

2/26/45 (153) 2/26/45
February 26, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Krock
FROM: J. Catledge

Here are some random notes on my conversations with certain people in Washington regarding the recent Three-Power Conference at Yalta. My main contact was former Justice James F. Byrnes, who attended the conference as an assistant to President Roosevelt and who, sensing the importance of the occasion and yielding to a lifetime personal habit, made shorthand notes of everything he witnessed. What he told me was, of course, in the strictest of confidence so far as he is concerned, but he knew I would pass the essential parts of the information along to my associates on The New York Times. The statements of facts, conclusions and impressions which follow are primarily his:

Military plans laid and discussed at Yalta look to the end of the war in Europe no later than July 1, 1945. The conferees reached the unanimous conclusion that the time had come for much closer coordination of the military forces of the "Big Three" powers in Europe, and made certain proposals for combined staff decisions and joint operations which are soon to be put into effect.

The enormous raids by American and British aircraft on targets on the Russo-German front were put on deliberately as an example of what could be done. There was unanimous agreement as to the general lines of military operations, but there was a mite of fear that the success in carrying it out might be delayed somewhat by another possible development, namely, a declaration of war on Russia by Japan.

JAPAN

Stalin left no doubt that Russia will declare war on Japan shortly after VE-Day. He disclosed that the logistics were being planned for Russia entering the war against Japan within 90 days after the collapse of Germany. He expressed a feeling that too much is being said in the United States and Great Britain about this proposal and that Japan might, therefore, be provoked into jumping the gun and declaring war on Russia before the capitulation of Germany, which might necessitate transfer of twenty divisions or more from the Eastern German front to the Asiatic zone. He asked the President and Mr. Churchill if there were not some steps they could take to prevent American and British newspapers and radio commentators speculating on the likelihood of Russian-Japanese war. Information at the conference indicated that the Japanese are becoming aware of Russia's general hostility towards them--an awareness that is being fanned by the Germans who are insisting that the Japs help get Russia off Germany's back. Stalin's intentions about Japan were not

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always stated in definite terms when the question was brought up. He referred first to the logistics of the case and of preparation being made to transfer Russian troops to Asia after VE-Day. He referred next to the diplomatic reports on Germany and Japan. He re-emphasized time and again the possibility of Japan striking first, but at one of the last luncheons, at the end of the conference, the Marshall raised his glass and said: "I propose a toast to the speedy and absolute defeat of our enemies, the Nazis and the Japanese". (He used the term "Nazis" not "Germans".)

POLAND

The question of Poland occupied more attention than any other at the conference. Mr. Roosevelt, knowing that he was to act as chairman of the group, sketched out an agenda. The first day they sat down to the table, each found a copy of the agenda at his place. The first 6 and 7 items were non-controversial subjects, but numbers 8 and 9 (as my informant remembers them) were "Poland" and "German Settlements". Stalin looked up at Roosevelt and said in effect: "Mr. President, why do we waste time? We know that the main subjects are numbers 8 and 9. Why don't we get to them?" And so, the question of Poland was immediately before the conference.

At their meeting at Malta, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill sought to do considerable preliminary work on the Polish question, at least to have something to present to Stalin on certain phases of it. They sketched out a jigsaw line for the Eastern boundary of Poland, one that would zig to put Lwow into Poland and sag to assign to Polish control certain oil fields to the south. As soon as the question was brought up at Yalta, Mr. Churchill presented the Churchill-Roosevelt ideas for the new Polish boundaries. Stalin took a quick glance at it, then looked up at the two with a glint in his eye, as if to suggest that he knew they had been skinning a cow. He pulled from his papers his own map showing the Curzon line with the variations as they were finally determined. Then he gave a short speech, something as follows:

"Gentlemen, don't mistake me and don't mistake the Soviet Union. We don't want a weak Poland. We want the strongest Poland possible, but we want a Poland that will respect the rights and security interests of Russia. Twice during our lifetime Germany has invaded Russia through Poland, and there is one thing I intend to contribute to the welfare of the Soviet Union, if nothing else, and that is to see that Germany does not surprise us again.

"I do not insist that the western boundary of Poland should stop at the Oder" (he then sketched a new western boundary, which he said would cover more than 9,000,000 new people into Poland from Germany). "You will notice that my proposal follows largely the Curzon line. The Curzon line is not a Russian invention. It was proposed after very exhaustive studies of the many factors involved in the Polish situation following the last war. Russia did not propose it. In fact, a Russian by the name of Lenin opposed it at the time. One of the principal authors of that line, I seem to remember, was a Frenchman. I believe his name was Clemenceau. There was also an Englishman. I believe his name was Lord Curzon. Now, gentlemen, I can overcome Mr. Lenin's objections, but surely you would not want me to be less Russian than Lord Curzon or Clemenceau.

After this little speech there wasn't much question as to who was going to have his way in establishing the Polish line. He reminded them that it was not the Polish army nor the British army nor any other than the Russian army that liberated Poland. He observed that Russian soldiers were in charge of the country even today. He was perfectly willing to agree to the proposal for an election as raised by Roosevelt, but added facetiously that under the circumstances of Poland's occupation, he didn't have much doubt as to the election's outcome. Then, seriously, he stated that he believed that in time the Poles would vote in a free election to continue the arrangement which he had in mind.

It looked for a while that Stalin would have his way also about the Lublin Government. He opened the discussion of this phase with a proposal that the Lublin Government be "expanded". Roosevelt and Churchill sparred around for a while, countering with the suggestion that the Lublin and London Polish Governments be merged. Stalin grunted. Then they fished around for the exact word to use. Stalin stated a willingness to have the Lublin committed take in some of the members of the London Government, but wanted the latter to know that they were being incorporated, not that they were doing the incorporating. He demanded that Stanislaw Mikolajczyk not be included in the revised government. Finally, after much pulling and holding, the three agreed on the phraseology as carried in the Polish communique.

GERMAN SETTLEMENT

General plans for handling of Germany after the war, such as military occupation and policing, disposition of industries, assessing and collecting reparation, etc., were laid at Yalta with the major exception that no decision was taken on the Russian plan for transfer of "labor in kind". This is Stalin's plan to send millions of workers from Germany into Russia or any other allied countries that want them, to repair war damage caused by Germany. This subject was a hot one that neither Roosevelt nor Churchill wanted to touch. So they avoided it--going away considerably worried.

Other major proposals dealing with Germany were drawn in major outlines, and many of the details fixed. The original idea was that Germany should be divided into three parts, each to be administered one of the Big Three. There was originally an additional, and somewhat vague, proposal that France should have a part in handling the Rhineland. This proposal, as it was first suggested almost a year ago, provided that the occupational representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR should each report directly to his own government. It seems that was Stalin's idea at the time. He was very much in favor this time, however, of a joint policy committee to sit in Brandenburg Province, whose function would be to set policy for the conduct of the occupation. This essential body would also have the initial job of determining the amount and kinds of reparations which Germany must pay, the disposition of her industries, the relocation of her people, and all such things. The conferees readily concluded that inasmuch as problems of this character would often be country-wide, they had better have a country-wide top policy commission. Members of this commission are to be named very soon. Mr. Roosevelt knows that the U.S. membership on this commission is going to be a terribly thankless job for someone. He is already considering the possibility of naming someone who has a ready-made backlog of popularity in the United States--someone, for instance, like General Eisenhower. The occupation of

Germany was considered by the "Big Three" as a military matter, with Stalin holding that it would remain so for many years.

DUMBARTON OAKS, de GAULLE, ETC.

It seems that Stalin carried the ball most of the time. The prime consideration in most questions seemed to be what Stalin proposed to do. As soon as he had made it plain that he intended to go into war with Japan and that henceforth he favored closer military cooperation among the Big Three in the European theatre, he had everyone eating out of his hand. Throughout the discussion, however, Stalin insisted that the answers to all major problems must lay eventually, if not immediately, with the Big Three. He was not enthusiastic about a broad international peace preserving organization such as outlined at Dumbarton Oaks. He treated Dumbarton Oaks, as well as the forthcoming San Francisco Conference, as largely "window dressing". He said in effect, if not literally, that peace will be restored in the world by the "three of us", and that it would be kept only so long as the "three of us" act together to keep it. He deferred in matters of this kind, however, to Roosevelt. "Mr. President," he would say, "if you want it that way, of course I agree." But he kept coming back to the proposal that the winning of the war and keeping of the peace are, in his mind, the job of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. He referred repeatedly to decisions which would have to be made and said laughingly, "Must we leave these decisions to Albania and Ecuador?" He foresaw that the Big Three must dominate the world for purposes of peace-keeping for many years to come, and he spoke of a security organization such as proposed at Dumbarton Oaks as an "Ideal" which might not have practical effect for twenty-five years. He repeatedly admonished the president and Mr. Churchill to be realistic about things.

It seems clear, furthermore, that in line with this thinking, Stalin was the person mainly responsible for de Gaulle's omission from the conference. He said he didn't see why the decisions of the Big Three should be complicated by anything that France or "Albania" had to say. He remarked, rather brutally that France was powerless, that if it wasn't for the presence of the allied armies in France, the Germans would be back in Paris in a few days. It was in connection with the de Gaulle matter that he said again "Let's be realistic". It seems that the President and Churchill had suggested that de Gaulle might sit in, on at least some of the conferences. It is highly likely that Harry Hopkins so told the de Gaulle people when he was in Paris on his way to Yalta. When the matter was put to Stalin, however, he said he didn't see any need of jeopardizing or complicating the decisions of the conference by inviting de Gaulle. He made it evident that he didn't think much of de Gaulle, nor was he very much impressed with France's various claims for attention. When he made this attitude known, the President didn't fight very hard for de Gaulle. As a matter of fact, the President seemed relieved when Churchill likewise did not insist on the Frenchman being invited.

Stalin was very fulsome and frequent in his praise of America's part in the war. Time and again when proposing a toast, he would make a remark something like this:

"If it were not for you and your great America, Mr. President, none of us would be here today".

This became a little annoying toward the end to Mr. Churchill and the President, sensing this, responded a couple of times with tributes to England, at which Stalin scooted around the table and clicked glasses with the Prime Minister. Joe was the life of the party.

THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

The understanding at the Yalta Big Three meeting was that the forthcoming more general conference in San Francisco would deal wholly with the matter of international organization for the prevention of "future" wars. None of the plans or specifications for ending the present war or settling the issues growing immediately therefrom are to be subject to any official discussion or action at San Francisco. It was the thought that World War II and all of the major questions which its waging and its ending may bring, stand apart and are the primary problem of the Big Three, and such other powers as they may bring into their discussions later--such, perhaps, as France and one or two others. Stalin was adamant on this point, and Roosevelt and Churchill agreed in substance. It is probable, therefore, that when official invitations are issued for the San Francisco meeting, they will be explicit on the subjects, or at least the general area, to be covered there.

My informant expressed some amusement at Senator Vandenberg's dilemma, because the Michigan senator is evidently worried about the Big Three decisions on Poland. These, I was told, will not be subject to any official action one way or the other at San Francisco, because they have been made and their enforcement is to start immediately. The same goes for post-victory settlements in Germany and other matters growing directly out of this war. Senator Vandenberg's proposal for keeping Germany and Japan in check will not, under this understanding, be a proper subject for "official" consideration at the San Francisco sessions.

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5/19/45

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF WAR - 19 May 1945

1. I read to the Secretary the proposed reply to the Acting Secretary of State to the letter sent by the latter under date of May 12, 1945 to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. I read over each paragraph to him carefully and discussed it with him. He agreed with the conclusions reached and said that he thought our reply had been well reasoned and well expressed. Accordingly, I arranged to have the letter sent off.
2. I then discussed with him the question that had come up at San Francisco on the wisdom of having a withdrawal clause inserted in the Charter. I told him of my conversation with Mr. Gates, who had stated that there was a growing feeling that with the freedom of action that was afforded to the Russians in Europe and possibly in Asia under existing Charter arrangements and considering the pattern which Russian policy was disclosing in the Balkans, Austria and in Poland it might be desirable at some point for us to disassociate ourselves from an association that was working out contrary to some of our fundamental beliefs and traditions.

The Secretary thought the matter over for a while and said he was inclined to think that such a clause might not be altogether bad, although at first the thought of talking about withdrawal at the same time we were talking about the creation of a Charter might be considered bad policy and certainly bad psychology. He thought it was possible that such a right might operate as a brake on the development of such a policy. He said, however, he thought that as hosts at the Conference, and in the light of our rather poor record with the old League, that it was rather inappropriate for us to introduce the subject. This was a matter which required further thought and high consideration.

3. I told the Secretary of the growing feeling that we should be reluctant to break up SHAEF and institute the Control Council management of Germany. I spoke of Mr. Churchill's feeling that we should hold together the combined aspect of our armies in Europe at least until certain concessions were obtained from the Russians and I also referred to what I thought was perhaps General Eisenhower's and General Bedell Smith's desire to maintain SHAEF for some time.

We then discussed Mr. Roosevelt's general policy toward the Soviets and Great Britain which enabled him to play a mediation role between the two rather than to look ourselves completely in on a combined basis vis-a-vis the Russians. The Secretary said he thought we might be driven to

Don. Angel about "copy"
mgon, Mr. Gurney

Shuman Pp / reel 28
= box 172

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such a position in the future, but he thought that President Roosevelt's position in that regard was a wise one; that he did not see how we could go back on our very definite agreements for the institution of tripartite control of Germany nor permit the Russians to do so. Moreover, our geographical situation with respect of Russia, as well as our position in the world, made it perfectly possible for us to get along without fighting; that as long as she did not threaten any of our vital interests, as he saw it, we need never fight the Soviets. He felt that the British were more closely involved in Europe; the Russians were more suspicious of them than they were of us and any steps we took now in immediate reversal of our agreement with the Russians would be construed by them as a definite alignment of the Anglo-Americans against the Russians and make it all the more difficult for us to work out an effective relationship with them. Our position and strength justified and made advisable an independent attitude toward Russia in our own right.

He said this was the time to put up with a good bit of ill mannered behavior with the Russians in a sincere attempt to work out such a relationship rather than to form what would be construed as a close military alliance against them. Accordingly, he was disposed to press for the setting up of the Control Council for the common administration of Germany.

cf 5/14
in notes!

* * * *

In the meantime General Hilldring had prepared a paper for the Chief of Staff urging renewed action looking to the setting up of the Control Council and the dissolution of SHAEF. I approved this paper.

I saw General Marshall at lunch and talked the matter over with him, he in the meantime having received General Hilldring's paper. I explained to him some of the very important considerations this paper involved. He very promptly approved of the paper and stated that General Handy and General Hull had also approved it. General Somervell was present in General Marshall's room when we discussed this matter after lunch, and he said that he felt strongly that this was a desirable policy to adopt.

J.J. McC.

[John J. McCloy]

SECRET

Comment on O'Malley to
Sargant 5/22/45 May 30th, 1945!

5/30/45

The truly desperate remedies recommended by Sir O. O'Malley will, I trust, prove unnecessary if we play our cards reasonably well.

In any case how does he think we could apply these remedies without the support of the United States Government - and of that I should say there would be no prospect whatsoever on present form.

I agree
BE

It may prove difficult to get their support even for our more moderate policy of standing up to the Russians when they go too far and of refusing in future to give anything for nothing merely in the hope of creating a good atmosphere while at the same time aiming at close co-operation with the Soviet Government in world affairs.

According to Mr. Davies it does not pay to be tough with the Russians and it does pay to appease them. I trust that Mr. Davies is speaking for himself and not for President Truman and his Government. For his language is far too reminiscent of what I used to hear in 1938 to be altogether pleasant. However there is no smoke without fire and I think we may take it that Mr. Davies' views do represent a certain restatement of what has always fundamentally been America's European policy.

I think so
BE

So long as the war was on the outlines of this policy were blurred, but now she is going to make her position clear. She is not going to be dragged into a quarrel between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and she is not going to allow Great Britain to dictate to her her European policy, and in order to avoid these two dangers she is going to assume the role of an independent mediator and to be tough to both the Soviet Union and Great Britain until both become reasonable and cooperative. (See

FO 321/42842

Lippmann's ...

David FO
WGS19
reel 10 (10)
Nov 1946

Lippmann's article of May 17th (Flag A) and
Stettinius' broadcast of May 28th (Flag B, p.8).

All of which makes it very necessary that
while this American mood lasts we should walk
warily in our dealings with Russia and not
embark lightly on adventures and experiments
such as those advocated by Sir O. O'Malley.

O. Sargent

May 31st, 1945.

*Though I have not read
Sir O. O'Malley's letter
I am in entire agreement
with Sir O. Sargent's comment
on Mr. Weston's summary.*

A. S. J. J. J.

Stettin
Broadly

Finally, I wish to report that we have been in daily communication with President Truman. He has been fully informed of every step in the work of this Conference. As Chief Executive of the United States, he has guided our course. His leadership has been essential to our progress.

Our remaining work here at San Francisco moves ahead steadily. Since the committees have already approved most of the important provisions of the Charter, we shall be principally occupied during the next few days with drafting those provisions into Charter language. The various drafts will then go to the four commissions for approval, and finally, to the plenary session of the whole Conference. Our work will then be concluded. I hope we shall finish during the early part of June.

I have no doubt that the final Charter prepared here will offer great hope of lasting peace. But I cannot speak so surely when I try to answer the question: Will it work? Will it keep the peace? For that depends upon the will to peace with which the nations of the world support the Charter and build strength into the World Organisation. We can do no more at San Francisco than to establish the constitutional basis upon which the world can live without war -- if it will.

Our own foreign policy will play a great part in determining the achievements of these ends. What, then, are the major considerations which must govern our foreign policy?

First, we must carry the second phase of the war to final victory and see to it that Germany and Japan are never able to wage war again.

Second, we must maintain and extend the collaboration and community of purpose now existing among the great nations which have fought this war together. The interests of the United States extend to the whole world. We must maintain those interests in our relations with the other great powers, and we must mediate between them when their interests conflict among themselves. In both cases, our own interests, as well as theirs, require that agreement be achieved and the solidarity of the great nations be preserved.

Third, we must seek constantly to make our full contribution toward the establishment in practice of the supremacy of justice and of fair dealing for all peoples and states, large and small. The power that happens to be in the hands of certain nations must never be used for any purpose which is not in accordance with justice. And the formulation of international law to embody justice must be speeded.

Fourth, those social and economic conditions which create a climate for peace must be advanced. The beginnings we shall make through the Economic and Social Council and its related agencies must be constantly developed.

Finally, we must realise that we live in a world where the sovereignty of no nation, not even the most powerful, is absolute. There is no such thing as complete freedom of decision for any nation. It was not the action of our Congress, but a decision of the Japanese High Command to

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

June 6, 1945

*plus a letter
5 minutes - 11 am
George Ball - minor
verbally*

1. I opened by telling him that I had asked for this conference yesterday morning for a number of important but not immediate subjects but in the afternoon they had been blotted out by the explosion of the matter about which I had spoken to him last night, and I would take that up first and might have to have more time for the others.

I told him of how I came to hear about this clash with the French at the regular State-War-Navy meeting which I was in the habit of holding every week; that Grew had shown me the papers of this incident for the first time including the proposed press release; that I was so much in sympathy with it that when it was first read to me I was tempted to send him, the President, a telegram of "Go to it", but that further reflection and the views of others had brought me to an appreciation of the dangers of going ahead with it before other steps had been taken. He laughed and said that was the same way with himself; that he thought it was fine but was coming to the conclusion that he must go slow.

I then outlined my position to the effect that I was fully in sympathy with the necessity of curbing deGaulle whom I was coming to regard as a psychopathic. He interrupted to say that was his opinion too. I said I had spent most of last night in a good deal of thought on it and I was afraid now that the reaction of making public a press release would be to inflame the American people and solidify the French people behind deGaulle - in fact to do just what was the mistake in the British handling of the Syrian matter when there was accidentally made public in the House of Commons Churchill's message to deGaulle before deGaulle had even received it. I said that I had ascertained that this had inflamed French government men who were on our side in trying to hold back deGaulle. Therefore I very much feared that doing the same thing over again would solidify his position.

I told him that we in the War Department were the "innocent bystanders" who were most likely to be hit because deGaulle and his forces lay right across the line of communications for the deployment of our troops in the Asiatic war. I said that the trouble lay in the publicity of the press release; that he, the President, could send a message directly to deGaulle of a perfectly devastating character without this damage and in the same letter could show all the good we had done to deGaulle and France and the real friendship of the American government to France.

G. M. ... / ... 28 = 800122

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He said he fully agreed. I then, to cut the matter short and seal the whole thing up, asked if he would have any objection if I with the aid of Marshall and McCloy tried to write out a draft of what I thought might be done by him and that would be the quickest way of putting it to him. He at once broke in and said he wished I would do just that thing; that he had great confidence in us and that he himself had reached a position where he saw the dangers and wanted to have it done that way. He reiterated his earlier statement that he had been himself taken off his guard by the proposed press release and had not thought it out until afterwards. Accordingly I let the matter stop there and said I would at once get such a message drafted and send it over to him.

2. I then took up the matters on my agenda, telling him first of the work of the Interim Committee meetings last week. He said that Byrnes had reported to him already about it and that Byrnes seemed to be highly pleased with what had been done. I then said that the points of agreement and views arrived at were substantially as follows:

a. That there should be no revelation to Russia or anyone else of our work in S-1 until the first bomb had been successfully laid on Japan.

b. That the greatest complication was what might happen at the meeting of the Big Three. He told me he had postponed that until the 15th of July on purpose to give us more time. I pointed out that there might still be delay and if there was and the Russians should bring up the subject and ask us to take them in as partners, I thought that our attitude was to do just what the Russians had done to us, namely to make the simple statement that as yet we were not quite ready to do it.

c. I told him that the only suggestion which our Committee had been able to give as to future control of the situation was that each country should promise to make public all work that was being done on this subject and that an international committee of control should be constituted with full power of inspection of all countries to see whether this promise was being carried out. I said I recognized that this was imperfect and might not be assented to by Russia, but that in that case we were far enough ahead of the game to be able to accumulate enough material to serve as insurance against being caught helpless.

d. I said that of course no disclosure of the work should be made to anyone until all such promises of control were made and established. We then also discussed further quid pro quo which should be established in consideration for our taking them into partnership. He said he had been thinking of that and mentioned the same things that I was thinking of, namely the settlement of the Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslavian, and Manchurian problems.

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3. He then asked me if I had heard of the accomplishment which Harry Hopkins had made in Moscow and when I said I had not he told me there was a promise in writing by Stalin that Manchuria should remain fully Chinese except for a 99 year lease of Port Arthur and the settlement of Dairen which we had hold of. I warned him that with the 50-50 control of the railways running across Manchuria, Russia would still be likely to outweigh the Chinese in actual power in that country. He said he realized that but the promise was perfectly clear and distinct.

4. I told him that I was busy considering our conduct of the war against Japan and I told him how I was trying to hold the Air Force down to precision bombing but that with the Japanese method of scattering its manufacture it was rather difficult to prevent area bombing. I told him I was anxious about this feature of the war for two reasons: first, because I did not want to have the United States get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities; and second, I was a little fearful that before we could get ready the Air Force might have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon would not have a fair background to show its strength. He laughed and said he understood.

Owing to the shortness of time I did not get through any further matters on my agenda.

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7/11/45

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11 JULY 1945

TO : THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM: THE ACTING SECRETARY



JTB
SKV
3/11/45
WOL

NR : 86 (State Department No. 12)

This is second in series of information telegrams.

Department has told Murphy Zhukov's statement in Berlin that the Crimea Conference established the Polish frontier along the Oder and Neisse Rivers is wrong. The Crimea Conference agreed that at some later date Poland should get an increase of territory in the west but the U.S. has not accepted any specific line and has not agreed to a date for transfer of German territory to the Poles. Thus U.S. understanding was confirmed without qualification by Vyshinski's letter of May 16 to Harriman in which he stated as self-evident that, as envisaged by the Crimea agreement, the final determination of Poland's western boundary will be made at the peace settlement. Meanwhile the U.S. firmly adheres to the protocol of September 12, 1944 which in describing Zones of Occupation defined the Germany to be occupied as that "within her frontiers as they were on December 31, 1937."

