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Authority NND 957245By SL NARA Date 3/11/97**TOP SECRET**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1954 JAN 14 AM 10 07 SUMMARY OF MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE
ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S
DECEMBER 8th SPEECH, 6 JANUARY 1954

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
S/PPresent:Department of State:

Secretary Dulles

Mr. Murphy

Mr. Bowie

Mr. Merchant

Atomic Energy Commission:

Mr. Strauss

Mr. Smyth

Department of Defense:

Secretary Wilson

Deputy Secretary Kyes

Mr. Nash

Mr. LeBaron

Secretary Dulles paraphrased Ambassador Bohlen's cable from Moscow relaying Molotov's suggestion that preliminary talks be held in Washington with Ambassador Zarubin in preparation for further discussions of the President's atomic proposals at the Berlin meeting.

Secretary Dulles then summarized four basic questions which he said he discussed with the President on Tuesday, January 5th.

1. Where should talks be held, in the UN Disarmament Commission or through diplomatic channels?
2. What other nations, if any, should participate?
3. Should the US ask to confine the talks to the questions of the President's "atomic pool" proposal or should we also be prepared to discuss atomic disarmament?
4. If we discuss atomic disarmament should these discussions be based on the principle that atomic weapons and conventional weapons must be linked together, or are we prepared to discuss atomic disarmament alone?

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Annex

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Secretary Dulles stated that the preparation for these talks was a full time job that required a high-level working group consisting of State, Defense and Atomic Energy Commission. State is thinking of designating Howard Peterson, former Assistant Secretary of the Army, as their representative.

Secretary Dulles said that in his discussion with the President he did not ask for any definite decisions on these four points, but only the President's preliminary views. The President thought that we should be prepared to talk atomic disarmament, if the USSR raised the matter. He said he felt he made this clear in his December 8th speech when he said "The US is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be 'principally involved', to seek 'an acceptable solution' to the atomic armaments race"

Secretary Dulles pointed out that in our recent press release we said that if the USSR wanted to make any atomic disarmament proposals we would be prepared to discuss them. Both the President and Secretary Dulles believed the Soviets would find it difficult to formulate acceptable proposals, but for our part we would be prepared to listen to anything they had to say. Secretary Dulles stated that the President feels if a way could be found which would eliminate atomic and similar weapons of mass destruction under a really reliable security system he would be prepared to accept it even if it left the USSR with a numerical predominance in ground forces. Secretary Dulles said the President indicated he would be willing to do this because he is convinced that the US industrial potential and capability for rapid mobilization would still constitute an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and that if such aggression should occur, the US industrial capability, when harnessed into a war effort, would ultimately defeat them. Secretary Dulles said that he was reporting this not as a decision but only as the President's initial reaction to the subject.

Admiral Strauss stated that the idea behind the President's speech was that even limited contributions from the several stockpiles would improve international relations, and if the USSR rejected the proposal, the US would have won a psychological victory.

Secretary Wilson observed that we should still approach this subject with an open mind even if our hope of success in subsequent negotiations may be slim. He commented that ultimately war is war, and that there must be a broader disarmament than merely atomic disarmament. He remarked that until the Iron Curtain was pierced or lifted we could not achieve any real security system. Secretary Wilson recognized that if we want to relieve tension we must be willing to talk and listen. However, he cautioned that we should not talk with "two mouths". We can not go on telling our people that our strength in deterring aggression rests in SAC and that we are making our military plans on this basis; i.e., the full use of atomic weapons, -- and at the same time talk about eliminating atomic weapons without at the same time reducing the level of conventional armaments.

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Admiral Strauss, Secretary Wilson, and Secretary Dulles all agreed that we should try to keep the French out of the discussions, at least initially. Secretary Dulles added, however, that this may be very difficult as if the French are excluded this might bring about a revulsion in their thinking which would turn them toward the USSR. However, all of this is a question of tactics. Secretary Dulles recalled the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow in 1947 which resulted in the breaking-up of the previously close working relationship between the French and the USSR. Since then we have had the French fully on our side.

Mr. Nash suggested that the best way to handle it would be bilaterally between the US and USSR. Secretary Dulles agreed, but said that the British have been quite concerned that US made approaches to the USSR without consulting them. Secretary Dulles felt that the best idea would be for the US to carry the discussions alone for two or three months, and after Berlin perhaps to bring the British in, and the French if absolutely necessary. Secretary Wilson remarked that if the British do come in we should be prepared to admit the Canadians and Belgians. Admiral Strauss observed that he would hate to see the French brought in the discussions. As to the Belgians, Admiral Strauss remarked that "their nose has been out of joint" since Bermuda, but all in all he did not expect too much trouble from the Canadians and Belgians.

Admiral Strauss and Mr. LeBaron then entered into a discussion of the status of our current agreement with the Belgians for purchase of uranium ore, with particular emphasis on the fact that our contract expires next year. They also discussed the ramifications of the Lilienthal proposal which suggested Brussels as the center of an international atomic agency.

Secretary Dulles stated that he hoped the UK would agree not to insist on participation and in that way make it less embarrassing for us to leave the French out.


Mr. Murphy commented that that would be a safer approach to the problem. He noted, however, that the Malik-Churchill discussions might lead to UK initiative alone. Secretary Dulles pointed out that he would have to tell Ambassador Makins about his forthcoming talk with Zarubin. He noted that Churchill has complete contempt for the French, and therefore wouldn't take kindly to the idea of including them in any atomic discussions. (Mr. Merchant entered at this point.)

Mr. Merchant commented that although the French should be excluded, it would be difficult to get away with it. On balance he thought it was better to take the UK in from the start. This would be much better from the standpoint of world opinion.

Secretary Dulles conceded that Churchill will present an increasingly difficult problem. The UK is making an intensive effort to get into these discussions.

Mr. LeBaron observed that this is because the whole background of their

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thinking is directed towards realizing the peaceful application of atomic energy as soon as possible.

After some further discussion it was agreed that the US would conduct its initial negotiations on a bilateral basis through Ambassador Zarubin, in Washington. Later we may have to bring the UK in, but even then we would try to keep the French and Belgians out.

Secretary Dulles then discussed the question of whether to continue the discussions in the UN Disarmament Commission or bilaterally. He personally favored the bilateral approach as did Secretary Wilson and Admiral Strauss. Secretary Dulles said that he had never known a UN Committee that was held down to small size. It simply would not be possible to restrict it to the membership that we considered pertinent and discussions in that forum would automatically be turned into disarmament discussions.

Mr. Bowie raised again the question of whether we would be willing to talk about disarmament in the field of atomic weapons, and expressed the view that this is what the President meant in his speech.

Secretary Dulles said that the Russians would probably want to talk about atomic disarmament, but there is no practical plan that they would put up. In the first place we can not trust their word, and secondly, there is no practical plan of inspection. However, the principle which we should follow, and this is one to which the President agreed, is that if you could get a really workable scheme of atomic disarmament, coupled with adequate security safeguards, the US would be prepared to support it, and the peace of the world would benefit thereby. However, Secretary Dulles stated he did not think that the President believes this is a presently attainable objective. The President believes that the only way to get there is by the path of peaceful uses of atomic energy. By making progress in this field we could develop mutual trust and cooperation, and eventually atomic disarmament could mushroom out from these small beginnings. However, this is not something we can expect to achieve by a stroke of the pen.

Admiral Strauss observed that if we get involved in disarmament discussions now we will get nowhere on our proposals for the peaceful application of atomic energy.

Mr. Bowie asked what would happen if the USSR were to say to us, "Write out your own ticket for atomic disarmament"? Is there none we could write out?

Secretary Dulles answered by saying that in his view there must be more than what you write down on paper, there must be a fundamental transformation of environment - there must be an opening-up of the present Iron Curtain. In his opinion nothing short of five years would bring about such a fundamental change in Soviet policies.

Mr. Bowie believed that it would be impossible to get a fool-proof

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plan for atomic disarmament as we are not living in a fool-proof world. It was Mr. Bowie's judgment that we should continue to search for a workable system of atomic disarmament which would make the world a better and safer place than it is today. We must remember that as the Russian atomic strength increases the risks to the security of the US five years hence may be greater than they are today. Mr. Bowie felt that if things continue the way they are now, they will work out better for the Russians than they will for us. Therefore, we must seek some workable system that will improve our over-all security position.

Admiral Strauss commented that even if we assumed such a system existed - and the odds were against it - the problem was still to find it and get it agreed to. Meanwhile, the odds of accomplishing this would be improved if something could be done to minimize the distrust and suspicion which exists between the two principals today.

Mr. Bowie said that he was not urging that we let the Soviets get us "smoke screened" out of our original idea of moving forward with the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but he questioned whether this would really get us anywhere in the reduction of stockpiles of atomic weapons.

Secretary Dulles concluded the meeting by summarizing the agreement reached on (1), conducting the discussions through diplomatic channels rather than in the UN Disarmament Commission, (2), restricting them at least initially to the US and the USSR, although recognizing the UK may insist on coming in late, and possibly also the French, and (3) concentrating on the President's "atomic pool" proposal although being willing to listen to anything the Soviets might advance on the side of disarmament.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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 Authority NND 927313
 By JG NARA Date 3/23/92

February 28, 1951

SUBJECT : Views of Chancellor Adenauer

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Dulles
 Ambassador Conant
 Mr. Merchant
 Mr. Mac Arthur

Chancellor Adenauer
 Dr. Walter Hallstein
 Mr. Hans Heinrich von Herwarth
 (Interpreter)

Chancellor Adenauer opened the conversation by saying that he wished to express his most heartfelt thanks to Secretary Dulles for all he had done at the Berlin Conference. He said he spoke from the bottom of his heart.

Secretary Dulles thanked the Chancellor and said he had just concluded four very difficult weeks. The three Western Powers had gone into the Berlin meeting with some hopes and some fears. While the hopes had not been realized neither had been the fears.

Chancellor Adenauer said that in his opinion the Secretary had done more than could have been hoped for or expected. A satisfactory four power communique had been issued. But even more important the communique had made reference to Indo-China. This latter point was most important because of the good effect it would have in Paris which in turn would help with French action on EDC. The date of April 26th for the Far Eastern Conference in Geneva was well chosen because before that date EDC will have been acted on in France. The Chancellor believed EDC would be settled by the end of March. He felt that the Berlin Conference was new evidence of the fact that present Western policy was the only possible policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He believed that the Berlin Conference will prove the basic soundness of the Western position and, in this connection, he believed the Soviets did not want increased tension with the West.

