

11/5/53
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SECURITY INFORMATION

January 5, 1953.

Churchill may propose:

1. Putting US-UK relations on personalized basis. (There should be many intimate, informal contacts to achieve indispensable harmony. But decisions should be through normal channels.)
2. Combined US-UK chiefs of staffs. (de facto OK; but formal combination would adversely affect other allied relations)
3. Formal addition of UK to ANZUS (Same comment as above. UK has military advisers who sit in as observers.)
4. Four-power talk with Stalin. (No adequate groundwork as yet.)
5. Trieste; Yugoslavia to be favored over Italy. (Dangerous now with Italian elections pending.)
6. Economic and financial talks to implement Commonwealth conference re convertibility of currency. (To be sympathetically studied with Eden and Butler later.)
7. Support of UK in Iran. (Present negotiations should be given every chance to succeed.)
8. Korea, don't extend hostilities. (OK in principle. But to end hostilities in Korea and Indo-China these two areas and Formosa need to be studied as strategic whole, making two flanks and a center.)
9. Atomic energy and weapons; more exchange with UK. (Congress must be consulted under the law.)
10. US troops in Middle East. (Decision should await UK-Egypt settlement on Sudan-Suez.)

We might propose:

1. Stronger UK support for and closer UK association with E.D.C. project, to minimize French fears of Germany. (See DDE's cable to Ridgway.)
2. Withdrawal of UK recognition of Communist China (which it has never accepted or reciprocated); and restudy by US and UK of China policy to secure harmony.
3. General acceptance of importance of achieving unity between US and UK rather than exposing disunity to others.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Authority DR 55-544 #1

By bc NLE Date 1/16/86

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the ok'd - Dillon covering no 11/6/53

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J.C.S. 1907/90

9 January 1953

Pages 529 - 533, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

AGENDA FOR PROPOSED TRIPARTITE TALKS IN REGARD TO BERLIN

- References:
- a. J.C.S. 1901/91
 - b. J.C.S. 1907/77
 - c. J.C.S. 1907/84

The enclosed memorandum by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe (CINCUSAREUR), dated 31 December 1952, has been referred to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for comment and recommendation in light of the Decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on J.C.S. 1907/84.

W. G. -LALOR,
E. H. J. CARNS,
Joint Secretariat.

Special handling of this paper is requested. Access should be limited to individuals requiring the information herein in order to carry out their official duties.

J. C. S. FILE COPY

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JCS 1907/90

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ENCLOSURE

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

AG 373.2 GOT

31 December 1952

SUBJECT: Agenda for Proposed Tripartite Talks in Regard to Berlin.

TO: The Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Reference: Memorandum, subject as above (SM-2404-52) 14 October 1952,* with Appendix "A" (NSC 132/1)** and Appendix "B" (Agenda with the U.S. Position for Tripartite (France, United Kingdom, United States) Politico-Military Talks with Regard to Berlin).***

2. In accord with your request to comment upon proposed agenda (Appendix "B")*** referred to above, this headquarters concurs with exception of the provisions of paragraph 5. Inasmuch as USCINCEUR [Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command] has indicated in his reply# to your memorandum the intention of delegating to CINCUSAREUR the responsibility for Berlin planning under the general policy guidance of USCINCEUR, this paragraph should be revised to reflect such delegation.

3. Relative to request in paragraph 3, reference memorandum, for views on substance of plans:

a. Use of Force

(1) In view of the limitation imposed by not jeopardizing the execution of SACEUR's [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] mission, the number of ground troops employed in any show of force to gain access to or from Berlin must be kept to a minimum. By minimum is meant the number of Allied troops that would be necessary to force the Soviet

* Enclosure to Decision On J.C.S. 1907/84
** Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 1907/77
*** Appendix to Decision On J.C.S. 1907/84
Appendix to J.C.S. 1907/91

border crossing points or cause the Soviets to reinforce said crossing points with combat troops in order to prevent the passage of the Allies. Attempting the creation of a land corridor to Berlin by the employment of a sizable military force is therefore precluded since the risk of loss would be too great. Such forces could be readily enveloped by the Soviets and/or Satellites and lost to the Allies without contributing to the military effort or SACEUR's mission commensurate with the forces expended. Nevertheless, a small body of troops ready to take whatever steps necessary to gain access to Berlin would indicate to the Soviets just as impressively as a large force, the Allied intention of not relinquishing its right of access to Berlin, even at the risk of a general war. Moreover, the Soviet reaction to such Allied show of force would reveal as to whether or not the Soviets are willing to risk general war in order to seal off Berlin. The use of force should therefore be limited to small bodies of ground troops, not only to prevent jeopardizing SACEUR's mission, but to accomplish the same desirable results as could be achieved by employing sizable bodies of ground troops.

(2) Further, it appears that the initial show of force should be executed by units within Berlin rather than those from the Western Zone of Germany. In the eyes of the world this would constitute a more defensive type of action and less likely to be interpreted as a determined effort by the Allies to provoke war.

(3) In the event all civilian traffic was denied movement to Berlin, another possible use of military forces would be to escort through border points civilian truck convoys. In a sense this would give such civilian truck convoys a quasi-military status. A show of force similar to that described in subparagraph 3 a (1) above, could be employed in conjunction with gaining clearance for such civilian convoys.

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b. Alternate Land Routes

(1) While it appears somewhat contradictory that the Soviets having instituted a blockade of Berlin would entertain requests for alternate ground routes, our plans should contain suitable specific alternate routes for ready proposal to the Soviets. Moreover, suitable by-passes for the more critical points along the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn, as the bridge over the Elbe, should be determined in the event the Soviets elect to close the autobahn under the guise of technical reasons.

(2) It is fully within our capabilities to provide necessary military service troops to make repairs on autobahn bridges as may be required or to render alternate routes and by-passes suitable for traffic. The availability of such service troops for this purpose should be immediately communicated to the Soviets in the event the autobahn was closed for "technical reasons" or alternate routes proposed by Allies were claimed by Soviets as not capable of sustaining traffic.

(3) If any by-pass or alternate route proposed by the United States should require any considerable amount of materials for rehabilitation so as to render suitable for traffic, concessions would have to be obtained from the Soviets to make such materials locally available or provide means for their shipment to the work sites.

(4) Attendant difficulties to any use of U.S. service troops for road or bridge repairs within the Soviet Zone would be obtaining authority to:

- (a) Billet U.S. troops vicinity of work sites
- (b) Gain access to water supply
- (c) Supply the troops

These matters merely indicate the long-drawn out and probably fruitless negotiations that are to be anticipated in the event Soviets should close the Helmstedt-Berlin link of the autobahn.

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c. Miscellaneous

(1) At the imposition of a Soviet blockade of Berlin, our plans should provide for the immediate implementation of an airlift even if only of token nature. In that the Soviets lost face in their last such attempt at blockade, this timely action by the Allies could cause Soviets to abandon further efforts to blockade.

(2) The Allies should consider counteracting any direct Soviet interference with Allied airlift planes by employing fighter escort craft.

(3) Careful attention in any Allied plan must be given to the matter of designating the implementing authority.

(4) While it is recognized that any course of action supported tripartitely will be more effective, in no way should the U.S. authority to act unilaterally be jeopardized.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

/s/ R. G. GARD
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

TS Staff Summary 1/16/53

1/16/53

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Foreign Affairs Liaison/Agency in _____

VISA _____

CO. _____

PROVIDED BY RA H 10 195

Withdrawal No. _____

Germans Continue to Like Nazism - In a year-end study of rightist and neo-Nazi sentiment in West Germany, our Bonn authorities report that repeated surveys over the past year have disclosed that the viewpoint continues to predominate that there was more good than evil in the ideas of the Nazi Party. The surveys show that pro-Nazi orientations have increased among youth of 18 to 24 to the point where they now almost equal that among the youth of the Hitler era. There is evidence also of a rise in the pro-Nazi attitude among adherents of the coalition Free Democratic Party. Based on the surveys, our authorities feel that

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there is widespread German vulnerability to any revival of Nazi ideas and that a large segment of the population would have no inclination to oppose actively Nazi restoration.

(GER: Bonn's 3271, 1/15, C)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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 - With comment of
 - Declassify X in accordance with
- EO 12958, sec. 1.4
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Ty Staff Summary 215/53

February 5, 1953

HIGHLIGHTS:

Secretary's Conversation With Mayer on EDC - In a private meeting with Secretary Dulles French Premier Mayer pointed out that the political obstacles in France to ratification of the EDC Treaty were very great and could only be removed by careful and skillful planning. He made the following points: 1) there must be protocols to the Treaty "interpreting" certain of its provisions; 2) UK association with EDC is essential in some substantial form although the French recognize that full partnership is impossible; 3) settlement of the future economic status of the Saar will be necessary with the coming into force of the EDC Treaty; and 4) there must be some understanding, principally with the US, for sharing of the burden of the war in Indochina so as to make it possible for France to make a military contribution in Europe which will at least match that of the Germans.

In citing the lack of alternatives to EDC the Secretary pointed out that there could be no successful defense of the continent without substantial German contingents. He said he assumed that the French would never permit Germany to recreate a national army as a full partner under NATO and Mayer affirmed most emphatically that France would use its veto power in NATO to prevent this. If the veto were overridden, Mayer said, France would destroy the effectiveness of any German national army by being so strongly in opposition that in practical effect the lines of communication between Germany and the Atlantic would be broken. The Secretary pointed out that if this were so it logically followed that there must either be a European Defense Force with German contingents or an adequate defense of the continent was militarily impossible. Mayer said he recognized the logic of this position and said his government would do everything possible to put through the EDC Treaty but needed maximum help from the US. (EUR: 4294 from London, 2/4, S)

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- EO 12958
- Authority: RH 4/10/95
- Warranted by _____

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EYES ONLY

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February 12, 1953

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the
National Security Council on Wednesday,
February 11, 1953

Present at the 131st meeting of the Council were The President of the United States, presiding, The Vice President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, the Administrative Assistant to the President for National Security Matters, the Military Liaison Officer, the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

Mr. Allen Dulles opened his intelligence briefing with reference to the apparent inconsistency between the figures on tonnages entering Communist China from outside sources, set forth by Captain Layton of Admiral Radford's staff, and figures of the intelligence community in Washington as coordinated by CIA. The major discrepancy arose from Captain Layton's inclusion of some 9000 tons daily for coastal trade, which the CIA figure excluded. The main conclusion reached by Mr. Dulles was that there still remains excess capacity on the Trans-Siberian Railway, and that this railway could absorb to a large degree the tonnages now imported into China by sea. Hence the main effects of a blockade would be the impact on the Chinese-Manchurian railway system. If the amounts now entering China by sea have to be added to the load now carried by these latter railways, they would be subjected to a severe strain. Mr. Dulles concluded this part of his briefing by stating that an estimate of the total effect of a blockade was being prepared for the President.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.8(b)
Agency Case E95-0435
NLE Case MR 93-17841
By BAm NLE Date 7/18/94

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

to giving General Clark the authority he sought, and that the authority already in General Clark's hands as a result of the Joint Chiefs of Staff message of April 28, 1951, concerning actual attack, was sufficient. Nevertheless, the President stated that he had never been able to understand why the UN command had ever abandoned its rights of hot pursuit of enemy aircraft to the bases, wherever they were, from which the aircraft had risen to attack.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- b. Noted the President's desire that the Secretary of State undertake promptly* to secure the agreement of our allies to termination of the existing arrangements in Korea connected with the armistice negotiations.

NOTE: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

* NOTE: In approving this record of action on the following day, the President directed the inclusion of an explanatory note to the effect that intelligence from Korea received from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, after the close of the meeting indicates the advisability of proceeding deliberately rather than promptly.

3. THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

Secretary Dulles described briefly his visits to the various capitals of Western Europe, during which trip he had emphasized the importance of our knowing the intentions of the several governments as to ratification of the EDC treaties. He felt that on the whole his and Mr. Stassen's trip had at least taken this project out of mothballs. It has come alive again and there is at least a good chance that some of these countries will now initiate steps to secure ratification. Prime Minister De Gasperi will certainly try, while Churchill was unenthusiastic; Eden was strong for the experiment, and the British Government had stated its willingness to put its power behind ratification. Chancellor Adenauer was a strong believer in the whole idea and thought he could find ways and means of moving toward ratification. The Benelux countries will also take stronger initiatives. The French situation was the most difficult, but there was always a chance there too. Mayer and Plevin intend to do their best to get the treaty through, but they are skating on very thin parliamentary ice. Neither the French nor Adenauer were at all hospitable, continued Secretary Dulles, to the alternative course of German membership in NATO and a German national army. In conclusion, Secretary Dulles guessed that the odds were now about 60-40

EYES ONLY

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that the EDC treaties would be ratified. This was a marked improvement over the situation a few weeks ago.

The President stated with great warmth that we must, here in Washington and in this country, do everything to help and encourage the European statesmen who are attempting this difficult job. We should sit down--Cabinet members, Senators, Government officials, and everybody--to scan every possibility of American support.

Secretary Dulles said that he had one thought to add, namely, the likelihood that when Anthony Eden pays his visit he will ask for reassurance, as given by the Truman administration, that the United States will not launch an atomic attack from UK bases without prior British consent. Indeed, Eden will go further and ask that we launch no atomic attacks anywhere without prior consultation with the British.

Mr. Stassen discussed very succinctly the half dozen major problems regarding the European economic situation and American aid. He stressed the fact that the French were now seriously over-extended and in grave economic difficulties. This he pointed up by comparison with statistics on other countries in the European payments union. Mr. Stassen then turned to the problem of end-item military supplies to NATO countries. He said that he had a list of such items which were in critically short supply, including tanks, Howitzers and all other guns, and all kinds of ammunition. The 105-mm. and 155-mm. Howitzers were in the very worst case; in fact, not one such Howitzer had been made in this country, continued Mr. Stassen, since the end of the second World War. This was a situation which certainly required immediate action.

The National Security Council:

Discussed the subject in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security, based upon their trip to Europe.

4. THE USE OF RADIO AS A MEDIUM FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND THE IMPACT OF ITS USE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "The Need for Immediate Review and Later Establishment of National Policy on the Use of Radio as a Medium for Psychological Operations and the Impact of its Use on National Security", dated February 5, 1953; NSC 137 and NSC 137/1)

Mr. Cutler introduced the item, and explained briefly the recommendations.

Thereafter the President inquired whether, if the Soviets were so pre-occupied with jamming, the effect wouldn't be to cut down severely on their communications intelligence activities. In any

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JCS Records
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J.C.S. 2220/19

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

6 May 1953

Pages 154 - 161, incl

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DATE 19 Jan 76

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVISION OF INFORMATION FOR GENERAL RIDGWAY
ON AVAILABILITY OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

References: a. J.C.S. 2220/4
b. J.C.S. 2220/15

471.6(4-18-49)
O File

THE PROBLEM

1. In light of a letter from the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), dated 16 March 1953 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/15), to submit comment and recommendation concerning revision of the information for SACEUR on availability of atomic weapons contained in SM-271-52 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/4).

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. See Enclosure "B".

