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3/2/53

FRIDAY FEBRUARY 27

Quiet routine at the office: miscellaneous messages.

Dinner, black tie, at the MacArthurs. Attending included Don Lourie, Thruston Morton, Persons, Snyder. Chatted long with Lourie on McCarthy -- standard cocktail fare these days. He is as alienated by the man and his methods as anyone. But the policy of watchful waiting continues.

MONDAY MARCH 2 1953

After a relaxing weekend, another calm day. The staff met with the President this morning at 11 in the Cabinet room. He looked healthy and refreshed from his golfing sojourn. In informal discussion, he sounded off on a few subjects in this vein: "I think we're doing well. I've been reviewing mentally a lot of our campaign talks and promises, and I think we can say we're beginning to make good. Another thing -- not that we should congratulate ourselves too much -- but I really think it's astonishing we haven't made more mistakes. I think it's remarkable -- few of us really have had much experience in government. Talking with the Senators this morning, we got to speaking of one document that wasn't handled just quite the right way, and I told them I think it's amazing there's only been one.

"Now, of course, we keep hitting certain problems in the way of what we want to do. And a couple do bother me quite a bit. One is this whole tariff business -- you know about the briar pipes affair. Well, it isn't easy to do what we want and know is right in terms of world trade, and at the same time give a fair program to our own people.

"Another thing is this business of trade with the enemy. My God there's a lot of nonsense about this. Now it seems plain as anything can be that if you're going to choke off supplies to a country you just force them to deal with the guy you least want them to. What else can they do? Take Communist China, and leave out Korea -- say the war is over and all that. Why I would want to see us do all the business we could with China -- get them whatever they want most -- it would be even worth subsidizing trade if that kind of thing were possible or the only way to do it -- because that's the way to get them to depend and depend and depend on us -- so that there comes a day when Moscow wants them to hurt us or do this or that, and they have to say, We can't afford to, We need America and what it provides."

There was also some general discussion of the President soon making a TV appearance -- in informal discussion with some of his advisors. This idea appeals to all. Also thrown out by the President was the (to me) rather astonishing idea of a kind of press conference with "selected" correspondents asking questions ("No Drew Pearson or May Craig"). CD incredibly thought this a fine idea, and Hagerty seemed to concur. I decided not to precipitate a discussion at the moment, but later checked with Him and he of course agreed it was a n impossibility.

TUESDAY MARCH 3

Attended Clare Luce swearing in at 1030 in Dulles' office.

on "trade with enemy" in Communist world

↙

3/6(5)

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Hughes Diary 3/6(53)

gives Defense Secretary discretion on bids when disparity less than 5% -- so should he give British business? Reservations: (1) backlash of US industry (2) fact that maintenance easier and cheaper when all equipment comes from one source and a familiar one (3) military guesstimate involved in placing order for delivery more than 2 years hence -- might it not be something we should have to make ourselves in crisis? This was terse lesson in some common complexities, to which President's reaction finally was: "Well, just shooting from the hip, I'd say give the British the order."

Joe Dodge reported in the budget situation. The various Departments have been submitting estimates on feasible reductions in their next budget, most of them too small. When discussion turned to Congressional economy-demands, President asked with some bitterness: "How many of those fellows in Congress have ever cast a vote to cut funds going on any Veterans' affairs? Boy, when it comes to politics, how they all run!"

Commenting on possibility of Defense savings, President was unusually emphatic: "I simply KNOW there are savings to be made. One thing I know too well is their luxurious use of personnel and facilities -- plenty can be cut there. Another thing is duplication of facilities -- where you get two independent groups doing or planning or arguing about exactly the same things. Sure, Charley, it'll take time -- but I KNOW it can be done."

Contrary to popular presumption, meeting dwelt only very briefly on Stalin's death. Phleger sat in for Dulles and, as he arrived late, President made Stalin last order of business. His comment was short and acid: "For about seven years, ever since 1946, I know that everybody who should have been concerned with such things has been sounding off on what we should do when Stalin dies -- what difference it would make -- how it would affect our policies. Well, he died -- and we went to see what bright ideas were in the files of this government, what plans were laid. What we found was that the result of 7 years of yapping is exactly ZERO. We have no plan. We don't even have any agreement on what difference his death makes. It's -- well, it's criminal, that's all I can say." And no one felt like contradicting.

DDE on Stalin death

Some problem concerning AEC brought to President's mind the whole attitude of A-bomb enthusiasts who regard their weapon as conclusive factor in world politics. The President shook his head and spoke sharply: "I just don't get that state of mind. It ignores completely the facts of world politics, the whole matter of allied nations. Look at our European allies. It's cold comfort to a guy pushing up daisies, after his country's been overrun, to know that someone's going to bomb the Kremlin. This whole idea that the bomb is a cheap way to do things is wrong."

A Bomb

The meeting wound up with George Humphrey giving a brief reaction-resume to his British talks. He is hugely impressed with Rab Butler: "Boy, they've got everything figured and taped beautifully". He went on: "I've been astonished to find out how similar their problems are to ours -- the kind of inheritance they took over from the previous government, their attitudes on economy -- I told Butler he could talk to this group about his problems and we would all think he was discussing ours."

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Smith, by the way, did concede one value in a speech: if we don't make it, Churchill is most likely to -- to project himself as leader and shaper of policy.

*OVER →* (CABINET OVER)

~~XXXXXX~~

SUNDAY MARCH 15

Up to 3 a.m. finishing draft

It was, as I had Dulles and Jackson in former great part of the talking -- to this -- what are we trying satellites to stir their definite some more concrete purpose I tried again: "Let's take Korea we not be glad tomorrow if that Both Dulles and Jackson said, think," Dulles said, "we can we have shown -- before all America the Chinese one hell of a lively deal that just frees more of that this. I followed up with: "All Both men smiled sort of helplessly to cut off arms to China and that

*Dulles  
detention  
(w/ DPK  
see file)*

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What was there to say in a speech then? We could discuss disarmament; we could appeal economically to the satellites; we could talk in general terms of our readiness to clean up Austrian treaty ("Although the boys in the Pentagon don't want to pull out of Austria," Dulles pointed out), German unity and the like. Then Dulles said: "I rather hoped we could get you, Emmet, to try a hand at this." And so I was commissioned.

*Insert*  
I am rather surprisingly satisfied with what came out of the typewriter last night. It somehow manages at once to appeal to the satellites, draw a bead on Soviet foreign conduct, and open the door to any serious negotiations, if that's wanted.

This afternoon Dulles phoned me at home to relate news of Malenkow speech declaring all outstanding issues with US could be peacefully settled. More curious is his neglect of Stalin's name throughout speech.

This doesn't change validity of prepared speech, so far as I can see (which we are to discuss at breakfast tomorrow at Dulles' house). And -- again as so often -- the evidence of Soviet intent can be argued both ways. Assuming (as I believe) that Malenkow seems and feels insecure, it can be contended (1) that this is ideal time to crowd him with tough decisions and negotiation, or (2) this is worst possible time to dignify him and enhance his stature by opening door to him as negotiator.

