the European question should be separated out from consideration of general disarmament, including nuclear weapons. If the problems of Europe and disarmament were all lumped together, I feared we would go round and round, making no progress of any kind on any of them. In a sense, this would be playing into the Soviet hands, as in their May 10 disarmament

proposal

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

proposal they had already lumped a number of items together. Therefore, our thinking was that the problem of the unification of Germany and European security should be separated out from disarmament, which could be given continued study, possibly in the UN sub-committee. This did not mean that they were not related because indeed there was a relationship between these matters. Also we recognized that if progress were made eventually there, these matters might come together. But this was in the future and at present they should be kept separated. Mr. Blankenhorn said he fully agreed with this and that if the Secretary felt this way about it, it was important that he make this clear to the Chancellor and explain the reasons.

Mr. Blankenhorn said he assumed there would be a full discussion of Far East matters at Geneva. I said I did not anticipate that there would be such a discussion. The Western powers would not, I believe, raise the question of the Far East. We would expect the Soviets to inject it, particularly suggesting a five-power or larger meeting with the Chinese Communists. This, I believe, would be rejected by the Western powers. Blankenhorn said he was interested in what I said, because the Chancellor was going on the assumption that the discussions at Geneva would be fairly detailed and global in context, including detailed discussion of the Far East. He suggested that the Secretary outline to the Chancellor generally how the meeting at Geneva would be conducted and explain our view with respect to the treatment of the Far East at Geneva.

Finally, Mr. Blankenhorn asked if there were any chance of the three Western Ministers consulting with the NATO Foreign Ministers before Geneva. I said I thought there was a good prospect. I could tell him in strict confidence that in the Working Group the idea had been well thought of, but no information on this could be put out until after the three Ministers had met in New York next Thursday, and had decided on it. I therefore asked him to regard as strictly confidential my belief that it would be possible for the three Western Ministers to have one session with the NATO Foreign Ministers.

C:DMacArthur:aha

~~SECRET~~

3961.2571.1355

MR 88-32
 NNFI Case # NSC 5524
 Document # 16

file
 NSC 5524
 NSC
 5524
 Sec. 1

June 13, 1955

FROM: George F. Schwarzschild

Potential Impacts on the Mutual Security Program of withdrawal of Allied Forces from Germany and Alternative German force buildup

This memorandum supplements the memo of Max Lehrer to General Bonesteel of June 7, 1955, "Rough Order of Magnitude of the Costs Involved in a Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Germany."

The estimates presented below are rough order of the potential additional financial burden on our allies under the assumptions of the policy paper. No attempt is made to make a division of these costs between the portion which would be borne by the countries themselves and the portion which would need to be covered by Mutual Security assistance, in view of the extreme roughness of the figures and other difficulties involved. The fraction which would need to be covered with U.S. aid would depend on the politico-economic feasibility of increasing the defense budgets of other countries and the outcome of inter-governmental negotiations.

The costs discussed under A. relate to Assumption 7 of the Lehrer memorandum. The cost estimates are computed as percentage of the U.S. costs shown in that memo.

The costs under B. are additional and are based on the force levels projected in the JCS memorandum of May 27, 1955 circulated as Planning Board Memo of June 2, 1955.

A. Costs of additional military facilities and troop housing for forces of European allies moved out of Germany

(billions of dollars)

Ground forces facilities	1.2
Air Force facilities	.8
Housing	.5
Total	2.5

These projections are on the basis that the unit costs per division, etc., of alternative facilities will be somewhat lower than those projected by JCS staff for U.S. forces because of the partial availability of existing facilities and housing, lower standards, etc. It was arbitrarily assumed that other countries could cover their needs at the following fractions of the average cost for U.S. units: Ground forces facilities - 2/3 as much per division; Air Forces facilities - 1/5 as much per squadron; and Personnel Housing - 1/2 as much per 1,000 personnel.

B. Costs of additional German forces

The additional costs of equipment and war reserves and facilities for German forces are projected as follows under the various assumptions of the Planning Board paper (in billions of dollars):

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 880048

By HRC/PLW NADA, Date 7/18/91

<u>Status of German forces</u>	<u>Status of Russian forces</u>	
	<u>Withdrawal to home borders</u>	<u>Withdrawal to Poland</u>
Germany in NATO	0	\$1.9
Germany not in NATO	\$1.7	4.8

The above figures are on the assumption that additional units would involve a proportionate increase in the total costs of the current-agreed German forces, whether or not they are financed under HARP. (In the absence of more recent screened figures, the estimates presented in the Financial Annex to NSC 160/1 were used in the calculations.)

C. Additional factors

1. No reductions were made under B. to allow for savings due to the availability of current facilities, barracks, etc. in Germany for the use of German forces following the withdrawal of allied forces.
2. No adjustment was made for facilities or equipment of the present East German forces which might be available.
3. No estimate was made for the potential drain on West Germany due to unification.
4. No allowance was made in either A. or B. above for the impact of alternative policy on the German contribution for the troop support of other countries. This contribution is now scheduled to average roughly \$0.3 billion for European countries and Canada in the 6-month period ending May 1956 but the amount to be made available subsequently is open to negotiation apart from any implications of troop withdrawal.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NSC folder

5524

Sec 3

14 June 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Soviet Policy in Coming Four-Power Negotiations*

INTRODUCTION - THE QUESTIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE

1. In assessing the posture of Soviet policy on the eve of a new round of negotiation to be initiated by the Summit meeting, the following are probably the essential questions which intelligence ought to examine:

- a. Has there been a change in Soviet policy, and if so, what is its degree and character?
- b. What factors have caused the recent Soviet moves?
- c. What are the objectives of Soviet policy in its present phase?
- d. What are the probable Soviet positions on the several issues likely to be under negotiation in Four Power meetings, and what are the limits of concession on particular issues to which the USSR will go to achieve particular objectives?

AN ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET POLICY

2. In order to evaluate correctly and in proper perspective the USSR's recent moves, a backward look at the course which Soviet policy has pursued in the postwar period as a whole seems indicated. It is against this background that we can but judge whether, and if so in what degree, a change is taking place in Soviet policy.

* The discussion in this paper is not limited to the Summit conference but considers a prolonged period of negotiations which we believe is likely to be initiated by that meeting.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
NNFJ MR 88-324	
Authority	NSC F 88-489
By	DTD NARA, Date 2/14/89

Boggs of Det 12/22/61

27368

~~SECRET~~

9. The Soviet disarmament proposal of 10 May 1955 represents on its face a quite radical departure from previous Soviet positions, especially in agreeing to fixed levels of military forces and in accepting the phasing of nuclear weapons control with reductions of conventional forces. However, the control and inspection arrangements remain unsatisfactory to the West and these, together with the accompanying demands for political and military agreements clearly designed to nullify NATO, mean that the USSR runs little risk of having its plan accepted. While the possibility that the USSR does really want a disarmament agreement cannot be written off, for the present the Soviet leaders are asking an impossible price for it and there is a high probability that the 10 May proposal was made with no serious expectation that it would lead to fruitful negotiation. The circumstances in which it was announced, simultaneously with the Western invitation to the Summit meeting, strongly suggest that it was intended primarily to blanket out the effect of that move and to retain the propaganda initiative for the USSR.