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Secretary Dulles said the Conference was very revealing of Soviet unwillingness to let go its hold of any territory it has seized and also the continuance of Soviet desire to extend its control. He believed the Soviet rulers had a real fear of freedom as we understand that word. The Secretary said that he had had private talks with Molotov during which the Secretary had expressed the opinion that the concept of Versailles, that is to try to control Germany by imposed restrictions was wrong and would not work since the very controls resulted in a resurgence of extreme nationalism and a revival of militarism. Molotov had replied that the only thing wrong with the Versailles Treaty was that it had not been enforced. If it had been properly enforced the German Government would have lived up to it. This observation of Molotov summed up the way the Soviets looked at areas which had come under their control. It was evident in the Soviet attitude towards German unification resulting from free elections. The Soviets would only be willing to have elections if they could control the electoral machinery, insure that the "right" people were chosen, and thus have a government which could in turn be controlled.

The Secretary said that the Soviet attitude towards Austria told the whole story. It was a good example of what he had been saying. Austria was a small inoffensive country. The Austrians had given an undertaking not to join NATO or EDC. However, the Soviets were unwilling to relinquish their control in Austria and insisted on maintaining their military power there for an indefinite time. The case of Austria, the Secretary said, should be the answer to those people in Germany who believe that in return for a neutralized Germany the Soviets would relinquish their control. The Soviets will accept every concession and then find reasons to continue their control. The Secretary said he knew the Chancellor had

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had thought it important to have the Berlin Conference to demonstrate that the Soviets were unwilling to compromise. The Soviets had certainly demonstrated this. He did not know what the public opinion reactions in Western Germany had been, but he had the impression from such summaries of opinion as he had seen that there was an understanding that no compromise was possible on the basis of neutralism. He had much appreciated being kept informed of the Chancellor's views by Blankenhorn who had been most helpful.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he fully agreed with the Secretary and that it was impossible to find any compromise on a neutralization formula. The Soviets were only willing to talk with the strong. The Berlin Conference had been useful and had proved this. Once EDC has been consummated there will be a new situation of strength in Europe which will cause the Soviets to reconsider matters and adopt a new policy.

The Secretary said that new and stable conditions will not develop in Europe till it unites and develops real strength. After this happens the Soviets will eventually be forced to reanalyze their policy towards the satellite states and give them some form of semi-autonomous character. In other words when there is a really united and strong Western Europe the Soviets will not be able to maintain their total control of the satellite states by their present methods but will probably have to transform them in to buffer states, perhaps they will evolve into a status somewhat similar to Finland. It is after there is evolution in this direction that East Germany may be able to join with West Germany. For then conditions in East Germany and West Germany would not be such a startling contrast as at present. If the Soviets are obliged to grant more independence to Poland and Czechoslovakia they would be almost forced to give Germany to avoid an unfortunate comparison between

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East Germany and its satellite neighbors. This would in effect be the beginning of a form of revolutionary process.

The biggest obstacle today in the path of East Germany being able to join the West is the impact that the Soviets know this would have on the satellites. The Soviets are not ready now to remove their iron grip from East Germany but when they feel obliged to give more freedom to the satellites it will also come to East Germany.

The Chancellor said, "I think what you have just said is absolutely correct. As long as Western Europe remains weak and divided the Soviets can carry out any policies that they wish because they are faced with no real strength." The Chancellor added that he was in full accord with the Secretary's views which had been stated simply and clearly.

The Secretary then said he had had luncheon privately on Wednesday with Mr. Bidault and Mr. Alphand with only himself and Mr. Merchant present. The Secretary said Bidault had handled himself at Berlin courageously and had grown in stature. The Secretary said he had known Mr. Bidault since San Francisco in 1945, and had seen him subsequently at meetings in London and elsewhere. Mr. Bidault had developed remarkably since those days and was conducting himself with statesmanship and courage.

Chancellor Adenauer agreed and said that Mr. Bidault had changed greatly in recent months and had shown qualities which he understood had caused him to rise in the esteem of the French. This was good and important.

The Secretary said Mr. Bidault's prestige had increased very much in the U.S. and he understood the same thing was true in the United Kingdom.

The Secretary then reverted to his lunch with Bidault on Wednesday and said that Mr. Bidault had discussed with him the four points which must be dealt with if EDC is to be ratified.

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The first was a closer relationship between the U.K. and the EDC.

The second involved some form of assurances regarding the maintenance of substantial U.S. military forces in Europe and the continued acceptance by the U.S. of the forward strategy concept of NATO. The Secretary said he believed we could do something along these lines but there were constitutional and Congressional questions that would have to be handled carefully. Furthermore the U.S. obviously couldn't commit itself to maintain a specific number of forces anywhere for 50 years or any protracted period. (At this point Chancellor Adenauer interrupted to make a comment about the French asking for commitments from others that they were unwilling to give themselves. The Secretary said he knew the French reserved the right to withdraw forces if they were needed in France's overseas possessions. This, however, was understandable). The Secretary went on to say that it is the intention of the U.S. to maintain substantial elements of its armed forces on the European continent. He believed there were ways that we could do something to meet the French problem and he believed that if we did so it would help to persuade the British to do something similar and take further constructive steps which would be helpful in obtaining EDC ratification in France.

The third problem which Mr. Bidault had discussed in connection with EDC ratification was the Saar. Mr. Bidault had expressed the strong hope that Adenauer would make a great effort to reach a satisfactory Saar settlement. Bidault did not envisage that every detail must be settled. What he had in mind was a broad general settlement. Bidault hoped there would be an early occasion to talk to Adenauer quietly and inconspicuously about the Saar, since a settlement of this issue was essential to French ratification. The Secretary said he had the impression that

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Mr. Bidault recognized that the Germans could not be expected to make definitive concessions on the Saar prior to EDC ratification and he felt sure the French would agree that any Saar settlement would come into effect only when EDC was ratified.

The Secretary then said there was no point in any of the interested countries making a final contribution to meet the French requirements on these three problems which he had discussed with Mr. Bidault until their respective contributions would have a maximum impact and effect on French ratification of EDC. If the contributions are made too early the French parliament will accept them and ask for more and we will have nothing more to give. The British share this view. Therefore the U.S. the U.K. and Germany must make their final contribution to French ratification of the EDC at about the same time and when they will be decisive with the French. We understand from Bidault that serious French parliamentary consideration of EDC will occur about mid-March and in the meantime we will keep in close touch with the situation through the French Ambassador in Washington. Mr. Eden, on his part, will send someone to Paris about the end of next week to follow developments and be in touch with the French. We should focus our making our real effort about Mid-March to have a decisive effect.

The Secretary had asked Bidault about the life of the present French government and whether it would survive and be in office to bring about a vote on EDC. Bidault believes the Government will be in power. Should it fall, however, a new situation involving further delays would occur.

Chancellor Adenauer replied that he hoped to reach an understanding with France on the Saar. He was now inclined to take the Van der Goes report (of the Council of Europe) as a basis for a settlement. One point in this report, however, makes it very difficult for the Germans to accept. He would discuss this in detail with

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Ambassador Conant. (Hallstein indicated the problem was that the Van der Goes report in paragraph 19 envisaged the U.S., U.K., France and Germany agreeing now that the Saar would be Europeanized and separated from Germany and that its frontiers would be definitively accepted. If the Federal Republic accepted the definitive settlement of its Western frontier with respect to the Saar, the ODR would be provided with the pretext to finalize the Oder-Neiser line and turn over definitively the territory to the east over to Poland. Therefore, while the Germans might use the Van der Goes report as the basis of a settlement there should be a provision that final settlement of the Saar frontier could only be reached at the time of the Peace Treaty by an all-German Government.)

The Secretary replied that he did not know anything about the details of the Saar problem. Nor did he wish to. He recognized that it was a very complicated and technical problem. The point he was making was that to secure EDC ratification the U.S. the U.K. and Germany each had to make a contribution. For the U.S. it was some arrangement about the continuation of armed forces in Europe which would be extremely difficult to formulate because of Congress. For the U.K. it would perhaps be some improvement in the form of association with EDC which the U.K. would develop. The Secretary said we counted on Germany to make its contribution and its contribution is a Saar settlement. The Secretary said: "I plead with you to make the necessary contribution." He said that both he and President Eisenhower recalled the Chancellor's assurances given in Washington last April that the Chancellor would not permit the Saar to stand in the way of EDC. They had confidence that the Chancellor would find the way since he was one of the world's ablest international statesman.

Chancellor Adenauer replied: "I maintain and stand by what I told you and the President in Washington."

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The Secretary said that this was all he wanted to know and that he would so inform the President.

The Secretary then said that he wanted to report to the Chancellor about the Spandau affair. The three Western Foreign Ministers had decided that it would be unwise to raise it with Molotov at the Council table. Accordingly it had been taken up with Molotov outside the Conference. Eden had done most of the talking to Molotov and had gone into the question of the disposition of the remains of prisoners who died as well as improving living conditions in the prison. Molotov had replied that he was not familiar with the details but would inquire of Semenov. The Secretary said he could not promise that anything would come of this but an effort had been made.

Chancellor Adenauer asked whether publicity could be given to the fact that the matter had been taken up with Molotov.

The Secretary replied that he thought this would not be wise. We should wait at least for about a month and see what came of the request to Molotov. Adenauer said he supposed this was right.

Chancellor Adenauer then asked if the three Western Ministers had taken up with Molotov the question of German war prisoners who are held in the Soviet Union.

The Secretary replied that he had not taken up this question but that the three Western Ministers had let Molotov know that the Western High Commissioners would take up with the Soviet High Commissioner a number of measures designed to ameliorate the situation resulting from the division of Germany and the controls in the Eastern Zone and that we hoped something constructive could be done.

Ambassador Conant then briefly explained what the Western High Commissioners had in mind.

The Secretary then referred to the German amendment to the constitution necessitated by EDC and asked when the parliamentary action would be completed. The Chancellor

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replied

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replied that he believed it would be done on Friday February 26. The Secretary said he hoped Belgium ratification would soon be completed and mentioned that he had written Van Zeeland a long letter from Berlin which he hoped would be helpful in rectifying some of the latter's misapprehensions.

The Secretary then mentioned that he had come away from the Berlin Conference with the impression that the Soviets were concerned about their relations with the Chinese Communists. The Chancellor said he had had interesting reports from missionaries returning from China. He hoped the U.S. would succeed in getting a foothold in China. Social conditions there were very bad. He added 500 million discontented Chinese represented a problem which could cause difficulties for all of us.

The Chancellor then said he had been asked by Washington whether it would be good to give food to the East Zone of Germany. He would like to. He said that the influx of refugees from the East Zone was increasing and that he would like to dam this influx so as to avoid a shortage of population in the East Zone. He said the U.S. had helped with the refugee problem and he hoped they could continue to do so.