MONDAY MARCH 16

A rather memorable day. We spent an hour at breakfast -- CD, Dulles and I -- making most minor text revisions in my draft, which they both seemed to like. I reworked it somewhat, cleaned up editing, and sent copies to both men, to Smith, and readied one for talk with President.

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*of the  
Cabinet Meeting*

The hour and a half Cabinet meeting struck some pretty interesting highlights:

*more that  
ever got  
down*

**FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY.** The President returns with tireless zeal to the subject of freer trade. He asks consideration of the creation of "a continuing organism like the NSC" to which can be referred all questions like the briar pipe problem "so we don't come up to these issues always unprepared". Such a committee could consist of Sec. of Treasury, State, Agricultura, MSA Director etc.

*Bricker  
Amendment;  
OP in  
Congress.*

**BRICKER AMENDMENT.** This is plain thorn in government's side. Its bite is not lessened by the fact that Dulles admits he gave some moral support to it in days past. The President deplores "having to have a head-on collision over this darn thing". He goes on: "Senator Taft has told me that when Bricker gets the idea that he's got to take the floor, he just can't be stopped. Well, there's our problem -- when these boys get stubborn, what do we do?" He goes on to explain the frivolity of the Senate having authority to approve even "executive agreements", of which there could be a score in a week's time. Nixon speaks briefly and intelligently to the problem, suggesting Bricker & Co. might be satisfied with a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate in lieu of the Amendment. But no one seems especially hopeful they would be content with this. Both he and Dulles remark, as Dulles put it: "Of course the Democrats are being damn smart. They're quick to cast themselves in the roles of Eisenhower supporters -- just the smart way they played the declaration on Yalta. They know that way they get all the Republican backs up -- and then they can go before the country and say WE are the President's real supporters." It develops that George Humphrey knows Bricker personally quite well, and he agrees to suggestion that he lunch quietly with him to test his tractability. (Later in day I hear that he did, that Bricker would concede not a step toward even a compromise wording).

*DE  
on  
Carthy*

**MCCARTHY.** President comments crisply on cockiness of lot of people in Congress, going on thus: "Those boys who have just been elected think they're safe for years, they don't have to worry about 54. But these CHAIRMEN value their being heads of Committess more than their own right eyes -- and they better start realizing they could lose THIS in 54...Now take McCarthy. During the campaign he kept saying I practically had to waltz with him all through Wisconsin if I was going to carry the state. Well, we did no such thing. We set our course and we stuck to it -- we didn't deviate an inch from the line we set for ourselves (???)". And what happened? We won by I guess more than 200,000 more votes than he did." And he wound up sourly: "So I think he'd better get a little smart and realize that he isn't going to become -- a -- a Tsar -- just yet!"

**ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY.** This discussed in re coming Canadian official visits. Humphrey speaks with quiet fervor for the project -- unanswerable since Canada proceeding anyway. Opposition, of course, has come from NY, Baltimore, and -- overwhelmingly and concertedly -- from the RRs. Support centers on steel companies needing iron ore, and ME states that will get power from project. Adams urges affirmative gesture toward Canada as not only amiable neighbor but our vital source for newsprint, nickel, iron ore. And President agrees we should make an affirmative fireindly gesture to Canada on project.

**CONTROLS.** Arthur Fleming speaks on their disposition, emtio ns various date-alternatives for rent controls. Should we ask for consumer credit controls? Stassen and others are surprised to learn these have long since lapsed. Although Humphrey demurs at "controversial nature" of making request, Stassen and Wilson urge it be requested immediately -- and President agrees.

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MONDAY MARCH 16 (cont.)

At 3:45 went in to see President with draft of speech. He took 10 minutes or so carefully reading it. He rose, began pacing the room, back of his desk, around the windows, his face set, serious, his words flowing easily and forcefully:

"This is a good speech, it makes its points better than I've ever seen them made, perhaps. But what does it all mean, what does it add up to?"

"I'm tired, and I think everyone is tired, of indictments of the Soviet regime. I think it's assinine for me to get up before the world -- to make another indictment.

"What matters is this -- what have WE got to offer the world? What are WE ready to do? If we cannot say that -- A, B, C, DE, F, G, H -- just like that -- these are things we propose -- then we really have nothing to say. Malenkow isn't going to be impressed by speeches. The satellite countries aren't going to be freed with just speeches. What are we trying to achieve?"

"Here is what I would like to say:

"That jet plane over your head costs three quarters of a million dollars. That is more money than a ~~man earning~~ <sup>man earning</sup> \$10,000 every year is going to make in his lifetime. What world can afford this sort of thing for long?"

"Now here's where we stand. We're in an armaments race: everyone is wearing himself out to build up his defenses. Where is it going to lead us? At worst, to atomic warfare -- and we can state pretty damn plainly what that means. But at the least, it means that every people, every nation on earth is being deprived of the fruits of its own toil.

"Now here's the other choice before us, the other road to take -- the road of disarmament. What does that mean? It means -- for everybody in the world -- butter, bread, clothes, hospitals, schools, the good and necessary things of decent living.

"Then let this be what we offer. If we take this road, every nation can produce more of these things. If we take this road, we, the United States, can help them yet more.

"How are we going to go about it? Well let us come out, straight, no double-talk, no slick sophisticated propaganda devices -- and say: this ~~is what~~ is what we'll do -- we'll withdraw our armies from there if you'll withdraw yours -- we favor free elections for any country that wants them under UN supervision or under the supervision of a group of neutral countries. We can go on: we want to talk to the Russian people -- if their government will give us so much unjammed time, we would do our best to give them facilities to state their side of the case. We can go on -- this -- concretely, spell it out -- is what we could hope to do for the economic well-being of other countries.

"What do we say about the Soviet government? I'd like to get up and say: I am NOT going to make an indictment of them. The past speaks for itself. We are interested in the future. There are new governments in two great countries. The slate is clean -- now let's begin -- and LET'S SAY WHAT WE'VE GOT TO SAY SO EVERY PERSON ON EARTH CAN UNDERSTAND IT.

"Then I would say frankly: we don't insist that this, whatever we propose, is the only or even necessarily the best plan for peace. If the Russians or anybody else think they can improve on it -- we want to hear what they have got to say.

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MARCH 16 SPECIAL CONTINUED

"Now, if we can't say anything like this, if we really don't have anything to offer, then there's going to be no speech."

I interjected: "I couldn't agree more with the spirit of this, Mr. President, but you should know the temper and the gist of all the discussions that have gone on on this. Concretely: it was difficult in this draft even to refer to Soviet troop withdrawal -- because we don't according to State dare withdraw our own troops. The other day I raised the question on Korea as sharply as possible -- how would we feel if the Russians accepted the Indian proposal? The answer was we would regret it. So even there, in Korea, we are not cleanly committed to any stand.

"All through these discussions, one thing has been apparent: it has not been decided whether we should be or are making a serious overture in all this -- or simply making propoganda."

To which he responded:

"All right, then. If these very sophisticated gentlemen in the State Department, Mr. Dulles and all his advisers, really don't mean they can talk about peace seriously, then I'm in the wrong pew. I surely don't know why I'm wasting my time with them. Because if it's war we should be talking about -- I know the people to discuss that with, and it's not the State Department. Now we either cut out all this fooling around and make a serious bid for peace -- or we forget the whole thing."