RECOMMENDATION

3. That the memorandum in Enclosure "A" be forwarded to General Ridgway.

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Gen. Caraway (Ch. Plans, G-3)
Adm. Gardner (DCNO-Op)
Adm. Burke (ACNO-Op30)
Gen. White (DC/S-Op, Air)

Gen. Lee (Dir. Plans, Air)
Gen. Thatcher (DD Plans, Air)
Gen. Everest (D/JS)
Gen. J. S. Bradley (DDSP)
Secy, JCS
Secy, JSSC
Secy, JSPC
Gen. Samford (AFOIN)
Gen. Bunker (AFOAT)

See Corrig. dtd 5-13-53 See J. H., dated 3-12-54

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~~TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL RIDGWAY

(Through: U.S. National Military Representative, SHAPE)

Subject: Planning Assumptions

1. Reference is made to your letter to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 16 March 1953,* concerning the revision of SM-271-52 to bring the planning assumptions therein up to date.

2. The following information is classified TOP SECRET and may be released to your Allied commanders and certain key staff officers on a strictly "need-to-know" basis. These figures are being given to you purely as planning assumptions and do not reflect stockpile capabilities or actual planning allocation of atomic weapons to your command:

a. As of 1 July 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have authorized tentative planning figures of ____, ____, and ____** atomic weapons for tactical use in the defense of Western Eurasia. This is a planning assumption only and should not be interpreted as representing an allocation of weapons and is subject to revision from time to time. All weapons will be assumed to be air-burst type.

b. The actual weapons would be retained in the custody of U.S. Commands. For planning purposes it may be assumed that you will be responsible for determining the military significance of targets, for target approval, and for weapon expenditure. All weapons delivered in support of your operations, whether delivered by forces allocated to you or by supporting commands, would be chargeable against the number of weapons indicated in subparagraph 2 a above.

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/15

** Figures to be furnished under separate cover. Figures on file in J.C.S. Secretariat.

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JCS 2220/19

c. There is considerable flexibility as to the exact types which may be included in the planning figures indicated above. Of the U.S. aircraft available to you, some can deliver all of the types of weapons while others can deliver only certain types of the weapons included in the planning figures above.

d. The following factors apply to bombing capabilities of various aircraft types:

(1) Suitably equipped USAF B-45 light bombers and medium bombers can bomb by SHORAN in areas covered by SHORAN ground installation.

(2) USAF medium, and B-45 light bombers and USN AJ-1 attack bombers can bomb by radar.

(3) All types available to you can bomb under MSQ ground control.

(4) USAF F-84, USN AD-4B and F2H-2B types can execute dive and toss bombing attacks. Commencing in June 1953 the AD-4B and the F-84 will be able to deliver atomic weapons by the low level "loft" technique.

e. The following factors apply to bombing accuracy:

- (1) Dive, toss, and loft bombing 600 feet CEP.*
- (2) All-weather horizontal bombing 3,000 feet CEP.
- (3) Visual horizontal bombing - 1,500 feet CEP.
- (4) Horizontal bombing within SHORAN or MSQ range (all-weather) 900 feet CEP.

f. Nominal weapon yield - 20 kilotons.

g. Present planning indicates that the following forces having an atomic delivery capability will become available to you during Fiscal Year 1954:

(1) Army

- (a) 1 battalion of 280mm guns in July.
- (b) 1 battalion of 280mm guns in August.
- (c) 2 battalions of 280mm guns in September.
- (d) 1 battalion of 280mm guns in October.
- (e) 3 battalions of CORPORAL guided missiles in the fourth quarter.

*CEP - circular probable error - radius of the circle within which half the bombs will fall.

JCS 2220/19

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(2) Navy

On 1 April 1953 there was deployed in the Mediterranean area one 9-plane AJ squadron and one Midway-class carrier with an on-board detachment of 4 AD-4B and 4 F2H-2B3 aircraft. Subsequent to 22 June 1953, there is scheduled to be deployed in the Mediterranean area at all times a minimum of two aircraft carriers (Midway and/or Essex class) each with a minimum on-board detachment of 4 AD and 4 F2H atomic bomb delivery aircraft. The number of AD and F2H deployed in each aircraft carrier will be progressively increased during FY 1954 as additional numbers of these types become available. No increase in the numbers of deployed AJ aircraft is contemplated.

(3) Air Force

(a) 1 B-45 Light Bomber Wing already in the theater.

(b) 1 F-84 Fighter Bomber Wing already in the theater.

(c) 1 F-84 Fighter Bomber Wing in the first quarter.

(d) 3 F-86 Fighter Bomber Wings in the third quarter. One squadron (25 aircraft) of each wing will have an atomic delivery capability.

(e) 4 F-86 Fighter Bomber Wings in the 4th quarter. One squadron (25 aircraft) of each wing will have an atomic capability. Also during this quarter, 25 additional F-86 aircraft with an atomic capability will be assigned to one of the F-86 Wings referred to in subparagraph 2 g (3) (d) above.

(f) 1 Squadron of MATADOR guided missiles which will have only an emergency atomic capability until the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1955.

(g) Strategic Air Command (SAC) units are also available on call from you, to augment units now

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available or shortly to become available to you for delivery of these weapons. Current SAC operations orders specifically provide for SHORAN equipped medium bomb-type aircraft to "stand by" in United Kingdom, for retardation missions. It is anticipated that SAC will maintain this SHORAN capability in the United Kingdom until the 3d quarter of FY 1954 at which time the B-45 wing will assume the "stand by" requirement. It is contemplated that SAC will continue to maintain a combat unit in the United Kingdom on rotation replacing conventional bombers with jet bombers in accordance with the current Air Force program.

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JCS 2220/19

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ENCLOSURE "B"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. SM-271-52 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/4) provided General Eisenhower with a planning figure of ____* atomic weapons and information on delivery methods associated therewith. The information contained in SM-271-52 was classified TOP SECRET and was releasable to the Allied members of General Eisenhower's staff on a strictly "need-to-know" basis.

2. In a letter to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 16 March 1953 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 2220/15), General Ridgway states:

"I would expect that as my planning allocation of atomic weapons is increased I would be permitted, on a need-to-know basis, to so inform appropriate senior Allied officers. I should like to point out in this connection that the information contained in SM-271-52 is now well over a year old and it may be appropriate for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take under advisement a revision of this document to reflect such added capabilities in this field as may be made available to me on a planning basis at this time."

3. There are many different types of atomic weapons which may be included in the planning figures to be furnished. Of the U.S. aircraft available to SACEUR, some can deliver all of the types of weapons while others can deliver only certain types of these weapons.

4. Information furnished by the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy indicates that the factors applicable

* Figure on file in J.C.S. Secretariat

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JCS 2220/19

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to the bombing capabilities of the various aircraft types have not changed since the preparation of SM-271-52, except as follows:

a. Commencing in June 1953 the AD-4B will be able to deliver atomic weapons by the low level "loft" technique.

b. The CEP* for loft bombing is 600 feet.

5. Information furnished by the Services indicates that the following delivery forces are planned to be available during Fiscal Year 1954:

a. Army

- (1) 1 battalion of 280mm guns in July.
- (2) 1 battalion of 280mm guns in August.
- (3) 2 battalions of 280mm guns in September.
- (4) 1 battalion of 280mm guns in October.
- (5) 3 battalions of CORPORAL guided missiles in the fourth quarter.

b. Navy

On 1 April 1953 there was deployed in the Mediterranean area one 9-plane AJ squadron and one Midway class carrier with an on-board detachment of 4 AD-4B and 4 F2H-2B3 aircraft. Subsequent to 22 June 1953, there is scheduled to be deployed in the Mediterranean area at all times a minimum of two aircraft carriers (Midway and/or Essex class) each with a minimum on-board detachment of 4 AD and 4 F2H atomic bomb delivery aircraft. The number of AD and F2H deployed in each aircraft carrier will be progressively increased during FY 1954 as additional numbers of these types become available. No increase in the numbers of deployed AJ aircraft is contemplated.

c. Air Force

- (1) 1 B-45 Light Bomber Wing already in the theater.
- (2) 1 F-84 Fighter Bomber Wing already in the theater.
- (3) 1 F-84 Fighter Bomb Wing in the first quarter.

*CEP - circular probable error.

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JCS 2220/19

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Enclosure "B"

(Page revised by Corrigendum - 13 May 1953)

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(4) 3 F-86 Fighter Bomber Wings in the third quarter. One squadron (25 aircraft) of each wing will have an atomic delivery capability.

(5) Four F-86 Fighter Bomber Wings in the 4th quarter. One squadron (25 aircraft) of each wing will have an atomic capability. Also during this quarter 25 additional F-86 aircraft with an atomic capability will be assigned to one of the F-86 wings referred to in subparagraph 5 c (4) above.

(6) 1 Squadron of MATADOR guided missiles which will have only an emergency atomic capability until the first quarter of FY 1955.

(7) Strategic Air Command (SAC) units are also available on call from SACEUR to augment units now available or shortly to become available to SACEUR for delivery of these weapons. Current SAC operations orders specifically provided for SHORAN (Short Range Aids to Navigation) equipped medium bomb type aircraft to "stand by" in the United Kingdom for retardation missions. It is anticipated that SAC will maintain this SHORAN capability in the United Kingdom until the 3d quarter of FY 1954 at which time the B-45 wing will assume the "stand by" requirement. It is contemplated that SAC will continue to maintain a combat unit in the United Kingdom on rotation replacing conventional bombers with jet bombers in accordance with the current Air Force program.

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 1

June 1, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury on the United States up to July 1, 1955

REFERENCES: A. NSC 140/1
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 28, 1953

The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security with respect to the reference report on the subject are transmitted herewith for the information of the Council in connection with its discussion of NSC 140/1 at its meeting on June 4, 1953.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosures and that access to each copy be strictly limited and individually controlled on an absolute need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

- cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
- The Attorney General
- The Director of Defense Mobilization
- The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
- The Federal Civil Defense Administrator
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
- The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security



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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 89-197 #1

BY DJH DATE 4/10/91

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OSAN SA / NSC / follow papers / 3 / NSC 140/1 Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC

C O P Y

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington 25, D. C.

May 29, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury on the United States up to July 1, 1955

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed NSC 140/1, subject as above. They note that the purpose of the report is to evaluate the net capability of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the United States in the period up to July 1, 1955. They further note that the terms of reference also included USSR capability to attack major U.S. installations outside of the United States, such installations selected on the basis of their relative importance to the defense of the United States or to a United States counteroffensive against the USSR.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to invite attention to the fact that the terms of reference on which the report is based limit consideration to only one aspect of the over-all problem of effects of the possible courses of action with which the USSR may initiate war and these terms of reference should not be construed as representing the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the manner in which the USSR would wage war. Although the report is a valuable contribution to defense planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it provides only a segment of the data necessary, and therefore does not constitute a sufficiently broad basis for planning for the over-all security of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
/s/ W. G. LALOR

W. G. LALOR,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
Secretary.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington 25, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

June 1, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT: CIA Comments on NSC 140/1

1. The subject paper has been reviewed by this Agency and found to be in consonance with the intelligence now available to us except for one minor point mentioned below in paragraph 2-a. In my opinion, the Subcommittee is to be highly commended for the quality of its report and the unique contribution it makes to our understanding of the nation's defense problem. It amply justifies efforts that have gone into it and to my mind suggests the advisability of similar attacks on other difficult questions requiring the blending of operational and intelligence information into "net" estimates.

2. I have only two comments as to the substance of the reports:

a. On page 8, in paragraph 5 of the Discussion, it is stated that:

" . . . In mid-1953, the USSR will probably possess about 1,000 medium bombers of the TU-4 type (comparable to U.S. B-29). By mid-1955, this number may be increased to about 1,100"

Since this portion of the paper was prepared, further evidence has come to light which has caused us now to estimate that the Soviet Union has over 1,600 of these planes at the present time and is producing them at the rate of about 35 per month. Since the number of TU-4's assumed to take part in attack is well below 1,000 in the period mid-1953 to mid-1955, the conclusions of NSC 140/1 are in no way affected by this revision; but it might be pointed out that any doubts as to whether the Soviet medium bomber fleet is sufficient to enable the Soviet Long-Range Air Force to expend planes relatively plentifully in one-way missions, are pretty well dissipated.



b. In order to keep the problem within manageable limits, General Edwards' Subcommittee based its calculations on the "best estimate" figure as to Soviet atomic bomb stockpile. As pointed out in SE-36, NSIE-1, and elsewhere, this median figure is never given except in conjunction with upper and lower limits -- plus 100 percent or minus 33 1/3 percent respectively. Thus it should be borne in mind that by 30 June 1955, the Soviets might have a stockpile up to twice as large as that taken as a basis for the calculations in NSC 140/1. Again this does not affect, in my judgment, the validity of the general conclusions of the report. It merely means that the magnitude of the Soviet capability envisaged therein for mid-1955 might be increased or reduced, or advanced or delayed by a year or more.

3. This Agency strongly recommends NSC 140/1 to the Council as a sound intelligence estimate and as an appropriate basis for developing national policy.

/s/ ALLEN W. DULLES

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Washington 25, D.C.

May 29, 1953

VIA LIAISON

Honorable James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.



Dear Mr. Lay:

Reference is made to your memorandum of May 19, 1953, which transmitted for review and comment by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference a report prepared by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council pursuant to a directive contained in NSC 140.

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference has certain comments to offer. The Soviet plan of attack as set forth in the report admittedly is not the only plan which the Soviets might logically pursue. The air attack contemplates delivery of the bulk of Soviet atomic weapons against certain of the major population centers of the United States. The Soviet leaders would have to weigh the advantages of such an attack which would involve only the random destruction of critical war industry against the fact that the bulk of the known Communist Party members in the United States and approximately two thirds of the most dangerous potential Communist saboteurs reside in the areas indicated for attack under the plan proposed. The Soviet leaders have in the past, in other countries and under war conditions utilized the indigenous Communists for underground guerrilla and sabotage operations. Any difference in allocation of atomic weapons under the plan of attack might have resulted in more atomic weapons being available for clandestine use.

The damage effects from clandestine attack and sabotage are set out on page 27 of the report. The language used in paragraph 63 thereof might leave an inaccurate impression, since the effects of "portable atomic weapons" are compared

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with those of air-dropped bombs. We understand it is a fact that clandestinely-placed atomic demolition weapons can have a much greater destructive power than the typical Soviet air-dropped atomic weapons contemplated in the evaluation. Damage resulting from use of clandestine atomic weapons could have been evaluated qualitatively had the Subcommittee designated specific targets for demolition atomic weapons in its plan of attack on the basis of the statements regarding vulnerability of certain critical facilities which appeared in paragraph 49 on page 20 of the report.

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, applying the above observations, approves the report.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. EDGAR HOOVER

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference



INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
2212 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D.C.

May 28, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
NSC Representative on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the
USSR to Inflict Direct Injury on the United
States up to July 1, 1955.

As requested in your memorandum captioned as above, dated May 19, 1953, the comments contained below are submitted by ICIS with regard to the report (NSC 140/1) on this subject prepared by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC. This memorandum has not been coordinated through the member departments of the ICIS.

While it is realized that other plans of attack are available to the Soviets and might have been considered, the ICIS is confining its observations to the Soviet concept of operation and plan of attack adopted by the NSC Special Evaluation Subcommittee. In this connection, the ICIS believes the report undervalues the likelihood of sabotage with atomic demolition weapons. This could be misleading.

