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NLT (PSE/NSC) 20

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MINUTES OF THE 4TH MEETING
of the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
held on Wednesday, December 17, 1947,
in the Cabinet Room at the White House

MEMBERS PRESENT

James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense
W. Averell Harriman, Secretary of Commerce
Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State
Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army
W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force
John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy
Arthur M. Hill, Chairman, National Security Resources Board

OTHERS PRESENT

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence
Cornelius V. Whitney, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
George F. Kennan, Department of State

SECRETARIAT

Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary

ACTIONS

1. COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES
(NSC 4)

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Adopted NSC 4 without change.

(NOTE: NSC 4 subsequently submitted to the President
for approval.)

2. CONTROL OF EXPORTS TO THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE
(Memos for NSC members, including the Secretary of Commerce, from the
Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 13 and December 12,
1947.)

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Authority: ~~NSC~~ NSC LTR. 4-13-A2
NLT-AC 7-7-A2

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SECRETARY LOVETT said that the Department of State would prefer controls to be placed upon specific export items for the world at large. He understood, however, that this procedure was considered too difficult to administer and that it would place an undue burden on both government and business. In view of this fact, he said that the Department of State was willing to accept the proposal by the Secretary of Commerce provided that the requirement for adequate justification be permissive at the discretion of the U. S. Government rather than mandatory. He suggested that the paper amended accordingly be re-circulated to the Council for approval. He also said that he would prefer that a public statement on this action be made as a routine matter by the Department of Commerce.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked that all Council members be furnished framework of language that might be used in testifying in this matter before Congress.

SECRETARY HARRIMAN said that he wished to avoid publicizing the basis on which we accepted or rejected the justification for requirement.

He said that the Commerce Department would inform businessmen of this action through its normal publications. He said that this proposal could be put into effect as soon as the Commerce Department obtained the necessary funds.

In answer to a question by Secretary Royall, Secretary Harriman stated that the present proposal is not broad enough to control the export of professional services and advice.

SECRETARY LOVETT stated that the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State had been investigating devices for such controls but so far none had been developed except the briefing of businessmen during their visits to Washington.


SECRETARY ROYALL felt that no statement should be made that the Council's action on this matter is a subterfuge aimed at the USSR.

SECRETARY LOVETT suggested that the Council accept new wording of the Commerce proposal if it was agreed by the State and Commerce Departments. The other members agreed to this.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Adopted the proposal by the Secretary of Commerce on the Control of Exports to the USSR and Eastern Europe, subject to revision that the requirement for adequate justification should be permissive at the discretion of the U. S. Government, the wording of this revision to be acceptable to State and Commerce Departments.

(NOTE: Revised report, agreed to by the State and Commerce Departments, subsequently submitted to the President for approval.)



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At this point the PRESIDENT joined the Meeting for a brief period. The President stated that he has the utmost confidence in all of the Council members, that he appreciated what they were doing and kept himself fully informed of the Council's actions. The President expressed the belief that the Council is a vitally important arm of the US Government.

3. THE UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SPAIN
(NSC 3)

SECRETARY LOVETT stated that the purpose of this paper was to quit kidding ourselves as to our interest in Spain and to reorient our policy in relation thereto.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Concurred in NSC 3, subject to editorial revision to bring it up to date and to delete reference to the Policy Planning Staff.

4. POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO GREECE

MR. SOUERS said that the NSC Staff had hoped to submit a paper on this subject but there had been some confusion since the Staff was at a loss as to how far the Council was willing to go in our policies with reference to Greece.

SECRETARY LOVETT proposed that this matter be laid over to a subsequent meeting. He said that the State Department had sent word to Mr. Griswold to report on the current situation. Secretary Lovett said that the present funds would probably run out by the 31st of March, leaving only a bare minimum for the remaining three months. He said that the economic program would be ineffective until something is done to defeat the guerillas. He said that General Livesey is on his way back to Washington. Secretary Lovett, therefore, suggested that no action be taken until more facts had been obtained.

SECRETARY ROYALL agreed with Secretary Lovett. Secretary Royall also doubted the need to be specific as to the circumstances under which we would be willing to go to war. He felt that we were unable to construct the future situation to that extent.

MR. SOUERS said that the Staff apparently wanted to spell out the fact that the NSC knows we are taking the risk of war.

SECRETARY LOVETT expressed concern that there was a fundamental inconsistency in our policy in withdrawing troops from Italy where the terrain is well known and there is an industrial base, and our consideration of placing troops in Greece which is one of the worst possible

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areas in which to fight.

MR. SOUERS said that the Staff was not questioning whether to fight in Greece but rather where we would draw the line against further Soviet aggression.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that we are in a transitional period when three months from now we may have to decide whether to get out of Greece or to exert much greater effort there than we have so far.

MR. KENNAN said that we are faced with developments much faster than had been expected. He believed that the Communists may announce the setting up of a government in Northern Greece within a month.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Deferred action on this subject pending the availability of further facts on the current situation.

5. ECONOMIC POLICY IN JAPAN

SECRETARY ROYALL said that Congress had obtained a copy of the Far East Commission paper on this subject (FEC 230). They were making an effort to have this paper released. Secretary Royall felt that a statement on this subject should be issued today.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that he was proposing a message to General MacArthur stating that Secretary Forrestal had just read this paper and was shocked about it. Secretary Forrestal suggested having a capable economics man look at this situation. He felt that we must either send such a man to Japan or have General MacArthur come back for discussions.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that the State and Army Departments had been working on this subject for over two months. He said that Secretary Royall

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had sent a message to General MacArthur on this matter. Secretary Lovett said that the history of the administration has been bad and that we might as well admit it. He pointed out that the State, Army and Navy Departments were all responsible.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN said that he had fought this paper and had held it up for months.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that the reaction in the Far East Commission would have to be considered before this paper was released.

SECRETARY ROYALL suggested releasing a short historical resume of what has happened and what we are trying to do about it.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that the State Department has such a historical resume and that it may be aired in the press conference this afternoon. He said that this resume could be published, but he did not feel that FEC 230 could be released.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that General MacArthur maintains that he is only following his directives. Secretary Royall stated, however, that the paper had been referred to SCAP who had approved.

SECRETARY LOVETT requested that the Departments not foul up each other since this was a joint paper.

SECRETARY ROYALL suggested that we say we are revising it because of changed circumstances. He suggested that we state that this action having been taken, some modification has been directed and further modification is being examined. He suggested sending some man of sufficient force, with the full authority of the Secretaries of State and Defense behind him, and with the approval of the President.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL suggested that Mr. Souers take this matter up with the President if the State Department agreed.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that the State Department had agreed with the proposed action long ago. The question was to get a qualified man.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that he had read a synthesized summary of this paper and that it said "state socialism" throughout. He felt that if the President approved, State and Defense should try to get a man of sufficient stature to send to Japan.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:



Agreed that the Executive Secretary should discuss with the President the suggestion that a qualified man be sent to Japan to study and report upon economic policies there.

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6. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE SECURITY OF THE
UNITED STATES
✓ (CIA 3)

The National Security Council noted the subject report by the
Director of Central Intelligence.

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MINUTES OF THE 5TH MEETING
of the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
held on Tuesday, January 13, 1948,
in the Conference Room at the White House

MEMBERS PRESENT

James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense
Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State
Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army
John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy
Cornelius V. Whitney, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
Arthur M. Hill, Chairman, National Security Resources Board

OTHERS PRESENT

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence
George F. Kennan, Department of State



SECRETARIAT

Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary

ACTIONS

1. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO GREECE
(NSC 5)

SECRETARY LOVETT said that Secretary Marshall was sorry he was unable to attend. He asked Mr. Lovett, however, to express the following three points of view with respect to this paper:

1. The paper as a whole should be reworked by the NSC Staff. Such abstract terms as "sending troops to Greece" should be defined by indicating why they were being sent, what their function would be, e.g., show of force, a demonstration of determination, etc. The paper should also include an estimate of the effectiveness of the operation. He (Marshall) feels strongly that we should never start anything unless we are ready to see it through. He felt that the paper did not indicate adequate consideration of the consequences, particularly those involving the impact within the U. S.

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EO 12958, Sec. 3.4

Authority 88-8

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Also Kennan's
asst. FRUS 48:4
p27A

NSC 5 = FRUS 48:4 p2-7
p8

then: we may have to but we have to consider this thing very seriously
(Kennan, Lovett, Marshall)

(background 21-22) (more gap between rhetoric quoted & real policy)
(tough line) (Marshall's policy)
JCS: park mch. if we do it - US overextended
handover defenses line. weapons would
lead to war or collapse
consider this thing very seriously

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2. This is something of a test case for the National Security Council since it involves practically every foreseeable difficulty. It is a beautiful example of the inter-play of military power and foreign policy. It is desirable to make an approach to the problem based on the ultimate recourse which would be the use of troops. Decisions must be based upon a careful estimate of the situation by the ablest military brains and a careful examination of the impact upon the domestic economy and of the frame of mind of the U. S. people.
3. The concept that a forceful single individual is needed in Greece is challenged. We already have there very capable political and economic staffs. The situation now calls for a military appraisal. Putting in another civilian would not meet the problem. What is needed is to take advantage of the existing political and economic staffs and to bring in capable military men to advise the National Security Council.

Secretary Lovett explained that the above remarks were all based on the assumption that the conflict is Greek against Greek. If other countries intervened the picture would be entirely different.

Secretary Lovett explained that there is an understandable difference of opinion within the State Department between Mr. Kennan's Policy Planning Staff and Mr. Henderson. The latter desires aggressive action involving use of troops in Greece. Mr. Kennan feels that we should know what we want to do with the troops before sending them in. Secretary Lovett suggested making available to the NSC Staff the Policy Planning Staff's study which analyzes these two points of view. The Staff should then develop, with the assistance of the military technicians, an estimate of the situation showing what the troops will do, how many will be needed, etc.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that he was somewhat puzzled when he read this paper. He wondered if it did not overstep the bounds of Congress' concept by suggesting specific actions. His concept was that the Council would analyze the situation and indicate the position in which we find ourselves.

MR. SOUVERS explained that this came about partially at the insistence of operational people in the Departments. He agreed that NSC papers should be confined to policy and not operations. He pointed out, however, that too broad statements frequently were difficult to interpret when the working levels attempted to put them into effect.

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~~General Reference~~
~~Presidential~~

PR 1548
Henderson
Kennan
(PPS 18)
21 PP



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SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that he desired, if asked by Congress what part the military played in making policy, to be able to say that it participated only when asked for the military view point.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that getting expert military advice is a necessary precedent to the formulation of a definite policy. He said that Greece is a good example. This problem was passed to the National Security Council because it is now necessary to know how far militarily we can afford to go. He said that the State Department would like to know whether one division would be clear evidence to Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia of our determination in Greece so that they would stop their aggressive activities. This cannot be decided until more military judgment is obtained. He said that Secretary Marshall was in complete agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff's comments on this paper. Secretary Lovett felt that it was wrong to attempt to draw a definite line between military and foreign policy.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that he quite agreed.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that the terrifying aspect of our past policies has been that we have frequently jumped into situations without looking. He felt that we were frequently just lucky that we got away with it. Mr. Henderson has the classical concept that a show of power will be effective. Secretary Lovett said that there were an equal number of examples where mere show of power resulted in difficulties or defeat.

MR. SOUERS noted that none of the military people advocated the use of troops in Greece from a purely military standpoint, but they were trying to go along with what they believed to be the desires of the State Department.

In answer to Secretary Sullivan, SECRETARY LOVETT said that he believed that the Greek army, if properly led, would fight but could not under the present governmental setup.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL suggested that the Council direct the Staff to study the State Department document and rework the paper on that basis.

SECRETARY LOVETT also suggested that the Council agree unofficially that competent military men will be sent out by the Army, Navy and Air Force to survey the situation.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN said that the Council could get all the information it wanted from Admiral Sherman without any formal action.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that he felt the Army should have the top military man in Greece if the Army was to run that show. He believed there were two possible ways to proceed. First, we could

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move along slowly, keeping in close touch with the situation. Second, we could decide to fight in Greece. He favored the first course because we have nothing to back up any divisions we send to Greece.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that Mr. Henderson believes that if we send one division we will hear no more from the Communists.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that when troops are put in Greece we must tell Congress that it may mean war.

SECRETARY LOVETT agreed that we must be prepared in case our plan does not work.

MR. WHITNEY said that the weakness in the present plan is that it does not say, if we put one division in, what it can do, i.e., can it clear up the situation.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that the Army thinks it now knows that one division cannot contain the Greek guerrillas.