I returned to my office for time to digest this. It made more impression all the time. I went back to the President, got in to see him without delay, and talked:

"Just a moment more, Mr. President. What you were saying to me a few minutes ago is as exciting and sensible a thing as I've heard in a long time. Now I have one thought: we are not going to get anywhere with this by rounds and rounds of conferences. I think you ought to have Mr. Dulles, whoever he wants and you want in here to talk these things out. I think I ought to draw up overnight -- or anyone could do it -- a list of 15 or 20 or 25 proposals of all sorts and kinds, concrete proposals, and then we study them together. We either end by agreeing that 6 or 8 are acceptable -- or we have nothing."

He answered: "All right. But this is the way I feel: we can and we ought to get down to hard facts and hard propositions. If I get them and believe in them, the State Department is going to have one hell of a time stopping me. After all -- I'm responsible for this country's goddam foreign policy. It's my job... Okay, you go ahead and get a conference ready and I'll be ready."

Ten minutes later, I got Dulles on the phone -- and listened to another world speaking:

"Well, you know the first problem you hit with any concrete proposals is that you have to consult with our allies. If you don't, you end by shaking our coalition more than the other fellow's.

"And when you get down to cases, here's what you face. In Germany, you talk about withdrawing and you scare everyone in France and Germany -- they want us to stay for 50 years. You talk about quitting Austria -- but you can't order the French and British armies out of Austria.

"What all this gets down to is: are we ready to start negotiating directly with Molotov. Now the President hasn't seemed to feel this in his exchanges with Churchill. But perhaps he's changed his mind."

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MARCH 16 (Cont)

It was, in short, a lawyer's answer to a poet -- and an intelligent one.

I pressed him on a conference and he agreed to clear appointments to make way for one. He asked me to call Allen Dulles, when I inquired who else should attend, and Allen accepted readily, as did CD. Time set: 1015 in the morning. This is the ONLY way we can get down to brass tacks.

Checking back on my record above of the President's remarks, I think they are as faithful as anything but a tape-recording, but I recall now a couple of omitted points:

(1) "Now take Hughes" (he startled me) "in his whole career as Secretary of State and Chief Justice and so on -- he did just one thing that was memorable -- he looked at the navies of 3 nations and hit on the 5-5-3 formula. That clear, simple thing ruled affairs for years. It was concrete -- and nobody forgot it -- that's the sort of thing I'm talking about."

(2) "One thing I'm certain of about any talk -- I will NOT give it before the UN. That just invites all the usual dialectic -- you no sooner give the speech than the Russians are back debating you, and nobody can even remember what you said. That sort of thing may be all right, fine, for Cabot Lodge to do, but I'm not going to do it that way."

(3) At one point in pacing in the room, he paused in mid-thought, as he so often does, and said with the awesome humility that is so moving: "You know, it is so difficult. You come up to these terrible issues, you know that what is in almost everyone's heart is peace, you want so much to do something -- and then you wonder if there really is anything you can do by words or promises."

This evening Eileen, at two different points in a conversation about all this, summed up both "sides" on the day. (1) "It's rather wonderful in a way to have someone in the White House who really has a dream -- there hasn't been one since Lincoln." But then (2) later: "Well, fine as it is to have a dream, he can't forget that Malenkov has a dream too -- and he isn't going to give HIS up."

MARCH 17 TUESDAY

The meeting last more than an hour and 15 minutes -- the two Dulles', Jackson and myself.

The President repeated, more concisely but no less candidly, most of what he had said last night. At one point in a fairly long monologue he laughed wryly himself when he perorated to a pitch -- then added -- "--if you only could trust that bastard Malenkov". And everyone echoed, what an IF!

Jackson at one point forcefully argued that Russians could not be impressed by talk about schools, hospitals etc. -- "their idiom is totally different." But the President shot back: "Damn it, I don't know that you're right. I still remember that 4 hour session I had with Stalin. Why damn near all he talked about was 'We have to get along with the US because we can't afford not to' -- and he talked about all the things they needed, the homes, the food, the technical help. He talked to me about 7 people living in a single room in Moscow just as anxiously as you or I'd talk about an American slum problem. Hell, those boys HAVE to think in material terms -- that's all they believe in."

Once Allen Dulles stepped in hard. When the President cited the brisk Hughes formula, he shot back -- "And a damn bad idea it was." Which nonplussed the President a little, who nonetheless insisted he was arguing the principle not the case.

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MONDAY MAY 11

Spent most of yesterday doing first draft on defense-budget speech, most of this morning checking it over. Helpful supporting memos came from Folsom (on taxes) and Hauge (on budget), but -- as usual -- most of it was written off the top of the scalp...Also edited extensively message on Reorganization of State-III-MSA, sent back to Finan, who liked it; but it hasn't cleared Justice and probably won't get to the Hill this week...I give copy of speech to Sherm, who had session with Pres today, latter asking where's the mss (about which he's yet to speak a mention to me directly) -- and Sherm reported -- "He said very vociferously that THIS time he wanted a speech the way HE wanted it" -- which brings smiles from both of us, albeit mine a little humorless.

TUESDAY MAY 12

At 2 this pm met with Hauge and Cutler to review speech text. Spent most of morning reviewing it on phone with Dodge, Folsom and Burnes, all of whom like it very much and made number of minor changes. Our review session produces little of interest, though Bobbie and I discuss briefly underlying issues. I indicated my personal reservation -- whether all this verbiage amounted to anything but saying we simply wanted to spend less money on defense. To which Bobbie answered with this illuminating bit: "Well, as our lunch with the NSC boys broke up yesterday and the President and I were walking out together, he said, 'You know, all these fellows worry so damn much about what we'll do when the Russians attack -- Well I just don't believe for a second they ever will attack us -- that isn't the problem we have to face at all.'" This is the nerve of the issue, all right; and it was touched in last week's press conference in answer to Shepley's question on expected danger of attack, and picked up by Alsops, all of whom are right to this extent -- Pres. really does discount danger of Soviet attack.

I clean up text to get Adams copy in late afternoon and leave one with Ann for Pres if he wants to glance at first thing in the morning.

Dinner, formal, in the cool garden of the Argentine Embassy on Q Street. Dinner honors Asst Sec Cabot, includes Bolivian Ambassador (I sit between Mrs Cabot and his wife), Mrs. Bacon, the Nixons. Pleasant evening, Paz and I spending all cognac-time in corner talking philosophy. Toward evening's end Mrs. Bacon and I somehow find ourselves ganging up on Cabot: re McCarthy. Both of us argue -- why don't fellows on less-than-top levels join the issues, rather than waiting for Pres. to join a big issue that may not emerge for months? I cite (without names) matter of Burr and Mersen meeting Sine and Cohn under Sokolosky's auspices. Cabot tells of his decision, when IIA reductions came up, to cut VOA as least worthy function -- "Whereupon someone came along and said, oh you can't do that or McCarthy will be after all the Latin American division as a bunch of crypto-communists!" But he stuck -- and won. I asked -- doesn't that prove just what I'm saying?