E.A.C. delegates signed the agreement on control machinery in Austria July 10. The Yugoslav AVNOJ due to meet July 15 and be enlarged according to the Yalta formula is reportedly being indefinitely postponed by the Partisans with Tito planning to create a single Yugoslav political Party.

The Pope has directed Polish Cardinal Hlond [7] to return to his Poznan Archdiocese. He will travel by auto, clearance having been

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)
5/14/76
GPO letter, May 3, 1972

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972

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received for Czechoslovakia. The Polish Minister in Praha has been requested to advise Warsaw. The Papacy believes that should he be turned back at the Polish border "the true color of the Government would at least have been shown to the world."

War Department has accepted State's recommendation that U.S. troops remain in Czechoslovakia, future withdrawal to be timed with that of the U.S.S.R. Kirk reports Italian Embassy, Moscow has been told that U.S.S.R. does not favor an Italian declaration of war on Japan now. British sources in Rumania say the U.S.S.R. intends to re-establish diplomatic relations with former Nazi satellite states on July 15. Caffery has been told that the Soviet Embassy was instrumental in persuading French Communists not to oppose de Gaulle's support for the two-chamber legislature. Ambassador Barnes in Bulgaria believes present U.S. "diplomacy of silence and apparent inaction, except for discreet observations now and then made in Moscow," will never get results in the Balkans. Bulgarian Communists are contrasting U.S. impotence with U.S.S.R. virility, citing Soviet threats against Turkey. Barnes earnestly hopes that on the eve of the Big Three meeting U.S. representatives in south and east Europe can be assured that "a strenuous effort will be made there to correct the situation responsible for the misconception of those in this part of the world who see Russia sitting in the seat of world dictatorship." London is hesitant to take a position on U.S.S.R. admission to Tangier talks which would lead to participation in Tangier administration. The French have reiterated their desire to return even temporarily to

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972

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the 1923 statute. Since we do not plan to withdraw our support from U.S.S.R. participation in the talks and the administration, a stalemate exists.

GREW



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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
by State letter, Aug. 10, 1972
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Documentary History of the Truman Presidency

**General Editor
Dennis Merrill**

Volume 2 Planning for the Postwar World: President Truman at the Potsdam Conference, July 17–August 2, 1945

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA
An Imprint of CIS

7/19/45

At twelve o'clock Lord Cherwell called, and he and Bundy and I sat out under the trees and talked over Sl. He was very reasonable on the subject of notification to the Russians, feeling about as doubtful as we. He reported Churchill as being much pleased with our luncheon together last Monday, and much cheered by the talk.

After lunch at two o'clock Field Marshal Alexander and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson came in. The main subject of their call was the appointment of Colonel James H. Douglas to be the American member of the Italian Control Commission. There had been delay and some complications about it and Alexander reported that there had been news reports which had been embarrassing to the present incumbent, Admiral Stone. He thereupon proposed a solution by suggesting that Douglas come out on a visit of inspection preparatory to assuming the duties of the office, and invited him to stay with him. Then he would take office latter in September. This was agreed to and the telegrams were drawn up and sent. I talked over with Alexander his campaigns in Italy and complimented him on their success which seemed to please him. It is the first time I had met him personally, he having been absent when I visited both Africa and Italy. We talked over the episodes of Tito and DeGaulle in their incursions into Italy.

Later in the afternoon at a quarter to five, McCloy, Bundy and I had a long and interesting discussion on our relations with

SPM: [unclear] / [unclear] 128 = Box 172
S. P. [unclear] [unclear] 7/19/45 - 7 -

attached

Russia; what the cause of the constant differences between the countries are, and how to avoid them. As a result, I dictated a memorandum on the subject to serve as a sort of analysis and possible basis for action. It boiled down to the possibility of getting the Russians to see that the real basis of the evil was the absence of freedom of speech in their regime, and the iron-bound rule of the OGPU. I have been very much impressed on this visit with the atmosphere of repression that exists everywhere, and which is felt by all who come in contact with the Russian rule in Germany. While the Russian soldiers and American soldiers seem to like each other individually when they meet, the people who have to deal with the Russian officials feel very differently, and it greatly impairs the cooperation between our two countries.

Churchill is very rampant about it, and most of our people who have seen the Russians most intimately think we have been too easy and that they have taken advantage of it.

It is a very difficult problem because they are crusaders for their own system and suspicious of everybody outside trying to interfere with it. At the same time it is becoming more and more evident to me that a nation whose system rests upon free speech and all the elements of freedom, as does ours, cannot be sure of getting on permanently with a nation where speech is strictly controlled and where the Government uses the iron hand of the secret police. The question is very important just now,

and the development of SI is bringing it to a focus. I am beginning to feel that our committee which met in Washington on this subject, and was so set upon opening communications with the Russians on the subject, may have been thinking in a vacuum.

Today's talk with McCloy and Bundy was a good one and opened up the situation.

→ we wouldn't share because we can't get along as long as they're a police state

Friday, 20 July 1945.

In the morning George Patton arrived with General Floyd L. Parks who is the Commander of the district here. Patton had flown up from his headquarters near Munich to see me. We went out a little before noon accompanied by them, McCloy, Bundy and Kyle and reviewed the Second Armored Division on the autobahn. We drove in a half track car up and down the line, and it was a very impressive sight.

At luncheon we had as guests Patton and Parks, Major Murnane and Captain Hayo who were respective aides to the generals.

Immediately after lunch we hurried off with the same company to the 'Little White House' where we joined the Presidential procession into Berlin. There the President raised the flag at the Headquarters of the American Control Group in the Air Defense buildings. This was the same flag which I saw raised during the ceremonies in Rome. Eisenhower and Bradley were also present, and I had a pleasant chat with each of them after the show was over.

We then returned to the house and Ambassador Harriman soon

*Harriman's personal to S. was -
S. "frustrated me a good deal"*

7/20

TOP SECRET

After luncheon and rest, at three fifty we took an auto drive out into the country to the west of Babelsberg, and saw some open country and also the very battered city of Potsdam. Captain G. T. Gabelia came with us as a guide, and the party consisted of Bundy, Kyle, Kreps, Cabell and myself.

In the evening we had the usual movies. The daily massage which I have been having every afternoon just before dinner has been a great success in keeping me going.

Monday, 23 July 1945.

At ten o'clock Secretary Byrnes called me up, asking me as to the timing of the SI program. I told him the effect of the two cables, and that I would try to get further definite news. I dictated a cable to Harrison asking him to let us know immediately when the time was fixed.

At ten fifteen Ambassador Harriman arrived, and he and McCloy, Bundy, and I had a talk over the situation, Harriman giving us the information of yesterday afternoon's meetings. He commented on the increasing cheerfulness evidently caused by the news from us, and confirmed the expanding demands being made by the Russians. They are throwing aside all their previous restraint as to being only a Continental power and not interested in any further acquisitions, and are now apparently seeking to branch in all directions. Thus they have not only been vigorously seeking to extend their influence in Poland, Austria, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but they are seeking bases in Turkey and now are putting in demands for the Italian colonies in the Mediterranean

TOP SECRET

from Harrison giving the dates of the operations. He said that was just what he wanted, that he was highly delighted and that it gave him his cue for his warning. He said he had just sent his warning to Chiang Kai Shek to see if he would join in it, and as soon as that was cleared by Chiang, he, Truman, would release the warning and that would fit right in time with the program we had received from Harrison.

I then spoke of the importance which I attributed to the reassurance of the Japanese on the continuance of their dynasty, and I had felt that the insertion of that in the formal warning was important and might be just the thing that would make or mar their acceptance, but that I had heard from Byrnes that they preferred not to put it in, and that now such a change was made impossible by the sending of the message to Chiang. I hoped that the President would watch carefully so that the Japanese might be reassured verbally through diplomatic channels if it was found that they were hanging fire on that one point. He said that he had that in mind, and that he would take care of it.

We had a few words more about the SI program, and I again gave him my reasons for eliminating one of the proposed targets. He again reiterated with the utmost emphasis his own concurring belief on that subject, and he was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion that if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act might

7/22/45

make it impossible during the long post war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely, a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria.

TOP SECRET

*When
present 1955 10*

~~TOP SECRET~~

REFLECTIONS ON THE BASIC PROBLEMS WHICH CONFRONT US.

1. With each International Conference that passes and, in fact, with each month that passes between conferences, it becomes clearer that the great basic problem of the future is the stability of the relations of the Western democracies with Russia.

2. With each such time that passes it also becomes clear that that problem arises out of the fundamental differences between a nation of free thought, free speech, free elections, in fact, a really free people with a nation which is not basically free but which is systematically controlled from above by Secret Police and in which free speech is not permitted.

3. It also becomes clear that no permanently safe international relations can be established between two such fundamentally different national systems. With the best of efforts we cannot understand each other. Furthermore, in an autocratically controlled system, policy cannot be permanent. It is tied up with the life of one man. Even if a measure of mental accord is established with one head the resulting agreement is liable to be succeeded by an entirely different policy coming from a different successor.

4. Daily we find our best efforts for coordination and sympathetic understanding with Russia thwarted by

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

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HENRY L. STIMSON PAPERS

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~~TOP SECRET~~

- b. By what means can we proceed?
1. By private diplomatic discussion of the reasons for our distrust.
 2. By encouraging open public discussions.
 3. By setting conditions for any concessions which Russia may ask in respect to -
 - (a) Territorial concessions
 - (b) Loans
 - (c) Bases
 - (d) Any other concessions.

How far these conditions can extend is a serious problem. At the start it may be possible to effect only some amelioration of the local results of Russia's Secret Police State.

7. The foregoing has a vital bearing upon the control of the vast and revolutionary discovery of _____ X _____ which is now confronting us. Upon the successful control of that energy depends the future successful development or destruction of the modern civilized world. The Committee appointed by the War Department which has been considering that control has pointed this out in no uncertain terms and has called for an international organization for that purpose. After careful reflection I am of the belief that no world organization containing as one of its dominant members a nation whose people are not possessed of free speech but whose governmental action is controlled by the autocratic machinery of a secret political police, cannot

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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REEL 128

New York, September 17, 1946

11/17/46

Frankfurter, speaking today on the telephone from New Milford, Madison Square Garden and half-hearted referred to Wallace's speech and Truman's cryptic repudiation of it as a "disaster". Apart from the ~~points~~ substance of what Wallace said, which seems

to Felix to have less than no merit, "since it assumes that Russia and the U. S. can have imperialisms and only Britain cannot, and that you can compartmentalize ~~the~~ the interests of world powers," he said it

"atomized us at home, atomized Byrnes and Paris and leaves us a cipher nationally speaking in the world." ~~Truman's speech is a masterpiece of evasion~~

I told Felix, who scents a political nigger in Truman's woodpile, that yesterday La Guardia had lunch with a group of radio commentators. ^{former Mayor's} John Gunther, who was there, told me about it last night. Much of the talk, apparently, was about how much the Russians want peace and how wrong Byrnes has been. He mentioned incidentally that he had been with Truman the afternoon of the evening when Wallace gave his talk, and that Truman had told him he had just read the text, described what it covered, and said he liked it. La Guardia of course encouraged him in that. The point is, ~~that~~ this completely destroys the thesis of some of the papers that Truman simply was busy and hadn't understood what he glanced through. It confirms the belief I expressed to Carman this morning that he simply said to himself, well, Jimmy has been having a good run with the anti-Soviet thesis, lets give the pro-Soviet boys a chance to even things up politically. She said that if he had that little conscience and that little sense he ought to be impeached. Felix remarked that he was sometimes in favor of the recall of Presidents, and I quoted Carman to him. He said to tell her that sometimes literary people happen on political truths, but added that if I told her so, to add that his best decisions were the ones that never secured the approval of a majority of the Supreme Court. He ~~ended~~ ended on a note of speculation - whether Wallace does not now intend to go ahead on the ^{same} ~~same~~ line,

in the hope of forcing Truman to choose between him and Byrnes, and on the chance

Amirham (100) (MVA)

that Byrnes might conceivably resign in view of Truman's luke-warm support.
and

If not, Wallace were forced out, he would be a notable martyr and would
politically

profit from whatever troubles came to Truman and Byrnes, whether or not

this own policies would

have avoided them. Is there a chance, too, that

Truman may be jealous of Byrnes, think he has gone too far to be

politically an asset, and might not be sorry to see him quit? None

of these hypotheses does much credit to those concerned. Felix ended on

a merry note. He said that after Marion had read this morning's column

by Lippmann, she remarked, "You can always count on Walter's being for

manliness in others."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office _____
~~DIVISION~~ OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

December 31, 1946

NEA - Mr. Henderson

~~TOP SECRET~~

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The suggestion in the attached telegram (No.1293, Dec. 30) from Ankara that the Turks are giving thought to a "regional agreement between USA, UK, USSR and Turkey for defense Straits in time war" is, in my opinion, a thoroughly bad idea. From every point of view it seems to me preferable that the Turks look to the Security Council for such assistance as they may need in the defense of the Straits rather than try to play around with regional defense ideas. The only regional defense system which is now a going concern is the inter-American system. This is composed of the American Republics with no outsiders participating. The Russians could cite the inter-American system as an argument in favor of their thesis that the defense of the Straits is a matter for the Black Sea powers. Alternatively the USSR might, if they wish to have some fun with us, take the position that they would be glad to see the United States admitted to a regional defense arrangement for the Straits if the Soviet Union were admitted to the Chapultepec regime.

Might it not be a good idea for Ambassador Wilson to be instructed to tell Erkin that we take a dim view of his suggestion.

JH
John Hickerson

Copy to EE- Mr. Thompson
ARA-Mr. Briggs

DC/R

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

NND 760050

By *Am*, NARA, Date *7/4/87*

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*This is the dramatic letter says shows a hypocrisy
An to passage in any. Popp.*

[c. March, 1947]

195 3/47

Mr. Krock
Mr. James
Mr. Merz
Mr. Markel:

General Marshall had an off-the-record session with a few reporters yesterday afternoon and Admiral Leahy also talked to a few correspondents on the same basis last night. They made one or two observations that may interest you:

1. Marshall said he was surprised by Stalin's appearance. "He looked pretty bad," the General said, "as if he had somehow shrunk into his clothes." Marshall added that when he greeted the Generalissimo, Stalin said: "You look just the same as when I saw you last time, but I am just an old man." Marshall said he had a frank talk with Stalin but had insisted and still insisted on keeping it quiet. Ambassador Smith had told him, he added, that his usefulness had been impaired in Moscow because a report of Smith's talk with Stalin had leaked out. Marshall said he was not taking any chances, and had taken extraordinary precautions to protect his conversation.

2. The Secretary of State was disturbed by the current Greek-Turkish debate in the House, and said that Rayburn had told him the last week was the worst he had seen on Capitol Hill in his 34 years in the House. Marshall deplored the emotional anti-Russian attitude in the country and kept emphasizing the necessity to talk and write about Europe in terms of economics instead of ideologies. He seemed to be more impressed by the "techniques" of Soviet infiltration into the trade unions than by the threat of communism itself. He was clearly annoyed with Bevin, whom he charged with bad tactics in dealing with the Russians. His complaint was that Bevin let Molotov's provocative statements draw him too much.

3. Marshall kept talking about Western Europe: especially Germany and France. He is worried about the possibility of our losing ground in Germany between now and the November meeting of the Big Four. He fears the communist techniques in the trade union and political movements in the joint zone. This and the signs of disunity at home and particularly in Congress seemed to be very much on his mind. He was asked if he thought his bargaining position could be improved by November; he replied that he was afraid it would decline. He now appears to share Dulles' view that Germany cannot be counted on as a reliable center of our European policy. He did not say so, but he indicated that we might lose control there due to the efforts of the communists in the trade union and political movements. Russia, he said, wasn't the least bit scared of a revived Germany. They seemed confident they could control whatever Germany came out of the reconstruction period. What they really wanted, he said, was to get us out of Europe. In spite of this talk, the General was not inclined to be hopeless or anti-Soviet. He kept urging the reporters to try to understand their psychology, and he insisted that a way must be found to get more reparations for them without allowing them to control Germany.

4. Marshall said he found Rumadier and Bidault terrified of the communists. They were even hesitant to speak above a whisper, he added. He is obviously watching the French situation closely and is eager to make a policy with France as its center if a non-communist coalition can prove its ability to govern.

5. The General said we had three problems with the British over the combined zone in Germany:

Reshm Mamm Krock pp 307/14 L

(193)

- a. LEVEL OF STEEL PRODUCTION. Bevin wanted to set it arbitrarily at 10,000,000 tons. We want to go about it in a more scientific way, though the tendency among our experts seems to indicate that we will approve the 10,000,000 ton ceiling.
- b. MANAGEMENT. The British want to have their managers and inspectors watching the Germans in every factory all the time. We want to exert control of the finished product and give the Germans more leeway in the management of the factories. Marshall thought both these points could be cleared away pretty soon.
- c. SOCIALISM. Marshall said the British wanted to impose their socialistic experiment on the Germans while we took the view that that was for the Germans themselves to decide. Tom Reynolds questioned Marshall about our preference, and the General said our preference was to go along with the private owners. Reynolds asked whether these were not more or less the same men who had collaborated with Hitler. Marshall said he assumed some of them were but that each case would have to be dealt with separately. Anyway, the General said, the Germans could take socialism if they wanted it, provided they did it on a state basis instead of a national basis. He was against anything but limited national centralization, and he wasn't going to impose socialism on the Germans, especially since he added, the British experiment was far from a proved success. This problem was the toughest of the three, he said, but he was confident it would be worked out. If the US and Britain failed in Germany, he concluded, the jig was up.

Marshall was keen, impressive, and relaxed. He has obviously absorbed an immense amount of knowledge in a short time. He seems to assume that he has every right to withhold the Stalin material and even the above discussions with the British over Germany for tactical negotiating reasons, and maybe he has.

1. LEAHY. The Admiral seemed to me to be aging fast. I hadn't seen him for several months, and I thought he was not only less well-informed but obviously far less in Truman's confidence. He contributed only three bits of information: Truman was extremely dubious about the Greek-Turkish program, and Marshall sold him on it. The Yugoslavs, Bulgars, and Albanians, he insisted, were also fighting along the northern Greek border. He put the number of dissident Greeks at 8,000 and said that 5,000 foreigners were also engaged in the fighting. He was pressed hard on this and finally cast it off with the remark that there wasn't any difference between a Yugoslav and a Greek anyway. He said there were 263,000 Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Albanian and Russian troops bordering on Greece, 123,000 of which were Russian. These were not deployed in a menacing fashion, he added.

2. The third thing he said was that after the Battle of the Bulge, when the Germans began for the first time to surrender to the United States in large numbers, Stalin wrote a vicious letter to Roosevelt, charging that he (Roosevelt) had entered into a secret agreement with Hitler under which the Germans would surrender to us. This information came from a very good source, Stalin said.

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Leahy said this made Roosevelt furious and that he denied the charge in an extremely sharp letter which Leahy drafted.

Among other things the Admiral said were: that he didn't think we would have trouble with the Russians for five years and didn't really think we'd have trouble with them then; that we couldn't really beat them in a war; that he thought we had to keep them from expanding but he didn't like the Truman Doctrine; that, nevertheless, he thought it was important to keep Greece and Turkey from going down the drain; that Turkey could hold out against the Russians for three months (the army puts it at two weeks or 50 days at the most); that even if the war and navy budgets were cut as proposed in Congress, they could probably get along all right; that this had always happened in the past and would probably happen again; and that we didn't have any agents in Russia (later he said well, maybe we did, he didn't know)...

J.B.R.

Incidentally, Marshall said that when he returned from Moscow, with the reconstruction of Western Europe very much in mind, he looked up a report written by Mr. Stimson during the big bombardment of Germany. At that time, he said, a proposal was made that the Ruhr should be wiped out. Mr. Stimson blocked this, however, by stating that the reconstruction of Europe was so dependent on the Ruhr that we dare not take the responsibility for such an act. This was very much criticized at the time, Marshall said, but in view of the present problems, it was clearly one of the most remarkable state papers of the war.

S E C R E T

Moscow Conference

*7/7/45
D/Hes memo
(for Moscow Conf)*

The papers from the State Department and CMGUS deal primarily with the technical problems involved in the restoration of German political and economic life. I have not seen any discussion of what is the basic policy of the United States which it should seek to promote through the European peace negotiations. I suggest as premises for such consideration:

1. There is a world-wide struggle primarily ideological between western (Christian) civilization and communism, the former led by the USA and the latter led by the USSR. The division also reflects the classic division between so-called "status quo" (satisfied) powers and so-called "dynamic" (acquisitive) powers.

2. In Europe the Soviet now dominates except for Greece and Italy (where the situation is precarious and held only by troops and large economic subsidies) and western Germany (where the US, UK and France are in occupation) and the Netherlands, Belgium, France and UK.

3. The German settlement raises these basic questions:

a. Can a united Germany be relied upon to form part of the western civilization which will resist Soviet communism?

b. Can such a German result be obtained on terms which will not put France into the communist bloc?

c. If (a) and (b) can be reliably answered in the affirmative, is it practical to proceed on the assumption that the Soviet Union will

S E C R E T

D/Hes (personal) / 1947: CPM file

contribute its German zone to a united Germany?

d. If (c) can be answered in the affirmative, will German bargaining power be compatible with the stability and peace of Europe?

4. I suggest that all of the questions put under (3) must be answered in the negative:

a. The German people, once they begin to recover their vitality, will almost certainly be dominated by a spirit of revenge and ambition to recover a great power status. This will align them, at least provisionally, with the dynamic element of the disrupted war coalition, just as, after the First World War, Germany aligned itself with Italy and Japan.

b. If Germany is to be so well treated as to avoid the above result, such a prospect would almost certainly put France into the Soviet bloc for the dominant French sentiment is fear of Germany. If that happened, Spain and Italy would almost certainly also become communist-dominated, the Mediterranean would be lost, northwest Europe would be effectively flanked, and the US position in South America would be greatly weakened because of the great influence there of the Latin cultures of Europe (France, Spain, Italy).

c. Certainly the Soviet Union will not deliberately promote a united Germany which she believes will form part of the western civilization. She may, of course, make a mistake in judgment but I believe that her judgment, involving as it does a knowledge of her own possibilities of

political penetration in an adjacent and partly occupied area, is as likely to be a correct judgment than a contrary judgment of our own.

d. If a united Germany can be created which will initially be independent of both east and west, it would have an enormous bargaining power which, if used skillfully, can give Germany the mastery of Europe.

5. If the conclusions expressed in (4) are even partially correct, the European settlement should seek primarily to solidify and strengthen western Europe (Britain, France, Belgium and Holland) and keep France from falling into the communist bloc. This can best be done by integrating the Ruhr area economically into western Europe and not now risking it in an economically and politically united Germany.

6. The best practical procedure might be to hold in suspense the final treaty commitments and first develop de facto the desired results.

J.F.D.

7 March 1947

doing everything they can to attain a majority in the Assembly, and it is not at all impossible that they will succeed. They have made a great deal of progress since San Francisco. Then we could count regularly on forty-five votes, but our majority since that time has been whittled away very considerably. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Soviets do not believe in such a thing as a free vote. They are sure, for instance, that this country controls all of the Latin American votes.

Turning to consideration of Germany, Mr. Zukoski asked whether it might not be possible and desirable to reach an agreement dividing Europe at the Elbe. Mr. Dulles replied that, in his opinion, it would be quite impossible to attain this effectively by agreement until we have first attained it in fact. Until our ideas and ideals have shown their holding power, Russia, he said, will continue to push. In response to a question by Mr. Binder, Mr. Dulles stated that Soviet policy with regard to Germany undergoes strange fluctuations. At one moment the Soviets do everything to win the Germans' favor and at the next they take a position which alienates them; for example, their position on the Polish boundary. Ordinarily, said Mr. Dulles, people assume that the Germans, under U.S. administration, are much happier than Germans under Soviet administration, but he had some doubt whether this was the case. We think we are doing a lot for the Germans. They, however, think we are almost deliberately attempting mass starvation.