MR. WHITNEY also felt that if the Greeks do not themselves desire to fight, he felt that we should take a good look at how important Greece is in the overall military plans.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that General Marshall agreed that Greece is critical and is one of the keystones in the arch in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is not to say, however, that sending troops into Greece means that we are saving Greece. We would be gambling that one division would scare off the Communists. If it did not, we would be in World War III.

MR. HILL asked whether the British could enlarge their occupational forces.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that it was possible but he did not think that it could unless the Markos regime was recognized. He felt that the British were prepared to stay there and wanted to work out a combined program.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that we cannot afford to run from the Yugoslavs. He said that the Army is going to replace General Livesey.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

- a. Directed the NSC Staff to study the report on this subject by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.
- b. Directed the NSC Staff to rework NSC 5 in the

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light of the Policy Planning Staff's report and the discussion at this meeting.

- c. Agreed unofficially that the Army, Navy and Air Force would endeavor to send competent military men to Greece to survey the situation and report their findings and recommendations.

2. PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVES TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(Reference: Memos for NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 10, 1947 and January 6, 1948.)

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that he had made the basic decision that the Air Force has the dominant interest in air intelligence, but that the Navy should not be denied what it needs in this field. He said that he would issue a modified directive on this subject which would adequately protect the Navy's interests.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN said that he was ready to approve the paper in the light of Secretary Forrestal's assurance that the Navy's interests would be protected by the issuance of a modified directive.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Approved the proposed National Security Council Intelligence Directives Nos. 2 and 3 with the provision that dominant interest in air intelligence is assigned to the Department of the Air Force in paragraph 1 of NSCID 2 and paragraph 3 of NSCID 3.

(NOTE: NSCID Nos. 2 and 3 subsequently issued.)



3. POLICY RELATING TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR BASE RIGHTS IN GREENLAND

SECRETARY LOVETT said that the basic problem was to obtain bases in Greenland. The present agreement requires withdrawal at an early date unless the U. S. can get an extension. There are groups in Denmark who are favorable to the U. S. but they are faced with growing Communist strength and with resentment against the U. S. One of the causes of this resentment stems from the mass of displaced persons who were pushed into Denmark toward the end of the war. These DP's represent a big burden on this small country. Arrangements were made that the U. S., British, French, Soviets and Denmark's neighbors would take these DP's. There is now a lot of public discussion in Denmark because the British, Soviets and others have agreed to take many of these DP's provided the U. S. takes the remainder. The U. S. Army does not favor taking this balance because they have already taken a large number without obtaining base rights in return. In addition, many taken by other countries have drifted into the U. S. Zone.

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SECRETARY ROYALL said that no results on bases had been obtained. In addition, the food situation in the U. S. Zone is critical. Moreover, people who are interested in refugees say that those in Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries are suffering most. These are being refused entry into the U. S. Zone. In the light of these considerations, Secretary Royall said that he did not see how the Army could justify taking the additional DP's from Denmark.

SECRETARY LOVETT called attention to the fact that the State Department is merely a negotiating agent. He pointed out the difficulty that any arrangements regarding bases must be passed upon by the representatives of the Danish people. He said that you can't have a quid pro quo with the Danish people at this stage.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that we must remember that other governments have the same domestic political problems we have.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked whether it was possible to accept maybe 2000 DP's with the possibility that we would take more at a later date.

SECRETARY LOVETT said that might be a possibility. He felt, however, that we were under sharp restriction since the British and other countries had maneuvered us into a difficult position.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that he would look into the British agreement, of which he had not previously heard, and that this might make a difference.



THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Noted that the Secretary of the Army would further investigate this matter.

4. SURVEY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MR. SOUERS submitted a proposed resolution which would provide for a survey of CIA by a group of two or three specially qualified individuals not in the government service. He said that Alan Dulles and Mathias F. Correa had been suggested for this job.

SECRETARY LOVETT also suggested William Harding Jackson.

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

- a. Approved a resolution authorizing a survey of the organization, activities and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
- b. Nominated for consideration by the President the names of three individuals to make such a survey.



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MINUTES OF THE 6th MEETING
OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
held on Thursday, February 12, 1948,
in the Conference Room at The White House

MEMBERS PRESENT

George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, presiding
James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense
John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy
Arthur M. Hill, Chairman, National Security Resources Board
W. H. Draper, Jr., Under Secretary of the Army
C. V. Whitney, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

SECRETARIAT

Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary
James S. Lay, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary

ACTIONS

1. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO GREECE
(NSC 5/1)

SECRETARY FORRESTAL read the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this paper, which reiterated their previous comments on NSC 5, particularly as to the possible need for partial mobilization.

MR. SOUERS pointed out that this paper makes no commitment as to the use of armed forces, but provides for the necessary planning concerning their possible use.

MR. DRAPER noted that each step leads to further commitments of armed forces and in turn reduces the personnel available. He felt that we were adding new missions which in total would require selective service.

SECRETARY MARSHALL said that this constitutes a change from the previous one-year program of assistance to Greece, to provisions for a continued program. He said that a proposed program for aid to Greece and Turkey for the next fiscal year was being prepared. He felt that it was unfortunate that the amount for Turkey would be the same as for last year and that all of it would be spent for military purposes. He believed that this put us in a bad political position.

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402

State Dept. Guidelines, June 12, 1979

NSC LTR. 4-13-42

By NLT-NC, NARS, Date 6-18-92

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See FRUS 48:4
p39. The
revised paper does
not include a
decision to
send troops.
General
Hickerson
upset by that
"hesitation &
indecision".
True enough. An
reason for it was
that Marshall's
bid for 1948 + 1949
was 1945.
then Marshall
is turn.

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MR. DRAPER said that this brings up the problem of priorities for furnishing equipment to Greece, Turkey, and Italy. If equipment is sent to Italy before the April elections and to Greece for the spring campaign, it will slow down deliveries to Turkey.

SECRETARY MARSHALL read the following comments prepared by the geographic desk in the State Department:

- FAVS 48.4
34-40641
- a. There should be a clear cut decision now on the sending of troops to Greece.
 - b. Paragraph 13 should be redrafted to leave no doubt that we would use force if Greece was in danger.
 - c. Various other changes were proposed to be made in paragraphs 6-b, 6-d, and 6-f, 7-d, and 8-a. [NOTE: These changes have been incorporated in NSC 5/2.7] (a) + (b) not made

NSC 5/2
FAVS 48.4
4667
OK'd 2/16: keeps door open, but don't not plunge.

SECRETARY MARSHALL said that there were three aspects concerning the use of force: (1) We cannot consider Greece without considering Palestine and China; (2) there is a question whether a token force would do enough good to justify the hazards; (3) we should consider the impact in Congress and on the American people. He felt that we should not put ourselves in a position by one action which would inevitably force a subsequent action to be taken. He thought the outlook was exceedingly grave. He pointed out that there would be less reaction if Marines were landed than if the Army conducted the landing.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN said there were 38,000 Marines ready for combat; five battalions are in the US.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL thought that we could get by public reaction if a regimental combat team were used, but not if a division were used.

SECRETARY MARSHALL questioned what good we would get out of a regimental combat team.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that politically he cannot conceive of the President sending troops unless there is some further provocative action.

SECRETARY MARSHALL thought we may get such action from the Yugoslavs, who are uncontrollable even by the Soviets.

MR. DRAPER was afraid of the public reaction to the use of troops against Greek guerrillas rather than against the Soviets.

SECRETARY MARSHALL was not so sure. He thought that the American public might well assume that the guerrillas were operating under the Soviet satellites. He said that we cannot escape the dire consequences if it appears that we don't back up our policies while others do. He said that the trouble was that we are playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out. He questioned whether we should bring this Greek situation to an issue of the use of troops. On the other hand,

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he felt that if we appear to be weakening, we will lose the game and prejudice our whole national position, particularly since we are now involved in the European Recovery Program. He thought that we must have a decision whether the Council would propose to the President that he take the lead and send in our forces to Greece. If we do, Secretary Marshall preferred that Marines be used first.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN thought that the use of forces in Greece would be purely defensive, since we cannot change the situation beyond the frontiers.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that G-2 thought that the best solution would be to seal off the frontiers. He felt that General Van Fleet might be able to accomplish a lot in that regard.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN noted that the frontiers were so long that it would be impossible to hold the entire length.

SECRETARY MARSHALL said that the thing to do in that case was to hold key spots; then, if the guerrillas come in at other places, you can go behind them and cut them off. While doing this, however, you will inevitably leave other places on the frontier open. He thought that if political pressure on the Greek army could be overcome, considerable progress could be made. He pointed out, however, that this paper passed the buck as far as a decision to use armed forces is concerned.

MR. SOUERS said that the paper was based on Mr. Lovett's remarks at the last meeting, and provided for the necessary planning prior to the decision to use armed forces.

In answer to a question by Secretary Marshall about public reaction to the use of troops, SECRETARY FORRESTAL thought that newspapers like the Chicago TRIBUNE would lead off by saying that we are seeking war with Russia. He thought, however, that other papers like the New York TIMES and HERALD-TRIBUNE, if given the necessary background, would have a favorable reaction.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN pointed out that if there were American casualties demands would mount that we pour more troops in.

MR. WHITNEY asked if the use of troops in Greece would imply the same action in Palestine.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL thought that it would, but that we could then say that we must mobilize if we entered Palestine.

SECRETARY MARSHALL questioned whether such action in Greece would lessen the need in Italy; he thought it would, in a sense, but the Communists could then stir up trouble behind you. They could force you

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a contradiction
with Roosevelt
P. 17. We must
have a decision
to want to do
to be kept yet

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to spend more money and devote more effort at less cost to them than to you. He thought it might be desirable to provoke the Soviets to a decision at a point where we chose to force the issue. He pointed out that we cannot hope to force the issue at all points. He questioned whether we could do all three -- Greece, Italy, and Palestine. He wondered whether we could do one and let the others ride. He agreed with Secretary Forrestal that the use of troops would put the President in a bad position, but felt that we must nevertheless be ready.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL thought that it would be extremely important if Vandenberg, Taft, and Dewey were informed of the situation. He did not see how Secretary Marshall could do his job this year until there was an understanding with them.

MR. WHITNEY said that the Air Force was engaged in an attempt to get itself in readiness by sending airplanes to various places around the world in order to train its people. He said it would be very helpful if they could get into Greece on training flights and set up fuel stores. This might be a cheaper way to impress the Communists than the use of a token force.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL thought this would not scare the Communists.

MR. WHITNEY thought it might impress the people behind the guerrillas.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL agreed with that. He thought that if the Soviets were convinced that we mean business, they might be willing to deal with us.

SECRETARY MARSHALL said that he was trading on the belief that the Soviets thought that he was more inclined to a military solution, and that he meant what he said. He granted, however, that the Soviets also had a free choice of analyzing the mood of the American people.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL thought that it was extremely important to get over the fact that a prerequisite to human progress is the maintenance of order throughout the world.

MR. DRAPER thought that the paper should provide for a strengthening of our information program in Greece.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Adopted NSC 5/1 subject to the following amendments:

- a. Revisions in paragraphs 6-b, 6-d, and 6-f, 7-d, and 8-a.
- b. Addition of provision for training flights into Greece, and strengthening of the US information program in Greece.
(NOTE: NSC 5/1 as revised subsequently issued as NSC 5/2 and submitted to the President for consideration.)

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2. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO ITALY
(NSC 1/2)

SECRETARY FORRESTAL proposed deferment of this paper until the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been received.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Deferred action on NSC 1/2 pending the receipt of comments thereon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. PROVISION OF U. S. EQUIPMENT TO THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES
(Memo for NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 9, 1948.)

SECRETARY FORRESTAL pointed out that the difficulty was in finding the facilities with which to load and ship equipment to Italy.

MR. LAY pointed out that the proposed recommendation only granted the necessary Presidential authority to transfer equipment to Italy, but that no actual transfers would take place until the Secretary of Defense approved them.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Adopted the recommendation proposed in paragraph 13-e of SANACC 390/1. (Subsequently submitted to the President for consideration.)

4. PROPOSED NSC DIRECTIVES TO CIA
(Memo for NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 9, 1948.)

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Approved NSCID No. 7 without change. (NOTE: NSCID No. 7 subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence and the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee for information and appropriate action, and to the National Security Council for information.)

5. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO PALESTINE

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that his only interest was that the Army must have a sound basis for realistic planning.