There was considerable talk of Attlee's blast, following the Churchill speech, asking whether Ike or McCarthy running America and declaring US Constitution obsolete. So far as I can see, speech was frivolous, petty and asinine.

WEDNESDAY MAY 13

Day devoted largely to speech -- beginning rough and ending fine.

After staff meeting group of us met with Pres: Adams, Hauge, Jackson, Dodge, Folsom, Cutler and I. Pres. began by pointing to mss on his desk and storming-- "Now this is a pretty good document, well reasoned and all that -- but I've said time and time again I won't do anything like this unless I've got three weeks time to work on it -- now I just won't bury my face in paper and go before TV cameras to bore a nation for a half hour, I won't do it".

DDE Optimism  
in Strife to justify  
"Cheap" Defense

DDE 8  
7



3/26/53  
15

~~TOP SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION~~

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SPGM-298-53  
26 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: General J. S. Bradley  
General Harkins  
Admiral Burke  
General Thatcher  
General Wornham

Subject: Revision of Format of Part "B" of JSOP

1. The enclosure hereto is submitted in accordance with the instructions of the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, 24 March 1953. It contains a revision of Part "B" of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to conform with the format adopted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

2. Also, in accordance with the desires of the Committee, applicable paragraphs of the JSOP have been included in the enclosure.

3. This memorandum is to be accounted for in accordance with J.C.S. Memorandum of Policy #74.

FOR THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP:

J. E. STEPHENS,  
B. R. EGGEMAN,  
Joint Secretariat.

DECLASSIFIED BY:  
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH  
DATE 24 Oct 75

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TOP SECRET-SECURITY INFORMATION

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~~TOP SECRET~~E N C L O S U R EMILITARY COURSES OF ACTION AND TASKS

67. Conduct a Defense of the Western Hemisphere. This primary U.S. responsibility will be participated in by other interested nations. U.S. military forces will:

a. Provide for the continuous surveillance and defense of the vital areas and installations against air attack.

b. Conduct strategic air operations designed to destroy enemy capability to deliver attacks with atomic and thermo-nuclear atomic weapons.

c. Conduct naval operations (ASW) designed to destroy enemy capability to deliver submarine-launched guided missiles with atomic warheads.

d. Provide for the protection of coastal and intercoastal shipping and of important ports and harbors.

e. Provide for defense against sabotage, subversion and espionage.

f. Provide a mobile defense against limited airborne or seaborne attack.

68. Conduct a Strategic Defense in Europe and Turkey While Preparing for a Strategic Offense.

a. The initial defense of Western Eurasia includes holding the United Kingdom and the retardation of Soviet advances as near to presently established borders as practicable. The current concept of SACEUR for Allied forces under his command is to hold large areas in Norway, Denmark, Greece and Turkey, holding on the Ijssel-Rhine line and on the line of the Alps. The United States supports this concept. However, USCINCEUR will prepare emergency plans to allow for the possibility of being forced back as far as the Trondheim and Stavanger area -- United Kingdom -- Spain -- French-Italian-Austrian Alps -- Denaric Alps -- Crete -- Southern Turkey.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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COMMENTS: #1. The U.S. concept of operations in Western Eurasia is in consonance with SACEUR Emergency Defense Plan (EDP 1-53). Specific missions and tasks of that plan are not quoted herein. However, certain U.S. evaluations and views are included to provide guidance to U.S. commanders and planning agencies.

#2. Northern European Command Area.

a. The Jutland peninsula lies on the flank of the most probable initial Soviet offensive to the west. In Allied possession this peninsula is a serious threat to such a land campaign and should be held as long as possible. The Danish home islands command the exit from the Baltic, and their retention in Allied hands will prevent egress by Soviet naval forces. Moreover, this entire area provides a valuable base for Allied air and naval operations against the Baltic region. However, during the period of this plan, Allied forces which can be committed to this task are not considered adequate to hold Denmark against a determined Soviet offensive. If forced to withdraw, Allied military forces should impose maximum delay and destruction on the enemy, keeping forces intact and redeploying to more defensible positions as necessary. Prior to capitulation or evacuation of Allied military forces, the channels should be thoroughly mined or blocked.

b. There is a possibility of a successful attack on Oslo, either through or around Sweden. Subsequent to any successful enemy attack on Oslo and northern Norway, defending forces should be withdrawn toward Stavanger and Trondheim.

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c. The key to the defense of the Stavanger and Trondheim areas lies in denying the Soviets the capability of moving troops, in force, by water to the southern and western portions of the peninsula. The first requirement for the defense of these two areas is to maintain control of the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea areas and the Baltic Sea approaches thereto, and to gain general air superiority in the North Sea area and Baltic Sea approaches, in order to deny water movement of Soviet troops in the area. The Trondheim and the Stavanger areas of Norway should be held.

#3. Central European Command Area.

a. In event of Soviet attack, the Central area will be the major theater of ground operations. The enemy will probably attack in force to destroy the Allied military forces before reinforcement through general mobilization and redeployments can be effected.

b. The U.S. concept, in agreement with that of SACEUR, is to hold a line as far to the east as possible, and no further west than the Ijssel-Rhine. Prior to and during withdrawals to this line, primary consideration will be given to demolitions and to attriting enemy military forces. For the event total deployed Allied military forces prove insufficient to hold the Ijssel-Rhine line, emergency plans should provide for the withdrawal of British (subject to logistic and other considerations) and U.S. forces to final defensive positions in the Pyrenees (in conjunction with the Portuguese and Spanish forces). French forces

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should withdraw southward generally along the valley of the Rhone. Every effort should be made to encourage these forces to establish an effective defense in the French Alps to assist in the defense of Italy.

(Not in SACEUR's area.)

#4. United Kingdom. / Defense of the United Kingdom would retain for the Allies considerable manpower and industrial potential and provide a major base for air and naval operations against Western and Northern Europe (including the Western USSR). The security of the United Kingdom must of necessity be primarily a British responsibility, with such assistance as is practicable being furnished by U.S. forces. United Kingdom air defense forces will be supplemented by offensive action against Soviet air installations, troop concentrations, transportation systems and invasion ports.

#5. Yugoslavia. (Not in SACEUR's area.) Due to the terrain, the relative strengths of opposing forces and the favorable positions enjoyed by Soviet and satellite forces in Hungary and Rumania, Yugoslav forces alone can do very little to prevent the Soviets from overrunning the Danube Valley area of Northern Yugoslavia if the Soviets choose to attack there. However, the mountains afford excellent possibilities for defensive redoubts. Although it is possible that Yugoslavian forces may elect to defend in the Danube Valley, it is believed that they probably will fight a delaying action, withdrawing to the mountains and defending an area in the Dinaric Alps in Southern Yugoslavia and a smaller area in the Julian Alps to the north and east of Fiume.

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Holding in the latter area would facilitate Allied logistic support to Yugoslavia. If supported logistically, it is believed that the Yugoslavian forces can hold out in these mountain redoubts indefinitely.

#6. Southern European Command Area.

a. Southern Europe. The line of the Alps offers the Allies their best chance of retaining, with forces available, a favorable position on the flanks of a Soviet salient in Western Europe.