Dr. Duggan expressed the opinion that the poor Communist showing in elections in the Western zone of Germany indicates small sympathy for the Soviets in that region. Mr. Dulles doubted, however, whether elections are a good barometer of public opinion when the voter feels that his food depends on pleasing the occupying authority.

Mr. Morris asked whether Mr. Dulles did not believe that a separate peace treaty would be a counsel of despair. Mr. Dulles replied that it may, rather,

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28 JUNE 1948

BERLIN SITUATION

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

During the meeting at the White House this morning Mr. Lovett approved the sending of the telegram to General Clay relating to his proposed offer of compromise to the currency, and also approved the sending of two additional squadrons of B29s direct to Germany instead of England as was discussed yesterday at the meeting in my office. Mr. Forrestal agreed with both decisions. The President expressed no opinion about the currency matter but did not dissent therefrom and expressed affirmative approval of sending the B29s to Germany.

Mr. Lovett announced casually that he assumed that the other two groups of B29s would go to England as soon as clearance was obtained from the British and would not be diverted to Germany unless there is a later decision to that effect.

Both the State version and the Army version of the three alternatives relative to the Berlin situation discussed at the meeting in my office yesterday were presented to the President. After a general discussion the President indicated his tentative approval of staying in Berlin at all costs and of determining his actions with this in mind. However, he stated that this was not a final decision and he wished to review the two papers and discuss it further with us, probably tomorrow. Upon inquiry from Mr. Forrestal it was stated by Mr. Lovett that General Marshall would probably be available for a meeting tomorrow.

(s) Kenneth C. Royall
Secretary of the Army

KCR/g

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28 JUNE 1948

MEETING AT WHITE HOUSE -
BERLIN SITUATION

Meeting at the White House, Monday, June 28, 1948, at 12:30, with the President.

Present: Lovett, Royall and myself.

Lovett recited the details of the meeting at the Department of the Army, Sunday afternoon. When the specific question was discussed as to what our future policy in Germany was to be: namely, were we to stay in Berlin or not, the President interrupted to say that there was no discussion on that point, we were going to stay period.

Mr. Royall said that he had had some concern along these lines: that we might not fully have thought through our course of action in the event of continued Russian pressure to the point of where we had to face the bald fact of having to fight our way into Berlin, in terms of providing food and other logistic support. He expressed some apprehension that even if we sent a note to Moscow, clearly demonstrating our right to remain in Berlin on the basis of past promises by the Soviets, we might then be subjected to greater loss of face. In other words to the degree that we had made the case good with our own public and abroad, withdrawal would be to that extent that much more humiliating. The President's rejoinder was that we would have to deal with the situation as it developed; that he did not think there could be a black and white decision now other than that we were in Berlin by terms of an agreement and that the Russians had no right to get us out by either direct or indirect pressure.

---ooo---

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6-30-48

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FD/12/PP/ML

13 SEPTEMBER 1948

CABINET LUNCH

2495

1/19/48

The Secretary of State reported on the weekend developments in the Moscow-Berlin negotiations. They were faced, he said, with constant and continuing difficulties with both the British and the French, neither being willing to go as far in firmness of language as the United States desired. He is not at all sanguine about the outcome of the current discussions on the disposition of the Italian Colonies, appraising the Soviet moves on this question as having a purely political foundation.

He looks forward with great apprehension to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Lovett suggested this morning that Byrnes and Vandenberg accompany him, both for purposes of counsel and also possibly to speak in some of the debates. Dulles, he said, only wanted to talk on the basis of a lawyer's brief, whereas the debates in the Security Council sessions may call for a swift give and take and rough and tumble debate.

Marshall said that Bevin had sent him a personal cable over the weekend outlining the British position and supplementing some of the conversations that he had had with Douglas. Bevin's position is that he wishes, if possible, to avoid a break in the negotiations, which will send the issue to the UN. Cripps participated with him in some of the weekend conversations and agrees with Bevin's position.

Marshall said that one of the difficulties in Britain was the fact that with Parliament out of session and a minimum of public exposition of the issues underlying the Berlin impasse, British opinion had not yet crystallized to the extent that ours had. I made the observation that in addition to this fact, Bevin was undoubtedly conditioned by the war weariness of the British and their extreme reluctance to have to face the grim prospect of another war (Marshall said that Bevin kept constantly referring to the fact that "they were in the front line."). I mentioned the report that General Saville had brought back from Britain in connection with the participation in Operation DAGGER and that he reported the sense of a tremendous reluctance to face any decision which might lead to conflict.

JF:FJT 9-13-48

FD / 10/12 / PP / ML

Copy

9/14/48 (206)

September 11, 1948

The Hon. James Forrestal,
The Pentagon,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Jim,

On several occasions you have discussed with us how to guard security through (1) the exercise of voluntary restraint by the press when it comes into possession of top secret facts and (2) restraints imposed by government on its own personnel with access to such facts. It seems to me that the article by the Alsops in the current issue of The Saturday Evening Post violates both.

It informs the possible and named enemy where and how our airplanes will strike, and with what types of airplanes; where they will be based if we can arrange it; what are the Russian targets in those areas known in detail to our intelligence groups; what are some of the Russian counter-weapons (submarines) known to us and what types they are.

I will now quote from a representation made to me by intelligence officers in the services other than the Air Force which so obviously was the source of this published material:

"We lost lives in getting these facts, and now they can be bought for ten cents by anyone. We were instructed that almost everything published was top secret, not to be disseminated outside our group in any circumstances; and now our superiors have deliberately given it the widest publicity. If this is either sense or security, why is it?"

Frankly, I don't know whether it was wise or unwise to give the instructions which plainly were given -- to release this material for the publication that was made. I think it was most unwise, and a good many people whose opinions are worth more than mine come to agree with me. But if it was wise to make this publication, then I believe the impact on the Russian and American people that apparently was sought would

Kruetz Nupis

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would have been much greater if the material had been given to The New York Times. However, if it had been offered to me, I should have asked you to think again whether you really wanted it published.

I am used to requests from government officials to do constructive pieces for them and then see their real favors go elsewhere. Two of these requests came from The Pentagon within the last ten days and I granted them. This might justify me merely in saying that the material released to the Alsops should have been given to The New York Times as a mark of some appreciation. But that is not my point: in this instance I am discussing only the question of security.

I assume the material could not have been gathered from the source it was if you had not given instructions to furnish it. If that is incorrect, then it seems to me you have a problem of censure discipline before you.

Also, from what I hear, the cause of integration was not well served in this instance.

Yours faithfully,

Arthur Kroe

*Excluded from
Rosen
Gale
Lore
P. H. H.*

INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

AIRGRAM

2378

From: Political Adviser for
Germany, Berlin.

Date of Mailing:

Oct. 5, 1948

Rec'd:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Oct 14, 1948 10:49 a.m.
OFFICE OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER
OCT 14 4 12 PM 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary of State,

Washington.

ON EUR

678
A-722, September 7, 1948.

Ernst Lemmer, second Chairman of the Soviet Zone CDU from December 1945 to December 1947, third chairman of the Soviet Zone FDGB, and a shrewd and pro-Western politician, reported in a private conversation September 6th the following observations as a result of a two-week Western Germany tour:

The dominant political leaders of all parties in Western Germany with the exception of Kurt Schumacher, have inwardly long since written Berlin off in their calculations for the future, and now are acutely embarrassed by Berlin's determined fight to remain in the Western world. They desire that under no circumstances a war be fought over Berlin, and want only to be left to reconstruct in peace on their side of the Iron Curtain. This attitude of the leaders is in striking contrast to the attitude of the people, who see in the struggle for Berlin the outpost battle over their own liberties. However, popular attitudes do not, as in Berlin, influence the policies of the political parties, which are undemocratically organized and led by small cliques of generally narrow-minded men. In this phenomenon one sees the true significance of the twelve Nazi years, since the masses, even the political party members, regard it as natural and just that they are led by men whose views do not accord with their own.

In no other major party is rule from above more apparent than in the British Zone CDU, and this fact was exposed in a disgusting manner during that party's convention at Recklinghausen August 28-29, 1948, which Jakob Kaiser and Ernst Lemmer attended. 72-year-old Konrad Adenauer chaired this convention in an incredibly dictatorial manner. He gave the principal programmatic speech. He recognized discussion speakers who agreed in general with him and refused to recognize those whose opposition might be disturbing. After each discussion speech he gave a didactic commentary twice as long as the discussion speech itself. He chose the convention committees. The delegates, including the left-wing and national-minded opposition, accepted this regime without a murmur, because there are no other strong men in the leadership.

PERMANENT RECORD TOP SECRET, AND TO BE KEPT IN A SEPARATE FILE IN THE DIVISION OF RECORDS, COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Lemmer in Adenauer

same; M. A. W. H. K.

862.00/9-748

FILTH HH

1853 (when 20 yrs. old) tour w/ Hungarian Violinist Edward Reményi.

Brahms met Liszt, Joachim eventually Schumann.
Reményi wanted Brahms to ~~be~~ ^{become} a friend, but NO w/ Liszt

Brahms was exposed to ^{popular} ~~melody~~ (Gypsy)
< Hung. dan > formally strict, for amateurs playing at home
for piano solo, 4 hands → orchestral piece
So, popular

1890 ↓

Book III, IV another set.

Brahms' publisher 'Simrock' also published Pjotr's
Slavic dances. → became famous in Germany
as a non-German composer.

< op. 39 Waltzes >

written for pi. solo & 4 hands

more related to Schubert's approach to waltz

more even approach to meter, even emphasis on each
not exclude technical aspects (unlike Chopin's waltzes)

What happened to this old dance form in 20th c.?

* Ravel < Le Tombeau de Couperin > 1917.

① dedicated to memory of a soldier who died in WWI

② to create, honor of memory of Couperin (François)
: French Clavecin school, heritage of Fr. School
→ patriotic music in Bourgeois

* diff. bet. Debussy & Ravel.

Ⓡ = look more to the past for inspiration
= Neo-Classical (Neo-Bourgeois)

[Clear textures

clear forms (binary) like Baroque composers

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Berlin, A-233,
September 7, 1948.

is now a state official with the mentality of a governor. Gerike from Hamburg has good ideas but is weak.

Adenauer, himself, according to Lemmer, is as much a separatist now as in the years 1918-23 except that the territory he wants to separate and rule now includes all Trizonia. Two years ago he said to Lemmer, "We are now rid of the colonial territories in the East, and I welcome this fact." During an executive committee session at the recent Recklinghausen convention he sarcastically asked Jakob Kaiser to report on the Soviet Zone CDU. When Kaiser launched into a denunciation of the quisling party which has developed since December 1947 and declared that Hickmann (Thuringian Land chairman and formerly one of Kaiser's closest friends) and the other leaders were to be written off, Adenauer smiled and said "I told you that two years ago." Lemmer himself then spoke up in disagreement, saying that in spite of their top leadership, the overwhelming majority of Soviet Zone CDU members, including city assembly deputies, was still carrying on a brave fight against the Sovietization of their country. That the party was still a danger to the Soviets was proved, said Lemmer, by Marshal Sokolovski's postponing the elections scheduled for October 1948. Instead of answering this argument, Adenauer tried to use it to separate Kaiser from Lemmer, saying they were obviously of differing opinions.

According to Lemmer, a hope now exists of breaking Adenauer's "pernicious" domination of the Western German CDU, and that hope lies in the person of Andreas Hermes, Weimar Republic agriculture minister and Kaiser's predecessor as first chairman of the Soviet Zone CDU. Hermes has spent the past two years building up a Western German peasant movement, which is now a powerful thing. He told Lemmer that, following the convention of this organization in October or November, he will return to politics to try to take CDU leadership away from Adenauer. Though 70 years old, he is, according to Lemmer, fully recovered physically (he was ill for almost a year after leaving Berlin) and extremely clever mentally. He has moderate left-wing democratic-national views like those of Lemmer himself. Bavarian Land chairman Josef Mueller is his ally since Adenauer offended Mueller a few months ago. Lemmer suggested that Hermes is definitely a man to be watched.

MURPHY

Copies to Bremen and Munich.

LAWIESNER:jam

- relationship w/ Schubert

- #1 bis. relatively fast, chords, forte

- #2 accents on 2nd, 3rd beats.

- #4 represents hemiola (also in Schubert)

- not imitate Schubert but trying to be inspired
rhythmic outlines of melodies, atmosphere.

- also Baroque form (mood, rhythm of Couperin)

- Tombeau = grand. concert (tomb)

- = honour the person.

- Fr. Clavecin school used to write 'Tombeau'
homage, honour of one who passed away

- drawings on 1st edition.

* Debussy.

< Pour le Piano >

- 1896 - 1901

- Suite

- prelude - figuration

- Sarabande

- toccata - more perpetual, technical display
Ravel's approach.

- Sarabande = emphasis on 2nd beat in 3/4 time.

- = abiding by basic idea of Sarabande

- = creates antique feeling - modal

- (not related to Baroque - parallel harmony
→ older medieval rather)

< Suite Bergamasque >

- 1890 - 1905

- prelude

- minuet

- Clair de Lune - more of character piece

- Passepied

< minuet > ◦ not nearly clear as forms of dance as Ravel
(Unlike Ravel) relationships

T2/15/48 NLT(Nsc)

MR. LOVETT'S REMARKS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BERLIN AIRLIFTAt The 30th Meeting Of The
National Security Council,
Thursday, December 13, 1948.

Mr. Lovett stated emphatically that the airlift, which had started out merely as a difficult embarrassment for us, had now become a vital part of our foreign policy. It had had the effect of welding the western Germans into a unity that we had been unable to get otherwise. He mentioned how one old-time Communist in the Ruhr area had recently been beaten by an 82.6% vote. He stressed the fact that the airlift was just not a mechanism but a symbol of American determination and ingenuity. He agreed with Mr. Draper's remark that it was now the greatest political factor in Europe.

Mr. Lovett said that it would be extremely unfortunate if anything were to happen now to the airlift. He realized that the planes would begin to get beat up shortly and felt that we should get started on replacements so that there would be no hiatus, with too many planes out for repairs. He added that the Department of State was ready to help in any way it could with respect to the tight budgetary situation and could make a case for the airlift that nobody could challenge. As far as the Department of State is concerned, the Berlin situation is war, a showdown. In the shooting war we did not blink at money or sacrifices, and he felt that we should act the same way now.

see memo to
Sec/Def, Dec 22, 48
mms

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Journal

Jan. 17, '49

Jan 14/49

This paper should be helpful in CIA as a means of orientation of intelligence analyses of "security" matters.

For the NSC, I would like to see such a paper go on to meet the daily operating problems of the government and the NSC. Specifically, when does a matter become an issue of national security? (I.e., when should it be sent to the NSC?) And, what are the areas of overlap and of identity in "U.S. security interests" and "World" or "UN" security interests?

We might raise these questions with Reitzel.

Personally I am inclined to doubt the estimate (page 3, ¶ 4) that Western Europe may ever again become "able to deploy the elements of power Reitzel lists, as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are now able to.

Hughy



NLT 88-72

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6/14/49
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NSC 21/3

COPY NO. 43

A REPORT
TO THE
PRESIDENT
BY THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT
THE USSR REIMPOSES THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

June 14, 1949

WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED
Auth: EO 11652
Date: 4/11/99
By: Jeanne M. D'Amico
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSC 24/3

June 14, 1949

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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

on

POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT
THE USSR REIMPOSES THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

- References: A. NSC Actions Nos. 219 and 223
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated June 13, 1949
C. NSC 24/2

The enclosed report, prepared by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Department of State and concurred in by the National Security Council with an amendment and subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State as indicated by NSC Action No. 219, is submitted herewith for consideration by the President.

The Secretary of State has concurred in the enclosed report subject to the addition of the following sentence at the end of paragraph 5 thereof:

"It is considered, however, that the desirability of making such a declaration in connection with the present meeting of the CFM as well as its textual content and manner of presentation should be left to the discretion of the Secretary of State in the light of the situation as it develops at the current meetings of the CFM."

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board, have agreed to this addition.

The Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force took no action with respect to the above proposed addition to paragraph 5 and stated that it was the view of the National Military Establishment that the carrying out of the policy proposed by the National Security Council is a matter to be determined by the President.

The National Security Council recommends that the President, subject to his decision as to the proposed addition to paragraph 5, approve the recommendations in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the enclosed report and direct their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.

DECLASSIFIED
Auth: EQ 11653
Date: 1 Aug 1975
By: Jeanne M. Dwyer
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NSC 24/3

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June 14, 1949

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REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF ACTION
IN THE EVENT THE USSR REIMPOSES THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

1. This report is submitted in accordance with the Council's direction of May 17, 1949 (NSC Action No. 215-b). It has been prepared in conjunction with the Department of State, which concurs in it.

2. Alternative U. S. courses of action have been studied, based upon the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attached as Appendix "A".

3. It is recommended, in the event that the U.S.S.R. reimposes the blockade of Berlin, that:

a. The airlift be continued at full operational capacity.

b. The counter-blockade be reimposed.

c. No attempt be made to establish a land supply route to Berlin by the use of armed motor convoys or otherwise.

d. No attempt to "probe" the blockade to determine Soviet intentions be made. This is considered to be impracticable, to risk a serious loss of prestige and involvement in hostilities.

4. As interim measures, while the Council of Foreign Ministers is in session and thereafter unless a clear written agreement is reached providing definitive arrangements for adequate rail, road and water access to Berlin, it is recommended that:

a. All efforts, including the airlift, be made to increase the reserve stocks of supplies in Berlin.

b. The airlift system be kept in a state of readiness for full operation.

c. All measures requisite for the reinstitution of the counter-blockade be kept in readiness.

5. If a satisfactory agreement for access to Berlin is not reached at the Council of Foreign Ministers, it is recommended that the three western representatives should make it plain to Vyshinski that any reimposition of the blockade would create a dangerous

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situation which would constitute a threat to international peace and security and that we would have to reserve to ourselves full rights to take such measures as might be necessary to maintain in these circumstances our situation in Berlin.

Incl.
Appendix "A".

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APPENDIX A

STUDY ON THE POSSIBLE UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION
IN THE EVENT THE USSR REIMPOSES THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

1. In considering the possible United States courses of action in the event the USSR reimposes the Berlin blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have necessarily taken account of the fact that conditions attending the assumed reimposition of the Berlin blockade cannot be accurately known in advance. Since it is manifest that the seriousness of disagreement at the Council of Foreign Ministers, prior to reimposition of the blockade, can only be conjectured, the conclusions and recommendations contained herein should be subject to later re-examination based on all of the circumstances during and at the conclusion of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and on such indications as there may then be as to the probable motives and intentions of the USSR in reimposing the blockade.

2. If the Council of Foreign Ministers fails to reach agreement, and the Soviets reimpose the Berlin blockade, it follows that their decision to take this step would have very serious implications. It is, therefore, essential from the standpoint of national security to give full consideration to these implications. Thus, we should not assume that the next blockade would be intended only to resume the same nuisance position as has existed for the last ten months. We should realize, rather, that the new blockade may be more severe and that its basis might be a determination to force us out of Berlin by taking any steps necessary to make the airlift abortive or, perhaps, to bring about a major war issue.

3. If the Soviets do have in mind, in resuming the Berlin blockade, the creation of a really critical major issue, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that they would hope to cause the situation to develop in such a manner as to place upon the United States the responsibility for the initiation of any actual hostilities. If this is the case, then our continuation of the airlift would impose that responsibility upon the Soviets. On the other hand, our resorting to steps involving force would risk our falling in with their plans.

4. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that the diplomatic field is not within their purview, the possible implications of the reimposition of the Berlin blockade are so serious and potentially far-reaching that they believe that every practicable effort should be made to forestall such a situation. One approach might be to formalize at the Council of Foreign Ministers our right for access to Berlin. It might be said that this would not be worth

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trying because such formalization will not be needed if the Council of Foreign Ministers reaches satisfactory over-all conclusions while, if not, the effort would naturally fail. It may, nevertheless, be worth undertaking if handled as a point at issue in the early sessions and, in any case, to probe diplomatically the Soviet intentions. It might also be worth-while, if there are indications that the Soviets intend to resume the blockade, to take strong prior diplomatic action, extending even, if attendant circumstances warrant, to a warning that blockade resumption would be considered an unfriendly act.

5. Returning, however, to the basic assumption that the Soviets have reimposed the Berlin blockade, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that the airlift be continued or, if at that time it has been discontinued, that it be resumed and that our own blockade be reimposed. (Present plans call for continuation of the Berlin airlift until stockpiles in Berlin reach the level of 1 March 1948. The present airlift should not be discontinued unless and until there is satisfactory indication that possibility of blockade resumption is remote.) The airlift is neither a sole nor a final action with respect to solution of a new Berlin blockade problem. It is, however, an essential immediate step and, in fact, it is the only practicable step short of great risk of hostilities or decision to leave Berlin.

6. There is now no question as to the practicability of the airlift provided Soviet action does not seriously interfere. The Acting Secretary of the Army's study for the Secretary of Defense, dated 18 May 1949, on the "Support of Berlin Throughout Indefinite Period of Blockade" concludes essentially that the Berlin airlift can be continued indefinitely provided that adequate funds are made available upon request. The study further concludes that the cost will be high and that the "Military Implications Involved in Continuing and Augmenting the Operation of the Airlift" will become more pronounced in proportion to the additional concentration of effort towards maintenance of our position in Berlin. Airlift, however, is the best solution of the problem as long as airlift remains practicable.

7. An alternative solution, not recommended, might be to attempt to establish a land supply route by the use of armed motor convoys. This was thoroughly considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shortly after the Berlin blockade was first imposed and the conclusion then reached is still considered sound, that such an attempt would be fraught with the gravest military implications, including the risk of war, and would probably prove ineffective even if faced only with passive interference.

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Staff do not now recommend such a step. The National Security Council on 22 July 1948, reiterated the determination of the United States to remain in Berlin in any event.* Developments since that date have fully justified this determination. If, however, it becomes evident that the supply of Berlin can only be continued by the use of force, serious consideration should then be given as to whether to risk war by resort to force or whether to evacuate U. S. forces from Berlin. At such time the effects of evacuating Berlin should be carefully reconsidered in the light of the adverse military situation. The improvement which a withdrawal from Berlin would make in our immediate military position is obvious, but there is no assurance that the effects of such a move in reducing the threat of war would be lasting.

12. The overriding point that becomes manifest from consideration of the foregoing study as a whole is that blockade reimposition would raise anew, and perhaps more forcibly, all the military questions with respect to war imminence and war readiness that arose with the first blockade. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that in the event the Soviets reimpose the blockade of Berlin the airlift should be reinstituted or continued. Further serious consideration should be given at that time to the application of additional economic sanctions, over and above the counter-blockade, and the taking of the strongest diplomatic action.

* NSC Action No. 84

NSC 24/3

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by CIA has
CIA has no objection to declass
it contains information of CIA
interest that must remain
classified at TS S
Authority: HR 10-2
It contains nothing of CIA interest
Date 29 Jan 82 Reviewer 049244

REF TO:
STATE
NSC

CB
DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED
NL 88-23 Date 13 Feb 81
3/20/89

UNCLASSIFIED
file

12 September 1947

REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES
TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES



1. Among foreign powers, only the U.S.S.R. is capable of threatening the security of the United States. Even the U.S.S.R., lacking the requisite naval and air forces, is incapable of direct attack upon the United States or of major military operations anywhere outside of the continents of Europe and Asia. The preponderance of readily available Soviet ground strength is such, however, that the U.S.S.R., at will, could speedily overrun continental Europe, the Near East, northern China, and Korea. If the U.S.S.R. were to exercise this capability, the ultimate danger to the United States would be even greater than that threatened by Germany and Japan, to avert which the United States willfully incurred the risk of war.

