

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY

ATES MISSION

THE

TREATY ORGANIZATION

SIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SRO)

2 RUE ST. FLORENTIN

PARIS 1, FRANCE

January 18, 1957

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*Mr. Murphy -*

*Mr. Raynor (BNA) brought his to me by hand; he emphasized (as set forth in the 2nd full p. 2 of Mr. Muchant's memo to you dated Jan 19) that the matter has been very closely held in the Dept.*

*Mr. Raynor also said that he and Mr. Bonbright are prepared to discuss this matter with you at your full convenience.*

*Jan 21/1000*

*JL.*

luncheon which Hughes and I had with last Wednesday to outline a project, you during the Ministerial Meeting, of quietly and informally a statement of taken in the course of NATO military at the ability of the military forces of s to conduct military operations as inde- tline some of the steps which might be having in mind both the long term problem

of maintaining the alliance firmly locked together in a period of possibly relaxed tension and lessened military threat in which problems of the sort which are felt by some to be emerging in Italy might become more widespread, and measures to be considered for more rapid implementation in case there is need for the "agonizing reappraisal." Gruenther was enthusiastic about doing this and will give his full cooperation. I have in mind a very quiet job in which Bob Wood and I would be the main workers with help from not more than one or two others here in USRO.

As an illustration of what I had in mind for the future, I mentioned the developments in the logistics field, including the Bogart plan, as one very important field in which, fortunately, we had had some pushes in the right direction in the Nash-MacArthur letter. I also mentioned the possibility of expanding the NATO command structure on an allied basis to the point where national G-3's would be left without functions to be performed and hopefully wither away. The fact that some people were thinking of this as a possibly desirable direction in which to move and that there was a long term policy framework in which steps in this direction might be

Ben T. Moore, Esquire,  
Director, Office of  
European Regional Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

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TOP SECRET 1

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1/18/54



UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
(USRO)

2 RUE ST. FLORENTIN  
PARIS 1, FRANCE  
January 18, 1954

TOP SECRET

Dear Ben:

I took the opportunity of a luncheon which Hughes and I had with Gruenther, Norstad, and Schuyler last Wednesday to outline a project, which I discussed with several of you during the Ministerial Meeting, of trying to get down on paper very quietly and informally a statement of the steps which have already been taken in the course of NATO military planning and operations which limit the ability of the military forces of individual European NATO countries to conduct military operations as independent national units, and to outline some of the steps which might be taken in the future to this end, having in mind both the long term problem of maintaining the alliance firmly locked together in a period of possible relaxed tension and lessened military threat in which problems of the sort which are felt by some to be emerging in Italy might become more widespread, and measures to be considered for more rapid implementation in case there is need for the "agonizing reappraisal." Gruenther was enthusiastic about doing this and will give his full cooperation. I have in mind a very quiet job in which Bob Wood and I would be the main workers with help from not more than one or two others here in USRO.

As an illustration of what I had in mind for the future, I mentioned the developments in the logistics field, including the Bogart plan, as one very important field in which, fortunately, we had had some pushes in the right direction in the Nash-MacArthur letter. I also mentioned the possibility of expanding the NATO command structure on an allied basis to the point where national G-3's would be left without functions to be performed and hopefully wither away. The fact that some people were thinking of this as a possibly desirable direction in which to move and that there was a long term policy framework in which steps in this direction might be

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put seemed to be welcomed with great enthusiasm by both Gruenther and Norstad, particularly since they had felt that they were being forced to take steps in the opposite direction in a number of areas which had been very discouraging to them. Norstad was particularly excited about the possibility of continuing to fight in this larger framework to prevent what he had been about ready to accept as the necessity for disbanding the international headquarters of the Fourth Tactical Air Force and turning its functions largely over to the Twelfth US Air Force, together with some strengthening of the national command elements of the other country components of the Fourth Air Force. They felt this was just one illustration of pressure which they were under with respect both to army groups and air commands, largely as a result of budgetary and manpower ceiling rulings which had been initiated or fully supported by Washington. They had also, of course, been fairly discouraged by the Washington attitude toward things like the Bogart plan, until the recent Nash letter.

I believe, and so stated, that there had been a failure to examine these questions in their larger context. I do not think money is, in fact, being saved, but rather that it is a question of whether the money is being spent for persons in national organizations or in international organizations. I think that in terms of the Secretary's worry about the future, it is highly important that we do everything we can to increase the internationalization of the NATO military structure and that this is a point which deserves high level consideration between State and Defense.

In this connection, Norstad pointed out that, looking to the very long term future, the establishment of effective international command organizations would make it far easier to pull out one national contribution to such a command organization than if we have important NATO commands essentially financed and staffed by one country only, as would be the case if the Fourth Tactical Air Force were operated by the command organization of the Twelfth US Air Force. I urge that without waiting for the results of the study we are initiating, there be some careful consideration of these aspects of the detailed budgetary decisions which are apparently being made in a quite different and narrower context.

Sincerely,



Edwin M. Martin,  
Director, Office of Political Affairs.

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January 22, 1954

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 181st Meeting  
 of the National Security Council,  
 Thursday, January 21, 1954

Present at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend the meeting because of his absence from the city. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 6); Mr. Morrison for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the U. S. Representative to the United Nations; the Under Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of the Army and Adm. Duncan for the Secretary of the Navy (for Item 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Bolte for the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps (for Item 4); Judge Barnes, Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Department of State (for Item 6); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler and C. D. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. MEETING OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS

Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that the forthcoming Berlin meeting would be more important in its negative than in its positive aspects. He thought that this meeting might represent the last major Soviet effort to disrupt the Western alliance and to destroy the security of Western Europe. If this effort failed, our own program would succeed. If the Soviets are successful, it would be necessary to reexamine fundamentally United States policies with regard to the EDC and NATO.

Turning to specifics, Secretary Dulles thought that if the Soviets were in the "right mood" it might prove possible to obtain a treaty for Austria and the withdrawal of the occupation forces. We would be prepared, if absolutely necessary to secure the treaty, to envisage some degree of neutralization for Austria.

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As for Germany, Secretary Dulles thought the prospects for unification very poor. Soviet agreement to German unification would, in effect, represent an invasion of freedom deep into the Iron Curtain. Until the Soviets are prepared to extend greater freedom to Poland and Czechoslovakia, they cannot afford to permit this invasion to occur. Nevertheless, the Soviets will probably put forward some kind of package proposal for German unification, primarily designed to induce the French to abandon both EDC and their struggle in Indochina. Whether or not the French will succumb to these Soviet wiles remains to be seen. In any event, for tactical reasons Secretary Dulles said that he proposed to submerge his own personal role in the hope that France would then take a more positive part in the forthcoming conference. Thus we shall avoid the charge that France is merely the tail to the U. S. kite, and will favorably influence the French Parliament and French public opinion.

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral report by the Secretary of State on probable developments at the forthcoming meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Berlin.

2. U. S. POLICY ON BERLIN

(NSC 5404; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 20, 1954)

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that it had referred back to the Planning Board an earlier policy report on Berlin, and had called for a revised Planning Board draft statement along the lines of the Council discussion. The present report represented the Planning Board's attempt to meet the Council's viewpoint, but it was not a unanimous report. Mr. Cutler then read virtually the entire paper, and pointed out that although there were seven split paragraphs, nearly all the splits revolved about a basic issue, namely, the point at which the United States determines that the Soviets have created an intolerable situation in Berlin. When such determination has been made, shall the United States resort to the use of limited military force to probe Soviet intentions, or shall the United States make use of a longer period of time with the objective of demonstrating, both to its own citizens and to its allies, the true intentions of the Soviet Union?

Mr. Cutler then suggested that it would be appropriate to ask the Secretary of State to speak first, since the Planning Board was unanimous in its recommendations except for the State Department.

The President, however, interrupted and said that the whole problem to him boiled down to one basic issue: How seriously would the United States regard the imposition of another blockade of Berlin? No involved reasoning was necessary to reach an answer to this question, unless we imagine that the Soviets do not know what they are

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doing when they commence a new blockade. This seemed nonsense to the President, who said he believed if the Soviets tried this move again the United States would know very definitely what they were doing and, furthermore, would want to make its own position crystal clear as early as possible. Otherwise, war could result from a miscalculation of intentions.

Turning to General Twining, the President inquired if he was right in assuming that the Soviets could jam any airlift that we might mount. General Twining replied in the affirmative, and the President commented, "Why talk about an airlift?" This was a lot of bunk.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the draft prepared by the Planning Board, minus the paragraphs inserted by the State Department, came pretty close to meeting the President's position. The President replied that he was glad to see to it that the State Department, in terms of this policy, should have sufficient time to convince world opinion of Soviet intentions, but of course we could not wait forever. "Am I wrong", asked the President (directing his question to Secretary Dulles), "in assuming that the Soviets are well aware that we would take very seriously the imposition of another blockade?"

Secretary Dulles said that he did not think that we had ever made as clear a statement of our position with regard to a renewal of the blockade in Berlin as we had in the case of aggression in Indochina, Korea, or against NATO. However, Secretary Dulles expressed full agreement with the President's anxiety to avoid the danger of a general war arising through miscalculation.

In reply, the President asked Secretary Dulles whether the first step should not logically be for him to talk this problem over with the British and the French in order to ascertain how these governments would react to a new blockade and to our courses of action in meeting this contingency. Secretary Dulles commented that the State Department did not feel that the circumstances of a future blockade of Berlin would be quite as clear as those which the President seemed to anticipate. Secretary Dulles thought it quite possible that Soviet measures to blockade Berlin might be undertaken without any intention of provoking the United States to general war. The Soviets were obviously very worried about our potentialities for subversive action in the East German Zone, with Berlin as a base. Accordingly, they might try to drive us out of Berlin in order to deprive us of this base, without any intention of going to general war.

Furthermore, said Secretary Dulles, the State Department took the position, reflected in their paragraphs of the present draft paper, that time would be needed to mobilize public opinion in the event of a new blockade of Berlin. He did not see how we could all sit around this table and decide that in certain circumstances and contingencies we would go to war with the Soviet Union.

EYES ONLY

Obviously we would have to persuade Congress and our allies of the necessity of doing so. The State Department felt that the use of an airlift might offer a very good means of persuasion, especially if the Soviets shot down any of our planes. On the other hand, failure to even attempt an airlift might be a very strong obstacle to public understanding and acceptance of our view of Soviet intentions if they instituted another blockade. In sum, Secretary Dulles insisted that we should not tie our hands either with regard to timing or methods by which we would test the real intentions of the Soviets. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles said he fully agreed that as matters now stood, a resumption of the blockade should probably be interpreted as an indication of Moscow's desire to precipitate general war and to thrust upon the United States the onus of actually initiating hostilities. Hence we must exercise great care and avoid adopting a policy whose courses of action were too rigid.

Mr. Cutler replied to Secretary Dulles that the point he had made was covered by paragraph 9 of the present draft.

Secretary Dulles then quoted from a memorandum of conversation between the First Secretary of the British Embassy and officials of the State Department, dated December 30, 1953, and indicating the British view that we should have to resort to an airlift in the event of another blockade of Berlin.

The President's response to this was to suggest that we tell the British to go ahead and institute the airlift, but we would not. "I am ready", he continued, "to allow time for us to probe Soviet intentions and to mobilize free world opinion, but the time must shortly come when we would have to make the decision." In any event, the President said, he was strongly opposed to another airlift on a scale similar to the last.

Secretary Humphrey wondered, with respect to the airlift, whether we should not ask the British the question, "At whose expense?"

The President repeated his conviction that it was essential to rally public opinion, but also that we could not allow ourselves to be "sucked along forever" to a point where the Russians were shooting down our planes in the air corridor. The present draft report seemed to him to call for a clearer understanding on both sides. How, inquired the President, can we find a way to make clear to the world the nature and objective of Soviet intentions if they impose a new blockade?

Secretary Dulles then inquired as to what had been done by the United States by way of warning the Soviets as to our views on Berlin. Secretary Smith replied that we had never actually told the Soviets that we would be prepared even to go to war if they imposed a new blockade, since previous NSC policy had opposed such a warning.

# EYES ONLY

At this point Secretary Dulles rose from the table and said that he would have to be on his way to the Berlin conference. He observed with a smile that he hoped the President would not decide against any airlift, at least while he was in Berlin, since in that case he might not be able to get back. Amid laughter, the President said that he would see to it that a jet pick-a-back plane was sent to bring Secretary Dulles back.

After Secretary Dulles had left the Cabinet Room, Mr. Cutler read and summarized the various statements which this Government and its allies had issued with regard to the determination of the Western Powers to maintain their position in Berlin and the consequences of a Soviet reimposition of the blockade.

The President commented that these statements seemed "pretty strong" to him. Accordingly, if the Soviets again block our lines of communication into Berlin, the action would be tantamount to a Soviet attack on the United States. The President inquired whether the Planning Board had had these statements in mind when it formulated the present draft report, and Mr. Cutler assured the President that they had.

Secretary Kyes said that the Defense Department subscribed fully to the position on Berlin which the President had taken.

The President pointed out that of course we are not going to get ourselves in a situation where we declare war in advance. He agreed that our freedom of maneuver in the contingency of a new blockade must not be too rigidly circumscribed. Nevertheless, we must be clear in our own minds what we are maneuvering for.

Mr. Cutler replied that he believed the President's view was fully covered by paragraph 5 of the report, which he reread. He then suggested that perhaps the best way to reach a solution of the difference of opinion between the State Department and the others was to examine the split paragraphs and attempt to decide each case on its merits.

With respect to the split opinion on the use of the airlift, Admiral Radford reminded the Council that in the previous blockade of Berlin the airlift had been used solely to assure subsistence to the Berlin population, and did not attempt to maintain the industrial activity of the city. If we were to try to do both in the event of another blockade, the cost would be terrific.

Secretary Smith replied that there was no such thought in the present paper, and therefore no point in discussing the matter. The President said that we simply couldn't undertake such an airlift, and we had best eliminate now any thought of doing so. (The President left the Cabinet Room at this point.)

EYES ONLY

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Wright  
Eisenhower  
(Ann)

Secretary Smith said that as he understood this, it did not eliminate the idea of an airlift of any kind. Mr. Cutler assured him that this was not the case.

Discussion thereupon centered on paragraph 6, which was supported only by the State Department member of the Planning Board and which Mr. Cutler said posed a major issue with respect to the Berlin problem, since it warned that the UK, France and the United States would not be willing to go to war until their peoples were satisfied that the Soviet blockade had been imposed in order to force the Western Powers to abandon Berlin and that the Soviets could not be forced to lift the blockade by measures short of those which might lead to general war. The State Department therefore contended in this paragraph that a substantial period of representations and counter-measures would be necessary to clarify Soviet intentions. Mr. Cutler then asked Secretary Smith to speak to this issue.

Secretary Smith said that at the very least a paragraph at this point should state that at the present time it appears unlikely that the UK or France would go along with the United States in war against the Soviet Union over Berlin, or in any courses of action which might lead to war with the Soviet Union. He referred to the memorandum of conversation with the First Secretary of the British Embassy, previously cited by Secretary Dulles. Thereafter he pointed out that the total cost of the airlift when Berlin was last blockaded had been \$700 million. The peak cost per day of prosecuting World War II had been \$2 billion. Accordingly, it seemed to him that the cost of another airlift would be "small change". Nor, said Secretary Smith, was he prepared to say with assurance that if the Soviet Union should today reinstitute the blockade it would be unmistakable proof that they wanted general war. It was our counter-blockade that had caused them to lift their blockade last time. They are well aware that we cannot in the present circumstances institute an effective counter-blockade. Accordingly, they might well decide to reimpose a blockade with the sole objective of driving the Western Powers from Berlin, but without the intention of provoking general war. The real issue, concluded Secretary Smith, was whether the United States and the American people would be willing to go to general war over the issue of Berlin. He confessed that he did not know the answer to this question.

(The President returned to the meeting.)

Secretary Smith repeated his last statement for the benefit of the President, and Mr. Cutler insisted that it was precisely to this problem that the present report addressed itself, he thought in a very logical manner.

(Secretary Kyes and Mr. C. D. Jackson left the Cabinet Room at this point.)

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EYES ONLY

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The President said that the issue boiled down to the point at which we went to the Congress and asked for general mobilization. He believed we would do this the moment that the Soviets really imposed a tight blockade. Requesting Congress for mobilization would not, said the President, be a declaration of war, but it would be a stiff warning to the Soviets.

Governor Stassen expressed the view that if we lost our position in Berlin the effect on our world position would be altogether disastrous. Accordingly, he did not believe that we could permit the Soviets to force us out of Berlin even if the UK and France would not agree in advance to the firm steps we propose to take to avoid being forced out. The governments of these two countries were like a timid man, and we must respond to a crisis in such fashion as would induce them to follow our leadership.

The President pointed out that he had not argued that we should take no measures to resist a blockade as it began to be imposed, but he did insist that we could not repeat the multitude of measures which we had resorted to last time. What we have got to do, continued the President, is to get over to our people that the reimposition of a blockade would be an attack upon the United States and not merely aggression against Berlin. Our people will understand this, and we can certainly determine now that a real blockade is unacceptable to us, though such a determination would not mean that we would go to war at the moment the blockade was imposed.

Mr. Cutler again pointed out that paragraph 6 was the crux of the difference between the State Department member and the other members of the Planning Board. In response, the President said that of course the State Department had a right to insist that we allow a period of time for representations and counter-measures and action in support of Berlin. They cannot, however, insist on an airlift.

Secretary Smith said that the State Department was not insisting on an airlift, but merely urging consideration of its use.

Admiral Radford commented that of course we have an airlift into Berlin operating all the time. Its activities could be stepped up any time we decided to. We would certainly use it to remove dependents during the initial period of a new blockade, and while this process was going on we should have time to investigate the various excuses which the Soviets would be making for their restrictive measures.

After further discussion, Mr. Cutler suggested that in lieu of the present paragraph 6 the Council accept the statement proposed by Secretary Smith, to the effect that at the present time the UK and France will not be willing to go to war or to support actions likely to lead to war, unless and until they are satisfied of the intentions of the Soviet Union to drive the Western Powers from Berlin and that the Soviets cannot be forced to lift the blockade by measures short of those which might lead to general war.

EYES ONLY

Governor Stassen expressed himself as opposed to following any course of action which was wholly contingent on allied agreement thereto, and Ambassador Lodge added that our allies often followed along with us in the UN although initially opposed to the courses of action we recommended.

After further revisions, Mr. Cutler concentrated the Council discussion on paragraph 9, which was a vital portion of the report dealing with the measures that the United States should be prepared to take if the Soviets actually imposed or threatened imminently to impose a new blockade.

The President commented that by the time this point had been reached, sufficient time would have elapsed so that we should have no doubt as to the nature of Soviet intentions. Accordingly, he felt that the policy should not lay down any further precise courses of action, but leave the decision to be taken by the United States in the light of the circumstances then existing.

Secretary Smith, in agreement with the President, said that we could certainly not determine now whether we would resort to the use of limited military force to determine Soviet intentions and to demonstrate our refusal to quit Berlin, as was called for in the disputed paragraph 9-f.

The President said that he shared Secretary Smith's doubts on this point, but added that if the situation in Berlin ever got as hot as this, the National Security Council would be meeting every minute of the day and would make its decisions at the time.

Mr. Cutler, however, pointed out that this paragraph did not state that we would actually resort to an armed probe, but that we should be prepared to do so. Did the State Department object to paragraph 9-f?

Secretary Smith said that the State Department certainly felt the paragraph to be unrealistic. Admiral Radford added that he was inclined to agree with the President's thought that specific courses of action at this stage in a potential blockade should be omitted from the report.

The President then asked General Bolte whether, in his opinion, a U. S. commander in Berlin would want such a subparagraph to be contained in a policy statement. General Bolte replied that he thought that a U. S. commander would want the paragraph, and he personally favored inclusion of the present paragraph 9-f.

It was accordingly agreed that the paragraph should be included.

The National Security Council:

**EYES ONLY**

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a. Adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in the reference report, subject to the following changes:

- (1) Page 2, paragraph 4-a: In the second line, place a period after the word "improved", and delete the material in brackets and the supporting footnote.
- (2) Page 3, paragraph 4-f: In line 8, delete the word "An", and insert the words "A full-scale".
- (3) Pages 4-5, paragraph 6: Delete the bracketed paragraph and the supporting footnote, and substitute therefor:

"6. At this time, the UK and France will not be willing to go to war or to support actions likely to lead to war until they are satisfied:

"a. That the Soviet blockade has been imposed for the purpose of forcing the Allies to abandon Berlin; and

"b. That the Soviet Union cannot be forced to lift the blockade by measures short of those which might lead to general war."

- (4) Page 7, paragraph 8-a: Add the following words at the end of this subparagraph: "and that Soviet measures challenging that position will be forcefully and promptly resisted and will have the gravest consequences."
- (5) Page 7, paragraph 8-c: Delete the bracketed phrase "/if necessary/" and the supporting footnote.
- (6) Page 7, paragraph 8-e: Delete this subparagraph and the supporting footnotes, and substitute therefor:

"e. Review the present stockpile program in the light of the likelihood that, in the event of a new blockade, the Allies would resort to an airlift only as a supplement to other more positive measures."

- (7) Page 8, paragraph 8-h: Reword this subparagraph as follows:

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"h. Seek to persuade the UK and France to adopt the U. S. policy on Berlin and seek to widen the areas of agreement with regard to future plans and emergency measures."

- (8) Page 9, paragraph 9-d: Delete this subparagraph and the supporting footnote, and substitute therefor:

"d. In the meantime, make use at an accelerated rate of the means of access remaining open, in order to provide an opportunity to gain support of our Allies and world opinion."

- (9) Page 10, paragraph 9-f: Delete the brackets and the supporting footnote.

- (10) Page 11, paragraph 9-i: Add at the end of this subparagraph the following:

"Prior to the use of force on a scale which might lead to general war, however, measures as enumerated in subparagraphs 9-a through -g above should be taken to make clear to the USSR the nature of our determination."

NOTE: NSC 5404, as amended and approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5404/1 and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

### 3. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

The Director of Central Intelligence emphasized that the current release of the prisoners of war in Korea constituted one of the greatest psychological victories so far achieved by the free world against Communism. Conversely, it amounted to a great loss of face for the Communists, particularly in the light of their threats and warnings prior to the event. Mr. Dulles summarized the latest Peiping broadcast on the subject, which spoke bitterly of the "kidnapping" of the anti-Communist prisoners. As yet, continued Mr. Dulles, the intelligence community has detected no signs of any early renewal of hostilities by the Communists in Korea as a result of the release of the prisoners. There had been no significant change in the disposition of Chinese Communist military forces on the frontiers of Indochina and Burma or on the mainland opposite Formosa. While it therefore looks as though no aggression were imminent in Southeast Asia, it was necessary to be vigilant. CIA has been concerning itself with possible retaliatory moves open to the Chinese Communists. They might, for instance, seize the offshore islands near Amoy; they might step up their military assistance to the Vietminh. There had been no significant change in the situation at Dien Bien Phu.

1/25/54

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NSC 5404/1

January 25, 1954

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# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

## U. S. POLICY ON BERLIN

Declassified/Released on 9/25/92  
under provisions of E.O. 12356  
by C. Seeley, National Security Council  
F 91-108

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U. S. POLICY ON BERLIN

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restrictions on access to Berlin. Reimposition of a blockade would violate the Soviet Government's acceptance of this agreement, which was embodied in the modus vivendi for Germany of June 20, 1949.)

d. Since 1949 the Soviets have taken various measures which would reduce the effect of the counter-blockade measures used by the Allies in 1949.

e. A stockpile has been accumulated in Berlin to lessen the vulnerability of the city to a blockade. Emphasis has been placed on commodities difficult to airlift, those of great bulk such as grain and coal and selected industrial materials. The present plan for the composition of the uncompleted portion of the stockpile presupposes that the stockpile will be supplemented by an airlift during a blockade.

f. Soviet capabilities of interference with an airlift, particularly in the field of electro-magnetic warfare, have considerably improved since 1949, but now, as then, the possibility of imposing a total blockade depends upon the readiness to force down Allied planes in agreed corridors, with all the implications of such acts. In addition, an airlift would involve high costs in military readiness. A full-scale airlift with the stockpile could sustain Berlin for a considerable period of time; but nonetheless it is doubtful that the institution of an airlift would cause the Soviets to discontinue a blockade which might be imposed now.

5. Therefore the reimposition by the USSR of a blockade or severe harassing measures would be a deliberate challenge to the Western powers' position in Berlin. Moreover, the prestige of the United States as the leader of the free world is deeply committed in Berlin. If the Soviets initiate harassing measures to restrict access to Berlin, it will be of crucial importance to demonstrate at once the firm intent of the United States not to tolerate such action. If Soviet harassment nonetheless continues to threaten Western access to Berlin, the security interests of the United States and its Allies will require them to take immediate and forceful action to counter the Soviet challenge, even though such countermeasures might lead to general war.

6. At this time, the UK and France will not be willing to go to war or to support actions likely to lead to war until they are satisfied:

a. That the Soviet blockade has been imposed for the purpose of forcing the Allies to abandon Berlin; and

COURSES OF ACTION

8. In the existing situation, and unless the USSR further restricts access to Berlin, the United States should:

a. Continue to make clear, as appropriate, to the USSR that the Western powers will maintain their position in Berlin and that Soviet measures challenging that position will be forcefully and promptly resisted and will have the gravest consequences.

b. Vigorously react to any local or minor Soviet harassments by lodging prompt Allied protests and undertaking any feasible reprisals.

c. Support all feasible measures, including limited economic aid, to bolster the morale and economy of the city and reduce unemployment.

d. Continue to provide funds for special projects designed to influence the people of the Soviet Zone and Sector, such as the food program in the summer of 1953.

e. Review the present stockpile program in the light of the likelihood that, in the event of a new blockade, the Allies would resort to an airlift only as a supplement to other more positive measures. *B-1-7(A)(5)*

f. Continue to exploit the unrivaled propaganda advantages.

g. Intensify intelligence activities.

h. Seek to persuade the UK and France to adopt the U. S. policy on Berlin and seek to widen the areas of agreement with regard to future plans and emergency measures.

i. Perfect plans and practicable preparatory measures for future contingencies. Some of this can be done unilaterally, some requires the cooperation of our Allies or the German authorities or both. Keep under review:

(1) Possible retaliatory measures and the means of quickly concerting action against specific local harassments.

(2) Conditions affecting security and necessary remedial measures.

f. In agreement with the other occupying powers, use limited military force to the extent necessary to determine Soviet intentions and to demonstrate the Allied refusal voluntarily to relinquish their right to access to Berlin. If Soviet reaction to this course indicates their intent forcibly to deny Allied access to Berlin, the United States should consider implementing the course of action set forth in para. 9-1 below.

g. Seek to solidify the free world behind the U. S. position, including appropriate action in the United Nations and in NATO.

h. Start evacuation of U. S. dependents at an appropriate time.

i. In the light of all the circumstances, including the general security situation, use limited military force to attempt to reopen access to Berlin. In doing so, recognize that Berlin is not militarily defensible and that if determined Soviet armed opposition should develop when U. S. units attempt to force their way into or out of Berlin, no additional forces would be committed, but resort would have to be made to general war. Prior to the use of force on a scale which might lead to general war, however, measures as enumerated in subparagraphs 9-a through -g above should be taken to make clear to the USSR the nature of our determination. *B-1.3(4)(5)*

10. If the USSR should attack Berlin with its own forces, the United States will have to act on the assumption that general war is imminent. In addition to resisting the initial attack and to placing itself in the best possible position for immediate global war, the United States should, if circumstances permit, address an ultimatum to the Soviet Government before full implementation of emergency war plans.\* *if preempt*

\* The President, on February 4, 1957, approved NSC Action No. 1664-c, in which the Council agreed that, because an attack on Berlin by East German forces alone might not necessarily carry the same implications as an attack by Soviet forces, the United States (in addition to resisting the initial attack) would consider at that time whether or not to treat such an attack in the manner stated in paragraph 10 of NSC 5404/1 with respect to an attack by Soviet forces.

December 1, 1953

FINANCIAL APPENDIX

A. Special Provisions Relating to Berlin.

The position taken in the basic paper is in accordance with the Three Power Declaration at Paris, May 27, 1952, and with legislation enacted by the Congress in connection with the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and in the Mutual Security Act, Public Law 165, the 82nd Congress, and in the legislation appropriating funds for the conduct of the Department of State's operations in Germany. The sense of the public declarations referred to is not only that the United States will not abandon Berlin, but that it will strengthen and make maximum use of its position there. The legislative provisions cited indicate that Berlin is to have a special position with respect to authorized and appropriated funds and that special arrangements have been made by the Congress in order to provide for prompt and adequate action to maintain the Western position in Berlin and to lessen its vulnerability. For example, in the Mutual Security Act, there is the provision that "funds made available for carrying out the purpose of this Act in the Federal Republic of Germany may, as authorized in 114 (h) of the Economic Cooperation Act, as amended, 22nd United States Code, 1512 (b), be transferred by the President to any department or agencies for the expenses necessary to meet the responsibilities and obligations of the United States in the Federal Republic of Germany." These provisions were written into the legislation for the express purpose of safeguarding our position in Berlin. Similar Congressional intent was expressed in Public Law 547 of the 82nd Congress, where it was stated that currencies deposited in Germany in connection with surplus property of whatever nature and kind may be used "in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of \$25 million; however, the foregoing limitation shall not apply to currencies utilized hereunder for United States assistance to Berlin..."\* The special arrangements, which do not apply elsewhere, reflect the concern of the Congress for Berlin's unique position and our responsibilities there. They make formal provision for both the special need for funds to carry out our policy towards Berlin and for the need for flexibility in the management of those funds.

\* This particular provision has not been repeated in the current year's appropriation act since it is inconsistent with the general approach by the Congress toward the use of local currencies, set forth in Sec. 1415 of Public Law 547.