There are difficulties to be surmounted, such as coordinating the operations of forces from Italy, Yugoslavia, United States (from Austria and Trieste), United Kingdom, France, and possibly Switzerland, on a single front and with the possibility of strong guerrilla forces operating along the LOC's. However, the natural advantages of terrain, defensively speaking, are such that a relatively small number of troops can hold against large masses of the Soviet Army. The proximity to the Ligurian and Adriatic Seas shortens LOC's and adds the support of naval air. If the Allies are forced from the line of the Alps, they can conduct a fighting withdrawal down the Italian peninsula, using the natural obstacles as successive delaying positions, and attempting to hold as much of Italy as possible, consistent with maintaining the combat effectiveness of Allied forces.

b. Southeastern Europe.

(1) Greece. The successful defense of Greece is tied to that of European Turkey. Greek forces, if unassisted, are believed to be incapable of defending Greece against a determined Soviet

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satellite attack. Well-planned demolitions and determined holding and guerrilla operations in the mountains could seriously retard the Communist advance. Against such tactics, the Soviets might require six months or more to overrun Greece. The Greeks, with Allied support, may be able to hold the Peloponnese by a determined stand. If not, as much as possible of the Greek Army should be evacuated by sea to Crete, using all means available. It is estimated that as many as 60,000 of the Greek Army might be thus saved. After reorganizing, these forces could furnish valuable units for the defense of Crete and to make commando raids on Greece.

(2) Turkey. The Allied objectives in the Middle East can best be furthered by a forward strategy in the defense of Turkey. The Turks themselves will establish a determined defense of their entire country. However, their available forces are not considered adequate to secure European Thrace in the event of a major Soviet effort in this area. Nevertheless, if the Soviets choose to conduct only holding operations in Bulgaria, making their main effort elsewhere, the possibility of a quick NATO seizure of Bulgarian territory to the line of the Balkan Mountains should not be overlooked. Such a seizure would vastly improve the Allied strategic position in the Balkan-Black Sea area. In the event the Turks are forced to withdraw from their initial defense line in Thrace, they should be able, with NATO logistic, sea and air

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support, to maintain a foothold on the Black Sea and to defend a line running generally southwest to the Aegean Sea. In eastern Turkey, the Erzurum area is considered to be the key to a successful defense against Soviet attack from the Caucasus. In addition, the Erzurum area can serve as a pivot for the establishment of a defense of either the outer or the inner ring of the Middle East. If troops are available, or in the absence of a sustained Soviet drive in the Middle East, the Erzurum area could serve as a left flank of an outer ring defense. On the other hand, if paucity of Allied troops demand withdrawal to the inner ring, a line running generally southwest to Aleppo should connect with the British defense.

#7. Mediterranean Sea Command Area.

a. Control of this sea is vital to Allied military operations being conducted in land areas adjoining the Mediterranean littoral and will be maintained. In the initial phase Soviet air will be the major threat to Allied control. Should the enemy gain control of the Dardanelles, with adjacent ports in Greece and Turkey, submarines would become an equal or greater threat. Soviet submarine access to the Mediterranean must be blocked by all means practicable.

b. While Allied control of the Black Sea is doubtful, Soviet control should be contested utilizing naval (air and submarine) and air force forces as practicable in order to deny the enemy free access to shortened LOC's and greatly facilitated movement of military forces.

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c. Retention of control of strategically located islands in the Mediterranean is feasible and should be assured. These are Crete, Cyprus, Rhodes, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Malta, and the Balearic Islands.

b. Concurrently with the foregoing there will be conducted:

(1) Operations designed to: destroy enemy air and naval forces; gain air superiority in vital areas of operations; interdict enemy LOC's; provide air support for Allied operations.

(2) Defense of essential areas, bases, ports and LOC's.

(3) Operations to halt the enemy advance and to inflict maximum attrition on his military forces.

69. Conduct a Strategic Defense of the Middle East and Far East.

a. The defense of the Middle East is recognized as a primary British Commonwealth military responsibility.

(1) The Allies should maintain control of the Cairo-Suez area, holding maximum areas in other Middle Eastern countries, utilizing to the maximum indigenous capabilities supported by other Allied courses of action.

(2) In the event that a major Soviet offensive cuts the Aleppo Rift line, British and other Allied forces would attempt to halt the offensive along the Lebanon-Jordan mountains north of the main lateral road connecting Beirut and Damascus, thence southward through Lake Tiberias and the Jordan Valley. If this line is broken, a last ditch stand would be made on the Ramallah line, running through Tel Aviv-Ramallah-Jericho-Dead Sea-Aqaba.

(3) Since bases in the Cairo-Suez area are expected to be in Allied hands on D-day, Allied bombers will launch attacks on Soviet targets from these bases soon after D-day if necessary pre-stocked supplies and prepared facilities

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are available. British (or Egyptian) naval bases in the Eastern Mediterranean at Alexandria and Port Said will be utilized, as necessary, with port facilities at Suez, Port Sudan, Massawa, and Aden being expanded for support of forces.

(4) Operations will be executed to deny oil to the Soviets from those portions of the Middle East oil area which are not retained by the Allies. The Bahrein-Dhahran-Qatar area should be defended in isolation, if practicable, utilizing indigenous capabilities to the maximum. Defense of the latter area, plus demolitions, air and other supporting operations appear to make it feasible to deny oil to the Soviets from those portions of the Middle East oil area which are not retained by the Allies.

b. The retention of maximum areas in South and Southeast Asia would: insure the availability of economic resources; provide additional security for Allied bases and sea communications in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans; provide advanced air and naval bases; encourage dissension, as well as underground and resistance movements, within Communist-controlled areas, and strengthen our position relative to our long term objectives in these areas and the Far East. However, the over-all strength of the Allied forces will preclude the allocation of major forces specifically to this task, except in Malaya, where the importance of natural rubber-producing areas and the threat to Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and Malaya (ANZIM) area by Communist control of the peninsula would justify the continued deployment there of a division of British or Australia, New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) forces. U.S. naval forces which will be operating in the Western Pacific in support of other tasks may also be available for operations in support of indigenous forces in Southeast Asia. Hold the Malay Peninsula at the Kra Isthmus.

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c. The defense of Japan, Ryukus, Formosa and the Philippines is a United States responsibility to which we are obligated by treaties.

(1) The retention of Japan is mandatory in order to prevent this power center from being integrated into the Soviet war-making potential, to prevent the Soviets from acquiring additional air and naval bases, and denying these advanced bases to the Allies. Defense forces during this emergency phase will be kept at a minimum to prevent Soviet occupation.

(2) In the event United Nations forces are in Korea on D-day, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) will be directed to withdraw all such forces (less ROK) from Korea by D/3 months. The decision regarding withdrawal or continued support in Korea of ROK forces will be made at the time in light of conditions existing. After completion of withdrawal from Korea, and in the light of conditions then obtaining, Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) will be directed to redeploy those U.S. forces in excess of those allocated in the Far East in the Appendices hereto.

(3) The principal importance of the Ryukyus (centered at Okinawa) to Allied strategy is two-fold:

(a) As a heavy and medium bomber staging and post-strike base.

(b) As flank defense protection for the defense of Japan and Formosa.

These islands will be held.