2. Soviet predominance in Eurasia is, for the present, less a matter of absolute strength than of relative immediately available strength. Only five years ago the Soviet Union was virtually "on the ropes"; it emerged from the war weakened rather than strengthened, in absolute terms. During the same period, however, the power of Germany and Japan was obliterated, that of France and of Italy was reduced to insignificance, and that of Great Britain was severely impaired. China also, no great power in 1937, is even more weak and disorganized in 1947. Thus the balance of power which restrained the U.S.S.R. from 1921 to 1941 has ceased to exist. The only effective counterpoise to the power of the Soviet Union, that of the United States, is both latent and remote. Consequently the U.S.S.R., despite its present weaknesses, enjoys an overwhelming preponderance of power at every point within logistical reach of its land forces.

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3. Despite this advantage, the U.S.S.R. does not resort to open military aggression precisely because it fears that in doing so it would become engaged in a war with the United States ultimately disastrous to itself, whatever its initial successes. For the time being Soviet strength is simply not comparable to the strength which the United States could mobilize. The U.S.S.R. requires time for recovery and for further development of its vast potential strength before risking such a war.

4. The policy of the U.S.S.R., in these circumstances, is:

a. To avoid provoking a war with the United States, relying upon the disinclination of the United States to resort to war on its own initiative.

b. To build up its own strength, in absolute terms, by:

(1) Intensive reconstruction and industrial expansion, with particular reference to war industry.

(2) Intensive research and development (e.g., an atomic bomb, guided missiles).

(3) Development of naval and strategic air forces.

c. To preserve and augment, meanwhile, its relative predominance in Eurasia by:

(1) Maintaining its overwhelmingly preponderant ground strength.

(2) Consolidating its control of satellite and occupied areas.

(3) Preventing stabilization and recovery in other areas.

(4) Exploiting weakness and instability to extend its own influence and control by political and economic means (e.g., the Communist parties, Communist-controlled labor unions, timely shipments of grain, etc.)

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d. To enhance its relative strength by undermining the strength and influence of the United States.

5. The economic dislocation, social unrest, political instability, and military weakness general in Europe and Asia are thus dangerous to the security of the United States in the opportunities they afford for the further extension of Soviet power and influence. On the other hand, stabilization and recovery in those countries would tend to redress the balance of power, curbing Soviet aggressiveness and stabilizing the international situation.

6. From the point of view of redressing the balance of power the major regions of Europe and Asia, outside of the Soviet sphere, are not of equal importance. Western Europe merits first consideration in terms of both urgency and potential value. The most highly developed of these regions, it is at once the most vulnerable to disorganization and the most favorable for the early development of potential power. It is also most accessible from the center of Soviet power, and ~~most accessible~~ ^{conversely}, best located for the eventual exertion of restraining pressure upon the Soviet Union. In Western Europe a severe and possibly decisive economic and political crisis now impends. Within the general area the most critical situations exist in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany.

7. The United Kingdom, supported by the British Commonwealth and Empire, was formerly a major stabilizing influence in world economy and the balance of power. In consequence of losses suffered in two World Wars the United Kingdom is no longer able to perform this function. In view of its critical economic situation, it must reduce drastically its overseas commitments and concentrate its effort upon achieving domestic recovery, with a consequent reduction of its power and influence abroad. While measures conducive to British recovery contribute to eventual stabilization of the

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World situation, British overseas commitments are so extensive and important that there is danger that their precipitate liquidation will create a power vacuum prejudicial to security interests of the United States.

8. Defeat by Germany eliminated France as a major factor in the balance of power. The French economic situation is even more desperate than that of the United Kingdom and the French are less able to cope with it, in large measure because of the instability of the internal political situation. The ineffectiveness of coalition government increasingly encourages resort to arbitrary solutions and so is conducive to political extremes. The Communist Party is already strong in France; a swift economic collapse might well lead to its accession to power. A more gradual decline would probably favor a trend toward an authoritarian solution under the leadership of DeGaulle. Unless the event were more decisive than it is likely to be, it could well result in civil war between the Left and Right.

9. The Italian economic situation also is desperate and the political situation unstable, for reasons similar to those obtaining in France, with an even greater possibility of Communist accession to power in the event of economic and political collapse.

10. In Germany acute economic distress is aggravated by continued partition and consequent uncertainty regarding the future of the nation. The resultant despair is conducive to unrest and favorable to Soviet penetration and influence.

11. As a region, the Near and Middle East is of second priority in point of both urgency and importance (but within this general area the situation in Greece is of great importance and the utmost urgency). The region's human and material resources are inadequate for the development of a significant power potential, but the petroleum of the Persian Gulf area is

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of vital importance. In terms of strategic location, the region has value both as a barrier to Soviet expansion and as a potential base from which power, developed elsewhere, could be brought to bear on the sources of Soviet strength, outflanking the Soviet position in Central Europe.

12. In Greece the U.S.S.R. is in actual process of taking over a major portion of the country by force of arms, acting indirectly through Communist led guerrillas supported by the Balkan satellite states. The Greek Government is apparently unable to cope with this threat. At any time armed intervention may prove necessary to prevent its collapse and to restore the front.

13. The Soviet effort to penetrate Iran is still being conducted by political and economic means. Iranian refusal of an oil concession to the U.S.S.R. (until recently probable) would provoke a strong Soviet reaction, including a renewal of subversive activity, though probably not an overt Soviet intervention. If, discouraged by the contradictory attitudes of the United States and the United Kingdom, Iran should grant the concession, Soviet penetration would be facilitated.

14. In contrast to Greece and Iran, Turkey is not susceptible to Soviet penetration. Turkey may be expected to remain firm in any circumstances, but could not be expected to withstand for long a full scale Soviet attack.

15. The Far East is of only third priority in this reckoning, even though the situation is critical in both China and Korea. The human and material resources of China, in particular, are vast, but undeveloped and remote from the power centers of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. It is impossible that either the United States or the U.S.S.R., given the opportunity, could develop them as a significant factor in the balance of power within any period of present concern. It is unlikely that the U.S.S.R. will invest any more effort in this quarter than is necessary to neutralize

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the influence of the United States, and unprofitable for the United States to attempt more than to check the Soviet Union. In any event, the Pacific, under secure United States control, remains as a further safeguard.

16. There is no prospect of an early solution of the political and economic problems of China. Neither the National Government nor the Chinese Communist Party is capable of obtaining a military decision, nor is it possible to pacify the country by political means. The economic situation, normally bad, is rendered increasingly acute by astronomical inflation; no solution is in sight. The best prospect is for a prolonged stalemate; the worst, for further disintegration.

17. The stalemate in Korea can be broken only by yielding to terms *to the U.S.S.R.* which would in effect surrender that country as a satellite. United States efforts to make the best of the status quo must be conducted in the face of persistent Soviet subversive activity and propaganda pressure.

18. In contrast, the political situation in Japan is well in hand, although the economic situation is difficult.

19. A fourth general area of concern is the belt of colonial (or former colonial) territories extending across southern Asia and northern Africa. From Indonesia to Morocco this area is disturbed by resurgent native nationalism and communal strife, affecting adversely the economic and political interests of the several European powers (the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands) hitherto accustomed to depend on its resources. Armed conflict exists between natives and Europeans in Indonesia and Indochina, and between native communities in India and Pakistan. Between Britain and Egypt the matter is one of international dispute. Unrest is widespread in French North Africa. None of these situations bears promise of early stabilisation. There is a consistent tendency to bring them before the United Nations, where their effect is to divide the non-Soviet powers.

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In these situations the humanitarian principles of the United States are in apparent conflict with its interest in the rehabilitation of Europe on a cooperative basis. The area is remote from the U.S.S.R. and not subject to direct Soviet aggression, but the U.S.S.R. is capable of exploiting these situations to create dissension to undermine the strength of European states, and to discredit them and the United States.

20. The case of Palestine is similar, but fraught with peculiar difficulties. Zionist leadership, taking advantage of widespread humanitarian sympathy with the surviving Jews of Europe, is pursuing its objective without regard for other consequences. The Arab reaction is bitter and potentially violent. Arab solidarity and goodwill, strategically important in support of stability in the Near and Middle East, is thereby jeopardized. Partition as proposed to the United Nations, satisfies minimum Jewish demands, but will be bitterly resisted by the Arabs.

21. In Latin America Soviet objectives are limited and negative: to undermine the influence of the United States and to be able to deny to the United States material support from Latin America in the event of future conflict. The U.S.S.R. has achieved some success in the development of native Communist parties and of Communist leadership of key labor unions. With the conclusion of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, however, United States interests in Latin America appear to be reasonably secure.

22. Recapitulation.

a. Among foreign powers, only the U.S.S.R. is capable of threatening the security of the United States.

b. The U.S.S.R. is presently incapable of military aggression outside of the continents of Europe and Asia, but is capable of over-running continental Europe, the Near East, northern China and Korea.

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c. The U.S.S.R. does not exercise this capability for fear of becoming engaged in a war with the United States ultimately disastrous to itself.

d. The policy of the U.S.S.R., for the time being, is to avoid war, to build up its own war potential, to maintain and augment its present preponderance of strength in Eurasia, and to undermine the strength and influence of the United States.

e. The weakness and instability general in Europe and Asia are dangerous to the security of the United States as opportunities for the further extension of Soviet power and influence.

f. Stabilization and recovery in Europe and Asia would tend to redress the balance of power and restrain the U.S.S.R.

g. From this point of view the order of priority, in terms of urgency and importance, is

- a. Western Europe.
- b. The Near and Middle East.
- c. The Far East.
- d. The colonial (and former colonial) areas of southern Asia and northern Africa.



6/16/50
6404
6/16/50
June 16, 1950

Memorandum for: Secretary of State

From: The President

I just received copy of a Top Secret telegram from Commissioner McCloy on the rearming of Germany. This is a most difficult subject about which to talk.

It seems to me that the British are doing everything possible to break up western European unity and, of course, one of their approaches would be to advocate the rearmament of Germany. France would immediately get a severe case of jitters if the subject is ever seriously considered.

We certainly don't want to make the same mistake that was made after World War I when Germany was authorized to train one hundred thousand soldiers, principally for maintaining order locally in Germany. As you know, that hundred thousand was used for the basis of training the greatest war machine that ever came forth in European history. While it wasn't successful in its objective, it certainly caused the unnecessary death of millions and millions of young men of all the other European countries and the United States.

This is a subject on which I think you should call McCloy home and you, the Secretary of Defense, McCloy and I ought to sit down and discuss the proper approach to a police force for Germany that will maintain order locally and yet not be allowed to develop into a training ground for a military machine that can combine with Russia and ruin the rest of the world.

efforts and other things which are being done to the United States and the world after the war. If I am not mistaken, the United States and the world will have a very good chance of maintaining order locally in Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and also in the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere, but not in the rest of the world. The creation of a world police force, although there is a strong tendency to think that the United States and the world would be benefited by it, is a very dangerous thing to do.

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6/16/50

(PSC Memo 9-18-85)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State NLT (PFC-SUBJ) 272

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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Action
GER

Control: 5634

Rec'd: June 13, 1950
7:25 p.m.

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FROM: Frankfurt

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 5052, June 13, 8 p.m.

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NLT 85-50 (USE Memo 8-13-82)

SENT DEPARTMENT 5052; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 319.

Former German General Gerhard Graf von Schwerin, according to his own admission, has recently returned from England on a trip ostensibly sponsored by Unilever Corporation, but which was apparently arranged in order that he might discuss remilitarization of Germany with certain British officials.

While in England, Schwerin said he discussed remilitarization with certain British officials and MPs, including General Kenneth Strong, Lord Packenham, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, David Astor, and others. British officials who discussed remilitarization with him are alleged to have said that, although the official attitude was still negative, majority opinion in England now favors remilitarization. He was warned, however, that British approach to French in this connection had been unsuccessful. It was suggested that he approach members of De Gaulle's entourage, however, and in that way endeavor to influence French opinion. Schwerin says he now plans to visit Paris in July. He further claims he was told the US would present no great problem and could "be brought into line quickly", although American press would probably create considerable stir for the present.

Upon returning to Germany, Schwerin reported on his trip to Adenauer who subsequently told him that on the recommendation of Robertson and British Political Adviser Schwerin should be his nonofficial military adviser. Adenauer has subsequently admitted to me that he is using Schwerin as a nonofficial adviser on matters relating to formation of a police force and internal security problems.

From the foregoing and from other information reaching me, it is becoming increasingly evident that the UK is utilizing pressure for creation of a German police force as a first step toward the remilitarization of Germany. It is likely that Adenauer is fully aware of this and may have concurred. The French and ourselves have, however, regarded the

Chancellor's request

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MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED

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-2- #5052, June 13, 8 p.m., from Frankfort

Chancellor's request as purely in relation to a possible federal police and do not intend to regard it in any sense as establishing the nucleus of a future German army. It is my impression that US Government is not yet prepared to agree to German remilitarization which, in my opinion, would be premature until a stronger democratic Germany has emerged and until the militarization of West Europe has made far greater progress. Furthermore, the rearmament of Germany would undoubtedly speed up any Soviet schedule for any possible future action in Germany and would, no doubt, be regarded by them as sufficiently provocative to warrant extreme countermeasures.

Would appreciate Department's ideas on police question in light of foregoing.

MCCLOY

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Department of State

NLT (AF-5085) 271

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Action
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Control: 5273
Rec'd: June 13, 1950
7:43 a.m.

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Info
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FROM: The Hague

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 699, June 12, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT REPEATED INFO BRUSSELS 35.

In course of call on Amir, Israeli Minister, who is Rumanian by birth although apparently sympathetic to west, he stated he had significant conversation recently with a Communist "friend" re conditions in Transylvania and specifically position of Hungarian minority there. It obvious to me that the "friend" was Hungarian Minister here. Amir stated his friend, after pointing out Hungarian minority now enjoyed complete freedom of language and culture and that all traditional differences between Hungarians and Rumanians had now been eliminated under benign Communist rule, said one should not be surprised this eradication of racial differences and distrust in southeast Europe were soon perpetuated in a political union between Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. It was difficult for me, since this only second time I have seen Amir, to draw him out much further, although we discussed as background the famous Dimitrov declaration and the rumors which abounded late 1947 with regard to a Danubian federation. Amir did, however, say in response to my direct question that he had distinct impression from his "friend" that first move would be creation of a southeastern European union somewhat as a counterpoise to Atlantic Pact and that although these states might eventually be incorporated in the Soviet Union, such action would be deferred.

It is possible that someone in Brussels Embassy, where Amir has his headquarters and spends most of his time, might attempt without referring to our conversation to develop further leads from him and to ascertain whether he was raising the subject as an intentional warning.

CHAPIN

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August 10, 1950.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
WITH THE PRESIDENT

Item No. 2

Mr. Spofford's Return and Report

The President will be very glad indeed to see Mr. Spofford before he goes back.

I discussed with the President briefly, for the purpose of getting his general point of view rather than a decision, the principal points which we had discussed with Mr. Spofford this morning; that is, (1) the need for a unified NAT staff and, eventually, a unified command; (2) the necessity for a unified production board; (3) the necessity for decisions to station more American and British troops in Europe.

The President was favorably inclined to all of these ideas. I told him that the matter would be taken up with the Defense Establishment and would reach him in an orderly way, even though it might result in some strong differences of opinion.

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STATE DEPT. MEMO 8-1-54Project NLT 82-4

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By NLT-ALC NARS, Date 8-11-84~~TOP SECRET~~

Papers of:
Dean Acheson

8/27/50



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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M.A.

Memorandum of Conversation

Conf

DATE:

August 23, 1950

SUBJECT:

French Memoranda on Defense Program, Korea, Formosa,
Indochina, German defense potential.

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PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Bonnet
The Secretary

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STATE DEPT. MEMO 8-1-54

Project NLT 8-2-54

By NLT-KE NARS, Date 8-11-54

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-61120-1

Ambassador Bonnet called today at his request. He said that he wanted to tell me the views of Messrs. Plevin, Schuman and Moch regarding the two French memoranda on rearmament. He referred to recent articles appearing in the American press which tended to disparage the French Defense effort as well as that of other European countries and to the fact that these articles had caused some concern in Paris. The first point that he wanted to stress was the seriousness with which the French Government regarded the necessity for increased and mutual effort and their willingness to make the necessary sacrifices. Secondly, he wanted to stress the need for making the NATO a more efficient and workable organism. Certain modifications would help, such as giving the organization a better staff and perhaps creating certain organizations similar to those used during the last war, such as the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Boards (sic) under the direction of a strong executive organ.

I replied that I could only give him my personal estimate of the French proposals at this time but that my first reaction to all of the proposed additional defense programs was that they tended to fall short of the effort necessary successfully to defend Europe and I felt that a greater effort must be made by all than was apparent in the programs if we were to attain our objectives.

With regard to the proposals to strengthen NATO through reorganization, I said that the matter was a complex one and was under active study. It would also require decision at the highest government levels. The French objective to create a more efficient machinery was one to which we naturally subscribed. The French proposals might help to provide a solution and we will examine them sympathetically.

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I said that the maximum effort on the part of all was necessary and that it was very important to get started at once on programs of priority production without waiting for organizational or procedural changes. Also, while the results so far obtained in economic recovery of Europe must not be jeopardized, some sacrifices will have to be made at the expense of continuing and rising rate of recovery.

I pointed out that I expected shortly to appear before Congress to testify in support of the program to make available \$4 billion for the defense of Europe and that I might be requested by Congress to make certain requirements of the NATO countries a prerequisite for furnishing additional aid to them. I hoped to avoid having to make such requests and any evidence of progress on the part of the NATO countries in implementing their high priority production programs would be very helpful.

The Ambassador requested our views on the possibility of stationing additional British and American military forces in Europe. I replied that this was a question involving military considerations which were being studied by Defense and that our military were not unsympathetic to it.

Mr. Bonnet said that his Government had been somewhat concerned over the visit of General MacArthur to Formosa and that with the Western world as heavily committed in the East as it was he hoped that nothing would be done which might incite Chinese Communists to take any action. I told him that General MacArthur's visit to Formosa was purely a matter of military reconnaissance and nothing else. Mr. Bonnet then touched on Indochina and repeated the French Government's fears that either a Chinese invasion of Tonkin or an assault by Chinese-aided and strengthened Viet Minh might take place when the rainy season was over. He said that he had taken up with Mr. Rusk the matter of possible tactical air assistance on our part in case of a Chinese invasion. I told him that while, of course, one could not overlook the possibility of a Chinese invasion intelligence coming from that area tended to discount such a possibility. I said that in view of our involvement in Korea it was difficult at this time to give him an answer on the question of tactical air support but that of course we were studying the question.

I also took occasion to tell him of our great satisfaction at France's sending ground troops to Korea.

Mr. Bonnet then brought up the subject of utilizing German resources to help strengthen Western Europe. Mr. Schuman hoped that nothing would be done along these lines which would interfere with the successful conclusion of the Franco-German negotiations. I told him that this was a subject which we intended to take up with Mr. Schuman at the forthcoming meeting. Mr. Bonnet said that it would, of course, be much easier to integrate the West German potential into Western Europe once the latter's forces had been strengthened. I agreed that this would be helpful and that we would go into this thoroughly with Mr. Schuman.

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September 5, 1950



Meeting with the President

Item 5. Reply to President's Letter of
August 26 on Defense of Europe

I told the President that our reply had been finished, was now before the Chiefs of Staff, and that we were ready to lay it before him whenever he wished it. We did not know when the Chiefs of Staff would be able to give us their views although we had discussed the matter informally with them and I believed we were in accord.

The President said that following my appointment he had an appointment with Secretary Johnson who might probably request an extension of time. The President will let me know his views later.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

18 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: United States Policy With Respect to Berlin and Eastern Germany.

The Department of State in a separate but related action* is forwarding to the National Security Council for its information the text of the "Agreement on Berlin Security" which was reached by the Three Foreign Ministers in their September meeting, as well as a copy of "A Review of the Berlin Situation", a study prepared in Germany by the U. S. High Commissioner; the Commander in Chief, Europe; and the U. S. Commander, Berlin.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in early September commented upon the text of the "Agreement on Berlin Security" prior to its finalization. They have also commented upon the study "A Review of the Berlin Situation". Their comments with respect to these two documents are of interest to the National Security Council and pertinent extracts thereof are set forth in the following paragraphs.

Concerning the "Agreement on Berlin Security" an early version of this Agreement contained the following paragraph:

"7. Initiate a joint military study of possible ground action to break through blockade by ground transport and of a limited airlift with fighter escort."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented as follows with respect to this paragraph:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the subject matter of paragraph 7 of the draft agreement is, in the first instance, a military matter. Furthermore, the Western Powers do not now have, nor will they have in the foreseeable future, sufficient military forces to break through a blockade of Berlin. Accordingly, they feel that the subject matter of paragraph 7 should be deleted from the draft agreement on Berlin security since a joint military study of this nature would serve no useful purpose at this time. If and whenever the military strength of the Western

* See Page 1.

Also in Summary, reel 4, Ar. 920

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Powers is sufficient for such an operation, military authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will undoubtedly consider plans for such an operation."

With respect to the study "A Review of the Berlin Situation" pertinent extracts of the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning this study are as follows:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the enclosed Study, dated 29 August 1950 entitled "A Review of the Berlin Situation". They consider the Study prepared jointly by the United States High Commissioner for Germany; the United States Commander, Berlin; and the Commander in Chief, Europe, to be an excellent short-range politico-military analysis of the Berlin situation. Further, the Study discloses a high degree of coordination in the planning field, particularly with respect to the measures recommended to be taken during the next six to twelve months in order that the Western Allies may maintain their position in Berlin despite renewed Soviet efforts, including the use of military force under the control of the East German Government, to drive them out.

* * * * *

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection to that part of the recommendation of the Study which provides for the reinforcing and re-equipping of the West German police and for the development of a possible reserve capable of military action, and the recommendation that the United States military garrison in Berlin be reinforced with parallel action by the United Kingdom and France being requested.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that a number of other recommendations in the subject paper are at variance with the present United States policy toward Berlin and Germany. Accordingly, they suggest that the National Security Council be requested to review the United States policy toward Berlin and Germany in the light of the enclosed Study and the recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon. The Secretary of State should also be immediately apprised of your action."

It is recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the National Security Council Staff for its use in connection with the study now being made with respect to Berlin under the provisions of paragraph 42 of NSC 73/4.

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NSC 684-962	NNFJ84-105
By <u>1349</u>	NARS, Date <u>9/25/85</u>

/s/ G. Marshall

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A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by
THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
on
UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN AND EASTERN GERMANY

October 20, 1950

DECLASSIFIED in part	
NSC 89-962	MMF-964-145
By 1A19	NARS, Date 9/25/85

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NSC 89

October 20, 1950

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN AND EASTERN GERMANY

- References: A. NSC Action No. 368
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Additional Airlift to Support the Far East," dated September 27, 1950
C. NSC 24 Series
D. NSC 73/4, paragraph 42 *FMUS, 1950, I, 384*

The enclosed memoranda on the subject by the Deputy Under Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, respectively, are circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury and referred to the NSC Staff for use in connection with the current staff project pursuant to paragraph 42 of NSC 73/4.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

NSC 89

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<u>b.</u> JCS Comments on <u>b</u> above.....	31

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

October 19, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES S. LAY, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

In connection with the study which the National Security Council Staff is making concerning the policy of this government in the event of a reestablishment of the Berlin blockade,* I am forwarding herewith for the information of the Council the agreement concerning Berlin Security reached by the three Foreign Ministers in New York on September 18, 1950.

I am also enclosing a copy of a paper entitled "A Review of the Berlin Situation," jointly submitted on August 29, 1950 by the United States High Commissioner, Mr. McCloy, by the United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe, General Thomas T. Handy, and by the United States Commanding Officer in Berlin, Major General Maxwell D. Taylor. Most of the points concerning Berlin and Germany which are raised in this joint paper have already been covered by the New York agreement of the Foreign Ministers. There remain, however, two points which the National Security Council Staff may wish to consider in connection with its study. These are:

- (a) The reaction of this government in the event the East Germans rather than the Soviet authorities establish a blockade; more particularly whether there should be ground action in such an event.