10. The latest Soviet move, the approach to Adenauer, has apparently had a heightened impact on Western opinion because the three preceding Soviet initiatives discussed above had conditioned Western opinion-forming media to give sensational treatment to each new Soviet action. In fact, however, the Soviet intention to "normalize" relations with Bonn had long been forecast. So long as France was the principal stumbling block to West Germany's rearmament, the French were naturally the main target of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, and normal relations with Bonn would have weakened this propaganda effort. But with the Paris Agreements ratified and West Germany now a sovereign state, the USSR apparently chose to try to influence the further course of developments by direct dealings with the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, the USSR pays some price for the shift from treating the Bonn government as a gang of "Hitlerite revanchists" to accepting it as a respectable diplomatic partner. Aside from the propaganda embarrassment, which the Soviet system is apparently able to absorb without much difficulty, the new line may cause some uneasiness in the Satellites and possibly complicate the control of East Germany. Even though it was an expected move and a logical development, the Soviet leaders probably did not take the step lightly and it does mark another important indication of the increasing flexibility of Soviet policy.

- 5 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Germany

27. The issue of Germany, of course, is formally agreed by all parties to center upon the need for an agreement on reunification. If the USSR agreed to German reunification, it would do so because it anticipated that a situation could be brought about preferable to the prospect now in view -- integration of West Germany into NATO and a growing military contribution by West Germany to the Western alliance, perhaps followed by German-instigated pressure on the Soviet sphere. For such a situation to be preferable, the USSR would have to obtain effective guarantees with respect to the future behavior of Germany. The USSR knows that the political complexion of a reunited Germany would be pro-Western and anti-Soviet and that there would be little hope in the foreseeable future for the victory of internal Communist forces. Therefore, any Soviet agreement to German re-unification would include at a minimum: denial to Germany of the right to enter alliances and consequently withdrawal of Western forces from Germany; international control of German arms, probably in the context of a wider arms control agreement. It would probably also include a guarantee by Germany and the Western Powers of the finality of the Oder-Neisse frontier. If the USSR was willing to permit unification to come about on these conditions, it would probably insist also on doing so by a series of delaying steps, probably involving negotiations between the East and West German governments. This would be necessary in order to camouflage the painful political reverse that would result from immediate free elections in East Germany, and to give time to adopt the Soviet line for effective maneuver among the West German parties. Therefore, Soviet negotiators would be unlikely to accept outright the Eden plan for free elections, but would probably propose some revision of it which would delay free elections as long as possible and thus cushion the blow to Soviet prestige which the results of elections would bring.

28. The key question the Soviet leaders would have to ask themselves in considering German reunification on such a basis would be whether any guarantees they might obtain with respect to the future behavior of Germany would be enforceable, and would insure

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

for any long period that a reunified Germany would not tacitly become a member of a Western alliance. Probably they would not believe that any system of guarantees, including the Molotov all-European security plan, would insure this result so long as the political forces predominant in the Western countries continued to be those which are anti-Soviet and determined to oppose the expansion of Communist power. Therefore, the USSR probably is not now prepared to conclude an agreement for reunification of a neutralized Germany.

29. Soviet tactics in the negotiations will, however, go to great lengths to establish that the USSR does in fact want a reunified Germany. The Soviet negotiators will attempt to leave this impression and to lay the blame for failure on the Western Powers, since this, because of the effects on West German opinion, would serve their minimum objective to prevent or at least slow down West German rearmament. Their problem would be a great deal easier if they felt confident that they could offer reunification and free elections in return for agreement to neutralize Germany, and obtain a Western refusal. How confident they would be of this is difficult to estimate. We believe that they probably would not take the risk of offering such a settlement in clear and unmistakable terms. If the Western powers themselves take the initiative to offer such a settlement, the USSR will probably accept in principle but emphasize the need for settlements on other issues to create an atmosphere of confidence as a pre-condition for agreement on a neutralized, unified Germany. These would include a disarmament agreement, the dismantling of US bases threatening the USSR, and a system of security guarantees. Whatever these counter-demands might be in detail, their effect would be to nullify NATO as an effective defense system. Only if such demands were conceded in satisfactory form would the USSR be likely to agree to the unification of Germany. This is tantamount to saying that the USSR's price for the reunification of Germany would probably be the emasculation of Western alliance and defense arrangements.*

* See NIE 11-55, "Probable Soviet Response to the Ratification of the Paris Agreements," 1 March 1955, for a fuller statement of the advantages and disadvantages to the USSR of agreeing to German unification.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

30. Since the USSR will know in advance that such a price is unacceptable, the real Soviet basis for agreement will probably be to retain the division of Germany "temporarily," but to establish guarantees against the growth of military power in East and West Germany above agreed levels. This could be proposed in the context of a disarmament and European collective security pact. At the same time, in order not to appear to close the door entirely to future reunification, the USSR would probably propose continuing talks on unification either directly between the two Germanies, or perhaps in the UN. Withdrawal of troops from Germany, except for the "limited contingents" mentioned in the 10 May note, would probably also be included in the package.

31. The Soviet leaders would probably expect such a proposal to have much appeal in Western Europe, where there is still considerable uneasiness about the possible consequences of German reunification, and even of the rearmament of West Germany. They would not demand outright the withdrawal of all US forces from Europe or the dissolution of NATO, which would be flatly rejected by a substantial majority of West European opinion. The Soviet proposal would probably seem to many Europeans as a sincere attempt to reduce tensions by an initial step toward disengagement of the two blocs, and at the same time would be attractive to them because it would put the menacing German question in limbo. The Soviet leaders would expect to achieve a disruption of NATO defense planning, to render difficult the maintenance of US power in Europe, and to gain some control over the future course of West German rearmament. The withdrawal of the bulk of their forces from East Germany under these circumstances would be a price they would probably be prepared to pay. Above all, the arrangement would have for them the great advantage of gaining time, probably now one of their principal concerns in connection with the problem of Germany.

- 17 -


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~An Alternative Soviet Position on Germany

32. We have presented above what we believe is the likely Soviet course with respect to Germany in the forthcoming negotiations. It rests on an estimate that the USSR does not yet believe that the attempt to implement the Paris Accords will necessarily produce a powerful and dangerous West Germany. It also rests on the estimate that the Soviet leaders believe they still have cards to play which could prevent this development from coming about. It is possible, however, that what we have described will prove to be only the initial Soviet position and that at some point during the process of negotiation the Soviet leaders will decide that this course will not lead to a satisfactory interim agreement, nor set up political barriers to rearmament in West Germany, nor divide the Western Powers. Their judgment on this point will depend on the reaction to their proposals in West Germany, and on the unity and firmness of the Western Powers.