(4) Chinese Nationalist forces should be able to hold Formosa, if assisted by a carrier task force, long-range bombing and tactical air operations and continued military aid. The introduction of Allied forces on to the mainland

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Enclosure

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appear unprofitable during the period of this phase. An alternative would be to assist the non-Communist Chinese or other indigenous personnel, by naval and air supporting action from bases outside the Chinese mainland to include Formosa. These would consist of attacks on LOC's and enemy bases in China by land-based air in Japan and Okinawa and naval forces based in the Western Pacific. Psychological, economic, and underground warfare measures should be carried on. Formosa will be held.

(5) The Communists would not attempt an invasion of the Philippines, since they have little chance of seizing these islands by direct attack from the mainland, barring a complete collapse of U.S. naval power in the Far East. However, with such assistance as the United States can provide, a determined campaign must be launched by Philippine forces against the Hukbalahaps to prevent their endangering the present Philippine Government.

#### 70. Conduct Naval and Air Offensives Against the Soviet Bloc.

a. As a prerequisite to establishment of Allied control of the sea, a campaign will be initiated at once to destroy Soviet submarines both in port and at sea together with the submarine building yards, operating bases, supply and storage depots. Where practicable, submarine access to the open sea will be blocked. This campaign envisages the use of fast carrier task forces, hunter-killer forces and mining operations.

In the NATO area operations will be in accordance with the plans of the Supreme Allied Commanders; elsewhere, U.S. operations will be conducted by CINCPAC and CINCLANT.

b. Other Soviet naval bloc forces threatening Allied shipping and seaborne forces will be destroyed together with their bases and supporting facilities. Enemy ports and the local sea approaches thereto will be mined.

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c. Bases essential to the conduct of naval operations will be seized and defended.

d. Initial aerial offensive operations to be conducted to gain air superiority in critical areas, retard the enemy's offensive operations, and contribute to blunting the enemy's atomic weapon delivery capability. Tactical air attacks, aimed at retarding to the maximum the initial Soviet land, sea and air offensives will begin immediately. All Allied tactical air and <sup>some</sup> naval units now in position as well as those to be deployed subsequently will be required to conduct operations in support of this task. Where general air superiority is not gained incidental to other operations, Allied effort will be directed towards gaining local superiority in critical areas where major surface operations are being conducted.

#### 71. Conduct Strategic Air

##### ARMY-NAVY-MARINE CORPS VIEW

Operations to Create Conditions Which Would Permit Satisfactory Accomplishment of U.S. Objectives.

##### AIR FORCE VIEW

Warfare Operations Aimed at the Attainment of Our National War Objectives During this Phase.

Strategic air warfare is a United States responsibility (SAC).

It will be initiated at the earliest possible time after the commencement of hostilities. Target systems and allocation of atomic weapons are indicated in Appendix "C" to Enclosure. Initially, the main strategic air effort will be directed against the Soviet atomic weapon capability with a priority time-wise being reserved for targets in retardation of the Soviet ground offensive. Other vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity will also be attacked.

72. Conduct as follows general tasks in support of some or all of the tasks mentioned in paragraphs 67 to 70 inclusive.

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a. Initiate demolition and mining operations to obtain the maximum retardation of Soviet Bloc advances and maximum practicable denial of overrun facilities.

b. Assist in securing world-wide sea and air lines of communications essential to the security of U.S. and Allied forces overseas, to the maintenance of bases, to the flow of essential material and manpower, and to the prosecution of the war.

c. Deploy or redeploy military forces to support emergency phase operations.

d. Expand the over-all power of the Armed Forces of the United States to continue a general war extending beyond the emergency period, as contained in Part "C".

e. To an extent which will not jeopardize the success of offensive and defensive operations by U.S. emergency phase forces, provide logistic support to existing forces of our Allies with priority to those forces which will contribute most to winning the war and with emphasis on our European Allies.

f. Initiate cover and deception operations as soon as practicable in support of military operations.

g. Be prepared to implement Civil Affairs and Military Government operations as required in liberated or occupied territories.

h. Be prepared to intern captured enemy personnel, including members of the enemy-armed forces, enemy agents and enemy sympathizers.

i. Conduct psychological operations to:

(1) Convince the Soviet people of the futility of resisting the imposition of Allied objectives.

(2) Exploit the opportunities resulting from air offensives.

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(3) Impede Soviet military operations while strengthening those nations actively opposing the USSR and its Satellites.

(4) Encourage other nations to take up arms against the USSR and its Satellites.

(5) Encourage Soviet Satellites and elements within the USSR to change allegiance to the Allied side.

j. Conduct unconventional warfare to support military operations and to reduce the military, economic, political and psychological potential of the Soviet Bloc and its Satellites in areas removed from regular military operations.

k. Be prepared to employ biological, chemical and radiological weapons as authorized.

l. Initiate preparatory actions, based upon the progress of operations, including the development of base areas, to launch a combined offensive to destroy enemy forces, and to seize control of vital areas on the USSR periphery, by exploiting either the Central Europe-Baltic Sea or the Balkans-Black Sea invasion routes in a manner which will take advantage of our strength factors and of enemy weaknesses as they develop in the course of the war.

m. Be prepared to impose adequate controls upon and plan to utilize Soviet and Satellite peoples as the situation permits.

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12/1/53

AIR POUCH  
PRIORITY

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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December 1, 1953  
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SUBJECT: German Neutralism

The following report deals with the question of neutralism in Germany and suggests a step which could be taken at an appropriate time somewhere in the future, to minimize the potential danger of German neutralism to US policy. Note that we consider it "potential" and not "immediate" or "approaching". It is like a stationary cloud in the horizon, but somewhat bigger than a man's hand, which political winds might begin to move nearer. The climate in which a movement toward neutralism would be likely to gain momentum would be that created by the disappointment felt regarding no progress in integration and German expansion in the West, i.e. political and economic frustration resulting from French delay or failure to ratify LDC, failure to end occupation, slackening in expansion of markets. If this should be accompanied by Soviet or GDR conciliatory gestures, neutralism might take effective shape.

The problem of neutralism in Germany does not, by and large, arise as it does in other European countries from an attempt to escape from the problems posed by the menace of the Soviet Union through denying that this menace exists. Nor does it stem from anti-American feeling or the frustration of the once-powerful at being caught, as they phrase it, between the grindstones of Soviet and American power, with the implication that if one of the parties to the controversy, presumably the US, would be more reasonable, there would be no conflict. There is a certain amount of pacifism, anti-Americanism, and plain wishful thinking in the Federal Republic, but these tendencies are not now important and the intense anti-Soviet feeling of most Germans is a strong deterrent to Communist influence or attempts to belittle the danger of the Soviet Union.

The mainspring of neutralism in Germany is not the despairing attempt to ignore the danger of the Red Army, but emotional longing to reunify Germany. This longing, based in most cases on deep-felt sympathy for the population of the Soviet Zone and a desire to free them from their bondage, results in a disposition to make experiments and to take risks with Soviet power in working out ways to bring about reunification.