(b) [REDACTED]

/s/ H. Freeman Matthews

Enclosures:

1. Agreement on Berlin Security (Cpy)
2. Joint HICOG, EUCOM, USCIB Paper
(attached to original only)

* NSC Status of Projects as of October 16, 1950, page 13.

NSC 89

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Document No. 37 (Final)
September 19, 1950

AGREEMENT ON BERLIN SECURITY

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and France agree that their Governments shall take the following steps to maintain their position in Berlin:

1. Build up Berlin fuel and non-perishable food stocks to one-year's supply with rationing.
2. Reaffirm that counter-blockade measures against Soviet interference with Berlin transport will be taken in degrees commensurate with the Soviet or DDR interference. Direct the High Commission to prepare plans for such action at once.
3. Request the NAT countries to cooperate in such counter-blockade action and, while it is going on, to restrict their trade with the rest of the Soviet orbit to a level at most no higher than in the period preceding the action.
4. Strengthen Allied forces in Berlin by the assignment prior to 1 January 1951 to that garrison of additional French, British and United States units and authorize the formation of German auxiliary forces there.
5. Make clear that the Soviet Union is responsible for any attack upon Berlin or Western Germany by the East German forces inasmuch as they are in occupation of the Eastern zone. In the event of an armed attack from whatever source, defend Berlin by force, bring the relevant provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty into effect, and present the issue to the United Nations.

C O P Y

August 29, 1950

A REVIEW OF THE BERLIN SITUATION

(Joint HICOG--EUCOM--USCOB Paper)

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

1. To review the ability of the Western Allies to maintain their position in Berlin during the next six to twelve months despite renewed Soviet efforts to drive them out by utilizing military forces under the control of East German governmental agencies.

II. ASSUMPTIONS:

1. That it is a major Soviet objective to eliminate the Allied beachhead in the heart of the Soviet Zone and to make Berlin the undivided capital of a Communist Germany.

2. That the Soviets do not desire World War III now nor within the period covered in this paper (six to twelve months).

3. That the Allies will remain in Berlin even at the risk of war.

4. That the Soviets will ostensibly turn over control of Soviet Zone Germany to the DDR after the October elections.

5. That the Soviets in attempting to achieve their objectives will use East Germans but will not permit Soviet forces to come into contact with Allied forces.

6. That the East German paramilitary force now contains not over 55,000 East Germans; that its effectiveness can improve rapidly, reaching an approximate strength of 150,000 by 1 May 1951 with the capability of coordinated ground action utilizing units of regimental combat team strength.

III. DISCUSSION:

1. Major Fields of Soviet Offensive:

a. The Soviet offensive against Berlin has never ceased since 1945; it merely waxes and wanes in intensity. For the moment, the pressure is low, but there are many reasons to believe that the

campaign will soon resume with renewed vigor in one or more of the following fields:

- (1) Economic warfare
- (2) Psychological warfare
- (3) Subversive penetration
- (4) Increased pressure of political activity
- (5) Coup de grace by East German paramilitary forces

2. Recent Developments Bearing Upon the Security of Berlin:

a. Recent developments have shaken the feeling of security in Berlin. The principal events which are responsible for this view are:

(1) Creation of DDR (The Deutsche Demokratische Republik): A first and most far-reaching event was the creation of this facade behind which the Soviets can henceforth operate.

(2) The organization of the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften: This agency provided the force in being for Soviet seizure of Berlin without involvement of the USSR or its forces.

(3) The outbreak of hostilities in Korea: This event points up the pattern which the Soviets may follow with respect to Berlin.

(4) Redeployment of cargo aircraft to the Far East: A direct result of the Korean fighting has been to limit the availability of cargo aircraft necessary to implement a new airlift for Berlin.

(5) The Communist Congress in Berlin: The tone of this meeting was reflected in the frequency of a threat to use the DDR and the SED (Socialist Unity Party) to challenge the Allied Occupation.

3. Lines of Actions which the Soviets May Pursue Against Berlin:

a. The capabilities listed below represent a series of actions of mounting intensity which may be taken separately or in combination by the Soviet puppets:

(1) Capability No. 1:

Ostensibly to return sovereignty to DDR following October elections, initially permitting DDR to assert authority over all transport facilities, and ultimately to make a timely declaration that Western Allies are illegally in Germany.

(2) Capability No. 2:

To extend Capability 1 by gradual imposition of documentation requirements by DDR agencies at all Allied and/or German trade control points, thereby effecting a partial blockade of the Western Sector of Berlin.

(3) Capability No. 3:

To have DDR paramilitary forces seal off the city at a propitious time and close the air corridor, thereby placing the blockade in full effect.

(4) Capability No. 4:

To deploy the DDR paramilitary forces around Berlin in force, issue an ultimatum demanding withdrawal of Allies, reinforcing the bluff with Communist-inspired riots in West Berlin.

(5) Capability No. 5:

To have the DDR paramilitary forces, possibly with camouflaged Soviet elements assisting, attack with mission of seizing Berlin and evicting Western Allies should intimidation fail.

4. Courses of Action to Counter Soviet Capabilities:

a. Evaluation of Soviet capabilities presents three broad courses of counteraction open to the Allies. These are:

(1) To engage their attention on other affairs through encouraging dis-affection in the satellite nations and other areas, and specifically in East Germany, for the purposes of convincing the Soviets that the bases of their present strength, and that of the East German Communists, are insecure and that it would be premature to execute their master plan vis-a-vis Berlin.

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(2) To convince the Soviet leaders that it is impossible to localize any action they begin against Berlin and that such action may lead directly to World War III.

(3) To create sufficient Allied strength to produce doubt in the Soviet leaders' minds that they could achieve success in Berlin even though World War III should not come as a result of their acts.

b. The first two of these broad courses of action are primarily political in nature and require consideration on the highest governmental levels. Some of the implications are indicated in Annex A. The third course of action is military and depends upon the creation and maintenance of a balance of military power. In the further development of Allied military capabilities essential to counter possible Soviet-inspired actions, the over-all military requirements are established regardless of present availability. For simplicity, Allied courses of action best suited to counter specific Soviet capabilities are shown below:

(1) Capability No. 1:

Although this first step is not military in nature, the Allies should begin by taking all action within their power to discredit the DDR as the voice of the popular German will. Such measures should include strong unequivocal statements that the authority of the DDR is not recognized by the Allies and that any actions which interfere with the rights or the exercise of the legal functions of the Allied Occupation Powers vis-a-vis West Berlin will not be tolerated.

(2) Capability No. 2:

The next step is to resist attempts by the DDR and its agencies to interfere with Berlin communications. The Allies should be ready in concert to react immediately and decisively to the first restrictive measures which the DDR places on these communications. This reaction should be expressed in strong language backed by forces in being strong enough to break a blockade. Thus the very existence of such a force would be a deterrent to DDR action. Other measures which would deter Soviet puppet agencies from restricting the Berlin communications are:

(a) The city can be stocked in advance with food and fuel to assure holding out for at least one year with little more than token assistance from the outside. Annex B.

COPIES OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

(b) Military forces and supplies needed for an all-out defense of West Berlin against the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften can be moved in now, at a time of relative freedom from tension. The size and composition of the force required to defend Berlin has been developed under Capability No. 4 below.

(3) Capability No. 3:

Under the assumption that the DDR has successfully blockaded the city, the Allies may take one of the following measures which would tend to frustrate the blockade:

(a) Ground action to include driving a salient from the west into Berlin and providing protection for rail and motor convoys. Forces required for this operation are a minimum of three Allied divisions with supporting troops. See Annex C.

(b) An airlift with fighter escort. Requirements for a lift of approximately 50,000 tons per month with limited fighter escort will be on the order of one heavy transport group and one fighter group in addition to that now available to the Allies. See Annex E.

(4) Capability Nos. 4 and 5:

A final Allied capability is to resist militarily the forces of the DDR (Volkspolizei Bereitschaften) if the latter attempt to take over West Berlin by force. To do so with hope of eventual success requires the maintenance in Berlin of sufficient forces in being to prevent a sudden putsch and to assure successful resistance for the time necessary to bring in reinforcements from West Germany. Allied garrisons supported by West Berlin paramilitary units properly equipped could, however, deter the Bereitschaften from attack and make the city militarily tenable for the next six to twelve months. The immediate requirements for the US Berlin garrison is one regiment of infantry, one battalion of military police, the necessary supporting administrative troops, and a force of as many thousand West Germans as can be organized, equipped and trained in paramilitary and home-guard units. It is highly desirable that the French and British provide similar contingents. See Annex D.

c. If the DDR interfere with Berlin ground communications, it may be desirable to test their intentions through a reconnaissance in force. However, it is obvious that the Allies should not attempt to break a blockade or to raise the siege unless they are fully

prepared to take whatever actions are necessary to win. For a discussion of requirements for such operations see Annex C.

5. Availability of Forces:

a. Within Berlin the Allies maintain garrisons of approximately 10,000; there are some 11,000 West Berlin police. At present the DDR paramilitary forces have the capability of possibly overwhelming this Allied garrison and certainly of bottling it up in a small area. In six months these forces will have the capability of overwhelming the Allied garrison at will.

b. Allied forces immediately available to support the West Berlin garrison are committed by other operational plans in the event of a general emergency. An estimate of such forces is contained in Annex D.

c. There are no West German forces of any nature now available.

d. The position of the United States Commander, Berlin is now militarily untenable.

6. The Solution to Maintaining the Allied Position in Berlin:

Despite the weakness of the Allied military position brought out in paragraph 5 preceding, it is possible to compensate therefor by supplementing military with political and economic measures. By integrated military, political and economic action, it is within the range of Allied capabilities to maintain their position in Berlin. Such a program would contain five steps:

a. The Allies should make the Soviets understand that an armed aggression from any source against Berlin means war.

b. The Allies should make it apparent to the Soviet leaders that Berlin is stocked to face a long blockade.

c. Along the same line, the Allies should make it clear to the Soviet leaders that the former are able and willing to impose a counter-blockade which will be damaging to the Soviet and East German economy.

d. The Allies should maintain a tough, well-equipped garrison in Berlin, which will make any direct attack costly to the aggressors and destructive to the city which they wish to use as a Communist capital.

e. The Allies should develop a West Berlin military organization capable of supporting and extending the effectiveness of the Allied garrison.

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

1. That it is vital to the interests of the United States that the Allied position in Berlin be maintained. (See Annex A.)
2. That probably the East German paramilitary forces can overwhelm West Berlin now and can certainly do so in six months, unless the Allies take effective measures to prevent this action.
3. That the Allies must be prepared to react vigorously to initial DDR moves aimed at restricting Berlin communications.
4. That Berlin should be stocked with supplies adequate to enable the city to withstand a year's blockade.
5. That in the event of blockade or siege, Berlin might be supported by a very limited airlift with present means for a short time.
6. That an airlift supporting Berlin can easily be disrupted and its effectiveness would be questionable.
7. That in the event Berlin is blockaded or besieged under present conditions it would be unwise on the part of the Allies to commit any substantial force to an overland expedition to relieve the city.
8. That Allied reinforcements to the West Berlin garrison are desirable at this time.
9. That certain stop-gap measures such as arming the West Berlin police, increasing their strength, increasing the West German police forces, establishing a Berlin police reserve, and increasing the number of labor service units in the city, may provide a deterrent to blockade or siege of Berlin and will reduce the requirements for Allied reinforcements to Berlin garrison.
10. That in view of the foregoing, the position of the US Commander, Berlin is at present militarily untenable, but it is within the military capabilities of the US and of the Allies to strengthen his position to the point of being able to make a resistance which will deter a Bereitschaften aggression.
11. That the Bonn Government should ultimately become responsible for the security of Western Berlin, and to carry out this responsibility, the rearmament of West Germany must be started at once; that this rearmament should result in the development of integrated combat forces capable of sustained operations.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That immediate steps be taken to intensify psychological warfare vis-a-vis the Soviets and East German Communists, and to step-up Allied propaganda campaigns directed at East Germany for the purposes of undermining the present sources of Soviet and DDR strength, of creating doubt as to the reliability of East Germans who may be required to execute Soviet designs on Berlin, of discrediting Soviet-DDR political moves, and of disrupting the Soviet-DDR timetable vis-a-vis West Berlin and West Germany. Similar efforts by the West Germans should be promoted by the Allies. The immediate targets should be the October 15 elections in the Soviet Zone, the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften, the SED-National Front campaign for German unification, and any Soviet efforts to grant "sovereignty" to the DDR.

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3. That the US Commander, Berlin, resurvey (in conjunction with his Allied opposites where applicable) the military requirements for the successful defense of West Berlin against the Bereitschaften (including the expansion of US Labor Service Units, the reinforcement and re-equipment of the West Berlin police, and the recruitment and paramilitary training of West Berlin police reserves). Such study should include recommendations on the military mission of the US Berlin garrison.

4. That steps should then be instituted to reenforce the US Berlin garrison to the required strength, to initiate parallel action on the part of the U.K. and France, and to direct the Berlin commandants to reenforce and re-equip the West Berlin police and develop a police reserve capable of military action. The measures taken should be adequate to create a balanced Allied-West Berlin force which would possess capabilities in manpower and equipment necessary to offset action by the Bereitschaften.

5. That the US High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief jointly produce an estimate of the most likely means the DDR may use to restrict Berlin communications.

6. That the US High Commissioner should seek approval of the Allied High Commission, in the light of the foregoing estimate, to develop a tripartite program to resist DDR interference with, or control of communications between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, including agreement on the progressive application of countermeasures and sanctions. Such plan should include customs controls capable of executing agreed interzonal sanctions and should include the UK capability of closing the border between the British and Soviet

Zones in the manner now contemplated by the US Occupation Forces under Operation Concourse for the US-Soviet Zone border. Once this program has been developed action should be taken to convince the Soviets and East Germans that the Allies have the capability and the willingness to adopt counter-measures of progressive intensity to counter DDR interference with access to Berlin.

7. That the US High Commissioner should seek approval of the Allied High Commission to increase the West Berlin reserves of food to a level of one year's maintenance, it being understood that the Commission has previously approved an increase of reserves of fuel to this level. In order to do so, funds must be found other than those now at the disposal of the US High Commissioner.

8. That the US High Commissioner should seek approval of the Allied High Commission for further early increases in the Federal Republic and/or Laender police forces (including increased capabilities to reenforce the West Berlin police) and for maintaining pressure on the Federal Republic and West German Laender governments to support West Berlin to the full extent of their resources.

9. That the Foreign Ministers, at their September meeting, issue the strongest possible statement on Berlin and one which will demonstrate the unequivocal intention of the Allies, even at the risk of war, to maintain their position in Berlin and their rights of access to and from Berlin regardless of restrictions imposed either by the DDR or by the Soviets.

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11. That the United States proceed as rapidly as possible to encourage the development of a European defense force into which the manpower and industrial reserves of West Germany will be integrated.

12. That the United States take steps designed to invoke the services of the UN, through appropriate procedural machinery, for the purposes of mobilizing non-Communist world opinion against Soviet designs on Berlin and of laying a basis for immediate concerted UN action to meet any threat to the peace created by illegal Soviet or DDR actions.

13. That the US High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief forward this paper to the Department of State and to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, respectively, as a joint position paper.

VI. COORDINATION:

The US High Commissioner; the Commander-in-Chief, Europe; and the US Commander, Berlin, have jointly prepared this review and concur in it.

ENCLOSURES: 5 Annexes

- A. Political Considerations
- B. Logistics Situation, Berlin
- C. Maintenance of Overland Communications
with Berlin
- D. Considerations in Reinforcement of the
Allied Berlin Garrison
- E. Airlift

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ANNEX "A"

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. The governing politico-military factors in respect of Berlin appear to be these:

In respect of the Soviets -

a) It is clearly a major Soviet objective to eliminate the Allied island of West Berlin, to convert Berlin into an undivided capital of a Communist Germany, and thus to consolidate Soviet Germany as a shield and a sword for use against West Germany.

b) Under the Soviet timetable, it is highly advantageous, if not necessary, that such be done as promptly as possible and before such date as the Soviets may be able and ready to provoke World War III.

c) To gain their objectives - West Berlin and West Germany - the Soviets will go very close to provoking World War III and may commit the Bereitschaften against Allied troops in Berlin (if it is calculated that such an engagement could be localized), since the Soviets must try at nearly any cost to deny the Allies their objectives of maintaining West Berlin while integrating the military potential of West Germany with that of Western Europe.

d) The Soviets will no doubt seek to dislodge the Allies from Berlin by attrition, including a full-scale blockade enforced by the Germans, before committing the Bereitschaften to any major attack on the Allied positions in Berlin.

e) Hence, it may be assumed that Soviet efforts of obtaining control of West Berlin, or to make the Allied position therein so untenable as to dictate an Allied withdrawal short of World War III, will involve the employment of East Germans, and particularly the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften, in lieu of Soviet manpower. This assumption is based on the belief that the employment of Soviet troops against the Allied positions in Berlin would provoke World War III, that the Soviets are reasonably aware of such eventuality, and that the DDR will seek to secure the Soviet control of the whole of Berlin before either the Soviets or the Bereitschaften move against West Germany and thereby run the almost certain risk of provoking World War III.

In respect of the Allies -

f) It is Allied policy to remain in Berlin even at the risk of war. Only such a decision will permit the Allies to exploit the numerous political and ideological advantages deriving

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from holding an advanced post in Soviet Europe, to keep faith with the two million Berliners who have linked their fate with the West, and to maintain the maximum of psychological support from the West Germans during the critical period required to redress the present imbalance of conventional military strength between Soviet Europe and Free Europe. The alternatives - the withdrawal from or loss of Berlin in any action short of World War III (in which Soviet troops would be employed) - would contribute to such a psychological undermining of Allied prestige in West Germany as very probably to undermine the program of integrating West German manpower and industrial capacity in a West European rearmament system capable of discouraging the Soviets from further European aggression.

g) The maintenance of the Allied position in Berlin for the next six to twelve months must be based on three paramount components: (1) maintenance of rights of access to and from the city, (2) a sufficient balance of military strength to discourage the Bereitschaften from ventures, and (3) a psychological campaign intended to convince the Soviets that our position is stronger than it may be in fact and to shake their faith in the reliability of East Germans whom they may wish to commit to the attainment of Soviet purposes vis-a-vis West Berlin.

2. The Soviet offensive against Berlin has never ceased since 1945; it merely waxes and wanes in intensity. For the moment, the pressure is low, but there are many reasons to believe that the campaign will soon resume with renewed vigor. This campaign will almost certainly be based on the use of the agencies of the DDR, and East German manpower, with the Soviets keeping in the background. These agencies will gradually increase the pressure while military or paramilitary forces are made ready to administer the coup de grace in case relatively peaceful methods are unavailing. This paper revises the recent changes in the Berlin situation and enumerates actions which should be taken to frustrate Soviet designs on Berlin.

3. The most significant change in the Berlin situation has been the growing capability of the DDR to attempt a coup in the Korean pattern. Heretofore, it has been felt that the Soviets would not risk war over Berlin and that "war over Berlin" connoted the use of Soviet troops against Allied troops. It was expected that the Kremlin would apply a variety of political and economic pressures to undermine the morale of the West Berliners and the security of the Allied position in Berlin. By such means, it would hope eventually to maneuver a deal at the conference table which would gain its objectives in Berlin without fighting. Even a second blockade was believed unlikely because the Soviets allegedly would not repeat a gambit which had once failed. Influenced by the foregoing reasoning, the Allies have been satisfied with maintaining military forces in Berlin capable of doing little more than putting down civil disturbances in conjunction with the

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German police. Their inability to resist an armed enemy was not considered of decisive importance since the only enemy was considered to be the Red Army, and the Red Army could not be resisted successfully by any garrison which the Allies could place in Berlin.

4. Recent developments have shaken this attitude in respect of the security of Berlin and have contributed to the knowledge that, regardless of the validity of the former reasoning, a new threat has arisen through the increased capabilities of the DDR. The following paragraphs chronicle events responsible for this change of viewpoint.

5. The first and most far-reaching event was the creation last October of a German facade behind which the Soviets can henceforth operate -- the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR). This action gives the Soviets a cat's paw which can be used either against the West Berliners or against the Western Allies. It is probable that if such measures as a renewed blockade were adopted, the agent would be the DDR pretending to act by virtue of sovereign rights restored to it by the Soviets. The latter would be in the position to disavow responsibility for the consequences of East German actions against Berlin and thus avoid commitment of Soviet forces, which in all likelihood is still their goal.

6. A second and related development is the organization of the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften. This force provides the claws for the East German cat's paw. We now know the present size and composition of this force and recognize that it is a military organization which, unless challenged by increased Allied military and German paramilitary strength in West Berlin, could soon be capable of dominating East Germany for the Soviets. Although units undergoing training have thus far been of battalion size, larger units will probably be formed of greater military capability in the coming year. It may also be assumed that by the end of another six months, the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften will be strong enough to overpower the present Allied garrison of West Berlin unless the latter is reinforced and unless German paramilitary police reserves are trained and armed in West Berlin.

7. A third factor which affects the Berlin situation is the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. This event reveals a pattern which the Soviets may follow with respect to Berlin. It may be argued that, in contrast to Korea, there are Allied troops in Berlin whose presence will deter an overt attack. However, counterbalancing this advantage is the difficulty of reinforcing Berlin through or over the Red Army, in contrast to the situation in Korea, where access to the battle area is unimpeded. This latter consideration introduces one of the essential imponderables in the present Berlin situation: If it is assumed that the Soviets will not risk provoking World War III over Berlin before such time as

they are ready to provoke a world war, will they commit the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften against the Allied garrisons if they believe the resultant hostilities could be localized? It is believed that the Soviets would probably commit the Bereitschaften against West Berlin if (1) their estimate is that the ensuing hostilities can be localized and (2) the speedy success of the Bereitschaften seemed assured. Hence, it is a thesis of this paper that the Allied positions in Berlin will be maintained only if (1) Allied military and German paramilitary strength sufficient to discourage the Bereitschaften from attack is kept in West Berlin until the military imbalance between Soviet Europe and Free Europe is redressed and (2) the Soviets are led to believe that any assault by the Bereitschaften on Berlin might result in a world war in advance of the Soviet timetable.

8. The capability of a full-scale airlift for Berlin has been reduced materially as a result of the Korean war. Not only have air units previously earmarked for the airlift been redeployed to the Far East, but devices which the Soviets and/or East Germans are capable of bringing to bear are more likely to be used to reduce the effectiveness of any renewed airlift. For these reasons and because of increased tension with attendant risk to the transportation as involved, the Allied military leaders will be loathe to expose to destruction, or commit to ineffective operations, all or part of their strategic transport forces. Hence, the decision to attempt to support a blockaded Berlin again with an airlift will be a much more serious one than in 1948.

9. A final factor bearing upon the Berlin situation is the tone of the recent Communist Congress in Berlin. There, the threat to employ the DDR to challenge the Allied occupation was apparent and unequivocal. Communists were exhorted to civil disobedience and to prepare themselves for the day when Germany was reunited on Communist (Soviet) terms. The temper of the decisions taken suggests that the Communists' schedule against Berlin may move faster and more aggressively than we have estimated in the past.

10. It is possible that the DDR may ostensibly be granted "full sovereignty" by the USSR in October and that thereafter Soviet forces may either be withdrawn from the Soviet occupation zone in Germany or that they will, more probably, be concentrated in a few strategic localities in East Germany. In any event, it is likely that the DDR will assert authority to speak and act for the whole of the German people following its "legitimation" in the October elections. As a corollary, the DDR would adopt the position enunciated by the SED Congress in July that the Western occupation authorities remain in Germany without benefit of legal status. Although the Allies would immediately reject all claims of this nature, they would be faced with the practical problem of whether to deal directly with representatives of the DDR on such administrative matters as documentation for goods and persons moving to and from Berlin.