33. If the Soviet leaders decide that their initial position will fail of its objectives, they may take the initial steps toward a genuine offer for German reunification. The process of unification would probably have to be arranged to save as much face as possible for the Communists. Germany would be denied the right to adhere to NATO and would be required to accept arms control. The USSR would realize that these legalistic guarantees would not serve as any sure protection against Germany's future behavior. However, the Soviet leaders might calculate that certain countervailing political factors would come into play which would make this course a lesser risk than that of a rearmad, irredentist West Germany closely tied to the Western alliance. One of these would be the threat to the unity of the Western Powers if France insisted on keeping Germany in check and the US chose to continue to support Germany as an anti-Soviet partner. Another would be the political assets the USSR might acquire within Western Europe which might enable it to influence the policies of states. For example, the effect of such a settlement might be to release the Communist parties from their present political isolation and enable them once again to employ popular front tactics effectively. There would probably

~~SECRET~~



MANSON
NSC 5524

June 14, 1955



MR 88-32
NNFJ Case # ASC 5524
Document # 17

REPORT OF THE QUANTICO VULNERABILITIES PANEL

1. The report is premised on hypothesis 6-A, i.e. Soviet leaders are negotiating in order to gain time to overcome their present inferior military position.
2. The report advocates that the United States meet the Soviet leaders with the intention to force them to retreat. The purpose of the conference would be to inflict a diplomatic defeat on the USSR.
3. The report states that because we now have a decisive superiority in the arms race, the next two years should be spent negotiating with a view to winning the cold war within that time period.
4. The report states that "we should not again make the mistake of confusing talk about a relaxation of tensions with progress toward a fundamental solution of world problems".
5. In apparent contradiction to the horatory introductory comments, the report also states that we are prepared to live with the cold war indefinitely, if necessary.
6. The report premises its disarmament proposal on the belief that "some degree of understanding, and even trust, is essential to any effective armaments control scheme", and that both the U.S. and the USSR have "mutual interest in avoiding an all-out nuclear conflict".
7. The recommendations to implement the report's estimate that now is the time to force the Soviet Union to abandon the cold war, contain very little that is new.

a. Actions prior to the conference.

- (1) The report states that the fate of the conference should be made to depend upon Soviet compliance with a demand that the Berlin toll blockade be lifted prior to the conference. The U.S. would not attend if the blockade were not lifted.
- (2) Exchange of ratifications of the Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the conference. Defense may still believe that the build-up of the Austrian army requires as long a period as is legally possible, and would therefore oppose a speed-up of ratifications.

b. Actions during the conference.

- (1) The disarmament proposals probably should be left for discussion at a later time when the Stassen position is crystalized.
- (2) Exchange of persons, information and goods involves the

20000

Mr. Lupp's list 7/12/55

issues of East-West trade and admission of Soviet nationals. The old idea of a world-wide fund for cooperative economic development of under-developed areas is reintroduced.

(3) The extensive proposals dealing with German matters need close study prior to comment.

(4) Greater allied unity on Far Eastern policy is listed among the courses of action, but appears to be more of an objective.

c. Actions outside the conference.

Numerous of the actions involving wide elements of U.S. foreign policy are recommended in a concluding section. One new, serious and apparently important recommendation, is to establish, organize and support research and development in the NATO countries on an ambitious scale. Other recommendations involve NATO and Asia.

8. Comment. The summary of conclusions appears to be somewhat deceptive in giving the impression of agreement among all the members. Several of the underlying papers, some prepared jointly and some by individuals, precede from different estimates of the situation and contain contradictory recommendations. It would appear, therefore, that the conclusions as drafted may not be an agreed consensus.

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~ *full*

PREG MC-19

June 16, 1955

44

PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETING OF CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT

Memorandum of Conversation

Place: The Secretary's Office

Time: June 15, 1955

Participants: The Secretary
 Mr. MacArthur
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Board
 Mr. McCordle
 Ambassador Bohlen
 Mr. Beam
 Mr. Kidd
 Mr. Wolf
 Mr. Galloway
 Mr. McAniff
 Mr. Appling

The Secretary believed that the Soviets were faced with a number of accumulated problems such as the failure to block western unity in Europe, the economic burdens of atomic development and heavy armament, and chronic agricultural problems. It seemed reasonable that they would seek a period of relaxation. Mr. Beam said that a paper on the general position of the USSR at this time would be available.

Ambassador Bohlen said that, as he had indicated in recent cables, there did exist a number of major problems for the Soviets, but that it would be an overstatement to say that the Soviet regime had lost control. He saw no prospect of progress arising from discussion of the satellites at the Summit meeting. It is Soviet policy to retain control in the satellites which they consider important to the maintenance of the security and power of the Government of the USSR. The Soviets might be willing to discuss constructively other subjects such as armament limitations.

The

~~SECRET~~

8676

100-2961-66/5-2855
 SECRET

The Secretary said that a major cause of tension in relations between the US and the USSR was the control of the satellites. The captive peoples would interpret our failure to raise this question at the Summit meeting as acceptance of the status quo. Ambassador Bohlen expressed the view that the instrument of Soviet control of the satellites was the Communist governments in those countries. Our recognition of these governments established a feeling among the satellite peoples that the status quo was recognized. Nothing we failed to raise at the Summit meeting would much enhance this conviction. Ambassador Bohlen said that our long-range objective was to establish governments freely selected by the peoples in the satellites. A step to this end would be the detachment of existing governments from the USSR. These two purposes would appear contradictory if pressed simultaneously. The Secretary said that we might have to set toward both objectives until we could foresee which way things were going to develop. Mr. McManis said that national independence could be expected to precede individual freedom. Ambassador Bohlen added that the Soviets would reject any suggestion that the satellite governments were not independent. They might, for instance, point out that Poland offered France a bilateral military alliance. Ambassador Bohlen understood that there might be very good reasons why we had to raise the satellite issue but that he did not expect this to be profitable as a point for negotiation with the Soviets.

Ambassador Bohlen and Mr. Harboist noted that this meeting might be different from earlier Big Four meetings which had had to boot in mini reports and statements to the public. This was to be a more substantive meeting without those usual psychological problems. In this light, they wondered whether it would be useful to open the meeting with a general statement of the type to which the Soviets would respond with denial and counter-accusations. Such an exchange would

SECRET

proportion

~~SECRET~~

-2-

prejudice the choice of topics on the specific substantive issues which would subsequently be discussed. Ambassador Bohlen suggested that we might confine our opening remarks to a sort of listing or summary of such subjects. The Secretary thought that if a meeting intended to formulate issues, it would be difficult not to raise the two key questions, the satellites and international communism. Ambassador Bohlen agreed that they should be mentioned but thought that this could be done under very headings. He thought that the question of the satellites was in fact only an important result of more basic causes. To raise it would, he thought, only lead to endless arguments. The Secretary agreed that we could not throw the Soviets to discuss this question, but thought that we would have to raise it. Mr. Bonie considered it important not to visualize our opening statement as one primarily for the press but as a candid summary of the views of one of two parties who have profound and conflicting differences of view. In approaching specific issues we should not "use the blunt edge of the wedge". Ambassador Bohlen added that we might consider whether our ultimate position would be better or worse for having raised the questions of the satellites and international communism as the key questions, knowing that the Soviets would refuse to discuss them and therefore that any progress was impossible. Mr. Bonie mentioned that the Soviets would certainly raise the foreign bases question which we would similarly refuse to discuss as such.