In order to raise living standards, reduce unemployment, and improve economic conditions, the United States and German officials have drawn up an investment program which, by channeling counterpart funds into desirable investment is aimed at doubling industrial output, reducing Berlin's external deficit and reducing unemployment by 50,000 annually. Although aid from the Federal Republic to Berlin, amounting annually to about \$300-350 million, is far greater than United States aid, the form that United States aid takes makes it the dynamic and job-creating element in the Berlin economy. Bearing in mind the many uncertainties which can affect planning for Berlin, such as the loss of jobs by West Berliners now working in East Berlin, which among other factors requires increases in United States support of Berlin's work relief program, additional aid in the amount of \$37 million is needed for Berlin's investment and work relief program for Fiscal Year 1955. This compares with \$22 million appropriated in Fiscal Year 1953, supplemented by \$50 million made available by President Eisenhower in June 1953, and expended largely in Fiscal Year 1954. Accordingly, only \$15 million was appropriated in Fiscal Year 1954. (See Table I-A)

## 2. The Berlin Stockpile and Airlift

The vulnerability of Berlin was made clearly evident in 1948-49 when the blockading of Berlin by the Soviets made necessary the institution of an airlift, of which only the operating expenses cost the United States alone \$216 million. At its conclusion, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed that essential commodities should be accumulated in Berlin in order to lessen the vulnerability of the city to a new blockade, and this action was prescribed by NSC 132/1. In developing this program, efforts have been made to accelerate the accumulation of such commodities, especially those impossible to airlift or of great bulk, as grain and coal and industrial raw materials.

While some portion of the raw materials component of the stockpile remains to be purchased, the schedule of procurement has been clarified and funds now on hand from Fiscal Year 1953 appropriations will make it possible to bring all essential elements of the stockpile to target levels.

## 3. Special Measures Which May be Called for From Time to Time to Meet the Pressures Created by and Assure Adequate Provision for Refugees Coming into Berlin

The continuing flow of refugees into West Berlin has created a tremendous strain on the city's economy. Although the vast majority of these are flown out to Western

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TABLE II

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Disbursement of U. S. Counterpart in West Berlin <sup>1/</sup>  
(millions of dollars)

| <u>Programs</u> | <u>Fiscal Years</u> |             |             |             | (Est.)      | (Est.)      |
|-----------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                 | <u>1950</u>         | <u>1951</u> | <u>1952</u> | <u>1953</u> | <u>1954</u> | <u>1955</u> |
| Investment      | 34.8                | 38.7        | 47.8        | 55.0        | 69.9        | 70.2        |
| Work Relief     | 14.2                | 54.8        | 38.1        | 19.0        | 13.0        | 23.1        |
| Stockpile       | --                  | 4.2         | 3.0         | 15.5        | 38.0        | --          |
| Other           | --                  | 29.8        | --          | 2.4         | --          | --          |
| Total           | 49.0                | 127.5       | 88.9        | 91.9        | 120.9       | 93.3        |

<sup>1/</sup> An assumption of new U. S. aid in FY 1955 of \$37 million is included for planning purposes.

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Feb. 6, 1953 - Secretary of State Dulles, at Wahn airport on his departure from a visit to Germany, stated:

"I regret that time did not permit a visit to Berlin on this occasion. I recall my visit there on the airlift in 1948. We, in the United States are, now as then, vitally interested in the welfare and security of this city and we share the determination of the Berliners to maintain their liberties."

Feb. 18, 1953 - High Commissioner Conant, in a speech over RIAS on his first visit to Berlin shortly after assuming his post as High Commissioner, stated:

"Speaking as U. S. High Commissioner from Germany, let me make plain at the outset the position of my government. The new administration in Washington will not abandon Berlin. The U. S. is pledged to do its part to see to it that this city continues as an unshaken outpost of the Western world. We shall continue to insist on the free circulation throughout the entire city. We shall continue to fulfill our duties and to maintain our rights. Our rights as a joint occupying power in Berlin derive from the defeat and surrender of Germany and are defined in the agreements of the four powers. Unfortunately, neither the spirit nor the letter of these agreements is being carried out in one sector of this city. The U. S., in cooperation with other two Western powers, is determined to keep open the lines of communications with Berlin. I can assure you there will be no faltering in our determination.

...The frontiers of freedom will peacefully expand and Berlin will then no longer be an isolated citadel. Until this time comes, the insurance of its freedom and industrial prosperity must depend on the strength of the Western world, and that strength will not fail."



ANNEXEXCERPTS FROM ALLIED STATEMENTS RE  
WESTERN PROTECTION OF BERLIN

May 14, 1952 - Secretary of State at news conference:

"...I think that is well understood by you and by everybody, including the Soviet Government, that we are determined to maintain our position in Berlin and to assist and protect the interests of the people of Berlin".

May 27, 1952 - Three Power Declaration at Paris by the U. S., U. K., and France:

"...the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three powers there are regarded by the three powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly, they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They, therefore, reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves".

May 29, 1952 - Foreign Secretary Eden in a speech to the Berlin Chamber of Deputies called attention to security guarantees given to Berlin by the Allies.

June 29, 1952 - Secretary of State, in a speech in Berlin at the corner-stone-laying ceremonies for a new library, stated:

"We have joined the Governments of France and Great Britain in reaffirming our abiding interest in the protection of Berlin. We have given notice, in plain and unmistakable language, that we are in Berlin until we are satisfied that the freedom of this city is secure. We have also indicated in unmistakable terms that we shall regard any attack on Berlin from whatever quarter as an attack against our forces and ourselves."

Germany as soon as possible, there remain in Berlin 4% of the total number of "recognized" and all the "non-recognized" refugees, which causes continued strain on Berlin resources.

One reason the Federal Republic has been unable to resettle more refugees has been the housing shortage in Western Germany. In order to alleviate this situation, the United States in Fiscal Year 1954 granted \$15 million for housing construction for refugees, two-thirds of it to be used in West Germany, and one-third in Berlin. This sum will be matched by Federal Republic and Land Government funds and should result, both in the movement of more refugees out of Berlin and improved conditions for the few who must remain there.

No funds have been requested to assure adequate provision for refugees in Berlin in Fiscal Year 1955, since it is anticipated that the Federal Republic will make adequate provision for this problem.

4. Cost of Maintaining United States Occupation Forces in Berlin

United States Forces in Berlin consist of Army constabulary, plus a small number of Air Force personnel involved in operation of Tempelhof Airbase. During the past two years, these forces have averaged approximately 6,000 and no change in number is anticipated under current conditions.

It is estimated that the cost to the United States of maintaining United States Forces in Berlin amounts to approximately \$20 million per year, including military personnel costs. In addition to these United States dollar costs, the Army and Air Force receive occupation support in Berlin from the Berlin government equivalent to \$18 million per year, as well as approximately \$1.7 million per year in mandatory costs. The Berlin element of the High Commissioner for Germany also receives approximately \$3.1 million per year from the Berlin government. (See Table I-B)

5. Special Projects Designed Mainly to Strengthen the Position in East Berlin and the East Zone of Germany

The support of United States objectives requires that adequate preparation be made to seize opportunities to influence the people of the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the Soviet Zone of Germany in ways that will benefit United States objectives. To date in this Fiscal Year, \$15 million has been expended in financing special projects of this character. The food program, which is generally considered one of the

B. Cost of Maintaining Western Position in Berlin.

The maintenance of our position in Berlin, which has required that we keep troops there, that we feed the people to prevent disease and unrest in the early years of the occupation, that we assist their economic recovery with funds for investment and rehabilitation and that, in the period of Soviet blockade, we airlift essential supplies to them, has cost the Western world approximately 2 billion dollars in the years 1945-1952. The United States has provided approximately one-third of this sum, directly or indirectly, through its aid to the Federal Republic. Although Berlin is not a part of the Federal Republic of Germany, the latter has met the bulk of the rest of the cost of supporting Berlin (less than \$200 million being spent by the British and French Governments) chiefly during the first stages of the occupation and during the airlift.

The cost of supporting Berlin has been levelling off in the past three years, and can be expected to be reduced further, largely as a result of the economic improvement which was made possible by the aid Berlin received. In the present fiscal year, the Federal Republic will provide about \$300 million of support for Berlin, while over \$100 million will be spent from United States aid or its counterpart provided from appropriations previous to 1954. In Fiscal Year 1955, it is estimated that Berlin will require about \$350 million assistance. It is expected that approximately 12% of this will be derived from new United States appropriations, which will be supplemented by a carryover of undisbursed counterpart. The major burden will rest upon the Federal Republic. Even with improving conditions, however, it is still possible that the United States may have to continue to participate in the support of Berlin beyond 1955.

The specific programs now in operation in Berlin are described below. (See Table II)

1. Economic Programs Designed to Decrease Unemployment and Increase Production. (Investment and Work Relief Programs)

Although great progress has been made in restoring Berlin's economy, its external deficit, including its position with Western Germany, totals about \$400 million annually and there are still approximately 210,000 unemployed in the city. It is essential in order to accomplish our political objectives in Berlin to program for a progressive reduction in unemployment of not less than 50,000 annually.

f. In agreement with the other occupying powers, use limited military force to the extent necessary to determine Soviet intentions and to demonstrate the Allied refusal voluntarily to relinquish their right to access to Berlin. If Soviet reaction to this course indicates their intent forcibly to deny Allied access to Berlin, the United States should consider implementing the course of action set forth in par. 9-1 below.

g. Seek to solidify the free world behind the U. S. position, including appropriate action in the United Nations and in NATO.

h. Start evacuation of U. S. dependents at an appropriate time.

i. In the light of all the circumstances, including the general security situation, use limited military force to attempt to reopen access to Berlin. In doing so, recognize that Berlin is not militarily defensible and that if determined Soviet armed opposition should develop when U. S. units attempt to force their way into or out of Berlin, no additional forces would be committed, but resort would have to be made to general war. Prior to the use of force on a scale which might lead to general war, however, measures as enumerated in subparagraphs 9-a through -g above should be taken to make clear to the USSR the nature of our determination. B-17615

10. If the USSR should attack Berlin with its own forces, the United States will have to act on the assumption that general war is imminent. In addition to resisting the initial attack and to placing itself in the best possible position for immediate global war, the United States should, if circumstances permit, address an ultimatum to the Soviet Government before full implementation of emergency war plans.

(3) German Federal Republic financial and other support for Berlin.

(4) Condition of the stockpile and equipment held in reserve for emergencies.

(5) Plans for increased use of air transport in case of partial blockade.

(6) Improvement of relations with the local authorities, in keeping with the new relationship to the Federal Government which the Allies will have under the Bonn Conventions subject to essential Allied security requirements.

9. If the Soviets or East Germans impose, or threaten imminently to impose, a blockade, or increase harassment to the point of seriously impeding Western access to Berlin, the United States should consult with its Allies and be prepared to:

a. Make a determined effort in Berlin to end the restrictions by vigorous protests from Allied Commanders to the Soviet Commander.

11-3(a)(5)

b. Instruct the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow to join with the U. K. and France in presenting an agreed declaration stating their intention to use force if necessary and the risk to world peace occasioned by the Soviet action in Berlin. If the U. K. and France cannot agree to such a declaration, the U. S. should then consider making a unilateral declaration.

c. Continue to hold the Soviet Union responsible for any Communist action against the Western position in Berlin whether the action is taken by the Soviets or by East Germans or other satellites.

d. In the meantime, make use at an accelerated rate of the means of access remaining open, in order to provide an opportunity to gain support of our Allies and world opinion.

e. Initiate appropriate mobilization measures with the dual purpose of convincing the Soviets of the seriousness of the situation and of getting the United States and its Allies in a "ready" state in the event resort to general war is required.



b. That the Soviet Union cannot be forced to lift the blockade by measures short of those which might lead to general war.

7. In taking actions to maintain the Allied position in Berlin and to avoid war, or to show the actual nature of the Soviet purpose, the following factors should be taken into account.

a. If either side miscalculates, the situation could grow into war, even though neither side desires it.

b. Most courses of action can be carried out only with the united effort of the Allies. Divergence of views with the UK and France or with other NATO powers must be reconciled on the basis of a clear understanding that the Soviet aggression is serious and that united Western support of local or general action is essential to a collective security of the free world. Although U. S. actions must seek to retain Allied cooperation, the United States must be prepared to act alone if this will serve its best interests. (b)(1)(5)

c. The Soviets may seek by every means to obscure their responsibility for renewed tensions in Berlin, by alleging that they are merely reacting to Western moves or by using East German forces.

d. Because the world situation is different from that during the previous blockade, the period between initiation of aggressive actions and the "show down" is likely to be short. During this period, therefore, diplomatic, military and mobilization actions should be speeded up.

STATEMENT OF POLICY  
by the  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
on  
U. S. POLICY ON BERLIN

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Under existing treaties and U. S. policies, an attack on Berlin would involve the United States in war with the USSR. The Soviet rulers probably would not use Soviet forces to drive the Western powers from Berlin unless they had decided on war for reasons other than their desire to control the city.
2. Short of direct military attack, the USSR has the capability of making the Western position in Berlin untenable by restricting Western access to the city.
3. The United States, the UK and France demonstrated their determination to stay in Berlin when the USSR blockaded the city in 1948. Although the military posture of the Allies was too weak at that time to permit the forceful assertion of the Allies' right of surface entry into Berlin, counter measures were taken by the Allies, especially the Berlin airlift, which caused the Soviet Union to lift the blockade. In view of the past and of outstanding commitments, the Allies could not afford to permit themselves to be driven from Berlin.
4. Since the end of the blockade in 1949, there have been several developments which affect Western capabilities in Berlin.
  - a. The military readiness of the Allies in Europe has improved.
  - b. The Kremlin leaders have been put on notice that the United States is determined to remain in Berlin and will use the necessary measures to protect the Western right of access. (See Annex)
  - c. The Soviet Foreign Minister in 1949 joined in a quadripartite "gentlemen's agreement" which was a "moral and political undertaking" not to reimpose

January 25, 1954

## NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

U. S. POLICY ON BERLIN

- References:
- A. NSC 5404
  - B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 20, 1954
  - C. NSC Action Nos. 920, 978 and 1017
  - D. NSC 132/1
  - E. NSC 173

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 181st Council meeting on January 21, 1954 adopted the statement of policy contained in the reference report (NSC 5404), subject to the changes therein which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1017.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 5404, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith; directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

The financial appendix and the Annex originally contained in NSC 173 are also enclosed.

Accordingly, NSC 132/1 is hereby superseded.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure and that access to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

No. 437

762.00/2-654

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen)<sup>1</sup>*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, February 6, 1954.

## Participants:

|                                |                 |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| The Secretary                  | Mr. Molotov     |
| Mr. MacArthur                  | Mr. Gromyko     |
| Ambassador Bohlen              | Mr. Zarubin     |
| (toward the end,               | Mr. Troyanovski |
| Mr. McCardle joined the group) |                 |

Mr. Molotov, after an exchange of amenities after dinner,<sup>2</sup> asked the Secretary what he thought the prospects of success at the Berlin Conference were and on what particular points they might reach agreement.

The Secretary replied that he thought possibly there was more chance for agreement on the Austrian question because Austria, after all, was a little country which could not appreciably affect the balance of power in Europe. Mr. Molotov replied that he thought there was a possibility of some success on Germany. The Secretary asked Mr. Molotov what he had in mind and where he thought progress on Germany might be made. Mr. Molotov, in reply to the Secretary's question, inquired whether there could not be some progress made along the line of a small German army, with a German government which would be directed neither against the United States, France, Great Britain, nor the Soviet Union. He wondered if that possibility was totally excluded.

The Secretary said that in our view, the European Army constituted the best device we could think of to prevent the revival of German militarism, and he wished to assure Mr. Molotov with all the sincerity at his command that this idea not only was not directed against the Soviet Union, or any other country, but provided the best means of preventing Germany from threatening Soviet security. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Union had great apprehen-

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum of conversation was drafted jointly by MacArthur and Bohlen.

<sup>2</sup> According to another memorandum of this conversation, Molotov and the other members of the Soviet Delegation had arrived at the Secretary's residence at 8:30 p.m. The predinner conversation had centered around authors and journalists in the United States, while the conversation at dinner had revolved around the political experience of the two Foreign Ministers before they entered the diplomatic service. (Memorandum of conversation by MacArthur, Feb. 6, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203)

sions concerning the European Army, and inquired whether the Secretary did not feel it was setting one part of Europe off against the other. He said that despite all the assurances and arguments he had heard, the Soviet Union was seriously disturbed over this development, and that this was not just an idea of his but one that was held very widely in the Soviet Union, and not only in the Soviet Union.

The Secretary outlined in considerable detail why in our view the European Army concept afforded the greatest possibility of guaranteeing European security as against any other means of dealing with this problem. He pointed out that discrimination and control in the past has been of little value over the long run in preventing the rise of German militarism; that the great advantage of the European Army was that it did not discriminate against Germany, but on equal footing made it subject to the restraining influence of the countries in Europe who had, along with the Soviet Union, suffered from German militarism.

Mr. Molotov repeated his view that a limited German army, with a government which was directed against none of the four powers, was a possible line of development. The Secretary then stated that he felt this was not a very workable solution, since it in effect raised the main issue which had been brought out here at this Conference. In the first place, any such system would involve a high degree of control from without, which all experience had shown was unreliable as a means of controlling Germany. Secondly, he stated that it in effect brought into conflict the difference in our physiological type of government. He did not believe you could dictate nor guarantee the type of government a country would have without violation of our deepest principles concerning free elections.

Mr. Molotov repeated the serious concern the Soviet Union felt from the point of view of its security over the concept of a European Army including German armed forces. He said they were asking for no privileges for the Soviet Union, but they did not wish to be discriminated against, and quite apart from statements he made at the Conference, there was real concern not only in the Soviet Union but elsewhere, over the prospect of Germany's rearming. He said you had only to read statements which have appeared in the press in West Germany, and especially those of General Kesselring, who was practically being accepted by the former German Officers' Corps as their leader. He inquired whether a German Army would not, under the leadership and control of men like Kesselring, soon be running both Germany and the EDC. He added that what the Secretary had described might be the beginning of EDC, but what would be the end? He doubted very much whether

the other members of EDC would have sufficient power to restrain the German militarists, which in the end might come to dominate not only Germany but the EDC as well.

The Secretary repeated his arguments concerning the EDC, stating that this was indeed a difficult question; that this concept was in no sense directed against the Soviet Union, but on the contrary its chief purpose was the prevention of revival of German militarism; that it was only within a Western European framework that we felt this purpose could be achieved; and that any German armed force on a national basis, however limited at the beginning, would inevitably lead to the same results that had followed the Treaty of Versailles. The Secretary reiterated the belief that a Germany in EDC was the greatest safeguard the Soviet Union could have. He said some elements in France which opposed the EDC did so on the basis that they did not wish to see France in EDC because it would mean the elimination of a French national army, as it would the elimination of a German national army. These elements would prefer to see Germany in NATO. Germany in NATO, the Secretary said, would in his own personal view give less security to the Soviet Union than Germany in EDC. In NATO there were not the restraints on national forces that there were in EDC. If, however, the EDC did not come into being, the United States could not exclude the possibility that an acceptable alternative might be the entry of Western Germany into NATO.

He inquired of Mr. Molotov whether he had read recently the Treaty of Versailles, and said it was very interesting reading. Mr. Molotov said he had. The Secretary then stated that Marshal Foch, who was a very good general, had written into the Treaty of Versailles almost every limitation and control you could imagine, including prevention of sporting associations, use of rifles, etc. Nevertheless, this had permitted the rebirth of German military forces, and he felt that an attempt to repeat this process would have the same results. He said there may be other alternatives, but he had not been able to think of them, and felt that possibly Mr. Molotov would have some ideas on the subject.

Mr. Molotov said that the trouble had been that the Allied Powers did not keep control over the German Government. If the wrong kind of government got into power, then it was difficult to control what it did. The important thing was to be sure that it was a government that we could control and that would not work against any one of the Four Powers.

Mr. Dulles said that this raised a basic ideological point on which we split. The Soviet Communist belief was that the people generally could not be trusted, and therefore it was necessary for a smaller group to keep control of the election machinery so as to assure

that the "right" people were elected. We did not believe in that system, and were willing to trust the people and give them real freedom of elections. That seemed to be a very basic issue between us as this Conference developed.

The Secretary went on to say that he could understand very fully the preoccupations of the Soviet Union; that there were people who believed that the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the countries allied with it, which were still considerably larger than those of Western Europe, were directed against the West and constituted a threat to other countries. He personally did not believe this, since he felt the Soviet leaders had created this force for defense, and he, therefore, hoped the Soviet Union could take the same attitude toward the EDC. He said if this was the chief Soviet preoccupation, it should not be impossible to find a formula whereby a correlation of actual military forces between the EDC and the Soviet system would be so adjusted as not to constitute a threat in either direction. He said that in the past and at present the forces of the Soviet system were considerably greater than those of the Western powers in Europe. He believed it might be possible to develop some formula for a ratio between the ground forces of the Soviet Union and its associated states on the one hand, and the ground forces of the EDC and other Western nations which are stationed in Europe on the other. Since the Soviet Union, because of its large territory and many frontiers, had multiple responsibilities, such a formula would mean that the strength of the ground forces of the Western states, including the United States, stationed in Western Europe, would be numerically less than the forces of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states associated with it.

Mr. Molotov said the question involved not only the forces of the proposed European Army and the Soviet Union, but forces on a worldwide scale, which would involve all the great powers. He said the Soviet Union was prepared to consider a reciprocal reduction of armaments, as it had already made plain.

The Secretary stated that by the forces of the EDC he, of course, had in mind all of the forces, including those of the United States, which were stationed in Western Europe. He added that the United States was already in the process of reducing its own forces, and that shortly the ground forces of the United States would be materially curtailed.

Mr. Molotov stated that this problem was one of deep concern in the Soviet Union, and he felt that any German army was a "very unquiet" army. He repeated his belief that a small German army with a German government directed against none of the four powers might be possible, but he left the impression that if this was excluded, other courses might be considered. He made no spe-

Ways  
Army  
Influence

cific reference to the Secretary's formula statement, but he seemed to imply that this could at least be examined.

The Secretary said Mr. Molotov should think this matter over, and if he had any thoughts on the subject, he would be very glad to talk to Mr. Molotov again before they left Berlin, adding that he felt the German question was the most serious one that confronted them.

Mr. Molotov agreed and said he thought they should both think over their *whole conversation* this evening and give it the attention which its importance merited.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On Feb. 7 Secretary Dulles transmitted to President Eisenhower a one-page summary of the discussion following dinner. (Dulte 45 from Berlin, 110.11 DU/2-754)

### No. 438

396.1 BE/2-654: Telegram

#### *The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Berlin*

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1954—5:26 p.m.

Tedul 27. Re Dulte 40.<sup>1</sup> Appreciate French pressures for negotiated Indochina settlement. We wonder whether preliminary private conversations between French and British and/or Russians might not have occurred. If some formula envisaging eventual negotiations is unavoidable, we hope it will conform as closely as possible to language penultimate paragraph Dulte 35.<sup>2</sup> You, of course, will know best whether to recall that French associated themselves at UNGA last August with view that favorable developments at Korean political conference should precede discussion of other Asian questions with states concerned with those questions. If that position is abandoned and we appear to be suing for negotiated peace, Communists may well conclude situation so desperate in Indochina they need only stand firm to win full victory. Negotiations in such circumstances not likely produce agreement but could further sap French will to resist in Indochina.

SMITH

<sup>1</sup> Document 425.

<sup>2</sup> Document 418.

February 7, 1954

### No. 439

#### *Editorial Note*

According to the records of the United States Delegation, with the exception of the events described in Dulte 47, *infra*, no meetings took place on Sunday, February 7. However Secretary Dulles held a press conference that afternoon at which he responded to questions concerning the progress of the meetings. The full text of the press conference was transmitted in Secto 103 from Berlin, February 8. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210)

### No. 440

396.1 BE/2-754: Telegram

#### *The Secretary of State to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET NIACT

BERLIN, February 7, 1954—8 p.m.

Dulte 47. Eyes only for the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. As result of objections raised by Bidault on instructions from Paris this morning to Indochina paragraph of draft resolution on Political Conference which we had provisionally agreed to last night (Dulte 44<sup>1</sup>), following revision drafted by me this morning has just been definitely accepted by the French:<sup>2</sup>

"Agree further that as soon as actions of the Chinese People's Republic at the Korean Political Conference and in Southeast Asia provide proofs of its spirit of peace, such Four Power representatives will settle by common agreement the conditions for the convening of another conference designed to restore peace in Indochina."

At meeting late this afternoon, Eden expressed misgivings about this paragraph. He argued that it would be impossible for the Soviets to accept a resolution which stigmatized and placed on probation their Chinese partner. He said draft imposed two conditions on which Communist China alone would be required to meet. He felt that the specific reference to the Chinese foredoomed the resolution to rejection by the Soviets. He believed we would be vulnerable to future criticism along the line that we were bound to have

<sup>1</sup> Document 436.

<sup>2</sup> The exchange of correspondence between Bidault and Dulles on Feb. 7, in which Bidault indicated the reaction in Paris and Dulles transmitted his draft, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 215.

3326

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

~~TOP SECRET~~

14

Action  
SS

Info

FROM: Berlin

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DULTE 45, February 7, 2 p.m.

Control: 2688

Rec'd: February 7, 1954  
9:13 a.m.

2

NIACT

FOR PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY, COPY EYES ONLY FOR ACTING  
SECRETARY.

After leaving table at my dinner for Molotov last night we had an hour and half of significant discussion initiated by Molotov concerning European matters. He sought my judgment as to what could be accomplished here. When I said Austria, he said he hoped also something on Germany.

Then followed lengthy discussion of German military threat and role of projected European Army in containing it. Molotov argued strongly for small German national army under government which between us we would assure would be friendly and non-militaristic. I said any controls which would give foreigners right to control German elections and their outcome would be repugnant to us and I felt also to Germans. I renewed argument for EDC and tried to meet Molotov's contention that initial German military forces would expand greatly as threat to Soviet by suggesting that it might be possible to develop some formula for ratio between ground forces of Soviet Union and its associated states on one hand and ground forces of EDC and Western nations stationed in Europe on other hand.

Molotov gave evidence of interest in this idea but countered by saying what was needed was the Soviet plan of worldwide reduction of armaments. I said this too complicated to be realistic.

Molotov concluded by saying we should both think over entire conversation and give it attention which its importance merited.

Conversation throughout frank and realistic and Molotov was obviously seeking to create impression of desire to find some area of agreement here, although actually he gave little foundation for this. He did not (repeat not) mention Far East.

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EGL/1

Authority MR 84-200 #4By LKD NLE Date 9/24/85

DULLES

Robert D. Thompson, Director  
President of the United States,  
1953-61 (Ann Whitlin File)

DULLES CENTER

Box 2, Dulles, Va 22026

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2-12-6/54  
**EYES ONLY**

TOP SECRET

February 26, 1954

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 186th Meeting  
of the National Security Council,  
Friday, February 26, 1954

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Under Secretary of State; the U. S. Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Army; Mr. Smith for the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the report and discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. MEETING OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS

Secretary Dulles indicated that he would not make his report in narrative form, even though this would be the most interesting way, but would single out those elements in the picture which would be of particular interest to the National Security Council.

The frequent meetings at Berlin provided an opportunity for the United States delegation to learn a great deal by direct contact even with Molotov himself. Molotov had spoken with an evident show of personal authority. The Soviet Foreign Minister no longer appeared as a mere subordinate, as he had when Stalin was alive. He appeared, comparatively at least, free to make his own decisions, with a minimum of reporting back to Moscow for instructions.

I. EUROPE

In the first instance, said Secretary Dulles, one thing was made crystal clear. There is no disposition on the part of the



# EYES ONLY

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Russians to accept any terms which would relax the grip on the areas of Europe that they now control. They may pretend to be willing to relax this grip, but only as a means of extending it. This very shallow pretense deceived only those who wished to be deceived by it. Thus we anticipated before the meeting that we would be obliged to make certain very difficult decisions if the Russians actually offered the basis of a genuine settlement with regard to East Germany and Austria. In point of fact, however, we were not obliged to face such tough problems as the neutralization of a united Germany and an independent Austria. Neither now nor in the foreseeable future will we have to face up to the possibility that these countries will be neutralized. The Austrians were quite prepared to agree to neutralize their country if this proved the only way to secure a treaty and rid themselves of the occupation forces. They would have preferred to have incorporated their neutral status in a specific declaration, but if they had been pressed they would have even incorporated their neutral status in the treaty itself. However, the Soviets dismissed any and all such suggestions out of hand. At the last meeting at which the Austrians were present, their delegation strongly hinted Austria's willingness to neutralize itself. Molotov brushed aside the hint in the most brutal fashion. Chancellor Figl and his colleagues walked out of the room almost in tears. The whole episode was shocking, but it was a clear revelation of Soviet intention. After killing the Austrian treaty the Soviets did try to give the corpse a decent burial by suggesting further study of the peace treaty at the Ambassadorial level. Secretary Dulles said that he prevented this decent burial by making it perfectly clear to the Soviets that he was unwilling to refer the problem to the Ambassadors until the Russians agreed to the removal of their forces from Austria.

The net result of this phase of the discussions was to make it clear that neutralization is no substitute for the European Defense Community, as many Western Europeans believed or would like to believe. A study of the record shows that the Soviets will not accept neutralization, and there is accordingly no use whatsoever to consider it as a substitute for EDC.

There was one other significant point, said Secretary Dulles, which came out in connection with the negotiations on Germany and Austria. The Soviets made no effort to play up to public opinion in these countries. Indeed, they appeared almost contemptuous of the thinking of the Germans and the Austrians. A trend in this direction had been apparent in the exchange of notes prior to the Berlin conference, but the trend became very clear at the conference itself. From this, Secretary Dulles deduced that the Soviets proposed to hold on to East Germany for a very long time and by means of force. They do not expect to depend on public opinion as a means of retaining their hold in these areas.

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In the course of the meeting it became apparent that Molotov increasingly focussed his efforts on the defeat of the EDC. In his mind this was the principal purpose of the Berlin meeting and the chief means to the end was to create disunity among the Western powers. Initially, Molotov's attacks on the Western powers had been of a very general nature, including East-West trade, U. S. bases in Europe, and NATO. At the end, however, he focussed his efforts almost completely on EDC. The line he took was that EDC was the great obstacle to a solution of European problems. If the Europeans would give up EDC, all these problems could be readily solved. Eden and Bidault grasped this very clearly.