11. It follows that such an "autonomous" East German government could initiate actions restricting Allied use of the lines of communications to Berlin. Initially, such restrictions might not be placed on transportation facilities directly controlled by the Allied authorities but normal German commerce between the Western Zones and Berlin could be strangled. If the DDR meets with initial success, it can be expected to continue applying pressure, unless stopped, until the Allies have been driven from Berlin, if necessary by the application of military force.

12.a. If the foregoing sequence of events appears plausible, it is essential that the Allies develop a program to accomplish the following objectives:

- (1) Induce the Soviet leaders to cancel their program.
- (2) Neutralize the Soviet program, if implemented.

b. The Soviet leaders may call off the campaign under any effective combination of the following conditions:

(1) They become persuaded that the time is not yet ripe, that the DDR and the Volkspolizei Bereitschaften are not ready to play their appointed roles in the conquest of Berlin. The Soviet timetable in East Germany and the firming-up of a Soviet estimate of the reliability of the East Germans may be retarded by Allied actions of these types: The establishing, at appropriate intervals and for specific strategic purposes, of effective economic blockades of the Soviet Zone (which must include the Czechoslovak frontiers with West Germany); the subverting of the Bereitschaften to the maximum capabilities of the Allies and West Germans; creating of disaffection among crucial segments of the population and the discrediting of Soviet/DDR political and propagandistic moves, including those directed at West Germany. As a result, the Soviets and East German Communists might feel their bases of strength in East Germany, aside from the Red Army, were insecure and hence be reluctant to act.

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(2) The Soviet leaders are made to realize that the campaign for Berlin is so hazardous that they risk a world war if they or the Bereitschaften attack West Berlin. An integral component of the Allied position on this matter should be to leave doubt in the Soviet mind of whether any attack by the Bereitschaften could be localized. An announced decision on the part of the Allies to maintain their position in Berlin and their rights of access against action by either the Soviets or the DDR, even at the risk of war, would thus be an extremely important factor in the protection of West Berlin. Similarly, action by the Federal Republic which would indicate its support of Berlin to the full extent of its resources would be an important contribution.

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(3) The Soviets become disadvantageously embroiled elsewhere in the world. Such would obviously ameliorate the situation in Berlin. It is felt, however, that more immediate results in this respect will be obtained by exploiting Soviet weaknesses in East Germany than by developing diversions elsewhere in the world in the hope of distracting Soviet attention from Berlin.

(4) The Soviets become convinced that Allied military and West Berlin paramilitary forces in West Berlin are capable of successful resistance to attack by the Bereitschaften. The Allied position in maintaining West Berlin for the next six to twelve months at least should proceed on the assumption that West Berlin need not be militarily untenable against the Bereitschaften and that our position in Berlin should be materially strengthened by additional Allied units and by training Germans to assist the Allied garrisons in defending the city.

c. The Soviet program could be neutralized by the following measures:

(1) The Allies must be prepared to take immediate concerted action, in accordance with a previously agreed program, in response to any positive indication that the DDR is restricting communications between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. Such action must be decisive in nature and designed to make the Soviets and DDR authorities hesitant to proceed further with their program.

(2) If and when the USSR restores "sovereignty" to the DDR, the Allies must announce that their rights and position in Berlin remain unaffected and reiterate their unequivocal intention to remain in Berlin.

(3) Defeat of any Bereitschaften units committed to hostilities. Parity of equipment with the Bereitschaften should, therefore, be maintained and provision should be made to stock weapons which the West Berliners might use to defend their city in case of necessity.

(4) Invoke the services of the UN through appropriate procedural machinery for the purposes of mobilizing world opinion against Soviet designs on Berlin and of laying a basis for immediate concerted UN action.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

18 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: United States Policy With Respect to Berlin and Eastern Germany.

The Department of State in a separate but related action* is forwarding to the National Security Council for its information the text of the "Agreement on Berlin Security" which was reached by the Three Foreign Ministers in their September meeting, as well as a copy of "A Review of the Berlin Situation", a study prepared in Germany by the U. S. High Commissioner; the Commander in Chief, Europe; and the U. S. Commander, Berlin.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in early September commented upon the text of the "Agreement on Berlin Security" prior to its finalization. They have also commented upon the study "A Review of the Berlin Situation". Their comments with respect to these two documents are of interest to the National Security Council and pertinent extracts thereof are set forth in the following paragraphs.

Concerning the "Agreement on Berlin Security" an early version of this Agreement contained the following paragraph:

"7. Initiate a joint military study of possible ground action to break through blockade by ground transport and of a limited airlift with fighter escort."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff commented as follows with respect to this paragraph:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the subject matter of paragraph 7 of the draft agreement is, in the first instance, a military matter. Furthermore, the Western Powers do not now have, nor will they have in the foreseeable future, sufficient military forces to break through a blockade of Berlin. Accordingly, they feel that the subject matter of paragraph 7 should be deleted from the draft agreement on Berlin security since a joint military study of this nature would serve no useful purpose at this time. If and whenever the military strength of the Western

* See Page 1.

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Powers is sufficient for such an operation, military authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will undoubtedly consider plans for such an operation."

With respect to the study "A Review of the Berlin Situation" pertinent extracts of the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning this study are as follows:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the enclosed Study, dated 29 August 1950 entitled "A Review of the Berlin Situation". They consider the Study prepared jointly by the United States High Commissioner for Germany; the United States Commander, Berlin; and the Commander in Chief, Europe, to be an excellent short-range politico-military analysis of the Berlin situation. Further, the Study discloses a high degree of coordination in the planning field, particularly with respect to the measures recommended to be taken during the next six to twelve months in order that the Western Allies may maintain their position in Berlin despite renewed Soviet efforts, including the use of military force under the control of the East German Government, to drive them out.

* * * * *

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection to that part of the recommendation of the Study which provides for the reinforcing and re-equipping of the West German police and for the development of a possible reserve capable of military action, and the recommendation that the United States military garrison in Berlin be reinforced with parallel action by the United Kingdom and France being requested.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that a number of other recommendations in the subject paper are at variance with the present United States policy toward Berlin and Germany. Accordingly, they suggest that the National Security Council be requested to review the United States policy toward Berlin and Germany in the light of the enclosed Study and the recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon. The Secretary of State should also be immediately apprised of your action."

It is recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the National Security Council Staff for its use in connection with the study now being made with respect to Berlin under the provisions of paragraph 42 of NSC 73/4.

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NSC 684-962	NNFJ84-105
By <u>1429</u>	NARS, Date <u>9/25/85</u>

/s/ G. Marshall

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24 January 1951
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REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT EAST GERMANY
IMPOSES A BLOCKADE ON BERLIN

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS-CCS DECLASSIFICATION
WORKING GROUP
DATE 3 April 74

References: a. J.C.S. 1907 series
b. J.C.S. 1924/35
c. J.C.S. 2116/31
d. J.C.S. 2124/23
e. J.C.S. 2124/26

THE PROBLEM

1. In light of a memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, dated 28 November 1950 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/60), to comment and make recommendations upon possible U.S. courses of action in the event of an East German blockade of Berlin.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. See Enclosure "B".

CONCLUSIONS

3. As long as the USSR occupies East Germany, there is, from the military point of view, little or no difference between a blockade of Berlin imposed by the USSR or by East Germany.

4. Under present conditions a total blockade imposed by the USSR, or by East Germany with overt or covert Soviet support, could not be broken by passive Allied countermeasures (airlift, counterblockade, diplomatic action) in the face of Soviet determination to make such a blockade effective.

5. A partial blockade imposed initially by East Germany might develop into a total blockade by the USSR.

6. Under present conditions, and during the continued Soviet occupation of East Germany, in the event of a Berlin blockade imposed either by the USSR or by East Germany, which does not involve an armed attack upon the Western Allies (for this contingency see "Agreement on Berlin Security, page 208, Appendix "A" to J.C.S. 2124/23), the United States should:

a. Institute a partial airlift, together with those other states that are able and willing to contribute. This airlift should be continued until Soviet, or ostensibly East German, interference makes it patently impracticable.

b. Institute an appropriate counterblockade, in accordance with the decisions made by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, on 19 September 1950 ("Agreement on Berlin Security", page 208, Appendix "A" to J.C.S. 2124/23).

c. Take appropriate diplomatic action.

d. Initiate no armed action to lift the blockade. Make no attempt to force or maintain a corridor from the West, nor to "probe" with armed forces.

e. Make no attempt to reinforce the U.S. garrison in Berlin.

f. In the event a unified allied command for the defense of Berlin (Enclosure to J.C.S. 1907/61) has not been established, take action in concert with the British and French to establish immediately such a unified command.

7. If the action indicated in paragraph 6 above is not successful in lifting the blockade any further action to be taken should be determined at that time, at the highest governmental level, in light of the conditions then existing.

8. If, in the course of the blockade, armed action in Berlin should result from an attack upon that city, only the Berlin garrison, augmented by the West Berlin police, should be used to resist the attack, pending further consideration at the highest governmental level in accordance with paragraph 7 above.

9. The National Security Council Staff should be informed of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff views may be considered in connection with the current staff project being conducted pursuant to paragraph 42 of NSC 73/4 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 1924/35).

10. Upon conclusion of the Soviet occupation of East Germany or at such time as the military strength of the Western occupying powers and/or the West German forces increases so as to change their existing relative capabilities with respect to the East German forces the above course of action should be reviewed and revised accordingly.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

- a. Note the conclusions contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 10 above.
- b. Approve the conclusions contained in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 above.
- c. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A" to the Secretary of Defense.

ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. In connection with the current National Security Council (NSC) Staff project being conducted pursuant to paragraph 42 of NSC 73/4* the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated their views on possible United States courses of action in the event East Germany imposes a blockade on Berlin. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that:

a. Under present conditions, and during the continued Soviet occupation of East Germany, in the event of a Berlin blockade imposed either by the USSR or by East Germany which does not involve an armed attack upon the Western Allies (for this contingency see "Agreement on Berlin Security")** the United States should:

(1) Institute a partial airlift, together with those other states that are able and willing to contribute. This airlift should be continued until Soviet, or ostensibly East German, interference makes it patently impracticable.

(2) Institute an appropriate counterblockade in accordance with the decisions made by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, on 19 September 1950 ("Agreement on Berlin Security").**

(3) Take appropriate diplomatic action.

(4) Initiate no armed action to lift the blockade. Make no attempt to force or maintain a corridor from the West nor to "probe" with armed forces.

(5) Make no attempt to reinforce the United States garrison in Berlin.

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 1924/35
** Appendix "A" to J.C.S. 2124/23

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resisting an attack, the Allies would then be faced with the following:

- a. Such use of force would probably be unsuccessful in breaking the blockade.
- b. Any forces thus utilized would be maldeployed for their possible use in executing emergency war plans.
- c. The Allies will rightly be charged with initiating hostilities. While they have announced that they will "resist" any attack on Berlin they have not indicated that they will "initiate" an attack.

9. To summarize, the United States, together with the United Kingdom and France, is faced at the present time with the following situation regarding Berlin:

- a. The Allies have stated their intention to remain in Berlin, but

- (1) Berlin can be effectively blockaded by either the USSR alone or East Germany with Soviet support without resorting to the direct use of armed forces.

- (2) The passive measures already prescribed (partial airlift, counterblockade, diplomatic action) will probably not be sufficient to lift a blockade.

- (3) The Allies do not have sufficient military forces in that area to break through a blockade.

- b. The Allies have stated their intention to resist any attack on Berlin, but

- (1) The Allies do not have sufficient military forces in Berlin to successfully resist an all-out attack, nor is it contemplated that the Berlin garrison will be provided with sufficient forces for that purpose.

- (2) The Allies do not have sufficient military forces in West Germany to successfully overcome an all-out attack on Berlin without jeopardizing their ability to execute

emergency war plans nor is it contemplated that sufficient forces will be provided for that purpose.

(3) Even if in resisting an attack on Berlin it should be necessary to implement emergency war plans the Berlin garrison and Berlin would be lost from the outset.

10. It appears, therefore, that the United States is faced with a problem to which there is at best only a compromise solution. We do not have, nor do we intend to develop in the foreseeable future, the military capability to carry out completely our commitments in this regard. Without repudiating any commitments already made it appears that a decision should now be made as to how nearly those commitments can be realistically fulfilled and then only such action as is commensurate with that decision should be taken.

11. It should be recognized that at some point short of having used up all available forces in Europe, without a declaration of war, the United States can find itself, in fact, no longer able to remain in Berlin. It is considered that the Western powers will not, in the foreseeable future, have any forces in the area which are surplus to the requirements of any approved emergency war plan for the area. In view of this consideration it does not appear logical to commit any forces to the defense of Berlin other than the Berlin garrison which, in the event of war would be lost in any case.

12. In view of the foregoing it appears that during the current period, and while the Soviet occupation of East Germany continues, the only realistic course of action which the United States can pursue in the event of another blockade of Berlin of any appreciable magnitude, imposed either by the USSR or by East Germany, which does not involve an armed attack

against the Western Allies (for this contingency see "Agreement on Berlin Security", page 208, Appendix to J.C.S. 2124/23), is as follows:

a. The immediate institution of an airlift. This airlift should not be a "full" airlift in the sense of being able to supply all of the requirements for Berlin, but should be started initially only with the aircraft available in the area, and then developed as the situation warrants. The other Western Allies should participate from the outset and assistance should be accepted from any other nations able and willing to contribute. The airlift should be continued until Soviet, or ostensibly East German, interference makes it patently impracticable.

b. The governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France, having agreed to place the organization of any future counterblockade in the hands of their High Commissioners (Appendix to J.C.S. 2124/23), the details of any future counterblockade should be left to their discretion. In view of the expected continuing decrease in effectiveness of a counterblockade it appears neither necessary nor desirable to attempt to prescribe the details of a counterblockade at this time. An appropriate counterblockade should, however, be imposed immediately.

c. Appropriate diplomatic action should be taken. The foundations for such action have been well prepared as a result of the September agreements of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France (Appendix to J.C.S. 2124/23).

d. No armed action of any type should be initiated in order to lift the blockade. The United States does not have the military capability to successfully conclude any action thus initiated. This restriction would exclude any attempt to force a blockade from the west, regardless of the apparent success of such a course of action. Likewise, no

attempt to "probe" with armed forces of any size should be made. This conclusion is based upon the actuality of a clearly defined blockade and not merely an administrative order to close the city. It is considered that normal operations would be continued until actually confronted with force.

e. No attempt should be made to reinforce the U.S. Berlin garrison during a blockade. Any reinforcements which could then be provided the Berlin garrison would not materially affect the situation and in the event of hostilities the entire garrison would be lost.

f. Action is now being taken at governmental level to establish a unified allied command for the defense of Berlin in the event of an emergency (J.C.S. 1907/61). Provided such action has been completed, all Allied forces in Berlin, as well as the West Berlin police, would be immediately placed under the operational control of the Commander of that unified command, in the event of a blockade. In the event that command has not been established action should be taken, in concert with the British and French, for its immediate establishment.

13. If the action indicated in paragraph 12 above is not successful in lifting the blockade any further action to be taken should be determined at that time, at the highest governmental level, in light of the conditions then existing. It does not appear practicable to give consideration at this time to any further action which might be taken.

14. The possibility exists that armed action will take place. Any such action, whether intentional on the part of the USSR or of East Germany, will have the effect of an attack on Berlin which will call for the Allies to resist the attack and defend the city. In such event, only the Allied Berlin garrisons and

the West Berlin police should be used in resisting the attack. At that time, consideration at the highest governmental level should be given to possible further action which might be taken in light of paragraph 13 above.

15. The situation discussed above is applicable only under present conditions. At such time as West German forces are developed and trained adequately to affect materially the above conditions; at such time as the North Atlantic Treaty forces in Western Europe are adequate to affect materially the above conditions; or at such time as the Soviet occupation of East Germany has been terminated the course of action outlined herein should be reviewed and revised accordingly.

16. The National Security Council Staff should be informed of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position in order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff views may be considered in connection with the current staff project being conducted pursuant to paragraph 42 of NSC 73/4 (Enclosure to J.C.S. 1924/35).

TO [REDACTED]
JCS 1907/62

- 406 -

Enclosure "B"

[REDACTED]

8(2/51

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~~TOP SECRET~~

he had public relations to have so large a number. General Gruenther said that in explaining the over-all setup to various senators and others they were all startled to find Eisenhower way down in the diagram. The Secretary suggested that the diagramming could be done on functional lines. One would start with the idea that the whole effort was devoted to the creation of an adequate defense force in Europe. That defense force was represented by Eisenhower. There were then below that a series of supporting bodies, such as the North Atlantic Council, etc.

incl
scepticism
re EDC

On the question of the European Defense Force, General Gruenther said that it must be realized that professional military people in all countries were very skeptical about the whole concept. When one of the officers of SHAPE replied to a question that he was going to attend a meeting of the Paris Conference on the European Army, he was asked how the children were getting along with their paper dolls. This feeling of skepticism is strong among the British and also among the French professional soldiers. Actually the whole operation has been managed closely and personally by Moch and the French staff has not been brought in. Moch has had his own group of officers working with him on it. SHAPE plans to get General Juin to move in on this situation, and when he does he will be able to bring the French staff along. At present, however, Juin is still concerned with his duties in North Africa and keeps one foot there and one in Paris and has not set his foot down in Fontainebleau. General Gruenther attached importance to bringing in this staff opinion since there are many problems which such a group could address themselves which have been overlooked or neglected by the present group. In answer to the Secretary's question, General Gruenther said that since Eisenhower had come out in favor of the EDF all of the officers in SHAPE now followed that lead. He pointed out that a fundamental difficulty was that the plan began with the folly of the regimental combat team concept. Even when the idea of the divisional unit was accepted, the problems were not all solved. If General Eisenhower had to put first a Belgium division, then a German division, then a French division, then an American one and then another German division, the situation would be practically impossible. It was true that they had adopted on paper the idea that SACEUR could dispose of the units of the EDF, but he was not sure that the French really understood what this involved. He had asked various people about this with varying results. Bruce and McCloy thought that the French would accept it as did Monnet. Alphand, however, has not budged at all on this question. General Gruenther also pointed out the very difficult administrative problems which still remain to be solved. He said, however, that General Eisenhower would brush aside minor difficulties. Eisenhower has not yet talked with the British on this subject. The question did not come up when he saw Morrison in London. General Gruenther has talked with lower-level British



representatives.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum of Conversation
 with General Gruenther 8/2/51
 at Box 66, Memoranda of Conversation, Aug 1951
 HSTC

Aug 1951
 Dec 9/84

NLE MR Case No. 88-178
Document No. 142

687
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INCOMING MESSAGE

10/21/51
File

LOVETT, Robert

TOP SECRET
ROUTINE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: SECDEF WASH DC
TO : USLO SHAPE PARIS FRANCE
NR : DEF 84727

80-409-2
000 letter 2/5/51 (80-MOR-11)
21 OCT 51 - Not 0/51

PERSONAL FOR EISENHOWER FROM LOVETT

Dear Mr

I am sure you know of my sympathetic appreciation and understanding of the concern expressed in your personal cable to me of October 18 with regard to the possibility of serious delays developing in the rate of future deliveries of military equipment under our Foreign Aid Programs. The following observations reflect my own personal appraisal of the situation: simultaneously with the necessity of meeting the heavy requirements of a major war effort in Korea, we are undertaking to build up our US forces and the forces of our allies, both NATO and non-NATO, to a military strength capable of coping with the menace of Soviet Imperialism, all within the framework of a limited mobilization effort which seeks to avoid so far as possible such drastic dislocations of the US economy as might, and probably would, curtail the Foreign Aid Program as the first area offering politically attractive cuts. I strongly believe that a policy of limited, rather than total, mobilization is the wisest course for us to follow under the present circumstances. If we can stick to it (and, frankly, it looks to me as though we may have to go nearer total mobilization in certain areas of production) we will be able to meet our security needs, within the bounds of economy, on a long-term basis, and will at the same time succeed in achieving an industrial base capable of rapid expansion in the event war should be forced upon us. What this means, however, from the short-term view is that for a period of some months, pending the completion of the broad mobilization base and the new plants we are now building, there will be definite limitations on the extent to which we can take on new commitments or will be able to accelerate the meeting of

LN IN 1050

(22 OCT 51)

OASD (PA) OF DISC
88-MOR-137
88-TS-108

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Declassified by: OSD ExecSec
Declassified on: 07 Dec 88

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Box 72, Lovett, Robert A. (1)

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MR 88-178-2
12/15/80
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PERSONAL FOR

NLE MFR Case No. 88-172
Document No. 2
J. F. L.
LOVETT, Robert

CORRECTED COPY

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET
ROUTINE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

FROM: SECDEF WASH DC
TO : USLO SHAPE PARIS FRANCE
NR : DEF 84727 NOFORN

80-409-2
800 MFR 2/5/51 (80-MDE-
21 OCT 51

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(22 OCT 51)

88-MDE-132
88-TS-128
PERSONAL FOR

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Declassified by: OSD ExecSec
Declassified on: 07 Dec 88

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88-172-2
12/19/88
NLE DAB

Box 72, Lovett, Robert A. (1)

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NR: DEF 84727

PAGE 2

commitments already undertaken. Right now we are experiencing all the growing pains that are inevitable with a production program as extensive and as rapidly undertaken as the one on which we are presently engaged. Getting the bugs out of new designs, scraping around for machine tools that are in extremely short supply overall, meeting spot shortages of certain critical materials, shifting the limited numbers of available skilled workers to production points of greatest importance - these and other production difficulties, which were to be expected, have been aggravated by a continuing lack of appreciation in some quarters of the urgency of the task before us, as reflected in a series of costly and prolonged work stoppages that have hit us in many critical areas of industry, and in a tendency on the part of some of our producers and suppliers to string out their present contracts against the fear that after the present enormous budget Congress will cut down appropriations in a presidential election year. In short, we are encountering all the difficulties inherent in a situation of limited mobilization. Despite these difficulties, however, I think we are beginning to make reasonably good headway and, with a generous application of patience and persistence, we should be able to meet the tasks laid out before us. Specifically with reference to MDAP deliveries, I have endeavored to keep myself informed of any reports that delays in the delivery of promised equipment have retarded the pace of mobilization effort of the NATO countries, [in spite of heavy diversions from metropolitan France to Indochina.] To date I have received none, although it is altogether possible there have been some that have not been brought to my attention. On the other hand I understand that in the case of at least one NATO country, Norway, it was necessary to slow down deliveries of MDAP equipment in order to keep them from running ahead of prevailing capacity to absorb them. Such success as we have had in meeting the minimum training requirements of the countries receiving military assistance from us (and I understand that our MAAG representatives have been under continuous instructions to make certain that these minimum training requirements are met) has been made possible by drawing heavily from World War II stocks. From here on out MDAP deliveries will be largely dependent upon new production from assembly lines of which many are only recently under way with funds provided in January of this year. This means that in the period immediately ahead of us (probably extending for 12 to 18 months), while new lines of production are being built up, the requirements for MDAP deliveries will be in competition with the requirements for deliveries to meet the needs of our own rapidly

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PAGE 2

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NR: DEF 84727

PAGE 3

expanding US forces in addition to Korea (which is very costly). Pending the attainment of a flow of production sufficient to meet the two sets of requirements (both of which must of course continue to be subordinated to the requirements of the United Nations Forces in Korea), it will be necessary to work off a fair apportionment of available End Items between the two. A fair allocations system, supplemented by a greatly expanded offshore procurement program, is the crux of the problem in my opinion. Steps to ensure such an apportionment are now being taken, with active support from this office for your needs. For any such action to succeed it will be essential that End Items allocated to MDAP deliveries are pressed into effective use as rapidly as delivered. With respect to the possibility noted in your message of your being able to accelerate the troop programs of one or two nations if heavier and more expeditious deliveries of equipment could be made, I assume that in accordance with existing instructions General Handy's regional and country representatives will be forwarding us the necessary particulars. When we receive them we will do our best to help you take advantage of the situation. I have the feeling, however, the problem is largely the one of the chicken and the egg. In any event, I am convinced that during this interim period of End Item shortages, in order for us to be able to maintain any system of fair apportionment between MDAP requirements and those of our own forces, it will be necessary to demonstrate on a continuing basis that deliveries of MDAP equipment are being translated directly into steadily expanding NATO forces. Under such a system of apportionment, we expect within the next 12-14 months to complete delivery of all items of MDAP equipment embraced in the FY 1950, - 51 and 1952 programs as now authorized by Congress, except in the categories of tanks, aircraft, and certain electronics equipment wherein, principally because of the long lead time required, some deliveries will be delayed beyond the end of calendar 1952. This picture will of course be subject to change depending upon the extent of war requirements in Korea (achievement of an acceptable armistice would improve the picture substantially and, conversely, any increase of requirements would set it back). The picture would also be affected, as previously noted, by any other additions to our present commitments or by any acceleration in the rate of the deliveries to non-NATO countries such as we are undertaking to make in Indochina at the urgent request of the French. On the plus side, increased use of overseas production sources for complete items and parts should help. Army has already authorized Handy to proceed with approximately \$300,000,000 of

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(22 OCT 51)

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NR: DEF 84727

PAGE 11

procurement, principally in ammunition, spare parts, and electronics. About 200,000,000s of additional overseas procurement will be forthcoming shortly from the Navy and Air Force. In response to the suggestion in your message, I am arranging to have Major General George Olmsted, USA, who is the Director of Military Assistance in OSD, come over and give you and your staff the details of the MDAP deliveries picture. General Olmsted is presently planning to arrive in Paris on October 24. I will be coming over about November 14 on my way to the NATO meeting in Rome and hope to have an opportunity of discussing this and other matters with you at that time. I hope the foregoing may help somewhat to clarify the picture for you. What both of us need are some facts with the water wrung out of them and between us we should be able to get them. I will appreciate your frank comments and guidance. I regard the problem as one of the greatest importance, and nothing within my reach will be left undone toward helping to resolve it. With my best regards and wishes, I am, sincerely, Bob L.