The Secretary noted that both simultaneous and consecutive translation were proposed and that this would give us useful time before making our responses.

Mr. MacArthur suggested that the Secretary discuss with the President the general plan for the conduct of the whole meeting and the general statements as outlined in the working group report.

The Secretary said he assumed the Far East was listed among the principal problems only in the expectation that it would be raised by the Soviets. Mr. MacArthur said this was correct. He added that the French were very much concerned that the Soviets would charge violation of the Geneva Accords because Dien Bien Phu had not started talks about the elections. The French might want to discuss this in New York.

The Secretary asked whether, if we raised the question of German unification, the Soviets would not simply respond that they recognized the problem and were going to talk to Adenauer in September.

Ambassador Bohlen

~~SECRET~~

8678

~~SECRET~~

Ambassador Bohlen thought that the Soviet objective would be to make the question of German unification essentially one for the four German Governments who would consult the four powers, for remove the German question from the four power arena. He expected that on the German question, the Soviets would produce a refurbished version of their Berlin position including troop withdrawal. The Secretary then noted that we would also not yet have a position on disarmament. Ambassador Bohlen suggested that we should press the Soviets on the question of German unification. Mr. Harbois added that this might be a touchstone of the conference.

Ambassador Bohlen said that the Soviet's first objective is, of course, the maintenance of the communist system. The point on which progress might be made and which they would consider consistent with this objective seemed to be disarmament. We might, therefore, anticipate further Soviet proposals. We could, of course, expect the Soviets to press the German question on the "two plus four" basis.

The Secretary recalled that at Paris, Adenauer professed to remain in consultation but outside four power conferences on Germany with perhaps an opportunity to make a statement to such a conference.

Mr. MacArthur noted that the working group had agreed that on the question of German representation we should be guided by Adenauer's views. The Secretary agreed and said that this seemed to be a point to be discussed in New York.

~~SECRET~~

8679

CIA

C O P Y

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NSC

REFERENCE: NSC 5524, "Basic US Policy in Relation
to Four-Power Negotiations"

INTELLIGENCE COMMENTS ON NSC 5524

The following intelligence comments are submitted
on NSC 5524:

1. The Soviet leaders have tried in a conspicuous way over recent months to give the impression that they are earnestly seeking an improvement in the international atmosphere. The most recent indication is their unprecedentedly conciliatory attitude over the Boring Sea plane incident. However, no real evidence has yet appeared that they have altered their view that there is an ineradicable hostility between the Communist and free worlds, or that they have abandoned their ultimate aim to expand the sphere of Communist power. Their unyielding attitude to date in the Japanese treaty talks in London reveals their unwillingness to surrender positions they consider important. What we have been witnessing, therefore, is probably a new phase of Soviet tactics, not a fundamental change in policy.

Internal

2. The absence of a dominant figure like Stalin has raised serious problems for policy-making in the Soviet totalitarian system. Although Khrushchev seems to have been the most influential figure since the fall of Malenkov, he does not possess decisive power and following his unsatisfactory performance in Belgrade his position may even be somewhat shaken. The new "collective" leadership has evidently been concerned to avoid decisions involving any very high degree of risk and to exercise a greater degree of tactical flexibility than Stalin.

3. The Soviet leaders have themselves declared that the burden of military expenditures is weighing heavily on their economy, and there seems good reason for taking their

DECLASSIFIED
NNFJMR88-34A
Authority NSCF88-542
By CAZ NARA, Date 3/10/89

- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

13. The principal Soviet objectives in the negotiations will be (a) to prevent or at least to limit West German rearmament, and (b) to weaken the Western alliance and if possible to obtain the withdrawal of US forces from bases around the periphery of the Bloc. The Soviets probably calculate that if the cold war seemed to be coming to an end, there would be great reluctance in the West to continue the effort to maintain military strength, there would also be renewed opportunities for diplomatic maneuvers which might open up a new phase of political warfare.

SOVIET TACTICS AND POSITIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS

14. The initial Soviet position in the negotiations appears to have been laid down in the note of 10 May 1955 and confirmed by Molotov's speech to the UN on 22 June. It seems evident that the USSR wishes to gain the initiative by focusing the talks on its disarmament proposals and on its scheme for a security arrangement in Europe.

15. The USSR will probably lay great stress on the disarmament issue and may be prepared to carry out some limited form of agreement in this field. However, the Soviets will almost certainly not accept Western requirements for full freedom of access for international inspectors. The USSR would be unlikely to accept even the more limited form of inspection it has itself proposed unless it obtained some such concession as a substantial US withdrawal from bases in Europe and Asia. If the West were willing to accept an arms limitation arrangement without inspection, but providing for agreed levels of armament for West Germany and for mutual reduction of occupation forces in Germany, the USSR would probably welcome an agreement.

16. The USSR probably hopes to avoid discussion of German reunification, and in particular of the Western plan to accomplish this through free elections, by making its demands for a disarmament and security agreement on its own terms a condition precedent. The Soviets must be on the horns of a dilemma about Germany. Although they are anxious to keep reunification dangling before West German eyes, and may even regard their forward position in East Germany as becoming less vital in an age of nuclear weapons, they are probably greatly concerned lest withdrawal from East Germany endanger their position in the Satellites. They probably believe that the West could not provide adequate guarantees against the threat of a reunified Germany. In addition, they may be reluctant to lose East Germany's substantial industrial contribution to the Bloc.


~~SECRET~~

17. Therefore, the USSR probably prefers at this time to continue the division of Germany. It will probably offer to reduce its forces in East Germany to "limited contingents," and at the same time propose interim steps toward unification through negotiations between the two Germanies. It probably hopes that such an offer will confuse West German opinion, and thereby prevent the Adenauer government from pushing forward with rearmament. If such an effect is not achieved, however, the possibility cannot be excluded that, at some stage of a prolonged negotiation on Germany, the USSR would agree to German reunification in return for Western pledges to guarantee Eastern Europe against German aggression.

18. As additional, but secondary issues the Soviets will probably raise at least the following: (a) admission of Communist China to the UN; (b) a separate five-power, or larger, conference on Far Eastern affairs; (c) expansion of East-West trade; (d) banning of war propaganda; (e) broadening of cultural relations.

/s/ ALLEN W. DULLES

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director of
Central Intelligence



From NSC 5524

Case # ~~SECRET~~
 MR 88-34
 Document # 5

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

NND 880068

2 July 1955

Same one as...

HBM/pw

4/24/52

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Basic U.S. Policy in Relation to
 Four-Power Negotiations (NSC 5524).