SECRETARY MARSHALL presented a Policy Planning Staff paper for use by the National Security Council Staff as a proposed basis for a paper on the working levels. He said that it did not necessarily represent

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the final views of the Department of State. He was disturbed that the third course of action proposed in that paper indicated a disposition toward that course, and hoped that it would not be treated as such. He felt it was important that Mr. Dean Rusk work with the Staff in order to represent the aspects of this problem which may seriously affect the United Nations. Secretary Marshall felt that we cannot get in the position of walking back on ourselves. He thought that it was necessary to consider the voting situation in the UN Security Council. Four different issues can come up in that Council and we must be prepared to take a stand on them. The first one may arise next Thursday. In any case, we must have a definite decision by the first of April. He therefore felt that the Staff should act very quickly.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Directed the NSC Staff to prepare a report on the above subject as a matter of priority, making use of the report by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.

6. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO CHINA

SECRETARY MARSHALL said that he did not have a completed paper on this subject. However, he read a proposed statement to be made before a Congressional committee.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Noted the remarks on this subject by Secretary Marshall.

7. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
(CIA 5)

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Noted the subject report by the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. STATUS REPORT ON NSC PROJECTS

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Noted the brief oral report on this subject by the Executive Secretary.

NSC 5/3 of 5/25/48 FRUS 48:4 p47FR
The follow-on doc. says NSC 5/2 would be a time when
the ops. of the Greek Nat. Army held little promise of
success... even then no real willingness to use force.
Says Sols more moderate than Foreman.

JCS views (94): US overextended. Part. mds. have big on
commitments. Don't like simple 'deterrence' tactic. (+ 95)
"our currently relatively weak force" NSC. complaint about
mil's obtuseness in this regard (98-99)

Basic decision: no troops NSC 5/4 (6/7/48) - see p101 p93 p205
NSC app confirms: 11/20/48: 205-208, any p208 & 43

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

NLT (PSF/NSC) 711
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(action 29)

February 12, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Based upon consideration at its 6th Meeting, of the enclosed report (SANACC 390/1), the National Security Council recommends that, despite the lack of specific legislative authority, you, acting within your plenary powers as Commander-in-Chief and as head of the State in its relations with foreign countries and for the purpose of protecting primary security interests of the United States and of United States Armed Forces in Europe, direct the transfer to Italy from stocks now held or to be procured by United States Armed Forces, subject to reimbursement to the forces concerned, of all or any portion of certain limited quantities of military equipment and supplies requested by the Italian Government and considered by the U. S. Secretary of Defense to be essential in order to increase in so far as practicable the potential ability of Italian security forces to maintain the internal security of Italy and to suppress anticipated attempts by subversive elements to seize power by force.

Under this program it is planned that the Secretary of State will arrange for the necessary reimbursement to the forces concerned from the Italian Government.

The National Security Council recommends that you direct that the actions contemplated above be implemented by all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies of the U. S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.



SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Executive Secretary

Approved:

H. S. Truman
HARRY S. TRUMAN [13 Feb]

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F.R. OF U.S. 1948 W.P. III 122 769
By ~~NSC~~ NARS, Date 10-9-79

*Lots on all files in Carded JCS that
then shows on US weapons*

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*p44: our commitment only if intel suggests
SOV. will not respond by overt and actual Retired
44-50 has CIA comments from NSC 5(13) omitted in PRVS
CIA: SOV won't intervene.*

6/28/48

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| DATE <i>10/28/88</i> | BY <i>MR</i> |

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28 June 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Notes on the Situation in Berlin (Army View)

Enclosed is a new draft of "Notes on the Berlin Situation" in which we have endeavored to incorporate the ideas which you expressed this morning.

Ray T. Maddocks

RAY T. MADDOCKS
Major General, GSC
Deputy Director, Plans & Operations

1 Encl - Notes on the
Berlin Situation
(Army View),
28 June 1948

Concur
END

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Authority NND 770038
By CGD JAN 10 1977
NARS Date

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The American people would have difficulty in understanding why Berlin in its isolated position is so necessary to our interests that we would be willing to jeopardize the entire future of civilization in order to maintain indefinitely our position there. If the Soviets are determined to use Berlin

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STATE OF THE UNION
(Army View)

1. The following three courses of action are now under consideration with respect to our future policy in Berlin:

- a. Decide now to withdraw in the near future.
- b. Decide now to remain in Berlin, accepting the possibility of war if necessary.
- c. Maintain for the present our firm stand in Berlin but postpone ultimate decision on withdrawal pending further developments.

2. In considering the relative desirability of the above three courses of action, the following considerations are pertinent:

a. It is obvious that we cannot withdraw immediately in the face of the current Soviet pressure. To do so would definitely alienate the entire population of Germany and would so weaken our influence with all Western European nations as to jeopardize the success of our ECA program. It would strengthen the Communist parties in Austria, Italy and France, possibly to a point which would threaten the continued existence of present governments in those countries.

b. On the other hand, we should recognize that, although we must remain firm in the present crisis, nevertheless, unless the Soviets relax their pressure, our long-term position in Berlin may become untenable, in that hardship imposed on the German people by Soviet action may become so severe that insistence on our right to remain will no longer be warranted. Only future developments can determine whether we must leave in one month or in one year. Eventually, however, we will have to withdraw unless present indicated Soviet policy undergoes a radical change.

c. We cannot, on our part, afford to provoke a war over Berlin. The American people would have difficulty in understanding why Berlin in its isolated position is so necessary to our interests that we would be willing to jeopardize the entire future of civilization in order to maintain indefinitely our position there. If the Soviets are determined to use Berlin

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We must remain determined to resist force with force. We ourselves, however, would not have the support of the American people if we should initiate an action which foreseeably calls for our initial use of force.

d. Even if, as a result of our firm stand, the present crisis should subside, we must expect so long as we remain in Berlin that the Soviets will continue their pressure by various means, all designed to weaken our prestige in German eyes and to create an impossible situation for us in Berlin. If the Soviets, as now seems probable, continue to interfere with our communications, if they cut off the Berlin sectors of the Western allies from normal relations with the Soviet sector and with the surrounding country, then it will never be possible for us to reestablish a normal economic and social existence for the German population of our sectors. This population will continue to live under a feeling of insecurity and doubt as to their future which will more and more alienate their sympathies. Even though we are able to continue to supply them with minimum essential food, clothing, heat, light and shelter, which is doubtful, nevertheless it may gradually become apparent to them that their eventual interests will demand that they unite with the rest of Berlin and Eastern Germany. Therefore, in the long-term view we may anticipate a gradual withdrawal of sympathy on the part of Berlin's population.

e. We must decide now whether we are willing to fight to stay in Berlin. If this decision is affirmative, we should undertake at once full-scale preparation for possible war. If the decision is negative, which, in view of subparagraph d, above, appears the only logical one, then we should maintain our firm stand in the present crisis but let future developments determine whether or not in the longer view we should withdraw and, if so, under what conditions. This decision should be made known only to a very limited group of highly placed individuals. General Clay should be one of these individuals.

f. Having made the decision to stand firm in the present crisis but to avoid provoking a war, we should begin at once to plan a series of

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asked to cover the longer term if. In view of the considerations

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already mentioned, it is apparent that these plans must include provision for ultimate withdrawal. It thus becomes necessary to plan for the conditions under which we could withdraw without the disastrous effects inherent in a precipitate withdrawal now.

g. If Russian pressure relaxes, we can, of course, stay on in Berlin indefinitely. This is hardly likely. However, the longer we stay the more time we will have to build up a Western German government, thus de-emphasizing the importance of Berlin as the seat of all power in Germany. If Russian pressure continues, we will in all probability be unable adequately to feed, clothe and house the Germans in our Berlin zone. If this situation develops, we should be able, by proper handling of publicity, to convince the world and, particularly, the Germans themselves that our withdrawal is a desirable alternative to the continuance of a situation which might either provoke a war or cause undue hardships on, or perhaps starvation of, several million Berliners.

3. In view of the considerations outlined above, it is believed that the United States Government should at this time take the following actions:

a. Decide now that we should, for the present, maintain a firm stand in Berlin, but avoid any action which would require us to initiate the use of force. ✓

b. Concert with the U.K. and France in preparation of notes to the Soviet government reaffirming the right of the Western allies to free access to Berlin and demanding a statement by the Russian government as to whether or not it intends to abide by its long standing agreements as to these rights. ✓

c. Direct appropriate agencies to begin planning at once for the eventuality that continued Soviet interference with communications may require our eventual withdrawal from Berlin to avoid subjecting the German population of the Western sectors in Berlin to undue hardships. This planning should include provision for all measures which would contribute to minimizing the adverse effect of our withdrawal. ✓

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10/18/49
for Mr
Trachtenberg

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| By KON | NARS, Date 2/8/88 |

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POLICY PLANNING STAFF MEETING
October 18, 1949, 11:00 a.m. to 12:15 p.m.

Present: Secretary Acheson Lucius Battle

| | |
|---------------|-----------------|
| George Kennan | Lampton Berry |
| Paul Nitze | Robert Tufts |
| George Butler | Carlton Savage |
| John Davies | Dorothy Fosdick |
| Ware Adams | Harry Schwartz |
| Robert Hooker | |

1 - (P) 11/49
2 - EUR
3 - Adams
4 - Tufts
5 - Burnett

Walter Schwinn, POS
Richard Scammon, DRE

KENNAN: ... I believe we ought to move quite rapidly because all these Chiefs of Mission should have some sort of a line from us.

ACHESON: Do you want to read the telegram so we will have everything before us?

KENNAN: If we are going to discuss the telegram rather than the background of thought, perhaps we should have someone from EUR come down.

...

There remains the theoretical planning staff discussions on things like the line of thought.

ACHESON: Can we talk a little bit first as to the practical objective things which are necessary to accomplish when you read these papers? There is talk about the political desirability of unification, economic effect, of security, and the broader over-all idea of some regenerative effect which unification of Europe would have for focus of loyalty ... then we come up with Mr. Hoffman's more immediate suggestion ... getting money out of Congress, and I think that should be left aside because that will only confuse us. It might be worth while spending a few minutes talking about exactly what we think will happen objectively. If we looked at Europe from Mars and saw a lot of human beings carrying on their lives ... and say you want to accomplish something definite from this, either politically, security or economic, what is it you want them to do? What is it they can do in totality that would make this ... If they exchange more goods that they make with one another, how does that help their fundamental problem in connection with dollar exchange? If you speed up productivity, change the location of industries ... over all productivity will increase; if so, more of what? When we get through with this what we want is something which has greater general productivity so they can maintain more people who are not producing, i.e., soldiers, so they can have a more stable political life?

NITZE:

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18, 10/18/49, 11:00 a.m. to 12:15 p.m.

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ACHESON: That brings us to the political part of There's a phrase in this paper, "... everything possible should be done to promote at this time closer Franco-German understanding and association, so that some day Germany could conceivably be absorbed into larger European family without dominating or demoralizing others. ..." I thought that would be the neatest trick of the week if it could be brought about. How can Germany be absorbed into this kind of a union without dominating and demoralizing it?

KENNAN: They would have no votes when they came in; there would be no majority on German population. They are disarmed, demilitarized and divided. If you were to do this today I see no reason why they should be able to throw their weight around in the sense of dominating or demoralizing others, if the others were able to exhibit any comparable degree of energy and leadership in the thing. I doubt whether the others would be able to exhibit that leadership, and it is quite conceivable that in the end Germans would emerge running the show.

ACHESON: What is the population?

KENNAN: Roughly, about 46 million. Italy has about 40 million, France about the same, Benelux has about 20 million; you get then 100 million as against the 40 million Germans.

ACHESON: The Germans probably have the greatest industrial plant.

KENNAN: Western German steel and heavy industry is probably equal to France ...

NITZE: It is a little ahead now.

KENNAN: Would it be ahead of France plus Benelux? I think there is a fairly good balance there, and if you add in the industries of northern Italy that would certainly swing it.

BERRY: Are we agreed that over the long pull the Germans are going to play a dominant role in Europe? What are we doing in suggestion unification of Europe with Germany, making it easier for the Germans to dominate it? ... Germans are, for reasons we are all familiar with, going to dominate Europe and can't we make it easier for the "good" Germans to play the part rather than let the neurotic Germans take it over?

KENNAN: There is a deep issue here, I think. The idea that somehow, in alliance with the British and the French and by keeping a tight relationship between us three, we are going to keep the western Germans properly in their place and at the same time contain the Russians seems to me to be an unsound one. ... What that means is that in alliance with the peripheral countries we are trying to contain both the Germans and the Russians, and I don't think that is possible and that we are strong enough to do it.

We must

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is done 1/2 part
see that by integration
into that ally by
would be containing W.A.