The Secretary asked whether contributions of food would help keep people in the East Zone and thus prevent refugeeism. The Chancellor said this would be a great help and mentioned that cooperation between the Church authorities of the two zones was important both materially and psychologically in coping with the refugee problem.

The Chancellor mentioned he understood that a sub-committee of the Senate was considering the German property question and that favorable action on this was very important.

The Chancellor said he had only one final thing to say. Article 73 of the Bonn Treaty involving the right of an all-German Government to make its choice had caused a great reaction in Paris. With this in mind he would make a statement

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to the Bundestag next week saying that when an all-German Government was formed it was the strong intention of the Bonn Government to urge that the all-German Government maintain the EDC Treaty.

The Secretary said this would be very helpful and that he himself would take a similar line. If EDC came into being the judicial question of the right of an all-German Government to choose was incidental. If EDC was in existence and Europe united, obviously the all-German Government would apt for its place in the European community.


Distribution:

S: The Secretary
 U: The Under Secretary
 C: Mr. MacArthur
 G: Mr. Murphy
 S/P: Mr. Bowie
 EUR: Mr. Merchant
 GER: Mr. Lyon

Ambassador Conant (Pouched 2:00 p.m. 2/20)
 Ambassador Aldrich) " " " "
 Ambassador Brich (" " " "
 Mr. Achilles (" " " "

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
western position in Berlin was essential to the peace of the free world and that any attack against Berlin would be viewed as an attack on the Allies.

The firm attitude of the Western Powers has also been demonstrated by a tripartite declaration issued by the three High Commissioners on April 9, 1954, concerning the recent Soviet announcement that the East German regime had been granted increased "sovereignty". The High Commissioners indicated that their governments continue to hold the Soviet Union responsible in East Germany, do not recognize the "sovereignty" of the East German regime, and do not intend to deal with it as a government.

In accordance with the practice of evidencing occasionally our special interest in Berlin by the visit of top governmental officials, consideration is being given to a proposal that the Under Secretary of State or some other high governmental official visit Berlin in June in connection with the opening of the new Berlin library or on some other suitable occasion.

Paragraphs 8b and 8i(1): Be prepared to undertake any feasible reprisals against specific local harassments.

Status: A tripartite study of potential reprisals applicable primarily in Berlin and Western Germany has been completed by technical experts of the Allied High Commission. While this report has not yet been formally approved by the High Commissioners, it is available for quick application should local harassments be imposed. This catalogue of retaliation encompasses inter alia by tripartite arrangement such diverse items as the blocking of Soviet Zone transport in West Germany, including the delaying of the passage of Soviet Zone vessels through the Kiel Canal by refusal of exit on technical pretexts; delay or denial of licenses of International List III commodities to Soviet Bloc countries; and interference with certain Soviet interests, primarily those affecting their prestige, such as the War Memorial in the British Sector, the tank memorial in the U.S. Sector, or access to the former radio building in the British Sector which is still used by the Soviets. That portion of the report which concerns preventive and retaliatory measures in the field of transport has been drafted in agreement with appropriate German authorities in Bonn and Berlin. It is anticipated that the British and French will be reluctant to agree in advance to projected reprisals, especially to choosing certain ones for specific hypothetical cases of harassment, and that very likely final decisions will have to be made on the spot in the light of whatever harassment has occurred and the general situation. It is also recognized that available countermeasures, while useful in lifting relatively minor harassments, are probably insufficient to deter serious harassment should the Soviets decide upon such a course.



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during the first 90 days of the blockade. (The British and French representatives on the HICOM-Military Committee have taken a very serious interest in an airlift. The British have offered an initial contribution of 1325 tons daily. The French have offered 725 tons daily and a further increase to 900 tons at the end of three months. The French representative indicated that this contribution would be made available regardless of the Indo-China situation and that substantial further increases could be offered if there is any lessening of French commitments in Indo-China.)

Paragraph 8h: Seek to persuade the UK and France to adopt U.S. policy on Berlin and seek to widen areas of agreement on future plans and emergency measures.

Status: Implementation of this paragraph is expected to be difficult. On December 30, 1953 a British Embassy official, obviously acting on Foreign Office instructions, informed the State Department that the British Government was still firmly convinced that an airlift was sine qua non and in fact constituted the only proper response to a full blockade. The British representative expressed the hope that U.S. policy on this subject would not change and urged full development of airlift plans.

As an initial approach, the British and French Embassies here will be informed somewhat along the following lines: that while no plan yet proposed would eliminate the need for an airlift of some type in the event of a blockade, it is not believed that such an elaborate airlift as we had in 1948 is the sole answer to a blockade and that there must be other ways of approach which could assist in resolving the situation in a much shorter period than the last blockade; that we are considering more positive measures to maintain the Western position in event of emergency, e.g. high level protests to the Kremlin, possibility of transport and economic countermeasures, increased military preparedness, possibly limited use of military force, etc; that final decisions on all such measures will be made at the time in the light of all the prevailing circumstances and in consultation with our Allies; and that we wish to explore these measures.

An appropriate time for the above approach will have to be found in the light of other negotiations. It is contemplated that consultation would not be inaugurated until probably after the Geneva Conference and possibly after France has made a decision on EDC ratification.

Paragraph 8i(2): Keep under review conditions affecting security and necessary remedial measures.

Status: In the meantime, the U.S. High Commission has been requested to undertake tripartite discussions in Bonn and Berlin, concerning the problem and implications of the recent change in the status of the East German regime, with a view to (a) examining the various contingencies and types of problems that may arise; (b) reviewing

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By *JCS*

NARS, Date

27 Feb 1974
3/11/88

Paragraph 9: If access to Berlin is seriously harassed or a blockade imposed, the U.S. should consult with its Allies and be prepared to: protest at the local level and in Moscow; hold the USSR responsible; make use at an accelerated rate of any means of access still open; initiate mobilization; use in agreement with the Allies limited military force to determine Soviet intentions; solidify world opinion in our favor; evacuate dependents; use limited military force to reopen access.

Status: The Defense Department is engaged in the necessary military planning for the above contingencies. U.S. commanders in Germany have been requested to review the adequacy of previous instructions relating to resistance to attack, evacuation of dependents, and maintenance of access to Berlin. Preparation for the non-military aspects of the above contingencies is being planned as previously cited in the first nine paragraphs of this report.

B. Evaluation of Policy

1. The working group believes that NSC 5404/1 has been in effect for too short a period of time to make a determination of the need for reconsidering policies set forth in that paper.

C. Major Problems

A major problem is presented by the need to modify airlift planning and possibly the stockpile program, in accordance with NSC 5404/1, and on the other hand the dubiousness of seeking at this particular time to explain the policy reasons for any suggested modifications to the British and French. Although NSC 5404/1 calls for U.S. agencies to seek to persuade the UK and France to adopt U.S. policy on Berlin, it has been considered until now that to attempt to do so with the Geneva Conference in session and with the delicate situation with respect to French ratification of EDC, would be inappropriate since unfortunate repercussions could result.

At the present time, however, airlift planning and the stockpile program are in such final stages from previous negotiations called for under the old NSC paper (132/1) that possible modifications called for by NSC 5404/1 will have to be introduced almost immediately. The problem, therefore, is how to explain adequately the reasons for any of these modifications. In view of the potential repercussions upon other international negotiations, this problem deserves particular attention.

A tripartite HICOM-Military Committee has been working for nearly six months on detailed airlift planning. Under the previous NSC paper (132/1) U.S. members of this committee repeatedly urged planning for a full-scale airlift and were attaining a considerable degree of success. Now, in concluding negotiations, U.S. representatives are seeking to modify the plan to conform in effect with the concept of a limited

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By JCS Date 27 Feb 1974
NARS, Date 3/11/88

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

JUL 19 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Policy Guidance for United States, United Kingdom, and
French Commandants, Berlin

Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 16 June 1954,
setting forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a United
Kingdom proposal that surrender instructions be provided Allied
Commandants in Berlin.

The Department of Defense concurs in those views and, as
requested in your memorandum of 16 June, has obtained the con-
currence of the Department of State, as indicated in the attached
correspondence. In accordance with the proposal of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense concurs in the dis-
patch of the proposed message to CINCUSAREUR, as contained in the
Appendix to the aforementioned memorandum.

FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA):

A. C. Davis

A. C. DAVIS
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Office of
Foreign Military Affairs

1 Inclosure
Cy of ltr from Under Sec/State dtd 1 Jul 54

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PERTAINS TO N/H JCS 1907/107

SecDef Cent. No. TS-085

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 JCS Review 27 Feb 1974
 By JCS NARS, Date 3/11/85

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Y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Washington D C

In reply refer to
 GER:GPA: 762A.00/6-2454

July 1 1954

My dear Mr. Hensel:

Reference is made to your letter of June 24, 1954 concerning a British proposal that surrender instructions be provided the Allied Commandants in Berlin. It is the opinion of the Department of State that the larger political implications of the proposed policy fully coincide with the military implications noted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which the Department of Defense expressed its agreement. The Department of State agrees that these considerations override the desirability of maintaining a tripartite position and therefore concurs with the proposed message to the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Army Europe, indicating that the British proposal is neither required nor an appropriate topic of discussion.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Robert Murphy
 Deputy Under Secretary

The Honorable
 Struve Hensel,
 Assistant Secretary of Defense,
 International Security Affairs,
 Department of Defense,
 Washington, D. C.

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 JCS 7000 27 Feb 1974
 By [signature] NARS, Date 3/11/88

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16 June 1954

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 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~
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Subject: Policy Guidance for U.S., U.K., and French Commandants, Berlin.

1. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR) has requested (DA IN 56736, 8 May 1954) a United States Government position regarding a British Government proposal that surrender instructions be provided United States, United Kingdom, and French Commandants in Berlin. The reply to this message will establish a precedent reaching beyond the operational planning needs of Berlin.

2. CINCUSAREUR considers that from a military point of view, the instructions are neither required by the commands in Berlin nor, in view of their sensitive nature, are they appropriate topics of discussion. The Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, concurs.

3. The High Commissioner in Germany believes that since the British have raised the question, some satisfactory agreement should be reached in order to maintain the Tripartite position in Berlin.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the position of CINCUSAREUR, should be supported and that the military implications of the proposed policy are overriding. It is considered that:

a. The action proposed would involve a voluntary relinquishment, in advance of a crisis, of an inescapable responsibility of the President. Responsibility of this kind is non-delegable.

b. The British proposal would abrogate the authority of the commander on the spot to choose the course of action best designed to accomplish his assigned mission at the time of decision. Furthermore, a situation would be created

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 By *[initials]* NARS, Date 2/11/88

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wherein a commander with guidance of this nature might act unilaterally without full knowledge of the situation outside his area of responsibility.

c. The British proposal has adverse psychological implications that are inherent in any predetermined surrender plan.

5. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you obtain concurrence of the Secretary of State in sending the message in the Appendix hereto to CINCUSAREUR, which will establish a policy that surrender instructions will not be given U.S. commanders, except as a result of decisions taken at highest governmental level in the light of full consideration of the over-all situation as it then exists. Upon notification of receipt of the concurrence of the Department of State the Joint Chiefs of Staff will send the message in the Appendix to CINCUSAREUR.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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M. F. TWining,
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

Enclosure

Copies to:

Chairman, JCS (2)
 Asst C/S, G-3
 Secy to CNO (JCS)
 Director/Plans, AF
 Director J/S

(JCS 1907/107 - Approved 16 June 1954)

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By <i>JCS 7/1/54</i>	Date <i>27 Feb 1974</i>
By <i>JCS 7/1/54</i>	Date <i>3/11/54</i>

TOP SECRETENCLOSURE "B"

To JCS 1907/107

8 June 1954

FROM: CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY SGD HOGE

CJCS USA
on Policy Guidance
AN US, UK, & FR,
Commanding Berlin

TO: DEPTAR WASH DC FOR SECY OF DEFENSE

INFO: USCINCEUR PARIS FRANCE, HICOG BONN GERMANY

NR: SX 2627

071510Z MAY 54

1. On 24 Feb 54 Gen Gale, Chairman Comds in Chief Com British Forces Germany, informed CINCUSAREUR that the British Govt has auth issue of certain guidance to the British Comdt Berlin prov US and French agree to issue guidance in similar terms to their Comdts.

2. Guidance recm by the British fol:

"When in view of the three Comdts, the gar can no longer carry out its task of containing Soviet Forces, you may at your joint discretion agree to surr. If the three Comdts take this decision you will first order off and other ranks to attempt escape as indivs.

"If at the time of surr, allied families and civ women and children of NATO nations are still under your protection, you will negotiate with the enemy commander for their safety."

3. On 11 Mar 54 CINCUSAREUR informed Gen Gale that his psn was that such instr are neither required by the Comdts in Berlin nor are they by reason of their sensitivity of such nature bear discussion; however, CINCUSAREUR would obtain guidance on this matter from higher auth.

4. Subsequently, the Politico-mil aspects of this subj were discussed jointly by HICOG [High Commission in Germany] and USAREUR. Both agree that since Gen Gale's proposal had been sanctioned by the British Govt the US psn should be cfm in Wash. In that regard the Comd in Chief, French Forces Germany, has

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Enclosure "B"

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informed Gen Hoge that in his opinion a joint directive for the Comdts is required and that he too is consulting his govt in the matter.

5. USAREUR remains of the opinion that from a mil point of view the instr are neither required by the Comdts in Berlin nor, in view of their sensitive nature, are they appropriate topics of discussion. USEUCOM concurs.

6. HICOG, on the other hand, believes that since the British have raised the ques some sat agreement should be reached in order to maintain the Tripartite psn in Berlin.

7. If it is considered on the govt level that such political considerations are overriding, neither the mil auth in Germany nor HICOG have objection to the substance of the guidance suggested by Gen Gale and would in that event recom that it be fwd to the Comdts in Berlin. This recom is not to be intpr as a weakening of the mil psn outlined above. For the sake of clarity, the first sentence of Gen Gale's guidance should be changed to read: "When in view of the three Comdts the gar can no longer carry out its mission, you may at your joint discretion agree to surr...".

8. Your comments are requested. HICOG, who has concurred in this msg, rqst that your ans indicate coordination with State. It is envisaged that CINCUSAREUR will upon rec of your comments inform Gen Gale and Gen Noiret of the US Govt psn.

9. USEUCOM concurs with above.

DA IN 56736

(8 May 54)


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Enclosure "2"



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Department of State

Policy Information Statement
for USIA (EUR - 164)
September 3, 1954


REAPPRAISAL IN EUROPE

1. The reappraisal period which the United States entered with the defeat of EDC in France finds this Government faced with certain underlying considerations which will govern the detailed policies yet to be worked out. It is clear at this point that the United States will continue as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is also clear that, both from a military and political point of view, Germany cannot be kept unarmed indefinitely. While we will continue to seek safeguards against an independent revival of German military might, we must avoid any plan which would be discriminatory. Because of the present position of France in our European policies, any adjustment of our policies to meet the objectives set forth above must seek to find a solution where a French veto will not completely stymie all our efforts.

2. In the immediate future it will be our objective to encourage the Europeans, and especially France, to take the initiative in proposing workable alternatives for German integration into the Western defense system.

3. Our public position should show our continued interest in the defense of Europe and our allegiance to NATO, but should remain purposely hazy on the question of alternatives to EDC. The need for bringing about a German military contribution and our view that such a contribution must be brought about on a non-discriminatory basis should be stressed. On the other hand we do not wish to add fuel to German demands for "full sovereignty" since a climate of public opinion in which this demand is paramount may make it difficult for the German leaders even to enter into voluntary agreements restricting the exercise of that sovereignty.



4. We should continue to emphasize that it is essential that any substitute for EDC must be designed to further concept of European unity and contribute to burial of traditional Franco-German antagonisms.



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SECRETRECORD OF MEETINGHOTEL TALLEYRAND, 3 PM, SEPTEMBER 23, 1954

Participants: Assistant Secretary Merchant
 Ambassador Dillon, Amembassy, Paris
 Mr. Achilles, Amembassy, Paris
 Ambassador Hughes, USRO
 Mr. Martin, USRO
 General Wood, USRO
 Mr. Page, USRO
 General Schuyler, SHAPE
 General Cook, USEUCOM
 General Freeman, USEUCOM
 Mr. Fessenden, Department

Mr. Merchant outlined the general situation on the eve of the London Nine-Power Conference. Following the Secretary's trip of the preceding week to Bonn and London, an NSC paper had been prepared which set forth the basic US position. The NSC paper would be approved by the President before the Secretary left Washington. Underlying the US position was the assumption that it was crucially important to associate Germany in sovereign equality with the West. We agree with Adenauer's own estimate that he cannot go on much longer maintaining his position unless we take positive action.

At the forthcoming London conference, our general frame of mind will not be one of discouragement or defeatism. We do not believe that the conference is foredoomed to failure. We are also taking the position that primary responsibility rests with the Europeans for developing a proposal. No "made in America" plans will be represented, although we will do what we can to assist.

Three positions have been presented so far. The German position appears reasonable to us, and the British position is generally close to ours. The French proposal in our view has many serious difficulties. However, we have not rejected it out of hand, but have made certain general comments on it which were incorporated in Circular Telegram 156. We have also in Washington been giving thought to what should be done if we encounter a fundamental roadblock of obstructionism and cannot reach

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agreement. We have been giving much thought to the so called "interim measures" for proceeding without the French, if this becomes necessary. Finally, the cables coming out of the NATO Working Group in Paris have been very helpful in Washington and it is clear that our views and those in Paris have been very close.

Mr. Merchant suggested three general questions on which he would like to have the views of the group: (1) the best guess as to the nature of the package which could be sold to the French Assembly. (It must be borne in mind, of course, that the proposal must also be acceptable to the Bundestag, the British Parliament and Congress.) (2) The nature of the steps to strengthen NATO authority, particularly with respect to SACUR control in various fields. (3) The feasibility of an arms pool plan. Our feeling in Washington is that an arms pool has many attractions, but that its feasibility in the immediate future is another question.

In replying to the first point, Ambassador Dillon reviewed Mendes-France's conversation with Mr. Murphy (Paris' telegram 1254 to Department). Ambassador Dillon then gave his own evaluation of Mendes-France's probable position at London. Mendes will probably say he has little basis for negotiation. We will claim that unless he gets what he has asked for from the other Ministers he will not succeed with the Assembly. Ambassador Dillon added that we must remember that NATO membership is poison to the pro-EEC Deputies and that these same Deputies also have great personal animosity for Mendes-France. We must therefore be prepared to face the fact that, even if some sort of agreement is reached in London, it is by no means certain that the Assembly will approve it. It is therefore questionable whether anything acceptable will be worked out. We must therefore be prepared to go ahead with the British in the rearmament of Germany. It would be very important, however, to do this in a way which will not appear to be a threat to France.

The main difficulty with the French proposals is that they would require long and complex negotiations. The situation is very reminiscent of the pre-Brussels situation. Mendes has submitted proposals which he may well claim must be accepted without change if there is to be any prospect of approval by the Assembly. It is very important, therefore, that we go to London, not in a spirit of forcing Mendes to agree, but with our attention primarily focused on how our attitude will look after the conference. It is essential that Mendes not succeed in putting the

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blame on others for any failure. In replying to the second point raised by Mr. Merchant, strengthening NATO controls, General Schuyler described in some detail the practical controls which already exist under SACGER and which could very easily be further developed. (General Schuyler's account followed very closely NATO 187.) General Schuyler reported that General Gruenther had discussed SACGER controls with Mendes-France during his recent talk with him, and Mendes-France was obviously not interested in NATO controls on the ground that they lack political appeal. It was generally agreed that, if Mendes-France wanted to, he could make effective use of the NATO and SACGER controls in selling NATO membership and German rearmament to the Assembly. It was felt that his unwillingness to make any important use of NATO controls was a further reflection on his intentions.

General Cook commented that our attention was perhaps being diverted from Mendes' real purpose in his proposals. The emphasis on arms production controls in the French proposal might well reflect primary French concern over German economic ascendancy, rather than military ascendancy. Ambassador Dillon suggested that there might be considerable basis for General Cook's interpretation; pointing out that Mendes emphasized in his proposals that only new armaments factories would be subject to licensing. This obviously applied to Germany only.

General Cook raised the question of possible rearmament of Germany without the French. It would be quite possible that France would become "pacifically hostile" and the position of US forces in France and perhaps in Africa would become untenable. Our line of supply to our forces in Germany might then be impossible to maintain. General Schuyler pointed out that the British and US forces in Germany were in a very different position as far as their lines of supply were concerned. To have a long logistical "tail"; the US has a very short one. Mr. Merchant explained that the primary purpose of the interim measures program for proceeding without Germany was to induce France to go along. He agreed that if such action produced an excessively hostile attitude in France, then we would certainly have to take a long, new look at our entire program to determine whether it made sense militarily. It was also our view that it would make no sense militarily to proceed on the interim measures program without the United Kingdom, and it would certainly be very doubtful whether the Germans would agree to proceeding without British cooperation. Mr. Bruce made certain general observations on the forthcoming conference. He felt that, in the first place, our general attitude should be that of the nation which has the least direct

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interest in the conference. Second, he felt the German proposal was certainly the most meaningful of the three. It places full reliance on the NATO contact, and it is certainly to our own great long-term interest to build up NATO. The Brussels Treaty might be used to a limited extent, but only as window dressing. A third point was the grave danger of our making too many concessions and in a futile effort to win votes in the French Assembly when we were not at all sure that we will succeed. On the other hand, we must not be in a position of browbeating the French to the extent that we are made responsible for failure. We should go into the conference without "made in America" proposals and with our position essentially uncrystallized. On the arms pool, for instance, he felt that the US should remain completely aloof and let the others directly involved deal with the French proposal.