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Page 2 of  
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Page \_\_\_\_\_ of  
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From \_\_\_\_\_

At present the desire for reunification is latent or potential, to be set in motion as a real emotional drive only when the Germans see a possibility of taking aggressive steps to obtain reunification successfully. They are not likely to be aroused emotionally as long as the Soviets keep a firm grasp of the East Zone, or until their own strength has attained such proportions that they see some chance of throwing the Soviets out by successful pressure. The great majority of the German people is at the present conservatively inclined in this matter and unwilling to incur great risks for reunification or for any other experiment. But the politically important German neutralists - elements in the SPD, the Evangelical Church, and some business circles -- do not consider themselves dreamers, but realists. In fact, they would, and do, indignantly reject the appellation of neutralists, and it is true that they are in most cases sincerely anti-communist, and pro-Western. At the same time, they consider themselves more single-mindedly patriotic than the majority of Germans, who, they claim, have been diverted from giving their immediate attention to reunification by dreams of a united Europe and the selfish lack of concern which arises from a full stomach. Considerable impatience with Western and Adenauer policies as too slow and ineffective in bringing progress towards reunification results from this frame of mind. Similarly, there is a tendency among German neutralists to suggest all sorts of compensation deals and trades to bring about reunification, proposals which they consider more "realistic" than Adenauer's policy of building Western strength because they envisage offering a concrete "price" to be given the Soviet Union in future. At the same time, of course, these proposals imply much more risk for the theoretically United Germany and for the whole West than the West would willingly assume, or so we believe. The "respectable" German neutralists can therefore be regarded more as determined super-patriots than as fellow-travellers or frustrated intellectuals. It is also clear that West German neutralists have, to a considerable extent, regained the traditional feeling of German superiority over, and ability to handle the Russians, even though the war dissipated the confidence of most Germans in this respect.

Neutralist thought in the Federal Republic has centered on the idea of a united Germany with an army of moderate size and restricted only in that it does not have the freedom to enter military alliances with either East or West. The new Germany would be guaranteed against aggression by the US and the USSR, either directly or through the UN. This formula has occasionally been supplemented by ideas of secret military ties with the West, and of economic compensation for Moscow through reparations and trade. Its proponents claim that the severance of Germany from EDC and NATO, the removal of NATO bases from Germany, and economic compensation would be sufficient payment to the Soviet Union for releasing at least the East Zone, and they insist that this was in fact the original Soviet offer contained in Moscow's note of March 1952 and held open by Molotov in the course of his press interview this month.

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1952

INTRODUCTION

The problem of German unification has been for the past several years a matter of major interest to the Governments of the three Western Allies; it has been the subject of several resolutions by the German Bundestag; and has been considered at length in exchanges of notes between the Allies and the Kremlin.

The Bundestag, on October 21, 1949, a few weeks after its convocation, concerned itself with the problem of German unification in a declaration by Chancellor Adenauer who condemned the illegal government being set up in the Soviet Zone of Germany, in distinction to the freely elected government in the West; the latter was the legitimate spokesman of all Germans until such time as German unity was re-established. In succeeding years, the Bundestag was to repeat its demand for an all-German government which would incontestably be a free expression of the will of the people.

The criterion of the Soviet Zone government for reuniting Germany was first laid down in a letter from Minister President Grotewohl of the DDR to Chancellor Adenauer on November 30, 1950. Deploping the state of emergency which the division of Germany occasioned, Grotewohl called for formation of a consultative council out of existing authorities in East and West Germany, to examine questions relating to a German peace treaty.

In May 1950, the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK, and France approved a set of principles for bringing about the unification of Germany. The first of these was all-German elections, out of which an all-German government was to emerge. This resolution was communicated by the three High Commissioners to General Chuikov, Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany, on May 26, 1950.

While these steps were taking place, the governments of both the Federal Republic and the DDR were drawing up plans for holding an eventual all-German election. The Volkskammer approved an electoral law on January 9, 1952, and the Bundestag on February 6, 1952. Without attempting to analyze or compare the two laws here, it may be noted that the Pankow proposal provides for supervision and control of the elections by "German political parties, organizations and associations" while the Bonn law places

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sponsibility in the hands of an international commission; and the DDR calls for elections in multiple constituencies, against a single constituency in the Bonn proposal.

At the request of the Federal Chancellor, the Occupying Powers submitted the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 20, 1951, a proposal for the establishment of a special commission to determine whether conditions in West Germany, East Germany and Berlin were suitable for holding free and secret elections. A resolution was adopted, establishing a commission composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands and Pakistan, which held numerous meetings in Paris, Geneva, West Germany and West Berlin. Nevertheless, it was unable to establish contact with any Soviet or Soviet-controlled authority in spite of repeated requests to the Chairman of the Trilateral Control Commission.

A new stage was reached on March 10, 1952, with the note of the Soviet Government suggesting calling a four power conference to draft a German peace treaty, and put an end to the "abnormal condition" which had existed in Germany during the previous seven years. Attached to the note was a draft treaty. There were four exchanges of notes in this series, the last being the Allied reply of December 23, 1952, which again reiterated the conviction that free elections and formation of an all-German government must precede negotiation of a treaty.

A third stage can be taken as beginning in March 1953, when the death of Stalin was followed by a change in Soviet tactics, and possibly strategy, with respect to Germany.

On May 11, 1953, the British Prime Minister proposed a four power conference to discuss means of easing existing international tensions, high on the list of which would be a solution of the German problem. The three Western Ministers met in Washington in July to consider this proposal. As a result of this an invitation was issued to the Soviet Union for a four power meeting at an early date to draw up plans for free all-German elections, and necessary safeguards.

The latest statement of the Soviet position is contained in their note of August 15, 1953. In their reply of September 2, the US, UK and French

s invited the Soviet Union to attend a meeting of Foreign Ministers on October 15 "which should devote itself to the German problem ..... concentrate in the first instance on the question of free elections and status of the future German Government".

Following the latest exchange of notes between the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union, the principles on which both sides wish to base free German elections and the formation of a unified German Government remain separated:

- (i) For the Russians, formation of a provisional government should precede free elections, while the Allies are unable to recognize any representative character in
  - a. the government of the DDR
  - b. consequently, a German Government, even provisional, which is not formed as a result of free elections.
- (ii) The Western Powers consider that the holding of all-German elections should be preceded by an agreement on "necessary guarantees for freedom of movement, freedom of action for all political parties, freedom of press and full exercise of all basic rights for all Germans before, during and after the elections". As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, according to their Note of August 22, 1952, general elections should be conditional upon application throughout Germany of the Potsdam Resolutions. The Soviet Note of August 15, 1953, limits itself to stating that the provisional German Government must "decide on the utility of looking into prerequisites for holding democratic elections in all Germany".
- (iii) The Three Western Powers believe that supervision of the elections is essential. The Soviet Note of August 15 is not clear on this point.
- (iv) The Soviet Union considers preparation and supervision of free elections a purely German matter. If the Soviet Note of August 15 states that the Occupying Powers should "adopt measures to organize genuinely free elections throughout Germany, measures which will prevent the slightest pressure from foreign states," it seems that

the Soviet Union merely means that the Occupying Powers should not interfere with any agreement reached by representatives of the two Germanys.