Note : Corrections underlined.

Note: Ref msg is ALO 420 (18 OCT 51)

ACTION: US LIAISON

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(22 OCT 51)

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1/3/52

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

N4 A

January 3, 1952.

WHITE HOUSE DICTATION

Item No. 5.

Atomic Energy

I informed the President of the reasons given by the British for declining our proposal for the joint atomic test in Nevada.

I also mentioned to him Arthur Vandenberg Jr.'s forthcoming book, with its comments on atomic energy matters.

The President expressed the opinion that if Defense and AEC had made all the changes which national security required, it would be both unwise and impossible to propose any others. He said that, if Mr. Vandenberg had asked us to check the facts, we could, of course, have suggested such changes as were necessary to make the account accurate. However, if these differed from matters recorded in the diaries, he doubted if the changes would be made.

He agreed that we should speak to Mr. Churchill about the matter and that we should probably contemplate publication of the Quebec agreement at some time. I wish Mr. Arneson would give thought to this. The President gave it as his first impression that it would be unwise to publish the Modus Vivendi.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Authority

NLT 92-8

CS

3-18-93

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

S: D. Acheson: be

JCS Review, 6/3/1027
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

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J.C.S. 2220/4

31 January 1952

Pages 34 - 37, incl.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

INFORMATION FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER
ON AVAILABILITY OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

Reference: J.C.S. 2220 Series

At their meeting on 25 January 1952, after considering J.C.S. 2220, J.C.S. 2220/1, J.C.S. 2220/2, and J.C.S. 2220/3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to forward the memorandum in the Enclosure to General Eisenhower.

W. G. LALOR,

E. H. L. GARDNER

Joint Secretariat.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 19 Jan 26

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Bradley
Gen. Collins (CSA)
Adm. Fichteler (CNO)
Gen. Vandenberg (CSAF)

Gen. Lee (D. n. Plans, Air)
Gen. Thatcher (DD Plans, Air)
Gen. Cabell (D/JS)
Gen. J. S. Bradley (DDSP)

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

SM-271-52
28 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER

(THROUGH: U.S. Liaison Officer, SHAPE)

Subject: Planning Assumptions

1. Reference is made to your recent conversation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning certain planning assumptions on availability of atomic weapons for use by your command in planning your scheduled maneuvers.

2. The following information is classified TOP SECRET and may be released to the Allied members of your Staff on a strictly "need to know" basis. These figures are being given to you purely as planning assumptions and do not reflect stockpile capabilities or actual planning allocation of atomic weapons to your command:

a. As of 1 April 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have authorized a tentative planning figure of _____* atomic weapons for tactical use in the defense of Western Eurasia. This is a planning assumption only and should not be interpreted as representing an allocation of weapons and is subject to revision from time to time. All weapons will be assumed to be air burst type.

b. The actual weapons would be retained in the custody of U.S. Commands. For planning purposes it may be assumed that you will be responsible for determining the military significance of targets, for target approval, and for weapon expenditure. All weapons delivered in support of your operations, whether delivered by forces allocated to you or by supporting commands, would be chargeable against the number of weapons indicated in paragraph 2 a above.

* Figure to be furnished under separate cover. Figure on file in J.C.S. Secretariat

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2220/4

JCS Review, 6/3/1027
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION~~

COPY NO. 27

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J.C.S. 2220/4

31 January 1952

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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* Figure to be furnished under separate cover. Figure on file in J.C.S. Secretariat

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCS 2220/4

~~TOP SECRET~~

c. There is considerable flexibility as to the exact types which may be included in the planning figure indicated above. The breakdown of the planning figure should be determined by the type targets selected for attack. However, for a representative distribution of weapons types within this total figure an approximate percentage deliverability by U.S. aircraft types is indicated below:

<u>Types</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
USAF Medium Bombers	70
USAF B-45 Light Bombers	70
USAF F-84 Fighter Bombers	35
USN AJ-1 Attack Bombers	100
USN AD-4B Attack Bombers	35
USN F2H-2B Fighter Bomber	35

d. The following factors apply to bombing capabilities of various aircraft types:

(1) Suitably equipped USAF B-45 light bombers and medium bombers can bomb by SHORAN in areas covered by SHORAN ground installation.

(2) USAF medium, and B-45 light bombers and USN AJ-1 attack bombers can bomb by radar.

(3) All types listed under paragraph 2 c above can bomb under MSQ ground control.

(4) USAF F-84, USN AD-4B and F2H-2B types can execute dive and toss bombing attacks.

e. The following factors apply to bombing accuracy:

(1) Dive and toss bombing 600 feet CEP.*

(2) All-weather horizontal bombing 3,000 feet CEP.

(3) Visual horizontal bombing - 1500 feet CEP.

(4) Horizontal bombing within SHORAN or MSQ range (all-weather) 900 feet CEP.

f. Nominal weapon yield - 20 kilotons.

* CEP - circular probable error - the radius of the circle within which half the bombs will fall.

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. As of 1 April 1952, one F-84 Wing and one B-45 Wing (reduced strength) with aircraft modified to carry atomic weapons will be deployed to the Europe-Mediterranean area.

h. As of 1 April 1952, one Navy AJ-1 Squadron (9 planes) and 4 AD-4 plus 4 F2H-2 aircraft modified to carry atomic weapons will be deployed to the Mediterranean area. The number of AD-4B's and F2H-2B's will be increased substantially after 1 April 1952.

i. Strategic Air Command (SAC) units are also available on call from you, to augment units now available or shortly to become available to you, for delivery of these weapons. Current SAC operations orders specifically provide for SHORAN equipped aircraft to "stand by" for retardation operations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ W. G. LALOR,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.),
Secretary.

~~TOP SECRET~~

JCS 2220/4

best tell us whether we can increase the pressure without unacceptable casualties. Secretary Acheson summed up by saying the question is whether the time has come to recess the armistice negotiations.

THE PRESIDENT stated that the situation has arrived where a decision must be made whether we let the prisoner of war issue go over for political discussion without changing our position or whether we will do anything in the world to get an armistice. He said that he wished to be perfectly clear that he was not willing to do the latter. The only purpose of an armistice should be to try to get peace in the Pacific but not under conditions which may later enable the Communists to take over Japan or elsewhere. We have been striving to prevent World War III but this situation contains all the elements which could cause that war to come about. If and when the armistice is signed, we will find ourselves in the same position as on September 2, 1945, when we accepted the surrender of Japan and then tore up our military machine. Everyone was involved in that development and it is impossible to put the blame any one place. The President said that we cannot sit down now with the doors open and no military machine to protect us -- we must build up our military strength.

SECRETARY FOSTER said he thought Secretary Acheson had made a fine summing-up. Secretary Foster said that Defense was concerned about the morale problem in Korea. There is also the rotation problem to be considered. To put over the prisoner of war issue to political discussions would be disastrous. We must have a sound military armistice that will protect our troops in the field. Even then we will have all the difficulties mentioned. Our Field Commanders believe they have the ability to increase pressures without bringing on all-out war. One possibility is the use of two Chinese Nationalist divisions in Korea. In any case we can increase our pressure on the ground, including amphibious landings.

Secretary Foster said that all the people in Defense feel that the time has come to put our package proposal before the North Koreans and Chinese Communists and ask them to accept it. We have already made concessions. The airfield question involved a great concession which was made only in order to get our package proposal. Defense has come to the conclusion that the weekly meetings give the impression that we have something further to retreat to. General Harrison, not the President, should make a summary of our position, give the Communists time--say ten days--to accept as our final terms; then if they reject it, have an indefinite recess during which we increase the pressure, although not necessarily over the Yalu or by blockade. If we create the impression that we are increasing the pressures it will improve the morale of our troops there, since it is the stagnation that gets them.



3/24/52. 'Memo for the Pres-3 - (7 NSC Mtg. that morning)
1952/220/NSC Mtg. Memo for Pres. 3/24/52-63"
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JCS records, 6/5/839
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J.C.S. 1907/74

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

4 June 1952

Pages 458 - 461, incl.

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

UNITED STATES POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER SOVIET
OR SATELLITE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN

References: a. J.C.S. 1907 series
b. J.C.S. 1907/73

THE PROBLEM

1. As a matter of priority, and in accordance with the request contained in a memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 2 June 1952 (Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1907/73), to draft comments and recommendations on NSC 132, dated 29 May 1952, subject as above (Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 1907/73).

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat has been advised that the Office of the Secretary of Defense desires the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 132 by Friday, 6 June 1952.

RECOMMENDATION

3. That the memorandum in the Enclosure be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

DISTRIBUTION

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DATE 20 Oct 1971

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See decision on dtd 6-5-52

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S.O.

6-4-52

~~TOP SECRET~~ENCLOSUREDRAFTMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: United States Policy and Courses of Action to
Counter Possible Soviet or Satellite Action
Against Berlin (NSC 132)

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum of 2 June 1952 in which you requested the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 132, a draft statement of policy by the National Security Council Staff on the above subject. Study of the subject paper by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has necessarily been limited because of the desire of the National Security Council for early consideration of the matter.

2. In view of the recent declaration by the United States, United Kingdom, and France that "the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three powers there are regarded by them as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation" and that "they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarters as an attack upon their forces and themselves,"* the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, have no objection to the courses of action set forth in the draft statement of policy contained in NSC 132. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire, however, to record their understanding, with respect to certain parts of this statement of policy, that:

a. Concert of action on the part of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic will be a condition precedent to the implementation of the major courses of action set forth in the statement of policy (see paragraph 4 of NSC 132);

* Three Power Declaration made at Paris on 27 May 1952 by the United States, Britain, and France; on file in the J.C.S. Secretariat.

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b. When serious harassing measures against Berlin (short of a full blockade) are imposed by the Soviets, the United States will, among other things, immediately initiate a substantial increase in the level of its mobilization effort and coincident thereto will seek comparable action on the part of its Western allies. Thereafter, and depending upon the course of events, the development of increased military capabilities to meet any increase in the threat of general war will be paced to match a progression through the several situations set forth in the statement of policy (see paragraphs 5, 11 d, 18, 19 and 23 of NSC 132);

c. In view of the fact that Berlin would be militarily untenable in the event of general war, the purpose of the employment of military force as proposed in NSC 132 will be to determine whether the Soviets intend to maintain the blockade by force of arms. It will not be to open or maintain land and/or air corridors to Berlin against active military opposition (see paragraphs 11 e and 23 of NSC 132);

d. In the extreme situation in which the Soviet Union attacks Berlin with its own forces, the time factor involved in an ultimatum will not be such that, in the event of failure of the ultimatum, the military will have been placed at a serious disadvantage by undue delay in the implementation of emergency war plans; in this situation the military consideration will be overriding (see paragraph 27 of NSC 132); and

e. The courses of action prescribed in NSC 132, as well as the attendant implementing steps, will be kept under continuing review by the National Security Council in the light of developments in the world situation. This review is without prejudice to a reconsideration of these courses of action following any significant change in the status of East Germany as prescribed in paragraph 2 of NSC 132.

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3. In connection with measures of reprisal which would be taken when and if the Soviet rulers intensify harassing measures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that consideration will also be given to the progressive denial to Soviet seaborne commerce of the use of allied ports, and allied-controlled waterways such as the Suez and Panama Canals (see paragraph 13 of NSC 132).

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you communicate these views to the National Security Council and confirm the foregoing understanding with the Council prior to final action on NSC 132.

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JCS 1907/74

8/12/52

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NSC 132/1

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 56

A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by


THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

on

UNITED STATES POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER
POSSIBLE SOVIET OR SATELLITE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN

June 12, 1952

WASHINGTON



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NSC 132/1

June 12, 1952

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION TO
COUNTER POSSIBLE SOVIET OR SATELLITE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN

References: A. NSC Action Nos. 84-b, 645 and 648
B. NSC 132
C. SE-30
D. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 6 and June 10, 1952
E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "The Berlin Stockpile Situation and An Analysis of Airlift Capabilities", dated June 6, 1952
F. NSC 24/3
G. NSC 73/4, pars. 37-g and 42
H. NSC 89

At the 118th Council meeting with the President presiding, the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury adopted NSC 132, subject to the revisions therein recommended by the Senior NSC Staff in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of June 10 (NSC Action No. 648).

The report, as amended and adopted, was subsequently submitted to the President for consideration. The President has this date approved NSC 132, as amended and enclosed herewith, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.

Accordingly, NSC 24/3 is superseded by the enclosed report.

Special security precautions are requested in the handling of the enclosure.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Acting Director of Defense Mobilization

NSC 132/1

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REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILONUNITED STATES POLICY AND COURSES OF ACTION TO COUNTER
POSSIBLE SOVIET OR SATELLITE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN

1. In the view of the United States, the maintenance of the Western position in Berlin is of such importance to the Western powers that it could not be abandoned except at the cost of a major political reverse. The Soviet Union has it within its power to make the Western position in Berlin untenable: this result could be accomplished at any time by the use of force; it might be accomplished over a period of time by restricting Western access to the city. In the view of the United States, the Western powers should not voluntarily abandon the city under communist pressure even though the resulting situation may involve great risk of general war.

2. It is also the view of the United States that the Soviet Union should be held responsible for any communist action against the Western position in Berlin whether the action is taken by the Soviets or by East Germans or other satellites. Should a significant change in the status of East Germany take place, and particularly should the Soviets take steps to give East Germany the juridical semblance of autonomy, the courses of action which follow should be reviewed. Pending such review, the policy in this paper will retain its validity.

3. As long as Germany remains divided and Berlin is a land island in the Soviet Zone, the maintenance of our position in the city will not be an easy task. On the contrary, it is likely to be as nerve-wracking as it is important, and there is no way to make it otherwise. We must expect continuing harassing measures of greater or lesser severity. These measures may be designed to put us under pressure for the purpose of gaining concessions from us in Germany or elsewhere in return for the relaxation of the harassing measures. Or conceivably they may even be designed to provoke us into the use of force in an effort to make us appear responsible for the war which would probably follow. Or, and this is the most probably contingency, these measures might flow from steps which the Soviets would logically take to consolidate and strengthen their position in the eastern zone of Germany now that they are faced with the tying of West Germany into the Western defense community.

4. In considering possible courses of action, we must recognize that they can be pursued effectively only with the support of our major allies. It is reasonable to assume that divergencies of view are liable to develop as to the desirability and effectiveness of specific courses of action, and the United States must take these into account at every stage of planning and execution of plans.

5. The United States should therefore, as appropriate, seek agreement with its allies to common courses of action in each of the situations set forth below:

- a. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded;
- b. Serious harassing measures short of a full blockade are employed;
- c. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade are imposed;
- d. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable;
- e. A Soviet or satellite attack on the Western forces in Berlin occurs.

A. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT THAT WESTERN
ACCESS TO BERLIN IS NOT SERIOUSLY IMPEDED

6. The United States, in concert with appropriate allies, should take advantage of situations in which access to Berlin is not seriously impeded, to decrease Berlin's vulnerability by such measures as the expansion of stockpiles and of airlift capabilities. In addition, they should prepare to react by economic and other reprisals against the Soviet system in the event that the Soviet rulers intensify their harassing measures. Finally, in the light of the tensions which would be created by intensified harassing measures they should develop Western strength and unity to a degree not otherwise possible.

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7. The measures which can be taken to decrease the vulnerability and enhance the security of the Western position in Berlin depend largely on the degree of Western unity. If the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic have a determination to hold Berlin equalling our own, it should be possible to increase our staying power. If this unity is evident to the Soviet rulers, it may serve as a deterrent to aggressive Soviet action. The United States should do what it can to foster unity on this matter.

8. A variety of measures should be taken to convey to the Soviet rulers the determination of the Western powers to remain in Berlin even at the risk of using force to maintain access to the city. It is believed that informal warnings are preferable to formal governmental statements, whether made publicly or communicated through diplomatic channels. Formal action might become desirable if the communists take or seem about to take actions which threaten to make the Western position untenable. It should be made clear that the Western powers will regard the Soviet Union as being responsible for action by the East Germans or other satellites.

a. High officials of the United States should from time to time indicate in press conferences, speeches, etc., that the United States is determined to remain in Berlin, will take whatever measures are necessary to maintain access to the city and their position in it, and is

confident that the Russians are sufficiently aware of the dangerous consequences which would flow from the imposition of harassing measures to make such action unlikely:

*see 99 NSC 173 (12/1/53) - ref to
black + gray propaganda at this point*

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c. U.S. officials in Germany should from time to time "brief" the West Berlin and West German authorities on the determination of the Western powers to maintain their position in the city, with the expectation that such information would reach the communists.

d. Parallel action by officials of allied governments should be sought.

9. The United States should take and encourage action which will strengthen and make evident allied preparedness to cope with a new blockade. This should include the further build-up of a staggered stockpile* in Berlin adequate to maintain Berlin and the Western position there for a year, as an initial goal, based upon the assumption that a limited airlift can be established and maintained. The appropriate authorities of the United States Government should prepare,

*A staggered stockpile as here proposed is one containing a preponderant supply of relatively inexpensive items needed in large quantities, such as coal and grain, which require greater capacity for their transport during an airlift than the remaining necessary items.

as a matter of urgency, a plan for building up and financing this stockpile and for necessary related measures, such as the maintenance and improvement of Berlin airfields. When the foregoing stockpile level has been reached, consideration should be given to the desirability of further increases which would prolong the period during which the Western powers could maintain their position in Berlin in the face of harassing measures.

10. Consideration should now be given to the questions whether it is feasible to evacuate part of the Berlin population and whether, if this could be done, the Western airlift could supply the remaining population and the Western forces with essential supplies.

11. In preparation for severe harassing measures or a blockade, the United States, in concert where appropriate with the U.K., France, and other allied nations, should:

a. Make plans for mounting the maximum practicable airlift.

b. Make plans for such contingencies as use of alternate land routes to Berlin and for engineering work which may be needed to repair obstructions to ground travel such as bridge and railroad repair.

c. Make plans for an immediate cessation of trade and transport with the Soviet bloc by the United States and as many allied nations as possible in the event of a blockade. Since the United States now has a virtual embargo on trade with the Soviet bloc, there is little which

the United States can do to increase pressure on the Soviet bloc by intensification of its own trade restrictions. In view of the fact that the possibility of counter-action and reprisal depends almost entirely upon the extent to which our allies in Western Europe are willing to take the necessary measures, it is essential to obtain some sense of the extent to which these other countries would be willing to institute such measures in the event of a new Berlin blockade or other harassment of Berlin. Accordingly, the United States should consult with the U.K., France, other Coordinating Committee (COCOM) countries, and Western Germany on this issue and joint planning should be promptly instituted to develop these measures in detail. In this connection, consideration should be given to the best means of replacing from non-Soviet sources, the essential Western imports from the Soviet system which might be cut off by the Soviet rulers if the Western powers cut off important exports to the Soviet system.

d. Recognizing the possibility that the Western position in Berlin might ultimately become untenable, make plans to materially increase military capabilities to meet the increased threat of general war resulting from that possibility.

e. Make plans for the use of military force in carrying out the courses of action contained in paragraphs 23-25.

12. The appropriate authorities of the United States Government should make such preparations as are feasible for additional reprisals which might be taken against the Soviet system when and if the Soviet rulers intensify harassing measures.

13. The United States should discuss certain aspects of the problem of reprisals with the U.K., France, Western Germany and other allies whose cooperation would be important and attempt to reach agreement with them on the general nature and purpose of the reprisals which would be taken when and if the Soviet rulers intensify harassing measures. The costs of reprisals to the Western powers should be considered as well as the cost of any set of reprisals to the Soviet system. Reprisals need not be restricted to ones directly linked to the local situation, particularly since the Soviet zone is becoming increasingly less vulnerable to the measures of economic retaliation employed up to now. For example, reprisals might include measures against Soviet sea-borne commerce, such as strict enforcement of all relevant laws, regulations, and so forth, with the object of greatly slowing down and impeding this commerce without actually forbidding it.

14. The appropriate authorities of the United States Government should keep under continuing review, in the light of the situation in Berlin, the courses of action which could be taken to accelerate the Western defense effort and to

increase Western unity, including consideration of full mobilization.

15. The United States should discuss means of increasing Western strength and unity with the U.K., France, Western Germany, and other allies whose cooperation would be important, and attempt to reach agreement with these allies that such actions will be initiated when and if the Soviet Union intensifies harassing measures.

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The United States and its allies should maintain flexibility in implementing the courses of action set forth in the following sections.

B. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT OF SERIOUS
HARASSING MEASURES SHORT OF A FULL BLOCKADE

17. One of the most probable lines of Soviet or satellite action in the coming period would be employment of harassing tactics, particularly with reference to movement of persons and things to and from West Berlin, short of full blockade but drastic enough to seriously injure the Western position in Berlin, without, however, threatening to make it immediately untenable. In addition to producing this effect, the purpose would probably also be to undermine West Berlin morale and sow confusion and dissension among the Western powers while not incurring the psychological disadvantages of a full blockade.

18. The object of United States courses of action in meeting such a situation should be to minimize the above-mentioned effects, prolong Western capacity to stay in Berlin, and use the increased tension to accelerate the strengthening of the West. Accordingly, the Western powers should initiate--taking account of the particular circumstances at the time--such measures as may be appropriate for which preparations will have been made in accordance with the recommendations in paragraphs 11-16 above.

C. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT THAT A BLOCKADE
OR HARASSING MEASURES TANTAMOUNT TO A
SURFACE BLOCKADE ARE IMPOSED

19. Because it would be very difficult to disguise the true nature of any armed attack on Berlin, and nearly certain that any armed attack would rapidly lead to general war, it is highly probable that the Soviets or satellites, if they decide to drive the Western powers from Berlin, will attempt to accomplish this result by restricting access to the city. Belief on the part of the Soviets or satellites that the Western powers would probably use force rather than abandon the city without resistance will tend to deter Soviet action which would pose this choice for the West. However, the Soviet or satellites may not be deterred. If the Soviet or satellites so intensify harassing measures as to threaten to make the Western position in Berlin eventually untenable, the Western powers should prolong the period during which they will be able to remain in the city by taking such measures as an airlift, and should make use of this period to accelerate the Western defense effort and to increase Western unity, including consideration of the initiation of full mobilization. They should also take retaliatory action in an effort to induce the Soviet or satellites to cease their harassment. In short, during this period the Western powers should initiate--taking account of the particular circumstances at the time--such measures as may be appropriate for which preparations will have been made in accordance with the recommendations in paragraphs 11-16 above.