The ICIS disagrees with the conclusion stated in the third sentence of paragraph 4-d (1), page 6, for the following reasons:

Fissionable material diverted to small weapons for clandestine attack purposes would make available more weapons than the same amount of fissionable material would in weapons for military attack by air. If so diverted, these small weapons would permit a broader selection of targets and increase the likelihood of complete destruction of a greater number of critically important facilities. The ICIS concludes, accordingly, that the effect of clandestine atomic weapons properly placed could be considerably greater rather than "broadly equivalent" to the effect of the same amount of fissionable material used in air dropped weapons. Furthermore, as paragraph 4-d (1) indicates, clandestinely employed atomic weapons are one hundred percent effective whereas elsewhere in the report it is clearly indicated that weapons assigned to air drop are subject to a substantial percentage of aborts, operational losses, etc., as set forth in paragraph 7, page 9.



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The ICIS wishes to emphasize that the foregoing must be considered in direct relation to the possibility of detection of alien fissionable material. We cannot be assured of receiving advance information in this regard. There are no practical technical means available either now or in the foreseeable future for the detection of alien fissionable material. Such material, without any reasonable likelihood of detection, can be introduced clandestinely into the United States through varied means which includes but are not limited to the diplomatic pouch, the person, personal effects or baggage of legal or illegal entrants, shipments by land, sea and air, either at established ports of entry or across our unprotected coast lines and land borders. Once so introduced there is only a slight possibility of detecting such alien fissionable material either in disassembled or assembled form wherever located.

If the NSC concurs in the validity of the foregoing observations, it would appear desirable for NSC to direct a re-examination and revision of those few segments of the report that relate directly thereto such as paragraph 4-c - page 6, paragraph 16 - page 11, paragraph 44 - page 18, paragraph 56 - page 24, and paragraph 63 - page 27.

/s/ THOMAS J. DONEGAN

THOMAS J. DONEGAN
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security



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6/10/53

NLE - MR Case No. 95-255
Document No. 6

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Entire document declassified by the ISCAP
except for portion(s) identified as Restricted
Data or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) by
the Department of Energy, which is outside
jurisdiction of the ISCAP.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Consultation with the U.K. on Use of Atomic Weapons

I The Current Situation

On March 7, 1953 Secretary Dulles sent a memorandum to the President indicating that Mr. Eden had asked the Secretary the day before to confirm the understanding given by the Truman Administration concerning the use of U.S. bases in the U.K. The Secretary agreed to do so and the communique issued subsequently read in part:

"We confirmed the prior understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the U. S. Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time."



Secretary Dulles went on to state in his March 7, 1953 memorandum to the President that Mr. Eden had also raised with him the question of U.S. consultation with the U.K. on a decision to use atomic weapons anywhere. He sought a renewal of the personal assurances given by President Truman to both Atlee and Churchill that he would consult with him before making such a decision.

Secretary Dulles recommended against any such personal commitment by President Eisenhower to Mr. Churchill, and recommended that the President take the following position with Mr. Eden: the U.S. considers the U.K. its strongest ally, and would rely on its support in the event of war. The U.S. realizes the exposed position of the U.K. and the President does not intend to take action which would endanger it. Yet he cannot make the Prime Minister a commitment, either official or personal, to consult on a decision to use atomic weapons. The President does intend, however, to continue to consult on developments in the world situation which might endanger the U.S. and the U.K. through global war.

A memorandum of the Under Secretary of State to Mr. Arneson, dated May 12 indicates that at Mr. Eden's meeting with the President on March 9, 1953, the question of an assurance was raised. The President took the position suggested by Secretary Dulles and declined to make the commitment to consult with the British.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW DATE: <u>7/11/77</u>	DETERMINATION (CIRCLE NUMBER(S))
AUTHORITY: <u>EO 11652</u>	1. CLASSIFICATION RETAINED
NAME: <u>Donald R. New</u>	2. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: <u>TOP SECRET</u>
2ND REVIEW DATE: <u>7-16-87</u>	3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
AUTHORITY: <u>ADG</u>	4. COORDINATE WITH: <u>DOE, DOD</u>
NAME: <u>Robert J. Taylor</u>	5. CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
	6. CLASSIFIED INFO BRACKETED
	7. OTHER (SPECIFY): <u>HIGHEST DOE SECRET</u>

See

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure of this information is prohibited by Administrative and Criminal Penalties, 18 U.S.C. 793 and 794

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II Background



1. The Quebec Agreement entered into by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt on August 19, 1943, which set forth the arrangements to govern United States-United Kingdom wartime cooperation in the atomic energy field contained among its provisions, the following:

"It is agreed between us

"First, that we will never use this agency [the atomic bomb] against each other.

"Secondly, that we will not use it [the atomic bomb] against third parties without each other's consent."

2. Atomic bombing of Japan was authorized by the President with British consent.

3. Under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the power and responsibility to decide on the use of atomic weapons rests with the President. Section 6(a) of the Act states in part: "the President from time to time may direct the Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of fissionable materials or weapons to the armed forces for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense." underscoring supplied.

4. After the war and with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, it was clearly necessary to work out different arrangements to govern United States-United Kingdom relations in the atomic energy field. Negotiations with the Attlee Government, begun toward the end of 1947, culminated in the modus vivendi of January 7, 1948. This instrument superseded in toto the Quebec Agreement and abrogated the above quoted provisions.

5. The United States has the use of a number of air bases in the United Kingdom from which to launch an atomic offensive in the event of war.

Excised: The Department of Energy has designated as Formerly Restricted Data.

These activities have been taking place with the knowledge of the appropriate United Kingdom authorities.

6. In the course of his visit to Washington in December of 1950, Prime Minister Attlee raised the question concerning consultation on the use of atomic weapons. The communique issued at the end of the talks December 8, 1950, stated as follows:

"The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation."

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7. In March 1951, Senator McMahon asked the Secretary of State to "make a statement indicating whether or not any commitment to any other nation might bring about delay in the employment of American atomic weapons beyond the point in time at which, in the absence of the commitment, the President would cause this use." The Secretary responded that "no such commitment exists."

8. In September 1951, Mr. Herbert Morrison raised with the Secretary of State both the question of the use of United Kingdom bases for atomic strikes and the question of consultation on a decision to use atomic weapons. He wished to know what the Prime Minister might say on this question in answer to queries that might be put in Parliament. On October 17, 1951, the British were informed that the United States would be prepared to have the Prime Minister reply to such questions along the following lines:

"His Majesty's Government originally made available to the United States Air Force certain bases and facilities in the United Kingdom at the time of the Berlin Airlift. Subsequently it was decided that the United States Air Forces should continue to have the use of bases and facilities in the United Kingdom in the interest of the common defense of the United Kingdom and the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. The arrangement whereby these bases and facilities are made available to the United States depends upon no formal agreement but is being continued as a mutually satisfactory arrangement. The question of their use in an emergency naturally remains a matter for joint decision in the light of the circumstances at the time."

9. On November 21, 1951 the following question was put in the House of Commons:

"To ask the Prime Minister if he will now take steps to terminate the arrangement by which United States atom bombers are based in this country in view of the dangers of retaliatory bombing to the people living in the crowded cities of Britain."

Prime Minister Churchill replied as follows:

"Certain bases and facilities in the United Kingdom were made available by the late Government to the United States Air Forces for the common defense of the United Kingdom and other countries who are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. This arrangement will continue so long as it is needed in the general interest of world peace and security."

10. On December 7, 1951 another question was put in the Parliament by Mr. Sydney Silverman (Labour):

"Whether the agreement under which United States atom bomb forces are permitted to use bases in this country contains the usual provision for their withdrawal in the case the United States of America became involved in any war in which the United Kingdom did not wish to be involved."

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Prime Minister Churchill replied as follows:

"The use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time."



11. Several talks were held during the course of 1951 by representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the British Ambassador to exchange views on developments in the world situation which might or might not lead to general war and the consequent use of atomic weapons. These talks were completely without commitment. The views of the United States and the United Kingdom on this matter were found to be quite similar. The British recognized that general war would inevitably mean the use of atomic weapons and their views as to developments in the world situation which would thrust general war on the West closely paralleled those of the United States. It was recognized, moreover, that situations might arise in which the use of atomic weapons might be decided upon in local situations, as, for example, in the event of Soviet or satellite attack on Yugoslavia. In other words, while the general equation was that general war equals use of atomic weapons there also existed the possibility that atomic weapons might be used in situations short of general war.

12. The joint communique issued at the end of the Truman-Churchill talks on January 9, 1952 stated as follows:

"Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

"We share the hope and the determination that war, with all its modern weapons, shall not again be visited on mankind. We will remain in close consultation on the developments which might increase danger to the maintenance of world peace."

13. Parallel with the developments outlined above, similar arrangements have been made with Canada both as regards the use of Goose Bay in the event of war and as regards periodic exchanges of view concerning developments in the world situation. No similar arrangements have been made with any other country. Among the other NATO countries, only France has raised any question concerning this general problem. The French have asked for and received assurances that atomic weapons will not be introduced into metropolitan France without consultation. However, they have not asked for any assurances concerning (a) consultations on the general question of the use of atomic weapons or (b) consultations on the use of bases in metropolitan France for atomic strikes in the event of war.

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III Discussion

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1. In view of the very close cooperation in the atomic energy field that existed during the war between the United States and the United Kingdom (with Canada participating to a lesser extent) and in view of the uncertainty as to the nature of the weapon that might ultimately be produced, it is understandable that the wartime Quebec Agreement would provide that neither party should use the atomic weapon without the consent of the other. After the war and the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in the atomic energy field was drastically reduced. This development led to a feeling of considerable bitterness on the part of the United Kingdom which in turn made it difficult to work out any rational terms of cooperation within the narrow limits imposed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. However, at the time the modus vivendi was agreed to, no objection was raised by the British to the abrogation of the consent provision of the Quebec Agreement.

2. With the outbreak of the Korean war and growing speculation as to actions which might be taken in conducting that war, British apprehensions on the question of the use of atomic weapons were greatly heightened.

3. The assurance given the British on the use of United Kingdom bases is deliberately couched in general terms: while it includes atomic weapons it does not single them out. It is axiomatic that the United States cannot use the territory of another country for military operations without that country's consent. The general assurance given, therefore, in no way changes the de facto situation. It is important, however, that such assurances not highlight atomic weapons thereby giving the impression that these weapons require special permission in the matter of using the territory of another country.

4. On the broader question of committing the United States to secure the agreement of, or to consult with, the United Kingdom or any other government before using atomic weapons, it is clear that the United States should not so limit its freedom of action. To do so would be tantamount to giving the United Kingdom a veto on our ability effectively to wage war.

5. However, on the ground that a common appreciation of common danger should lead to common action, it is in the United States interest to engage with its closest allies--the United Kingdom and Canada--in talks designed to bring about a common appreciation of world situations which might or might not give rise to general war and the consequent use of atomic weapons, as well as a common appreciation of those situations where atomic weapons might be employed in a local conflict, provided always:

(a) that such talks are without commitment, expressed or implied;

(b) that it is understood that the views expressed are tentative and subject to change; and

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(c) that it is understood that the United States is not even committed to a continuance of such talks but will hope to continue to do so to the extent they are found to be mutually helpful.



6. The British should be brought to realize that reaffirmation of assurances given on such talks constitutes the nub of the matter and that further public statements on this subject would appear neither necessary nor desirable. For security reasons, the United States would be loathe to extend the habit of conducting such conversations to other members of NATO. Should other countries seek specific assurances as to consultation on the use of atomic weapons, the United States will of course have to deal with such requests as they arise, but there is no point in whetting the appetites of other NATO countries in this regard.

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7/53

Dictated but not sent

July 1953

PERSONAL AND ~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear Monty:

I have read both your memoranda. The first -- in almost its entirety -- advocates an approach to the military problem that I have always believed to be sound. I have constantly urged the need for balancing economic and military progress and, of course, I agree with your paragraph 20.

You will understand that this does not mean I am prepared to agree in detail with your suggestions as to next steps. While my immediate and personal reaction is that they represent a sound approach, yet I have not discussed these matters with any of our Chiefs of Staff or with the State Department.

With regard to your second memorandum, I think you make two assumptions -- very vital assumptions -- that are not necessarily true.

The first of these is that integration of Western Germany into a western concert of nations necessarily defeats the purpose of peaceful unification of Germany. I feel that if the resulting

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National Security Council
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File to Montgomery 7/14/53 (according to withdrawal sheet)
AWF/DDE Diary 8/3/53 DDE Diary 12/52 - 7/53 (1)

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integration should take place and progresses successfully, then we will see a steady social, political, military, and economic advance in Western Germany. This will greatly increase the pressures inside Eastern Germany to join up with other parts of their former Empire. It could even become impossible for the Communists to hold the place by force. While out of this situation there might develop conditions that could be almost provocative of general war, this would come about only if the East -- that is, Russia -- conducted such a campaign of reprisal, repression, and cruelty that the whole Eastern world would break into flames. This could not possibly come about until the West, with the great advantages of EDC and of greater unification of Western Europe, would have achieved a position of strength that would certainly have a sobering effect on any Russian plan for risking a global war.

The next assumption you make is that a neutral Germany would necessarily be a disarmed Germany. Former treaties have guaranteed the neutralization of both Belgium and Switzerland. But in neither case was any attempt ever made to disarm these

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nations. Personally, I think it is correct to say that a completely disarmed but united Germany is unthinkable in the sense that it is inconceivable. In the long run, Germany could not remain free and completely disarmed in a world otherwise armed far more heavily than has previously been the case. I personally believe that if ever we get into this business of guaranteeing the neutrality of Germany, we must be very careful to see that she has the right and the capability of participating in her own defense against an attack from any border whatsoever. In other words, her levels of armament might be limited, but she could not be a completely disarmed country.

You understand that I am commenting on your memoranda only because of my own former personal and intimate connection with the military phases of NATO. I am not answering them as the official pronouncement of an individual in my present office -- consequently, I must request that you consider this letter completely Confidential, to be revealed to no other person. I write it merely to give you, as my friend, my personal thoughts on your memoranda.

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Handwritten date: "8/4/53"

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SECURITY INFORMATION

NSC 160

COPY NO. 12

A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

on

UNITED STATES POSITION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

DECLASSIFIED
NSC FR 4-932 NNSJ 84-11 August 4, 1953
By WPA NARS, Date 11/29/82
WASHINGTON

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6. In Soviet policy control of Germany clearly occupies a central role. The Soviets would like to dominate the whole of Germany as they now do the East Zone. If this occurred, it would gravely endanger our national security. As Western policies have so far frustrated this purpose, the Soviets have devoted their efforts primarily to detaching Germany from the West and delaying its participation in Western defense. With the memory of recent German aggression, the USSR undoubtedly fears revival of German military power as a threat to its security. The Soviet tactics have been to appeal to the German desire for unity and fear of war and to exploit Western differences. In applying these tactics, the Soviets, in the face of increased resistance in East Germany and the satellites, may propose a united, neutralized, disarmed Germany as a means of weakening Allied cohesion, putting upon the Allies or the United States the onus for keeping Germany divided, and repairing Soviet prestige in German eyes. If accepted, unity on these terms would entail loss of Soviet control of East Germany for the present and might complicate the Soviet position in other satellite areas. The Soviets might be prepared to pay this price to prevent the rearming of Western Germany and its integration with the West. They would almost certainly not agree to unity on terms allowing a united Germany to ally with the West, and would be unlikely to permit a united Germany to rearm, except possibly to a limited extent under strict four-power control.