The big Soviet move, then, was their all-European security plan. This, said Secretary Dulles, was modeled on the Rio Pact and was represented by Molotov as a Monroe Doctrine for Europe which would exclude the influence of the United States. Molotov had indicated that 32 different countries would have membership in the pact, but it never was possible to get him to specify the actual countries. Since 32 independent states would obviously have to include not only the Soviet satellites but a number of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union, it was easy to deduce that the Soviets would have so rigged the European security organization as to ensure a working majority for themselves. The Soviet leaders, continued Secretary Dulles, really believe that the United States completely dominates the Latin American countries and that the Rio Pact is the instrument by which we effect this domination. Accordingly, they wish to use the Pact as a model for achieving their own domination of Europe.

While in a sense this all-European pact was the big Soviet move, back of it one could see their real conception of how the world should be divided. There were to be two great powers--the United States controlling the Western Hemisphere, and Russia dominating the Eurasian continent. As this conception became clear, Secretary Dulles said, he was at once reminded of the meetings between Hitler and Molotov at Berlin during the Nazi-Soviet collaboration. At one of these meetings Hitler and Molotov had discussed dividing up the world much in the fashion of Russia's present conception. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles was tempted to point out to Molotov that he had learned his lessons well from Hitler. With difficulty Secretary Dulles had refrained from saying so.

Molotov proved himself very clever and artful throughout the meeting. He is one of the shrewdest and wiliest diplomats of this century or, indeed, of any century. He spared no efforts to sow discord between the United States and its allies. One of the most potentially dangerous of these efforts related to the question whether or not a unified Germany was bound to remain a member of EDC. This could have posed a serious dilemma for us. Our general understanding with Adenauer is that legally, at any rate, a unified



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Germany could exercise the option of accepting the commitments of the present West German Government or rejecting them. This legal technicality was exploited by Molotov to prove that all the rest of the EDC countries were bound by their commitments but that Germany was free to do as it chose. In counteracting this Soviet line, Secretary Dulles took the position that while this was an interesting legal point to discuss, it was of no practical consequence. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles predicted that there would be repercussions of Molotov's argument when the French Parliament entered its discussions of ratification of EDC.

Secretary Dulles said that we had learned a lot also with regard to the attitude of the British and French on the Berlin question. They are not nearly as convinced and determined as we are that it is essential to maintain the position of the Western powers in Berlin. Secretary Dulles said that he had tried very hard to induce Eden and Bidault to make public statements which would reassure the population of Berlin that it would not be abandoned. With great difficulty he did succeed in inducing Eden and Bidault, at the end of the conference, to make a call on the Mayor of West Berlin. Bidault had even been willing to make a very nice statement on this occasion. Nevertheless, the difficulties he encountered were significant. It was, for instance, particularly difficult to induce Eden and Bidault to reaffirm the specific language of the Tripartite Declaration of 1952 on Berlin. The best that we could do, said Secretary Dulles, was to get the British and French Foreign Ministers to reaffirm the Declaration in very general language. Secretary Dulles himself made a specific reaffirmation, but his experience on this issue confirmed the doubts that had been expressed in the National Security Council meeting which had discussed our policy in Berlin prior to the Foreign Ministers conference. Clearly, a difficult educational job remains to be done with the British and French on the importance of the Western position in Berlin.

## II. ASIA

Molotov's big proposal with regard to Asia was, of course, to call for a five-power conference including Communist China. This proposal had been embodied in the Soviet note of last November, in which the five-power conference was set up as a condition precedent to any discussion of German and Austrian problems at Berlin. After Secretary Dulles had made absolutely clear from the outset that he would have nothing to do with any conference including Communist China except as it related to the specific problems of a settlement in Korea and Indochina, Molotov backed down from his insistence on a five-power conference to discuss world problems. He then indicated his willingness to accept a five-power conference on Asian as opposed to world problems. When we refused this also, Molotov came up with a

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J.S.P.C. 902/403

30 March 1954

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COPY NO. 36

3/30/54

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

NUCLEAR WEAPONS UTILIZATION PLANNING IN NATO

Reference: J.C.S. 2220/36

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report, responsive to J.S.P.C. 902/388/D and prepared by the Joint Strategic Plans Group, is circulated to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for consideration.

J. E. STEPHENS,

C. E. CURRAN,

Joint Secretariat.

471.6 (4-18-49) on 12.50.

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JSPC 902/403

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13-30-54

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS UTILIZATION PLANNING IN NATO

THE PROBLEM

1. In response to a memorandum\* by the SecDef to make specific recommendations as to the information on nuclear weapons, and new tactics and techniques which would be required by NATO Commanders to complete realistic military plans for atomic warfare.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The recommendations of SACEUR and SACLANT on this subject are attached as Enclosures "B" and "C" respectively.

DISCUSSION

3. It appears that several of the items of information recommended for release by SACEUR and SACLANT are not required in order to complete realistic military plans for atomic warfare. Such items as:

- a. Size, weight, and shape of weapons,
- b. Nuclear safety and high-explosive safety precautions, and
- c. Detailed logistic requirements

are more the items which the delivery or logistic force commanders need to know. Even under the proposed changes to the Atomic Energy Act, these delivery and logistic forces will be U.S. Such information is already available to the U.S. forces concerned.

4. It would appear that information necessary in order to allow realistic planning by NATO commanders is:

- a. General magnitude of the number of atomic weapons by type, yield and fuzing options which will be available to him on specific dates.
- b. Effects to be expected from the detonation of the various types of weapons.
- c. General description of basic safety features.

\* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/36

d. Capabilities and limitations of delivery vehicles to include:

- (1) Weapons which can be carrier by the different types of delivery vehicles.
- (2) Bombing capabilities of the various types of aircraft.
- (3) Accuracy factors associated with the various bombing techniques and other delivery vehicles.
- (4) Restrictions inherent in the escape requirements of escort aircraft from damage due to weapon detonation.

e. Tactics, techniques, and organizational concepts developed by the U.S. concerning atomic warfare contained in approved Service publications applicable to operations in the NATO commands.

f. General description of the magnitude of the logistic support required.

g. Estimated military results, in general terms, to be expected from the strategic air offensive which influence NATO planning.

h. Information on Soviet capabilities for atomic warfare.

5. It should be noted that not all the items listed in paragraph 4 come under the classification of RESTRICTED DATA of the Atomic Energy Act. Some of these items of information have already been made available to SACEUR and SACLANT for dissemination on a "need-to-know" basis.

#### CONCLUSION

6. That the items of information in paragraph 4 above should be made available to NATO commanders to allow completion of realistic military plans for atomic warfare.

#### RECOMMENDATION

7. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward to SecDef the memo in the Enclosure recommending these specific items of information as those necessary to NATO commanders to allow completion of realistic military plans for atomic warfare.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Nuclear Weapons Utilization Planning in NATO

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 27 January 1954, concerning nuclear weapons utilization planning in NATO. The recommendations of SACEUR and SACLANT have been considered in this regard.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the information on nuclear weapons, and new tactics and techniques required by NATO commanders to complete realistic military plans for atomic warfare is:

a. General magnitude of the number of atomic weapons by type, yield and fuzing options which will be available to NATO commands on specific dates.

b. Effects to be expected from the detonation of the various types of weapons.

c. General description of basic features.

d. Capabilities and limitations of delivery vehicles to include:

(1) Weapons which can be carried by the different types of delivery vehicles.

(2) Bombing capabilities of the various types of aircraft.

(3) Accuracy factors associated with the various bombing techniques and other delivery vehicles.

(4) Restrictions inherent in the escape requirements of escort aircraft from damage due to weapon detonation.

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JSPC 902/403

- 4 -

Enclosure "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

e. Tactics, techniques and organizational concepts developed by the United States concerning atomic warfare contained in approved Service publications applicable to operations in the NATO commands. The success of many missions will be dependent upon the detailed tactics and techniques used by the delivery agent, whether it be aircraft, missile or artillery. Since these specifics should not be required for planning by foreign officers, discretion must be exercised concerning the amount of detail contained in the release of such information.

f. General description of the magnitude of the logistic support required.

g. Estimated military results, in general terms, to be expected from the strategic air offensive which influence NATO planning.

h. Information on Soviet capabilities for atomic warfare.


3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out that not all the items of information above are now covered by the security classification of RESTRICTED DATA. It is believed that only those items covered by subparagraphs 2 a, 2 b, 2 d (1), 2 d (4) and 2 g now come under this classification.

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JFPC 902/403



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April 12, 1954



## MEMORANDUM OF DINNER WITH SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

Guests attending: Anthony Eden, Winthrop Aldrich, John Foster Dulles

The Prime Minister's physical condition seemed to have deteriorated, although there was no evidence of any definite physical ailment. He enunciated about as usual, and at the end of the evening, walked down the two flights of stairs with me to the door where we were photographed together. He seemed, however, mentally less robust and more pliable and more dependent upon guidance from Eden.

The following topics were touched on:

1. Nuclear Weapons. The Prime Minister spoke approvingly of the idea, which Eden and I had discussed, of a possible moratorium on large experiments.
2. Relations with Russia. The Prime Minister repeated the theme that the Russian people wanted a better life with more diversion, and that if we cater to this, we would give them more of a vested interest in peace. He said he realized that peace had not always come out of good economic and commercial conditions, but still he thought it worth while trying within limits. He said he would not want to "take a chance" by giving them too much. He did not speak of a three-power meeting.
3. Satellites. The Prime Minister said that he did not think you could have permanent peace in Europe so long as the satellite countries were held closely under Soviet rule. I said that possibly something like a Finnish relationship might evolve. Eden said he felt that this was difficult, because considerable autonomy was permissible to Finland from Russia because Finland was "the road to nowhere", but the satellite countries were "the road to somewhere else."
4. Egypt. I complimented the Prime Minister on the new approach to the Egyptian problem, and said that the idea of substituting civilian technicians for military was a statesmanlike and resourceful solution. Mr. Churchill merely grimaced to show his distaste for the proposal.
5. France. The Prime Minister followed his usual line. He said that only the English-speaking peoples counted; that together they could rule the world.

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attest P/WHM/11 Mags & the Pres. 1954 (4)  
1<sup>st</sup> p. only

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April 12, 1954



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DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59

WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDA SERIES

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Box 1

By sc NLE Date 2/16/83

Meetings with the  
President 1954 (4)

W/ks / WHM / 7 / A/B

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6. India. He again reiterated his bitterness at the "give-away" of India. He said the Labor Government had given India away to the accompaniment of US plaudits, but that the result was something we would have to live with painfully for a long time.

7. Israel. I referred to the fact that I understood that he had sent a message to Sharrett. I hoped that this would lead him or Eden to tell me of the long reply which Eden told me Churchill had received. However, Churchill evaded this, merely saying he had sent a personal message because of his known Zionist sympathy. (Eden had told me earlier that the reply had indicated that the policy of reprisals was now a definite government policy.)

8. President Eisenhower. I conveyed the President's warm personal greetings, and said that the President had considered the possibility of suggesting that instead of my coming to London, he and I and the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden might have met together at Newfoundland. However, he had not proposed this, because he knew it would create too much of a crisis atmosphere, and also it would raise more acutely the problem of French omission. The Prime Minister sent his warmest greetings to the President. He said he would like to have him come to London, and also later he said he himself planned to come to Washington again.

9. US Relations. The Prime Minister said he thought that not more than one-fourth of the Labor Party, which meant one-eighth of the House, was anti-American. He supposed there was a similar percentage in the US that was anti-British. He particularly deplored threatening speeches such as the redent one of Senator Knowland, which threatened to cut off military and economic assistance unless the British did what we wanted. He said that was no proper basis for a good relationship.

10. Labor Opposition. Eden asked the impression I had received from my private talks with Attlee and Morrison at his luncheon. I said that I had, I felt, explained the misunderstanding created as a result of our prompt press guidance on the recent Soviet note concerning NATO. I also presented briefly our thoughts about Indochina. I said these latter had been listening to it attentively and with no apparent evidence of disapproval. Mr. Eden remarked that often Mr. Attlee and Mr. Morrison appeared to acquiesce, but later on attacked openly in the House. Mr. Churchill indicated that he did not like having any talks with the opposition, who, he felt, were always playing politics.

John Foster Dulles

Personal and Private

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Personal and Private

April 14, 1954

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Prime Minister Laniel  
Douglas MacArthur II

Place: 15 rue Leroux, Prime Minister's private residence.

TIME : 10:15 p.m. to midnight, April 13, 1954.

At the request of Prime Minister Laniel I called on him privately last evening at 10:15 p.m. (he had sent word to me at the airport by M. Vidal, the Director of his Cabinet, that he would like to see me at the above-mentioned hour). We were alone except for Mme. Laniel, who sat quietly in another corner of the room.

After the usual exchange of amenities I said to M. Laniel that we were very glad to know that on Thursday, April 15, the French Cabinet would at last fix the date for the Assembly debate on the EDC. M. Laniel immediately replied that the entire EDC situation was extremely difficult. The URAS and ARS were making great difficulties and he was apprehensive that a political crisis might ensue when the date for the debate was fixed by the government, and this crisis would involve the fall of the present government. If the present government fell, he did not see how it could be succeeded by any other government which would put the EDC through. He felt that if someone like Mendes-France formed a new government the situation with respect to both the EDC and Indochina would be virtually hopeless. Furthermore, to get a majority for EDC in the French Parliament he needed a few of the URAS and ARS votes, which he thought he could get if he maneuvered properly. Therefore, he was not certain that it would be wise tactically to insist on fixing the date for the debate on Thursday.

I said to M. Laniel that I had known Chaban-Delmas, the leader of the URAS group, for some 15 years.

I said that I did not believe that Chaban-Delmas and his friends would ever go along with EDC. They were opposed to it and their efforts to postpone the fixing of the Assembly debate was simply a maneuver to postpone any decision until such time as EDC was virtually down the drain. I thought that if the consideration for postponing the debate was the hope of bringing Chaban-Delmas and his friends along in support of EDC, it was unsound.

M. Laniel

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Personal and Private

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Box 1 Meetings with the President 1954 (4)  
WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDA SERIES  
DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59

MR 81-172 #4  
LKS  
Date 9/11/81

WTHM 1/1/83  
Dulles 1/1/83



M. Laniel said that his position was very difficult and he did not wish to take steps which would involve the fall of the French Government prior to Geneva. He was inclined to agree that most of the URAS and ARS would, in the final analysis, oppose the EDC but he still thought he could carry a few of them along with him.

I replied that I did not share his view. I said that the Secretary expected upon his return to the United States on Thursday, to be able to report to the President that M. Laniel and his government had finally set the date for the EDC debate. If this were not possible I thought that very grave consequences would ensue. I said that I would like to speak very frankly. In the past few weeks the United States had been approached by the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Benelux countries with a view to discussing alternative plans for the EDC which would ensure German association with the West, and participation in collective defense. These approaches had been made because there was a growing belief that France had lost the capacity to act or take any decisions which required courage. This incapacity to face up to reality was rapidly undermining France's position as one of the leading powers of the free world. Thus far we had not discussed alternatives and other courses of action with our U.K., German and Benelux friends. However, if the French Government could not even fix the date of the debate, M. Laniel should know that we would be obliged to go quietly ahead and work out alternative courses of action. We would not announce publicly that we were doing this, since the French would construe any such announcement as a threat or blackmail. However, he should have no illusions. If France, by its inability to act, forced us to leave her behind, we would go on with the other nations which wished to survive. If the French Government did not fix the date of the debate on Thursday, I felt that we would soon have to begin to explore other courses of action to which we had given a great deal of thought and for which we had some plans.

I said that the countries that were joined together in the collective enterprise of making Europe were like a group of mountain climbers who were roped together. They had left the last resting camp and were attacking the peak. The peak or summit as we saw it was our very survival. Halfway between the last camp and the peak one member of the group, France, suddenly refused to go forward or backward. It simply wished to camp on a ledge and remain there until it perished. It apparently not only wished to remain there alone, but wished the other members of the party to remain there and perish with it. The United States, as one member of the group, was not prepared to die simply because France wished to commit what amounted to suicide. Furthermore, we did not believe that the other members of the team who were roped together in this enterprise wished to perish because of lack of collective action. Therefore, the time had come when, if France would not budge, the rest of us must cut the rope and leave her on the ledge.

In conclusion,



In conclusion, I said I had one final observation to make about all this. M. Laniel and I were very old friends. We had worked together in the Resistance. I knew his courage and his devotion to the cause of Franco-American understanding. To me it would be infinitely sad if he were Prime Minister presiding over a French government which, but its inaction, deliberately separated France from the United States and the other Western Allies and who would be responsible for France losing its position as a leader of the free world and becoming in effect another Belgium.

M. Laniel said he recognized that the rest of the world could not wait indefinitely on France. However, his problems were very great. The constitution and the electoral law had resulted in a situation where it was impossible to govern France under the existing system. He wished to make clear that he had not taken a decision not to fix the date of the Assembly debate on Thursday, but it was all very complicated.

We then discussed Indochina briefly. M. Laniel said the effect of the gallant stand at Dien-Bien-Phu had greatly helped him in the Parliament because, except for the Communists, even those members who wish to withdraw from Indochina do not feel that they can say anything which would undermine the morale of Colonel de Castrie's forces defending Dien-Bien-Phu. However, if Dien-Bien-Phu falls a most serious situation will result.

I said to M. Laniel that I recalled the assurances, that his government would take no action which directly or indirectly would turn Indochina over to the Communists, which he had given me when I saw him last July regarding increased U.S. assistance for the Indochinese war. I also recalled that he had given similar assurances informally to the President at Bermuda. I said that we knew that his determination not to turn Indochina over to the Communists was unshakeable and this had been one of the considerations which had led us to massively increase our aid to the French, including many additional aircraft and other types of supplies.

M. Laniel reaffirmed that he would not be a part to turning the area over to the Communists. He said, however, that the situation was very difficult in France because of war weariness and a desire on the part of many people to get out of Indochina at any cost.

I said that there was one thing the French could do rapidly to aid in the defense of Dien-Bien-Phu and the improvement of their military position in Indochina. This was to send additional aviation mechanics and maintenance personnel speedily to the area. I said that there was such a shortage of personnel of this category that the French were not able to maintain and make full operational use of the aircraft they now had in Indochina and that for the U.S. to furnish additional aircraft did not make much sense

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if there were not the flight and maintenance personnel to operate them. M. Laniel said that he was not aware of this and I had the impression that he had not been brought very fully into the picture by the French National Defense people with regard to the difficulties of the French air forces in Indochina, stemming in considerable part from the lack of qualified personnel.



Douglas MacArthur II

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# EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

April 14, 1954

1992/2735  
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 193rd Meeting  
of the National Security Council,  
Tuesday, April 13, 1954

Present at the 193rd Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1 and 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

The following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

Using both a chart and a small relief map of the Dien Bien Phu area, the Director of Central Intelligence briefed the Council on the latest developments in this battle. The President asked a number of questions regarding the terrain. Mr. Dulles then announced that the French had succeeded, during the period April 7 to 12, in dropping another battalion (Foreign Legion) into the fortress. This brought the total number of battalions replaced by the French to four. Mr. Dulles indicated that the CAT pilots operating to supply Dien Bien Phu were very critical of the performance of the French Union Air Force. The French dropped their supplies from very high altitudes, as much as 8000 feet, which explained why so many of the drops fell into the hands of the enemy. The CAT pilots, using C-119's, dropped their supplies from very low altitudes.

Mr. Dulles indicated that the French were reporting some 13,000 new Vietminh replacements as having reached Dien Bien Phu, and that a comparable number were on their way to the scene. The great majority of these reinforcements were raw recruits. Renewal of the mass assaults was anticipated by the French about April 15.

In other parts of Indochina fighting had been stepped up slightly. This, said Mr. Dulles, was in preparation for the Geneva Conference.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)

Agency Case NSC 62-135

NLE Case NS 62-371-5

By bc NLE Date 3/10/84

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# EYES ONLY

## 2. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR USE OF U. S. FORCES IN REACTING PROMPTLY TO AGGRESSION (NSC Action No. 998-c)

Copies of the Attorney General's report were distributed to the members of the Council, and Mr. Cutler pointed out that the purpose of the report was not to commit anyone to anything, but merely to provide an analysis of this very difficult problem. As a lawyer, he regarded the report as a masterful piece of work, and invited the Attorney General to summarize the conclusions, even though the members of the Council had not as yet had an opportunity to read and study the report.

The Attorney General then summarized the conclusions, which began on page 40. In the first place, in the event of an armed attack on the U. S. or on U. S. forces directly, the President would require no prior Congressional approval to order U. S. forces into action. Similarly, there could be no doubt of his authority to do this in the event of a direct attack on a NATO country.

With respect to armed attacks against nations which have mutual defense treaties with the United States, some real doubt existed as to whether the President could rightly order U. S. forces into action without prior Congressional authority. In any event, the Attorney General expressed the view that he should not do so even if he were legally free, since the effectiveness of the measures he decided to take would so largely depend on Congressional support. The Attorney General doubted whether UN authorization, over and above Congressional authorization, was required.

With regard to the President's power in the event of armed attacks against nations who were not joined to the United States by a mutual defense pact, it would seem to follow, a fortiori, that the President would have to secure Congressional approval.

The President commented that this, of course, was the situation with respect to Indochina, with whom we had no mutual defense pact. It would be necessary to secure Congressional approval before committing our armed forces into action there. The great problem, continued the President, posed by the Attorney General's study was what the President could and should do in the event that he had knowledge that Russia was on the point of attacking the United States.

In reply, the Attorney General called attention to the recent debates in Congress as to what the United States would do if there were direct attacks on our forces overseas, as, for example, in Korea. These debates had resulted in agreement that the United States should be in a position to resist instantly in the event that an enemy attack was launched directly on our forces. This would not,

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FILE MR Case No. 80-414

THE SECRETARY

Document No. 2

April 19, 1954

2

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT  
EISENHOWER, AUGUSTA, GA.



1. I first went over with the President the draft of a statement which might be issued either by him or by me. I said that Mr. Hagerty was of the opinion that it would be better if I made the statement as it would be useful to get it on to the newsreels. The President agreed. The President made a few verbal changes and he proposed what became the final paragraph.

2. I reported on my trip to London and Paris, with which the President was already familiar so far as the main lines were concerned. I added a little "color" with a view to giving a more vivid impression with reference to Churchill and Eden and Laniel and Bidault. I said that our trip had been useful not only in regard to Indochina, but also in regard to EDC, where the talks which MacArthur and I had had with Laniel had, I thought, played a decisive part in helping Laniel to make up his mind in announcing the date for debate in the Chamber on the EDC Treaty.

The President expressed some chagrin that the Senators had publicly stated that they had not been consulted. It seemed that they had forgotten.

3. I referred to the fact that Mr. Eden had insisted upon calling off the prospective meeting of the 10 South-east Asia countries to make a beginning on creating the collective defense. I explained that we had compromised on an arrangement which "fuzzed" the matter by combining the 10 with the 16 Korean countries. I said that I thought this was probably largely due to pressure from Nehru.

4. I told the President that there was still some risk that the Geneva Conference might fail because of Soviet insistence that it should be organized as a "Five Power" conference, including Red China. I said I

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☒ Retain classification ☐ Change classification to \_\_\_\_\_  
With concurrence of \_\_\_\_\_  
☒ Declassify in part and excise as shown  
EO 12355, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1)  
ACDCR by \_\_\_\_\_ 11-1-16-92

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

☐ Retain classification ☐ Change classification to \_\_\_\_\_  
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EO 12355, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1) (2) (3)

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felt that the Russians, who had vainly fought for this at Berlin, were trying to take advantage of the buildup of world hope in the Geneva Conference to repudiate their Berlin agreement and to put us in a position of either having to accept the five-power concept or be responsible for breaking up the conference. I said I regarded it as vital that the five-power concept should not be accepted. The Berlin understanding was to the contrary and was the "charter" of the Geneva Conference and I saw little use in going into a new conference with the Communists if they started out by repudiating the agreement on which the conference was based. I added that American public and Congressional opinion would be deeply resentful of our throwing away the principle which we had defended, and the acceptance of which we had won at Berlin.

The President was in entire agreement. He suggested that I should hint in my going-away statement that there was still a possibility of the conference breaking on the "five-power" issue. I indicated I would not want to deal with this on other than a very delicate basis before consulting with the British and French, who so far had stood fast with us.

(Later on, Mr. Hagerty, in the course of our drive together to the airport, suggested that the best way to handle this might be to get out a State Department bulletin recalling on a factual basis the Berlin debate on this subject and the conclusion reached.)

5. I told the President that at the NATO Ministerial Meeting I would probably be asked questions about U.S. policy with reference to the use of atomic weapons. I said I had drafted a talking paper which had been reviewed by Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I thought that we were in substantial agreement.

*REO 12062  
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(a)(1)*

The President said he would like to suggest to the British and the French that we were holding a certain number of atomic weapons of varied types for their possible use so as to place upon them a greater degree of responsibility in deciding whether or not in fact such weapons should or should not be used.

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6. I discussed the status of a possible moratorium on H bomb experimentation. I recalled our previous discussion of this subject. The President said he still believed that we should advocate such a moratorium and was prepared to come out in a statement to this effect either in his May 31 speech at Columbia, or perhaps he could find an earlier occasion. However, he wanted the technical studies completed first and as rapidly as possible. The President said as far as he was concerned he would be willing to have a moratorium on all further experimentation whether with H bombs or A bombs. This was said when I raised the question whether it would be possible by examination of debris to distinguish between the two types under experimentation. However, the President said he thought that the H-type explosion could be distinguished.

7. We discussed the Arab-Israeli tension and the matter of military aid to Iraq. I gave the President our State Department estimate of the present situation and the danger that the Israeli might be deliberately trying to break the armistice open on the theory that that was the only way to get a better arrangement. I also referred to the Arab fear of increased Jewish immigration and consequent inevitable expansion. The President agreed that we should continue our present policy of impartiality and should not be deterred by political pressures which might generate in connection with the forthcoming elections. He suggested I should make a speech on this subject when I returned, a speech which he would go over with me in advance. He felt it all right to conclude the mutual security agreement with Iraq on the condition that the actual aid given should be dependent upon the international situation at the time. He hoped very much that the agreement would in fact lead to identification of agreement with Turkey-Pakistan. I said that I thought the best hope of this was to proceed as we had planned, but I was confident that our action would be met by strong political opposition from elements subject to Zionist influence.

8. We discussed the Department of Justice paper on the President's war powers. I said I thought it was unduly

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legalistic. I thought that the heart of the matter was that the Government of the United States must have the power of self-preservation. If Congress was in session and in a position to act to save the Union, concurrent action would be the preferred procedure. If the danger was great and imminent and Congress unable to act quickly enough to avert the danger, the President would have to act alone.

The President agreed, stating that, in his judgment, the President would have to take the responsibility of carrying out the will of the people. If he made a mistake in this respect, then he was subject to impeachment, and repudiation by the Congress. The President thought, however, that it was unwise to ventilate this problem at the present time in view of Bricker Amendment problems. I said I wholly agreed. I had expressed my views merely as views which I thought should be in the background of the NSC thinking and planning.

Addendum to Paragraph 4.

The President asked what the position would be if we refused to attend and if the others went on without us. I said I felt this was unlikely to happen in relation to the initial, i.e. Korean phase, of the conference because I was confident that the ROK would follow us in this matter, and that any conference about Korea which was not participated in by both the ROK and the United States would be a farce. I said as regards the Indochina conference, that was different because France was principally concerned. However, this phase of the conference had not yet been arranged and the invitees had not been designated.

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PROPOSED "TALKING PAPER" FOR USE IN  
CLARIFYING UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING  
ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN WEAPONS DURING COURSE  
OF NATO MEETING IN PARIS ON 23 APRIL 1954

I welcome this opportunity to contribute to a clearer understanding  
of the US official thinking regarding nuclear weapons, including both  
atomic and hydrogen weapons of all descriptions. Our attitude can best  
be explained in terms of the relation of these weapons to the free world  
system of defense against the Soviet threat.

The primary purpose of the United States, like the rest of the  
free world, is to deter aggression and prevent the outbreak of war. In  
our opinion, nuclear weapons have a vital role to play in achieving  
this purpose.

I

The principal danger lies in the great concentration of military  
power within the Soviet Bloc combined with the known imperialistic,  
aggressive intent of the Soviet rulers.

The Communist Bloc comprises a vast array of people and military

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DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59

Box 3

Atomic Weapons and Proposal 1953 1954 1955 (2)

Authority MR 81-3621  
By ZKS 5/18/81

Op 1565 / Box 3 / folder Disarmament - Atomic Weapons & Proposal  
1953 1954 1955 (2)

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forces of all types centrally located in the Eurasian land mass. This great concentration of military power poses a threat around a periphery of 20,000 miles. Red forces could strike in any one of many directions against any one of many countries. Such attacks could never be deterred if the aggressor were assured in advance that his attack would be countered only at the place and by the means which he selects. Under such circumstances, he would be almost sure to win, and to win without endangering assets which he does not wish to expose.

The free world would have great difficulty in matching the non-atomic military strength of the Soviet Bloc man for man. Such an effort would impose critical strains upon the economic, social, and fiscal orders of many of the free nations and expose them to serious instability and unrest within their own borders.

It is known that the Soviet Union possesses atomic weapons and has trained its military personnel for their employment. In the event of general war, we must assume that the Soviet rulers will make use of atomic weapons with maximum surprise of which they are capable whenever they consider it to their advantage to do so. Since the free world rejects any resort to "preventive" war, the enemy would enjoy the military advantages which accrue to the side initiating the attack, particularly a surprise attack.

## II

We believe that the risk of Soviet aggression by means of open war will be minimized to the extent that the free world combines to maintain a strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate retaliatory strength. Within this collective framework, it is a basic policy of the United States to develop and maintain a military strength -- land, sea and air --



with emphasis on the capability of inflicting effective retaliatory damage by striking power. Under existing conditions, and having due regard for the necessity of maintaining a strong, stable economic foundation, the security posture of the free world can be adequate only if based on the integration of effective atomic means within our overall capability.