Allies have dropped the requirements of a neutral commissioning conditions for holding elections in Germany. Their latest mention of the type of supervision to be carried out over preparations and voting. The notes indicate, however, that it is the responsibility of the Four Powers to examine the problem of the measures required before, during, and after the elections.

Allied High Commission has not had the advantage of full and effective consultation with the West German authorities as to the position of the Federal Republic toward the questions being reported upon. This position is still under active consideration, and it has been necessary, therefore, to proceed upon the basis of informal, incomplete information in this respect. It is believed that the German position may be decided within the near future, and in any event in time for consideration during the proposed meeting in Paris.

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By JH/NARS, Date 2/11/85

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

8 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Lemnitzer  
Admiral Gardner  
General Partridge  
General Everest

Subject: Timing of Allied Use of Force to Determine Soviet Intentions Relative to a Possible Blockade of Berlin.

1. The Planning Board of the NSC gave much study to the question of proper timing of the use of military force in an attempt to lift a possible Berlin blockade or clearly establish Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin.

2. It was generally conceded that in the face of Soviet ground superiority in the area, an attempt to force passage into or out of Berlin which was fully opposed by Soviet armed action would be doomed to failure. It was further conceded that any considerable deployment of SACUR forces to forward areas for the purpose of making such an attempt would result in maldeployment to meet a Soviet attack launched at Western Europe while SACUR forces were in forward areas. It was further conceded that a defeat of Allied (U.S.) troops in an effort to force the blockade would result in a situation in which the Allies would have no recourse other than to resort to general war.

3. Cognizance was taken of the relative war readiness of the Allies and the Soviet Bloc. It was recognized that the Allies were not in an adequate mobilization posture to risk triggering general war without considerable further preparation. Redeployments of troops from the Far East, an increased production base, and the mobilization of reserve forces were all steps that should be undertaken before war was actually engaged.

4. Cognizance was taken of the Berlin stockpile, the existence of which is only justified as a time saving device.

5. Cognizance was taken of the fact that, regardless of provocation, many members of the UN and the Free World would consider the first nation resorting to armed force the aggressor and accordingly military action by the Allies would imperil UN and Free World support of their position if general war developed.

6. Based on the above certain decisions were agreed to by the Planning Board:

a. The use of force should be limited to a small number of troops whose deployment would not risk SACUR's primary mission.

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Adm. Carney (CNO)  
Gen. Twining (CSAF)  
Gen. Lemnitzer (DC/S, P)

Gen. Everest (NSC Rep)  
Gen. Gerhart (NSC Rep)  
Adm. Brown (DDSP)  
Adm. Campbell (DDLDP)

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b. When it became evident that Soviet harassing measures were in effect intended to blockade access to Berlin the Allies would start mobilizing for a show down.

c. Time purchased by the Berlin stockpile would be used for such mobilization.

d. The use of force to lift the Berlin blockade would be resorted to only when the Allies were mentally prepared to accept general war if the use of force failed.

7. It is believed that an earlier use of force than that recommended by the Planning Board runs the grave risk of plunging the Allies into World War III without availing themselves of the opportunity to improve their war readiness by utilizing the time bought with the Berlin stockpile. It is further believed that neither France, the U.K., nor West Germany would agree to taking such a risk, and that unilateral U.S. action in this case would be impossible.

RECOMMENDATION

8. That the policy recommended by the Planning Board be approved rather than that proposed in J.C.S. 1907/101.

JOHN K. GERHART  
Major General, USAF  
Special Assistant to the  
JCS for NSC Affairs

Copy for: Admiral Radford

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By JCS	NARS, Date 2/11/88

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 JCS 1451-53

ENCLOSURE

to JCS 1907/101  
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 on NSC 173

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: NSC 173 - United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views concerning a draft statement of policy prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board entitled: "United States Policy and Courses of Action to Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action Against Berlin" (NSC 173) which, if adopted, is intended to supersede NSC 132/1.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the imposition now by the Soviets of a blockade of Berlin or of harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade should be viewed in a different light from that attending the blockade of Berlin in 1948-49, when the military posture of the Allies was too weak to permit of forceful measures in the assertion of the Allied right of surface entry into Berlin. The measures taken then by the Allies, notably the establishment of the Berlin airlift, did result in the ultimate lifting of the blockade and are generally considered to have achieved a political and psychological victory for the West. However, the acceptance by the Allies of such a situation now would not only constitute a political setback of considerable proportions but would undoubtedly be widely interpreted as a sign of weakness vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc, with consequent injurious effects upon United States prestige and leadership world-wide, and upon the determination of free peoples everywhere to resist Soviet domination. Further, since 1949 the Soviets have established facilities in and around Berlin which would enable



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JCS Review 27 Feb 1974  
By JCS NARS, Date 2/11/88

them to circumvent certain Allied counterblockade measures of the type previously applied with effectiveness against the economy of East Berlin and the Soviet Zone of Germany. It is doubtful that the institution of an airlift, unsupported by effective counterblockade measures, would cause the Soviets to discontinue a blockade which might be imposed now.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that if the Soviets again attempt to establish a blockade of Berlin or to impose harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade, the United States, in concert with the British and French, should take early measures, including limited military action if necessary, to determine Soviet intentions and to demonstrate Allied refusal voluntarily to relinquish the right of access to Berlin. The measures set forth in paragraph 21, as now written, would not accomplish this purpose. On the contrary, those measures would hold the prospect of involving military elements in inconclusive actions under conditions likely to result only in embarrassment to the Allies and vulnerability to charges of vacillation or outright weakness.

4. In the light of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following changes to NSC 173:

a. Substitute the following for paragraph 21:

"21. The United States, in concert with the British and French, should be prepared to use limited military force to the extent necessary to determine Soviet intentions and to demonstrate the Allied refusal voluntarily to relinquish their right of surface access to Berlin. If Soviet reaction to this course indicates their intent forcibly to deny Allied access to Berlin, the United States should consider implementing appropriate courses of action set forth in paragraph 26 below."

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JCS Review 27 Feb 1974  
By JCS NARS, Date 3/11/88~~TOP SECRET~~

b. If the foregoing amendment to paragraph 21 is adopted, substitute the following for paragraph 26, delete paragraph 27, and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

"26. If the Western position is about to become untenable, it is the view of the United States Government that the Western Powers should be prepared to use limited military force to attempt to reopen access to Berlin. If determined Soviet armed opposition should develop, the Western Powers should not undertake to commit additional forces to meet such opposition in an effort to hold Berlin but would have to resort to general war. Prior to the use of force on a scale which might lead to general war, however, every measure should be taken to make clear to the Soviet Union the nature of our determination. Such measures should probably include full mobilization, appropriate redeployments of military forces, and a warning to the Soviet Union possibly in the nature of an ultimatum. Additionally, they should take measures in the UN and elsewhere designed to lay the best possible foundation for the forceful action which might become necessary."

5. In addition, for accuracy, it is recommended that paragraph 4, page 19, be amended by deleting the words "Army constabulary" in the first and second lines and substituting therefor the words "1 Infantry Regiment and 1 Military Police Battalion".

6. Subject to the foregoing proposed revisions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the adoption of NSC 173 to supersede NSC 132/1.