The participants generally agreed that the French proposal for a European arms pool was too complex and discriminatory. It was also agreed that full establishment of an arms pool, even if one should be worked out, should certainly not become a condition to German entrance into NATO.

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NPT Special 2

September 27, 1954

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Place: Residence of the French Ambassador, London

Participants: The Secretary
M. Mendes-France
Mr. Merchant

The Secretary called at noon today on Premier Mendes-France. The latter greeted the Secretary on the doorstep in the presence of a dozen or more press photographers who appeared out of nowhere.

The Premier escorted the Secretary to the living room and a moment later a dozen or so photographers were ushered in who took five minutes worth of pictures of the Secretary and the Premier engaged in pleasant conversation. In the presence of the photographers M. Mendes-France asked the Secretary how long he expected the conference to last. The Secretary said that he assumed it would last through this week. The Premier expressed surprise and said that he thought it should do its work in less time than that, reaching agreement on principles which would provide guidance for experts who would assemble immediately following the conference.

After the photographers had been removed from the room with some difficulty and at the cost of an upset vase of flowers, the Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he had seen Mr. Murphy on Saturday before he left and received a report of the talk he had had with the Premier. M. Mendes-France said that he had been glad to receive Mr. Murphy and was sorry that his visit was so short. He had seen him at the end of a very difficult day in which he had been concentrating on the scandal in the police and the arrest of Dides. He said that there was a very curious situation of espionage and that he didn't know where it might lead. He would have wished for another week or so of investigation with no publicity because then they might have had a more successful investigation. In a

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week or so, however, he hopes to have further information. He said that there was no doubt that secret documents were being passed on (he did not say to whom) and said that one curious aspect was that reports of at least two meetings of the National Defense Council had been passed on but that they were extractions of the proceedings and did not contain the most precise or sensitive subject matter discussed at the meetings. In other words they had been screened before transmission. He could not account for this pattern but "policemen are terrible people" and it was a bad situation. There were a number of them who were spending large sums of money on cars, women and gambling who had no private fortunes of their own and relatively small salaries. They were connected with different circles, including political groups. The Premier indicated that he was going to get to the bottom of it but that he was unable to see the full implications as yet.

M. Mendes-France then said that he was glad of this opportunity to talk to the Secretary and that he would like to do so frankly. In order to deal with the future it was necessary to go back to the past. He remembered their July meeting with pleasure and at that time he had felt that there had been a full, friendly and frank exchange of views even though they were dealing with difficult subjects. He reminded the Secretary that at that time he had made two promises, both of which he had fulfilled. The first was that he would hold the Assembly in Paris and secure an answer on EDC one way or the other before the end of August. The second was that since there was at that time no majority in favor of the EDC in the Assembly (a point on which he and the Secretary had had an argument) he would attempt to find some modification which would be acceptable to the other five countries and change 60 or so Deputies' votes to carry the treaty.

M. Mendes-France then recited at some length his experience at Brussels. He emphasized that when he arrived there he found that the other five were opposed to accepting his changes and that Mr. Bruce had told him at Brussels that the United States Government did not like his protocols either. Despite his best efforts he had been unable to secure from his partners what was necessary for him to obtain passage of EDC in the Assembly.

Mr. Mendes-France then explained at some length why under the French constitution and in light of the division

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within his Cabinet he had been unable to put the vote on the basis of an issue of confidence. He said he had fought for its passage and that he had made clear to the Assembly that the early return of sovereignty to Germany and the early rearmament of Germany under some alternative arrangement were inevitable if EDC was rejected. Notwithstanding his efforts, the Deputies sustained his earlier estimate of the situation by rejecting the treaty. He then referred in rather bitter terms to the violence of the reaction against France and against him personally in the American press and in the American Government. He indicated clearly that he felt this was unjust and whereas he disclaimed any personal feeling in the matter it was quite plain that he felt a deep and bitter resentment.

The Premier said that he came to London in the belief that it was essential that the conference succeed. He said that up until the close of his talks with Mr. Eden he had been opposed to German entrance into NATO but that he now saw that all others wished it and consequently France could not hold out. He needed, however, "weapons" to win his fight in the Parliament, which would be extremely difficult at best. The two factors about EDC which accounted for its rejection were (1) its supranational character and (2) the absence of the British. By expanding the Brussels Treaty and bringing Germany and Italy into it, it would be possible to meet these two objections. "I am proposing what is really the EDC but without supranationality and with British membership." (At no time during the conversation did M. Mendes-France mention specifically the armaments pool.)

On the matter of restoring sovereignty to Germany the Premier said that there would be no difficulty but it was essential that it be done on a trilateral basis and not be worked out on the basis of three separate bilateral arrangements with Germany. The French people, he said, were willing to accept the return of sovereignty to Germany and hence it presented no political problems to him although there were a number of very difficult legal complications. In this matter, however, we would find him completely reasonable and cooperative.

The important thing, however, M. Mendes-France said, was to give such powers to the Brussels Treaty Council and incorporate in the treaty such safeguards as would enable

him

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By L.H. NARA Date 3/13SECRET

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him to tell the French Chamber that the French were protected against the "inconveniences" flowing from German rearmament.

M. Mendes-France said that he felt it was a mistake for the Secretary to have omitted a visit to Paris last week when he went to Bonn and London. "It had done more harm than good." However, we had all come to London to make the conference a success and he was looking forward to working cooperatively toward that end.

The Secretary replied to the Premier (who had spoken without interruption for an hour) at some length. He recalled the long and affectionate relationship between the two countries extending back to the revolution. He reminded the French Premier that since the war it had been the United States who had supported the French materially, monetarily and diplomatically at conferences. He recited a number of post-war incidents when the United States had championed French interests. He said that the defeat of EDC had been a great blow to the American people who had felt, particularly as delay followed on delay, that it had become the symbol not only of the consistency of France but of the entire concept of a European community which the American people were convinced must be developed if we were to avoid a repetition of the history of two world wars starting in Europe.

The Secretary said that we came here with no plan of our own but only the desire to be helpful. We felt that, even though there was indeed no good alternative to the EDC, nevertheless we could find a solution. A solution, however, he felt must meet three criteria. First, it must result in the prompt restoration of sovereignty to Germany; second, it must permit German participation in its own defense and in support of NATO's forward strategy (the Secretary at this point said that notwithstanding the statements of some military men, the President and he had always felt that the supranational aspect of EDC was far, far more important than twelve German divisions). He said that we had no intention of rushing into a massive rearmament of Germany but we did feel that German participation and collective defense was essential); thirdly, the Secretary said that in any solution it was important that it be made clear that the idea of ultimate unity on the continent was not dead. He said that if the American people felt the rejection of EDC meant the rejection of the European movement toward unity then there

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was a very real chance that the American people would be disillusioned and would withdraw to their own continent feeling another world war would ultimately start in Europe and that we had no wish to be involved in it.


The Secretary then said that there had been press stories to the effect that he and Mendes-France did not get along. He said it was a curious irony that he, who of all American Secretaries of State probably knew France better and loved France better than any other, was regarded by the French with more hostility than any other Secretary (M. Mendes-France protested this statement vehemently). The Secretary said that he had the highest regard for Mendes-France, that he felt their talk in July had established a relationship in which they could work with frankness and intimacy for the same aims. He said he still felt that way but that even if he didn't he had learned years ago the foolishness of attempting to deal on governmental matters with anyone other than the chosen head of the government. He described Woodrow Wilson's failure in his effort to go to the people over the heads of Clemenceau and other European leaders at the time of Versailles. He said no one had the influence to achieve results by this measure. (The Premier interjected that President Eisenhower had enormous influence with the people of Europe.) The Secretary assured Mendes-France that he was looking forward to working with him on a basis of close and intimate association at this conference.

In connection with the omission of Paris from his last trip to Europe, the Secretary pointed out that he had made a number of trips in the last year and a half to Paris without necessarily going to many other capitals. He also pointed out that he had had urgent messages from Adenauer of the latter's desire to see him and similarly had an urgent suggestion from Mr. Eden that he come to London directly from the Manila Conference. He had had no such intimation from Mendes-France of a desire that he come to Paris at that time. He had hoped between Manila and the United Nations to take a week's vacation but he had reluctantly sacrificed four days of it in order to meet the requests he had had from Adenauer and Eden. There had been no intended slight of France and he was surprised that this interpretation had been placed by some upon his itinerary.

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By this time it was nearly 1:30 and as the Secretary rose to leave he asked Mendes-France what he would think of having Eden serve as Permanent Chairman of the Conference. He said he had given thought to other possibilities but that this seemed the best. The Premier indicated full agreement. The Premier then said that Eden had mentioned to him this morning a plan to base the discussion on an extraction of the common points conned from the French, UK and German memoranda. He felt this was unsatisfactory from his point of view and he suggested that they might open the conference by permitting him to expand and discuss in more detail his proposal. The Secretary said that that was a possibility, particularly if thereafter the British and the Germans were given a chance to expand their proposals, following which an agenda might be developed which would draw on the common points of all three memoranda, making clear, however, that each Minister reserved his position on any particular point until the outcome of the discussion of all was seen.

Either at this point or earlier Mendes-France assured the Secretary again that if the London conference arrived at an acceptable agreement he would put it to the French Parliament immediately with the full authority of his government behind it. "This time the French Parliament will be the first to act and not the last."

As they walked to the door Mendes-France said that he needed the Secretary's help at this conference. The Secretary said of course he would help him. Mendes-France however went on to say that he had to judge what was possible of passage in the French Assembly. He said there was no point in reaching an agreement which would fail to secure Parliamentary approval by the countries concerned. That would be meaningless. Therefore he knew the Secretary would understand that there would be certain points to which he had to stick.

The Premier then saw the Secretary to his car. The parting was cordial and friendly.

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Copy No. 3
of 3 copies.MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

September 27, 1954

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Ambassador Aldrich
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Butterworth
Mr. Bowie

Mr. Eden and Mr. Caccia

SUBJECT: Dinner last night at the Ambassador's House

After general discussion during first half of dinner, the discussion turned to business and was continued until about an hour after dinner.

MENDES-FRANCE'S INTENTIONS.