20. The Western powers should re-open the Berlin case in the United Nations and should make full use of the United Nations in their efforts to prevent the serious deterioration of the situation and to gain world support for their efforts to remain in Berlin.

21. A direct approach to the appropriate Soviet authorities by the U.K., French, and U.S. Ambassadors in Moscow should be considered if and when a blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a blockade are imposed or are about to be imposed.* It might be desirable to make a frank exposition, in the light of firm determination of the Western powers to maintain their position in Berlin, of the consequences of the course on which the Soviets or satellites appeared about to embark or had embarked.

*This does not, of course, preclude approaches at other levels such as have been employed in the face of past harassments.

D. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT
THAT THE WESTERN POSITION HAS BECOME
OR IS ABOUT TO BECOME UNTENABLE

22. The Soviet Union probably now has at its disposal means short of overt attack which could seriously interfere with the operation of an airlift. If this proves to be the case and if it employs these means, the Western position in Berlin may become untenable.

23. The Western powers should avoid the use of force unless and until necessity dictates. However, if the Western position is about to become untenable despite the measures recommended in the paragraphs above, it is the view of the United States Government that the Western powers should be prepared to use limited military force rather than voluntarily abandon their position in Berlin. If this need arises, they should realize that they are likely to meet resistance and that war would then be an imminent probability, and they should therefore initiate reasonable precautionary measures probably including full mobilization and appropriate redeployments of military forces. Additionally, they should take measures in the UN and elsewhere designed to lay the best possible foundation for the forceful action which might become necessary.

24. As a last resort short of the use of force, an ultimatum to the Soviet Union would probably be desirable. It would demand the lifting of the blockade and other harassing

measures and would explicitly or implicitly threaten the use of force to break the blockade in the event that the Soviet or satellites disregarded it. The precise nature, terms, and form of the ultimatum and the participation in it should be determined in the light of the circumstances at the time. It should be formulated in terms which are consistent with the UN Charter, particularly Article 51, and which will serve to gain the widest possible UN support.

25. If the Western position becomes untenable despite the measures recommended above and if in these circumstances it is decided to use force to open a corridor to Berlin, the Western powers may be able to maintain their position in Berlin if the Soviets do not offer armed opposition. If, however, determined Soviet armed opposition should develop, the Western powers should not undertake to commit additional forces to meet such opposition in an effort to hold Berlin, but would have to face general war.

E. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT OF A
SOVIET OR SATELLITE ATTACK ON WESTERN FORCES IN BERLIN

26. The United States, U.K. and France maintain a sizable military force in Berlin. An attack on these forces is covered by the NAT commitment. A Tripartite Declaration issued at the signing of the EDC Treaty reaffirmed our commitment with respect to Berlin. We assume that control of Berlin, in and of itself, is not so important to the Soviet rulers as to justify

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involving the Soviet Union in general war. We can therefore act on the assumption that the Soviet rulers will not use Soviet forces to drive the Western powers from the city unless they decide for other reasons to provoke or initiate general war.

27. If the Soviet Union should attack Berlin with its own forces, the United States Government will have to act on the assumption that general war is imminent. In addition to resisting the initial attack and to placing itself in the best possible position for immediate global war, the United States Government should, if circumstances permit, address an ultimatum to the Soviet Government before full implementation of emergency war plans. It will be desirable to issue the ultimatum through NATO, if possible. If this is not possible, it would be of great importance to act in concert with other allied governments, especially the Governments of the U.K., France, and the Federal Republic. The precise nature, terms and form of the ultimatum and the participation in it should be determined in light of the circumstances at the time. Appropriate action should be taken in the UN to gain the widest possible support for the actions which had been forced upon the United States and its allies by the Soviet Union.

28. It should be noted that an overt, direct attack on Berlin by Soviet forces as an initial move in a deliberate resort to war is most unlikely. If the Soviet rulers decide to initiate or provoke general war using Berlin as a pretext,

it is probable that they will seek to conduct themselves in a way which will obscure their own responsibility and place responsibility on the Western powers. It should be an important objective of the United States and its allies to foil this effort, no matter what ruses the Soviet rulers employ to conceal or dissemble the nature of their action.

29. It is probable that if the Soviet rulers decide to drive the Western powers from Berlin by force, they will initially use East German forces and will attempt to portray this attack as a counteraction to some action by the Western powers. If this contingency arises, the United States should act as indicated in paragraph 27. It would probably be feasible and it might be even more important in these circumstances to issue an ultimatum to the Soviet Union before full implementation of emergency plans for general war.

30. We can also act on the assumption that the Soviet rulers will not use East German or other satellite forces to drive the Western powers from the city unless they are prepared to accept the risk of general war. This is so because it would be extremely difficult to localize the resulting hostilities. A possible exception should be noted: there is perhaps a chance that the Soviet rulers might use East German forces--alone or reinforced by other satellite forces--under certain circumstances in the belief that if the Western powers did not back down, the satellite action could be broken off without involving the Soviet Union in war. So long as

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Soviet forces remain in Eastern Germany, should satellite forces attack Berlin the United States, in concert with appropriate allies, should immediately call upon the Soviet Union to suppress the attack at once or stand responsible for its continuance. Should the USSR fail to take adequate and prompt action to terminate the satellite attack, the action outlined in paragraph 27 should be taken.

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By hmg NARS, Date 9/24/85

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Agreed Concepts - Between State, Defense and
AEC on Matters Pertaining to Development, Manufacture
and Use of Atomic Weapons



I. ACTIONS REQUIRING PRESIDENTIAL DECISION

1. By direction of the President the NSC Special Committee shall "pass on the directives which I have to make, that effect all three of those Departments. (AEC, State, Defense)". Nothing in this limits the authority or responsibility of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, or Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, in their statutory responsibilities to deal directly with the President.

JCS

2. One of the duties of the Committee shall be to advise the President on the impact of all major atomic energy matters with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relative to the national security.

II. STOCKPILE CUSTODY

3. Military access to weapons stockpile is practicable in terms of the concept of "ready for military to use" for a pool of atomic weapons, the number of which will be adequate for military war plans

but will be a fraction of the total war reserve stockpile, should be transferred to the custody of the JCS in order to improve the state of military readiness, subject to:

III. ATOMIC WEAPONS

4. Requirements

a. The Department of Defense is responsible for military requirements for atomic weapons including their desired military characteristics.

b. (1) The Atomic Energy Commission is responsible for the design and development (and manufacture) of atomic weapons.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 89-314 #3

BY LJS DATE 8/12/91

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(2) The Department of Defense is responsible for the delivery vehicle or mechanism used.

(3) It has been determined by the Atomic Energy Commission that the atomic weapon is the nuclear core and the auxiliary mechanism needed to fire the weapon. The exterior casing is not an inherent atomic component. It is the marriage link between the atomic weapon and the delivery vehicle or mechanism. The responsibilities here are joint. They are also joint when the auxiliary mechanism needed to fire the weapon becomes an (guidance) inherent part of the delivery systems; i.e., (guided missiles).

c. Extensive consultation between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense will take place in preparation of the necessary data for the establishment of requirements.

5. Production

d. The Atomic Energy Commission is responsible for the production of finished weapons including the production of fissionable materials and component hardware.*

e. (1) The Atomic Energy Commission shall submit annual production schedules for fissionable materials and finished atomic weapons for review by the Department of Defense and subsequent joint recommendation to the President.

(2) The Atomic Energy Commission shall submit medium and long range forecasts of production schedules for finished weapons

*Note: There is an inconsistency here in that AEC makes external cases which we now say are outside the development of atomic weapons.

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and fissionable materials for review with the Department of Defense. These schedules shall serve as a basis for military planning.

f. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense shall exchange ideas for new weapons systems when and as these ideas occur.

6. Inspection and Acceptance

g. The Department of Defense as user shall determine criteria for weapons acceptability. Provision for monitoring progress and inspection of components at agreed stages of completion shall be worked out jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense.

7. Resolution of Disagreements

h. In all matters relating to atomic weapons development and production, the roles of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense are complementary. Where one has the responsibility for decision, the other is advisory. In the event that it is not possible for the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense to agree, the statutory provisions of Public Law 585 should be used by the Secretary of Defense for appeal to the President.

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June 27, 1952



MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Interest
In The Use of Atomic Weapons

A meeting of the staff of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy was held in your office on Friday, June 27, at 2:30 p.m.. The following were present:

State: Mr. Arneson

Defense: Mr. LeBaron
Capt. Ellis, USN (Joint Staff)

AEC: Brig. Gen. Fields
Capt. Ashworth, USN

NSC: Mr. Lay
Mr. Gleason

The Executive Secretary referred to the informal minutes of the meeting of the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy held in the Secretary of State's office on June 17, 1952. He then suggested taking each of the four issues which it had been decided at that meeting had been raised by the JCS paper, to see where we stood on these points and what should be done about them. The first of the four dealt with procedures whereby the President could most effectively obtain advice when called upon to decide on the use of atomic weapons. The Executive Secretary then called upon Mr. LeBaron for comment with respect to the views of the Department of Defense on the existing draft on this "use" policy which was essentially the earlier staff paper with minor amendments by State.

Mr. LeBaron did not answer directly this question, but posed another question in its place, namely, whether the staff desired to consider the "use" policy as something which it would act upon separately, or as part of a more general action relating to the general principles which had been agreed to on all four issues. He pointed out that if the Special Committee were to act separately on a draft statement with respect to use policy, such a draft would have to be sent in the usual manner to the Joint Chiefs for comment, after which the Secretary of Defense would make his decision. From the point of view of the internal operations of the Defense Department, Mr. LeBaron stated that this would be less advantageous than to consider the use

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 89-314#2

BY LHO DATE 8/12/91

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WHO (NSC staff) / Ex Secy's Subject ERL/4/#11 before
Director (2)

policy as part of a larger package. He did state, however, that with certain clarifications Mr. Arneson's statement of policy on use was generally acceptable to the Defense Department.



Asked for his views, Mr. Arneson stated that he thought that a draft report on use policy should go forward as a separate report and that if the Joint Chiefs did not like it it would be best that we should know why.

The Executive Secretary expressed some concern at the prospect of putting all four of the problems raised at the Secretary of State's office into one bundle, though he admitted that they were interrelated. He furthermore noted that technically, at least, the use paper had been before the Special Committee for some considerable time. He further expressed the hope of dealing in general with the other three points in the course of the afternoon's meeting.

Mr. LeBaron stated that he had no final objections to sending this paper separately to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though he warned that such a procedure might complicate the problem of dealing with the other three points, that is, the over-all problem of obtaining a statement of general principles covering all of the four points. He noted that he had at hand a paper which he had drafted, entitled "Agreed Concepts between State, Defense and AEC on Matters Pertaining to Development, Manufacture and Use of Atomic Weapons". It was his view, said Mr. LeBaron, that, as suitably revised and agreed, such a paper should go forward to the Special Committee prior to any detailed reports concerning the implementation of these agreed concepts.

*copy
attached*

Although Mr. Arneson still maintained that it would be best to deal with the use paper separately, since it was already virtually agreed, he expressed willingness to follow the procedure suggested by Mr. LeBaron if it would obviate problems from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He did, however, observe that the willingness of the State Department to go along with the other three points agreed to at the Secretary's meeting, depended on prior agreement to the draft report on use policy.

Coming back to his own point, Mr. LeBaron again suggested that the best procedure would be to send forward to the Special Committee draft recommendations on general principles to govern all four issues at stake, for the consideration of the President. Obviously, he added, it would be necessary to back up each of the generalizations in the draft with more detailed papers governing the specifics of implementation and authority. He said that frankly the proposal to send up four different papers was disappointing to him, since this would entail going through the whole long process again of reaching agreements which he had understood had already been obtained on broad principles at the meeting in the Secretary of State's office. He was, furthermore, unwilling to predict the length of time which such a procedure was likely to require in the Defense Department.



After further discussion the Executive Secretary stated that he perceived no very strong objection to taking Mr. LeBaron's draft statement of general principles and, after agreement, sending it to the Special Committee if attached to it at the appropriate places were drafts of implementing procedures which would cover the problems which would inevitably arise in translating these principles into practice. However, he expressed some anxiety lest such a procedure end up with the Special Committee's agreement to a variety of pious generalizations which might well disguise disagreements on the specifics by which such general principles were actually carried out in action.

The other staff members agreed with the proposal which the Executive Secretary suggested, but Mr. Arneson pointed out that it was essential to know the reaction of the Atomic Energy Commission to Mr. LeBaron's draft, which they had not yet had an opportunity to study. If this opportunity were given there could be greater certainty that the agreement to these principles was actual and not merely verbal.

Accordingly, the Executive Secretary asked Mr. LeBaron to transmit copies of his draft statement to General Fields and to himself, noted that Mr. Arneson already had a copy, and suggested that after all concerned had studied this draft, a meeting be held next week to agree on the text. This proposal met with unanimous agreement, and the next meeting of the staff was set for Wednesday, July 2, at 2:30 p.m., in the Executive Secretary's office.

The meeting adjourned at 4:00 p.m..

S. Everett Gleason
Deputy Executive Secretary

7/2/52

*Function of the Special Committee
in Advising*

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*National Security
Council on Atomic
Energy*

I. ~~ADVICE TO~~ THE PRESIDENT ON USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

1. By law, the National Security Council is to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security." By direction of the President, the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, is to "pass on the directives which I have to make, that affect all three of those Departments."



2. The above directives are interpreted to mean that the President ~~wants~~ the advice of the Special Committee before making any decision regarding the use of atomic weapons. This is not interpreted as limiting the statutory function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as "the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense."

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MR 89-31541
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document consists of 4 pages
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DRAFT

Flashworth/emh
July 2, 1952



The following general concepts within the provisions of P. L. 585, defining certain responsibilities of the State Department, Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission, constitute United States policy in the development, production, and utilization of atomic weapons.

I. Formulation of Presidential Decision for Military Use of Atomic Weapons.

(a) In making any decision regarding the use of atomic weapons, the views of the following agencies will be made available to the President.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. The Secretary of Defense.
3. The Secretary of State.
4. The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

(b) Any recommendation to the President regarding the use of atomic weapons by the Armed Services initially will be made by, or be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and such recommendation shall be made to the President direct by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(c) Before the President makes a final decision, a meeting of the President with the Special Committee of the National Security Council on Atomic Energy, together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be convened to consider any recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the use of atomic weapons.

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~~(d) Time permitting, consultation with Congressional leaders shall take place before a decision to use atomic weapons is implemented.~~

III (a) In the event of a positive decision, the President ^{would} ~~will~~ authorize the Secretary of Defense to use atomic weapons under such conditions as ^{to the President} ~~may be specified.~~ *specify*

III III. Atomic Weapon Stockpile Custody.

(a) The Department of Defense ^{should} ~~will~~ have custodial responsibility ^{both in the U.S. & elsewhere} for such portion of the stockpile of complete atomic weapons as is

needed to assure operational flexibility and military readiness, ^{for use} ~~as is~~ *subj. to*

(b) The Department of Defense ^{should} ~~will~~ assume responsibility for the security, the provision of arrangements to evacuate, and the acquisition of physical facilities required to store, maintain, and protect against physical deterioration of the atomic weapons under its custodial control. *It above.*

To come out?
(c) The Atomic Energy Commission ^{should} ~~will~~ maintain custodial responsibility for the remainder of the stockpile of complete atomic weapons and the physical facilities required to store and maintain it in order that the Atomic Energy Commission may discharge its responsibility for carrying out major modification and modernization programs and other desirable activities in connection with the atomic weapon stockpile as a whole.

(d) The Department of Defense ^{should} ~~will~~ provide the Atomic Energy Commission such access to atomic weapons in ^{the} ~~its~~ custodial control ^{of the D of D} as is required by the Atomic Energy Commission to discharge its responsibility,

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through modification, modernization, and surveillance programs, to insure that weapons and weapons components manufactured by the Atomic Energy Commission ~~in the custodial control of the Department of Defense~~ are of the most advanced design and technical integrity.

and
TV-III. The Establishment of Military Requirements, Characteristics, and ~~Production~~ Criteria of Atomic Weapons.

should
(a) The Department of Defense will establish the numbers *and types* of atomic weapons and their desired military characteristics required for the defense and security of the United States, *after* ~~subject to~~ discussions with the Atomic Energy Commission regarding the capabilities of the Atomic Energy Commission to meet these requirements.

should
(b) The Atomic Energy Commission, subject to approval by the President, *and, after discussion as to adequacy with the Department of Defense and* will establish ~~the~~ rates of production and production goals for *when* fissionable and weapon materials required for the numbers and *appropriate with the* types of atomic weapons established by the Department of Defense. *Department of State,*

omit
(c) The Atomic Energy Commission *should* will conduct vigorous programs of nuclear research and development to the end that new and radical weapon systems may be developed, and will engineer, test, and manufacture bombs and warheads for specific applications for military uses.

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omit
(d) The Department of Defense will develop and manufacture the vehicles to carry atomic bombs and warheads and may participate in projects for the development and production of atomic weapons under mutual agreements between the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

omit
(e) The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense will cooperate fully in the field of ordnance engineering and development of atomic weapons and weapons systems with the objective of the most effective utilization of their combined facilities and capabilities.

omit
(f) Proposals for new atomic weapons or weapons systems will be generated in the military services and in the Atomic Energy Commission, and both will conduct such studies as they deem necessary.

(c) (g) In consonance with the responsibility of the Department of Defense to establish military characteristics of atomic weapons, the Department of Defense ^{should} ~~will~~ establish appropriate criteria and conduct such tests and evaluations as deemed necessary to ascertain the acceptability of weapons to meet these military characteristics.

V

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V - Classification of Certain ^{atomic} Weapons Data

~~in consultation with the Dept of Defense,~~
The AEC should investigate the possibility of
determining that certain external characteristics
of atomic weapons no longer constitute
Restricted Data, and report the findings
back to the Special Committee ^{of the NSC and AEC} for
consideration.



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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

DEC 1 1952

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Honorable Harry S. Truman

The White House

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our discussion of November 20, 1952,
the attached program is recommended for action.

I believe issuance of this proposed memorandum would
be the most expeditious and effective means of establish-
ing these policies.

Respectfully,

Jack Gorrie
Jack Gorrie
Chairman



Attachment

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Authority NLT-88-7 (FEMA Ltr. 10-27-88)
By DEB NLT Date 11-30-88

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E-1056
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY
RESOURCES BOARD
THE ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL CIVIL
DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION

Significant advances in mass destruction weapons and their carriers constitute a rapidly growing threat to the United States which requires the immediate strengthening of continental defense.

In view of the estimated time scale on which the U.S.S.R. may possess sufficient nuclear weapons to deliver increasingly destructive attacks against the United States, we must begin now to establish greater balance between offense and defense. This must not be done, however, at the expense of offensive striking power. Our policy of building a strong offensive capability is sound because such strength represents a great deterrent to potential aggression.

Even with emphasis on offensive capabilities, it is necessary to take prudent measures to defend the United States and thereby insure its offensive strength.

To counter the threat of atomic attacks, the Nation needs an effective air, sea, and land defense in place as soon as possible and no later than December 31, 1955. Military defense must be supported by well organized programs of civilian defense, industrial security, and plans for rapid rehabilitation of vital facilities.

Recent discoveries in science and technology have made it possible to build an effective shield against this threat. For the first time, we can erect an early warning system and build a continental defense in depth that are both technically and economically feasible.

It is estimated that a system providing three to six hours early warning could be in operation within two years if initial funds for this purpose were made available immediately and necessary priorities and continuing support were given the project.

An early warning system is of special significance in itself. Not only does it multiply many times the effectiveness of our present military defense forces, it also provides the necessary basis for an effective system of passive defense. Obviously,

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there are many other essential elements in a program for protection of the United States against atomic attack. But while the other elements are being developed, we should proceed rapidly with the establishment of an early warning system.

An adequate continental defense would increase tremendously our security, add to our power position with respect to the Soviet Union, and give us a sounder base for speaking with assurance in international affairs.

Therefore, I hereby issue the following directives:

1. Department of Defense

(a) Install and have operational an early warning system with the responsibility of providing a minimum of three hours early warning of hostile aircraft approaching the United States. The target date for accomplishment of this mission is December 31, 1954.

(b) Submit for inclusion in the President's 1954 budget, estimates of appropriations required for this purpose.

(c) Expedite research and development for continental defense, proceeding on the assumption that an early warning system will be operational in two years, with the objective of achieving programming for a full-scale continental defense system as quickly as possible.

(d) Recommend to the President any organizational steps considered necessary to accomplish these goals.

(e) Submit to the President any information considered essential for the President's Message to the Congress urging inclusion of this program in the 1954 budget.

2. National Security Resources Board and Federal Civil Defense Administration

Proceed with planning of non-military defense measures on the assumptions that:

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(a) The early warning system will be operational by December 31, 1954; and

(b) The continental defense system will increase progressively to a high degree of effectiveness, but that targets will remain vulnerable to attack. Specific assumptions as to the degree of vulnerability of targets to be assumed by these agencies shall be developed jointly by them and the Department of Defense and submitted to the President for approval.

3. Federal Civil Defense Administration

Develop and recommend to the President, through the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, a revised overall civil defense program, with cost estimates and priority schedules on the basis of the assumptions stated in 2(a) and (b) above.

4. In carrying out this priority program for early warning and continental defense, it is desired that the Department of Defense receive the full cooperation of the Department of State; the Department of Treasury, Coast Guard; the Department of Commerce, Civil Aeronautics Administration; and the Federal Communications Commission.

Harry S. Truman

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Independence, Missouri 64050

December 6, 1988

Mr. Marc Tractenberg
Department of History
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Dear Mr. Tractenberg:

We have been authorized to declassify, from your case number NLT 88-7, document number two in full. Documents number one and number three remain classified in full. I enclose a copy of document number two.

If you wish to appeal the decision to keep these two documents closed, we will be happy to assist you. Your letter of appeal should clearly describe the documents that you wish to have re-reviewed and should contain a justification for the re-review. Address your appeal letter to the Classification Review Committee, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20472 and forward it to the Truman Library so that we might add the relevant copies of the documents involved in the appeal. We will then forward the letter to the appropriate address.

Sincerely,

George H. Curtis
for BENEDICT K. ZOBRIST
Director

Enclosure

6/24/82

of continents, would provide the wild - capitalizing
upon the old times - place, manner of our choosing

1. Soviet program is to expand our activities
over patience & divide us internally by mounting
a series of local actions around the world
at times & places of their choosing.
2. Korea, Indo China, Indochina are present
illustrations.
3. There are many other areas in the Far East,
East - India Africa & perhaps in Western
Europe & South America where they can
cause violent disturbances & civil wars
without appreciable cost to themselves, but
which we can cope with only at heavy cost.
4. The way around is to be prepared to use
the same kind of tactics. Can't just tolerate
them as like a boxer who obeys by the
rules of boxing rules until our opponent
strikes first blow. The way to stop him
is to be ready - able to beat him at his
own game.
5. The enemy is vulnerable in many areas
to an outbreak that we could mount by
civil war & revolutionary tactics - e.g., Formosa, etc.
6. If we do not deny the word war,
then our enemies will be convinced that we
are permanently superior & they will
press their tactics against us. They
expect the Republic Administration to try her
best it is not likely, they will enlarge their
estimate of what they can get away with.
Our future plight will be worse than our past.
7. We do not need to bluster or to proclaim our
purposes & to make any commitment.
8. We do need to prepare all points which will
be significant in terms of their potentiality for us.
9. The U.S.C. will quickly find the point &
where we can exploit them to the greatest advantage.

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Duller SS Helga Nites 12/11/52

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