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must look for a balance in Europe and Asia by permitting a situation to arise in which the Germans will have a stake in their own strength, where they will do things for their own sake and not for our sake. (It is not a bit pleasant, and I have little confidence in the Germans to be a force that we would call a westernized force. They will be something between ourselves and the Russians, but in that capacity I think they will be able to gather around them the sort of in-between countries of Europe. They might be able to establish a relationship which we could not establish, and get something antagonistic to the Russians and ourselves perhaps but which will be vigorous enough to back against the Russians. The whole difficulty arises from the fact that we are trying to counter one vigorous power, the Soviet one, while keeping in a state of vacuum the two greatest powers near them -- Germany and Japan. We all would wish that some way could be found to use German strength which would not involve military domination of others. It seems to me we are giving the French that opening now if they have enough energy and gumption ... we hold the Germans and they can make their own arrangements. If they don't, then logic says we Americans will have to let the Germans come forward as leaders. All this is connected with the arguments we had about the German business last winter. You will remember I was skeptical about making a success of this in western Germany, with 14 million refugees all over the country and the political problems they present. Western Germany is not going to find its place in the West on the basis of an independent state. If it finds its place it will be as a part of a union; if it doesn't find its place it will turn eastward to find possibilities ...

This is a very intricate point, because those who feel otherwise than I do say, "You would put the Germans in a position to play the east off against the west and they could really dicker then. We are holding them." But I don't think you can hold the Germans unless you give them a better stake in their own resistance than you are giving them. ...

ACHESON: That brings you to the security point of this. You cannot have any sort of security in western Europe without using German power. Is that going to be integrated into western European power or grow up in a power of its own?

KENNAN: That is borne out in things we hear from the military. It stems also from things they say -- that we can't hold the Germans without using tremendous forces, etc. I don't believe we would have to ... If that's true it means we are attempting the impossible and trying to hold the line permanently in Europe without making use of Germany.

ACHESON: What could you do? From the strategic point of view what are you going to do with western Germany, use it as a battleground, withdraw from it, or use it? The first two possibilities have little prospects for the Germans.

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KENNAN: If Western Union forces would utilize the Germans, not under a German flag but make some European flag, and then say "Now we are in a position to accept military service of the young Germans and absorb German skills" you are on the right track. If you won't do that, it worries me very much.

BUTLER: Have a European legion as part of the defense force?

KENNAN: That's right. They are all born mercenaries ...

BUTLER: It could only be done, of course, under French leadership -- not only French acquiescence.

ACHESON: You would have to use the Italians too. It could be outside of Italy, to get around the treaty. If you take that rather large concept where do the British fit in? Would it help or hurt in the political implications? On the economic side you have large arguments for having them in.

KENNAN: I have suspicions of the British getting into things we aren't in, and then coming to us and asking for help.

In the light of the Defense Ministers talk, how does this fit in? There is going to be a western European Headquarters and a planning group Montgomery is going to go on. We have relationship to that in the general Atlantic Pact framework, but are we not a part of the western group?

BUTLER: We accepted a part in the participation of planning of the regional group.

ACHESON: "As appropriate", wasn't it?

NITZE: The document says "as appropriate."

ACHESON: In the discussion of the Ministers, we told them "as appropriate" meant our people would participate as agreed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, but could not participate without ...

KENNAN: We have always considered that the Atlantic Pact must remain fully valid. It would seem to me that if certain countries on the continent were to go ahead and achieve a certain degree of political unification that might absorb commitments to the Atlantic Pact but would not weaken them. That gets us back to the problems we had on the working level of the Atlantic Pact negotiations; we thought at that time we ought to have a dumbbell relation of U.S.-U.K. on the one end and Europe on the other, including Germany. What we have today is a series of powers, with Iceland up here, Scandinavia here, France ... etc. ... into which it is hard to fit Germany. ... The alternative to that is that as the Germans get more and more power and

re-emerge

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re-emerge, they are going to want to come into the Pact in their own right as the Italians did. I differed with some of the people on including Italy in the Pact. It is not suitable for full-fledged membership of a military pact ... the Germans are going to say the precedent is already established. That would really be absurd if Germany were to remain entirely demilitarized. They will say their obligations under the defense pact must give them forces to back it up. The moment you start a German national force as such under some German flag ... I think we are off; and we are right back then to about 1933 with the Reichswehr Army. The only way we can ever keep Germany demilitarized is to have no German military force whatsoever, and no excuse for any force at all because they start chiseling and what they openly have will serve as cover for what they secretly have.

ACHESON: When you thought of the problem before, you looked for the removal some day of the line between east and west in Europe. Do you still do that?

KENNAN: We must look toward its removal. If we are going to say that we are not going to look toward its removal, then I would be inclined to swing to the camp of those who say union should be only in the western Europe ... I think western Europe today is not really politically viable entity in the long run without full U.S. and U.K. participation, but a European union which left out U.K. and ourselves would have much more drawing power as an organizer of Europe in the future than would be one of the Atlantic Pact group. It would be an entity in which the Germans had far more leadership. The Germans know more about how to handle such problems -- in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland -- than we do, particularly more than the British do. I want to make clear the horrifying significance of this, which is that the Germans again get a place in western Europe which is going to be very important. But it often seemed to me, during the war leaving over there, that what was wrong with Hitler's new order was that it was Hitler's ...

ACHESON: What forces do we see at work which will remove that line?

KENNAN: The difficulty involved in the permanent control of some 90 million people in eastern Europe by a more primitive, if more numerous, people in Russia. It is simply the difficulty of colonialism as applied to advanced peoples. ... The British don't want to take that possibility into account. Jebb told me they even fear that possibility. He said they don't think anybody is ready to face those problems yet; they want to continue to firm up the structure in western Europe before they get into questions of Eastern Europe. He envisaged this as something we have a close hold of and don't want to be asked to extend it; they want nothing else to emerge between the Russians and ourselves which is not ours or theirs. That is what frightens me. I think the Russians are over-extended, and we are over-extended in trying to maintain this.

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cannot be entirely certain about that. Sometimes when you see the pathetic lack of leadership in Europe, and the lack of really constructive leadership in Germany, you think Europe has gotten so weak and so silly both of us can handle our sides. That's easier for the Russians than ourselves, perhaps ... can't live in a divided Europe so easily.

BUTLER: The Russians have the advantage of being able to impose their wills by police methods. We cannot operate that way in half of Europe.

KENNAN: I am not sure how easy it will be in the long run for the Russians ...

ACHESON: Do you see any possibility for any development ... we don't have people who are enthusiastically doing it for you ...

KENNAN: They are all small minorities. I don't see any possibility of a popular revolt in the eastern satellites, but we see the satellite leaders terribly worried and uncertain about their relationships to Moscow and certain dilemmas are growing up ... the germ of Titoism is growing, too; no one speaks of it but it is in everyone's mind. I think they all envy Tito secretly; none of them enjoys being under the Russians, the Russians are as rough on them as they are on anyone else, and as secretive. The Russians don't tell them anything. The Russians are quite capable of selling any of them down the river. That scares the Poles, particularly, over the Oder-Neisse line.

ACHESON: Shouldn't we take that as aside from this new German government being set up?

KENNAN: We can't help but gain by it, but there may be some hidden gimmick.

TUFTS: Wouldn't it be better to have a union in Europe which the satellites could join without joining the U.S.? Their opportunities would be greater in joining Germany than in joining Russia.

NITZE: Take the case of Yugoslavia and the case of Spain. It would be easier for us to create a framework in which ...

KENNAN: I really wish for a social revolution in Germany. There are tremendous possibilities for the creation of a third force in Germany. We don't provide the ideological magnet ... They have little appreciation of our systems.

NITZE: ... What kind of a structure would it be easier for parts of eastern Europe to associate themselves with and make the transition? They have never been satisfied that a broad tolerant framework would be easier to fit themselves into than a tighter framework which is typical of any European organization.

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KENNAN: If you do make it tolerant, perhaps. The Council of Europe excludes them all as it stands now. If they break off they will still be totalitarian, or authoritarian; their systems will not change basically. ...

DAVIES: They would get a Fourth International before they could go socialist.

KENNAN: That could come only when the forces were largely withdrawn, and when Russia suffers indecision ... Probabilities that will occur. None of these authoritarian governments has ever demonstrated that they have reasonably reliable system of transferring power from one dictator to another. Russia was wracked for 10-15 years after Lenin died ... What will happen after Stalin, I don't know. In terms of Russian constitutional law, we are back in the days of Peter when it was law that each czar should appoint his successor. We can't rely on anything in such a possibility. The next fellow may be capable of holding his own ...

ACHESON: Do you put that within ten years?

KENNAN: Not possible to make a prediction. All these things can happen.

DAVIES: What you are saying is that you want to leave things so that we can take advantage of any break. Our only chance comes over a break at the center so we can do something.

KENNAN: The Russian system does not exclude moments of great weakness.

DAVIES: The Russian colonial system is not as strong as the British ...

...

ACHESON: You have a puzzling situation here. If you are sure that this line between east and west is permanent, then you would not be in favor of this particular form being an Atlantic Pact. ... you are taking a chance in advocating something you would not advocate unless this possibility happened.

KENNAN: I had in mind, perhaps wrongly, the fact that something probably is going to have to happen as a result of the needs of Germany and Austria and there must at some time be a withdrawal of forces there which would remove Russian forces ... It seems to me that the arrangements we made for Germany last spring were really based on the theory that the line was not only going to endure but to become more significant as time went on. You remember the discussions we had here a year ago, when you joined us as a consultant ...

ACHESON: If you went forward with this idea, would Austria be a part of this union? Is there anything in the draft of the treaty for Austria which talks about it?

Adams:

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ADAMS: It mentions union with entities ...
 KENNAN: That would bar it then, wouldn't it?
 ACHESON: That's something to consider.

KENNAN: What does stand out clearly is that if we are going to try to do this thing of holding western Germany firmly in our camp then we must by all means let the U.S. people know that they are in for a long and serious commitment here. Congress must get over the idea that everything is over by 1952.

NITZE: That is true irrespective of whether you get union or not.

KENNAN: The Germans have demonstrated a capability of handling Europe in such a way as to solve the pound-dollar problem.

NITZE: The possibility of union is not so strong.

TUFTS: Are these alternatives, or perhaps stages? If division of Germany becomes permanent, then can't we consider whether it becomes ...

ACHESON: I wonder if we haven't put the question up in the wrong way.

HOOKE: It is a question of accepting present fact and reconciling ourselves to future prospects.

ACHESON: I began wondering, when George said if this line is permanent we should not proceed, if it is not we should ... We don't know. It depends on a break we cannot plan on. We should look at the problem again and say at sometime in the future we will be possessed of knowledge as to whether Europe is going to be one or divided. At that time we will have to decide whether U.S. and Britain will participate. Are there any steps irrevocable up to that point regardless of what develops? It is very far in the future. Some ideas are a little fanciful ... talking of opening Africa. ... those we aren't going to adjust, but we are going to work for institutions of monetary nature which will rule out possible exchange problems, remove tariff barriers, permit common migration of workers back and forth, and perhaps some military relationship ... Would those things be true anyway?

VOICE: I believe they would be true anyway.

ACHESON: What would be the relation of the British to those steps?

NITZE: The issue becomes concrete if you consider two courses: (1) turn OEEC into an effective organization, remove veto, run by majority voice, make our aid conditional on majority voice; the British would be included in that. The other would be to do what ECA suggests which is to encourage the French, Italians, Benelux to set up centralized agencies which would have some power over trade and economic policies in the countries and try to get them to make a

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commitment in the relatively near future to do it themselves and to include western Germany within that group.

ACHESON: Are they alternativee, or can you do them both?

NITZE: You can do them both. I think it unlikely that you could get both done; if one is done it would take the heat off the accomplishments of the other.

TUFTS: To the extent you don't do them both ...

BERRY: Would that help the fears of the French?

NITZE: I think it would. You are dealing there with the financial side. In dealing with military side we should consider deeper participation of the U.S. on the continent in addition to our present commitments.

BUTLER: Suppose we did decide to do both, is there anything irrevocable about that? Could we postpone the decision on Europe?

KENNAN: That was my decision in this paper: that we can't see ~~any~~ this split removed and what we would do now ... I want to add that that meant to us we should do what we could to pave the way for closer association, and at the same time holding our own Atlantic Pact commitment over the whole thing and not going further. In that respect ECA wants to go further than in this paper ... I have gone further myself, somewhat, because I feel that if the French will not go along perhaps we should go back to what we had said about fitting it into the Atlantic Pact group, but to go after the French ...

NITZE: The centralized agencies ECA hopes for would be impossible for the present to go into. It would be possible for the British to cooperate with OEEC, which no longer has the one power-one veto principle. I think they could do it. The real power comes from the way in which we back up the decisions of the OEEC. They would have to have confidence that we would not participate in anything to their detriment. I don't think it would be possible for the British to participate in the OEEC type of scheme. Perhaps we should do both at once ...

TUFTS: If we should join the OEEC it would be reassuring to the French and British.