Mr. Eden said that he was still unclear about the real intentions of Mendes-France. He was aware of the various rumors and hypotheses but felt that we must proceed for the purpose of this Conference on the assumption that Mendes-France wanted to work out an acceptable solution which he could get through his Parliament. If we act on that basis, then if these are not his purposes, that should become apparent in the course of the Conference and we should then have to decide what to do.

He felt that if the efforts to reach an acceptable solution did not succeed here then the U.S. and Britain would probably have to act without France on a program regarding Germany.

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN BRUSSELS.

Mr. Eden said that he had concluded that the time had come for Britain to go further in its association with the defense of the Continent. He felt that Britain should be prepared to assign specific forces to the Continent which would be subject to the control of the majority vote of the Brussels Conference. This would constitute a kind of an acceptance by Britain of the supernatural principle and would contribute to the movement toward European unity.

Mr. Eden felt that this should help Mendes-France with his Parliament but he stressed that it would be important to


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Adenauer and that this was one of the reasons for his willingness to take the step.

Mr. Eden stated that he had talked about this somewhat with the Prime Minister but that it was not yet a Cabinet decision. He emphasized that he had spoken about it only to us and it was important that it be held closely for use by the British when it might do the most good.

The Secretary said that he thought this would be most helpful for Mendes-France in meeting his preoccupation for closer British association and for Adenauer in his desire for his continued movement toward European unity.

ARMS POOL

The question of our attitude to the Arms Pool was discussed. All agreed that the proposals put forward by Mendes-France seemed to include features which could hardly be accepted by Adenauer or by the other countries. After discussion of the possible advantages of a genuine system of common procurement, Mr. Eden expressed the view that this might have real advantages both political and economic. It was generally agreed that it would be undesirable and unwise merely to take a negative attitude towards Mendes-France's proposals. If this were done it would enable him to return to France and to present the position that his efforts to obtain satisfactory safeguards by this means had merely been arbitrarily rejected by the others. To prevent this, it was thought desirable that a project for a bona fide Arms Pool should be developed and presented, if possible, by one of the Benelux countries. Mr. Dulles, who was seeing Benelux late on Monday afternoon, agreed to broach the subject with them and see whether they would be interested in putting forward some positive proposal which would be more acceptable both to the Germans and themselves than the present French proposal.

ARRANGEMENTS

The Secretary suggested that it would be best to have a permanent chairman rather than to rotate and proposed that Mr. Eden act in that capacity. Mr. Eden was inclined to agree that a permanent chairman would be better but was not particularly anxious to serve because he would not wish to be foreclosed from presenting the British view. After reviewing the other possibility it was concluded that Mr. Eden should serve with the understanding that he would not

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be prevented from taking an active part in the discussion at the Conference. Mr. Dulles agreed also to suggest this to Mendes-France and the Benelux representatives when he saw them.

It was agreed that in the first day or two it would be desirable to avoid airing the respective positions in the press, especially the French and the German positions, which were likely to be negotiating positions. Any detailed reporting at the start would make it harder to make compromises to accommodate the differing points of view. The best answer seemed to be to have short formal statements from each of the Nine at the start of the Conference which could be released to the papers on the first day.

It was also agreed in the early stages it would be desirable to have a Four-Power Meeting to deal with German sovereignty and to request the High Commissioners to continue their work with the Germans on the revision of the contractals with a view to reporting any major issues to the Conference before it adjourns, if possible.

U.S.-BRITISH UNITY.

Mr. Dulles said that he felt that the U.S. should not take the initiative in the early stages of the meeting in putting forward any proposals. His attitude would be that the U.S. was there as a friend and counselor and was deeply interested in the results but looked to the Europeans to put forward proposals. We would probably be consulted by others and would express our views to them but would try to avoid getting out in front. Mr. Eden agreed that this was the wise approach.

Mr. Eden said that he felt that the success of the Conference depended absolutely on joint US-UK cooperation. He thought that at some point we would have to "heave" a solution through.

The Secretary said he was very glad that ^{we} were so close together in our thinking on the problems.

SOUTHEAST ASIA.

In the course of the discussion at the table, Mr. Eden expressed his belief that it was vital that Laos and Cambodia be preserved from Communist control. At one point he seemed to say that he thought the situation in Viet-Nam was hopeless, but later expressed the view that it was important, if possible, to preserve Cochin China.

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
In pursuing the question of U.S. training missions for Cambodia, Mr. Merchant pressed Mr. Caccia as to why there should be any objection to this in view of the terms of the armistice agreement. Mr. Caccia's somewhat evasive answers tended to confirm the suspicions that the British had given side assurances to the Chinese Communists regarding the U.S. training missions in Laos and Cambodia.

Mr. Eden said that he had sent a long cable to Nehru explaining the Southeast Asia Pact with a view to his pending trip to Peiping. He had also cabled him to express his concern about Laos.

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 NPT Memo. 30
 Sept. 27, 1954

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

September 27, 1954

Participants: The Secretary
 General Gruenther
 Ambassador Aldrich
 Mr. Merchant
 Mr. McCaule

Mr. Bowie
 Mr. Martin
 Colonel Silver
 Colonel Richardson
 Mr. O'Connor

Subject: SACUR Assistance in Alternative Arrangements to EDC

General Gruenther called attention to the fact that during the morning meeting he had not had an opportunity to answer the question asked by the Secretary about the feasibility of establishing a strategic zone in which it would be militarily unwise to produce certain types of munitions.

General Gruenther stated that establishment of such a zone was feasible, and his Headquarters would be willing to assist in it. However, they would prefer not to get involved, and he suggested that it might be possible to utilize, at least as a solution for the present, the arrangements in this regard agreed to in connection with the EDC negotiations.

General Gruenther expressed the opinion that the Germans were apparently willing to accept the EDC solution although he doubted the prohibition of the production in Germany of military aircraft could be maintained for long.

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NPT Memo. 29

Sept. 27, 1951

NINE POWER CONFERENCE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 1951MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: The Secretary of State
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Moore

Ambassador Hughes
Mr. Hensel
General Gruenther
Colonel Richardson
Colonel Anderson

THE SECRETARY said that he would like to have General Gruenther's views on the problem raised by the French in their memorandum, namely an armaments pool. He said that our preliminary thinking on this subject suggested that there were two main purposes to be serviced by such a proposal.

One would be the delimitation of certain areas, or zones, in which certain types of production would be prevented or limited, for example atomic weapons. These zones would be drawn in accordance with strategic and military considerations since the German territory would be included in the forward area. The proposal would also serve a political purpose by prohibiting or limiting German production of strategic weapons.

The second main purpose would be a rationalization of arms production within the territories covered, thereby serving an economic, as well as a political, purpose. The thought would be to lower costs of production by concentrating production of certain types of equipment in efficient plants, and, at the same time, make it impossible for any one country to provide a balanced arms program independently of its neighbor.

As we analyzed French motives at the conference, they were concerned about two main points: they wished to involve the U.K. as deeply as possible on the Continent and they were concerned to limit German control of an independent military potential. Some form of arms pool would help to meet the second preoccupation, although it was clear that the British attitude was such that it would do little to meet the first. It was probably true also that the French had ulterior mo-

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tives with a view to getting control over the allocation of arms orders for the benefit of French industry. However, it should be possible to arrange a scheme which would provide safeguards against this danger.

In reply, GENERAL CRUENTHER recounted his conversation with Monsieur Mendes-France, in which he pointed out that an arms pool was not the most satisfactory method of meeting the French desire to control German military strength. He pointed out to Monsieur Mendes-France that, in NATO, we had a going concern already set up to provide certain safeguards for France. He listed these as follows:

1. Through the Infrastructure Program, NATO controlled the pipelines through which fuel for aircraft must flow in the event of future war, and without this fuel German forces would have no aircraft support and thus could not fight independently.

2. Under NATO, a pooling of reserve supplies and stocks was being worked out, so that no one country would be able to fight for very long in the absence of control over these reserves.

3. NATO had integrated arrangements for air defense which, for military reasons, must be operated from one source through an integrated radar network.

4. The International command structure under NATO would provide a tip-off in the event that any one Member country initiated a process of pulling out its own forces for aggressive purposes.

He said that, to improve and strengthen these controls over international forces, SHAPE would need to have its powers strengthened and defined by Council action, but that this should be relatively easy to provide by international agreement. Monsieur Mendes-France had replied that a program of the kind outlined by General Gruenther would be difficult to sell politically in France. German Gruenther said that SHAPE's experience in talking with various groups of Frenchmen suggested that such a program could be sold if it were properly explained to the average Frenchman. He said further that the EDC had failed in part because of opposition from French military officials. These same officials, including General Juin, would support a proposal of the kind General Gruenther had made. He said that Mendes-France wanted SHAPE

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to accept responsibility for the inspection of German factories. This would be impracticable since SHAPE had no personnel for this purpose and it would be politically impossible for them to get into this field.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that, if SHAPE were given increased authority by Council action, the Council could only remove this authority by a unanimous vote, and that this should help to satisfy French fears. General GRUENTHER agreed and pointed out that a Frenchman, General Juin, would administer these NATO controls insofar as they relate to ground forces in the central sector. The air force commander in this sector is also a Frenchman, General Charpentier.

GENERAL GRUENTHER felt that the best tactic with respect to an arms pool would be to ask the French questions about their plan. The Germans, including Mr. _____, have no knowledge of the details. He said that the SHAPE analysis suggested that the basis of the French proposal was the so-called Lapie Plan, developed in 1951 to deal with the need for greater integration in aircraft procurement. He suggested that this plan provided the germ of a program which would be acceptable and which could be developed by the experts. It was pointed out that any plan would require some formula for making the basic decisions, such as the voting procedure set forth in the EDC Treaty. Perhaps such a formula could be worked out under the Brussels Treaty. THE SECRETARY felt that it was important to develop some set of counter-proposals, possibly by agreement with the Benelux countries, so that the French could not say that there was only destructive criticism of their proposal. It was agreed that we needed to develop promptly the principles of an effective scheme, so that we could use them informally in our discussion with other Delegations.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

November 4, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. The President has indicated his approval of the broad line of action indicated in the memorandum on "Recommended U.S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy" presented to him jointly by the Secretaries of State and Defense at the meeting at 12:30 on 3 November 1954. He has also indicated broad agreement with the concept and major points of the proposed Military Committee Report relating to the "new approach" as outlined by General Collins at that meeting.
2. During the meeting of November 3, the President indicated his readiness to consult with Congressional leaders on this matter at an early date, and indicated further that he will expect specific recommendations as to such consultation to be made to him by the Department of State in consultation with Defense.
3. With respect to concern expressed by Admiral Radford lest the impression be gained erroneously that the U.S. might assume the entire effort required to bring forces into position to accomplish the new concept, the President has indicated that he interprets the statements relating to U.S. support, through military assistance, of "agreed NATO plans to accomplish the new concept" to refer instead to a reorienting of present and future U.S. military assistance in such manner as to assure that this assistance is geared into and contributes toward the development of forces prepared for integrated action generally as called for in these studies.

signed

A. J. Goodpaster
Colonel, CF, U.S. Army
Staff SecretaryTOP SECRET

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NAR D-5/10 approved
November 16, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. State and Defense suggest that, in tomorrow's meeting with the Congressional leaders, you open the discussion on endorsement of Nato nuclear strategy by making these points:

a. Necessity and desirability of basing NATO military plans and preparations on the concept that an effective atomic capability is indispensable to a maximum deterrent and essential to defense in Western Europe. General Gruenther developed the basic NATO study through eight months' work; State and Defense have worked out proposed U. S. action on it during the past four months.

b. First element of proposed action is to secure NATO-wide approval of the concept of the capability to use A-weapons as a major element of military operations in event of hostilities. For this purpose, the U. S. should be prepared, if required, subject to constitutional limitations, to give assurances that A-weapons would be available in the hands of U. S. forces for such operations.

c. Second element is to reorient the pattern of NATO military forces toward the new type of operations. To this end, the U. S. should be prepared to give assurances, if required, that present and future U. S. military assistance will be geared into and make an appropriate contribution toward the development of forces prepared for integrated action generally as called for in the NATO studies. It would be understood, of course, that Congress retains its full power to act upon proposals for military aid programs.