Obviously, it is indispensable that the free world possess and maintain a capacity for instant and formidable retaliation. I emphasize the word "capacity". Without that, the free world might be totally dominated by the power possessed by the Soviet rulers, a power the use of which is not inhibited by any moral considerations. Such power, in such hands, is restrained only by a fear of retaliation, and by a fear that its aggression would lead to its ultimate defeat and

the collapse of its dictatorial system. Therefore, our capacity for retaliation must exist, in a state of constant readiness, as a neutralizing force, until the day may come when the awful possibilities of massive destruction can be done away with by effective international control of atomic energy with suitable safeguards.

### III



Current NATO force programs fall short of providing the conventional forces estimated to be required to defend the NATO area against a full-scale Soviet Bloc attack. In reaching the decision to level off force build-ups, and to concentrate on qualitative improvements, we and our Allies have placed greater reliance upon new weapons to compensate in part for the numerical disparity between NATO and Soviet forces. Current NATO military planning presupposes freedom to use atomic weapons in the defense of the NATO area in the event of Soviet Bloc aggression. The

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United States has accepted the current force programs and the NATO emergency plans as compromise measures on the premise that atomic weapons in substantial quantities would be available for the support of its presently programmed forces. Without the availability for use of atomic weapons, the security of all NATO forces in Europe would be in grave jeopardy in the event of a surprise Soviet attack. The United States considers that the ability to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons is essential for the defense of the NATO area in the face of the present threat.

In short, such weapons must now be treated as in fact having become "conventional". As I have said, these weapons are vital to the common defense of us all. Our main effort must be to see that our military capability is used to achieve the greatest deterrent effect. In order

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to achieve this, it should be our agreed policy, in case of either general war or local war, to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons against the military assets of the enemy whenever and wherever it would be of advantage to do so, taking account of all relevant factors. These include non-military, as well as military, considerations.

#### IV

The United States intends, of course, to consult with its Allies and to cooperate with them fully to this end. That is the essence of collective security. Consultation is an important means for insuring that our military strength, in case of any aggression, shall be used to the best advantage for the common defense. By the same token, we must make sure that the methods of consultation serve that common purpose and do not themselves stand in the way of our security. Under certain contingencies, time would not permit consultation without itself endangering the very security we seek to protect. So far as feasible,

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we must seek understanding in advance on the measures to be taken under various circumstances. In these ways, our joint capacities will be best calculated to deter aggression against any of us and to protect us in case it should occur.



V

Free people have always depended, for their security, upon the greater resourcefulness which freedom generates. There is an inherent incompatibility between freedom and the methods available to despots. If the people of the free world were to renounce the use of their actual and potential superiority in terms of new weapons and means for their application with greater mobility and flexibility, then they would have abandoned the principles which throughout the ages have enabled those who had freedom to prevail against the brute power of a despotic system. With the very survival of the free world in jeopardy, it would be suicidal

for the free peoples to renounce a major part of their military capability, unless compensating safeguards were assured.

Self-imposed military inferiority is an invitation rather than a deterrent to war. If the nations of the free world were collectively to adopt a policy that atomic weapons would be used only in retaliation for their use by the enemy even though the enemy started a war of aggression, and if such a policy became known in the Kremlin, the value of our formidable retaliatory capability as a deterrent to war would largely disappear. Such an action on our part would offer a strong temptation to the USSR to initiate wars on the expectation that they would be fought strictly on Soviet terms.

VI

For the foregoing reasons, the United States believes that in any war forced upon us by the Soviet Bloc, we and our Allies must be free to

use atomic weapons against appropriate elements of the enemy's military power where it is to our military advantage to do so. We must be enabled to strike an aggressor where it hurts. And this by no means involves exclusively the use of atomic power.



This is the only formula which gives good assurances against aggression, because it means that an aggressor cannot calculate to gain by his aggression more than he could lose. Indeed, if an aggressor is allowed in advance to limit his losses by gaining for his most valued assets a sanctuary status, then aggression would be encouraged. An aggressor glutted with manpower and occupying a central position would always be able to calculate on gaining from each local aggression more than he would lose. He would be relieved of the economic burden of defensive measures to protect his sources of power. He could concentrate on offensive means.

to use strength is as important as possession of strength.

If we can meet these tests, and I am convinced that we can, then mankind has good hope of escaping general war with all its attendant consequences.

VII



Until nuclear weapons can be brought under effective control, the course I have outlined seems to be the only hopeful one. Meanwhile we do not intend to slacken our efforts to bring about such control of nuclear weapons, under safe and acceptable conditions. President Eisenhower's plan for allocating fissionable material for peacetime purposes is one approach which we are exploring with complete dedication, in the hope of thereby creating a new atmosphere and new relationships which will open the way to effective controls in the military field. We are prepared to explore any measures on condition that this does not in fact increase the peril to the free nations.



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
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C. H. BONESTEEL, III

DEFENSE MEMBER, NSC PLANNING BD.

## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

# PROBABLE EFFECTS OF INCREASING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES UPON THE POLICIES OF US ALLIES



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
Approved 20 April 1954

Published 26 April 1954

*The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 20 April 1954. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.*

*The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.*

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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RG 330/64/471.6 Admin

Nov-Dec 1994

T-11, 836

## PROBABLE EFFECTS OF INCREASING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES UPON THE POLICIES OF US ALLIES

### THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable effect upon the policies of the principal US allies of a general conviction that the US and the USSR each had acquired nuclear capabilities more than sufficient to cripple the other.

### ASSUMPTIONS

1. Nuclear weapons will not have been used in war since 1945.
2. No international agreement will have been made restricting or outlawing the use of nuclear weapons in war.

### NOTE

This estimate applies primarily to the Western European allies of the US, though most of it holds true also for Japan, Turkey, and other allied countries. So numerous are the factors that would govern the policy of each allied government under the conditions of the problem, however, that no attempt can

usefully be made at present to estimate these policies for individual countries. This estimate is therefore stated in general terms. As the potentialities and implications of nuclear weapons become better understood in various countries, it may be possible to formulate more specific estimates.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. A great and recognized growth in nuclear capabilities will obviously intensify the anxiety of peoples and governments to avoid war. No government will willingly run risks of war unless interests are at stake which it considers vital, and the threat of nuclear weapons will almost certainly tend to narrow the range of interests that any government will consider vital.

2. Under such circumstances, the difficulties presently felt in maintaining an effective Western coalition under US leadership may be increased, but we do not believe that the alliance will necessarily show significant weakness, at least as long as there does not seem to be a greatly increased likelihood of general war. The US allies will probably seek to obtain greater influence over US policy

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sponsible publicists. Soviet propaganda may contribute to the process. There will probably be many and varying interpretations placed upon the potentialities and limitations of the nuclear factor in modern warfare — correct and incorrect, reassuring and hysterical, hopeful and despairing. In any event, increasing awareness of the potentialities and implications of nuclear weapons will eventually exert a profound influence upon public and governmental opinion throughout the world. Fear of war, and anxiety to avoid war, will increase.

8. This intensified anxiety to avoid war may in turn affect the policies of governments. To be sure, the present policies of governments were not made in ignorance of the existence of nuclear weapons, or without attention to their significance and probable future development. The present policies of the allies of the US are therefore at least a partial guide to their probable future courses of action. Nevertheless, it is possible that popular pressures, even popular hysteria, arising out of an increasing realization of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, might force changes in policy against the desires of governments. Moreover, some governments may under certain circumstances feel compelled to reappraise their policies in the light of their own increasing understanding of the implications of nuclear weapons. The likelihood of such changes of policy, and their probable nature, are examined in the following paragraphs.

## II. PROBABLE EFFECTS DURING A PERIOD OF COLD WAR

9. The Western alliance system was established in a period of high international tension. It had as its primary purpose the prevention of war, while at the same time providing its members with protection against the danger of Communist expansion. It was based on the proposition that the Kremlin would be unlikely to launch general war, or to take actions which it considered to involve grave risks of general war, as long as the political and military power of the Soviet Bloc was at least approximately balanced, in an over-all fashion, by the power of an opposing coalition.

10. We see no reason to believe that this proposition will necessarily become less convincing to allied peoples and governments as the nuclear capabilities of the USSR increase. Indeed it may appear to have even more force than before, at least as long as there does not seem to be a greatly increased likelihood of general war. The prevention of war will become more desirable than ever. Moreover, most allied governments will continue to realize that membership in the alliance assures them of US interest in their general welfare and prosperity, and gives them a much greater voice in world affairs than they could have in isolation.

11. We therefore believe it probable that the Western alliance will endure despite the new element introduced into the world situation by the further development of nuclear weapons. The allies will almost certainly demand that US armed forces remain in Western Europe and in some parts of the Far East as evidence of continuing US determination to protect its allies, and of the strength and integrity of the alliance. With the exception of the UK and perhaps a few other countries, the allies will probably not acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons. However, they will probably continue to play their role in the coalition by maintaining substantial military establishments, and will press for US aid for this purpose. US allies with no capability of producing nuclear weapons will probably eventually request the US to supply them with these weapons for use by their own armed forces or to make these weapons available for use under the control of NATO. Allies who have or intend to acquire a capability to produce these weapons will press the US for an exchange of information and a more complete integration of nuclear development and production within the alliance.

12. Nevertheless, as the increasingly disastrous consequences of war become more generally recognized, the allies will even more closely scrutinize the alliance to ensure that it in fact serves to prevent war. This may on many occasions make it more difficult for the US to exert vigorous leadership:

a. The allies will almost certainly seek to obtain greater influence over US policy toward

the USSR and Communist China, in order to ensure a cautious and non-provocative attitude toward the Communist states.

b. The allies will become more fearful that in pursuing its national interests or in response to domestic pressures the US may adopt courses of action involving, in the allies' opinion, undue risks of war. Each ally will try to ensure that no appreciable risk of war is run except to protect interests which it considers vital to its own national survival.

c. Increasing nuclear capabilities will place the USSR in a stronger position to exert pressures upon most non-Communist governments.

13. The alliance could receive a severe test in connection with local aggression committed or supported by the Soviet Bloc. Fear already exists that strong reaction to such aggression might lead to general war. Fears of general war will be intensified when both great power blocs are believed to possess large nuclear capabilities. US allies would, therefore, be even more insistent than at present that every effort be made to limit the scope and area of local conflicts and to deal with local aggression without resorting to acts which might expand the conflict into general war. US allies generally would also be more unwilling than at present to participate in repelling local Communist aggression.

14. On the other hand, the allies of the US will be sensitive to any indication that the US is unwilling, in the face of Soviet nuclear capabilities, to resort to war in their defense. If at some time in the future they should become convinced that the principal deterrent to Soviet attack upon them had been removed by such a change in US policy, at least some allies would, in the face of Soviet pressure, abandon the alliance and seek an accommodation with the USSR.

15. The great and probably increasing aversion to the use of nuclear weapons may also create difficulties for US policy. There is at present a fairly widespread hope that nuclear weapons will never actually be used again in war. This hope may vanish, but there is likely to be a strong desire among US allies to

maintain, as long as possible, whatever moral and political inhibitions may exist against the use of these weapons. Except when their own most vital interests are at stake, US allies will probably seek to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts.

16. It is almost certain that as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase and as the implications of this increase are better realized, popular pressures will grow for some kind of agreement restricting or outlawing the use of nuclear weapons. For example, there might be strong public demand for a pact with the USSR in which both sides undertook at least not to use such weapons against large centers of population. Such a demand might rest on ill-considered or militarily irrational foundations, and most governments would probably be wary of the adverse effect such an agreement might have on the deterrent power of Western nuclear capabilities. Nevertheless, especially if the USSR should display an apparently genuine interest in such a proposal, popular pressures might become so great as to compel the US and its allies either to accept such an agreement or to risk undermining popular support for the Western stand against the Soviet Bloc.

### III. PROBABLE EFFECTS IN THE EVENT OF GREATLY INCREASED THREAT OF GENERAL WAR

17. Soviet nuclear capabilities may eventually present the Free World with a problem unique in history. Peoples and governments have often in the past had to face the threat of heavy devastation, prolonged enemy occupation, massacre of parts of the population, and even destruction of the social order and the political and economic system. But no people or government has ever had to face the imminent likelihood of such enormous destruction of life and property as nuclear weapons can inflict in a brief period of time. Thus, the situation facing allied peoples and governments in the event of imminent threat of general war involving nuclear weapons will be one of a new order, and the pressures will be greater than those produced at any time in history.

18. Some of the peoples of countries allied to the US at present entertain the hope that if war occurs between the US and the USSR they may not themselves be attacked with nuclear weapons. We do not believe that this hope for immunity from nuclear attack will long survive, at least in Western Europe and Japan, but even if it does not entirely disappear it is unlikely to remain strong. We believe that almost without exception the allies will come to accept the idea that general war would in all probability include the risk of destruction of many of the cities and people of their own countries and would perhaps strike a mortal blow at their civilization.

19. Under these conditions, in a period of grave international crisis governments allied to the US would consider the following possibilities:

a. That the best interests of their countries could be served if the US could be persuaded to yield to Soviet demands or pressures, and that this persuasion could be accomplished by threatening to renounce their treaty commitments and to desert the alliance.

b. That in a prolonged crisis the attractions of neutrality might increase so greatly and popular pressure in their own countries might grow so as to force them to withdraw from the alliance and adopt a neutral position.

c. That, even if neutrality were not feasible, acceptance of Soviet occupation or Communist control would be preferable to undergoing the devastation likely to result from nuclear warfare.

It is also possible that the Kremlin might, at a time of grave international crisis, use the threat of nuclear devastation in an attempt to persuade the governments of at least some countries to forsake their alliance with the US in return for a Soviet pledge to respect their neutrality. The difficulties and risks involved in such an attempt would be considerable.

20. On the other hand, allied governments would also have to consider:

a. That unity and firmness might still offer a reasonable chance of preventing the ultimate outbreak of war without surrendering vital national interests.

b. That it might be difficult or impossible for them to enjoy the rewards of neutrality, since they might be overrun and occupied or brought under effective control by the USSR, even if they sought to remain neutral. Or the US in the course of actions designed to ensure its own survival, to weaken the USSR, and to attain victory might feel compelled to use nuclear weapons against targets in the territory of its former allies.

c. That even though abandonment of the alliance were to prevent war, at least for the time being, the break-up of the alliance and the consequent loss of US support might condemn them eventually to Soviet domination.

21. It is possible that governments would have no real choice between alternatives in a swiftly developing crisis leading to war. It seems probable, however, that most governments would have some chance to control their courses of action, especially if the Kremlin succeeded in managing the crisis in such a way as to give opportunity for some allies to desert the alliance. In such an event the course of action of each allied government would be determined by many factors, of which the following seem to us most important:

a. *The chances of national survival.* Each nation would evaluate its air defenses, its capability of resisting invasion, the likelihood of early and adequate assistance from its allies, the condition of popular morale, and other factors bearing on an estimate of the probable consequences of entering general war.

b. *The political and social stability of the state.* Some countries, such as the UK, have a much higher level of political and social stability than others and a correspondingly greater ability to undergo periods of crisis and war. The governments of these countries can generally count on popular support in time of grave danger. In some of the less stable countries, such as France and Italy, Communists and their allies have great political strength, and would probably be able to confuse if not to control governmental decisions in times of crisis.

c. *The issues at stake.* No country would willingly risk nuclear war unless issues were at stake which it considered vital to its exist-

ence. The threat of nuclear weapons, however, will almost certainly tend to narrow the range of interests that any country facing war will consider vital.

*d. The condition of the alliance at the time of crisis.* If the Western alliance had come through a long period of cold war as an integrated and effective coalition, and, above all, if the intermeshing of political, economic, and military relationships had become highly developed, each member government might discover at the moment of crisis that a large part of the crucial decisions had in effect already been made. Under such circumstances any government might find it difficult, though not necessarily impossible, to abandon its commitments, recall its forces, and reverse the whole trend of its foreign policy.

*e. The conduct of US policy.* The allies would be reluctant to support the US through a grave crisis if they considered that US policy had been rash and provocative. The standards by which the allies would judge US conduct are not easy to define, but it is plain that the existence of the nuclear threat will cause the allies to scrutinize US actions far more critically than they might otherwise have done.

*f. The concentration of decision-making.* If the crisis should develop with great swiftness, it might make public debate upon policy almost impossible. In such a case, decision-making would tend to be concentrated in fewer hands than normally, and a few dominant powers in the alliance might make de-

cisions which for all practical purposes would commit their lesser allies.

22. We believe that in the event of international crisis involving grave danger of general war, the allies of the US would almost certainly support the US as long as they believed that firm maintenance of the alliance would probably avert war.

23. We cannot estimate the probable courses of action of US allies if an international crisis should develop to the point where general war seemed to them virtually certain and no longer to be averted by firm maintenance of the alliance. There is inadequate evidence or precedent on which to calculate the reaction of governments and peoples who consider themselves to be facing imminent threat of attack with nuclear weapons. We believe that the main factors determining their courses of action at such a time would be those discussed above, but we cannot foresee how such factors would operate at some future period when general war may appear to have become almost inevitable.

24. We believe that most allied governments, if confronted with certain national destruction as the sole alternative to an accommodation with the USSR, would choose the latter. We believe it unlikely, though possible, that the major allies of the US would become convinced that the alternatives facing them were so limited and so clear-cut as the two described.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

May 15, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Merchant ✓  
Mr. Bowie

The attached is a memorandum which I dictated very hastily and have not read over. I am taking it with me to Williamsburg and expect to have a rewrite done Sunday afternoon, as perhaps a basis for discussion on Sunday evening. Meanwhile, I would be glad to have you look at it, treating it of course as highly provisional and very confidential.

John Foster Dulles



DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59  
WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDA SERIES

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority MR 81-172#6  
By JWS Date 9/11/81

Box 8

General Foreign Policy Matters (2)

Personal and Confidential

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WMM/  
Mike Sp (18)  
Mudd

from pg



5/16/54

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY



The aggressive strategy and techniques of Soviet Communism require counter policies which should comprehend:

I. The deterring of open armed aggression by the capacity and willingness to retaliate at places and by means of our own choosing, so that the aggressor would be hurt more than he could gain.

II. The restoration of Western prestige and strength by closing of the Franco-German breach which has for a century caused the West to war with itself and expend its vigor in internecine strife.

III. The distraction of the Soviet Communist rulers from indirect aggression by our compounding their internal difficulties. This would involve resourcefully intensifying and exploiting Party quarrels and promoting the spirit of nationalism within the captive nations of Europe.

IV. Vitalizing liberty and freedom within the free world so that it becomes a dynamic force countering the revolutionary spirit with which Communism imbues its followers.

After 16 months of effort:

I has become NSC policy. Its efficacy is limited by well publicized constitutional limitations. Also, our allies oppose this policy, particularly as it may involve the use of

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59

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Box 8

General Foreign Policy Matters (2)

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Authority MR 86-253 #1

By bc NLE Date 7/25/86

new (atomic) weapons. Nevertheless, there has been no open armed aggression and none seems likely, so long as we retain effective atomic supremacy and the will, if need be, to use it. This is, however, no assurance of permanent effective superiority.



II depends primarily on EDC, the chances of which have been hurt by the growing governmental weakness in France and Italy. In the face of French indecision and seeming collapse as a world power, Germany has made a spectacular recovery, and the prospects of a unified "West" in Europe are presently obscure.

III has been checked by the fears of our allies. There has been the execution of Beria and the East German June outbreak. But these are perhaps more revealing of possibilities than of accomplishments. Our allies think it too dangerous "to prod the bear" by exploiting internal weakness as the Communists exploit them within the free world.

IV has been stifled by US identification with the "colonialism" of UK, France and Belgium in Asia, the Near and Middle East and Africa (and to a lesser degree in the Americas). By defending our allies at the UN and at international conferences and failing to play our historic role as an apostle of political liberty, we have enabled Communist propaganda plausibly to brand us as today's leading "imperialist".

\* \* \*

It should be noted that the UK and French governments now in power have only a slim parliamentary backing, and if there were a change, it would probably be to increased neutralism.

I. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE UK



1. Europe

At present there is general agreement on basic European policy and particularly EDC. However, until recently the UK held back from vigorously supporting EDC, and Churchill still makes no secret of his belief that there should be "a grand alliance" of national forces, including Germany. He failed to support EDC at a time when that support would probably have been decisive.

2. The Near East

British policies and our deference to them have increased danger to the area.

During this fiscal year, we have

That program has contained features which we knew would make it unacceptable, and these are, we hope, now in process of elimination. But this may now be too late.

In Arabia, the British are pushing inland their claims based upon seacoast principalities

Our failure to support Ibn Saud in this controversy gravely threatened our good relations with that kingdom with its important US oil and airfield positions.

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Authority MR 80-447 #1

By bc NLE Date 8/28/81

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.351 (2)(b)(d)

NSC letter 6/23/81

NLE Date 8/28/81



In Iran the British conduct in relation to their concession in the Abadan refinery and our refusal, in deference to UK requests, to allow Americans to reactivate that refinery, brought Iran to the verge of Communist control. It was saved through US efforts as a near miracle, but again the situation is rapidly deteriorating largely as a result of the British insistence that any new oil arrangements must be activated through a British-chartered company.

### 3. South Asia

The British are greatly influenced by Nehru, who is neutralist and strongly opposed to US policies. The intense British desire to keep India within the Commonwealth gives Nehru close to a veto power over British Asian policies.

### 4. Southeast Asia

The UK, after first publicly adhering to our plan for immediate collective planning to defend the entire area, has since insisted upon delay. The British profess to be complacent about their ability to hold Malaya even if Indochina and Siam are lost, a judgment with which we are not in agreement.

### 5. China and the Western Pacific

The UK has recognized the Chinese Communist regime, although that regime has not reciprocated. The UK seeks to

develop trade with Communist China. The UK is opposed to our recognition of National China, and while it has agreed to maintain the status quo of China in the UN, this agreement is on a very short-term basis, and British policy basically favors the ousting of the Nationalist regime and the admission of Red China to the United Nations. The cleavage of our China policy makes us both ineffectual in Asia.



#### 6. American Hemisphere

The remnants of colonialism in the Central American and Caribbean area have become an appreciable, though not grave, cause of disturbances in our Pan American relations. The British position in British Honduras and British Guiana and the Falklands is constantly under attacks against which we defend Britain.

#### 7. Africa

The UK and France stand together to support the present colonial structure. The US reluctantly goes along with this.

#### 8. Estimate of Soviet Danger

It seems to be the view of the British Government that the danger from Russia is primarily a nationalist danger reminiscent of the days of the Czar; that it will soon run its course and that the best way to assure this is to develop




good relations and to increase trade and perhaps for the UK to resume its historic role of "balance of power" between two great powers.

The British leaders do not accept the view that Communism, in control of Russia, seeks world domination or that the danger cannot be met by the means which have conventionally applied against national threats.

The UK tends to regard as acceptable some division of the world which would concede to the Soviet rulers control over the present captive states of Western Europe, and which would accept Communist domination of East Asia. [REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED]



## II. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH FRANCE

France seems to be deteriorating as a great power and losing capacity to govern itself or to deal with its problems. This has general world-wide repercussions. It creates vacuums of power into which Communism is alert to move.

### 1. Europe

The most serious problem is Franco-German relations. There has been and still is a German government eager to develop in terms of its being "European" rather than a resurgent nationalistic Germany. France originally promoted this idea and negotiated the EDC two years ago. However, it is now turning away, and meanwhile the situation in Germany is rapidly getting out of hand.

### 2. North Africa

The French are with great difficulty holding on to a colonial position which is being undermined much as was the French position in Indochina. This position is constantly



under attack in the UN, and US support of the French position causes us great embarrassment in the UN.



### 3. The Near East

There is a heritage of resentment, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, against French colonialism and a sympathy toward the North African Arabs, with the result that US intimacy with France leads to strong reactions against the US.

### 4. Southeast Asia

The French perpetuation of a colonial relationship and its persistent refusal to "internationalize" the war or to permit any appeal to the UN either by the Associated States or by Thailand has resulted in a situation in Indochina which today is almost beyond repair, and all of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific is in peril. The US influence has been weakened and its action immobilized by its desire on the one hand to support France and its unwillingness on the other hand to become engaged in a war which did not have local or world support because it seemed to be a war to perpetuate French colonialism.

5/16/54



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The UK tends to regard as acceptable some division of the world which would concede to the Soviet rulers control over the present captive states of Western Europe, and which would accept Communist domination of East Asia.

9.

From Dulles "Specific Problems with the U.K." 5/16/54  
(~~Continued~~) identified in Dulles → Benoit 5/14/54 Mrs. S. L. (with) Howard sheep  
(continuing both together)  
Dulles P / WHM/8 / "General Foreign Policy Matters"

*Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 2,*

# EYES ONLY

5/21/54  
TOP SECRET

May 21, 1954

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 198th Meeting  
of the National Security Council,  
Thursday, May 20, 1954

Present at the 198th Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States (presiding for part of Items 1 and 8); the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 6); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Items 1, 4 and 5); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Items 1, 2 and 3); Mr. Milton for the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; Assistant Secretary of Commerce Anderson and Marshall Smith, Department of Commerce (for Item 6); Admiral DeLany, Foreign Operations Administration; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps (for Items 1, 2 and 3); the NSC Planning Board (for Items 1, 2 and 3), as follows: Mr. Bowie, Department of State; Mr. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; Gen. Bonesteel, Department of Defense; Mr. McDonnell, Department of Justice; Gen. Porter, FOA; Mr. Elliott, ODM; Mr. Reid, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Snapp, AEC; General Gerhart, JCS; Mr. Amory, CIA; and Mr. Staats, OCB. The following were also present: the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Gen. Persons, Deputy Assistant to the President; Gen. Carroll, White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

### 1. FISCAL OUTLOOK

Mr. Cutler asked the Vice President to preside over the meeting for the first half hour during the President's absence. He then explained the purpose of the briefing on the fiscal outlook, and called on the Director of the Budget to present his report.

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PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (a)(1)(5)

*NSC letter 8/28/84*

NLE DATE

*10/31/84*

TOP SECRET

NLE Date

*10/31/84*

Authority

*ML 80-434#3*

*SLC*

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TOP SECRET

Secretary Humphrey repeated that he was talking about the long pull, and that we must therefore continually reappraise our capabilities. If we are willing to change the whole face of America there was, of course, a lot that we could do. If, on the other hand, we were anxious to preserve our American way of life, built on individual incentive and individual freedom, we must have a strong and free economy.

Secretary Dulles replied that we must also appraise the nature and degree of the external dangers we faced. There had been no real relaxation of international tensions since this Administration had been in office. In fact, the last two or three months had seen the international situation changing greatly for the worse. The new nuclear capability of the Soviets was permitting them to adopt a policy of blackmail. The Soviets were obviously becoming bolder, as was indicated by Indochina and by their threatening posture in Austria. Pretty tough talk, moreover, was coming from the Communist side at the Geneva Conference. We are probably, therefore, in for a period of mounting rather than of lessening danger. It was a time when it would increase our peril if either our allies or our enemies concluded that we were sacrificing security to economy.

Governor Stassen expressed some doubts as to whether increased taxes was the real key factor in determining the health of an economy. After all, the most startling economic recovery in Europe had been made by West Germany, whose level of taxation was also the heaviest in Western Europe. More significant, thought Governor Stassen, was the form of taxation and the way the money was spent.

The President said that, strongly as he agreed with Secretary Humphrey on the need for preserving our American way of life, we could not do so unless we assured the physical survival of our nation. This was a very tough problem and there are valid viewpoints on both sides. Therefore, the President said he could not agree more completely than he did with the Secretary of State.

The National Security Council:

Discussed an oral report on the subject by the Director, Bureau of the Budget, supplemented by oral remarks by the Secretary of the Treasury.

## 2. NATO ALERT PROCEDURE

The National Security Council:

Noted that the President had approved recommendations on the subject by the Secretaries of State and Defense, subject to two modifications.

NOTE: The recommendations of the Secretaries of State and Defense, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for the information of the Council.

3. FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN INDOCHINA

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral briefing on the subject presented by the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, U. S. Army, in lieu of the regular weekly briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. RADIO SECURITY

(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 3, 1954)

The National Security Council:

Noted the report on the subject transmitted by the reference memorandum.

5. NATION-WIDE CIVIL DEFENSE EXERCISE

(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 5, 1954; NSC Action No. 1061)

Governor Peterson stated that the plans for the civil defense exercise were being developed very satisfactorily, with the 48 States, Canada, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii all participating.

Excellent cooperation had been received from all the agencies of the Executive Branch. The exercise would also provide a test of the continuity of government and the emergency relocation plans, for which ODM was responsible.

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral report by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator on the status of plans for the nation-wide civil defense exercise scheduled for June 14, and on the recent Governors' Conference.

6. ECONOMIC DEFENSE: REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL LISTS

(NSC Action No. 1121; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 18, 1954; NSC 152/3)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the past history of this problem and on last week's action. He then called on Governor Stassen to make his report and recommendation as to the United States position on critical items which had been requested at last week's meeting.

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NLE Mr. Case No.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Document No.

THE SECRETARY

May 25, 1954

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE  
PRESIDENT

Deputy Secretary Anderson and I discussed with the President the prospective five-power military talks. I said that I was concerned lest the JCS viewpoint should be presented in a way which would have undesirable political repercussions. Their judgment had been that there was little use discussing any "defense" of the Southeast Asia area or any substantial commitment of U.S. force to this area; that United States power should be directed against the source of the peril which was, at least in the first instance, China, and that in this connection atomic weapons should be used.

The British at least wanted to discuss the establishment of a defensive line, assuming the loss of all or part of Indochina.

I said that while I did not question Admiral Radford's military judgment, I did not believe that it was serving our political objectives to present it at this time; that it would lead to U.S. isolation, and indeed it had already done so to some extent in connection with Admiral Radford's last trip to Paris and London.

If there was U.S. intervention as part of a coalition, no one could, of course, tell what the consequences might be or whether the initial theater would be enlarged. However, it was not politically good judgment to take it for granted that any defensive coalition would be bound to become involved in a general war with China, and perhaps with Russia, and that this would be an atomic war.