KENNAN: Can we suggest to the western Europeans that they proceed on a provisional basis ... we would need a new look at it; whether feasible or not, it seems a most suitable approach. I am afraid there is an irrevocable quality about these things.

ACHESON: I don't mean they should be irrevocable except that one step might lead to another. Could you get help now to continental countries should they set up some federal reserve board of their own by which they establish their currencies and relationship to one another and manage

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Carlton Savage
Harry H. Schwartz
Robert Tufts

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throughout this picture is the fact that they are apparently getting rid of all who participated in the Spanish Civil War, and particularly in the International Brigade.

Mr. Bohlen said that he did not agree with those who explain the Soviet peace propaganda on the grounds of exuberant confidence in the Kremlin. He feels rather that the Russians may actually be concerned enough to mean it.

In France the Communists have gotten themselves into a rather sticky position, as they have been ordered to make an all-out effort against the MAP. This puts them in the position of saying, in effect, that France should not be armed and that even if she should be armed she should not accept arms for nothing. We should stay out of this one, but it is important that the French themselves make the most of this awkward Communist line.

[REDACTED]

E.O.

1.3.05

In reply to a specific question as to why the top Poles were not at Stalin's birthday celebrations, Mr. Bohlen expressed the opinion that Poland occupies a special position in the eyes of the Kremlin. It is the country through which all the major invasions from the West against Russia have passed and the Russians

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have a vast mistrust for Poles, whether they be Polish Communists or Polish Fascists. They don't intend to pamper the Poles, take any chances with them, or stand for any nonsense from them, and they want the Poles to know that. Stalin is not only a brutal man but he uses his brutality and impresses the fact of its existence on those whom he wishes to dominate. He probably has utter contempt for non-Russian Communists and he probably considers them a worthless lot. If they are worth anything, it is only to the extent that they are completely disciplined. This explains why the lack of discipline is not only dealt with harshly but in such a manner as to make the harshness and brutality as apparent as possible.

Mr. Bohlen then addressed himself to the question of European integration. He said that he felt that the basic issue between himself and Mr. Kennan was on Britain's role in Europe. He felt that a good case could be made to show that the last two World Wars were in large part due to British coyness in committing itself sufficiently to the Continent. He feels that the assumption has been made that it is impossible for Britain to weave its political life more closely into that of the Continent without examining carefully enough the premises on which this assumption is based. He suggested that the British might be using the empire argument when there is no basis in fact for it, that the empire is looking less and less to London and more to Washington, and that the United States might be able to pick up some of the empire commitments which the British are trying to hold, and thus allow England to join with Europe. He said that the British must make a choice as to whether they are a European country with over-seas connections or an over-seas empire with European connections, and he suggested that the U.S. probably has not given sufficient study to the question as to whether we could not take steps to help England resolve this choice in favor of the former alternative. He seemed to think that more of the English attitude on this question was subjective than real and that the State Department, while examining the subjective attitudes of other countries critically, was at the same time too

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emotionally friendly to the same factors in English policy. He also considered that a European Union without the British would leave the French open to German domination and that any hints of closer association between the United States and Great Britain which does not include the Western Europeans, in particular the French, would leave the latter with the very definite impression that the Anglo-Saxons considered them as expendable raw material for a holding operation and nothing more. In summary, then, everything in his view pointed to European integration (which was not defined) to include the British. This, in turn, brings up the question of the real nature of British commitments elsewhere which would prevent this, and finally, the necessity for studying the nature of those commitments.

After Mr. Bohlen left, it was decided that, inasmuch as he will be able to meet again with the Staff on this question before he returns to France, it would be advisable to draw up a list of specific questions to which he, Mr. Kennan, and Mr. Nitze could address themselves at the next meeting, possibly with the Secretary in attendance. Messrs. Hooker, Tufts, Adams, Scammon, and Joyce will each draft such a list for submission to Mr. Nitze.

When asked his opinion about the draft speech for the Secretary, which was contemplated to have been delivered before the CIO Convention last Fall, Mr. Bohlen said that, while this was an excellent speech for a highly intelligent audience, he considered that it was a dangerous speech to give to the American people as a whole, as it would probably be interpreted as some sort of appeasement. Furthermore, the Soviets are past masters at setting traps with this sort of thing, and he felt that they would not fail to make propaganda capital of it in a way that would be very harmful to us.

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POLICY PLANNING STAFF

7th Meeting

Tuesday, January 24, 1950
11:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

Present: George Kennan
Paul Nitze
Ware Adams
Lampton Berry
George Butler
John Davies

Dorothy Fosdick
Robert Hooker
Robert Joyce
Carlton Savage
Harry H. Schwartz
Robert Tufts

Mr. Scammon, R
Mr. Schwinn, P

Charles E. Bohlen, Minister, Embassy Paris

Mr. Bohlen began by stating that in 1947 our policy toward the Continent of Europe was laid on a foundation which made no distinctions between Great Britain and other European countries. Great Britain, in fact, took the lead in the formation of the OEEC and the Brussels Pact. In September 1949, during the U.S.-British-Canadian conference in Washington, the newspaper stories by the Alsop Brothers, Walter Lippmann, and others, coupled with the manner in which the conference was handled, led the Europeans to believe that a basic historical change was taking place in our foreign policy in this respect in that the United States was going to press for U.S.-Canadian-British association on the one hand, and a separate Continental European association on the other. Mr. Bohlen remarked that it

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- 1-5/P. minutes
- 2-4/P. Bohlen's summary
- 3-5/S-R
- 4-6/P. minutes
- 5-7/P. minutes
- 6-4/A
- 7-4/B
- 8-6/B
- 9-10/P. minutes
- 10-DI
- 11-R
- 12-R
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- 15-E. Bohlen
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was immaterial whether, as Mr. Kennan pointed out, this attitude was based simply on newspaper stories and in the face of the signing of the Atlantic Pact a few days before. He added that the British spread everywhere the story that the United States was going to shift to this new position.

Mr. Bohlen said that if Great Britain were cut out of Europe there was no hope of an integrated community there. The British are playing the dual role of a European country with overseas commitments and an empire with European connections. Which one should receive the greater emphasis? The U.K. should, in his opinion, take a leading role on the Continent. He expressed the view that the French could not assume the leadership on the Continent, pointing out in this regard that the Dutch, for example, would not accept French leadership. The question is, then, can the U.S. somehow lighten Great Britain's overseas burden? What we cannot do is either encourage her to drift away from the Continent or force her closer into the Continent. Mr. Kennan suggested that we should separate military from political alliances on this subject. The U.S. has a military alliance with Europe without political connections. Why cannot Great Britain do the same? Mr. Bohlen said that the British may be opposed to a strong European federation and expressed the view that faced with one on the Continent, the British might make private deals with Germany.

Mr. Nitze said that it was very difficult for the United Kingdom to join a European federation not only because of her Commonwealth ties but also because of her internal policies. On the other hand, the question was whether or not you would have a strong enough organization on the Continent if Great Britain were not a part of it. He raised the question of whether federation was the best objective in this regard, or the right technique. Mr. Bohlen replied that the Continentals have not yet reached the point of looking to full federation but that Mr. Harriman is of the opinion that the

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British have violated their commitments under the Marshall Plan through lack of cooperation economically with the European Continental countries on matters less binding than political federation. Mr. Nitze agreed that the British had been back-sliding in this respect and that we should try to stop it.

Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that the Europeans were looking at the present and not to the long-term future, and that they would have no objection if at a later date the British, having cooperated to the fullest extent possible, were to say that they could go no further on steps which then would obviously be leading to political union. Mr. Nitze agreed that if you consider their objective one year from now as a clearing union, lower trade barriers, strengthening the Council of Europe, etc., then the full cooperation of the British was needed to accomplish these ends.

Mr. Bohlen expressed the opinion that there were great dangers in looking too far ahead because there are too many intangibles and too many imponderable factors which one cannot foresee; and if you attempt to plan too far ahead, except in your own mind, you find that in discussing the future you produce effects today which may not be, and often are not, appropriate for today's problems. In his opinion, the British are too badly off to think ahead at the present moment and must expend all their thought on today's problems. Mr. Nitze pointed out that it takes at least two years to think out a policy, obtain governmental agreement, and the necessary public backing and Congressional legislation, and for this reason alone you cannot avoid advance planning. Mr. Kennan said that it is possible to see a certain number of long-range trends in the world and pointed to the increase in German power on the Continent of Europe as an example and one which would seem to call for some advance planning to anticipate the problems that it is bound to create.

Mr. Kennan went on to say that the Staff had come to the conclusion that the more national economies are controlled the less you can talk of integrating them

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without full political integration, and it is the thought of full political integration with Continental countries that scares the British. The OEEC commitments, however, do not call for a merger of sovereignty but simply for a change in British commercial policy, and he agreed that for better or worse we should press them to make such changes as are necessary to live up to those commitments. Mr. Bohlen remarked that that idea alone would get rid of most of the worries on the Continent, and he thought that the next step was to discuss what we could do to help the British in their overseas empire so that more of their attention could be turned in the direction of Europe. He pointed out in that connection that the present British war plans call for sending the bulk of their armed forces to the Middle East in case of war, and he added that he felt that we and the British make an atavistic distinction between defending Western Europe and defending the British Isles; whereas he fails to see how you can defend the latter without defending the former. He pointed out that even Montgomery feels that the defense of Great Britain should be as far east as possible.

Mr. Kennan said that he thought both the British and American Joint Chiefs are wrong politically in their judgments on these matters, but he did feel that perhaps the British are more right than we are in gambling on the probability that the Russians will be unable to over-run all of Europe and the Middle East simultaneously, that the Russians may very well leave Western Europe alone in event of war and concentrate on the Middle East, in the first place at least, and that, therefore, it is a good risk to prepare for that eventuality.

Mr. Kennan agreed that we must get the British to do their part in the OEEC and related organizations, but he raised the question of how this solves the German problem. Mr. Bohlen, while admitting that the German problem is very real and very imminent, said that he would give priority to the problem of solving the anomalous position of the British over one of specifically providing for a possible rise in the near future of a dangerous German nationalist. He added that Europe is a patient

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whom we have been treating and who we can now say will not die but who, during the convalescent period, is showing decided tendencies to drift back into its former bad habits of disunity. We are committed to Europe by the Atlantic Pact whether we like it or not and we have to live up to it and to all its implications. In two fields, we can deal directly with the British and not let anyone else interfere, i.e., atomic energy and Britain's overseas empire. Mr. Kennan said that the demands that the Germans are now making on the Western powers can only be considered as the inevitable concomitant of the whole policy of the Western powers toward Germany since the conclusion of hostilities, and that, in his mind, the problem still remains bound up with the fact that with Great Britain playing an active role in a European association, federation is impossible and that without federation there is no adequate framework within which adequately to handle the German problem.

Mr. Bohlen said that ever since the war we have been putting every pressure on the French to do something or other and very little on the British, and that the historic feeling of fraternal association with the British, enhanced by our wartime partnership, has led to an assumption on the part of this government of the basic correctness of British positions without subjecting those positions to critical examination.

Mr. Kennan suggested that the question is either one of OEEC type of association between the British and the Continental countries or federation. He expressed the opinion that if the British joined the European federation, the dominions would cut their ties with Great Britain. Mr. Bohlen replied that perhaps what we should really face then was the dissolution of the British empire. Mr. Kennan said that dissolution of the empire was not in our interest as there were many things the Commonwealth could do which we could not do and which we wished them to continue doing. Mr. Bohlen said that if we encourage the British in their attachment to their overseas empire, they will drift away from the Continent and that if they drift away from the Continent, they will drift into opposition to it; but suppose that the empire dissolves of its own accord, what have we then? Mr. Kennan

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remarked that the British can still call a Colombo conference and Mr. Nitze added that, although it is certainly an evil, the sterling balance problem itself is a bond holding the Commonwealth together. Mr. Bohlen suggested that the Colombo conference might be the dying glow of a setting sun and that while such things were useful, he questioned whether they were worth the damage which the British attitude toward them created on the Continent. Mr. Nitze said that he saw no conflict between the two because the more we help the empire the more the British would be able to participate in European affairs. Mr. Bohlen agreed and said that the British were using the empire as an excuse to stay out of European affairs. Mr. Nitze suggested that if the Labor Party were reelected in February we might find them willing to take the lead on the Continent from us.

Mr. Kennan said that he saw certain things that we could do vis-a-vis the British: (1) we could straighten them out on their ideas of military planning with regard to the Continent; (2) we could press them to live up to their economic commitments; and (3) we could make strenuous efforts to see that they do not oppose European unity; but, he added, such a policy does not take into consideration the basic problem of Germany and the merger of sovereignty required for a federation. Mr. Bohlen replied that perhaps too much emphasis is given to the question of mergers of sovereignty. It is a slow process; perhaps the most that you can ask is that you move generally in that direction. When you reach the point where the British can go no further, then you can solidify the superstructure on the Continent; but you will have nothing on which to erect a superstructure if the British continue to obstruct cooperative mechanisms.