7. U. S. security interests require that the continent of Europe be made as impregnable as possible against Soviet attack or subversion. This requires participation in Western defense, in conformity with paragraph 5 above, of West Germany and, if possible, of a united, democratic Germany from which Soviet occupation forces have been withdrawn. A united Germany, disarmed or neutralized by four-power agreement, would jeopardize these interests by tending to separate Germany from the West and placing excessive military burdens on the U. S. and free Europe.

Reconciling These Factors

8. The United States seeks to reconcile these varied and complex factors by two related conceptions:

a. A strong, united European community, including Germany.

b. A unified, democratic and sovereign Germany, allied to the West by its own choice.

9. European Community

a. We should endeavor to effect the integration of West Germany, or a unified Germany if possible, in an organically united European Community, within the broader Atlantic Community. Such a European Community provides the best means of solving Europe's economic, political and defense problems. The first step, the Coal and Steel Community, is already in operation. Integration of

b. The Soviet Union seems unlikely to accept unity on these terms at this time. It is more likely to seek to exploit German desire for unity by offering unification on terms designed to isolate and neutralize a united Germany and thus bar it from association with the Free World. A "neutralized", unified Germany, with or without armed forces, would entail sacrifices and risks to the West incommensurate with any possible gains. It would deny Germany strength to the West, wreck present and prospective plans for building augmented European strength through union, and open up the whole of Germany to Soviet intrigue and manipulation which would aim at the absorption of Germany into the Soviet bloc. Unity on these terms should therefore be opposed by the West.

11. Evaluation of EDC Prospects

a. Various factors, and especially French and Italian hesitation, have delayed the ratification of the EDC and related Contractual Agreements, designed to restore substantial West German sovereignty, which were signed in May 1952. Although the possibility of holding four-power talks on Germany will tend further to postpone action on these agreements, French ratification of EDC appears unlikely until four-power talks have been held or blocked by the Soviets. The basic policy decisions and compromises of conflicting national interests contained in these agreements are not likely to remain acceptable

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JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 25 November 1980

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

Aug 8, 1953

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

In answer to your oral directive and in compliance with the memorandum to you from the President dated 1 July 1953, we submit herewith our views.

We have outlined first the problem as we see it and following a brief discussion have given you our conclusions and recommendations.

I. THE PROBLEM

To produce a summarized statement of our own initial views as to the best balance and most effective use and deployment of our armed forces based on an examination of:

- a. existing strategic concepts and implementing plans;
- b. the roles and missions of the Services;
- c. the composition and readiness of our present forces;
- d. the development of new weapons and weapons systems, and resulting new advances in military tactics;
- e. our military assistance programs;

and having in mind austerity and the overlapping in operations and administration, and with due regard to existing basic national security policies, national security programs for fiscal 1954 and 1955, and the current views of the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of the Budget

in order to

furnish the President with material for his consideration in connection with formulating interim guidance to the NSC in developing policies for the most effective employment of available national resources to insure the defense of our country for the long pull which may lie ahead.

Some: David Rosenberg; also see Jurika, Badford

II. DISCUSSION

1. A review of our military plans and their implementation since June 1950 must result in the conclusion that in general they were sound and adequate. The exceptions were generally the result of immediate pressures, inadequate intelligence, or both. That these plans have served their purpose is a fact, since we have successfully averted a general war. We do find ourselves, however, militarily extended at this time with our existing armed forces so deployed or committed that we have little strategic reserve. Our Armed Forces are of such a size that augmentation of any magnitude could take place only after full scale mobilization. Their roles and missions as stated in the functions paper are clear and that document as now written provides reasonable workable guidance for service programs. There is no reason to believe that our combat readiness or overall military power will be materially increased in the immediate future by the advent of new weapons or tactics except perhaps in the atomic field. Any across the board reduction in the military budget would result in an almost equal reduction in overall security. A satisfactory military position for the long pull from a budgetary point of view cannot be easily or quickly obtained, but it is a possibility. It would involve changes in present international obligations of some magnitude and taking time. The decision to implement such a revised plan must take into account not only international psychological factors but the seriousness of public reaction in the United States. Hasty premature announcement could well result in more radical action by the Congress.

2. In the time that has been available for this study, exact force compositions in a revised program could not be made. Only general conclusions can be presented now which, if approved by the President, could form the basis for further detailed studies.

3. It is estimated that the redeployment and reorientation of our military forces as envisaged by the conclusions which follow would take a minimum of two years to accomplish and would require not only cooperation on the part of our Allies but the cooperation of our legislative branch in that a continuation of deficit financing would probably be necessary in the interim period.

III. CONCLUSIONS

1. The primary national responsibility is to insure our survival as a free nation. This includes the stability and durability of our economy.

2. Soviet long-range objectives remain unchanged and are aimed at the overthrow of democracy. The Soviet now has the capability of an atomic attack against Continental United States of serious though indeterminate magnitude, and this capability can be expected to increase.

3. We must therefore insure that there is sufficient military strength and the necessary state of readiness to deter the USSR from embarking on a general war, if possible, or, if not, to insure that we win it.

4. Currently the most critical factors in the military aspects of our security are air defense of our Continental U. S. vitals and our ability to retaliate swiftly and powerfully in the event we are attacked. These air defenses need bolstering to a degree which can hold damage to nationally manageable proportions. A capability for swift and powerful retaliation is a deterrent and, in event of hostilities, will blunt the enemy offensive and reduce his capabilities.

5. Our current military capabilities are inadequate to provide essential national security and at the same time to meet our global military commitments. We are over-extended.

6. We continue to place our major emphasis in the military field on peripheral deployments overseas, to the neglect of our vitals in Continental United States. Our freedom of action is seriously curtailed, the exercise of initiative severely limited.

7. Our state of readiness for timely military reaction to full-scale armed aggression continues to deteriorate. We have used in World War II and in the Korean War practically our entire pool of trained military reservists, particularly specialists. For any emergency short of general war, we shall now be forced to the time-consuming procedure of training new personnel.

8. We must now consider what alternative courses of action are open to us which, if adopted, could arrest and ultimately reverse the foregoing deteriorations in our military position without seriously weakening the stability and durability of the national economy.

[REDACTED]

9. Of the broad courses of action examined, only one, in our opinion, offers reasonable promise of improving our general security position. The course we have in mind would reverse our present strategic policy. It would place in first priority the essential military protection of our Continental U. S. vitals and the capability for delivering swift and powerful retaliatory blows. Military commitments overseas -- that is to say, peripheral military commitments -- would cease to have first claim on our resources.

10. Adoption of this course of action would involve a change in basic foreign policy of fundamental and far-reaching implications. Under this concept, it would also be essential that our national objectives in situations short of a general emergency be clearly defined to all nations to the end that our friends be reassured and our enemies be not in doubt as to our intentions.

11. If adopted, these changes in our foreign policy and military deployments should be made only after the most exhaustive consideration by the highest governmental officials, and dissemination of knowledge of the decision should be most carefully controlled. Finally, implementing plans would have to be prepared on a carefully phased schedule, carefully coordinated at home and abroad, and given the most effective security practicable.

12. An essential element of such plans would be the public information program thoroughly thought out and resolutely executed.

13. Inseparably involved in the adoption of this or any other course of action, and at every stage of its execution, is the problem of adequate intelligence. Intelligence is the foundation for determination of military force and facility requirements. We lay top emphasis on the appraisal of Soviet capabilities and intentions and also on the critical need for early warning of attack. We consider intelligence concerning the Soviets to be inadequate at present.

14. In view of U. S. responsibility for leadership in the free world, we should be more discriminatory in extending any form of our aid or protection, and should require an appropriate contribution or concession in return.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the President direct the NSC to examine, as a matter of priority, the effects on the national interests of adoption of the course of action outlined above.

2. Formulation, and to the extent it accords with approved national policy, the public announcement of a clear, positive policy with respect to the use of atomic weapons.

3. Until and unless otherwise directed by the President, we recommend that the distribution of this document and information as to its contents be limited to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

A. W. RADFORD
Admiral, USN

K. B. MIDWAY
General, USA

ROBERT S. CARLEY
Admiral, USN

H. F. TRINING
General, USAF

German divisions to the defense forces of Western Europe. He said he wanted General Ridgway to make a statement as to the importance of these divisions.

General Ridgway replied that in his view these twelve divisions were absolutely indispensable to the accomplishment of our mission in Europe.

Mr. Dodge replied that if the Council adopted the view of Side "A" as set forth in paragraph 36-a, it would amount to stating that we cannot reduce our military aid until these nations state that they are able to carry the load. After further discussion it was agreed to accept the version of paragraph 36-a proposed by Side "A", dropping out the last phrase which read "as rapidly as the United States concludes that the European economies can assume this burden" and to substitute therefor the phrase "as rapidly as the United States security interests permit."

The next issue, said General Cutler, concerned the redeployment of U.S. forces overseas. Side "A", said Mr. Cutler, maintained that a major redeployment of U.S. forces from Europe and the Far East at the present time would seriously undermine the strength of the coalition. While partial redeployment might improve the United States and Allied military posture, only further study can determine our most effective deployment. Side "B" maintained that, because the United States and Allied military posture is weakened by the present over-extended deployment of U.S. forces, an early determination should be made whether, with the understanding of our Allies, the redeployment toward the United States of the bulk of our land and other forces should soon be initiated and carried during the next few years.

As Mr. Cutler called on Admiral Radford for his views on this issue, the President observed that the critical phrase in this statement was the phrase "with the understanding of our Allies."

Before Admiral Radford could make his statement, Secretary Wilson pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached an agreed position on this issue and that it was set forth on page 8 of their written memorandum in the language which, in substance, adopted the position of Side "B" as contained in the righthand text of paragraph 37-a-b and c of NSC 162. Admiral Radford confirmed Secretary Wilson's remark by stating that the Joint Chiefs were prepared to accept Side "B's" language for paragraph 37-a with only two changes. He wished to strike out the phrase "reasonably soon" in subparagraph c.

Secretary Dulles said that on the basis of his "embryonic military knowledge" the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed sound. He felt obliged to say, however, that unless this redeployment were handled with the greatest delicacy and under the

cover of another and larger operation, the redeployment could bring about the complete collapse of our coalition in Europe. He repeated that the redeployment simply could not be done as a separate and distinct move. He hoped and believed that it could be done, however, as part of an "over-all operation" in Europe in which the redeployment would stand out as a constructive and not a destructive step. In concluding his remarks, Secretary Dulles indicated that this whole matter was so delicate that he was fearful of even having it set forth as it was in paragraph 37-c for fear that the report might leak out with terrible repercussions abroad.

The President commented philosophically that we seemed to be hoist on our own petard. On the one hand we wanted our policy set forth clearly in the present report. On the other we couldn't afford to let such matters get into the hands of the columnists. On the whole, continued the President, he thought paragraph 37 constituted a good statement of military policy. On the other hand it was vitally important that no inkling of the proposed redeployment should be made public until our Allies had also been brought to realize that such a redeployment was really good military policy. The President went on to point out that properly speaking the stationing of U.S. divisions in Europe had been at the outset an emergency measure not intended to last indefinitely. Unhappily, however, the European nations have been slow in building up their own military forces and had now come to expect our forces to remain in Europe indefinitely.

The discussion then centered on the fact that while everybody agreed with the sense of paragraph c, for reasons of prudence and to avoid a leak, it was thought best to omit subparagraph c. Secretary Dulles also said that he felt that subparagraph b on the left-hand or Side "A" column of page 25 should be left in since this called attention to the fact that under present conditions a major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe could be very dangerous to the coalition.

Secretary Humphrey said that this position of the Secretary of State really went to the heart of the question and to the reality of our basic intention. Secretary Humphrey contended that the present overextended deployment of our forces represented a situation which we did not wish to perpetuate. Instead, we wished to redeploy these forces and if we had to fight, to fight a new and not an old type of war. This particular issue, said Secretary Humphrey, was the guts of our whole military program. The President cautioned Secretary Humphrey by pointing out that the caveman's rock could kill his enemy if the enemy had no defense against it. Going on, the President observed that if the Communists succeeded in gaining control of Europe the world balance of power would be

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On August 19 I made a trip to New York for the purpose of attending a ceremony honoring Bernie Baruch. Before making the trip, arrangements were made for Secretary Durkin to meet me for luncheon at the Waldorf.

My purpose in getting to see Mr. Durkin was that I was getting the feeling that he regarded himself in the Cabinet as a representative of labor rather than as my principal adviser on labor. It seemed to me that he kept thinking of himself as an employee of a labor union, serving on the Cabinet merely on an interim basis while on vacation from his true work and position. Consequently I expressed to him the very earnest hope that he would give to the rest of us in the Cabinet his own convictions and conclusions based upon his lifetime experience and study. I particularly tried to impress on him that he was not dependent upon any one else for his present or future livelihood or standing in labor. On the contrary, I told him that if he served through these four years as an independent individual, giving the best that he had to the Administration, that I would personally guarantee him a job -- a good job -- when the next Administration took over. This I felt I could promise with confidence because I had discussed the matter with one or two prominent executives, and they told me that if Secretary Durkin should work in this fashion for four years, he would thereafter be of

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
Agency Case NSC F90-376
NLE Case 90-16341
By *AK* NLE Date 7/18/91

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tremendous value to them in their organizations.

Secretary Durkin appeared deeply touched by this statement of purpose and indicated his readiness and ability to function in the manner I described.

He said that the staff group in Washington had been making great progress toward reaching conclusions as to what should be recommended to Congress as amendments to the Taft Hartley Law, and I told him that, if all of course, /my advisers on that body were unanimous in their recommendations, that I would be happy to send their conclusions along to the Congress.

Such a promise was, of course, based upon my knowledge of the diverse views that were represented on the Committee. It included the chairmen of both the House and Senate Committees on Labor, the Secretary of Labor or his representative, the Secretary of Commerce or his representative, Senator Taft (for most of the meetings), and two members of my own staff, Mr. Shanley and Mr. Morgan. I personally attended only one meeting.

On August 31, back in Denver, where I had resumed my vacation, I received a letter of resignation from Secretary Durkin. He stated only that he found it necessary to return to his position as head of the Plumbers' Union. He gave no other reason for resigning, but did go to the trouble to express great personal admiration and friendship for me.

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On September 10, I made a one-day trip to Washington to attend the funeral of Chief Justice Vinson, who had died suddenly. I had the morning in the office, and while there Secretary Durkin visited me. I had not yet formally accepted his resignation, though I had sent a message to him through Governor Adams to tell him that of course his resignation would be accepted under the terms he specified, which were that he could remain as Secretary until September 9, and no announcement should be made until that date.

When he came to see me on the 10th, I talked the situation over with him and discovered that he felt that Mr. Shanley and Mr. Morgan had, as he expressed it, broken faith in "collective bargaining." This expression startled me, and I explained to him very earnestly that he was not a bargainer in my Cabinet -- he was my principal adviser on labor -- and that he was perfectly free to make to me such recommendations and offer such advice as his own convictions and wisdom dictated. He merely kept repeating, "I think you should accept my resignation." I told him that of course I would, and he left after quite a conversation, protesting lasting friendship and admiration for me.

Apparently as soon as he returned to his own office, he held a press conference, in which he again stated that Mr. Shanley and Mr.