The President said he wholly agreed with me and that he was strongly opposed to any assumption that it was necessary to have a war with China. He said that the JCS should not act in any way which would interfere with the political purposes of the Government, and that he would try to find an occasion to make this clear. He also said that he might plan himself to talk with the military representatives of the other four nations so that they would get directly from him the political position of the United States.

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Authority 12820-2-54 #13

By

DC 12/10/81

THE SECRETARY

July 7, 1954 - 4:00 p.m.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AT THE  
WHITE HOUSE



1. The President said he had talked on the telephone with Paul Hoffman, who had indicated that he might be available for India if it could stay open until the end of the year when he would have completed a pending reorganization. The President said that Hoffman had spoken again of the possible desirability of using Bowles on some special mission to India.

*just before  
sent to Dunnington  
Bee*

2. The President read Syngman Rhee's letter to me of July 2. He indicated he thought that President Rhee was being rather arrogant in attaching conditions to acceptance of the President's possible invitation. We discussed the possibility of getting the Van Fleet recommendations before making a definitive reply to Rhee's request for additional Korean divisions. I said that I thought if he came he would want to come before Congress adjourned so as to be able to appear before a joint session. That made the timing difficult. The President said he doubted that Van Fleet's recommendations on this subject would be very important. He was good as a field general but not as a planner. I said I would try to find out the Defense Department's views with a view to drafting a reply to Rhee in the light thereof.

3. We discussed the Churchill letter and I presented a draft of a reply which the President went over and modified in certain respects. He gave me the final draft to transmit through the British Ambassador. He said he was anxious that it go through channels to be sure that Eden would see it. He authorized me to send a copy, if I thought it wise, to Aldrich.

*Bowie  
McArdle*

I stated to the President that we were getting into an awkward position in relation to our allies taking independent courses of action. It gave an appearance of our loss of control of the situation which could easily be explained if we told publicly the basic principles which guide us and which we are prepared to adhere to whether or not our allies go along. On the other hand, if we make these statements, they imply criticism of our allies and they arouse public opinion

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By AKS Personal and Private  
Date 7/8/81

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
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and public opinion is already pretty hostile. I said I thought this matter should be given a good deal of consideration.

*Bowie*

4. The President discussed the lack of high-level planning by persons who do not have operational responsibilities. He felt that the NSC work was too hurried, and did not deal sufficiently with the long-range problems. He recognized that it was very much better than it had ever been before but still he thought it was susceptible of improvement. I said that I considered that our representative on the Planning Board, Bowie, was one of the best minds I had ever come in contact with. However, he was over-burdened and in a way too much drawn into operations. On the other hand, this was necessary to avoid an irresponsible "ivory tower" approach. The President said he felt that the Army organization with its staff planning probably had solved this type of problem better than most other governmental agencies.

5. I told the President of the message which I had sent to Eden with reference to Geneva and indicated that we would make a final decision in the light of further information we might get from London and Paris.



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Personal and Private

7/16/54

TOP SECRET

transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 8, the report of the Director of Central Intelligence contained in DDC 1-7-54, and the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 1, 1954.

1. Adopted Recommendations 2, 3, 4 and 5 by the Planning Board, with the understanding that they be instituted quickly and by degree, and that the exact method of implementing Recommendations 2 and 5 will be determined by the Department of State in consultation with other interested agencies in order to minimize the risk of Soviet bloc retaliation.
2. In view of Recommendations 1 and 3 by the NSC Planning Board, adopted the following:

Restrictions be placed upon diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the United States on the basis of strict reciprocity for restrictions placed upon U. S. representatives in each Soviet bloc country; as determined to be feasible by a group composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and of NSM and CEA.

NOTE: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the appropriate agencies for implementation, and circulated to the Council for information.

## 2. REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President said that he wished to hear from the Secretary of State next.

### A. EDC and Germany.

Secretary Dulles informed the President that he would be as brief as the President desired, but that what he had to say was of considerable importance. He had reached Paris and had been met by Eden and Mendes-France. He had talked alone with Mendes-France thereafter for approximately an hour and a half. This conversation dealt almost entirely with EDC and the German problem. Secretary Dulles had informed Mendes-France of his own conviction that most of France's troubles derived from lack of decision with respect to the organization of Western Europe. This played directly into Russia's hands--Russia's great objective being initially to split Germany and France and subsequently to gain control of a unified Germany. The only answer to this was the achievement of a real organic unity including

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NSC 7/16/54

France and Germany. As long as this goal was unachieved, France would continue to be subject to harassment. This underscored the necessity for EDC.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that Mendes-France seemed to have been impressed with the foregoing argument and had replied by stating his determination to push forward to secure a settlement of the EDC problem before the French Parliament recessed. As matters stood, however, Mendes-France did not think it possible to secure a parliamentary majority for EDC--at least not that constitutional majority (314 votes) which it would be necessary to have in the event that the French Senate reversed a favorable vote in the Chamber of Deputies.

To this point Secretary Dulles said he had replied by emphasizing that the proposed revisions could not be of a character which would subject the present treaties to renegotiation by the countries which had approved them. Mendes-France thought that he could avoid renegotiation, and said he would try to avoid textual modification of the treaties and to secure a decision early in August.

Secretary Dulles then told Mendes-France that public sentiment in the United States was reaching a point where we could no longer tolerate indefinite delay on French action. A hornets' nest of trouble would be stirred up if German rearmament had to be arranged without an EDC. Indeed, if this actually happened, all further U. S. aid to NATO would be cut off. Congress simply would not go on appropriating money for NATO.

Secretary Dulles said that he was very well impressed with the sincerity, frankness and simplicity of the French Premier.

#### B. Indochina.

Secretary Dulles began by explaining the dilemma which had confronted the United States with respect to participation at a high level in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. He said that we had been reluctant thus to participate, in the first instance, out of fear that the Communists might say to the French that they would be willing to accept a certain solution of the Indochina problem provided the United States joined in guaranteeing such a solution. Had the United States been faced with such a proposition, we would have had to reject it, said Secretary Dulles. We couldn't get ourselves

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# The "Big Three" Alliance

The "alliance" concept is, for the U.S., one of recent origin.

During the first World War, President Wilson refused to allow the U.S. to be termed an "ally". He created the phrase the "allied and associated powers". The U.S. "association" quickly weakened after World War I was won and the "association" resumed only after Great Britain, repudiating the policies of appeasement which had characterized the British policy prior to the opening of the Second World War, made its "chip on the shoulder" Treaty of Alliance with Poland and then declared war on Hitler's Germany when Poland was attacked. Then U.S. sympathy mounted to a degree which culminated in the de facto alliance constituted by Roosevelt and Churchill when they met and drew up the so-called "Atlantic Charter" in August 1941 before the U.S. was formally in the war.



The Big Two became the "Big Three" when Hitler attacked Soviet then Russia in 1941. France was/a defeated power and was not itself a party

SUBJECT SERIES

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to the alliance. France was indeed excluded from the war conferences up to and including the Potsdam Conference of July 1945 which developed the terms of peace in relation to Europe.



Only after the elimination of Communists from the French Government following the Moscow Conference of 1947 was France treated as an equal partner with U.S. and U.K. in post-war matters and in constituting the so-called "Big Three". This was primarily at U.S. insistence. The U.K. went along reluctantly with this experiment.

The North Atlantic Treaty, made in 1949, is the only document of formal alliance to which the U.S., U.K., and France are parties.

This "alliance" was tightened in 1950 as a result of the wave of fear which spread over the Western world when the North Korean Communists, with moral and material support from Soviet Russia, made their armed attack upon the Republic of Korea. That led to plans to change the North Atlantic Treaty from what was primarily a verbal engagement into the basis of a force-in-being. This in turn led to more

intimate relationships between the Big Three because of the fact that they were the only three nations which could make a substantial contribution to NATO and because France possessed the "real estate" necessary for an adequate logistic support of Continental defense.

This very brief and inadequate historical review is given for the purpose of pointing up the fact that the so-called "Big Three" alliance is of recent origin and vague scope (except for the North Atlantic Treaty pledges) and like all "alliances" is highly sensitive to fluctuating estimates of national interest.



At the present time, there is occurring a very definite loosening and of the ties which unite Great Britain, France/the United States in the field of foreign policy. The causes of this are not superficial, such as disagreement about tactics or clashes of personalities, but they are fundamental, and need to be understood if our policies are to be wise and adequate. Some of the more important causes are now listed:

I



Developments in the field of atomic and hydrogen missiles have brought with them a reappraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of a close alliance with the U.S. It is felt that the U.S., because of its geographical position, its access to land and sea spaces needed for "early warning"; its possession of resources both financial and technical to avail of "early warning"; its unique capacity for instant and massive retaliation, and its present presumed superiority over Soviet Russia in this new field, is in a position to adopt strong policies toward Soviet Russia, policies which might even involve the risk of general war. It is felt that some important influences in the U.S. indeed favor a general war before Soviet Russia gains what could be a practical equality with the U.S. in the field of new weapons. It is felt that even in circles which do not want war there is nevertheless a belief that war should be risked as an alternative to accepting retreats and surrenders which would substantially increase the material and moral authority of the Communist



world. This basic policy is not one with which most of our so-called "allies" wish to be identified. They feel that they themselves have no defense against atomic war and they would prefer to see the Western nations adopt policies of accommodation rather than to adopt a firmness which might lead to war. They do not believe that the Soviet Union itself plans aggression by methods of open warfare and while they do not like the Communist methods of aggrandizement by civil war, subversive warfare, and the like, they would not want to see resistance to this form of aggression take a character which might lead to general war.



Therefore, the "fear" element which always plays the principal part in creating and cementing alliances is now operating to disintegrate rather than to strengthen the Western alliance.

## II

France is so greatly weakened that there is at least grave question

as to whether it can any more be rated as one of the "Big Three" carrying important world-wide responsibilities. The inability of France to develop an effective post-war constitutional system of government, the lack of military power and of statesmanship required to deal with colonial problems in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, the indecisiveness of France in relation to reviving Germany, all combine to create a vacuum of power in vital areas of the free world which have historically been a primary responsibility of France. Hostile forces are crowding rapidly into this vacuum as it develops. The U.S. has made great efforts to bolster France through economic aid under the Marshall Plan, through financial support of the Indochina war and through the delivery of military equipment both in France and in Indochina. These efforts, vast as they have been, have not served to enable France to balance its responsibilities with its capabilities. The Laniel-Bidault Government was perhaps the last French Government of our time which wanted to preserve France's role as a "great power". The bringing into



power of Mendes-France seems to mark a decision by the French Nation to cut its commitments and responsibilities so as to bring them into closer harmony with French capabilities. This process inevitably puts a strain upon the relations of France with the U.S. and U.K.



Those strains are apparent in relation to German policy. In the case of Indochina the strain is primarily with the U.S. which opposes a "peace at any price" whereas the U.K. in accord with its policy of seeking to avoid any risk of general war is pushing the French to resort to ending the hostilities on almost any terms.

Broadly speaking, it would seem that developments indicate a failure of the U.S. effort to reinstate France as a nation qualified to be one of the "Big Three".

The recent meeting of Churchill and Eden with Eisenhower and Dulles without participation of France marks a significant trend toward the substitution of a "Big Two" for a "Big Three" in the West. France's pride, however, will not permit its ready

acceptance of this secondary role.

### III.

The U.K. is subject to many influences which militate against a close partnership of world-wide scope with the U.S. Certainly, a close U.S. relationship is a major element of U.K. foreign policy and perhaps the most powerful single element in that policy. However, there are many other inconsistent elements which dilute the fidelity of the U.K. relationships with the U.S.



There is a basic difference in Asian policy. There the influence of India is powerful. The continuance of India within the British Commonwealth is almost as vital a part of British policy as is close ties with the U.S. and Britain is prepared to strain U.S. relations if necessary to keep India within the Commonwealth. The tie that binds India to the Commonwealth is only a slender thread and whenever Nehru threatens to cut it, that leads the British to adopt an Asian policy acceptable to Nehru even though it is unwelcome to the U.S. Also, the British feel

unable to renounce the possibility of commercial advantages through dealing with the China mainland, such as have been extremely profitable to them in the past. In this connection, the Chinese Communists hold a certain blackmail threat over the British in relation to Hong Kong. The British further strongly oppose the economic rehabilitation of Japan as a competitor with Britain in the world markets. The British view of the Soviet communist peril is basically different from that of the U. S.



Reference has already been made to the vulnerability of the British Isles to modern weapons, as against which there is at present no conceivable defense so far as the U.K. is concerned. Therefore, British policy seems to base itself upon what to them is their only hope of survival, namely the chance that Soviet leadership may itself gradually "soften" under the influence of more friendly associations and better internal living conditions.

A further influence is the British traditional policy of gaining influence in the world through being a balance of power between two

other great powers. They have played this role in relation to Continental powers for several centuries and there is an instinctive disposition to weigh the advantages of close alliance with the U.S. as against the advantages of being a balance of power as between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The British can see a possibility of leadership in the "balance of power" position which they cannot see in a close tie with the U.S. which would bind them to the position of a junior partner.

Another influence is the commercial need which the British feel as a nation which must trade to live. They feel that U.S. trade policies are essentially protectionist and that they must develop a sterling area of trade on a world-wide basis which will be independent of the U.S.



#### IV:

The U.S. is itself subject to influences which tend to divorce it from a permanent close alliance with powers such as the U.K.

and France. The American people, far more than the people of either Britain or France, are a religious people who like to feel that their international policies have a moral quality. By and large throughout our history we have stood for policies which could be expressed in moral terms. Perhaps there has been an element of hypocrisy in this respect but also there is a very genuine dedication to moral principles as contributing the element of "enlightenment" to what is called "enlightened self-interest." There is a particular antipathy in the American people to the so-called "colonial" policies of the Western Europe powers. The U S. is the first colony to win independence and feels sympathetic to the aspirations of colonial and dependent peoples and <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ strongly vexed at the leadership which communism is giving to these aspirations, while we seem inhibited from giving that leadership because of our alliance with the colonial powers. There is also strong opposition to giving







permit of a total identity of policy between the three of us, as for a time we assumed possible, nevertheless we should not have any policies which would be lacking in the sympathy and broad understanding of the other members of Western civilization of which we form a part or which would be designed unnecessarily to bruise or weaken them. There are many areas where we can work together to great advantage. The task is to find these areas and in other respects, not to expect the impossible so that we frustrate the possible.



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20 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Between July 3 and 15, I visited at your direction the following overseas installations and conferred with our principal representatives there:

Argentia, Newfoundland

Lajes, Azores

Morocco (Twelfth Air Force and 5th Air Division - Rabat;  
Sidi Slimane; Nouasseur; Ben Guerir)

Naples (COMSOUTH)

Heidelberg (USAREUR; 34th AA Brigade)

Wiesbaden (USAFE; Twelfth Air Force; High Commissioner Conant)

Paris (SHAPE; EUCOM; Generals Gruenther and Norstad;  
Ambassadors Dillon, Bruce, Hughes and Eohlen)

London (Sir James Gault; Ambassador Aldrich; CINCNELM; UK MAAG;  
Third Air Force; 320th Medium Bomber Wing)

From copious notes which I made, I have summarized points which seem most significant and are still timely (summaries attached).

*Robert Cutler*  
ROBERT CUTLER  
Special Assistant



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The "New Approach" and Consequences of its Acceptance (State, Defense).  
Because the NATO-agreed goals for forces, airfields, equipment, etc., are all some 30 - 40% below NATO requirements for defending Western Europe by conventional weapons against the vastly numerical superiority of the Soviet Bloc, SACEUR's recommendations for making up this deficiency and having a reasonable capacity to defend Western Europe are for the Allies to be ready, willing, and able to use and permit the use of atomic weapons. It is suggested that: (1) more authority be vested in Gruenther to determine on the spot the priorities needed under this "New Approach"; (2) a careful restudy be made at once of the programming of the \$6 billion MDAP not yet spent, which is available for NATO, to be sure that we will hereafter buy what should be bought; (3) the mechanics to obtain the formal decision by NATO on the "New Approach" should be expedited as much as possible; (4) in the interval, it should be decided at top Washington levels that the "New Approach" recommendations are sound and will be adopted, and the U.S. should accordingly begin to take steps to implement them now. As soon as possible, we must determine how much programming for conventional weapons may remain and how much should be replaced.

This "New Approach" specifically contemplates (1) a defense of Western Europe on a line east of the Rhine, (2) a German contribution, (3) instantaneous use of atomic weapons. Atomic weapons do not supersede ground forces, but supplement them to make up the deficiency.

The true seriousness of the issue is not recognized at home or abroad. The issue is not whether to do it one way or the other. The issue is: how can we survive free?



(July 12, 1951)

Position of Allies on Use of Atomic Weapons (State, Defense).  
As to the willingness of our Allies to permit the use of atomic weapons, there is no problem at all with Turkey, Greece, and the Benelux countries, which understand and will side with us on the "New Approach". The Italians so far have shown no concern over the issue, and Bruce feels they will come along (historically, they always join the stronger side). The British like to wait as long as possible, but when the chips are down, they will certainly be on our side. Bruce thinks the French will probably agree to let the U.S. use the bomb from U.S. bases in France. In our dealings on this subject, we should be firm and strong--paying less attention to sensibilities and more to realities. In fact, there is no other way to accomplish the defense of Europe than the recommendations Gruenther has made. Bruce makes this important suggestion: let the discussions on this subject hereafter be in NATO, not bilateral or tripartite. It is a NATO problem. In the North Atlantic Council meetings, the U.S. will have many participants vigorously on her side, so that

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gradually any French opposition will become isolated. Note that France no longer speaks for the Continent. The Benelux countries bitterly resent her assuming the right to do so.

(July 14, 15)

Negotiations with Allies (State). In future negotiations with our Allies, the U.S. should use all its negotiating assets (military, fiscal, political, economic). It was felt that Americans were apt to deal with one subject at a time, give undue consideration to sensibilities, not be ready to press for a quid pro quo. The U.K. has a great interest in the current Convertibility Conference. Will we attend that Conference merely to deal with convertibility or will we try to use at the table all our negotiating assets to help obtain our other objectives?

(July 15)



EDC (State, Defense). All the leaders with whom I talked, military and civilian, felt that Europe could not be defended against attack without France and West Germany on our side. It was generally felt that there were enough votes in the French Assembly to ratify EDC if the political leadership would move. Mendes-France no longer talks of the (fictitious) need for a large majority. France might ratify with some reservations as to what she would do.

If there is delay beyond mid-August in taking action to restore sovereignty to W. Germany and to commence her rearmament, the situation there will rapidly deteriorate. Conant believes that if we are unable to take legislative action, then the High Commissioners should do everything possible by executive action to "reduce the optical effect of occupation." In the absence of action this autumn by the Allies, there will be real danger of W. Germany slipping away from our side.

Conant and Bruce believe that if the U.S. and U.K. would act firmly and positively, not in anger or recrimination but in anticipation that France is going later to ratify EDC, France will follow along in the wake of such action. Bruce feels that France knows her own grave weaknesses, has nowhere else to go, and--after delaying as long as we let her--she will come along.

It is idle to consider admitting West Germany as a NATO partner, subject to certain restrictions (as the British sometimes suggest). The Germans will not agree.

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July 26, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Report of Conversation with Prime Minister Churchill,  
Thursday, July 22, 1954.

I stopped in London for dinner with the Prime Minister at the private suggestion of Mr. Eden, who is gravely concerned regarding the "solitary pilgrimage". Eden told me that he feared if this takes place there will be Cabinet resignations. He said that the Prime Minister was no longer amenable to argument against it from those around him, and was making the mistake of believing that Malenkov was another Stalin, whereas his (Eden's) talks with Molotov had convinced him more than ever that this was not the case. In fact, Eden believes that the Prime Minister's proposal was actually offensive to Molotov. Eden thought that some words along this line from an outside source who was also a former associate, might help tip the scales.

I met the Prime Minister and Lady Churchill at Number 10 Downing Street, at 7:45 p.m. Mr. Eden and Ambassador Aldrich, with their wives, were also present. The Prime Minister and I talked privately before dinner. After some personal exchange, I asked him again what he expected to accomplish by talking with Malenkov at this time, and he again said that he hoped at least to get an Austrian Treaty. He repeated his theme of the importance of a final try for peaceful co-existence. He then added that "these people" must be convinced that while we could not make a surprise attack on them, and they could, and would, make a surprise attack on us, it was inevitable that "even though they should slaughter ten million of us in Britain and the United States, they could not prevent the devastating counterstroke." He went on to say that this meant that we must have "many bases, more and more of them--some camouflaged and concealed--all over the world", and that we must reduce the size of "these frightful things" so that they can be carried on smaller planes which can take off from any airfield or from any of our carriers.

I said I thought he was making a mistake to seek so urgently an interview with Malenkov, citing my own views and those of others that Malenkov was not actually filling Stalin's shoes. I said it seemed to me that the Russians were trying to get along without a supreme "boss" and that actually Molotov was possibly more important at the moment than Malenkov. I told him the story of Molotov's toast at our first

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- 2 -

dinner, when he had mentioned "the Chiefs of our two States, General Eisenhower, the President of the United States, and Marshal Voroshilov, the President of the Supreme Soviet." I said that this was the first time I had heard the President of the Supreme Soviet mentioned by name in such a toast, and that it had never been done while Stalin was alive. The Prime Minister became petulant at once, saying rather irritably that this made no difference--that Eden would be along and that he could talk to Molotov. I asked if the Prime Minister would go to Moscow in case the Russians declined to meet elsewhere. He said he did not know, that this would have to be thought over, and repeated the importance of making a final try for co-existence.

During this talk and during the dinner which followed, the Prime Minister was quite as usual when discussing events of the war and the individuals with whom he had been associated, but he was unable to realize that I had come from Geneva and not from Washington. Four or five times during the conversation he mentioned the fact that I had "made a very quick trip from Washington", or that it "was very good of me to have come all the way from Washington to have this talk and dinner", etcetera. He mentioned again, as he had stated to me in our final talk when he was in Washington, that he "would like to die in harness, but that Anthony had been his loyal lieutenant, was connected with him by marriage, and was entitled to a long, straight run at the jump"--meaning by this a period of preparation for the next general election. He mentioned again that Harold Macmillan would be Eden's successor as Foreign Minister.

In a brief period before this dinner, Macmillan, Portal, Tedder, and a number of other former senior officers of SHAEP, stopped by Ambassador Aldrich's residence and sent personal messages of greeting and affection to the President. I spoke privately to Macmillan of his probable new assignment, and suggested that as soon as it became effective he should seize the first opportunity to visit the United States.

It is possible that the President might be interested in reading the above.

W. B. S.

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July 30, 1954

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 208th Meeting  
of the National Security Council,  
Thursday, July 29, 1954

Present at the 208th meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Secretary of Labor (for Item 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 1); Hugh M. Milton for the Secretary of the Army; the Acting Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles (for Item 1); Assistant Secretary of Defense Hannah (for Item 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; the Acting Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps; Mr. Sprague, NSC Consultant (for Item 1); the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 1); Ralph T. Walters, NSC Special Staff (for Item 1); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Major John S. D. Eisenhower, AUS; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Assistant to the Executive Secretary, NSC (for Items 2-5).

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

### 1. CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 1 and 19, 1954; Progress Reports on NSC 5408, dated June 14, 1954)

Mr. Cutler opened the meeting with the statement that today's session on Continental Defense was in the nature of a continuation of the Council's consideration, at its July 1 meeting, of the Defense Progress Report on Continental Defense. He stated that the following items were scheduled for the instant meeting in order that the Council might hear the final factual discussion of the Defense-JCS-Sprague views thereon:

1. Sprague recommendations 4 and 5 (circulated to the NSC by Mr. Lay's memorandum of July 1, 1954).

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12255, SEC. 1.3 (a)(3)(4)(5)

NSC letter 12/16/85

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
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Mr. Sprague stated that he was familiar with and heartily endorsed the policy of the Administration in avoiding the selection of any specific target date when war might occur, inasmuch as a continuing effort is needed both before and after any date selected. He pointed out that if one were to select July 1957 as a date when such a war would occur, continuous efforts would, of course, be required after that date on intercontinental ballistic missiles and other long-range potential capabilities of the enemy. He stated that he was not assuming that July 1, 1957 means war. On the contrary, he said he had picked that date as a time of increased hazard to the United States, and he felt that we had to be geared up to meet such a hazard, rather than to leave in Soviet hands the question of whether they should or should not attack us at that time depending upon the state of development of their armaments and ours. He expressed the view that we cannot afford to leave such a decision in Russian hands because of the capability which we know they will have at that time. He observed that most of the programs being discussed will be operational by that date and he thought that the remaining ones could be made operational by that date. He said that he was confident that if the NSC should adopt a policy that all of the elements of this program should be in place by 1957, we have the capability in the military, supplemented by appropriate civilian support, to do such a job without injuring other military programs.

The President agreed with Mr. Sprague's general thesis. He noted that we are getting along pretty well with the Canadians at this time, but he again asked what, as a practical matter, can be done by way of accelerating these programs over our present rate of acceleration.





The President, at this point, referred to Clausewitz and to one of the principles enunciated by him which, when applied to this situation, called for the capability of diminishing as much as possible the first blow of an enemy attack. He referred to our desire to have this capability, and stated in summary that for anyone to belittle or shrug off the situation which confronted us would be fatal; that during the next several months we should devote very intensive study to these problems so that more complete details may be ready for consideration should acceleration of these programs and a supplemental appropriation request be determined to be desirable in January. The President stated that he was ready to ask for a supplemental appropriation any time it was demonstrated that we will really increase our defense thereby.

8/13/54

TS Staff Summary  
8/13/54

EUROPE:

Mendes-France Position on EDC - Mendes-France told Dillon and the UK Charge yesterday that the difficulties facing him on EDC had proved even greater than he had expected. The changes which he would suggest in the treaty, he said, would not of themselves be sufficient to guarantee passage at this time. He stated that while he was under no illusions, as the situation stands today, that a favorable result would occur as a result of a four-power meeting on Germany, the pressure to accept such a meeting is very great in France. He felt, however, that after the Assembly had passed EDC on first reading, a position of strength would have been created which might make possible further negotiations.

The Prime Minister said the reply to the Soviet note could be made around September 1 after the first reading had occurred and that the reply should not accept the Soviet offer but neither should it close the door completely to such talks. If the Soviets should then give some proof of their willingness to negotiate reasonably, the West should be agreeable to another four-power conference.

He pointed out that the Assembly will probably recess the end of the first week in September, which would not allow time for consideration by the Council of the Republic. Parliament would reconvene at the end of October and at that time EDC would come before the Council. The Assembly would consider EDC in second reading toward the end of November and would complete the ratification process probably in early December, either before or simultaneously with the earliest possible completion of the ratification process in Italy. Mendes-France pointed out that this would provide ample time for another attempt to reach agreement with the USSR, during which time the Soviets would clearly be on notice as to what the alternative would be.

Paris 603 8/12 (TS)

US Reaction to Mendes' EDC Presentation - The Secretary has told Dillon he is deeply shocked and disheartened over Mendes-France's plans for EDC and has asked Dillon to convey to Mendes the implications of these plans as he sees them before taking any irrevocable action. (Aldrich is to obtain UK support as quickly as possible for a demarche along similar lines.) First, Mendes has assured us he would obtain a French decision on German rearmament before Assembly adjournment;

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to impose a new delaying condition prior to completion of ratification will be considered by all concerned in the US as final evidence that the last hope has proved vain. Holding still another meeting with the Soviets, in spite of how clearly the Soviets demonstrated their intransigence on the same question at the Berlin meeting, will be considered as further convincing proof of French unreliability.

The implications of Mendes' position would undermine the very basis of Franco-American relations and the future of NATO since it seems to amount to the fact that France is prepared to abandon EDC if the Soviets will agree to unify Germany by free elections. This can only mean that France will agree to neutralize Germany as a basis for unification, thereby splitting the basic Western position and solidarity and providing the Soviets with an opportunity they have sought for years. Mendes in effect will be offering to sacrifice the basis of Western security for German unity. Finally, Mendes' proposal would probably destroy Adenauer.

The Secretary feels that Mendes may perhaps be underestimating his own standing and prestige, that the respect he has won abroad must be reflected in French domestic opinion and that his forthright support of EDC would carry the day.

To Paris 552 8/12 (TS)

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RESERVE

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE  
EN GRANDE BRETAGNE

Londres le 11 août 1954

TELEGRAMME EN CLAIR P.S. COURRIER

DIPLOMATIE PARIS No 3123

Relations anglo-allemandes

Je me réfère au télégramme de Bonn 3445 (Londres 10.616).

J'ai à diverses reprises, depuis trois mois, attiré l'attention du Département sur les principales manifestations par lesquelles s'est marquée l'amélioration des relations anglo-allemandes.

Pour résumer l'évolution de ces relations depuis 10 ans et en déterminer les causes, on doit, je pense, noter essentiellement les points suivants:

- 1) De 1945 à 1949, le principal objectif de Londres est de mettre l'Allemagne en situation de subvenir à ses besoins et de ~~mettre~~ dispenser par là même la Trésorerie britannique de continuer les lourdes dépenses qu'elle doit faire pour compte allemand pendant les premières années de l'occupation. Le souci de poursuivre une politique germanique d'accord avec les Etats-Unis, ne serait-ce que pour des raisons d'ordre financier et économique, tend au même but. A quoi s'ajoute la traditionnelle réaction sentimentale - ou sportive - des Britanniques, qui leur fait tendre la main à l'ennemi vaincu; elle est d'ailleurs tempérée par la vivacité des sentiments germanophobes qui subsistent dans les masses populaires.
- 2) Avec la création en 1949 de la République Fédérale et l'arrivée au pouvoir du Chancelier Adenauer, l'Angleterre partage les préoccupations de ses allies tendant à "intégrer

0154/69

8/16/54

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TS Staff Summary

EUROPE:

(4700)

Bruce Comments on French EDC Proposals - Bruce comments that the French EDC proposals for the Brussels meeting are unacceptable beyond our worst expectations. His information is that Mendes drew up his proposals without any consultation with the pro-European leaders outside his cabinet and that the anti-EDC group in the Foreign Office was left to do the actual drafting. However, Bruce's pro-European informants insist that Mendes can and will accept complete abandonment of his proposals at Brussels if the other EDC countries stand firm.