Mr. Nitze said that it seemed to him that what Mr. Bohlen was suggesting was that there be a special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom with regard to the Commonwealth and that the U.S. withdraw and let Britain take the leadership in Europe. Mr. Kennan stated his opinion that the British cannot do anything in Europe which we will not do with them, to which Mr. Bohlen replied that the British do not have the great gulf between their Parliament and people on the one hand and government on the other that exists between the people and the Congress of the United States

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and the American Government, and that they can do many things that are difficult for us to do for that reason. Mr. Nitze said that it is obvious to him that Europe cannot stand on its own feet during the next five years and he did not see how we could help them if we were playing second fiddle to the British. Mr. Bohlen replied that as long as we are occupying Germany and are in the Atlantic Pact we won't be playing second fiddle. Mr. Kennan said that the British may be able to negotiate with the Europeans more easily than we can by virtue of the reasons given by Mr. Bohlen, but they can't actually do anything-- we will have to do it.

Mr. Bohlen said that our maximum objective should be the general one of making common European interests more important than individual national interests, and he felt that in this context there has already been considerable progress, however slow. Mr. Kennan agreed but said he was convinced that the British were not going into a European federation, in which case the question still remained as to what to do about Germany. Mr. Bohlen said that he felt we could not reject the idea that the British might not someday join a European federation. Mr. Kennan replied that the Germans and the British would not fit into a federation together as basically they are competitors. Mr. Bohlen said that the answer you come to in the end is that the European problem is unmanageable.

When asked by Mr. Nitze what specifically Mr. Bohlen objected to in the telegram (No. 4013 of October 19, 1949, to Paris, for Perkins), Mr. Bohlen pointed to two parts which he felt bracketed the U.S. and the U.K. together and which insisted on French leadership on the Continent.

In reply to a request for specific suggestions in regard to the European policy on this whole issue, Mr. Bohlen suggested that (a) the U.S. and the U.K. form a partnership with respect to Britain's overseas problems; and (b) in return for relieving the British of some of these burdens, the U.K. would adopt a more positive approach to the Continent and would attempt to work out with the other Continental European countries the integration into Western Europe of Western Germany. The

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U.S. would remain committed in Europe by the Atlantic Pact and a partnership with the British and French directed to solving the German problem. In this connection, he added that it was important to divide the British problem into its European and Overseas halves. (c) Furthermore, he suggested that in April the foreign ministers of the U.S., U.K., and France meet to exchange views on the German problem and that they have a series of conversations designed more to explore their mutual problems on a broad basis rather than to reach concrete decisions on specific points.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that the British want another British-U.S.-Canadian conference and asked about French reaction. Mr. Bohlen said that there was no objection to that as long as the Continentals were properly prepared beforehand and were not given the impression that the three countries were discussing the fate of Europe, which was the impression created by the poor preparation for the September conference.

Mr. Tufts will attempt to draw up a paper which will meet with the approval of Messrs. Bohlen, Kennan, and Nitze and will be a helpful guide to the Department on this whole problem.

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POLICY PLANNING STAFF

7th Meeting

Tuesday, January 24, 1950
11:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

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Paul Nitze
Ware Adams
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George Butler
John Davies

Dorothy Fosdick
Robert Hooker
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Mr. Scammon, R
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without full political integration, and it is the thought of full political integration with Continental countries that scares the British. The OEEC commitments, however, do not call for a merger of sovereignty but simply for a change in British commercial policy, and he agreed that for better or worse we should press them to make such changes as are necessary to live up to those commitments. Mr. Bohlen remarked that that idea alone would get rid of most of the worries on the Continent, and he thought that the next step was to discuss what we could do to help the British in their overseas empire so that more of their attention could be turned in the direction of Europe. He pointed out in that connection that the present British war plans call for sending the bulk of their armed forces to the Middle East in case of war, and he added that he felt that we and the British make an atavistic distinction between defending Western Europe and defending the British Isles; whereas he fails to see how you can defend the latter without defending the former. He pointed out that even Montgomery feels that the defense of Great Britain should be as far east as possible.

Mr. Kennan said that he thought both the British and American Joint Chiefs are wrong politically in their judgments on these matters, but he did feel that perhaps the British are more right than we are in gambling on the probability that the Russians will be unable to over-run all of Europe and the Middle East simultaneously, that the Russians may very well leave Western Europe alone in event of war and concentrate on the Middle East, in the first place at least, and that, therefore, it is a good risk to prepare for that eventuality.

Mr. Kennan agreed that we must get the British to do their part in the OEEC and related organizations, but he raised the question of how this solves the German problem. Mr. Bohlen, while admitting that the German problem is very real and very imminent, said that he would give priority to the problem of solving the anomalous position of the British over one of specifically providing for a possible rise in the near future of a dangerous German nationalist. He added that Europe is a patient

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whom we have been treating and who we can now say will not die but who, during the convalescent period, is showing decided tendencies to drift back into its former bad habits of disunity. We are committed to Europe by the Atlantic Pact whether we like it or not and we have to live up to it and to all its implications. In two fields, we can deal directly with the British and not let anyone else interfere, i.e., atomic energy and Britain's overseas empire. Mr. Kennan said that the demands that the Germans are now making on the Western powers can only be considered as the inevitable concomitant of the whole policy of the Western powers toward Germany since the conclusion of hostilities, and that, in his mind, the problem still remains bound up with the fact that with Great Britain playing an active role in a European association, federation is impossible and that without federation there is no adequate framework within which adequately to handle the German problem.

Mr. Bohlen said that ever since the war we have been putting every pressure on the French to do something or other and very little on the British, and that the historic feeling of fraternal association with the British, enhanced by our wartime partnership, has led to an assumption on the part of this government of the basic correctness of British positions without subjecting those positions to critical examination.

Mr. Kennan suggested that the question is either one of OEEC type of association between the British and the Continental countries or federation. He expressed the opinion that if the British joined the European federation, the dominions would cut their ties with Great Britain. Mr. Bohlen replied that perhaps what we should really face then was the dissolution of the British empire. Mr. Kennan said that dissolution of the empire was not in our interest as there were many things the Commonwealth could do which we could not do and which we wished them to continue doing. Mr. Bohlen said that if we encourage the British in their attachment to their overseas empire, they will drift away from the Continent and that if they drift away from the Continent, they will drift into opposition to it; but suppose that the empire dissolves of its own accord, what have we then? Mr. Kennan

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remarked that the British can still call a Colombo conference and Mr. Nitze added that, although it is certainly an evil, the sterling balance problem itself is a bond holding the Commonwealth together. Mr. Bohlen suggested that the Colombo conference might be the dying glow of a setting sun and that while such things were useful, he questioned whether they were worth the damage which the British attitude toward them created on the Continent. Mr. Nitze said that he saw no conflict between the two because the more we help the empire the more the British would be able to participate in European affairs. Mr. Bohlen agreed and said that the British were using the empire as an excuse to stay out of European affairs. Mr. Nitze suggested that if the Labor Party were reelected in February we might find them willing to take the lead on the Continent from us.

Mr. Kennan said that he saw certain things that we could do vis-a-vis the British: (1) we could straighten them out on their ideas of military planning with regard to the Continent; (2) we could press them to live up to their economic commitments; and (3) we could make strenuous efforts to see that they do not oppose European unity; but, he added, such a policy does not take into consideration the basic problem of Germany and the merger of sovereignty required for a federation. Mr. Bohlen replied that perhaps too much emphasis is given to the question of mergers of sovereignty. It is a slow process; perhaps the most that you can ask is that you move generally in that direction. When you reach the point where the British can go no further, then you can solidify the superstructure on the Continent; but you will have nothing on which to erect a superstructure if the British continue to obstruct cooperative mechanisms.

Mr. Nitze said that it seemed to him that what Mr. Bohlen was suggesting was that there be a special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom with regard to the Commonwealth and that the U.S. withdraw and let Britain take the leadership in Europe. Mr. Kennan stated his opinion that the British cannot do anything in Europe which we will not do with them, to which Mr. Bohlen replied that the British do not have the great gulf between their Parliament and people on the one hand and government on the other that exists between the people and the Congress of the United States

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and the American Government, and that they can do many things that are difficult for us to do for that reason. Mr. Nitze said that it is obvious to him that Europe cannot stand on its own feet during the next five years and he did not see how we could help them if we were playing second fiddle to the British. Mr. Bohlen replied that as long as we are occupying Germany and are in the Atlantic Pact we won't be playing second fiddle. Mr. Kennan said that the British may be able to negotiate with the Europeans more easily than we can by virtue of the reasons given by Mr. Bohlen, but they can't actually do anything-- we will have to do it.

Mr. Bohlen said that our maximum objective should be the general one of making common European interests more important than individual national interests, and he felt that in this context there has already been considerable progress, however slow. Mr. Kennan agreed but said he was convinced that the British were not going into a European federation, in which case the question still remained as to what to do about Germany. Mr. Bohlen said that he felt we could not reject the idea that the British might not someday join a European federation. Mr. Kennan replied that the Germans and the British would not fit into a federation together as basically they are competitors. Mr. Bohlen said that the answer you come to in the end is that the European problem is unmanageable.

When asked by Mr. Nitze what specifically Mr. Bohlen objected to in the telegram (No. 4013 of October 19, 1949, to Paris, for Perkins), Mr. Bohlen pointed to two parts which he felt bracketed the U.S. and the U.K. together and which insisted on French leadership on the Continent.

In reply to a request for specific suggestions in regard to the European policy on this whole issue, Mr. Bohlen suggested that (a) the U.S. and the U.K. form a partnership with respect to Britain's overseas problems; and (b) in return for relieving the British of some of these burdens, the U.K. would adopt a more positive approach to the Continent and would attempt to work out with the other Continental European countries the integration into Western Europe of Western Germany. The

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U.S. would remain committed in Europe by the Atlantic Pact and a partnership with the British and French directed to solving the German problem. In this connection, he added that it was important to divide the British problem into its European and Overseas halves. (c) Furthermore, he suggested that in April the foreign ministers of the U.S., U.K., and France meet to exchange views on the German problem and that they have a series of conversations designed more to explore their mutual problems on a broad basis rather than to reach concrete decisions on specific points.

Mr. Nitze pointed out that the British want another British-U.S.-Canadian conference and asked about French reaction. Mr. Bohlen said that there was no objection to that as long as the Continentals were properly prepared beforehand and were not given the impression that the three countries were discussing the fate of Europe, which was the impression created by the poor preparation for the September conference.

Mr. Tufts will attempt to draw up a paper which will meet with the approval of Messrs. Bohlen, Kennan, and Nitze and will be a helpful guide to the Department on this whole problem.

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| By | SL NARA Date 3/11/97 |

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POLICY PLANNING STAFF

8th Meeting

Thursday, February 2, 1950
11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

| | | |
|----------|---------------|-------------------|
| Present: | Paul Nitze | Dorothy Fosdick |
| | Ware Adams | Robert Hooker |
| | Lampton Berry | Carlton Savage |
| | George Butler | Harry H. Schwartz |
| | John Davies | |

Mr. Scammon, R
Mr. Schwinn, P

Mr. Nitze said that at the Secretary's Meeting this morning his opinion had been asked as to the danger of war, and he had replied that it seemed considerably greater than last Fall. In general, his thesis was that it is always possible but that historical precedents may have become inaccurate as criteria by which to judge the degree of probability. In the discussion that followed several points were brought out: there are an increasing number of signs of toughness on the part of the Kremlin; the informal opinion of the Joint Chiefs now is that the Soviet Union could begin a major attack from a standing start so that the usual signs of mobilization and preparation would be lacking; there are increasing indications that some of the basic elements of Communist dogma no longer hold, i.e., that the Communist bastion has infinite time in which to achieve its purpose, that capitalist nations carry within themselves the seeds of their own

destruction

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6-LB
7-GB
8-JD...
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PPS 144-53 / 32 / Policy Planning Staff 1950

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| Authority | <u>NND 959295</u> |
| By | <u>SL</u> NARA Date <u>3/11/97</u> |

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destruction which require watering but not planting by the Soviet Union, that the Red Army is used only when a revolutionary atmosphere makes the situation right for the coup de grâce, etc.

The Planning Staff is immediately to prepare a paper analyzing the probability of a war in the immediate future, which is to be drafted in the first instance by Mr. Davies.

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FRANKFORT

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URTELS 2605 Mar 28 (rptd London as 144, Paris as 227, Berlin as 156

and passed Moscow unnumbered) and 2638 Mar 29 (rptd London as 147, Paris as 231 and passed Moscow unnumbered) re all-Ger elections.