2. There is some likelihood that the Congressmen will ask what the U. S. gets in return for these assurances -- specifically, whether we shouldn't receive from the European countries authority to conduct atomic operations from bases in their territory. General Gruenther feels, and State and Defense strongly support him, that it would be unwise to press for categorical commitments -- rather that the Europeans should be led into the atomic era gradually and tacitly.

3. Some release of atomic information -- for example letting Nato commanders know how many weapons they should base their plans on --

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will be required. The Congressmen may challenge the wisdom of making such a release, prior to receiving formal agreement that A-weapons can be used from foreign soil. There are two basic points; first, commanders must have at least minimum essential planning data, if they are to conduct effective operations, and second, the "quid pro quo" is in the acceptance by NATO of the new concept, not in seeking formal commitments for automatic use of a nature the U.S. would not itself be prepared to give.

A. J. Goodpaster
Col. CE, US Army

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By L.H. NARA Date 3/13

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Position Paper
NAR D-5/3 Approved
December 10, 1954

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, PARIS,
DECEMBER, 1954

Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength
for the Next Few Years

Contingency Paper - Assurances Which May Be Given on Availability of Aid Programs

Recommended U.S. Position

If required, U.S. prepared to give the following assurance on development of U.S. aid Programs in support of NATO nuclear strategy:

"I am authorized to state that the Executive Branch of my Government will use its best efforts so that present and future U.S. military assistance will be geared into and make an appropriate contribution toward the development of forces prepared for integrated action generally as called for in these NATO studies. It is understood, of course, that the Congress retains its full power to act upon proposals for military aid programs."

Anticipated Position of Other Members

Possible that any country may raise.

Discussion

As acceptance of MC 48 by NATO nations will mean that other members of NATO will be depending on nuclear strategy without any assurance of NATO's ability to accomplish it unless U.S. agrees appropriately to support it, foregoing assurance may become necessary.

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Nar D-5/10 Approved
December 10, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommended U.S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy.

In December the Military Committee will render a report to the North Atlantic Council, in accordance with previous directions, on "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years". The Standing Group has prepared a draft of this report based upon special capabilities studies prepared by the major NATO commands which take into account the availability of nuclear weapons. This proposed report will state that Soviet aggression against NATO nations can be deterred or defeated if, and only if, NATO forces have the capability both to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack and to deliver an immediate effective nuclear counter-attack. The report will also assert that, in the possibility of a full-scale Soviet attack without employing nuclear weapons, NATO would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe without immediate employment by NATO of nuclear weapons, both strategically and tactically.

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The positions to be taken on this matter by U.S. Representatives in the various NATO military and civilian agencies involve important aspects of foreign policy and strategic plans, and should, therefore, reflect your authorization and possible Congressional consultation. The Departments of State and Defense have reviewed the proposed report prepared by the Standing Group in the light of both the current international situation and the policies indicated by NSC action regarding arrangements for the use of nuclear weapons. This review established the following significant points which are consonant with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Gruenther.

1. U.S.

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1. U.S. objectives regarding a nuclear strategy for NATO, under present conditions, should be:

a. To develop in the NATO Alliance a nuclear capability as an indispensable element in providing a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

b. To seek, without jeopardizing the NATO Alliance or its deterrent effect, to have NATO prepared to take immediate military action in the event of aggression, including the use of nuclear weapons.

c. To obtain by virtue of (b) above or by supplemental arrangements the necessary U.S. operating rights required to make such nuclear strategy effective.

2. NSC policy calls for promptly obtaining necessary authority from our Allies to make immediate use of nuclear weapons. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirm the urgent need from the military point of view for early action in effecting arrangements for the use of nuclear weapons in defense of the NATO area, they recognize the governing influence of political considerations in these matters and the danger of proceeding too quickly. In our judgment, the present political and psychological atmosphere in Europe is such that NATO Governments could not, at this juncture, specifically and formally authorize the automatic use of nuclear weapons, especially in a form which might necessitate parliamentary action with all the attendant publicity.

3. Once the building of NATO forces in support of a nuclear strategy is under way, in accordance with the recommendations of the Military Committee, a situation of acceptance in fact of a nuclear capability can develop and thus condition the European psychology. Within this context the question of U.S. operating rights can be continuously pursued without dividing the Alliance, impairing its deterrent effect, prejudicing satisfactory rights and arrangements already existing, or seriously delaying development of an integrated nuclear capability for NATO forces.

4. While it is believed undesirable to attempt any concerted NATO program for the specific development of public opinion, it is considered desirable to direct the attention of the NATO Ministers to the common political

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December 10, 1954

problem facing each of them, i. e., that each must soberly and carefully seek to develop public opinion in their own country to tacitly accept the new situation.

5. In order to obtain acceptance by the North Atlantic Council in December of the nuclear concept embodied in the Military Committee Report, the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government must be prepared to give assurance that nuclear weapons in the hands of U.S. forces in NATO will be in sufficient quantity and available to support agreed NATO plans. Otherwise the other members of NATO would be depending on this strategy without any assurances of NATO's ability to accomplish it. Any such assurances should be clearly limited to the form of a declaration of intention of the President, in order to conform with constitutional limitations, as explained by the Secretary of State at the London Nine-Power Conference.

6. It is not clear at this time what adjustments in forces and equipment, both of the U.S. and of our Allies, will be required for this new NATO concept. There is little hope, however, that the new system of weapons will cost less than the system it replaces, and it might well cost more. The development of U.S. forces is continually taking into account plans for nuclear weapons, including NATO plans. However, it is possible that these developments in NATO could involve considerable changes in our Military Assistance Program both in types of equipment and expenditures, such as would be involved in an expanded European air defense and early warning system. We should be prepared, if required, to give assurance to NATO that the Executive Branch will use its best efforts with the Legislative Branch in support of military assistance programs required to accomplish the new concept.

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Based upon the foregoing, the two Departments suggest, for your approval, the following guidelines for U.S. actions on this subject leading into the December Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council:

1. As the initial step in developing a nuclear capability in the NATO Alliance, the U.S. will seek North Atlantic Council approval, at the December Ministerial Meeting, of the Report by the Military Committee. This Council action will not require NATO nations to make formal pre-commitments to nuclear warfare; but will be limited to approving in principle the military requirement for a capability of immediate nuclear counter-attack and to authorizing the development of plans and the building of NATO forces in support of this concept.

2. The question

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NAR D-5/10 approved
December 10, 1954

2. The question of the requirement for and the feasibility of the U. S. obtaining formal rights from the NATO countries to use nuclear weapons will be considered in the U. S. Government as a secondary step in the light of the political climate, and will be the subject of continuing consideration in the U. S. Government with due regard for the necessity for maintaining the political ties that make NATO an important deterrent to Soviet aggression.

3. For use as required in promoting favorable consideration of the Military Committee Report, US Representatives in NATO agencies may, if required, appropriately assure other NATO nations that (a) nuclear weapons to implement agreed NATO plans will be available to US forces assigned to NATO commanders, and (b) in presenting programs for military assistance to the Legislative Branch of the US Government, the Executive Branch will support agreed NATO plans to accomplish the new concept.

4. US actions will be designed to limit, insofar as possible, the political problems inherent in a NATO nuclear concept. However, in the event discussion of these political issues is required at the December Council Meeting we should be prepared to inform our Allies that it is US policy that (a) we will not wage a preventive war, (b) we will be prepared to explore reasonable bona fide disarmament proposals, and (c) that under existing circumstances a nuclear capability is an indispensable element in providing a deterrent to Soviet armed aggression, with or without nuclear weapons, or Soviet intimidation of NATO by threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

5. In addition to the foregoing action the US will as soon as possible propose to the Permanent Council a formal agreement concerning the release of certain atomic information to NATO, as provided for in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Necessary procedural steps with the Legislative Branch required by the Atomic Energy Act will take place during January and February 1955, the earliest time that Congress will be in session long enough to satisfy these procedural requirements. It is not considered advisable to attempt to utilize that agreement as a quid pro quo for rights to use nuclear weapons from foreign soil.

It is recommended (a) that you approve the foregoing course of action and guidelines, and (b) that, in view of the important domestic and international political aspects, you take the necessary steps to consult as appropriate with Congressional leaders on the assurances set forth in Paragraph 3 of the proposed guidelines.

/s/ John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State

/s/ Charles E. Wilson
Secretary of Defense

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 12/11/54

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Roger Makins
Mr. Leishman, British Embassy
Livingston T. Merchant

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Sir Roger told me during a call on another subject that he had had another telegram from Sir Anthony Eden concerning MC/48. London interprets the document as being more than an authorization to SACEUR to plan but as prejudging the question of authorization to use atomic weapons. I told Sir Roger that this was contrary to our interpretation and cited again the Secretary's analogy of the preparation of war plans. Sir Roger said that he agreed with our interpretation after having personally read MC/48 ten times. Eden apparently still feels that a resolution is needed along the lines he originally suggested but apparently is willing to wait until he talks to the Secretary in Paris. He reported that the French have been pressing them hard in London for a reply to their communication which I gather was along the lines of Bonnet's aide-memoire of December 4, delivered to us. He also reported that their impression is that a number of other governments are nervous on this subject.

I recalled to Sir Roger the copy of the talking paper used by the Secretary at the Council meeting last April and the fact that we have given the British a copy of it. I said I thought Sir Anthony Eden would find reassurance in re-reading this statement of the Secretary.