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding the military aspects of a draft statement of policy entitled "Basic U.S. Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations" (NSC 5524) which was prepared by the NSC Planning Board for consideration by the Council at its meeting on 7 July 1955.

2. The statement of the basic U.S. approach to be contained in paragraph 1 of NSC 5524 is considered of primary importance to the successful exercise of U.S. initiative during the Four-Power Negotiations, since U.S. flexibility will be based in the main on the guidance developed therein. With this in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the addition of further guidance, based on NSC 5501, as part of the Basic U.S. Approach, as follows:

a. Add the following new paragraph 1.

"Basic U.S. Approach

"1. Inherent in the basic U.S. approach to Four-Power negotiations must be the realization that 'despite the talk of coexistence, the Communist powers will continue strenuous efforts to weaken and disrupt free world strength and unity and to expand the area of their control, principally by subversion (including the support of insurrection), while avoiding involvement of the main sources of Communist power. This strategy will probably present the free world with its most serious challenge and greatest danger in the next few years.' (NSC 5501, paragraph 19.)"

b. Renumber present paragraph 1 of NSC 5524 as paragraph 2, leaving subparagraphs a, b, and c, and c (1) and c (2) thereof unchanged, and omitting the last sentence here.

c. Add a new paragraph 3 as follows:

"3. In pursuing this strategy during the forthcoming negotiations, the U.S. must 'give to the

SECRET

PD

E-29-83

F33-687

JCS
SM-442-83

RV AR NARA. Date 11/12/44
~~SECRET~~

territory or the de facto eastern border of Germany, part of a militarized zone extended southward to the border in Czechoslovakia. However, a generally one falling Weisse, as described considered acceptable further and more consider that the proposal within the lower limits The prolonged sovereignty to West German as a equal partner in a Europe resolved with her access of this year. The danger of her loss no longer a compelling factor and, position of the Allies has been Under these circum- stances, it is considered United States should not accede to the establishment of neutral belt which would be confined to NATO territory alone and which would leave such neutralized territory in juxtaposition to the armed forces of the Soviet Bloc. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that the third sentence of present paragraph 13 be deleted.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the conditions established in present subparagraph 14a as prerequisite to United States agreement to a proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from a united Germany are acceptable from the military point of view. They deem it only prudent to note, however, that efforts to bring about the conditions set forth in present subparagraph 14a(2) would present problems (military, political, and financial) of such magnitude as to render remote a likelihood of their attainment. Failing this, there would be the distinct possibility that agreement to withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany would result in the forced withdrawal from Europe of all or a major portion of our forces. It should therefore be recognized that any continuing examination of the acceptability to the United States of proposals for the withdrawal of United States forces (such as is contemplated in the last subparagraph of the Executive Secretary's Note of Transmittal) would, of necessity, be based upon a very tenuous assumption. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate, however, that they would prefer repositioning of U.S. forces in Europe with all its inherent problems, to a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.

~~SECRET~~

10. Subject to the foregoing comments and the adoption of the revisions recommended, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the draft statement of policy to be acceptable from the military point of view.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED


ARTHUR RADFORD
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- 6 -

~~SECRET~~

PD 12-27-00
F33-687 SM

8/9/55



FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Washington, D.C.

762.00

Translation

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Thank you for your letter of July 27. I am glad about the spirit of confidence and understanding between us. It is in this spirit that I should like to give you my view on the present political situation.

Though I am not living here in the wonderful solitude you are enjoying on your island it is quiet enough here in the mountains to follow one's own thoughts more undisturbed than in Bonn. The result of my reflections are the following observations with which I should like to acquaint you strictly personally.

I. 1. Geneva Conference

I have thanked you and the other gentlemen because you have so consistently interceded for the reunification and further have declared impossible the creation of a European security system without simultaneous restoration of the unity of Germany.

His Excellency
The Secretary of State
of the United States

John Foster Dulles

Washington, D.C.

34-1-6E
762.00
A

Insofar the Conference has been a success for us.

2. For the rest the Geneva Conference has been a complete success for the Russians.

a) They contrived by cheap gestures to make forget their debit account: The Soviet zone, the satellite states, the conditions in their own country, maintenance of the Communist parties as shock troops in other countries (Federal Republic, France, Italy, North Africa, the Arabian states, the Far East), compulsion exerted on all free countries to rearm to the utmost of their capabilities.

All this tends to effect the conquest of the world by Communism, Russia's ultimate plan, and there is not a single fact to be scored that would justify the assumption that the Russians have actually given up their plans to conquer the world.

b) The Russians - due to the change of public opinion in relation to them - have felt strengthened to such an extent that after the Geneva Conference they now want to see the restoration of the unity of Germany postponed indefinitely, - contrary to all their previous declarations including the declaration during the Berlin Conference.

c) The news of August 6 from Vienna that Russians are stationing in Hungary, and Czecho-Slovakia - where

so far as Soviet troops were stationed - the Russian troops withdrawn from Austria are another proof showing that in reality the situation has not been eased by the conclusion of the Austrian treaty and by Geneva.

The statements by the Soviet Zone ministers which have never been as provocative as they are now after Geneva prove the same.

II. In my opinion the reason for the changes in the Soviet Russian attitude concerning the reunification is not in the first line apprehension with regard to repercussions in the satellite states. This apprehension certainly plays a role in the Russian deliberations. The decisive reasons, however, in my opinion, lie in the following considerations.

The Russians count on succeeding by way of indefinite postponement of the reunification in disengaging the Federal Republic from its connection with the West, in thereby preventing the creation of a united Europe, getting Germany, France, and Italy under their control, and thus working themselves into a very favorable starting position for the final struggle with the United States, "the last pillar of Capitalism" which they envisage. This speculation is based on the following considerations:

a) In the Federal Republic the opposition of SPD and trade-unions against the policy of the Federal

Government: will be strengthened.


b) The success the Russians have scored by Germany in their estimation by world public opinion has not been without impression even on the attitude of certain non-socialistic quarters in Germany.

c) Chancellor Adenauer, on account of his age, will leave the political scene within a measurable space of time. He is now keeping together the non-socialistic parties. His successor will most likely not have the necessary political influence to do this, so that the SPD will participate in the Government. Whether Bundestag elections in 1957 will result in an equally strong majority for the present foreign policy seems doubtful to the Russians.

d) The spirit of resistance against Soviet Russia upheld by free peoples will, as the Geneva echo has shown, gradually decrease. For this purpose things must be delayed under cover of nice gestures.

This, in my opinion, are the real reasons of the Soviets for the attitude taken regarding the question of reunification.

III. Let me add a few more observations. The postponement of German reunification is particularly dangerous because it coincides with the rehabilitation of Russia by the Anglo-Saxon powers as forecast by the Geneva

 Conference. The very unfavorable echo of public opinion in Germany regarding Geneva is based on the belief that in Geneva Russia had been considered by the Anglo-Saxon powers as rehabilitated, and that this would lead the Anglo-Saxon powers to abandon Germany.