Bruce states that the Mendes-France proposals, if accepted, would lose not only the votes of the pro-EDC Socialists but also of the pro-EDC factions in the MRP, Radical Socialist and independent parties. At the same time, Mendes has no commitment for a favorable vote from rightist deputies opposed to EDC. Bruce believes the Prime Minister has committed a perhaps irretrievable error, even in terms of French domestic politics. However, there remains a possibility the situation might be saved by judicious firmness on the part of the other countries at Brussels and by the US and UK not deviating from a resolute course.

Bruce requests that in view of the confused, chauvinistic and destructive nature of the proposals he be authorized to inform the President of the EDC Interim Committee that his authorization to sign the proposed agreement on external aid between the EDC and the US has been withdrawn until the results of the Brussels meeting are known and have been considered by the US. He also suggests 1) that the Secretary make a statement to the effect that the guarantees offered in the President's statement of April 16 may also have to be reconsidered after the Brussels meeting, and 2) that Dillon be instructed to inform Mendes that we will not enter into any discussion on a possible tripartite declaration on security until such time as the results of the Brussels conference are known and the French policy on EDC is definite.

Paris Coled 17, 19 8/15 (S)

US Position on Mendes' Plans - We have notified our missions in the EDC countries, the UK and Canada that we are deeply disturbed both by Mendes-France's outline of his plans and by what we firmly believe to be the inevitable implications thereof, and have authorized them to explain the substance of the US position. We are not reassured by Mendes' subsequent explanation and believe the whole tactic of tying

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1)  
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Western reaction to the Soviet notes with the French EDC ratification process is one which is fraught with danger for Western security. We are therefore most anxious to assure that the other countries should understand and support the US in its efforts to dissuade the French from this line of approach. The missions are also to point out that we remain strongly opposed to any alterations in the EDC treaty which are discriminatory or require resubmission to parliaments.

The British Charge in Paris advised our Embassy Friday that Churchill wished to associate himself with the Secretary's message to Mendes, delivered by Dillon that morning. The Charge hoped to see Mendes the following day.

To Brussels 159 8/14 (TS) Paris 630 8/13 (TS)

Mendes' Explanation of EDC Position - Following Dillon's presentation Friday of the US reaction to the French EDC position, Mendes stated that his position did not constitute a new delaying tactic. He claimed he was moving ahead as rapidly as he could to obtain ratification and even with such changes as might be agreed upon at Brussels there would still probably not be a majority for EDC unless it was possible to show that France's decision in favor of EDC is a peaceful one and does not shut the door on negotiations.

Mendes said he was not proposing holding another meeting with the Soviets but was proposing to make such a reply to the Soviet notes as would force them to clarify their position. The USSR must give clear proof of its good intentions by concessions such as an agreement to sign an Austrian treaty, or agreement to free elections in Germany, or real progress on disarmament or there would be no meeting as far as he was concerned. He fully agreed there was no present evidence that the USSR is prepared to make any of the concessions required.

The Prime Minister said he is not in favor of a neutralized Germany and feels that Germany, whether united or not, must be politically and militarily tied to the West. As to Adenauer's personal position, he felt that if he could arrive at a Franco-German agreement in Brussels and have this ratified it would strengthen both his own position and that of Adenauer.

Paris 614 8/13 (TS)

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~~Personal and Private~~

COPY OF MESSAGE FROM SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL  
TO SECRETARY DULLES, AUGUST 24, 1954

The visit passed off as follows. The first thing Mendes-France said, and we affirmed, was that he was absolutely sure that the Chamber would not, repeat not, agree to E. D. C. but were also determined that the matter should be debated. The French Cabinet were resolved to have a free vote. They would certainly be beaten but not probably by enough to have an election. Mendes-France seemed much hurt that everybody should have voted against France at Brussels. We made the obvious reply.

2. I was surprised to find that Mendes-France was himself much keener about N. A. T. O. I suppose it is because of the deep feeling in France that in E. D. C. they will be bound up in civil and military affairs with the much more active and powerful Western Germany, whereas in the N. A. T. O. system the United Kingdom and the United States of America counter-balance Germany to her proper proportions. He furnished no solution about how to persuade Germany to make some substitute for the E. D. C. safeguards. We told him that France would never get so good a bargain with Germany as they had got in E. D. C. He did not contradict this but pleaded helplessness. I was very sorry for him but gave him no comfort and pointed out that we should not agree to be governed by the impotence of the French Chamber. I was pleased at his attitude towards Adenauer and Germany.

3. Anthony who was with me for the three out of our four hour talk was in full agreement though we had no chance of talking things over beforehand. He said he would send you a fuller account from the Foreign Office.

4. Thank you very much for your message just received. I think that there is nothing that can be done before the impending debate in the Chamber and there will be time enough for our discussion after that result is known and you have finished your Manila expedition. I am now handing back to Anthony and wishing you all luck.

Kindest regards,

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59

SUBJECT SERIES

WINSTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

Box 10, Churchill-Eden  
Correspondence 1954/11

MR Y3-387#4  
BY DJH DATE 12/13/83

ALLIED POWERS EUROPE  
SUPREME COMMANDER

September 2, 1954

Dear Ike:

The purpose of this letter is to tell you of my "political" speeches later this month. A couple of weeks ago you suggested that an important conference might be held with Messrs. Allen and Robinson while I am in the U.S. I want you to know that my arm could be twisted sufficiently to cause me to agree to participate in such a meeting.

The Ministers of Defense will attend a maneuver in the Northern Army Group on September 26-27, and I shall be present for it. I shall leave Northern Germany on the afternoon of September 27th to fly directly to Los Angeles where I will talk at the American Federation of Labor Convention on the afternoon of September 28th. (I understand the President will precede me by 5 days) I speak in New York on the evening of September 29th; in St. Paul, Minnesota on the evening of September 30th, and again in the morning of October 1st; and finally in Des Moines, Iowa on either October 4 or 5 (the choice of date is up to me).


If the above schedule finds any gaps in your busy activities, please be assured that I am open to negotiations. In any case, I'll inform you of the status of the Republican Party Campaign after I have made this tour.

Also please allow me to remind you that you are going to give me a couple of readings on the results of your wine sampling.

As you can well imagine, we are currently in a state of confusion as to our future military planning for the defense of Europe. There is great bitterness both in France and among the other E.D.C. countries, and it will take some time before blood pressures are down to normal again.

I was impressed by the cleverness of Mendes-France in the parliamentary debates which took place on E.D.C. He is the sharpest article that has been seen around France for a long time. There are a good many people who think he is too sharp, but more time is needed to form an objective judgment on that point.

There is considerable talk in Paris now that there should be a conference of the three Occupying Powers and Western Germany prior to any NATO meeting. Personally, I think that would be a big mistake. The smaller countries -- and especially Belgium and the Netherlands -- have their noses badly out of joint, and I consider that their feelings must be carefully considered.



ACW / Adm / 16 / Guenther, Gen Almed




Incidentally, I thought that the Dulles statement was an excellent one and his recommendation that there be a NATO conference in the near future was very, very sound. Your Des Moines talk also had a favorable impact here. I was particularly glad to have you emphasize the strength of our over-all power position in spite of the current setback.

The Soviets are doing a very fine propaganda job these days, and they are making some headway with the wishful thinkers, and also with those people who are preaching coexistence. I am convinced that we are up against Big League competition in the propaganda field.

I am delighted to see that you are getting some rest. I note, however, that you are going to have to make many trips away from Denver, and these will undoubtedly be tiring.

All my best.

Devotedly,

A handwritten signature, likely of Dwight D. Eisenhower, is written in dark ink. To the right of the signature is a circular stamp. The text within the stamp is partially legible but appears to be a circular seal or stamp, possibly from the Eisenhower Library or a similar official source.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

9/10/54



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1954

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The United States position on the NATO "New Approach" studies, which was the subject of recent conversations and correspondence between our two Departments, has received further consideration, and the following confirms our understanding of the procedures agreed between our two Departments.

It is understood that The Standing Group of NATO will confer with the North Atlantic Council on September 15 with reference to progress on those studies, and on progress on programs for the 1953 Annual Review of NATO progress.

It is understood that General Collins, as Chairman of The Standing Group, will report to the Council along the following lines:

1. The Standing Group has the reports of the NATO Commanders under consideration, the outcome of which cannot be prejudged at this time. It is planned to process the Military Committee report to the Council on the schedule which the Standing Group provided to the Council in April.

2. The Standing Group desires to make two points clear to the Council at this time:

a. There is nothing in the "New Approach" studies which would change the urgent requirement that nations should comply with the 1953 Annual Review goals and should complete and implement the 1954 Annual Review.

b. These studies simply serve to emphasize the necessity of an effective German contribution to the defense of Western Europe.

It is

The Honorable  
Charles E. Wilson,  
Secretary of Defense.

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
11 June 54

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It is understood that General Collins would then, as the United States member of the Standing Group, state that since the assumption of a German contribution is an integral part of the "New Approach" studies, and as the position of the United States military authorities must be based on realistic possibilities of attainment, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, in light of the fact that the availability of such a contribution has been clouded by the failure of the EDC, will reserve their final comments until the possibility of an effective German contribution to the defense of the area has been clarified. Therefore, from the United States point of view, the draft report which on the proposed Standing Group schedule would be circulated to the Military Representatives Committee must, for the time being, be considered an international working paper only.


While the foregoing program is designed as the position to be taken in the Council on September 15, it is essential, if we are to be prepared to move forward as rapidly as events permit, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense urgently prepare their views on the many actions connected with the "New Approach" programs so that we can together develop a final United States position.

Sincerely,



Acting Secretary = Nedell Smith

4/15/54



SEP 15 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Use of Atomic Weapons in Support of NATO Forces

I understand that the JCS will consider this afternoon, in the light of the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary dated 26 August on this subject, action on the proposed report to the NATO Military Committee (MC 241/3), submitted by General Collins. I also understand that considerable differences of opinion still exist on this subject among the three Services. I have given considerable personal attention to this matter in the last few days and my purpose in this memorandum is to give you my views on where we stand, for such use as you may desire, in connection with the JCS consideration of the subject today.

Some form of an International Military Committee paper will be required in order for the U. S. to make any progress in obtaining the agreement and support of our Allies in an atomic strategy concept, particularly to attain the objectives recommended by the JCS in their memorandum to the Secretary dated 11 June. As I see it, what is needed at the present time is a U. S. opinion on the broad outlines of the strategy outlined in the NATO studies. We do not necessarily require an analysis of the details which, of course, will require development over the next sixty days. If the JCS do not agree with the broad principles of the NATO studies, we must know it as soon as possible before we get overly committed in that direction by rapidly moving events. If the JCS do agree with the broad outlines of the studies, such agreement is sufficient to move this matter along with our Allies over the next two or three months. It appears to me that where the JCS do not agree with the specifics indicated by the NATO studies, we must be prepared to tell the UK Representative to the Standing Group, as soon as practicable, in order that adjustments can be made. On these latter actions, however, we have more time than our consideration of the general principles.

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As far as SS 241/3 is concerned, the Department of State has already informed us that they consider that some adjustment in drafting may be required from their point of view before it can be agreed as a U. S. position. Therefore, it is obvious that further work must be done in the preparation of an agreed paper for the Military Committee. However, deferral by the JCS of recommendations on the broad principles we should be operating from may put us in the position of being overtaken by events. There is certainly no necessity for the JCS to provide the details on an urgent basis. In fact, details in this point would not be very useful in view of the attitude of the Department of State. What we really need is JCS recommendations regarding the general strategy and concept of operations indicated in Gruenther's plans in order that we can set the proper course for the events which, as you well know, are moving extremely rapidly regarding our European policy.

As an indication of the problems in procedure and timing which may face us on this matter, I am attaching for your information a copy of a proposed schedule of actions, which I intend to discuss with Dep. Secretary Anderson as soon as possible.

SIGNED

A. C. DAVIS  
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Inclosure - 1  
Copy of Action List and Timetable  
dated 14 September 1954

cc: General Truesdell

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# FOR THE PARLIAMENT

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TOP SECRET

REPORT ON SECRETARY'S CONVERSATIONS

WITH CHANCELLOR ADENAUER AND FOREIGN MINISTER EDEN

SEPTEMBER 16-17, 1954

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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integration policy, immediate objectives of sovereignty and German defense participation, revision of the Contractual agreements, utility and shortcomings of the Eden plan for revival of the Brussels Pact, and the importance of interim measures to forestall further delays. En route to the airport on Friday morning the Chancellor particularly reverted to the subject of interim measures. The Chancellor was assisted by State Secretary Hallstein, Under Secretary Blankenhorn, his confidential adviser Globke, Blank (head of the German defense agency), Ophuls and Grewe (legal advisers), and von Herwarth. Ambassador Conant and Mr. Dowling participated in the discussions, with Mr. Hensel, Mr. Merchant, and Mr. Bowie.

With regard to general policy toward France, the Chancellor was of opinion that the Secretary had done wisely in omitting Paris from his schedule. He felt that it was a bold move, since Mendes-France would no doubt take it personally; but on the whole he felt it would have a salutary effect. Without indicating any ill-will towards Mendes-France, the Chancellor appeared to regard him with detachment as a man who, either from his own personality or from the exigencies of French politics, was an exponent of an opportunist type of politics which could be dangerous. His dealings with the Soviets, or possible dealings with the Communists, should thus be explained, in the Chancellor's opinion, on the grounds of opportunism rather than any pro-Communist leanings. The Chancellor felt that Mendes-France was primarily interested in economic and financial matters, and could probably be most easily influenced on this side.

The Chancellor

TOP SECRET



9/18/54 9/18/54  
Chron

~~TOP SECRET~~

Personal and Private September 18, 1954



FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

I had a very friendly and useful stop in London. I first lunched privately with Churchill and Eden. The Prime Minister was in fine shape and sent you his best. He expressed his relief that the "EDC taxfoolery" was over. He said he had only supported it because you wanted it but had never had faith in it. Now we could get German armies to march by our side instead of having a "sludgy amalgam".

Then we had meeting at Foreign Office first on Europe, then on China.

I was disappointed that Eden has not arrived at anything concrete, even in general principles. It seems that Mendes-France has been most evasive. He may be working out his own project on terms which profess to provide for sovereignty of Germany in NATO but attaching conditions unacceptable to Germany, U.S. and perhaps others. He could present these French terms at prospective London Conference and, if they are not accepted, attempt to pass blame to others. This <sup>his</sup> was Brussels Conference tactic. I find evidence of a rising tide of concern about Mendes-France's Russian contacts. He has killed EDC at least for now and he may be out to kill German admission to NATO.

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DULLES, JOHN FOSTER: PAPERS, 1952-59

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SUBJECT SERIES

Authority MR 85-363#1  
By AKO NLE Date 9/5/85

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Personal and Private

Box 8, Germany  
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Personal and Private

I said I would attend London Conference. Eden wants September 28. I set in motion some preliminary planning to try to smoke out Mendes-France and concert UK-US thinking before Conference opens. I am reluctant to go into a major conference where there is so little preparatory work. But Eden thinks it necessary to maintain momentum and avoid vacuum. We are agreed a NATO Ministerial meeting would follow after short interval devoted to further preparation in detail.

On the China matter, we met on restricted basis. Eden listened with intense interest but was totally non-committal which was natural. He remarked that US action to defend Formosa was understandable and would have wide approval but that the same was not true of Guernsey and other islands near the mainland. I explained large psychological and lesser material relationship of these islands to Formosa but I fear he was not totally convinced. He will let me know shortly his views re appeal to UK.

I am spending weekend on my island and then shall go to NY for UK opening. Faithfully yours, Foster.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Personal and Private



P813  
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Sept. 18 msg. to  
President From Churchill

Message from the Prime Minister to the President

My dear Friend,

Thank you very much for your message of September 15. I am glad I was a good reporter. I made my living as a journalist. I believe you have them in your country too.

2. Foster lunched with me and Anthony today and we had an agreeable and helpful talk. As you know, E.D.C. was very different from the grand alliance there I opened at Strasbourg in August, 1950. I disliked on military grounds the Ploven European army plan which began with mixing races in companies if not platoons. At that time when I saw you in Paris I was talking of it as "sludgy amalgam". However, when I came to power again I swallowed my prejudices because I was led to believe that it was the only way in which the French could be persuaded to accept the limited German army which they require. I do not blame the French for rejecting E.D.C. but only for inventing it. Their harshness to Schuman in wasting three years of his life and much of his power is a tragedy. Also I accepted the American wish to show all possible patience and not to compromise the chances of E.D.C. by running N.A.T.O. as a confusing rival.

3. All this time I kept one aim above all others in view, namely a German contribution to the defence of an already uniting Europe. This, I felt, was your aim too, and I am sure we both liked the plan better when the intermingling was excluded from all units lower than a division. But it was to get a German army looking eastward in the line with us that commanded my thought, and also I felt yours, with all its military authority. Although the French have rejected E.D.C. I do hope and pray that you and I will still keep the German contribution as our No. 1 target and also to get them on our side instead of on the other.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 34 (b)

MR 83-38646

BY

DATE

11/30/83

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER PAPERS, 1952-59

SUBJECT SERIES

Box 10, Churchill-Edg  
Correspondence 1954 (1)

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- 2 -

4. When Anthony recently proposed taking the Brussels Treaty of 1948 turned upside down, as a model for preserving the cause of European unity, coupled with a variant of H.A.T.O. to include Germany, I thought it was a first rate plan. I hope earnestly that it will commend itself to you. It may lead on as time passes to United Europe and also gain for us both what we have tried for so hard, namely, the German comradeship. Now Foster tells me that there is a widespread feeling in America that it has not got any, or at least enough, "supra-national" characteristics. I hope this will not prevent you giving it all the help you can. European federation may grow but it cannot be built. It must be a volunteer not a conscript.

5. After all if the realities can be achieved and if Truentner can form a front including French and German armies by whose side we and you stand, we need not worry too much about the particular theories which are favoured or rebuffed. Above all, we should not lose sight of the fact that we have worked so long and hard to win may now be within our grasp.

6. I have been distressed to hear talk (not from Foster) about the withdrawal of American forces from Europe and even that a German contingent might fill the gap. If the U.S. loses or seems to lose its interest in Europe there might well be a landslide into Communism or into a bow-towing to Soviet influence and infiltration which would reduce the continent to satellite status. I really do not see how we British could stay there by ourselves.

7. Forgive me burdening you with all this, but I feel it a great comfort when I am sure our thoughts are marching along the same roads. You may imagine how pleased I was by your applying the word "perfect" to my message to Adenauer.

Kindest regards,

WINSTON


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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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Op-00/mm  
Ser 0009P00

21 SEP 1954

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I understand that pursuant to an agreed position of the Department of State and the Department of Defense, the United States Representative to the Military Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, will inform the British and French members of the Standing Group that until assurances are received that there will be an adequate German contribution to the defense of Western Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be unable to comment on the Standing Group papers and on the NATO Capabilities Studies for 1957 from which these papers were derived.

The Chief of Naval Operations has advised me that the Capabilities Studies for 1957 by SACEUR, SACLANT and CHANCOM are under active consideration in the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of arriving at a position in regard to these studies. He has further advised me that preliminary examination by the Navy Planners indicates that the Standing Group papers do not in all respects accurately reflect the studies themselves, for example, in overemphasizing the "two-phase" concept of a war in 1957 and a likely early conclusion, with consequent playing down of the necessity for providing balanced armed forces and planning and preparing for extended operations.

The NATO Capabilities Studies carry far-reaching implications of grave significance to our national security. The Navy Department is, therefore, actively reviewing these studies for the purpose of developing Departmental views.

Of the three studies under consideration, SACEUR's study appears to be controlling. It, however, rests on certain assumptions which require thorough exploration. For example, General Gruenther says that in order for his plan to succeed there must be an effective air defense in the NATO area of Europe. He has pointed out that such a defense does not exist today. In addition, General Gruenther has proposed a large number of program recommendations which he says will require very considerable increases in cost and resources. So far as I know there has not yet been any estimate made of the ultimate cost necessary to adapt our forces and their supporting facilities to fulfill the special requirements which would be imposed by our acceptance of the "New Approach."

Another matter of concern to me has to do with the changes in the fighting potential of our armed forces which might result from an adoption of

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Page 1 of 2 Pages

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SecDef. Cont. No. 0615

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this new NATO concept. As you know, we have a considerable portion of our armed forces assigned to NATO. On the other hand we have world-wide responsibilities which will require us to use, or to have ready for use, many of the same forces in parts of the world other than Europe. It may well develop that if we tailor the size, the composition and the organization of our armed forces to fit special NATO needs in Western Europe we will not be prepared to meet military responsibilities which may develop in other parts of the world. This certainly is a matter which will require our earnest study.

In addition it seems to me that common prudence would preclude the adoption of what to some appears to be a concept of a single strategy which might destroy the versatility and adaptability of our armed forces to meet possible or probable circumstances for which this strategy may not be applicable. I do not believe it necessary to expand on this point since I am sure you are well aware not only of its importance but of the many factors involved.

In view of the above, I hope that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Departments will be afforded sufficient time to make a thorough analyses of the NATO Capabilities Studies in order to establish a completely sound position on them. I will keep you advised on the development of the views of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

*C. S. Thomas*

Honorable C. E. Wilson  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C.

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Page 2 of 2 Pages

NAVY CONT. NO. *TS-4461*

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File 87/669

669

9/24/54



FRIDAY  
September 24, 1954  
10:19 a.m.

# TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT

The Pres. called Gen. Smith, and then the Sec. talked. I did not monitor S.'s conversation, so did not get in at the beginning.

The Sec. said the British are with us. If we can bring Germany into NATO and establish reasonable controls using the Brussels Pact, we will be all right. We don't know if Mendes-France is going to go into a neutralist game and play with them in Germany. If he is honestly trying to find a fair substitute, he can get it. If he makes excuses to bust it up etc., he can do that. The Pres. talked of giving Dillon the job under some other excuse of talking to MF and dropping a hint to let him know that we are not completely blind about his being able to play a double game. The Sec. said some of our friends in Europe like Monnet think MF is playing a double game here. Spaak is not sure of him either. We don't know yet what he is up to. The Sec. referred to the letter he just wrote to the Pres. He also referred to the French being here next week on financial talks. Defense and Stassen want to be rough about cutting off all the help. The Sec. said he thinks we don't want to be so drastic that we give MF an excuse to switch. The Pres. said he told Stassen that anything we talk about reduction etc., we do in a sad voice. Say something to the effect we want to go along, but here is the decision of Congress. Isn't this too bad - we can do a little. The Sec. thinks it is best to be non-committal. The Pres. would like them to see the real validity of a Congressional decision here. The Sec. said if we can get the French to go along and bring Germany into NATO, we can afford to be tougher in other respects. The Pres. said he thought if we can do this, we can go along without going to Congress.

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CDD/ISR by 11/12/89

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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☐ With concurrence of  
☒ Declassify in part and excise as shown  
ED 12356, Sec. 1.3 (1) (5)  
ACDC/ISR by 11/12/89

9/24/54

## TELEPHONE CALLS SERIES

Box 10

White House Memos - Telephone

Conv. July 1, 1954 - Oct. 30, 1954(1)



FRIDAY

September 24, 1954

10:19 a.m.

*For*  
*[Signature]*

## TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT

The Pres. called Gen. Smith, and then the Sec. talked. I did not monitor S.'s conversation, so did not get in at the beginning.

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pdb

*W/ke/TC/10/11/54*  
*W/ke/WM/12/11/54*

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Authority

MR 84-326 #1

By

bc

NLE Date

10/31/85

PORTION3 EXEMPTED

E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (2X3X5)

NISC Letter 8/15/85

NLE DATE

10/18/85



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FAV 1452-54, I, 527

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MEMORANDUM

October 12, 1954

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : EUR - Mr. Elbrick

E.I.E./M

SUBJECT: Status of Program on NATO "New Approach" Studies.

On Wednesday, October 6, 1954 we met with General Gruenther in the Pentagon to get his views on the program on the NATO "New Approach" studies.

In essence, it is his position that we should get North Atlantic Council approval at the Ministerial Meeting in December of the proposed Military Committee Report, the draft of which has been modified along the lines authorized by you while you were in London.

However, General Gruenther does not believe that we should push at this time for express agreements in NATO on the right to use nuclear weapons. He believes that getting a plan approved in principle, as the draft Military Committee Report provides, will permit implementation in fact to take place and lay the groundwork for any future action.

We are unofficially informed that after the meeting, General Gruenther discussed the matter with Admiral Radford and that they agreed to disagree on the above topic.

A copy of the transcript of the meeting with General Gruenther is attached as Tab A. I recommend that you give it your personal attention, inasmuch as so much of the action in preparation for the December meeting will call for your own personal thought and guidance.

After the meeting, the Department of Defense sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting their views.

A copy thereof is attached hereto as Tab B. Your attention is particularly directed to Paragraph 4(f) thereof, commencing at the bottom of Page 2.

The present timetable calls for the Secretary of Defense and yourself to submit your recommendations for a program on the NATO "New Approach" studies to the President about November 1, and we will be, in the ensuing weeks, preparing the necessary staff work for that action.

cc: S/P - Mr. Bowie  
S/AE - Mr. Smith  
C - Mr. MacArthur  
EUR - Mr. Elbrick  
RA - Mr. Moore

EUR:RA:JJWolf:et  
10/11/54

EUR  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Barbour  
TOP SECRET  
G - Mr. Goodyear

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10/11/54

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USMC/22

**PROTOCOL ON THE TERMINATION OF THE OCCUPATION REGIME  
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

Concluded at Paris on October 23, 1954, Between the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Article 1

1. On the entry into force of the present Convention the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic (hereinafter and in the related Conventions sometimes referred to as "the Three Powers") will terminate the Occupation regime in the Federal Republic, revoke the Occupation Statute and abolish the Allied High Commission and the Offices of the Land Commissioners in the Federal Republic.

2. The Federal Republic shall have accordingly the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs.

Article 2

In view of the international situation, which has so far prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace settlement, the Three Powers retain the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement. The rights and responsibilities retained by the Three Powers relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security are dealt with in Articles 4 and 5 of the present Convention.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by MR

DATE June 27, 1991

☒ RELEASE ☒ DECLASSIFY

☐ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY IN PART

☐ DENY ☐ Non-responding (NS)

FOI, EO or RA exemptions \_\_\_\_\_

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☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C, OADR

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Copy No. 1 of 8 copies  
consisting of 3 pages and  
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Memorandum of Conversation

WHITE HOUSE

DATE: Nov. 3, 1954  
12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: NATO "New Approach" Studies

XC NATO

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary Dulles  
Secretary Wilson  
Adm. Radford  
Gen. Collins  
Adm. Davis  
Col. Billups  
Col. Goodpaster (White House staff)  
Livingston T. Merchant

COPIES TO: S/S (For the Secretary, Under Secretary and  
Deputy Under Secretary)

C

H

S/MSA

S/AE

EUR

Adm. Davis

Col. Goodpaster

1-1403

The meeting with the President was requested jointly by Secretaries Dulles and Wilson to present to and discuss with the President the memorandum entitled "Recommended U.S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy" signed by the two Secretaries.

After a brief introduction of the subject, the Secretary of State suggested that General Collins describe the background of this project and its present status. Gen. Collins did so concisely but comprehensively. [Toward the end of his presentation he pointed out that whereas the military view was that rights should be obtained immediately from our Allies for nuclear use of bases in their territories in event of war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the judgment of the Secretary of State (which was shared by General Gruenther) that it was undesirable to seek precise agreements at this time. There was no disagreement expressed with this view.]

General Collins then pointed out that for use in discussions at the military level with our Allies before the Council meeting and, in particular, for use at the Ministerial Council meeting of NATO in December, it was important to be able to give assurances that (a) the nuclear weapons to implement agreed NATO plans would be available to U.S. forces assigned to NATO Commanders, and (B) in presenting programs for military assistance to the Congress the

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By RTG

4.3.1984

11/4/54  
Rec'd 11/4/54  
dated: Nov 11/2(?)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommended U. S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy.

In December the Military Committee will render a report to the North Atlantic Council, in accordance with previous directions, on "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years". The Standing Group has prepared a draft of this report based upon special capabilities studies prepared by the major NATO commands which take into account the availability of nuclear weapons. This proposed report will state that Soviet aggression against NATO nations can be deterred or defeated if, and only if, NATO forces have the capability both to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack and to deliver an immediate effective nuclear counter-attack. The report will also assert that, in the possibility of a full-scale Soviet attack without employing nuclear weapons, NATO would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe without immediate employment by NATO of nuclear weapons, both strategically and tactically.

The positions to be taken on this matter by U. S. Representatives in the various NATO military and civilian agencies involve important aspects of foreign policy and strategic plans, and should, therefore, reflect your authorization and possible Congressional consultation. The Departments of State and Defense have reviewed the proposed report prepared by the Standing Group in the light of both the current international situation and the policies indicated by NSC action regarding arrangements for the use of nuclear weapons. This review established the following significant points which are consonant with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Gruenther.

1. U. S.

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- 2 -

1. U. S. objectives regarding a nuclear strategy for NATO, under present conditions, should be:

a. To develop in the NATO Alliance a nuclear capability as an indispensable element in providing a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

4. While it is believed undesirable to attempt any concerted NATO program for the specific development of public opinion, it is considered desirable to direct the attention of the NATO Ministers to the common political problem facing each of them, i.e., that each must soberly and carefully seek to develop public opinion in their own country to tacitly accept the new situation.

5. In order

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
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- 3 -

5. In order to obtain acceptance by the North Atlantic Council in December of the nuclear concept embodied in the Military Committee Report, the Executive Branch of the U. S. Government must be prepared to give assurance that nuclear weapons in the hands of U. S. forces in NATO will be in sufficient quantity and available to support agreed NATO plans. Otherwise the other members of NATO would be depending on this strategy without any assurance of NATO's ability to accomplish it. Any such assurances should be clearly limited to the form of a declaration of intention of the President, in order to conform with constitutional limitations, as explained by the Secretary of State at the London Nine-Power Conference.