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Arms

TO: The Secretary
 THROUGH: S/S
 FROM: C - Mr. Murphy

December 29, 1954

SUBJECT: Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments

DISCUSSION

1. Working Groups of State, Defense and AEC have been engaged in a review of basic disarmament policy as defined in NSC 112. Papers prepared by these groups prior to agency clearance have already been informally discussed in the NSC Planning Board. The problem is presently scheduled for NSC consideration on January 6.

In the latter part of February, the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will convene in London. Position papers are being prepared for this meeting based on existing policy with certain tactical changes.

2. There is a basic disagreement between Defense and State. Failing a fundamental change in Soviet international habits, Defense is not presently able to conceive of any plan "acceptable for actual implementation" which would not be injurious to U.S. security; for political reasons it would nevertheless continue to negotiate on the basis of the United Nations Atomic Energy Control Plan or something stronger. State believes that the increasing risks of the present trends make armaments control in the best interests of U.S. security, and that the U.S. should not advocate any plan which it is not prepared to carry through. There is considerable disagreement within the Department itself on the elements of a disarmament program. There is, however, general agreement in the Department on the following points:

a) that continuation of present military trends involves increasing risks for the U.S. especially after the Soviets attain effective atomic parity;

b) that United States efforts to obtain international agreement on the control of armaments should continue, not only because it is politically advisable but because of the dangers to the U.S. inherent in present military trends;

c) that the United Nations Atomic Energy Control Plan is outmoded in at least two respects: (i) the accumulation of nuclear stocks now makes it exceedingly difficult to ensure the effective elimination of nuclear weapons; (ii) there are sufficient nuclear stockpiles for at least a decade of prospective peaceful uses of atomic energy, and thus operation of nuclear facilities by an international agency is not needed for this purpose.

3. There is disagreement between S/P on the one hand and ID and EUR on the other, concerning such important matters as the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament, the phases in which a disarmament program is to take effect, the means of testing Soviet intentions in the disarmament field and the kind of safeguards necessary in such programs.

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4. G, RWR, IO, S/P and S/AE agree that it is advisable at this stage to have the policy review placed under the direction of a person of outstanding qualifications free to concentrate on disarmament matters and devote the major part of his time to these matters for at least a year. This person would represent the Secretary of State, as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee conducting this review. He could also be appointed Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, to head the U.S. Delegation in the forthcoming London discussions. I suggest the following names as possibilities:

Sterling Cole
Gordon Dean
Arthur Dean
Thomas K. Finletter
James B. Conant
Vannevar Bush
Walter Whitman
John J. McCloy
Mervyn J. Kelly of Bell Laboratories

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you propose to the NSC that it recommend:

- a) It is important for the United States to continue efforts to achieve safeguarded disarmament, as politically necessary and in U.S. security interests;
- b) The review of basic disarmament policy should be continued, and the President should promptly appoint an outstanding person to direct this review and to represent the U.S. in the London disarmament discussions.
- c) Pending conclusion of this review, the U.S. should continue to rely on existing NSC policy toward disarmament with appropriate adjustments to reflect the technical changes

CONCURRENCESIO
Mr. KeyRWR
Mr. HarbourS/AE
Mr. SmithS/P
Mr. Bowie except for
Recommendation Csee
attachedIO:UNP:Weyers:pal
S/P:RaffallionTOP SECRET

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By <u>DOD</u>	Date <u>5200.1</u>
By <u>RVD</u>	NARS, Date <u>2/17/88</u>

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IMMEDIATE U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

Reference: NSC 5439/2

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BR
DATE 22 July 1987 1987-54

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

1. I have examined JCS 2124/141 and consider that certain revisions should be made in it.

2. a. The statement that no defense of Europe is possible without German participation is, in my opinion, too broad and does not take into consideration all the facts. It is true that the absence of a German contribution would result in grave strength deficiencies under current plans. However, it is manifest that by raising force goals, and increasing U.S. military assistance, it is possible to devise a feasible strategy for the defense of Europe without a German contribution.

b. On the other hand, I do not agree that it is possible to defend Western Europe north of the Alps and the Pyrenees without French participation. French terrain is necessary for the battle for Northwest Europe, since France contains the only feasible lines of communication, the necessary depth for the battle area and the location of bases for air support.

c. With respect to the use of atomic weapons by NATO forces, I concur in the statement that there is a military requirement for the immediate use of these weapons, but I do not believe that the present is an appropriate time to seek agreements with our allies to this effect. I suggest that the US initiate a program for the psychological conditioning of our allies for the acceptance of an atomic concept. When strategy embodying atomic concepts is generally accepted, specific agreements should then be sought.

3. I therefore recommend that JCS 2124/141 be returned to the JSSC for revision in the light of the comments made in the Appendix, together with such comments as the other Services may submit.

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Appendix

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APPENDIX

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO JCS 2124/61

1. Page 1127, paragraph 4. Delete and substitute the following:

"4. Without German Participation.

a. Feasibility of Defense of Western Europe.

(1) If an agreement for German rearmament is not reached at this time two alternatives could result. One would be the maintenance of the status quo with Allied Forces disposed essentially as at present. The second would be a neutralized Germany with Allied and Soviet Forces withdrawn. Under the first alternative NATO forces to provide and will continue to provide a deterrent to Soviet aggression. However, in the event of a Soviet attack the possibility of a successful defense of Western Europe is marginal with the forces presently available to SACEUR. To render the defense feasible there would have to be an increase in the force goals for the NATO nations. (2) Under the second alternative the NATO forces would still furnish a deterrent to Soviet aggression and, although the difficulties of defending the remainder of Western Europe would increase, a feasible defense could be established if an increase in NATO forces were to compensate for the loss of the prospective German contribution. NATO forces would be fighting along a shortened front with well established LOC's properly located for maximum protection and with better forward air facilities for tactical air support and for support of the air offensive. Soviet forces would have to advance across Germany under Allied air attack and breach the Rhine River barrier in force in order to place heavy pressure on the NATO forces."

b. Changes of Military Dispositions and Commitments.

No substantial change in dispositions is necessary if US troops are not required to leave Germany. Should they be required to leave Germany, they could be redeployed in France, the Low Countries, Denmark.

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German contribution would most likely require an increase in US troops to be committed in Europe and an increase in military assistance support of NATO allies.

REASON: The assumption that West Germany is no longer oriented to the West and that her territory is no longer at the disposal of the Allies places an unrealistic restriction on the problem. This possibility must be considered but not to the exclusion of the equally likely possibility that NATO forces could remain in West Germany. Likewise, NATO ability to devise an effective defensive strategy should not necessarily be limited to current available forces. Paragraph 4b also places undue reliance on the value of German industrial resources. Since these resources would be located in the immediate battle area, their contribution to the Allies would be considerably diminished. When these factors are considered, it is apparent that the possibility of developing a feasible strategy is not foreclosed.

2. Page 1123, paragraph 5. Delete and substitute the following:

"5. Without French Participation.

"a. Assumptions. France has withdrawn from NATO and adopted a neutralist or hostile policy. No assumption can be made as to the effect of this withdrawal on NATO. While there are no restrictions on the size of German forces, no assumption can be made that the German Federal Republic will order full mobilization or contribute a substantially larger force than is now contemplated.

"b. Possibility of Defense of Western Europe. It can be conceded that a large mobilized German force coupled with the US, British and other forces would provide a deterrent to Soviet aggression in the cold war. However, in the event of aggression, no feasible strategy for the defense of Western Europe north of the Alps and the Pyrenees can be devised. Forces disposed in Germany but denied the use of French territory would be in an untenable position. The available LOC's are parallel to the front and vulnerable to the enemy. These lines of communication must run either through the Low Countries within easy fighter-bomber range of the

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and in some cases the Alps through easily blocked defiles. Bases for air support are limited and must be located at a great distance from the battlefield. There is no depth of position nor is there room available for maneuver. The terrain in the Low Countries has not proven well suited to defense in the past. While German forces are being built up (24-36 months) adoption of a strategy of defense of Europe without France involves a risk of grave weakness which could invite aggression."

"c. Change in Military Dispositions. The adoption of a strategy of defense of Western Europe without France requires the re-location of lines of communication through the Low Countries and the construction of bases in England, the Low Countries and Spain. The bulk of the tactical air forces would have to be repositioned and bases constructed for them. The Strategic Air Force bases in French North Africa would have to be abandoned and relocated with a consequent temporary loss in effectiveness. Adoption of a strategy which does not include France would probably also require greater commitment of US forces and resources to Western Europe."

REASONS:

a. The assumption in the original paragraph 5a that all NATO countries would continue to defend Europe after the withdrawal of France is debatable.

b. It cannot be assumed that German forces would be mobilized in strength beyond the forecast EDC goals. There is no guarantee that a German manpower contribution would outweigh the loss of French manpower. In the most likely case, the German manpower contribution would merely compensate for the loss of French manpower.

c. The land mass of France is essential to any feasible defense of Western Europe. Any defensive concept which did not include France would expose practically all of Western Europe to virtually unopposed occupation by Soviet forces so small in size as to offer unremunerative atomic targets. Subsequent efforts to destroy Soviet ability to capitalize on the industrial potential of Western Europe would mean the destruction of the major cities and productive installations of our Allies. In the wake of this destruction, it is extremely doubtful that the people of Western Europe would be inclined to assist Allied efforts to regain Western Europe.

3. Page 1130, paragraph 7, sixth line. Delete remainder of paragraph and substitute the following:

"In their memorandum^{*} to you, dated 11 June 1954, and in their subsequent memorandum^{**} subject, "NATO Capabilities Studies," dated 24 September 1954, the JCS have indicated to you that the securing of agreements allowing the immediate use of atomic weapons by NATO forces in the event of Soviet aggression is a military requirement. It continues to be essential that our forces have the right to use their full offensive and defensive capabilities in the event of Soviet aggression. However, the immediate future does not appear to be the appropriate time for the opening of negotiations leading to the securing of these agreements. The present delicate political climate, the importance of current negotiations and their expected aftermath is not the proper atmosphere for the institution of these negotiations. The JCS suggest that the US initiate a program for the psychological conditioning of our allies toward the acceptance of atomic concepts. When strategy embodying atomic concepts is generally accepted, specific agreements should then be sought."

REASON: In addition to the reasons given in the substituted paragraph above, it is believed that the institution of negotiations leading to the securing of these agreements would play into the hands of neutralist and pacifist elements which exist in varying degrees in all West European countries. Governments which remain in power only through the toleration of neutralist sentiment might well fall in the process of seeking ratification of these agreements.

"*Encl to JCS 2073/823"

"**Encl to JCS 2073/900"

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