Russia cannot be forced to restore the unity of Germany but the impression of a rehabilitation of Russia by the Anglo-Saxon powers can be avoided. If this impression is avoided it will greatly lessen the danger of the Federal Republic, and thus Europe, becoming Russian sphere of influence. I may add that in the meantime the SED plans for the future have become known to us from reliable sources:

"First, contact with the Federal Government should be taken up and at least a de facto recognition of the DDR Government be obtained. Then four-power negotiations under participation of the two German governments, all-German elections, National Assembly, central government above the present two governments, finally withdrawal of the Occupation forces. After that close coordination of the activities of the Communist parties of France, Italy, and Germany.

The now formed all-German government would be a bourgeois-democratic government in which strong Communist forces would participate. This would be the tactical starting position from which the Communists would begin to open the fight for the strategic main object. The

preliminary stage would be "the unmasking of the bourgeois politicians" and simultaneous infiltration of Communists into all organisations of the working people. In this period the alliance with the national groups of the bourgeoisie and the middle class must be attained in form of a compromise. As soon as the alliance with the small farmers would be strong enough the "stage of the bourgeois democratic dictatorship" would begin, i.e., the most "reactionary ministers" would be displaced by men from the national groups of the bourgeoisie and the group of the farmers. Now the period would begin in which the bourgeois parties would be deprived of their power. As soon as this government was consolidated the monopolies and the big landowners would be assaulted in a broad front ultimately leading towards turning the government into an instrument of the Kremlin. As in this way the main phase of the Communist activities would only set in after the reunification, the Kremlin and Pankow within the next future would probably be very willing to strike a compromise with regard to Germany. In the light of these considerations the conclusion of the Austrian treaty should in now way be considered as a miracle but only as the result of consistent tactics aiming at the conquest of Germany."

I apologise, dear Mr. Dulles, for writing you such a long letter. However, I do think the political situation is very serious and critical.

- 7 -

I had the time here to study a little the Russian history since 1900. In doing so I have once more realised that Russia reckons with very long periods and that such a disposition implies a danger for other peoples.

I hope that you went on your vacation in the meantime and send you my best wishes for your and Mrs. Balles recreation.

With most cordial regards as ever

Yours

Adenauer

August 9, 1955

88/11/8
NOV 1955
004738 INN
CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

This document consists of 2 pages
No. 3 of 8 copies.

Series A

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
LEO 11652: XGDS (1) 2 (3) 4
Authorized By: H. D. Brewster
August 4, 1975 HOK

In reply refer to
EGR

October 18 1955

This Document Must Be Returned To
DC/R
Central
Files
762A.5/10-1855

Dear Mr. Gray:

On January 26 of this year I sent a letter to Mr. Hensel in reply to one from him, about the implementation of certain aspects of NSC 5404/1 ("U.S. Policy on Berlin"). You will recall that we are required by the terms of NSC 5404/1 to seek to persuade the British and French to accept the entire policy expressed in that paper. At the time of my letter it did not seem wise to do this until after the Paris Agreements had been ratified. Accordingly, I wrote to Mr. Hensel that no approach to our Allies regarding major changes in the military stockpile would be appropriate until all of our policy on Berlin had been explained to our Allies, and that tripartite technical planning on possible use of force to break a blockade would not be appropriate until such time as the principle had been accepted by the British and French. (The first of these points arises under sub-paragraphs 8(e) and 8(i) of the NSC paper, and the second under sub-paragraphs 9(f) and 9(i).)

After the Paris Agreements came into effect, a preliminary approach was made to the British and French in Washington with a view to further discussions in Bonn of the full policy stated in NSC 5404/1. Because of the approaching Geneva Conference, these discussions were not pursued. It now seems to us an appropriate time to raise this subject again, and indeed to examine all aspects of our Berlin policy, particularly in view of the new situation created by the recent agreement between the Soviets and the East Germans.

We have sent instructions to this effect to the Embassy in Bonn, asking that the policy expressed in the NSC paper be put to the British and French, that the Berlin situation be reviewed in


the light

The Honorable
Gordon Gray,
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs,
The Pentagon.

TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

FILED
NOV 28 1955

762A.5/10-1855
TOP SECRET FILE



~~TOP SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

the light of the Soviet-GDR agreement, and that a study be made of measures to be taken in the event of further interference with Allied access to Berlin. (Department's telegram No. 896 to Bonn, September 28.) This would, of course, be done in association with the military authorities, and I would not want anything said in my earlier letter to stand in the way of their full participation. I am aware that they have been authorized to take part in the conversations (DA 990032, October 9), but I thought I would make clear directly to you that the inhibitions suggested in my letter to Mr. Hensel no longer apply, so that there would be no misunderstanding on the point.

Sincerely yours,

Livingston T. Merchant
Assistant Secretary

~~For European Office~~

5/2/55
BWA
OCT 13 1955 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

EUR:GER:GPA:JWAuchincloss:erk
10/14/55

GER - Mr. Reinstein

RA - Mr. Wolf

DECLASSIFIED	
By <u>DoD</u>	Date <u>2/8/88</u>
NARS, Date <u>2/8/88</u>	

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 November 1955

S 381 (Mil Strat & Posture) (7 Nov. 55)

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL RADFORD

(b) VIA: REAR ADMIRAL HEDDING

Rate, - you then put Rear Admiral Hedding in the subject review

SUBJECT: Review of Events Leading up to JCS Action of 10 December 1953 concerning "Military Strategy and Posture".

1. I understand that you have asked for the subject review in order that you may discuss with the Secretary of Defense the advisability of undertaking a similar study in the next few months in light of developments since 1953.

2. Incident to assuming office in 1953, the newly appointed members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the world situation at that time. You and your colleagues made a written report to the President in accordance with a Presidential directive. The report gave JCS views with regard to an outline of U.S. strategy which would best serve the over-all U.S. security interests and requirements for the next few years. I believe a copy of this report is on file in your personal safe.

3. By late September 1953, the Secretary of Defense had developed six (6) basic questions concerning the size and deployment of the U.S. armed forces in the light of the Soviet threat, - existence of atomic weapons, U.S. commitments and the national economy for the long pull. About this time, there were recommendations to establish a policy that the U.S. would use atomic weapons to repel aggression whenever it was to our military advantage to do so. In addition, a new Basic National Security Policy was distributed as NSC 162/2. However, this Policy was not approved by the President until 30 October 1953.

COMMENT: Up to this time, the JCS had no definite statement of policy that atomic weapons would be used. Thus, the use of these weapons was generally discounted when determining

ADM BOB: VDMIKVT HVDBOHD

(1 MOA. 22)

22154 8 BOAFME)

MOA 22154 1022

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
By <u>RVD</u>	NARS, Date <u>2/8/88</u>

~~TOP SECRET~~

Apparently, the Secretary of Defense discussed the six (6) questions with you and asked for your comments. At any rate, you then put Rear Admiral (then Captain) Anderson and me to work. We developed answers to the questions plus a back up study plus tentative estimates of force levels for the four Military Services. These three studies were bound together and a one page summary was added. I understand that you handed the original to the Secretary of Defense (I do know that he did receive it and still has it, I believe). Your copy of these papers is attached in the folder marked TAB 1. You have made some pencil notes on some pages. (Believe this is only copy made; it was in Rear Admiral Anderson's safe).