6. It is not clear at this time what adjustments in forces and equipment, both of the U. S. and of our Allies, will be required for this new NATO concept. There is little hope, however, that the new system of weapons will cost less than the system it replaces, and it might well cost more. The development of U. S. forces is continually taking into account plans for nuclear weapons, including NATO plans. However, it is possible that these developments in NATO could involve considerable changes in our Military Assistance Program both in types of equipment and expenditures, such as would be involved in an expanded European air defense and early warning system. We should be prepared, if required, to give assurance to NATO that the Executive Branch will use its best efforts with the Legislative Branch in support of military assistance programs required to accomplish the new concept.

Based upon the foregoing, the two Departments suggest, for your approval, the following guidelines for U. S. actions on this subject leading into the December Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council:



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4. U. S. actions will be designed to limit, insofar as possible, the political problems inherent in a NATO nuclear concept. However, in the event discussion of these political issues is required at the December Council Meeting we should be prepared to inform our Allies that it is U. S. policy that (a) we will not wage a preventive war, (b) we will be prepared to explore reasonable bona fide disarmament proposals, and (c) that under existing circumstances a nuclear capability is an indispensable element in providing a deterrent to Soviet armed aggression, with or without nuclear weapons, or Soviet intimidation of NATO by threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

5. In addition to the foregoing action the U. S. will as soon as possible propose to the Permanent Council a formal agreement concerning the release of certain atomic information to NATO, as provided for in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Necessary procedural steps with the Legislative Branch required by the Atomic Energy Act will take place during January and February 1955, the earliest time that Congress will be in session long enough to satisfy these procedural requirements. It is not considered advisable to attempt to utilize that agreement as a quid pro quo for rights to use nuclear weapons from foreign soil.

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- 5 -

It is recommended (a) that you approve the foregoing course of action and guidelines, and (b) that, in view of the important domestic and international political aspects, you take the necessary steps to consult as appropriate with Congressional leaders on the assurances set forth in Paragraph 3 of the proposed guidelines.

  
Secretary of State



  
Secretary of Defense

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11/4/54

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommended U. S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy.

In December the Military Committee will render a report to the North Atlantic Council, in accordance with previous directions, on "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Four Years". The Standing Group has prepared a draft of this report based upon special capabilities studies prepared by the major NATO commands which take into account the availability of nuclear weapons. This proposed report will state that Soviet aggression against NATO nations can be deterred or defeated if, and only if, NATO forces have the capability both to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack and to deliver an immediate effective nuclear counter-attack. The report will also assert that, in the possibility of a full-scale Soviet attack without employing nuclear weapons, NATO would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe without immediate employment by NATO of nuclear weapons, both strategically and tactically.

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1. U. S.

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Authority MK 83-417#1

LCB NLE Date 1/31/84

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 (a)(1)(3)(5)

DOD 8/2/83, State 1/4/84

NLE DATE 1/31/84

AWF/Dulles-Menden 5/7/ "Dulles, John Foster Nov. '54 (2)"

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- 2 -

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
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- 5 -

It is recommended (a) that you approve the foregoing course of action and guidelines, and (b) that, in view of the important domestic and international political aspects, you take the necessary steps to consult as appropriate with Congressional leaders on the assurances set forth in Paragraph 3 of the proposed guidelines.

  
Secretary of State

  
  
Secretary of Defense

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## STUDY GROUP REPORTS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Chairman: Gordon Dean  
Research Director: Carroll L. Wilson  
Rapporteur: Kelsey Marechal

First Meeting  
November 8, 1954

Digest of Discussion

(This digest has not been edited by the participants)

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21

Baldwin Pp (Total), Box 125, A/du 23

Dr. Smyth felt that an attack of this sort would not, however, destroy the power to retaliate; Mr. Dean suggested that "immobilize" would be the better term since most of our energies would be devoted to the merest survival efforts. Mr. Nash thought that the US could absorb such a blow and still have the capacity to retaliate. Actually, Mr. Dean observed, it is only for purposes of discussing weapons effects that we assume the first Soviet strike to be aimed against urban targets; it is more likely that the first blow would fall on SAC command centers and air bases throughout the world.

Mr. Pace epitomized atomic stalemate, then, as continuing until such time as the USSR can destroy our SAC, disperse its own targets completely, or defend itself adequately, since as long as the US retains atomic leadership there will be no war. He suggested that this stalemate might continue for five years, fifty years, or even indefinitely. Dr. Kelly said he is willing to go along with the five year estimate.

*5 lines really balanced in DR by*

Mr. Nitze questioned the existence of a stalemate by asking if it were not the case that, in response to Soviet attacks on Western Europe, the US would use atomic devices. Mr. Pace agreed that surely the preponderance of power lies in the nuclear field, for not only a surprise attack but also any form of aggression would be an invitation to use the atom bomb. When Dr. Rabi suggested that all weapons are in fact based on the ultimate power of atomic devices, Mr. Pace concurred, stating that this is particularly the case when a "picket line" has been drawn, across which the enemy may not step without grave risk. Gen. McCormack felt that such a line must necessarily be drawn. Mr. Baldwin cautioned that if a line is established and violated, then the US is committed to retaliatory action which in turn invites Soviet strategic bombing, at least of Western Europe. If this is the case, Mr. Dean asked whether the upshot is not that the US is forestalled from using any atomic device; Mr. Baldwin thought that it is, by the political pressure of its allies. He went on to redefine atomic stalemate as "the unwillingness to use the atom but not the unwillingness to use force".

#### Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Pace felt, further, than the atom might be only an extension of tactical weapons in a limited war. He cautioned, however, that the advantages of tactical atomic weapons must be weighed against the political liability of alienating world opinion. Mr. Nitze added that there would seem, therefore, to be another alternative, that of the use of tactical atomic devices in a limited war while the strategic stalemate continues. In answer to Mr. Perkins' question, Gen. McCormack said that the line between conventional and nuclear armaments grows dimmer with passing time; no country, that is to say, can begin a limited war without being prepared to accept the risks of total war.

Mr. Baldwin asserted that this country must retain its ability to fight with conventional weapons; but, as Dr. Kelly added, the time will approach when conventional weapons are atomic weapons. Mr. Pace disagreed, since atomic devices have different degrees of effectiveness under different

conditions of terrain. Mr. Dean felt that one must assume that a tactical atomic weapon will be effective in a given situation and then pose the question: can the US forbear using it? Mr. Pace reiterated his previous point that the use of such devices may have greater political disadvantages than military advantages.

Dr. Berkner felt that stalemate, in any definition, is a myth; either the US or the USSR will be willing to use atomic devices to achieve "vital" goals. Mr. Noyes suggested that it is vital, after all, that a nation not commit suicide in order to achieve a goal.

#### Mr. Halaby's Five Point Program

Mr. Halaby remarked that nearly all the members of the group have either "made" or "used" atomic devices and he called for a more political approach to the problem. He then stated five basic US foreign policy requirements, with the emphasis on political rather than military factors:

- (1) Prevent a nuclear war
- (2) Win a nuclear war if it occurs.
- (3) Stop local aggression at the locality.
- (4) Stop local aggression at its source.
- (5) Preserve the solidarity of the free world.

Mr. Dean agreed with the first of these five points but balked at the second; he felt that the US is not prepared, at this moment, to win a nuclear war.


Mr. Nitze thought that Mr. Halaby's points were well-taken but he would go one step further and make the primary goal the preservation of the United States and the continuance of a "salutary" world environment, thus placing the avoidance of war second. Even if war were to destroy the world as we know it today, still the US must win that war decisively. Furthermore, he would expect most policy planners to agree that, in the final analysis, the preservation of the US is the overriding goal, not the fate of our allies.

The atomic bomb has perhaps acted as a war-deterrent so far, Mr. Lillienthal suggested, but although it has avoided total war it has certainly not prevented Soviet aggression.

Mr. Nitze amplified his previous statement by saying that political success depends upon the military situation. Mr. Pace agreed, adding that to deter war a country must have the capacity to win that war and must make that clear to the potential enemy. Mr. Dean concurred but remarked that this country has not always made its intentions clear to the enemy nor has it always been prepared mentally to face the consequences of its actions. We know what we want to do with regard to war, Mr. Dean went on, but perhaps the people are not yet ready to assess the alternatives publicly.



ALLIED POWERS EUROPE  
SUPREME COMMANDER



Dear Ike -

Sunday,

Thursday we had Premier & Mme Mendes-Fr. and the Dillons for lunch. We found the Premier and his wife to be very cordial. She is in fact extra Charming. Even Queen Grace is singing her praises - and that doesn't always happen. The P.M. should use her more.

I had asked them - little believing that he could or would accept - so that it might form the basis of some "small talk" when he gets to Washington. M.F. looked at the fish - (he knows something about trout; believes a couple of pike in the pool will make the fish more healthy and improve their flavor) - at the house - at the Schuyler and Snyder's house and at the stereo-artist slides. So if you want to get off to a good start Thursday noon I suggest you tell him how much you enjoyed that house - and what a fine job the French Government did in fixing it up. He had not

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ALLIED POWERS EUROPE  
SUPREME COMMANDER

seen it before - nor did he even know there was such a project, but it pleased him very much to see how well the French had carried it through.

Or if you do not like the house as an opening gambit you might start off with "I see that the Socialists refuse to join your cabinet except under almost-blackmail conditions!" Either approach will get M.F. under way - one with a smile and the other with a growl.

The Socialist action is unfortunate, and it ~~will~~ cause him trouble. Nevertheless I still think he will survive and I believe we should place our confidence in him. The Country is very strongly behind him. But as you know very well, that is not what they pay off on here. He has many many enemies in the Parliament. This last week he picked up some new enemies out of Parliament when he launched an attack on alcoholism in France. That action is needed and it takes a brave man to carry through.

Somehow I trust you will get a chance to greet Madame M.F. I don't see that on the schedule but then I don't know all of the details. I am pleased that Mamie will see her at the Janet Dillies luncheon.

In other words I think that the alliance can be strengthened by increasing cordiality with M.F. & Co.

The Soviet note of yesterday gives me more confidence that our side is doing quite well in spite of our pains. I am delighted you continue to enjoy such excellent health.  
Devotedly  
-AL

NATO nuc - strap

11/16/54

November 16, 1954

will be required. The Congress may challenge the wisdom of making such a release, prior to reaching formal agreement that it would be used from foreign soil. There are two basic points.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:** (informal statement) planning that they are to conduct effective operations, and second, the

1. State and Defense suggest that, in tomorrow's meeting with the Congressional leaders, you open the discussion on endorsement of NATO nuclear strategy by making these points:

a. Necessity and desirability of basing NATO military plans and preparations on the concept that an effective atomic capability is indispensable to a maximum deterrent and essential to defense in Western Europe. General Gruenther developed the basic NATO study through eight months' work; State and Defense have worked out proposed U. S. action on it during the past four months.

b. First element of proposed action is to secure NATO-wide approval of the concept of the capability to use A-weapons as a major element of military operations in event of hostilities. For this purpose, the U. S. should be prepared, if required, subject to constitutional limitations, to give assurances that A-weapons would be available in the hands of U. S. forces for such operations.

c. Second element is to reorient the pattern of NATO military forces toward the new type of operations. To this end, the U. S. should be prepared to give assurances, if required, that present and future U. S. military assistance will be geared into and make an appropriate contribution toward the development of forces prepared for integrated action generally as called for in the NATO studies. It would be understood, of course, that Congress retains its full power to act upon proposals for military aid programs.



2. There is some likelihood that the Congressmen will ask what the U. S. gets in return for these assurances -- specifically, whether we shouldn't receive from the European countries authority to conduct atomic operations from bases in their territory. General Gruenther feels, and State and Defense strongly support him, that it would be unwise to press for categorical commitments -- rather that the Europeans should be led into the atomic era gradually and tacitly.

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3. Some release of atomic information -- for example letting NATO commanders know how many weapons they should base their plans on --

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
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will be required. The Congressmen may challenge the wisdom of making such a release, prior to receiving formal agreement that A-weapons can be used from foreign soil. There are two basic points: first, commanders must have at least minimum essential planning data, if they are to conduct effective operations, and second, the "quid pro quo" is in the acceptance by NATO of the new concept, not in seeking formal commitments for automatic use of a nature the U. S. would not itself be prepared to give.

A. J. Goodpaster

Colonel, CE, U. S. Army





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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: Nov. 20, 1954

SUBJECT: NATO "New Approach"

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PARTICIPANTS: Premier Mendes-France  
Ambassador Bonnet  
The Secretary  
Mr. Merchant

COPIES TO: S/S (2), EUR, WE, RA, DEFENSE (Sec. Hensel), S/AE  
G, S/P, C.

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The French Premier referred to the "new approach" studies of NATO and said that they had been discussed at length in the French National Defense Council which had agreed to the proposals as put forward by General Gruenther and the Standing Group. He said, however, that the subject matter was too serious to be left exclusively in military hands. Political decisions of the highest level would be required in an emergency. He then referred to an arrangement during the war whereby all great military questions were decided personally between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. He felt that similar arrangements, but including France, should be established to deal with questions of this nature in the event of war or its imminent threat. In other words, what was needed was a high level political Standing Group. He went on to say that he was not making a formal proposal at the moment but wanted to notify us that we would be receiving a proposal in the near future along these lines.

There was then some discussion of the NATO alert system and its broader application. Mendes-France was quite firm that France should participate with the ~~UK and the~~ U.S. in all great decisions.

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Mendes-France then mentioned briefly to the Secretary the fact that he hoped we could promptly close the current negotiations being conducted by Mr. James Wilson of the Defense Department in Paris concerning matters arising from the presence of the U.S. forces in France. He mentioned specifically housing and claims and the fact that agreements had already been concluded on similar matters with the British and the Canadians. The fact that ours had been prolonged is a source of some irritation. He said he hoped we would try to push them to a conclusion. The Secretary indicated that he would ask Defense to accelerate as much as possible the arrival at an agreement.

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Conference ~~to~~ with Senator Knowland 11/28/54.

Conference underway. Knowland referred to press conference of yesterday. President explained that he said he would consult with bipartisan members on all security measures "we are going to make bipartisanship work." As far as other things are concerned, circumstances have to dictate what we do. Referred to last year calling up Democrats to get them on my ~~my~~ side. President said newspapers were trying to get him to say he was going to have same kind of meetings with Democrats this coming year as he had had with Republicans; that he did not say that. President said he was trying to be a little bit cautious. If the Democrats themselves ask to come see him every so often, or periodically, he doesn't think he would refuse but I am going to make it clear that they ask.

Knowland said he wanted to be clear on procedures; President said no procedure. Knowland asked about a meeting late December or early January a meeting of various chairman. President thinks one morning's work will do it.

Apparently some question of Millikin retiring. President hopes if he does, he will do it while still have a Republican governor in Colorado.

President said Knowland could proceed roughly on same pattern as last year.

President then said: "Now there is one thing as long as you are here, that I have been thinking about, one thing that you apparently don't know that you should know and that is this. In the conduct of foreign affairs, we do so many things that we can't explain that once in a while something happens to us and we can't explain that. Now apparently there is a very great aggressiveness on our side that you have not known about and I guess that is on the theory of why put burdens on people that they don't need to know about, and therefore make them fearful that they give away something. I know so many things that I am almost afraid to speak to my wife. Now in the way of a reconnaissance and a great many things we are very active and there are a great many risky decisions on my part constantly, so that once ~~in~~ in a while something happens and I just don't dare let it lead to a question in the United Nations. You apparently think we are just sitting supinely and letting the people do as they please. Here's the thing to remember: suppose one day we get in war; if too many people knew we had done anything provocative -- so what I am asking is -- take a look at these things -- I have never tried to make a rubber stamp out of any congress or any one, and I realize there must be a close understanding between us, but I do try to spare other people some of the things I do. I admit you are a man of convictions, but we do have a party and that party can be effective only if generally speaking it is together in its appearance before the whole world -- I don't mean in details, but I do mean in general. I just want to say that we might have to answer to charges of being too provocative rather than being too sweet. There are somethings that could be argued interminably - ~~some~~ one could make an argument for termination of diplomatic relationship but that is a step toward war; if you do that, then the next question is, are you ready to attack. Well, I am not ready to attack." Knowland's answer was indistinct, he did not want to take the President's time this morning to discuss it.

President then asked Knowland to tell Jerry Persons he agreed ~~about~~ about one meeting and to tell him what he thought President should have ready to present.

Discussion

*Grouping Paper (MC 48)*

*12197*

1. Further study and development are required to determine what adjustments in forces and equipment will be required for the pattern of NATO forces called for in MC 48. Consequently no definitive cost figures are now available. Paragraph 24, MC 48, states "It has not yet been possible for assessment to be made of the cost involved in carrying out the measures necessary to enable our forces in Europe to fight effectively in an atomic war. Many of the most important of these measures are not ones involving heavy expenditures in either money or resources; others will be costly."

2. It is not clear at this time specifically what adjustments in forces and equipment, both of the U.S. and of our allies, will be required for this new NATO concept. There is little hope, however, that the new system of weapons will cost less than the system it replaces and it might well cost more. The development of U.S. forces is continually taking into account plans for nuclear weapons including NATO plans. It is possible, however, that these developments in NATO could involve considerable changes in our military assistance program, both in types of equipment and expenditures, such as would be involved in an expanded equipment air defense and air warning system. These matters are presently under study by U.S. governmental agencies and no definitive conclusions have been reached at this time.

3. Even before the Ministerial Meeting on the 1953 Annual Review, it was evident that some NATO countries were hoping for development of new weapons and new tactics to reduce requirements for conventional forces, and thus permit some relaxation in the pace of the defense build up and reduction in their defense expenditures. It has been obvious that the problem of the impact of new weapons on the military strength pattern has to be settled in order for the defense build up to proceed with the full confidence of the NATO members. Repeated military advice to the effect that nothing in the new studies gives any reason to believe that the introduction of new weapons would decrease the size of the minimum essential forces below those foreseen in the 1953 Annual Review, has not prevented decreases already planned by some countries. The fact that the introduction of new weapons to the NATO defense picture is supplemental rather than substitutive has not been driven home and generally accepted.

4. For the period covered by the Military Committee Report atomic weapons for NATO will consist almost entirely of those in the hands of U.S. forces. It may be erroneously inferred therefore that the other members can relax behind the U.S. atomic shield. Atomic weapons developed by our NATO allies, particularly the British, are a possibility for the future but this possibility is not definitive enough for the present report. The question as to whether the U.S. intends to make atomic weapons available to allied forces instead of keeping them solely in the hands of U.S. NATO forces, as now planned, will have to be periodically reviewed in the light of future developments.

*Shaw's question  
on this move  
from part*

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NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, PARIS,  
DECEMBER, 1954

Establishment of Requirements, Priorities and Costing Estimates

Recommended U.S. Position

1. Discourage any discussion of specific cost aspects at this time as premature.
2. The pattern of forces set forth in the Military Committee Report calls for gradual and progressive development of an integrated NATO atomic capability and, consequently, costing studies of force adjustments should properly be handled through the Annual Review procedure after the Military Authorities develop requirements and priorities.
3. There is little hope that the new pattern of forces will cost less than existing forces and they may cost more. There is therefore no valid reason for any reduction in the level of defense expenditures or programmed forces by member governments.
4. The composition of U.S. forces assigned to NATO has already begun to take account of the plans for a NATO atomic capability. For the period covered by MC 48 it is realized that atomic weapons for NATO will be almost entirely those in the hands of U.S. NATO forces.
5. Present and future U.S. Military assistance will be reoriented in so far as lies within the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government in such a manner so that this assistance will be geared into and contribute toward development of forces prepared for the integrated action called for in MC 48.

Anticipated Position of Other Members

1. Some members may try to have a detailed examination of the cost factors involved prior to taking action on the concepts of MC 48. It is unrealistic to lay out any price tags at this time, and the United States should oppose any action which would utilize the cost factor as an excuse for deferral of Council action on MC 48. In any event MC 48 should be approved - and subsequently nations can decide how much and how fast they can implement the adjustments which will be required. This process will take several years.
2. Some NATO nations have indulged in wishful thinking that the utilization of new weapons would provide a panacea whereby defense efforts could be relaxed. The Military Committee studies indicate that the new weapons are supplemental to conventional forces under development, not substitutive and, therefore, there is no justification whatsoever for relaxation of defense programs now underway.

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NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, PARIS  
DECEMBER, 1954

Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next  
Few Years: Contingency Paper on Dual-Purpose Force

Recommended U.S. Position

1. If some other delegation raises question of developing NATO forces capable of responding to non-nuclear attack with non-nuclear weapons, so as to avoid nuclear war, U.S. position should be;

a. It is understood that MC 48 was based upon the military authorities' assessment of the resources reasonably foreseeable available to NATO nations.

b. The subject of the possibility of developing a dual-purpose NATO force may properly be the subject of consideration.

c. Any further study should be separate from action approving MC 48 and must not be allowed to delay approval of MC 48, without which (a) a forward defense in Europe is not possible and (b) development of NATO new strength as a deterrent would be prejudicially delayed.

Anticipated Position of Other Members

It is anticipated that some other members may raise this point.

Discussion

1. The European allies had originally hoped that a NATO nuclear strategy would reduce both cost and risk. MC 48 makes it clear that not only will it not cost less and may cost more, but that growing Soviet nuclear strength creates a dangerous capability. To a certain extent, fear may replace hope.

2. Council approval of MC 48 will dedicate NATO nations to develop forces for nuclear, not non-nuclear warfare. As some nations may be concerned at having to respond to non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons, it is possible that further NATO studies to explore the military, budgetary and manpower aspects of a dual force capable of winning either a nuclear or a non-nuclear war may be suggested. It is even possible that some nations may suggest delaying action on MC 48 until this problem is fully studied.

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MOST EFFECTIVE PATTERN OF NATO MILITARY STRENGTH FOR  
THE NEXT FEW YEARS

Statement by the Secretary of State

The Government of the United States strongly endorses the report of the Military Committee. I believe this report represents an important milestone in our mutual effort to attain collective security through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For the first time since NATO'S defense program began, we can see daylight ahead. We now have the best military advice available to us that a truly effective capacity to deter and resist aggression can be created and maintained by the NATO nations.

It is clear from the Military Committee report that the new weapons which make this possible are supplemental, and not substitute weapons. Taken in conjunction with new techniques and new practices, it now appears that we can find it within our resources and abilities to develop a force, which, having a full armory of weapons available will present the Soviets with such a risk as to make it unlikely that they will initiate major hostilities against us.

Now an effective deterrent to the Soviet bloc can be obtained only by having a capacity to inflict such heavy and swift damage upon the aggressor that the risk of aggression would be unacceptable to him. A nuclear capacity is indispensable to the deterrent. Only through the capacity to use nuclear weapons is it possible for the nations of the free world to place in the scales a force which can counterbalance the heavy weight of Soviet Bloc manpower and Soviet nuclear weapons. Only through this capacity can the Soviet be presented with an unacceptable risk.

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and jointly, by means of continuous and effective help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". The action before us does not affect the sovereignty of any of the NATO nations. It is a proposal to develop collectively, the one thing which we all seek: An effective deterrent to war.

The paper which is before us today is but a step in this direction. By approving it, the North Atlantic Council will accept the need to develop a capability for immediate nuclear counter-attack in case of full-scale Soviet aggression, and will thus establish a basic principle for the further development of our military forces. It seems probable that the pattern of new forces will not cost less and may cost more over a period of time. However, with growing economic strength throughout the North Atlantic Community, we believe we can move forward in confidence that the task can be accomplished. Once these forces are in being - and it may well take several years of effort to bring that about - and the capability to respond without delay with overwhelming force in the event of attack exists, the Soviet will be confronted with a position of power which will enhance the effectiveness of the deterrent to the use of force.

Even when the balanced military forces contemplated by the Report have been realized, we shall not have reached the end of the road. In some respects, we shall only have made a beginning. Our objective is a world in which the preservation of our lives and liberties will not depend upon massive armaments -- a world in which the differences among nations, however deep, may be settled by peaceful negotiation. In pursuing these goals, free nations must concern themselves with developing many varieties of strength -- political, economic, social, cultural and spiritual. We must spare no effort to establish the conditions for durable peace and security on a universal basis.

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 4, 1954

SUBJECT: -NATO "New Approach" Study

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
Mr. Merchant - EUR

COPIES TO: S/S, C, C, S/P, S/AE, EUR,  
Mr. Hensel - Department of Defense

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61122-1

Sir Roger Makins delivered to the Secretary a memorandum entitled, "Authority for SACEUR to use Nuclear Weapons," covered by a short letter dated December 4 in which Sir Anthony Eden suggests that the subject of the note be discussed jointly with the Canadians in Paris and thereafter with the French, following which agreement should be sought with the other NATO governments. The Secretary read the note and said that

On principle we agreed that the power to authorize the use of atomic and nuclear weapons should remain in civilian hands and he pointed out that our legislation requires the approval of the President for such use. He went on to say, however, that he thought it was essential to avoid complications and detailed procedures.

These matters, he said, are best dealt with informally at the time of crisis on the highest level.

The Secretary said, however, that he would closely study the resolution and that his preliminary thought was that something along these general lines would be acceptable.

The Secretary

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The Secretary then questioned the necessity or desirability of bringing in Canada at the early stage suggested by Eden. He said he intuitively always welcomed in our councils the presence of Mike Pearson but that in this problem, which related to the defense of the continent, he felt that at the present time the principal responsibility was shared by the British, the French and ourselves. In a year or two it might be necessary or desirable to add Germany to these three but he doubted the wisdom of consulting with Canada even before the French. The Secretary, however, did not foreclose the meeting suggested by Eden in Paris for December 16.

During the course of the conversation Sir Roger informed the Secretary that the French had made a similar approach in London to the one made by Ambassador Bonnet on December 2 here. He said that Sir Anthony told the French Ambassador that he did not like the French proposal for a detailed study by the Standing Group.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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*New Approach*

December 6, 1954

TO: RA - Ben Moore  
FROM: EUR - Mr. Merchant *h/w*

Struve Hensel telephoned me this afternoon concerning the draft "New Approach" resolution. He would like to drop the word "contingent" where it modifies "plans". He thinks this carries an unnecessary implication of alternative plans. I told him we were going to have rough sledding next week. He seemed quite relaxed and said he did not think the "fish were wriggling on the hook" any more vigorously than he had expected.

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**Memorandum of Conversation**  
**TELEPHONE**

DATE:

December 7, 1954

SUBJECT:

NATO "New Approach"

PARTICIPANTS:

Sir Roger Makins  
Livingston T. Merchant

COPIES TO:

S/S, G, C, S/P, S/AE, EUR  
Mr. Hensel - Department of Defense

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Sir Roger called me to say that he had heard from Sir Anthony Eden after his report of his talk on this subject with the Secretary on December 4. He said that Sir Anthony agreed with the Secretary's general reactions, believing it important to keep the discussion of this matter between governments and to avoid the establishment of any formal machinery in the Council. The important thing is to enable SACEUR to get on with its planning. Sir Anthony thought that a resolution along the lines of his draft was the right answer and Sir Roger added that Mike Pearson had been consulted in New York and agreed.

I said we had some thoughts of our own as to the form of the resolution and might have some comments and ideas to pass on to him within the next two or three days.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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☐ With concurrence of \_\_\_\_\_  
☒ Declassify ☐ In part and exclude as shown  
EO 12368, Sec. 1.2(a) ( 12 1 12 )  
ACDC/SR by 12 1 12



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12/8/54

11B

8 December 1954

*Andy*

*Paul?*

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL RADFORD:

There is included in the draft resolution for the North Atlantic Council the following clause:

"Agreeing that the recommendations of that report are not to be construed to prejudge final decisions by governments concerned on the implementation of plans developed in support thereof."

For political purposes such a statement may indeed be necessary in the interest of preserving the appearance of unity, harmony and continuity of effort in the North Atlantic Community. However, we should have no illusions as to possible implications in event of war wherein one of our allies might endeavor to impose a veto on actions which the United States considers essential to its own security or to the security of its armed forces exposed to enemy attack. We should not let the British and French have any illusions as to U.S. intentions.

We must also be alert to the danger of reducing the value of our position of atomic strength in detering Soviet aggression and setting the stage for the USSR to play a game of "atomic blackmail" to divide the western alliance. Incidentally, the British memorandum, by implication at least, indicates possible accommodation to the idea advanced by the USSR "to outlaw atomic weapons".

If the resolution in its present form is submitted for the approval of the North Atlantic Council, both the British and the French should be informed that insofar as NATO is concerned the United States reserves the right instantly to use atomic weapons in event of enemy attack should the circumstances, in the view of the U.S. Government, be such as preclude the delay inherent in obtaining concurrence of each of its NATO allies.

DECLASSIFIED BY:  
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH  
DATE *17 OCT 78*

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*14067/838*  
**TOP SECRET**  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

*President's Memo to Sec  
Roosevelt  
6890*  
DATE: December 8, 1954

SUBJECT: NATO "New Approach"

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
Mr. Merchant - EUR

COPIES TO: S/S. G. C. S/P. E/AE, EUR  
Mr. Hornel - Department of Defense

*Copy to Sec*  
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61120-1

At the conclusion of a call by Sir Roger on another subject, the Secretary raised the matter of the British aide memoire delivered by Sir Roger on December 4.

The Secretary said that he had been giving further thought to the matter raised by Sir Anthony. He added that our general impression was that apart from the British and the French, the other members of NATO were not unduly concerned regarding MC-48 and its implications. This after all was what might be described as a war plan which every nation has to draw up and keep up-to-date. Its existence, however, does not mean that the military have the right to place it in effect by embarking on a war.

The Secretary went on to say that he agreed with Sir Anthony when that this matter should be dealt with primarily on a highly confidential basis as between governments and that a detailed discussion of the establishment of an elaborate machinery by the North Atlantic Council would be unwise. He thought that an informal agreement might be reached privately between the governments principally concerned with the defense of Europe to provide for high level consultation under various contingencies.

The Secretary said that he had discussed this matter earlier in the day with the President who had strong feelings on this subject and believed that the concept on which MC-48 rested was

*the only*

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-2-

the only concept which gave assurance of a successful defense of Europe in the event of a Soviet attack.

The Secretary then said that he had considered a redraft of the British proposed resolution or some form of counter proposal. In light, however, of the development of the President's and his thinking he had now decided to wait until he could discuss this matter personally with Sir Anthony in Paris. He added that he would appreciate it if Sir Roger would convey to Sir Anthony his thoughts as now expressed.