Dept has hesitated to give prompt approval your request because of (1) relationship of this proposal to recent decision on US side to proceed promptly with tripartite agreement for the holding of elections in Berlin, (2) desire, before decision is made on position to be taken by HICOM on all Ger elections, to determine advisability of 3 FM's taking position this subj at coming meeting and (3) dangers of proceeding too far along road to Ger unity based on free elections alone (which is of course only one element of problem) and vulnerable position we might be placed in if the West wld later have to add new conditions for Ger unity.

With ref to (1) above, it may be that simultaneous or closely timed proposals on both all Ger and Berlin election emanating from GER might tend to take away from apparent sincerity of both and give them openly propagandistic flavor. Berlin situation wld be automatically covered by all Ger proposal and it wld seem logical therefore to withhold

Berlin proposal if we proceed on other. We have been reluctant to suggest this due to desire for action in Berlin before May FDJ rally.

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In connection with (2) above we are now considering whether FOR DC/T USE ONLY
FM's shld publish rather full statement on Ger unity which wld cover not only free elections but reestablishment four power control machinery without veto, four power occupation statute, dissolution of para military units, etc. It might also include our position on frontiers, reparations, etc.

In connection with point (3) above, we wish ~~to~~ underline necessity of introducing into ~~the~~ discussion before idea develops too far the point that agreement to unite Ger necessarily involves agreement on conditions under which govt of unified country wld function. To be acceptable to us, these conditions must be such as ~~to~~ permit govt ~~to~~ function effectively, without arbitrary interference from ~~Soviets~~ ^{SOVS} and without ~~ECON~~ economic drains which wld impede EUR recovery. (We are prepared support Ger unity at some risk on this basis.) We must avoid, however, becoming engaged in protracted negots which offer no basis for success and which deflect Ger energy and interest from ^{EUR} ~~European~~ ^{POLIT} ~~pol~~ and ^{ECON} ~~eco~~ integration.

We are delighted with progress made in last few weeks to gain initiative from Sovs. We agree ~~that~~ some follow up to Bonn declaration is desirable on HICOM ~~2~~ level even if main emphasis were to be placed on statement by Fon Mins. Believe we can afford sufficient delay to formulate planned ^{SCHED} ~~schedule~~ at least up to termination ^{MTG.} ~~of~~ FM meeting.

In view above, will you give us your views on (1) relationship between

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all Ger election proposal with present plans to proceed and
proposal for Berlin elections; (2) desirability of Fon Mins setting
forth fairly complete statement of Western desire for and terms of Ger
unity. If you think such statement desirable wld it be preferable for
HICOM to restrict itself at this time to general statement of support
of Bonn Declaration without offer to negotiate? If you have any
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preliminary views of FR-BR on follow up to Bonn Declaration they wld
be helpful to us.

In any position we take on this problem, we recognize ^{cogency}~~urgency~~
of arguments outlined Berlin 508 to Frankfurt re Sov Zone reaction and
agree that concept Nat'l Constituent Assembly offers maximum appeal
to Eastern Gers. This principle was not included in agreed tripartite
paper of May 28, 1949 on all Ger elections, partially because it wld
have disrupted development of West Ger Govt at that time. Believe we
can accept this broader concept now that it has been put forward by
Fed Rep and we wld be prepared press Br and Fr at appropriate time to
agree with this concept in connection with supervised free elections.

Acheson
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CODE ROOM: Send to: HICOG, Frankfurt Repeat to: AMEMBASSY Paris 1/4
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Message Center
Release Date

APR 18

16-H-X

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Action
GER

FROM: Frankfurt

Control 3528

Info
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TO: Secretary of State

Rec'd April 10, 1950
5:16 p.m.

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NO: 3014, April 10, 8 p.m.

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NIACT

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SENT DEPARTMENT 3014; REPEATED BERLIN 206, LONDON 171,
PARIS 266; DEPARTMENT PASS MOSCOW 23.

FOR BYROADE

REDEPTEL 2252, April 3.

In view of rapidity and volume of exchange on all-Berlin
and all-German elections, feel that recapitulation of
our program desirable.

1. Calling for all-Berlin elections, Department's
authorization for which is greatly appreciated, does
not minimize necessity of following-up on Bonn pro-
posals for all-German elections. The two proposals are
quite separate segments of our present propaganda and
political campaign intended to regain and retain initia-
tive, discredit and disrupt Soviet election timetable,
and enlist psychological support of Germans. Linking
of two proposals will not give them a propagandistic
flavor if both have legitimate basis rooted German urge
to effect unification of both Berlin and Germany. But
restricting our moves to Berlin to exclusion of Germany
would (a) reduce prestige of Bonn, (b) pull carpet from
under our feet in midst of propaganda effort which has
produced substantial results and promises much more,
(c) impress Germans again, to our disadvantage, that
Western Powers split on matter of German unification
and thus (d) add to their uncertainty in adhering to
West and integrating with Western Europe.

2. Though we see impressive advantages in three Foreign
Ministers issuing statement on conditions of German unity
we feel such should not exclude our proceeding now on
HICOM level with proposal to negotiate electoral law
with Soviets. I note with satisfaction that Department
now feels it can support concept of an all-German con-
stituent assembly and that it is prepared to support

German unity

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-3-#WIACT 3014, April 10, 8 p.m., from Frankfurt

USSR. Though we may well qualify this position in practice and eventually work toward a de facto peace settlement with West Germany, I should not think we would wish to do so until (a) we had undercut Soviets line that peace treaty and withdrawal of troops is necessary to free elections, with our own caveat, fortified by bona fide political moves, that Germany must be unified and an all-German Government established as a necessary preliminary to peace settlement and (b) convince the Germans that only the Soviets have compelled them and ourselves to modify this position. Hence, moving ahead now is not only advantageous from standpoint disrupting Soviet plans but is vital to maintenance of our controls which under Soviet propaganda barrage may grow more unpalatable to Germans. Our failure to move ahead now will not only cancel our gains but increase West German suspicions of our motives and resolution. Third stage would be enunciation of broad terms of conditions under which Germany might be unified and emerge as candidate for peace settlement. We think this should preferably be done by three Ministers at governmental level and might be more effective if made in context of our having offered negotiations on HICOM level and failed through Soviet refusal to negotiate or through making impossible counter-proposals which because of our previous efforts, would not make propaganda capital with Germans.

5. Hence, our program as outlined and which envisaged offer of limited negotiations for electoral law should not be confused with controls which four powers might wish exert vis-a-vis a hypothetical all-German Government or with conditions of the peace.

6. We do not believe that protracted negotiations of type suggested by Department would result from suggested offer to enter limited negotiations, or, in remote possibility such did eventuate, that they would deflect German energy and interest from European political and economic integration. On contrary, I feel strongly that West Germany will not become either a firm or responsible member of an integrated Western Europe unless and until it is convinced that Western Europe is interested in the unification of Germany and that

integration with

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-4-#WIACT 3014, April 10, 8 p.m., from Frankfurt

Integration with Western Europe does not, therefore, connote a writing-off of the East. In this connection we must remember that Germans deeply suspect that we would willingly write off East Germany and this contributes to their dangerous tendency to play off East against West, seek to drive wedges between Allies, manipulate their affairs in a manner not entirely conducive to European integration.

7. Our best estimate of situation impels recommendation that we cannot afford to lose initiative now, observe silence until three Ministers convene. If HICOM fails reach agreement, we would welcome Ministers taking up matter but note that they will meet for three days and will not have opportunity examine specific programs.

8. We must be in position by, and preferably before April 14 to submit position paper to POLAFF committee of HICOM.

In light of above, could not Department accede to proceeding to present a position paper based on previously submitted program (MYTEL 2605, March 28) accompanied by statement to effect that relinquishing of present control, pattern of control of an all-Government, and conditions of peace therewith are way involved or a subject for discussion with Soviet

MCCLOY

BA:CMC

NOTE: Relayed to Moscow 5:45 p.m., 4/10/50, MR.

Colonel Byroade's office informed 7 p.m., (CWO) FMH.

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(Aug 25)
August 26, 1950

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)

Dept. of State letter, 7-3-74
PROJ. ALT 78-99
ALC: 7-22-74

MEMORANDUM FOR S/S

The Secretary had dinner last night with Sir Oliver Franks. During the course of the conversation, Sir Oliver said that Mr. Bevin had put up as a matter of great urgency to him the question of having Mr. Attlee come to the United States for conversations with President Truman. Sir Oliver said that he had told Mr. Bevin that he didn't think the suggestion made very much sense, unless we were sure what we had in mind for the two to talk about and were sure that progress could be made if there were discussions. The Secretary said that he agreed with Sir Oliver and pointed out that such a meeting would cause great speculation. People would say that Mr. Attlee was simply coming over for more money, etc. It might also be said that he had come over to influence the United States elections, etc.

The Secretary said that the thinking was that Mr. Attlee would come over before Mr. Bevin returned to the UK after the forthcoming tripartite and NATO meetings. This would mean the last of September. This would be very close to elections in this country which would lead to further confusion. The Secretary said we were all working on many points and so far as Western Europe was concerned that these questions would be considered at the forthcoming tripartite and NATO meetings. He was not clear as to just where the Attlee-Truman conversations would fit in.

Sir Oliver asked if it might be possible to announce that there would be a meeting sometime in the future. The Secretary said he saw no point in saying what we would do until we knew what we wanted to do and could do.

This matter was discussed in a meeting in the Secretary's office at which time Mr. Rusk said that since President Truman was considering addressing the General Assembly, Mr. Attlee might come over here for the same purpose.

Since the Secretary reported the above, he has seen Sir Oliver Franks again. He said that he told Sir Oliver we had had a brief

discussion about this matter but that he was a little puzzled as to exactly what Mr. Attlee wished to achieve by his visit. He said that if the Prime Minister wanted to really get lined up in detail with the President on the primary problems facing Europe, there would be no point, as the President would have only the very broad concepts of what we intended to do within the time available for the visit. Sir Oliver said that there was no connection between the proposed visit of Mr. Attlee and the visit of Mr. Churchill.

With regard to the UN as the reason for the visit, Sir Oliver said that this might have unfortunate repercussions as the papers would all say that it was due to Mr. Bevin's ill health and that Mr. Attlee was coming because Mr. Bevin was not strong enough to carry the load.

Sir Oliver asked if he could report the preliminary views of the Secretary and Mr. Acheson declined to permit him to give these views as he felt we had not had sufficient consideration of the matter. He has agreed to see Sir Oliver on Wednesday (this is on the assumption that MDAP hearings will be Tuesday) at which time this and the Formosa matter will be discussed.

Sir Oliver said that, putting himself in Attlee's place, he thought that Attlee would want to discuss several things. First, he would be interested in the extent to which the US expected to really play a role in the defense of Europe and the fact that it would be something of a breach of tradition to station large numbers of troops on the Continent.

Sir Oliver said that as he saw it, and again in the way he imagined Mr. Attlee saw it, the US and the UK policies were about the same in so far as Europe was concerned. That is, we are willing to back up Europe but not "take over" all of its responsibilities. We are attempting to fit our armament program in with our domestic program without loss of social gains which we have made. In other words, we are both trying to carry through with our domestic goals and have not thus far prepared for the current crisis to an extent which would threaten the continuation of domestic programs. Sir Oliver said he was basing his interpretation of the US on the extent to which we were asking for controls, etc. If his interpretation is correct, the US and the UK are more or less in step, he felt.

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Sir Oliver pointed out that Mr. Attlee also heard rumors that we want to treat the UK as a European power and are urging the breaking up of the British Commonwealth. He said that Mr. Attlee would want to be reassured on this.

Sir Oliver said that if a really major effort were to be made to meet the current crisis, the British would be quite concerned about the price of primary materials (rubber, wheat, iron, etc.). Sir Oliver pointed out that great increases in prices of these commodities could have a disastrous effect on British economy. He said if we planned a really major effort, Mr. Attlee would want to know what we had in mind as far as joint control boards, etc.

Sir Oliver said that, in his opinion, the time of the proposed visit was not as important as getting a real review of the problems. If we can decide fairly soon that we want such a visit, that would be satisfactory to the British.

Sir Oliver then said that if the UN "cover" for the visit should be used, they hoped that it could be handled in some way which would not be too embarrassing in so far as Mr. Bevin was concerned. Sir Oliver thought that this proposal was worth considering. He suggested that Mr. Truman might send a message to Mr. Attlee and other Heads of State to the effect that he planned to address the General Assembly and inviting the other Heads of State to do likewise. The Secretary said that this might be difficult as far as which Heads of State.