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Morgan had "broken faith" with him, although he said, of course, that he had never had any commitment from me.

Somedays later, he made a speech at the A. F. of L. Convention, in which he stated that I broke a promise to him.

That was the end of the whole incident, except that I immediately started looking for an acceptable replacement. For the moment I decided to be in no hurry to make any new appointment for two reasons: (a) I wanted to see how Under Secretary Mashburn would work out when he was carrying the load in his own right rather than serving as a lieutenant for Durkin; (b), I felt that the recess appointment of anyone to such a controversial post might start a snowball of criticism from those who would destroy the appointee, thus increasing the difficulty of confirmation. Things went along in this fashion until the day of the Cabinet meeting, September 25. Following the dispersal of the Cabinet, the Under Secretary Mashburn came to see me and asked that his resignation be accepted. He was apparently disappointed that he had not been offered the Secretaryship, and as a matter of fact, I was still seriously considering him for the post. However, his obvious impatience instantly eliminated from my mind any thought of giving him such an important place; such posts should go to people who are not personally seeking them.

However, he gave as his reason for resigning the same one that had been advanced by Secretary Durkin -- the fact that he had been offered a

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a very important post in a union organization and could not afford to turn it down. Moreover, he brought in a note of urgency by saying that he had to have prompt assurance that his resignation would be accepted so that he could inform the union heads. Since, of course, any man can resign from public service, what he was actually doing was putting me on notice that I was getting my last chance at him. I accepted his resignation to become effective and publicly announced it when I had finally designated a Secretary of Labor.

I finally decided upon Mr. James P. Mitchell of New Jersey, and his appointment was announced today, October 8th. Obviously it must be an interim appointment and he must be confirmed after the Congress convenes next January. I do hope that in the months until then he does not roll up enough opposition to block confirmation.

Mr. Mashburn, in asking me to accept his resignation, spoke in rather grateful terms of the opportunity he had had to serve in the government for a while, and said that the job he had really wanted was head of the Mediation Board. This I had not previously heard, and a suitable individual had already been appointed for that post. I had a growing liking for Mashburn and was really leaning more toward his appointment as Secretary than I was toward Mitchell or one other man I had in mind. However, his dissatisfaction with the post of Under Secretary (which I

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consider a high one) and some dark hints he made about his former and intimate association with Durkin, both convinced me that it would be a grave error to keep him on.

* * * * *

Chief Justice Fred Vinson was a graat friend of mine and his sudden death consequently a shock and source of real regret.

From the day of his death the name that figured most prominently in my search for his successor was that of Governor Earl Warren of California. Ever since last January, I had frankly hoped that one or two of the older men would soon retire from the Court, which would give me chance to appoint people whose qualifications would more nearly meet my ideas of those that should be possessed by a Supreme Court Justice than were represented in some of the individuals now carrying that exalted title.

I was firmly convinced the prestige of the Supreme Court had suffered severely in late years, and that the only way it could be restored was by the appointment to it of men of nation wide reputation for integrity, comptence in the law, and in statesmanship. Moreover, I sought the quality of physical fitness and made up my mind to make 64 as the absolute limit for anyone that I would consider. This limitation barred several Justices, notably Judge Phillips, Judge Parker and Judge Vanderbilt.

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I was equally determined that my selection could not be charged to favoritism or to personal political indebtedness. While all my friends knew that I had consented to stand for the Presidency only because of what I felt to be a matter of duty and service, still by and large the conviction prevails that if an individual supports another for the Presidency, there is almost automatically a great political indebtedness incurred. For this reason I would not have considered Governor Dewey, who came out in 1950 as a supporter of mine for the Presidency, even if he had had in a very high degree all of the other qualifications I was seeking. On top of this, Governor Dewey is so political in his whole outlook that I could scarcely imagine him as a Federal judge. Earl Warren, on the contrary, is very deliberate and judicial in his whole approach to almost any question. He is middle-of-the-road in political philosophy (another qualification I was seeking), is 62 years old, and alleged to be physically perfect for his age.

Moreover, in the Republican Convention of July, 1952, he never consented to turn over any of his own delegates to insure my nomination. He did not release them until after the nomination had been decided; consequently, there was no possibility of charging that this appointment was made as payment for a political debt. None of these considerations would have been important except because of the chief purpose I

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mentioned -- to restore the prestige of the Court. I am determined that it will not be made a political convenience for any reason whatsoever, and whatever individuals I appoint to it will merit and have the respect and admiration of the vast majority of our citizens.

Earl Warren has of necessity been an interim appointment. I made it early this month so that he could participate in the opening fall sessions of the Court. He will, of course, have to be confirmed next January. In this case confirmation should be immediate and overwhelming. If the Republicans as a body should try to repudiate him, I shall leave the Republican Party and try to organize an intelligent group of Independents, no matter how small.

* * * * *

Today, October 8th, the British and American governments made public a previously agreed upon position with respect to Trieste. Trieste has, of course, been for years a source of irritation and mutual recrimination between Italy and Yugoslavia. We need both nations as friends and we had therefore to try for some solution.

Tito, dictator of the Yugoslav government, has actually made good on his occupation of the so-called Zone B in the Trieste area, and our

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solution is merely to give similar de facto title to Italy with respect to Zone A. This zone is now occupied by British and American troops, and our announcement means that as soon as practicable, we will physically turn over that area to the Italians.


This is another step in a long series of things we have been attempting to do in order to strengthen America's political and security position vis a vis the Soviets. If this works -- and I certainly can't think of any better solution of the problem because it is one of those that has no perfect answer -- then we will vastly strengthen our position in the Adriatic and generate much greater confidence in all of Western Europe. As of now, the mutual hostility between these two countries has largely neutralized any help that NATO could expect from them in time of emergency. Obviously, if both accept this solution (although both are to have the right to denounce it publicly) we will have the chance to plan confidently for the defense of the whole Alps region.

All of these things take time to bring about. One development that was very favorable to our side was the recent re-election of Adenauer in Western Germany. We had supported him publicly and privately, and in fact had based our whole political program in Europe on Adenauer's continuance in power. This circumstance gives the greatest impetus to the early formation of the European Defense Community that we have had for many months. Adenauer believes in the concept of a community

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defense -- in fact, he says he would resign rather than to see Germany again begin to build up its armaments except in some cooperation fashion such as is envisioned in EDC. Moreover, his action should have the greatest effect on the French, particularly as it will give him more leeway in making concessions in the Saar where the French feel that they have a vital interest.



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Now if the British will be conciliatory and display some wisdom; if the Shah and his new premier, General Zahedi will be only a little bit flexible, and the United States will stand by to help both financially and with wise counsel, we may really give a serious defeat to Russian intentions and plans in that area.

Of course, it will not be so easy for the Iranian economy to be restored, even if her refineries again begin to operate. This is due to the fact that during the long period of shut down of her oil fields, world buyers have gone to other sources of supply. These have been expanded to meet the need and now, literally, Iran really has no ready market for her vast oil production. However, this is a problem that we should be able to help solve.

In Egypt there is again some sign of an improving situation. For quite a while negotiations between the British and the Egyptians over the occupation and use of the great British base on the Suez Canal had completely broken down. Through persistent persuasion and friendly attitude, we have done something to encourage the resumption of these negotiations -- and now, except for one or two very small points -- it looks as though agreement were practically reached. If this one is solved, our position in that area will be vastly strengthened.

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Likewise, we are making a new effort (here with not too much hope of success) of getting a settlement of the irritating Israel-Arab problem. The points at issue are Jerusalem and its control; use of the waters from the Sea of Galilee and River Jordan; disposition of Arab refugees; elimination of boycotts; production of some needed hydro-electric power in Israel; possibly construction of a small canal to render Israel fairly free access to the Suez; and the whole question of establishing economic and decent political relationships between Israel and the surrounding countries. We are sending Eric Johnston on a special mission to try his hand on this one. I calculate the chance of his success at about 1 out of five, and this I must say is real optimism.

In Korea, the negotiations since the actual cessation of hostilities have been disappointing. The so-called Neutral Commission continues in our opinion to favor the Communist interpretation of every clause in the Armistice agreement. President Rhee is highly emotional, excitable and threatening. On the other hand, India, as the head of the Neutral Commission, is serving notice on us that they cannot be responsible for maintaining peace in Korea unless Rhee behaves. Trying to save South Korea is a little bit like trying to defend the basic rights of someone

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in court who insists on behaving in such fashion as to earn the contempt of the judge, the jury and all the spectators.

In Japan there seems to be some hope that the Japanese will attempt to pick up some of the load and establish their own security organization. Their Constitution, adopted under General MacArthur's supervision, denies them the right to have military forces. But the time has come when they must become responsible for their own internal defense, even though to avoid frightening our other friends in the Pacific, we must always provide the naval and air strength required in that region by the free world.


These are only a few of the problems that continue to engage our attention around the world. In Europe there are innumerable others, but it is probable that I have long before this discussed some of these problems in one of the memoranda I have written. For the moment Laniel is Premier of France. He appears to us to be doing a good job and we sincerely hope he continues in that post. We have engaged to help him on a very major scale in Indo-China in return for which France has irrevokably promised to give each of the associated states independent status as soon as the Communist aggression has been repulsed. In addition, France has agreed to step up the tempo of the war and to ship out to that region nine new battalions to assist in the development Vietnamese forces and in waging a defense against

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MEMOR.

Pursuant to the agreement this morning during the meeting of the National Security Council, I submit the following statement of a policy regarding the use of atomic weapons for discussion with the U.K.



We have now reached a stage where the number, diversity and power of atomic weapons, together with their application to tactical situations, makes necessary the adoption of a general policy for their use in event of hostilities.

We are faced with the difficult task of building up adequate forces to counter the threat of Soviet aggression. In doing so we are forced to recognize the limitations imposed by the economy and manpower of the United States, as well as of our allies. Up to now our military services have not been furnished with any firm and clearly stated governmental policy which establishes how and when atomic weapons will be used. We have been embroiled in costly warfare for the past three years. During this period there has been reluctance to utilize atomic weapons. As a result, the military services when recommending and justifying their forces, have been forced to discount the use of these weapons. I believe that if we correct this fault we can then derive a military posture of defense which falls within the limitations imposed and which -- in the long pull -- will greatly strengthen the collective security of the U.S. and its allies.

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Box 8, General Foreign Policy (3)

Authority MR 85-413-12

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E.O. 12812, SEC. 1.2 (5)
State letter 1/12
NLE DATE 2/18/86

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Personally, I believe that the public announcement of such a policy would have a very salutary effect upon the Russians themselves in further deterring them from initiating hostilities. With proper emphasis this deterrent effect could be broadened to prevent situations such as Korea in 1950 or others that might well occur at any time in other parts of the world.



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the Communists. Laniel has also promised in return for this stepped-up help (which for the year 1954 amounts to a total of about a billion dollars), to support the EDC concept in the French Parliament and to attempt to get the treaty ratified at an early date. If he does this, I will not only send him my thanks; I will think up some new medal to award him. It would solve many of our problems in that region.



7 10/21/53

Personal and Private

NLE MR Case No. 80-550

Document No. 13



October 21, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Europe

On my return from the London Conference, I found that there was a general impression among the press that plans were under way to withdraw some of our U.S. troops now in Europe. I was asked about this at my press conference last Tuesday.

This matter is, of course, one of the greatest delicacy and I had understood, in accordance with NSC Decision of August 27, 1953, that the handling of it was entrusted to me. In the exercise of this responsibility, I had come to the conclusion, with Admiral Radford, that nothing of this sort could be done at this time without great injury to NATO and the prospects of EDC, and that ultimate action along this line would be effective only after an educational campaign, and probably as part of some new general program for European defense.

This conclusion is in substance embodied in NSC 162-1, paragraph 38b, and was left, by subparagraph c, to "our diplomacy" to develop the matter further.

The French at our urging have maintained and increased their forces in Indochina and are very fearful that the rearmament of Germany under EDC will leave them dominated by Germans unless the British and ourselves keep troops in Europe substantially as at present.

Even the idea that we are considering at this time a curtailment of these forces would be effectively used by the opponents of EDC to block it.

DULLS, JOHN FOSTER
Box 8
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

Admiral Foreign Policy Matter (4)

MR 80-550 #13

cc 10/20/53

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I strongly urge that the great delicacy of this matter should be realized and that no impression should be allowed to get about that we may be thinking of pulling troops out of Europe.

If any rumors to that effect come to the attention of any responsible officials, I hope they will be denied.

John Foster Dulles

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Personal and Private

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DEF NOT IN FILE

EDC *yes* RMR *yes*

11/12/53

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : EUR - Mr. Merchant

DATE: November 12, 1953

FROM : EUR - Mr. Elbrick *QZ* *free*

SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum entitled "Interests Never Lie"

762.0221 / 11-21-53

Central
Files

Document Must Be Returned to

In the attached memorandum to you Bob Hooker voices misgivings over the EDC that have occurred to some of us over the past two years. Looking at it from the point of view of UK-US relations, Bob makes the following points:

- 1 - Rather than seek to withdraw our troops from the continent we should postpone the day as long as possible.
- 2 - Since Germany will probably dominate the Community of Six eventually, it is questionable whether we should continue our efforts to bring about the EDC.

I think the entire memorandum is well worth reading. I have one observation which concerns the domination of the EDC by Germany: it has always been our intention, as I understand it, to bring Germany into NATO as soon as the EDC materializes. This, the French have said they would accept and it would provide some counterbalance to the Community of Six. I do not believe that we can at this late date give up the EDC - the time is approaching when a final decision must be made on this very important issue. Whether the answer is "Yes" or "No" we should still pursue our objective of bringing Germany into NATO.

Jaeger!
OSM

Attachment

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BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

NOV 17 1953

MR. MERCHANT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Secretary Merchant

DATE: November 6, 1953

FROM : Robert G. Hooker *RGH*

SUBJECT: "Interests Never Lie" - Certain Considerations Affecting U.S. Policy
Toward the UK and EDC

In his speech at the opening of Parliament, Churchill said:

"The only sure guide to the actions of mighty nations and powerful governments is a correct estimate of what are and what they consider to be their own interests."

This is only a restatement of his ancestor Marlborough's aphorism, which he is said to be fond of quoting, that "interests never lie".

This paper attempts to formulate certain propositions of self-interest applicable to the British, the Germans and the French, which closely affect the self-interest and indeed the security of the United States. It also attempts to suggest the conclusions for United States policy which seem to be indicated if these propositions are valid.

The propositions are:

1. The development of guided missiles since 1945 means that Britain's security depends on the launching sites on the Continent being firmly held in hands that can be counted on to be friendly.
2. The division of Germany, not only between the Federal Republic and the Soviet zone, but with a third Germany to the East annexed by Poland and the Soviet Union, means that the recovery of the lost Territories, including that east of the Oder-Neisse, will be the prime objective of every German government, of any party, whether Germany is in or out of EDC, EPC or NATO.
3. The growing disproportion between the power and stability of Germany and France means that French fears of German domination are more likely to increase than to diminish.