Sir Roger inquired what we proposed to do in the matter of a reply to the French memorandum. The Secretary answered that he proposed to deal with this in personal conversations (presumably tripartite) also in Paris with M. Mendes-France. He suggested that the subject first be discussed on the afternoon of December 16 with Sir Anthony and Lester Pearson of Canada at the meeting scheduled for 3:30.

In closing the Secretary said that he appreciated the constructive purpose behind the British draft resolution. He did however desire to point out his concern that the second half of it (if it became generally known) could be construed as amounting to an invitation for an atomic stalemate. This seemed to him extremely dangerous since there was military unanimity that the Russians could not be successfully resisted by conventional forces alone at the present level of NATO forces. Indeed to attempt to raise the level of forces available to SACEUR to a level which might provide a reasonably secure defense against an all-out Soviet attack would entail an extremely heavy increase in forces at an expense which would almost certainly be economically insupportable.

Sir Roger expressed his appreciation for the Secretary's observations and said that he would convey them immediately to Sir Anthony.

16 DEC 2 11 2:01

EUR:LT:Merchant:mt

TOP SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 14, 1954

MEMORANDUM OF TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT



1. I spoke of the suggestion made by Lodge that the Department of Defense and the Military be asked to refrain from activities in relation to Communist-held U.S. prisoners without first clearing with the State Department. The President said he would send a memorandum on this to Wilson.

2. I reported to the President Aldrich's talk with Eden and then submitted a suggestion to the President as to how he might reply to the portion of Churchill's letter which related to a possible top-level meeting with the Russians. The President looked this over and was in accord with the general approach. He kept my draft for his own use.

986  
3. I discussed the policy involved in the NATO MC 48 paper. I said that I doubted the wisdom of having a political fracas about this at the time when vitally important decisions were pending in France and Germany. I said I thought the important thing was not to get tied down by political machinery which might not work. I felt that, if in fact the military planning proceeded in accordance with this paper, events would take care of the political decisions, particularly if the United States was not bound to others and had its own freedom of action that would do the necessary because it would be our troops that would have the atomic weapons which they would be able to use in their own defense and that would be decisive.

The President agreed that this was a good approach and suggested I discuss it as promptly as possible with Gruenther.

4. I showed the President a proposed statement by him with reference to retention of U.S. forces in Europe, etc., if the London-Paris Accords were adopted. This was parallel to the statement he had made on EDC. The President read this and said that, while he agreed in substance, he doubted very much the wisdom of making this statement in advance of French and German action. It would look as though we were in effect trying to bribe them to take action which was in their own interest.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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With concurrence of ASAC  
Declassify ☐ in part and exclude no class'n

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY


December 14, 1954

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Personal and Private

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Authority MR 85-735 #1

By bc NLE Date 7/3/86

PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (a) (1)

State letter 6/26/86

NLE DATE 7/2/86

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER PAPERS, 1949-1954

WHITE HOUSE

Box 1

Meetings with President 1954 (1)

1987/3224

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-2-

5. I then went on to discuss the Saar situation and I showed the President cable 1713 from Bonn. The President indicated his great concern that this Saar situation was breaking open again. He felt we could not desert the Germans on this issue. We could get along without France but not without Germany. He suggested, however, that he would be willing to have us make the statement on U.S. troops (see above) as a part of a bargain dealing with Saar matter.

6. I reported that I had been working on a paper on the possible distribution of FOA activities if it were liquidated and said that we might be discussing this with Humphrey, Stassen and Anderson on this trip. He approved.

7. I said that the Italian Foreign Minister wanted me to lunch with him Thursday. I said I had declined but would call on him. I expected that he would bring up the matter of a possible visit on the part of Scelba. After some discussion, it was agreed that this would be acceptable, although I raised the question as to whether it should not also be clear that the visit was approved by Fanfani, who might be an important rival and perhaps a more effective Prime Minister than Scelba.

probably :

8. I said that I would be unable to comment on the draft State of the Union speech before Monday, and the President agreed to give me this extension of time.

9. The following appointments were approved:

Cooper for India.

Stevens for the Philippines if it was clearly developed by Wilson that Stevens wanted the position.

Holmes for Iran if Brownell would be prepared at the Foreign Relations Committee hearing to testify that he knew of no moral impediment which should prevent his confirmation.

Ferguson for some special assignment such as the job offered to Milton Eisenhower which he at the luncheon declined on the ground that it was too early.

Wilcox as Special Assistant on the Charter Review matter.

S JFDulles:ma

Personal and Private

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~~TOP SECRET~~

December 14, 1954

Dear Winston:

You have given a flawless exposition of Red China's relative weakness if we have under consideration only the possibility that she might launch aggressive war against either of our two countries. However, it is clear that our vital interests can be seriously damaged by operations that she is capable of carrying out against weaker areas lying along the boundaries of her territory. We saw what she tried to do in Korea and was foiled only by the intervention of strong allied forces, and we likewise saw what gains she made in the Indo-China region due to the political and military weakness of one of our allies. She can pay any price in manpower, with complete indifference to the amount. Consequently, she is a distinct threat to the peace of the world as long as she may be sufficiently irresponsible to launch an attack against peoples and areas of tremendous importance to us. This imposes on us the burden of supporting native forces in the region and of supplementing these with some of our own units.



Here I shall not outline the importance to the Western world of Japan and the island chain extending on to the southward, as well as the bits on the Pacific of mainland that still remain in the possession of the free world. The moral, political and military consequences that could follow upon the loss of important parts of this great chain are obvious to both of us and to the staffs that work for us in the military, economic and diplomatic fields. So I think it dangerous to dismiss too complacently the risks that the bad faith, bad deportment and greed of Red China pose to our world. Some of our citizens

DDE DIARIES

BOX 8, DDE DIARY  
December 14, 1954

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4.1

MIR 83-377-#8

BY DJH DATE 8/31/84

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- 2 -

are particularly sensitive to this threat and openly argue that it would be a mistake to allow this threat to endure and extend until the day comes when Red China may actually achieve the capacity to endanger us directly. I know that neither of us is blind to this possibility, even though we consider that such a development is somewhat doubtful and in any event its attainment would involve such a long time that world conditions and balances of power could well have been radically changed in the meantime. But, of course, I agree with you that our attention and watchfulness should be directed mainly to Moscow.

Incidentally, I was interested in your renewed suggestion of a top-level meeting with the regime in Russia. I have always felt, as you know, that it would be a mistake for you and me to participate in a meeting which was either essentially social or exploratory. A social meeting would merely give a false impression of accord which, in our free countries, would probably make it more difficult to get parliamentary support for needed defense appropriations. Within the captive world it would give the impression that we condone the present state of affairs. And if these are to be exploratory talks, should they not be carried out by our Foreign Ministers, so that Heads of Government would come in only if some really worthwhile agreement is in likely prospect?



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- 3 -

The latter, I fear, is not an early possibility. There are still several months to go before we shall know where we are on the London and Paris Accords and all the indications are that if they go through, the Russians will probably "play tough," at least for some little time. Therefore, I do not see the likelihood of our Foreign Ministers usefully meeting for some considerable period. So, I am bound to say that, while I would like to be more optimistic, I cannot see that a top-level meeting is anything which I can inscribe on my schedule for any predictable date. I regret this the more because if a top-level meeting were to take place, and if it led to a personal visit to London, I would indeed be very happy. I hope you will find some way of letting the Queen know how deeply I appreciate her gracious reference to the possibility of such a visit.

Foster and I have just had luncheon together and now he starts immediately for the NATO meeting. We discussed a number of matters, including a series of urgent requests that in our view practically amount to demands received from Mendes-France. He wants us to make public pronouncements supporting his statements affecting the Saar, Morocco and commitments of American troops to Europe. Important as French cooperation is to the great NATO Plan, Mendes-France seems to forget that the safety, security and welfare of France are far more directly and intimately involved in the projects now under discussion than is the future

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of this country or of yours. One of the virtues of EDC was that it contained an acceptable solution of the Saar problem and it was French desertion of that plan that insured its defeat.

I see no good reason for this government to re-state its intentions about the stationing of American troops in Europe or take a position as to the Saar arrangement at least until the French Parliament has by some positive action shown itself capable of making decisions in keeping with the responsibilities of a great European power. I have asked Foster to confer with Anthony on these matters. Likewise, I have asked him to avoid any rigid position of refusal in considering the seemingly unreasonable requests of Mendes-France, but I am determined that we shall begin to realize some dividends on the constant pledges and pronouncements that seem to be expected of us.

I like your phrase "tyrannical weakness." It sharply defines the situation.

As you know, I occasionally flatter myself by attempting to paint likenesses of friends. I would be tremendously intrigued by the effort to paint one of you. Would it be an intolerable burden on you to allow an artist friend of mine to visit you long enough to take a few photographs and draw a few hasty color sketches that I could use in such an attempt?

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- 5 -

The final result would, of course, not be good, but also it might not be so bad as to be unendurable. If you feel this would not make an unjustified demand upon your time, I could send my artist friend over soon after the first of the year. I should think that something about thirty minutes to an hour would be sufficient for what I would need from him.

This is just an idea and I shall not be at all offended by your inability to entertain it.

With warm personal regard,

As ever,

Ike.



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
Secy's Memos &amp; Com

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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## Memorandum of Conversation

in OC/R

DATE: December 16, 1954  
Paris, Quai d'Orsay

SUBJECT

PARTICIPANTS: M. Mendes-France  
M. Parodi  
M. Couve de Murville  
M. Soutou  
Marquis de Moustier  
Sir Anthony Eden  
COPIES FOR Sir Harold MacMillan  
Sir Gladwyn Jebb  
Sir Christopher Steel

Sir Harold Caccia  
Mr. R. R. Powell  
Sir Anthony Bumbold  
Secretary Dulles  
Secretary Anderson  
Ambassador Hughes  
Ambassador Dillon  
Livingston T. Merchant

Copies to: S/S<sup>2</sup> EUR, C, G, S/P, DEFENSE (Anderson), JCS (Radford)

(9)

MC/48

Secretary Dulles opened the talks on the subject of MC/48 along the lines of the talk in the British Embassy. He stated that the plan is like a War Plan and calls for no delegation from governments to military. The political problem of authority will take a long time to settle and should not hold up guidance for planning. He presented the US-UK draft resolution which Sir Anthony supported.

Mendes-France said that at first glance it looked good but he would study it overnight. If acceptable then the talks could be continued to work out arrangements. It was suggested that the Permanent Group might do a study.

The Secretary, understanding that Mendes-France meant the Permanent Council, said he would not object if the Governments of NATO agreed. He stated that no single country in peace can renounce the right to participate in the decisions which may have to be made.

Mendes-France said he agreed entirely but meant the Standing Group. The Secretary said he was not sure the Standing Group was the best place. Sir Anthony stated that the Standing Group was military and not political and excludes Canada which

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☐ With concurrence of             
☒ Declassify ☐ in part and exclude as shown  
 EO 12368, Sec. 1.3(a) (            )  
 AICDC/SR by            12/1/20

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has an atomic interest. He suggested an ad hoc body.

Mendes-France suggested that a Committee of Four might be all right, and the Secretary stated that it must be most informal if done. Eden thought they might use the 4 Permanent Representatives in Paris, to which Mendes-France agreed but thought it must be secret. The Secretary suggested they accept the idea ad referendum and said that he must first talk to JCS. There was general agreement on the 4 Permanent Representatives in Paris.

#### Soviet Note

All present agreed that no answer was needed nor was a tripartite meeting necessary. Mendes-France reported that a Soviet note had been received this day saying they will denounce the Franco-Soviet treaty if the Paris accords are ratified. The UK, however, had not received a similar note. It was believed that this would make an impression in France but won't change the policy which is needed to be followed. The Secretary stated that he would use the study of past threats at the NAC meeting and all agreed this would be useful. Mendes-France stated that he thought we must insist on saying we want to talk to the Soviets after ratification.

XR 163.022) Mendes-France stated that the UK had sent him a note indicating they were interested in the Saar and concerned by Adenauer's presentation. The French had kept very quiet but told the Germans they refused to hold a Four-Power meeting. They were anxious to cooperate but this is a matter between the French and Germans and France won't change the agreement as it now stands. Mendes-France said he felt assured the agreements will be ratified but it will not be easy. The Saar is a préalable in the Assembly. Adenauer must understand that no change is possible. He has asked for "interpretations" but that is impossible. Mendes-France, however, will conciliate on points subject to additional agreement.

The Secretary said he was not sufficiently liar with the details of this matter to comment usefully. ✓

Mendes-France asked that the US and UK tell Adenauer that the recent events were unfortunate and that we were against arbitration. He said that later WEU will have a job to do in connection with the Saar, but the French were always willing to talk directly to Germany.

D/R  
At 1.35  
ev  
Mendes-France asked what the US and UK attitudes were on a German-French request for guaranty of the Saar up to the Peace Treaty. Sir Anthony said the UK was quite ready to discuss



12/22/54

Basic strat -

blunting

Ridgway worried about overseas

Army's loss of "offensive capability" (p3)

Doc: Gen will not be overrun

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE

22 December 1954 1200

Others present

Admiral Carney  
General Shepherd  
Colonel Goodpastor

At Mr. Wilson's request, the President outlined the thinking underlying his decision on manpower ceilings for the Services. He stated three points were basic: true security requires a sound economy; there is, so far as he knows, no critical "danger date"; the U. S. has reason to be frightened for its safety for the first time, since with the new weapons it could be knocked out within the first thirty days of combat.

He indicated that the first priority must therefore be to blunt the enemy's initial threat -- by massive retaliatory power and ability to deliver it; and by a continental defense system of major capability. The Navy must also keep the oceans clear, and the Army and Marines keep the land situation under control during this initial period; to maintain order and organization under the conditions that could occur will be a big Army job; the improved Reserve programs will help, and the President indicated this is the reason he supports them. He added that the ability to blunt an initial enemy attack also gives a major deterrent effect against enemy resort to war.

The President indicated that it is necessary to make a realistic appraisal of what the country will support, over an extended period of time, without loss of morale, confidence, and dynamic industrial effort upon which a sound and expanding economy depends. He thought we could not, under present conditions, maintain a stable program at a higher level. It might be forced across during one year, but a disrupting cutback thereafter would have to be expected.

The President then stated that there could not, in his opinion, be great deployments of military forces while the initial attack and counterattack.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

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Date

new/new diary (3) "ACW Army December 1954 (2)"

were going on. He stated he wanted to make it clear that a priority approach is required -- holding back on the active Army and stressing the retaliatory, continental defense and Reserve elements. His was not a budgetary approach, but instead an effort to keep the economy -- as one of the pillars of security -- sound and to avoid controls and governmental intervention imperiling the values we seek to defend.

In sum, phase one would be the aversion of disaster; in phase two we would go on to win the war.

The President stated this was his own judgment on the matter. As Commander-in-Chief he is entitled to the loyal support of his subordinates of the official position he has adopted, and he expects to have it. Each official present has had, and will have, the right to come in and express his opinion, but once the decision is made all must follow.

Admiral Carney indicated that the Navy is tailoring its forces to follow the President's policy -- increasing its early striking power, cutting back amphibious forces not so necessary in the early days of hostilities and auxiliary elements, the reduction of which will curtail staying power -- although this effect will not be felt until later.

Admiral Carney considered it advisable to reduce the number of carriers in the Far East to three. This action will make it possible to have a "humane" rotation system, with resulting improved morale (and reinductment) and standard of training. The carriers on the West Coast at any time could be run out immediately.

The President indicated that savings achieved through personnel cuts will enable strength to be built up in other elements of the force; Reserves will also be built up. He stated his ideas were not fixed or frozen; we should always be endeavoring to get ready for the situation a few years ahead. He thought the essential was to save, through the initial period of hostilities, the ability of the U. S. to outproduce the rest of the world.

Secretary Wilson indicated that he was meeting Secretary Thomas of the Navy at 2:30 and Secretary Stevens and General Ridgway at 4 PM to consider how the Services could best give effect to the President's decision.

At Secretary Wilson's request, the President stated his view that the principal officers of the Administration must all be alert to efforts that will undoubtedly be made to create divisions and dissensions within the Administration. All must work together as a team, and resist these tendencies. In particular, officials must not allow themselves to be "needled" into criticising each other, or fighting among themselves.

*Added 31 Dec 54*

*\* The President indicated he had read and considered recent memoranda prepared by Adm Carney and Gen Ridgway on this matter.*



General Ridgway indicated he was deeply troubled as to the security of U. S. forces now overseas, since it is not possible to get reinforcements there as quickly as needed unless they exist in peacetime. The manpower ceilings will cut our forces to two divisions in the Far East (both in Korea) and five in Europe. We will lose any offensive capability, or ability to exploit the effects of air operations during the early phase. We will also lose the ability to link up quickly with satellite forces, and bring them to our side. The President indicated that it would be folly to fight in Korea in case of attack -- this is the wrong place. In any event, he stated, it would take a long period to get together forces for reinforcement of Europe. He cited World War II experience. This could not be done during the early days, since considerable time would be needed to gather ships, clear the sea lanes and assemble men and equipment. In his opinion, the first essential is to take care of the threat that endangers our very existence. He recognized that our troops are in some danger. In particular, he is worried about American dependents in the forward areas. He thought the tactical atomic weapon can be used effectively to protect our forces.

Mr. Wilson indicated he has asked the Chiefs to review U. S. commitments, since many changes in the world situation have occurred within the last few years. He has also asked them to study what we should have at the end of the first six months, and at the end of the second six months of hostilities. With flexible plans, we should be able to shift to meet the needs at the end of the first year in light of the actual wartime experience.

The President stressed that he does not contemplate allowing Europe to be overrun. The Soviets will, however, have great trouble maintaining an offensive. He indicated his firm intention to launch a strategic air force immediately in case of alert of actual attack. He stressed that a major war will be an atomic war.


The President indicated that we must be able to demonstrate a good case as to the austerity of our operations if we are to maintain a stable program. Otherwise cuts would be forced upon us. If we reach too high, we might attain our goal for one year but would then be cut back. This is unwise since there is no single date of maximum danger.

Secretary Wilson indicated that once decision has been taken that this is the best program to put forward, it should be strongly supported by all before the Congress. The President indicated he thought the heads





of the Departments, and the Chiefs of Staff too often go up before Congress personally. Subordinate officers having the factual information can be sent up. Mr. Wilson indicated that we have a good military program to put forward this year -- career incentives, new Reserve program, a sound budget, etc. It should not be allowed to be lost through the creation of any dissension. Now that the President's decision had been made known, all should positively and loyally support the program.

  
A. J. Goodpaster  
Colonel, CE, U S Army

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|------------------------------|----------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED                 |                      |
| Authority <u>MR 90-17541</u> | ALLIED POWERS EUROPE |
| By <u>JHS</u>                | SUPREME COMMANDER    |
| NLE Date <u>12/4/90</u>      |                      |

02/26/54

Dear Ike

Sunday, December 26


You are, of course, fully up to date on the French situation but you may be interested in some of the gossip tid-bits.

Most of the "wise guys" say that the opposition wanted to scare Mendes France and to serve notice on him that his political life expectancy is a short one. They had not wanted to overthrow him on this issue. But they miscalculated and the 280-259 adverse vote was a shock. It will now be corrected on Tuesday or Wednesday of this week.

But wise guys can be wrong. On Thursday evening we attended a dinner given by Amb & Mrs. Jeffs with about 50 guests - most of them French political sophisticates. One of the non-French guests was British Ambassador Jeffs who had listened to the Mendes France talk that afternoon. Here was the Jeffs estimate: "That is one of the finest speeches I have ever heard. It was delivered by a great man and it was most effective. If he could only let the matter come to a vote I thought it would be a great victory." Apparently MF felt the same.

ACW/Adm/16/Quentley, for ALP 7954 (1)

2  
ALLIED POWERS EUROPE  
SUPREME COMMANDER



way and be allowed the vote to be taken on a non-confidence basis a few hours later with the reversal which has caused so much gloom.

The non-Communist French press is more vitriolic than I have ever seen it during my tour here. They are most critical of the Parliament and use such words as "treason" frequently - and that is a very uncommon procedure for the non-Communist press. The Commies are of course very very happy - and they should be.

Personally I believe the vote will be reversed within a few hours after you have read this letter. But even so I shall be distressed because the Christmas Eve fiasco once again highlights the serious defects in French political institutions. The Assembly is deeply divided and unworthy to represent a great power. Imagine 61 of 85 MRP deputies voting against - just to show their hatred of M.F. ! (Only 6 voted For; the others abstained)

The de Gaulist deputies have been trying for months to get me to a luncheon but I have always declined on the basis that I cannot be associated with a movement in opposition to the French Government. But now they have two of their members in the Cabinet one of whom - Catroux - is a friend of mine.

ALLIED POWERS EUROPE  
SUPREME COMMANDER



Furthermore the Great Man Himself has seen fit to say a few kind words about M.F. So about two weeks ago - after considerable pressure - I agreed to a luncheon on January 12th with 10 of the de Gaulle deputies, Koenig, Catroux etc etc. If you hear that I have insulted them don't deny it to save my skin, because the allegation will probably be true.

In other words I am very unhappy at the moment

\* \* \* \* \*

Our Christmas was a very quiet one. Grace would like the devil this year in distributing packages to French service men in hospitals and then she also took on two French orphanages so she was very very tired. As for old man Gmenther he played tennis on Christmas day - with distinction I would add were I not so modest about my outstanding talent in that field. All I can say is that you are lucky I don't put the same energy in learning to play golf that I devote to tennis. It would produce results that would make your 87 scores look pretty sad. So there!

Dick Walters will leave us in a few weeks to return to the Pentagon. He has been a great asset for us, and I shall miss him. He broke his leg skiing last April and he is still on crutches. A bone grafting job was required and progress is slow.

I imagine you get from the 162 million Americans about 100 suggestions a day how to run

ALLIED POWERS EUROPE  
SUPREME COMMANDER



your job. Well, here is one more. Your informal stag dinners are a great success. I'd like to throw into the idea pot the suggestion that for one of these affairs you have Pres Truman, and a few of the Democratic leaders (Rayburn, Lyndon Johnson and that type) together with Republican leaders and your usual business types. There are no doubt some political disadvantages, but I wouldn't think they are serious. From the standpoint of dramatizing the idea of unity it could - in my opinion - have a good impact abroad. There is no charge for this suggestion, nor will it be necessary for you to tell me why it should not be adopted. Screwball ideas need no acknowledgment.

I hope you have been able to make those clucks moan and groan during the Augusta sessions. Give 'em hell - and then more hell.

Happy new year. You will have many complications after Congress reconvenes, but I have complete faith in you.  
Devotedly

Full

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:

December 29, 1954

TOP SECRET

## SUBJECT:

Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments

## PARTICIPANTS:

The Secretary  
Mr. Murphy, G  
Mr. MacArthur, C  
Mr. Merchant, EUR  
Mr. Barbour, EUR  
MR. Key, IO

Mr. Bowie, S/P  
Mr. Stelle, S/P  
Mr. Gerard Smith, S/AE  
Howard Meyers, UNP

## COPIES TO:

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The Secretary suggested that the key question in considering this subject was whether it was possible to have elimination of nuclear weapons without a corresponding reduction in the conventional armaments field. He thought it might be possible to work out effective controls in the nuclear field, but that it was not really feasible to control conventional weapons because this involved so many complicated items and because there was such great opportunity for evasion of agreements in the conventional field. The practical effect of insisting that there could be no limitations in the nuclear field without limitations in the conventional field meant that there might well not be disarmament, unless there should be a mutual de facto disarmament by both sides individually cutting down their armaments and armed forces. Thus far, the United States retained superiority in the nuclear field. Although there was a danger of under-rating the Soviets, the Secretary believed that the U.S. should be able to maintain this superiority even in the future. Thus, if the U.S. should agree to eliminate nuclear weapons alone, we would be depriving ourselves of those weapons in which the U.S. was ahead and would not be taking action in the area of Soviet superiority, the conventional armaments field. This created an obvious danger to the United States. On the other hand, it could be argued that atomic weapons are the only ones by which the U.S. can be virtually destroyed through a sudden attack, and if this danger of destruction should be removed by eliminating nuclear weapons this would help the U.S. by enabling retention intact of our industrial power which has acted both as a deterrent against total war and as a principal means of winning a war.

Mr. Bowie said that the Department of Defense position on this review of basic disarmament policy had raised a question which preceded the key question noted by the Secretary. This was that Defense believed any form of disarmament was contrary to U.S. security interests, principally because we could not trust the

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Soviets

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Soviets, who would violate any agreement.

The Secretary observed that in the conventional field, at least, there were so many areas to be covered that no plan could insure against all violations, and that in large measure the protection against violations of an international agreement involved the existence of such trust between nations that in fact there would be no need for a disarmament agreement. He thought that there was little difference between his views and those of the Defense Department, since he believed it would be impossible to insure absolutely that a disarmament program would be in our security interest. However, this came down to a question of the kind of risks we were willing to assume, and he believed that the real issue was how to maintain intact our industrial potential.

Mr. Bowie believed that the basic problem is how to remove the atomic threat to U.S. security, which had approached the point where failure to get disarmament now constituted a threat to U.S. security. He would be happy if an agreement could be reached which would cut down conventional armaments as well as nuclear, but this appeared to be too complicated a problem. The approach which seemed to offer the most promise was to take a little segment of the disarmament problem (cessation of nuclear fuel production) and see whether agreement could be reached with the Soviets on this objective, which would require simpler and more easily enforceable safeguards.

Mr. Murphy observed that it was not easy to separate the nuclear and conventional aspects of disarmament, because of the intermingling of both nuclear and conventional weapons systems and the fact that the means for delivering nuclear weapons involved conventional armaments, such as aircraft, artillery, etc.

The Secretary, in this connection, referred to the benefits given us by the existence of bases surrounding the Soviet Union, which enable us to deliver nuclear attack over such a wide area that it would be difficult for the Soviets to prevent an attack from being delivered on target. On the other hand, the Soviets could only hit the continental U.S. from one area, the North, which should make it easier for us to stop a good portion of a Soviet nuclear attack.

Mr. Bowie said that this did not take account of the fact that the Soviets within a fairly short time should be able to use submarine attacks against the American continent through firing guided missiles with nuclear warheads, and that before too many years the Soviets would probably have intercontinental ballistic missiles which could press home such attacks and would be fired from Soviet territory.

Mr. Meyers noted that one factor which had not been brought out in the discussion was that it was generally agreed that it was not possible to account fully for past production of nuclear materials, involving militarily significant amounts. This meant that it would be impossible to eliminate nuclear weapons, since we could not be sure that the Soviets would not hold out a sufficient amount of nuclear material (which could not be accounted for) so that they might launch a surprise attack. If we had agreed to eliminate all nuclear weapons we could not retaliate against such surprise attack, nor could we deter this attack by a nuclear capability in readiness. This factor seemed to indicate that an acceptable disarmament program had to link conventional and nuclear reduction. In part, this was required because we could not afford to reduce our nuclear stockpiles unless the Soviets reduced the conventional armaments in which they had superiority. In part, this

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linkage seemed required because, as Mr. Murphy had previously pointed out, the means of delivering nuclear weapons involved conventional armaments, and it certainly would be necessary to cut down delivery capabilities if we were to cut down our nuclear capabilities.

Mr. Bowie agreed that the impossibility of assuring the elimination of nuclear weapons at least led to the need to reduce the means of delivering these weapons. He emphasized the necessity for the U.S. to carry out a strenuous effort toward disarmament in all sincerity. The proposal which he had advanced was based on:  
(a) the fact that the effectiveness of an inspection system depends on experience gained in the operation of such system, since this is such an unexplored area;  
(b) the fact that increasing nuclear inventories increased the difficulty of inspection to verify what had happened to this nuclear material. This led him to believe that much could be said for minimizing this problem by stopping the production of all nuclear fuels, if this can be done without danger to our security.

Mr. Murphy referred to a suggestion previously made by Mr. Smith (S/AE) that the United States should conduct a trial run of an inspection system to see what were the difficulties.

The Secretary remarked on the great difficulty of securing competent personnel to check on the enforcement of any disarmament program. This was the reason why the Baruch Plan had proposed that the international control organ should run all nuclear plants, so that policing would follow automatically from the management operation.

Mr. Mayers explained that there was general agreement in the Department that cessation of nuclear fuel production within the next few years would be in U.S. security interests if protected by adequate safeguards. Disagreement with Mr. Bowie's views arose from the question of how to put forward such a proposal, since no other area in the Department concerned with this problem believed it would be politically advisable to make this suggestion except as part of proposals for reductions of nuclear and conventional armaments. There were two reasons for this view: (a) stopping nuclear fuel production at this time obviously favored the U.S. by freezing our nuclear superiority so that the Soviets would be bound to propose reductions in stockpiles or an unconditional ban on the use of all nuclear weapons, and this in turn would lead us to insist on reductions in the conventional field in which the Soviets had superiority; (b) it was doubtful that a proposal limited as Mr. Bowie suggested would be acceptable to certain of our principal allies, notably the United Kingdom, because they would not have adequate nuclear stockpiles for military or peaceful purposes. There was also considerable disagreement with Mr. Bowie's plan because of the safeguards he proposed and the stages he suggested for reaching this goal.

The Secretary believed that this was the kind of a problem which fundamentally could not be solved by controls or by limiting weapons. Once weapons of great power had been discovered, it seemed most doubtful that they could be eliminated. In fact, there would seem to be more chance of success if one could eliminate war.

Mr. Murphy directed the Secretary's attention to the memorandum which he had just laid before the Secretary, and which was agreed to by all the interested areas in the Department. This proposed that the Secretary should ask the National Security Council to recommend that it is important for the United States to continue

efforts

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efforts to achieve safeguarded disarmament, as politically necessary and in U.S. security interests; that the review of basic disarmament policy should be continued and that the President should promptly appoint an outstanding person to direct this review and perhaps to represent the United States in the London disarmament discussions, which would commence in February.

The Secretary agreed that it would be advisable to bring in a man of outstanding qualifications, as suggested in the memorandum, to head up this review. He believed that this required a decision by the Government, and not just by the State Department, and indicated that he would consider this matter further.

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