4. After you and the Secretary of Defense discussed your ideas (paragraph 3 above), I think the Secretary of Defense and/or you discussed the matter with the President. Soon thereafter, you asked that Anderson and I draw up a draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defense to send to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was done in early October 1953. Within a day or two, Carey Randall came to me and stated the Secretary of Defense thought the draft memorandum was satisfactory except there was no mention of continental air. ^{defense} Paragraph b(3) was immediately added to the draft to take care of this point. (Follows JCS 2141/108)

5. Next, there was a meeting in the office of the Secretary of Defense on 15 October 1953 (not sure who attended but understand the JCS were there). The Secretary of Defense generally discussed his ideas and intentions. The draft memorandum was then approved by the Secretary of Defense and came to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 October 1953. You then sent CM-33-53 of 16 October 1953 to the other members of JCS with

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
By <u>DoD</u>	Date <u>5/200.1</u>
By <u>RVD</u>	NARS, Date <u>2/8/88</u>

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sec/Def's memorandum as an attachment (these two papers are attached as J.C.S. 2101/108). You suggested an Ad Hoc Committee be appointed by JCS.

6. On 16 October 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved your recommendations, and on 23 October 1953, a directive to the Ad Hoc Committee (Lt General Everest as Chairman) was signed by JCS Secretary. This directive is also attached as one of the papers of J.C.S. 2101/108.

7. Within a day or two you left for your first trip to Europe as Chairman, JCS. Anderson and Powers were with you and trip took about 4 weeks. The Ad Hoc Committee went to work, and I attended all meetings. JCS directed committee to submit report by 1 December 1953 (JCS had deadline of 15 December to report to the Secretary of Defense). The committee was notified that the President approved the new Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2) on 30 October 1953.

8. The Ad Hoc Committee Report on "Military Strategy and Posture" was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 November 1953, as J.C.S. 2101/111 attached.

COMMENT: The committee deliberations were long, rugged and, at times, acrimonious. It was immediately apparent that some members wanted and tried to fight the problem; ^{some} ~~others~~ would not admit that atomic weapons changed anything. It was 10 days--2 weeks before anything was accomplished. Finally, it appeared that the Navy-Air Force-Marine contingents were very close to being in agreement although no one side completely agreed with the other two. Still they were close to acceptance of each others' views and all were hammering away at the Army members. The Army appeared not about to agree with any other group. At almost the last minute, the Navy-Marine side and the Air Force members drew

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
By <u>DoD</u>	Date <u>2/8/88</u>
NARS, Date <u>2/8/88</u>	

apart. I felt that the main differences between Navy-Marine and Air Force were:

a. Navy-Marine Corps felt 137 wing Air Force program would be too expensive and could not be maintained within dollars which might become available except at detriment of other Services. Navy-Marine Corps considered Air Force should have 127 total wings in 1957 and 950,000 people. Navy was also worried that Air Force members did not appear whole heartedly in support of 14 attack carriers.

b. Air Force felt that Navy needed only 8 attack carriers and 630,000 personnel in FY 1957. Air Force members wanted 1,000,000 men and 137 wing program for Air Force plus additional support forces. Air Force member said that program could be maintained and kept modern with \$5.1704 billions per year.

9. In the end, - the Ad Hoc Committee split four ways. All views are contained in J.C.S. 2101/111 attached. The matter went on JCS Agenda shortly after 1 December 1953.

10. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff began deliberations, it soon became apparent to you that you would need to go into executive session and the JCS would have to "pick up the pencil" if any agreement was to be reached. This was done for several days and many hours. Finally, the JCS did reach agreement on 9-10 December 1953 (J.C.S. 2101/113 attached). A memorandum to the Secretary of Defense was forwarded on 11 December 1953 (attached as J.C.S. 2101/113).

11. In the Summer and Fall of 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began work on FY 1956 forces for budget purposes. Most of the old argument against reductions were revived and enlarged. Some discussions were held with the Secretary of Defense. Before JCS had

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED	
By <u>RND</u>	NARS, Date <u>2/8/88</u>

TOP SECRET

decided what recommendations they would submit, the Secretary of Defense sent down a directive in December 1954 which gave the Services the guidelines for Major Forces and Personnel Strengths to be reached by end FY 1956 (1 July 1956). The Personnel Strengths directed by the Secretary of Defense for 1 July 1956 were:

Army	- 1,000,000
Navy	- 650,000
Air Force	- 975,000
Marine Corps	- <u>190,000</u>
Total	- 2,815,000

(Same as J.C.S. 2101/113 of 10 December 1953 *for FY57*)

These were later changed by the Secretary of Defense as follows:

Army	- 1,025,000
Navy	- 657,000
Air Force	- 975,000
Marine Corps	- <u>193,000</u>
Total	- 2,850,000

NOTE: Later (this year) the Secretary of Defense told Marines to reduce to 205,000 by 1 January 1956, and a decision would then be made as to later end strengths.

12. While you were away on the trip to the Far East last December-January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that they should complete the JCS records by giving their own views as to Force Levels even though the Secretary of Defense had already made a decision. They did so as separate views on file in JCS Secretariat. You were also asked to give your views, and you asked me to do so by giving a resume of your over-all philosophy on U.S. defense and security. Your views were submitted to complete the files in February 1955 and came out as a Note to Holders of 1800/225. A copy of your views is attached as TAB 2.

DECLASSIFIED	
By	DoD Di. 5200.1
	NARS, Date 2/8/88

31 March 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~

13. On 18 August 1955, the Secretary of Defense asked for JCS recommendations concerning Force Levels and Personnel Strengths for FY 1957 (budget purposes). On 6 October the split views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to FY 1957 personnel strengths were forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. These views are attached as J.C.S. 1800/241 (tabbed). On 7 October, the Secretary of Defense generally accepted your views and authorized presently approved end strengths for FY 1956 and end strengths for FY 1957 for initial planning and budget estimates. These were:

Army	- 1,025,000 (excludes cadets USMA)
Navy	- 657,000 (excludes Mids'n., NavCads, OCS)
Air Force	- 975,000
Marine Corps	- 193,000
	<u>2,850,000</u>

COMMENT: The JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense of 6 October 1955 (J.C.S. 1800/241 attached) gave a resumé of Force and Personnel decisions since December 1953.

The Marines seem to think a later decision has been made with regard to Marine Corps strength.

14. The above is a general outline from 1953 to the present time.

Very respectfully,


KIRKPATRICK

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867400
By KON
NARS, Date 2/12/88

SECRET

- 10 -

Question 3

Can the German authorities indicate the status of discussions on this matter? (SHAPE recommendation on 8:4 vs. 6:6)

German Reply

At the end of July 1955 SHAPE has in connection with a report on the status of discussions on the New Look of the ground forces recommended to examine the ratio of infantry divisions to armored divisions.