I believe that these are facts of life which our national security requires that we take account of. It is therefore necessary to consider their implications, which appear to the writer to be as follows:

In order to ensure that the launching sites on the Continent are firmly held in friendly hands

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in friendly hands, Britain must participate in their control. This means that British troops must remain on the Continent. In view of Britain's limited resources, and the relative power position, particularly after German rearmament, the British would probably consider the control of the sites insecure if the support of American troops on the Continent were diminished. If the British were denied participation in the control of the launching sites, they would have no alternative (unless they could retaliate in kind, which seems unlikely due to the concentration of targets in Britain and their dispersion on the Continent) but to ensure themselves of the friendship of the controlling power by avoiding policies which might be displeasing to it. In other words the facts of geography and physics would make Britain a satellite of that power. If the launching sites were in the hands of several powers, disunited or loosely held together, the situation of course would be to that extent mitigated for the British. Parenthetically, it must be pointed out that if the Soviet Union acquires the capability of hitting Britain and from launching sites behind the Elbe, similar considerations will be at work.

There is no reason to doubt, national egotism being what it is, to say nothing of characteristics peculiarly German, that in order to regain its lost territories the Federal Republic will exploit to the full every advantage and capability it has or may acquire, and will regard only its own interests in the process. This means Germany will at all times be subject to the most powerful incentives to acquire a dominating position in EDC-EPC, if these ever come into existence, in order to increase her leverage for the purposes either of bargaining or adventuring to get back her lost territories, and that there will always be a risk of her doing a deal behind the backs and at the expense of her Western allies. Thus it is not only clear that the likelihood of Germany's being able to dominate EDC and EPC is much greater than it appeared to be when the concepts were put forward, but by the same token the likelihood of EDC-EPC's constituting the hoped for matrix to fix Germany firmly in Western Europe is considerably diminished. It follows that the French, even though the fault is no doubt their own, have reason for their growing fears. And this not only raises the question whether the French will ratify EDC (obviously the best way to kill off EDC without incurring direct responsibility for refusing to ratify, will be to fail to reach agreement with Germany on the Saar) but it casts doubt on the value of French participation if they do ratify, at least unless the continued presence of US-UK troops on the Continent is assured. That is to say, the growing disproportion between the power and stability of Germany and France make it even less likely that EDC will be a satisfactory working arrangement if it comes into existence; unless the result is to facilitate German domination, the risks of which have just been mentioned.

These considerations carry important implications for United States policy. If Britain were forced to subordinate her policies to the power or powers controlling the launching sites on the Continent, if Germany were free to go bargaining

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with adventuring against the Soviet Union, and if France stays out of EDC, or participates grudgingly and uncooperatively, or falls under German domination, the perils for the United States are too obvious to enumerate. But obviously it is not within the power of the United States wholly to avert them. It has become a banality to say that total security is unattainable.

It would seem however that there are certain things we could do to minimize the risks. If we maintain our troops on the Continent we will maintain Britain's independence of the Continent and thereby prevent our own possible isolation, and we will make it much harder for the Germans to bargain with the Soviet Union at our expense, or to incur the risk of war to get back the lost territories, or to dominate France whether in or out of EDC. The withdrawal of our troops would mean the collapse of our influence in Europe and we already have reason to believe that the fear of their withdrawal is weakening our influence. In fact there never has been a clearer case of the use of armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy than the presence of our troops on the Continent. It would seem that it should be our policy therefore, not to seek for a situation which would ultimately permit the withdrawal of our troops from the Continent, but rather one which will postpone that day as long as possible. In view of the increasing likelihood that if EDC worked at all it would be dominated by Germany and might well hasten the day when the Germans could pursue their own interests to the detriment of ours (for a Germany dominating EDC-EPC would have greater potentialities for mischief than Germany in NATO, especially a NATO strengthened and supplemented in some of the various ways that are open to us) it would seem to be open to question whether we should continue our efforts to secure an EDC and later a federation of the six countries (at least without coming forward promptly with proposals strengthening and supplementing NATO so as to tie EDC more closely to it and broadening and strengthening the US-UK ties with the European Community). This statement is open to the retort that it is inherent in the effort to create "situations of strength" that you run the risk of not being able to control them. If this be true, then in backing the EDC-EPC concept it has been our policy all along to create a potential third force in Europe, the existence of which would automatically destroy the dependability of our most dependable and powerful ally. And with the growing disproportion between France and Germany the possibility that this potential third force would become an instrument of German policy and at the same time fall under authoritarian control has clearly been increased. If interests never lie, should we not take counsel of our interests again to see if they still say what they seemed to be saying when some of the above considerations were less apparent than they are today?

cc to Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Bowie

RGHooker:jhb

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Discussion of NATO Problems at Bermuda

The French have notified us that they intend to raise the questions of a guarantee by the U.S. to maintain its forces on the Continent and a freer exchange of information on atomic weapons within NATO at Bermuda. The British have likewise proposed that we discuss NATO problems generally, including those specifically mentioned by the French, with a view to incorporating in the communique agreement on a NATO program which would be helpful to French ratification of the EDC.

I believe you should be in a position to outline to Mr. Churchill and M. Laniel our views on NATO's future program, emphasizing the following points:

1. Long-term nature of the Soviet threat and the need for agreement within NATO as to the character of this threat. Use of periodic meetings of NATO Foreign Ministers for this purpose.
2. Need to base NATO planning squarely upon capabilities of new weapons, including atomic, and intention of U.S. to make available necessary information (on assumption NSC approves NSC _____).
3. Need to maintain and improve present forces plus German contingents by equipping them with new weapons as they become available, and intention of U.S. to make a contribution to this end by continuing end-item aid although at a reduced level.
4. Intention of U.S. to maintain and improve U.S. forces committed to NATO as evidenced in U.S. position in current NATO Annual Review which provides for maintenance of six U.S. divisions now in Europe and increases in air strength to be allocated to SACEUR.

I believe you should emphasize to both French and British that this forward-looking NATO program will be possible only on the assumption that the EDC comes into effect next spring in time to permit us to persuade our Congress that such a program for NATO is worthwhile. Without EDC all our efforts and accomplishments in NATO thus far will be gravely jeopardized.

The French

The French will probably press for a stronger commitment on the maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe over a longer period of time than is implied in the U.S. position in the NATO Annual Review. I believe we should consider, in consultation with the British, reaffirmation of our willingness to maintain forces in Europe and to consider German withdrawal from the EDC as a threat to our security, along the lines of the Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952. I do not believe we should commit ourselves at Bermuda to such a declaration. We should decide to do so only when it becomes clear that it is necessary in order to assist the French Government to obtain ratification of the EDC Treaty.

It is important that the discussion at Bermuda of NATO problems among the British, French and ourselves should not be carried so far as to prejudice the NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris or to give the smaller powers the impression that the Three Governments are settling NATO affairs without consultation with them. The Bermuda communique should be carefully drafted to avoid this impression.

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EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a)
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Tentative
Annotated Order of Business at Bermuda

1. Estimate of over-all Soviet position and purposes of latest note.

- A. Hostility toward non-Communist nations, but threat of military aggression appears much lower.
- B. Have maintained and strengthened massive military machine, including making substantial progress in field of nuclear weapons.
- C. Show no genuine desire to negotiate or settle outstanding issues.
- D. No fundamental changes in policies, although tactics employed to suit needs of moment internally or externally.
- E. Principal aims to divide Western allies, render NATO ineffective, prevent formation EDC by which Germany will be solidly tied to West and Europe made really strong.
- F. Recent note merely tactical device to create delays and confusion and aid in accomplishing E above; no real intention negotiate on Germany.

4
line

G. *We remain willing to meet with Soviets if any prospect of accomplishment*

2. Discussion of the reply to the Soviet Note, including tactics at a Four-Power Meeting.

A. Necessity of meeting.

To retain initiative but also to get meeting out of way so we can proceed with building Western strength.

B. Timing of Meeting.

- (1) January 4.
- (2) No reason to delay for formation new French Government.

C. Place

Berlin, in building formerly used by Four-Power administration of Germany.

D. Nature and Timing of Reply

- (1) Brief, non-argumentative.
- (2) Should be agreed and sent during Bermuda meetings or as soon thereafter as possible. If note not agreed at Bermuda meeting further coordination in Washington. (Previous coordination has been in Paris and London.)

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B. Future NATO Programs and Military Planning

Future NATO planning thus depends on outcome of EDC. With NATO reinforced by EDC, United States understands:

- (1) Realistic NATO military planning must take into account effects of new weapons and how they are to be used. Desire of US to make available necessary information.
- (2) Need to maintain and improve present forces plus German contingents by equipping them with new weapons as they become available; US will contribute to this end by continuing end item aid although at reduced level.
- (3) Intention of US to maintain and improve US forces committed to NATO as evidenced in US position in current NATO Annual Review which provides for maintenance of six US divisions now in Europe and increases in air strength to be allocated to SACEUR.
- (4) Need for periodic reassessment of long-term nature of Soviet threat, possibly NATO Foreign Ministers at least twice a year.

C. Any other European items.

- (1) Trieste (in light of developments)
- (2) Saar (do not raise)

4. Far East.A. Korea

- (1) Review Dean negotiations.
- (2) Future prospects.

B. Communist China

- (1) No consideration UN seating in present circumstances.
- (2) No changes forthcoming in well known US policy.

C. Indochina

- (1) Realize difficulty created for French Government by Ho Chi Minh message.
- (2) Any negotiations under present conditions would mean turning over Indochinese peoples and resources to be

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Security Information

December 2, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Mr. Lay and I had an informal discussion with the President while giving him a briefing this morning relative to Section 39b of NSC 162/2.

I had mentioned to the President the difference of opinion which arose at the Special Atomic Energy ^{Committee} Meeting as to the proper interpretation of Section 39b.

The following is a summary of my understanding of the President's views as expressed in this discussion:

- (1) It is intended that the military make plans on the basis of full availability of the use of nuclear weapons.
- (2) A distinction should be made between tactical and strategic use, difficult as it is in many cases to make. He was concerned with the level of decision in the military between strategic and tactical use.
- (3) There should be a clearly defined succession of persons authorized to act

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

subject to be reviewed by the Special Atomic Energy Committee for the purpose of the NSC 162/2

ROBERT CUTLER
Special Assistant
to the President

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Security Information

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4 (b)

PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 (c)

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HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

Mid-Ocean Club

Friday, December 4, 1953

Prior to the start of the formal meeting the Heads of Government and their Foreign Ministers held a private meeting. Just the six were present plus interpreters, and the object of the meeting was to inform Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr. Laniel and Mr. Bidault of the nature of the President's address to the United Nations. It is my understanding that at that meeting the French readily gave their consent to the speech but that the Prime Minister of Great Britain said that he wanted some time to consider the proposal and the speech itself.



At 5:45 P.M. the first formal meeting of the Heads of Government was held. The American Delegation, in addition to the President and Mr. Dulles, included: Douglas MacArthur and Livingston Merchant, both of whom were seated at the table with the President and Mr. Dulles; and in the seats directly behind the President were: Mr. Nash, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Bowie, Mr. Thurston and Mr. Hagerty.

At the start of the meeting Mr. Churchill asked the President to preside at the Heads of Government meeting, and this was seconded by Mr. Laniel as well as Mr. Eden, Mr. Bidault and, of course, Mr. Dulles.

The President then said that he believed the first order of business to be discussed by Heads of Government should be a general discussion of the world situation and the Communist threat. The President asked the French to start off the discussion.

BIDAULT

Mr. Bidault thanked the President for the honor he had bestowed upon the French Delegation in opening a discussion of such an important subject. He said that Stalin's disappearance from the Russian scene had created "mysteries and changes in policy" by the Soviet leadership. This change of policy was reflected in the attitude of the new government toward foreigners.

Dwight D. Eisenhower
President
1953

Box 1
Bermuda - Hagerty Notes

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Heads of Government Meeting
Mid-Ocean Club
Friday, December 4, 1953

CHURCHILL (Cont'd)

Mr. Churchill said that the free world was now rearming and facing boldly Russian movements and ambitions and that this again must have been a great shock to the Russian leaders. He said that in '45 and early '46 the Russians had only to press forward to the Atlantic and to the far reaches of the East. Now, however, they have found that they cannot do so -- that it would be very difficult for them to achieve their ends.



Mr. Churchill said that when the Stalin regime passed away, the new leaders of the Soviet had an opportunity he believed to reconsider the world situation. They were confronted, he said, with a great struggle if they continued their campaign of aggression. Consequently, it was not extraordinary that the new leaders thought that these matters required profound consideration.

He said that he would be inclined to answer the question "Is there a new Soviet look"? in the affirmative. He said that in addition to the military situation, the economic situation within Russia itself was making it impossible for the Russian leaders to deliver on the "Russian Utopia which they had dangled before millions of people". Therefore, Mr. Churchill said, it was quite reasonable to believe that two forces -- (1) Opposition from the free world and (2) Economic conditions within Russia may have given a tremendous change in the Russian outlook toward the world, an outlook which may hold for many, many years.

Mr. Churchill then pleaded for the free world not to discard any opportunity too lightly; not turn down any possibility that a "new look" may be in fact an actuality. He said that continued consultation by the Western world must, of course, go on and that at no time should the free world be "put off its guard". He said that he believed that a possibility of a "new look" was due to the strength and unity of the Western allies, adding that it would be "very foolish" if we came to this Bermuda Conference to weaken in any way our strength and unity or to permit ourselves to think that the danger was past. We must maintain our strength, standing resolute by all the means in our power to defend our freedom. Any reduction of the armed forces of the free world would be "criminal".

14851307

Foreign Ministers Meeting
Mid-Ocean Club
Sunday, December 6, 1953

DULLES

Mr. Dulles said he would like to have a few brief comments on the remarks of both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault. He said that they had covered the essential elements of the situation.

Mr. Dulles said that we accepted the concept of the "long haul" and pointed out that the American analysis of the Soviet threat had been made earlier at the Heads of Government meeting. He said there was always hope for some basic change on the part of the Soviets but that that was only in "an area of hope". He said that it would be great folly on our part, as Mr. Churchill had emphasized, to let down our guard in any degree. He said that a Korea was likely to recur in other places in the world.

In accepting the concept of the "long haul" Mr. Dulles said that he must emphasize that the American Government was not accepting the long haul as any static status. He said that we must continue to work to improve the economic strength of the participants and also must continue to work to get in the Germans. He said that there were varying risks in any situation and that we must continue to make all possible efforts.

He said that Mr. Eden had talked of the need for adding any weapons to NATO forces as a deterrent power to the Russians. He said that the United States believed that any background of deterrent power was represented by strategic air power and that bases for that air power were an essential element in global strategy. He also said that new atomic weapons had been developed to such a degree, quantity and quality that they could be rapidly interchanged in certain respects with conventional weapons now used by NATO forces.

Mr. Dulles said that according to our intelligence, while we have more atomic weapons than the Soviets, the Soviets are "making very considerable progress".

He said that the concept of atomic weapons "being meshed into" NATO forces would have to be considered since none of us wanted the NATO armies fighting with obsolete weapons.

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Foreign Ministers Meeting
Mid-Ocean Club
Sunday, December 6, 1953.

DULLES (Cont'd)

He also said that he would suggest that the concept of atomic weapons "in the background" was consequently not a permanent one; that while it might be the concept for today it can't be a permanent concept for the NATO forces and that as far as the United States was concerned, he hoped that atomic weapons would be "meshed into" NATO forces. He said that he wanted to tell the meeting confidentially that the President expects to ask "Congress to liberalize" present legislation so that the question of atomic weapons could be talked over with our Allies. He added that the present legislation was extremely stringent because it was passed when the United States thought they had and would continue to have a monopoly on such weapons. He repeated that this information must be held in the strictest confidence until the President had talked over this suggestion with the Congressional leaders. He said that the concept of atomic weapons being used by NATO forces could be realized only if the United States had greater freedom than is presently possible under existing legislation.

Turning to Mr. Bidault, Mr. Dulles said that the success of the NATO forces could depend only on the establishment of German effectives within the military grouping.

Mr. Dulles also said that Mr. Eden, as did Mr. Bidault, spoke of the importance of maintaining a scientific lead and of the importance of eliminating waste, duplication and overlapping in that field. Mr. Dulles said that the United States agrees with both.

Mr. Dulles said that Mr. Bidault had made some suggestions from an organizational standpoint which recommended smaller group meetings at the upcoming Paris Conference. He said that he quite sympathized with this point of view and that it would be very helpful if the Foreign Ministers would exchange views from time to time in the face of the present world danger. He said that he would make an additional suggestion that the Foreign Ministers continue to meet on a six-month basis so that they could give advice and guidance to our military advisers -- in order that they could indicate to them their predictions of things to come in any six-month period, whether there would be the same degree of tension in the world, whether it would lessen, or whether in that period we might have a political, if not a military, alert. We must try, he said, as effectively as we

BERMUDA. (Dictated 12/6/53).




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
The British dinner (December 5, 1953) was attended only by Sir Winston, Eden, Dulles and myself. The conversation revolved around several subjects:

(a) use of atomic bomb in Korea in the event hostilities are initiated by the Reds;

(b) the advisability of my delivering the proposed talk before the UN on the afternoon of December eighth;




(d) possible visit by the Queen Mother to the United States in the fall of 1954. This was mentioned privately to me by Anthony Eden, and did not come up while the four of us were talking together.



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Agency Case NYC F 89-851
Case MR 89-20742
NLE Date 8/6/91

AWP / DM 11/3 / Bermuda, President's notes
12/53 (1)



They apparently cling to the hope (to us fatuous) that if we avoid the first use of the atom bomb in any war, that the Soviets might likewise abstain.

Our thinking, on the other hand, has come a long ways past this kind of conjecture and hope. Specifically we have come to the conclusion that the atom bomb has to be treated just as another weapon in the arsenal. More important than this, we are certain in our own minds that the Soviets will do whatever they calculate their own best interests dictate. If they refrain from using the atom bomb, it will be for one reason only -- because they believe that their position would be relatively worse in atom warfare than if this type of warfare were not employed.


This is one point in which there seems to be no divergence of opinion whatsoever between Eden and Sir Winston. I told them that quite naturally in the event of war, we would always hold up enough to establish the fact before the world that the other was clearly the aggressor, but I also gave my conviction that anyone who held up too long in the use of his assets in atomic weapons might suddenly find himself subjected to such wide-spread and devastating attack that retaliation would be next to impossible.




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BERMUDA (dictation 12/6/53) - 3.

The devastating effect to be expected from an all-out surprise offensive featuring the atom bomb, is something that must be regarded with the gravest concern by countries such as ours -- which themselves will never initiate the war.






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Mr. Churchill had still not read the text of the draft we furnished to him the day we got here, but he has promised that by eleven o'clock today we would get from word as to his idea about the talk. So far as I am concerned this is not particularly annoying, because I am of two minds on the thing myself. Of course one difficulty about asking Winston about these things is that he cannot help thinking he himself is the world's only statesman today; it is almost impossible for him to see anyone else proposing an idea of any general importance to the world.

* * * * *



BERMUDA dictation 12/6/53. - 5.

* * * * *



I told Anthony that we would at the White House be prepared to entertain the Queen Mother overnight or longer if she wanted to stay, and would do anything necessary to make her visit to Washington as comfortable as possible.

D. D. E.

EYES ONLY

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The President wondered whether the announcement of the re-deployment of the Korean divisions should not be made at least sixty days in advance of the movement. Admiral Radford, however, thought that the announcement might well be made as early as next week, while Secretary Wilson thought that the best time would be just after the NATO Ministers meeting.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on U. S. objectives at the forthcoming NATO Ministers meeting.
- b. Noted the President's desire that public statements by Government officials should not directly or indirectly relate the effects of new weapons on military strategy to the redeployment of U. S. forces from Europe.
- c. Noted the President's statement that the Department of State would conduct confidential discussions with allied governments regarding the redeployment of U. S. forces, but that public statements on this subject would be made only by the President or by others at his direction.

4. UNITED STATES POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER POSSIBLE SOVIET OR SATELLITE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN
(NSC 173; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 9, 1953)

Mr. Cutler, in explaining the background of the problem, pointed out that the courses of action in the event of a reimposition of a Soviet blockade of Berlin were divided into four stages. It was not proposed to use even limited military force to test Soviet intentions until the fourth stage had been reached, namely, the stage when the Western position in Berlin had become untenable or was about to become untenable. Mr. Cutler then referred to the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and pointed out that the Chiefs took a very different view and recommended that limited military force should be used by the Western powers when blockade measures were first imposed by the Soviet Union. Thus there was a clear difference of opinion which would have to be resolved by the members of the Council.

The President said he had reached the same conclusion on this subject that the Joint Chiefs had reached, before they had. It was obviously important, continued the President, to signalize some overt act of the enemy as constituting a blockade. Otherwise the situation would be so fuzzed up that we would never arrive at a

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EYES ONLY

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precise point where we could call the Russian hand. The President re-stated his skepticism as to the slow development of the courses of action in the Planning Board's report.

Admiral Radford observed that after his visit to Berlin in October he had come to realize fully how very valuable the allied position in Berlin--behind the Iron Curtain--really was. He said that the Chiefs had not actually written the paper which presented their views on the Planning Board draft. They had been too busy with other matters. Also, he himself had been able to read the Planning Board draft only this morning. His immediate impression, however, was that the present report was much too long and involved, and that the actual substance of it could be reproduced on a single page.

Admiral Radford went on to comment as to the very different situation which would confront us in Berlin if the Soviets reimpose the blockade. On the prior occasion, in 1948, we were in a position to counter-blockade them. We were virtually unable to do so now, and it was even doubtful whether an airlift would be as effective as it had proved on the prior occasion. The crux of the matter, therefore, was the determination in our own minds of how to assess the significance of another Soviet move to blockade Berlin. Admiral Radford believed that the Soviets could not fail to appreciate fully the risks of such action. Accordingly, they would not undertake a new blockade unless they really meant business and unless they were pretty well aware that we would mean business in our reaction to such a blockade.

Mr. Dodge pointed out that in the 1948 action the Soviets had disguised their blockade by reference to "technical difficulties". General Clay knew this perfectly well, continued Mr. Dodge, and if we had followed his recommendations in 1948 the Soviets would probably have given up their effort much sooner.

The President expressed approval of General Clay's proposal to send a military convoy to test Soviet intentions in 1948, and Admiral Radford said that this was in fact what the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now proposing in their comments on the Planning Board paper.

The Secretary of State said that he remained unclear as to the difference in point of view between the Planning Board paper and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Cutler therefore explained that the Planning Board paper postponed even limited military force as a means of testing Soviet intentions as to a blockade until the final stage of untenability had been reached, whereas the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested a resort to limited military force at the very outset of Soviet blockading action.

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EYES ONLY

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As Secretary Humphrey put it, the big question is when do we begin to probe the Soviet blockade?

The President commented that this issue seemed to him in many respects rather academic. If a blockade were threatened, the National Security Council would be meeting continuously in view of the gravity of such a threat. Accordingly, all that a paper needed to do was to let our commander in Berlin understand that we were proposing to take a much stiffer attitude this time. We could not possibly plot in advance all the precise details of the course of action to be followed by the military commander in Berlin.

Admiral Radford agreed wholeheartedly with this criticism by the President, but Mr. Cutler pointed out that the slow stages and the deliberation of the courses of action set forth in the Planning Board paper had been consciously formulated in view of the extraordinary sensitivity of the Berlin problem and the possible danger of an outbreak of global war through a miscalculation by one side or the other. Originally, said Mr. Cutler, he had shared the view that the steps in our course of action in the event of a Berlin blockade had been too detailed, but after listening to the Planning Board discussion he had come fully to understand the reasons for these complicated steps. He added that nevertheless he was not properly a spokesman to defend the present draft report, and asked the Secretary of State if he were prepared to speak in behalf of the Planning Board paper, in which the State Department had had so large a hand.

Secretary Dulles replied that he was still unable to perceive any significant difference between the proposals in the Planning Board paper and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Cutler once again attempted, without success, to clarify for the Secretary of State the point and timing of the first resort to limited military force to probe Soviet intentions with respect to a blockade.

Secretary Dulles did state, however, his belief that in view of the fact that the Soviets had made a commitment at a Foreign Ministers meeting in 1949 not to resort to another blockade of Berlin, a decision to do so would mean that they were envisaging general war.

The President agreed with this statement by the Secretary of State, and pointed out how costly it would be if we permitted ourselves to fall into the trap of spending our money and resources on airlifts and other counter-measures before we undertook to probe and find out the true intent of the Soviet Union in initiating a new blockade.

Secretary Wilson said that the course of the discussion thus far suggested to him that it would be best to send the paper back to the Planning Board with a directive to revise it in the light of the discussion.

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Mr. Cutler said that he had no objection to such a proposal, but he hoped that if the Council agreed to Secretary Wilson's proposal it would provide more guidance to the Planning Board as to how the paper should be rewritten.

The President said that the substance of his recommendation for dealing with the threat of a new Soviet blockade of Berlin would be a paper which provided everything in readiness in advance, with a decision as to what we actually did to be taken in the light of the circumstances which existed at the time. He repeated his conviction that it was impossible to foresee now how the situation would shape up.

Admiral Radford added that there was at least one thing which we could agree on now, namely, that we can't and shouldn't reduplicate the airlift of 1948. About everything else with respect to the problem would be subject to decision at the time.

Mr. Cutler then agreed to withdraw the present draft and have it rewritten. Meanwhile he suggested that it would be advantageous if the members of the Council would make a greater effort to guide their Planning Board members along the lines of their own thinking as to such problems as this.

Secretary Dulles replied by pointing out that he understood it to be the function of members of the Council to give the President their best advice rather than merely to reflect the views of Planning Board members or of departments and agencies.

The President agreed with this statement by Secretary Dulles, but said that he nevertheless hoped that the members of the Council would indicate to their Planning Board members the views which should be incorporated in the revised draft.

Mr. Cutler then analyzed the Financial Appendix to the Berlin paper, pointing out the cheerful prospect of an expenditure more greatly reduced than had initially been anticipated.

Secretary Dulles inquired whether we proposed to cut out economic as opposed to military aid to Berlin. Mr. Rand answered that it was not proposed to cut out all economic aid, but to reduce it from the \$37 million level for Fiscal 1955, which the State Department had originally recommended, to perhaps \$20 million. Secretary Dulles commented that he would not deal with the actual level, but did wish to stress the importance of continuing at least some limited economic assistance to Berlin because of the city's enormous symbolic importance. Even token assistance would be better than none.

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BERMUDA CONFERENCE - 11.

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Korea. Foster Dulles explained the position in Korea, the personality and attitude of President Rhee, the measures we had taken to prevent the resumption of hostilities by a unilateral action on the part of Rhee, and the plans that we were making for (a) a better redeployment of all our troops on the theory that the present stalemate would last for a long time; (b) operation in the event that the truce was broken by a deliberate offensive on the part of the Communists.



He outlined the situation about as it appears in a dozen other documents that we have received here at the White House from the State and Defense Departments. The only part of the discussion that led to opposition (this from Winston) was the assertion that in the event of renewed attack, we would feel free to use the atomic bomb against military targets, whenever military advantage dictated such use. This awakened in Winston many fears which he voiced again and again.

Winston is a curious mixture of belligerence and of caution; sometimes amounting almost to hysterical fear. When he really wants to do something, he pooh-poohs and belittles every word or hint of risks involved. On the other hand, if he is in opposition to an argument -- as for example, the thought that we would count on using the atomic bomb to repel massive aggression in Korea -- he can rake up and expand upon every possible adverse effect on Russian intentions and reaction, and on public opinion throughout the world.

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BERMUDA CONFERENCE - 12

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On the other side of the picture, he is very anxious for us to announce publicly that we stand with Britain in certain of its struggles with other countries abroad, i. e., Suez Canal, Iran, and so on. When I tell him that this kind of "ganging up" has certain positive disadvantages and gives a country that fears we are aggressive a great chance to complain against us before the UN, he merely grows confident to the point of aggressiveness. He gives me a lecture on the might, the power, the majesty of the two great nations of the United States and the United Kingdom marching in before these little trembling dictators and announcing our decision -- which of course is always based upon justice, reason and consideration, to say nothing for a very deep concern for all humanity. This particular sentence I do not mean to be as sarcastic as it may sound -- to give Winston his due, I think there is a very great deal of good sense in the various stands that he wants us jointly to take with respect to these several problems. However, the method of the "joint Ultimatum" is, in my opinion, self-defeating -- and certainly is more likely to be rejected than is one in which we search for every possible way to allow the small or local country to save face.

* * * * *

The Soviet note was answered after a discussion that was really quite brief. There was a small amount of editing required, but the general purport brought up no argument whatsoever. We agreed to meet the Russians in West Berlin; to take up with them certain distinct European

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BERMUDA CONFERENCE - 4.

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effort to secure Parliamentary approval of the EDC treaty.

More particularly, Bidault emphasized the necessity for understanding that certain conditions had to be met before the government would have any possible chance of securing Parliamentary approval.

The first of his assertions in this regard was that, there would have to be a settlement satisfactory to the French of the Saar question. He dwelt at length on the history and significance of the Saar and asserted that unless Germany (apparently under the urging of the United States and the United Kingdom) made the concessions that the French thought necessary, there would be no hope of securing Parliamentary approval of EDC.

Next, he took up the question of American and British ground strength in Europe. He practically demanded a twenty year guarantee that these forces would remain in Europe in substantially their present strength; he again implied that without such assurances the treaty was doomed in the French parliament.

In his argument he constantly asserted that France alone among the great Western powers was making the great sacrifice of "integrating its forces with those of another nation which had long been its enemy." He referred to this as a sacrifice and that therefore America and Britain would not only have to be very understanding, but would have

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BERMUDA CONFERENCE - 4.

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BERMUDA CONFERENCE - 5.

to be ready to make sacrifices in other fields in order to secure this approval.

(I should insert right here that after the conclusion of the meetings I had a long talk with Bidault. He said, "What I was compelled to say about EDC in the conference did not, of course, represent my deepest views and convictions. I believe with you that EDC is a necessity, but I was compelled to do my duty in representing my chief, who through illness was absent from the conference. I have no assurance that within two weeks I will even be Foreign Minister in my country because, as you know, we have a new government to be formed -- but I assure you that if I am not in the government, I will engage in going around France to music halls, cinemas and other meeting places to proclaim the truth about this matter.")

The reaction of Winston was violent. He was polite enough to make several nice references to Bidault's personal courage in World War II and to some of his statesmanlike actions since that time. But he also said in effect that "implicit in everything Bidault said was the fear that France feels of Germany; the fear that in a European Defense Community Germany will become the predominant and controlling factor and France relegated to a very secondary position. This is the reason that he demands in advance a settlement of the Saar issue and the presence of American troops. EDC is the protection of France and was a French concept brought out three years

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BERMUDA CONFERENCE - 6.

ago by the French government. At that time there was violent opposition to the plan; I was one of those who did not see how it was to work.