After careful examination the Ministry of Defense in September has given SHAPE the following reasons for the ratio 6:6:

1. The armored divisions as envisaged for Germany are particularly suited for delaying action and therefore especially valuable for the outnumbered party.
2. The armored divisions of the German type make possible the merging of three armored divisions into an armored corps which through immediate exploitation of the effects of atomic weapons is particularly suited for local operational counter attacks.
3. If one considers not only the ratio of armored and infantry divisions within the German contingent and also the total number of divisions available in Western Germany with 6 German armored divisions there will be in our opinion a well balanced military situation.

In addition, reference should be made to the following considerations:

1. According to the German view it will be quite possible if not probable when trying to find a New Look for the ground forces that such small armored divisions particularly meet the requirements of atomic warfare. The M.C. 48 again and again asks for tactical flexibility, operational mobility and a minimum of vulnerability to enemy atomic attacks. We hold the view that the envisaged German type of armored divisions will particularly meet these requirements.
2. As regards the equipment required and the costs involved it should be pointed out that for the activation of these small armored divisions which are particularly suitable to atomic warfare we do not need altogether more tanks than was necessary already within the EDC framework for the German contingent for the then envisaged conventional divisions. At the time it was intended to raise 4 armored divisions and 2 mechanized divisions in addition to 6 infantry divisions. The total requirements of armored battalions including the general reserve units was 46 including a total number of approximately 3500 tanks whereas the new German planning envisages only 42 battalions requiring approximately 3200 tanks. Generally, there should be no

SECRET

762A. 5/16-11-55
POLTU A 309
preliminary to Staff Report 11/11/55
text of German statement made during AR 2 Exam NOV 9
of Fed Reps AR submitted

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
NND 867400
Date: 1/14/59

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 1 page.

Copy No. 1 of 6 Copies, Series A.

EUR-2043

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 19, 1955

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. John E. Coulson, British Minister
Mr. Elbrick - EUR
Mr. Wolf - RA

COPIES TO: S/S
G
C
R
EUR
RA

Downgraded To: ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652: XGDS ① 2 ③ 4
Authorized By: H. D. [Signature]
August 4, 1975

661.00/11-1-1955

Mr. Coulson called at 10:00 A.M., Saturday, November 19, at Mr. Elbrick's request.

Mr. Elbrick gave him an aide memoire responding to the British memorandum entitled "Possible Stages of Action when Indications of Major Russian Aggression Are Received in Good Time," of April 26, 1955.

Mr. Coulson read through the aide memoire. He stated that this subject would require study by the British experts and was too technical for him to do other than to comment generally. He noted a statement that we considered this procedure would be exceptional only, and said that he tended to think that the British Government had intended it to be the general procedure.

He said he would refer the matter for further study and be in touch with us again. Mr. Elbrick indicated that we had given a parallel memorandum to the Canadians, the day before; further, we hoped that this would be responsive to the thinking of the United Kingdom, and we would be prepared to study any comments they might make.

EUR:RA:JJWolf:psw
November 23, 1955

CONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET

362587

FILED
NOV 23 - 1955

661.00/11-1955

11/28/55

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
NND 867400
Date 1/28/55

This document consists of 1 page.

Copy No. 2 of 4 Copies, Series A.

EUR T/S Control 2039

Downgraded To ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL
EO 11652
Authorized for Release
August 4, 1978

OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOV 2 1955

NOV 2 8 1955

*Treat as
blue*

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO
661.00/11-2055

Dear George:

You will recall your letter of July 19, 1955, dealing with the British proposal on action to be taken on indications of major Russian aggression.

I enclose for your information one copy each of the aides memoire which we gave to the Canadians and British on November 18 and 19, respectively.

They both indicated that they would study these further and be in touch with us again. The U.K. Embassy representative particularly noted our statement that this would be an exceptional procedure. I am sure we will have more on this for you in the future.

I am also sending copies of these notes to Ridge Knight.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

C. Burke Elbrick
Deputy Assistant Secretary

2 Enclosures:

- 1-EUR-2024-4A
- 2-EUR-1442-Final-7A

The Honorable

George W. Perkins,
United States Permanent Representative
on the North Atlantic Council,
Hotel Talleyrand,
2, rue Saint Florentin,
Paris 1, France.

EUR:RA:JJWolf:psw
November 23, 1955

~~TOP SECRET~~

A/MRS

661.00/11-2855

12/28/55

DECLASSIFIED	
By <u>DOD</u>	Date <u>5200.1</u>
By <u>R.D.</u>	NARS, Date <u>2/17/88</u>

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF NSC 5404/1

THE PROBLEM

1. In light of a memorandum* by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), to amend the Berlin planning directive** of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29 December 1954.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 29 December 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided USCINCEUR with an over-all directive** encompassing all aspects of the Berlin planning problem. Paragraph 6 of this directive states:

"Other Tripartite Planning Responsibilities.

Certain military aspects of NSC 5404/1*** require political guidance and clarification. Until such guidance or clarification is received, implementation of these portions (i.e. subparagraphs 8 e, 8 i (4), 9 f, 9 i) must be deferred."

3. By memorandum**** dated 22 March 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to USCINCEUR certain political guidance received from the Department of State. This guidance, while clarifying the planning directive referred to in paragraph 2 above, still required that tripartite planning be deferred with respect to subparagraphs 8 e, 8 i (4), 9 f and 9 i of NSC 5404/1.

4. On 3 November 1955, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded* to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a memorandum# from the Assistant Secretary of State, indicating that, regarding subparagraphs 8 e, 8 i (4), 9 f, and 9 i of NSC 5404/1, the restrictions on tripartite military planning for implementation of U.S. policy regarding Berlin have now been removed.

* Dated 3 November 1955, Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/125
 ** Appendix "A" to Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1907/112
 *** Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/104
 **** Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/116
 # Appendix to J.C.S. 1907/125

DECLASSIFIED	
By <u>DOD</u>	<u>DA 5200.1</u>
<u>RvD</u>	NARS, Date <u>2/17/88</u>

5. By a message* dated 9 October 1955, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, representing the Executive Agency, after coordination with the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, authorized USCINCEUR to participate in tripartite discussions of measures and courses of action set forth in subparagraphs 8 e, 8 i (4), 9 f and 9 i, of NSC 5404/1.

DISCUSSION

6. The restrictions previously imposed on certain aspects of tripartite planning have been removed. Even though the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, representing the Executive Agency, has previously authorized USCINCEUR to participate in tripartite planning, the Berlin planning directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be formally amended.

CONCLUSION

7. USCINCEUR should be formally advised of the amending of the Berlin planning directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that the memorandum in the Enclosure, which reflects the above conclusion, be forwarded to USCINCEUR.

9. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this paper to commanders of unified or specified commands.

* DA msg to USCINCEUR, DA 990032, DTG 091657Z October 1955; on file in Joint Secretariat.