"But two things became clear to all of us. Western Europe cannot be defended without German troops, German economic help, and the German geographic position to give depth to the whole theatre. The second thing that became clear was that France would not, by any manner of means, agree to the re-arming of Germany on an independent or unilateral basis. France's fear of Germany led her to devise the EDC; now she has gotten so fearful of Germany that she is afraid of her even in EDC. Yet in this organization, Germany cannot have any complete military force of its own.

"Britain and the United States have done everything to support France economically, politically and in leadership of the Western European nations. We have worked very hard among all the other nations of Europe to secure the acceptance of EDC. Now France wants to run out and to give excuses for its political impotence. This is intolerable. EDC must be approved."

Winston even remarked that he was chagrined and astounded that Bidault would talk about EDC in terms of giving reasons for its probable impending defeat in the French Parliament. He emphasized that it must be accepted and that if not, he for one was going to urge the unilateral rearmament of

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BERMUDA CONFERENCE - 7.

Germany because he was convinced that the rearmament of Western Germany was absolutely indispensable to the safety of the Western world.

After Winston had finished his very harsh statement (which had in it certain aspects of the ridiculous in view of the fact that two years ago I used every resource at my command, including threat, cajolery and sheer prayer to get Winston to say a single kind word about EDC), I stepped in to straighten out certain misunderstandings that had arisen between the two. As Chairman of the conference, I had invited Bidault to present all of his problems and specific ways in which we could help in securing early French approval of EDC. Naturally, I meant political, moral and persuasive influence, but he expanded the idea to the fullest allowable extent. In any event, I pointed out that Winston had no right to criticize Bidault for his very full presentation. On the other hand, I decidedly sided with Winston in refusing to consider EDC in terms of failure. I told Bidault that EDC had become indispensable to NATO and would function as a part of NATO, but that without ^{it} the whole NATO concept would have to be over-hauled.

We could not shake Bidault from his position, largely due, I think, to the fact that he was talking for someone else and in the presence of too many people. Some two or three weeks ago he made a very

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BERMUDA CONFERENCE - 8.

courageous speech in front of the French Parliament and in favor of EDC.

In any event, he did state that support of EDC was the continuing policy of the French Government. That was about as strong a statement as he felt able to make.

* * * * *

Indo-China was likewise a subject on which Bidault expounded at great length. There was nothing particularly new that was developed out of his discussion, but it is clear that the French (possibly correctly) consider that the situation there is in better shape than it has been for a long time. While this does not mean that they are too hopeful about securing an early and real military victory, it does mean that for the first time they are talking positively in terms of a possible military victory.

The United States has been supplying equipment for that operation at a very generous rate. In fact, I believe that in some regards they have more equipment than they can use. In addition, we are right now turning over a second aircraft carrier, some C-47 transports (25) and some helicopters. All of this is designed to give them better air support and greater flexibility in the use of their paratroop battalions.

The American and the British delegations had little comment to make on Bidault's presentation, but I am going to urge our people going to the NATO Conference tomorrow to emphasize the importance we place on producing additional and efficient NATO units.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Paris,
December 13, 1953.

Participants: The Secretary
Ambassador Conant
Mr. MacArthur
Chancellor Adenauer
Mr. Walter Hallstein
German interpreter

AR Gormez

Copies to: The Secretary
S/S
U, General Smith
Ambassador Conant
Ambassador Bruce
Ambassador Aldrich
Minister Achilles
Mr. Adair
OSD, Mr. Nash

EUR, Mr. Merchant
GER, Mr. Morris
WE, Mr. Knight

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By *AK* NARA. Date *6/12/92*

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Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Conant, and Mr. MacArthur arrived at Chancellor Adenauer's suite in the Hotel Bristol at 9:30 a.m. The Chancellor was several minutes late in joining the Secretary, and apologized saying that he had gone to the 8 o'clock mass at Notre Dame this morning and had just returned.

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying he wished to express his personal congratulations on the results of the German elections, adding that he had felt he had a personal stake in their outcome. The Chancellor expressed appreciation for the Secretary's congratulations and said that the outcome of the elections gave the German Government the stability and consistency which was very much needed in these difficult times.

The Secretary agreed and said that it is very important that there be a government on the continent of Europe which could take strong and constructive positions with respect to the many common problems which confront us. Both the United States and German Governments are stable

and can be

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world also needs countries which can take strong and independent action, and in this connection he believed both President Eisenhower and the Chancellor were in a position to exercise great and constructive leadership.

The Chancellor commented that he had talked to General Koenig the day before yesterday and that the latter had said to him that he greatly envied Germany's stability.

The Secretary then said that from the standpoint of Europe's security, an essential element in the cement which binds Europe together is the presence of U.S. forces in Europe. It is our hope to continue to make this kind of contribution as long as it serves a really useful purpose.

The Chancellor said emphatically that there is no one in Germany who isn't convinced of the usefulness of the U.S. forces in Europe and Germany. He added that the relations between U.S. forces and the German population are excellent, as Ambassador Conant could confirm.

Secretary Dulles said he was glad to hear this. He then said there were rumors and reports flying about Europe that if the EDC is created and German forces are brought into being, this will be a signal for a retreat of U.S. forces from the continent. In the Secretary's opinion, just the reverse is true. If the EDC and steps toward European unity fail, it would give impetus to a movement within the U.S. to withdraw from Europe.

The Chancellor certainly hoped very much the Secretary would say this in Paris unless he had already said it in Bermuda.

The Secretary replied that like all good and true things, he felt that it could be said again and again.

The Chancellor concurred and said, "You can't say it too often". The Chancellor then said that in his talks with Bidault, the latter had indicated that he had been very much impressed and pleased with the position which President Eisenhower had taken at Bermuda but that he had not been too happy about the position Prime Minister Churchill had taken. The Secretary replied that Prime Minister Churchill was a great man who had ideas some of which stemmed from his past experience.

The Secretary said that one difficulty at Bermuda had been Laniel's illness. It was too bad that it had not been possible to have Laniel present at the discussions since Bidault was fully aware of the U°S° views.

The Chancellor

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Notes Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) on the Restricted Session of the North Atlantic Council, December 16¹

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PARIS, December 16, 1953.

Chairman Bidault. Understood in no form press to be given anything of this meeting. Must decide what to discuss.

Lange. All interested in Four Power meeting.² Could Bermuda participants say bit more on this subject—and on any plans for security arrangements or guarantees—trilateral or multilateral?

Dulles. Will Chairman speak to it?

Chairman. Not sure can reply entirely to legitimate Norwegian curiosity. Glad to try brief report. Considered time and place for Four Power meeting. Considered Russian replies, etc. We gave Jan 4 and Berlin in our reply. Problem posed for France in Presidential election in setting January date.

The subject raised in question of Security guarantees was essentially that of reducing Soviet fears (Adenauer one of first to speak on this). Problem not solved but progress on procedure. One form is a contract; other would be a guaranty. Texts not finished.

Exchange of guarantees best of course.—

Can say no more—experts starting today in Paris to achieve cohesion.³ (Germany will be informed.)

Also talked at Bermuda, with Ismay present, re this NAC Council—no decisions taken.⁴ Ismay already has reported. My suggestion for restricted meetings of Council for example was mentioned.

Had long debate on EDC—don't accept all that press said. No need to go further here on that subject.

Talked of China, the Korean Armistice and Indo China. Also Suez Canal.

Eden. Security guaranty is something (if terms agreed) which could be put in at Berlin only if talks there make progress. Not a solution by itself.

¹ Attached to the source text was a memorandum from Merchant to the Executive Secretariat, dated Dec. 24, which stated that the notes had been edited minimally for the sake of clarity and that no official record of the session had been kept. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of the restricted session in telegram Secto 9 from Paris, Dec. 16. (740.5/12-1653) According to Merchant's notes the session began at 11 a. m.

² Documentation on the preparations for the Berlin Four-Power Conference is presented in volume VII.

³ Documentation on the meetings of the experts of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Paris in December and January in preparation for the Berlin Conference is presented *ibid.*

⁴ For reports on Ismay's meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Bermuda on Dec. 6, see pp. 1787-1793.

Re Soviet intentions and our assessment, military threat may have receded (thanks in part to NATO) but Soviet diplomacy of division has become more skillful. We all here must be careful to promote unity. Soviets play line of "Europe for the Europeans" (Sov. in Eur and US not). We must never forget immense importance Marshall plan and US presence in NATO.

At Berlin we must make sure we miss no opportunity for negotiation. But cannot be led into another Palais Rose.⁵

Secretary Dulles. Can supplement with reference to Ger, USSR and US. Germany principal subject at prospective Berlin meeting.

Germany must be treated as a real party at interest and not as defeated, occupied country. Means we must keep contact with Bonn and experts. Also any Security arrangement must be one Germany will accept. Can't treat her as second class power—to do so promotes what we seek to avoid. Think such arrangement can be found. UN Charter contains provision equally binding USSR (Art II). We must not derogate from that. We rely on that and want to keep it unimpaired as in our own interest. Doubt Soviets seriously will consider unification of Korea or Germany or end Austrian occupation. Hope that will change. Discontent in satellites might lead to chain reactions if Soviets withdraw. We'll earnestly hope for change in Soviet policies. As indicated, we informed Soviets in advance of President's UN speech after UK and French thought its proposals sound.

A word on the US—all know tremendous difference between present policy and pre-1914 policy. Cannot leave you with belief that it is easy firmly to hold Congress and public opinion behind it—must not take US for granted. Our present policy is based on US great hopes that future will be different from past. We have serious problem at home—Administration eager to continue along this line. Please take this into account in your actions and statements.

Pearson. Can Eden say anything on Suez? ⁶

Eden. Yes. This negotiation long and difficult. In April negotiations broken off entirely. Resumed informally in May on UK initiative. Considerable progress on number of points. Down to two main issues on which we can't give way. Described. (Availability and uniforms.) Base vast—can't be physically moved as a whole.

Van Z. Heard much of new weapons in NAC. Realize secret but is there any further information US delegation can give.

Dulles. As Wilson and I pointed out, President intends seek liberalization of present law which is restrictive and was passed by Congress when US thought it had monopoly. Soviets have much information

⁵ Documentation on the Four-Power Deputy Foreign Ministers meetings at Paris, Mar. 5-June 21, 1951 is presented in *Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. III, Part I, pp. 1086 ff.*

⁶ Documentation on the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning the base at Suez is presented in volume IX.

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by stealing from US and by technical development. Not expert—can't say anything anyway because bound by law. Might say in confidence this room the following:

US has developed weapons in number and variety such that they are assuming almost conventional role—army, navy, air force. Much cheaper in explosive effect. Raises query on what scale to make because no use make if can't effectively use them. Possible duplication of expense adding A-weapons to conventional.

When law passed one question to raise thereafter is their use on bases. Soviets will have weapons. This involved series of problems but seemed wise to put this thought in minds around this table. Referred to 280 mm guns. Wilson added all our experimental work looks hopeful in achieving results and application in use.

Dulles. This raises technical issues not competent to discuss. There are of course dual purpose guns. Not merely technical problems, however—there are political factors involved. All would prefer I suppose not be first to use A weapons—certainly of mass type. But first to use gains tremendous advantage. Thinking we must do on this subject raises very profound problems.

Chairman. Our military placed in difficult planning situation. Will welcome liberalization of US law. Should come soon lest public say "if miracle weapon available, why waste our money?"

Pearson. There's another consequence—its political, strategic and economic. Now we know Soviet has it in advanced form. Must protect North America against these weapons. Expressed in US and Canada in new form Continentalism. If US destroyed, not much hope for rest of world. Secretary Dulles pointed out important not to underestimate US public opinion. Canada and US working out calmly Continental defense—only another aspect of NATO defense. This underlines importance US and Canada be kept encouraged by European developments in which we have real stake. Aware great progress made in this area within Atlantic context. No refuge for Canada in isolationism—learned that in 1914, but enemy will attempt to exploit potential divisive forces.

Expressed gratitude for this kind of talk. Underlined interest of all 14 in a security guaranty. Any guaranty would have to cover, he supposed, all 14. Therefore hope when experts near end their task, there will be provided opportunity for Permanent Council to be informed and consider results. Might put in communiqué phrase on Atlantic Community.

Ismay. (On Pearson request) Spoke of useful, closed NAC permanent rep sessions as developed in past year.

Chairman Bidault. Three will certainly think about Pearson suggestion—will study question of security guarantee. Like Pearson's

idea to put in communiqué phrases on Atlantic Community. ("We on the wrong continent" welcome suggestion.)

Dulles. Need to strike balance between defense and offensive. Heart of US and Canada probably first target of any future war. Area now easily in range of atomic attack. If we should build complete defense we'd spend so much we possibly couldn't spend sufficient on defense here or on SAC as retaliatory force—striking power of latter can equally deter against attack against all—in this way effective where local defense may not be. No panic on North American continent—deterrent striking power requires arrangements for facilities to be available on very short notice, as Gruenther said. Attach hence great importance to developing mechanism which can go into effect instantly on an alert—otherwise collective weapon losses efficacy.

Chairman. Anything else? Thanks to all, etc.

Meeting adjourned at about 12:40 p. m.

L[IVINGSTON] T. M[ERCHANT]

Editorial Note

According to a tentative schedule in the records of the United States Delegation the final session of the North Atlantic Council meeting was to be held at 3:30 p. m. on December 16. Apparently this meeting was largely, if not exclusively, devoted to the final communiqué for the Council meeting, but no record of it has been found in the Department of State files. A copy of the tentative schedule is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris December 1953". For the text of the final communiqué of the meeting, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1953, pages 8-9 or *AFP*, volume I, pages 1633-1636.

Eisenhower Library, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 23, 1953

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1953.

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board (for Items 7 and 8); the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy,

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MEMOR.

Pursuant to the agreement this morning during the meeting of the National Security Council, I submit the following statement of a policy regarding the use of atomic weapons for discussion with the U.K.

We have now reached a stage where the number, diversity and power of atomic weapons, together with their application to tactical situations, makes necessary the adoption of a general policy for their use in event of hostilities.

We are faced with the difficult task of building up adequate forces to counter the threat of Soviet aggression. In doing so we are forced to recognize the limitations imposed by the economy and manpower of the United States, as well as of our allies. Up to now our military services have not been furnished with any firm and clearly stated governmental policy which establishes how and when atomic weapons will be used. We have been embroiled in costly warfare for the past three years. During this period there has been reluctance to utilize atomic weapons. As a result, the military services when recommending and justifying their forces, have been forced to discount the use of these weapons. I believe that if we correct this fault we can then derive a military posture of defense which falls within the limitations imposed and which -- in the long pull -- will greatly strengthen the collective security of the U.S. and its allies.

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Box 8, General Foreign Policy (13)

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PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958, REG. 1.4(a)(5)
State letter 11/22/80
NLE DATE 2/18/80

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Personally, I believe that the public announcement of such a policy would have a very salutary effect upon the Russians themselves in further deterring them from initiating hostilities. With proper emphasis this deterrent effect could be broadened to prevent situations such as Korea in 1950 or others that might well occur at any time in other parts of the world.