Mr. Matthews was present when the Secretary reported on these meetings. He is anxious to get a copy of these notes as soon as possible.

LDBattle

S:LDBattle:mlm

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Control: 1089
Rec'd: January 3, 1951
9:43 p.m.

JAN 12 1951

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Action

GER

FROM: Frankfort

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 5382, January 3, 8 p.m.

DEPARTMENT PASS MOSCOW.

DECLASSIFIED

BY AT

NARS, Date

3-8-92

SENT DEPARTMENT 5382, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 455,
PARIS 506, MOSCOW 76.

Had long conversation with Chancellor yesterday. He opened his remarks by saying we were coming into a critical and dangerous period. He seemed primarily concerned that Soviet acceptance of CFM might mean postponement of any decisions concerning future of Germany and its contribution to Western defense. He was willing to authorize Blank and Generals Speidel and Heusinger to start conversations if it were clear that the Western powers would not hold back because of Soviet reply. He said, however, that if the conversations began and were then stopped, this would be disastrous on public opinion in Germany. He stated that German opinion was already concerned over fact that Germany's future might be decided without German participation. In that connection, he pointed out that it would be difficult for Germany to recognize any four power decisions reached in a meeting in which it was not represented.

As regards forthcoming CFM or talks with Grotewohl, Chancellor doubted whether Soviets would ever agree to Western terms for free elections and free movement of political parties and believed Soviets would attempt to preserve present structure of FEDREP and GDR placing both, however, under an all-German governing council. They would likewise probably insist upon complete demilitarization of Germany and propose the withdrawal of all occupying forces. Any such political structure would of course be unacceptable to West Germany as it would imply equality between East and West and lead to renewed Communist pressure from inside.

The Chancellor agreed that Germany was facing another strong Soviet move to gain control of West Germany or at least to neutralize it. He said that without positive evidence of increasing US strength in Europe West Germany felt itself isolated as, rightly or wrongly,

German

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FEB - 7 1951

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Admiral's
memo for
Smith
version
762a-00

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762a-05

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JAN 12 1951
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AMEMBASSY,

LONDON.

3378

1. Dept has welcomed opportunity to examine BRIT and FR views re contractual arrangements with GER. (London's 3760 Jan 5, and Paris 3855 Jan 8.)

2. While BRIT have touched on question of Supreme Authority, thinking of FR FONOFF appears to be overly centered on this point. We agree question is of great importance but do not believe its consideration shld be allowed to obstruct thinking on extent to which we are otherwise prepared to readjust relationship to GERS. We agree with BRIT that as circumstances now stand we have most to gain QTE by bringing about the inevitable gracefully and rapidly rather than grudgingly and too late UNQTE. Acceptance this premise means broadly surrendering our controls and powers, largely abolishing our machinery of control and thus placing GERS on basis substantial equality.

3. If this is result we aim at, supreme authority will have little practical meaning in terms of day to day controls, as BRIT point out. Decision re its retention will always have to depend on legal considerations and political necessities, including GER views, and as of present moment it is not at all clear whether GERS will push us to surrender supreme authority.

On ~~the~~ balance, however, Dept does believe some formula must be found whereby supreme authority or a right of intervention is retained for two purposes: First, to permit interim control over long-range security arrangements.

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agreement with GERS. This might or might not be serious,
from viewpoint possible GER backsliding, depending on degree

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of GER commitment to a European Army, NATO defense arrangements and other
western institutions.

8. Dept's thinking on ^{foregoing is} ~~XXXXXX~~ only tentative and point/is in any
event one of last we shall have to face. Dept believes it is more important
to proceed with dispatch to formulate plans for replacing occupation controls
by contractual arrangements. Dept does not believe OCC STAT will serve any
useful purpose if remaining controls are either handed over to GERS or embodied
in agreements freely entered into by both sides, and HICOM as such might well
be replaced by Ambassadors to emphasize more equal normal status of relations.

9. As for relationship between GER negotiations and possible four-power
talks Dept holds two views strongly. First, cardinal principle must be to
push unremittingly our policy of integrating GER with West, including defense
plans. This is best means of insuring GER does not fall under SOV domination,
an eventuality which wld be far from ensured against in the event of a
unified, demilitarized QTE neutral UNQTE GER. Dept therefore fully shares
views set forth para 1 of BRIT TEL of Jan 3 to Paris.

10. Second, Dept concludes that in absence of any basis for hope of
overall settlement outstanding tensions with SOV Union, we must proceed with

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NEGOTS with GERS without delay and without regard for possible four-power
talks. We wld fall into trap so obviously set by SOV maneuvers if we
delayed GER plans pending outcome our exchange of notes with SOVS. This

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wld mean possibly indefinite delay and still further
opportunity for GER opinion to swing toward QTE neutrality
UNQTE concept.

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11. You may discuss problems with FONOFF along these lines, showing
them this message if you wish.

12. Have just seen Paris' 3973 Jan 11, but do not consider additional
observations necessary at present.

ACHESON
(P.L.)

ACHESON

CODE ROOM: Sent London for action as _____.
" Paris for action as 3687.
" Frankfort for info as 4857.

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1/11-12/51

GER
(Mr. Byroade)

HAB.

S/S-CR

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TELEGRAPH BRANCH
SECRET

JAN 11 1951

23-D-X

Control: 4747
Rec'd: January 11, 1951
1:09 p.m.

GER
Info

FROM: London

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3843, January 11, 2 p.m.

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DEPARTMENT PASS MOSCOW. SENT DEPARTMENT 3843, REPEATED
INFORMATION PARIS 1299, FRANKFORT 711, MOSCOW 135.

Embassy has recently heard opinion expressed by several highly placed and influential members in both Labor and Conservative Parties to effect that Soviet gravely concerned German rearmament, would undoubtedly be willing to make substantial concessions to obtain elimination or postponement such rearmament, and that this fact gives West strong bargaining position in any CFM. Even Eden has stated in private conversation that he feels it would be worthwhile to consider holding up German rearmament plan, at least for present, providing sufficient concessions obtainable from Soviet. Other facet same argument also being currently widely discussed is that West's chances obtaining German support for rearmament program involving German participation now so slight that security obtainable from pursuing plan is negligible. These arguments also being echoed in certain sections responsible press such as ECONOMIST. These points seem based mainly on positive conviction but also doubtless in part consist of wishful thinking, reaction to general West European desire for CFM and fear and other doubts re German rearmament. As indicated EMBTEL 3688, January 2, these views are not shared by Foreign Office officials from Strang on down who feel West powers should not agree to German demilitarization irrespective of concessions which Soviet might offer in return. However, matter has not yet been considered by Bevin or Cabinet and therefore present Foreign Office position subject to possible modification.

In view foregoing it occurs to Embassy that it might be helpful if joint, secret British-US, and, possibly French, intelligence survey could be initiated immediately with object of determining what justifiable factual basis there is for above opinions. Although it is realized there is little hard data upon which to base estimates it seems possible that in presumably objective intelligence forum some measure of agreement could be reached which might prove most useful in our later endeavors to maintain solidarity between ourselves and our Western allies.

GIFFORD

GEM:LQB

NOTE: Relayed to Moscow 1/11/51 1:12 p.m. HEF.

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6-2

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 26 1951

Action

GER

FROM: Paris

Control: 4998

Rec'd: January 11, 1951
7:01 p.m.

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SMDA

NO: 3973, January 11, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 3973, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 977,
FRANKFORT 464.

Although British views (London's 3760 to Department January 5) re contractual arrangements with Germany were presented to French Foreign Office in form of 2 alternatives, with observation that British Foreign Office had not yet chosen between them, French Foreign Office considers that British Government would prefer conferring full sovereignty upon Germans in the course of implementation of Brussels decisions, and papers are being drawn up here marshalling arguments against December along such lines. Supplementing observations reported in EMBTEL 3855, January 8, Sauvagnargues has shown us informational message just sent to Francois-Poncet for comment, setting forth tentative French Foreign Office views along following lines.

British apparently claim that after NY decisions of September, only major step left for us to take in Germany is relinquishment supreme authority in conjunction with conclusion of contractual arrangements as foreshadowed by Brussels communique, and they point out that nothing short of a major step will suffice in connection with the "accord de securite". In reply to this presumed British contention, the message shown to us points out that reserved powers even after implementation of NY decisions are still considerable, that placing them on contractual basis would be major concession to Germans, and that in fact there would have been room for one more major revision of occupation statute. Instead, French are in principle prepared to envisage placing all reserved powers on contractual basis. What is important is that this be done while leaving legal framework of occupation intact and maintaining allied supreme authority in Germany.

Sauvagnargues himself envisages, he said, not a single short document containing contractual agreement, but one document concerning Germany's defense contribution and then, possibly simultaneously, a series of other contractual agreements on separate hitherto reserved powers. It would probably be necessary at same time that we telescope the contemplated procedure re implementation of the NY decisions, by forgetting about the annex to instrument of revision and by substituting

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-2- # 3973, January 11, 7 p.m., from Paris.

for it contractual agreements in such fields as decartelization and deconcentration, DP affairs, respect for basic law, et cetera. Such items as paragraphs 2G and I of revised statute (control of foreign commerce, and prisons) might be handled in similar manner.

Greatest difficulty obviously concerns foreign relations and PLI, but the message which Sauvagnargues showed us, setting forth tentative Foreign Office views, contemplates placing these on contractual basis also, so that in the end Germans would enjoy "all governmental prerogatives", although supreme allied authority would continue, with implication that we would have legal basis to take back specific powers in event any specific contractual agreement were not observed by the Germans. Sauvagnargues added the comment that although the French Defense Minister had not been as yet consulted in matter, it is supposed that from military point of view our ability to take unilateral measures in Germany in event of hostilities (by declaration martial law in all or part of our zones) is also important factor that must not be overlooked.

In conclusion, the Foreign Office communication states that tripartite nature of allied representation in Germany should be retained even if institution of HICOMS is terminated. Sauvagnargues expressed hope that our own tentative views on these subjects may become similarly available on informal basis in near future.

BRUCE

JAK:JWM

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FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MAR 20 1951

27

PRIORITY: AIR POUCH

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TO : Department of State

762.00/2-2751

OM : PARIS 2438 FEBRUARY 27, 1951

REF : BONN'S TELEGRAM 556 TO DEPT OF FEBRUARY 21, 1951
DEPTEL TO FRANKFURT 5670 OF FEBRUARY 17, 1951

ECT : FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY POSITION RE HICOM ENDORSEMENT
OF BUNDESTAG RESPONSE TO VOLKSKAMMER RESOLUTION

RECD
GERMAN AFFAIRS
MAR 5
GER
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22/22

The Foreign Ministry has sent instructions several days ago to its representatives in Bonn to oppose any reiteration of, or even reference to, the previous HICOM letters to General Chuikov, in connection with transmittal of the expected Bundestag reply to the Volkskammer resolution on German unity. In a discussion of the Ministry's reasoning, Sauvagnargues, the chief of its Division of Central European Affairs, made the following observations:

The most embarrassing thing that could happen to us immediately prior to the anticipated CFM would be Soviet acceptance of the proposals last made to Chuikov on October 9, 1950. It is true, Sauvagnargues said, that (as incidentally pointed out in Frankfurt's telegram 6749 to the Department, February 15) the Soviets could in any event, at any time, accept the outstanding proposals for free elections, but the Ministry sees no reason for an already bad situation to be made worse and considers, moreover, that German public opinion in connection with the Volkskammer resolution is of less importance to us than German public opinion in connection with the anticipated CFM. Furthermore, in view of our agreed tripartite position that the problems of Germany cannot be solved in isolation, it would be unsatisfactory either to bring that view out explicitly (which would detract from the propaganda value of our letter of transmittal) or to pass it over in silence (which would impair our substantive position), and it is therefore felt by the Ministry that the less said about the anticipated Bundestag resolution the better.

If the Soviets were to accept free elections at this time on the basis of the London "statement on German unity" of May 1950, our position would have to be that conditions have changed since that time in two respects, Sauvagnargues said. The first change is involved in promulgation by the GDR of the Law for the Protection of Peace, and the second

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PARIS DESPATCH NO. 2438 FEBRUARY 27 2

concerns the sanctioning of the Oder-Neisse boundary by the GDR.

The Ministry considers that a very brief acknowledgment of the Bundestag resolution might be in order, but that if any letter of transmittal is drafted it should merely indicate that the three western powers "take note of the resolution and will defend the Bundestag's position at the forthcoming four-power conference." (It should be noted that in all recent dealings at the Foreign Ministry, as previously reported in the Embassy's despatch 2052 of January 27, the holding of a CFM is entirely taken for granted.) Furthermore, Sauvagnargues said, the Federal Government might well be informed, pursuant to the Ministry's thoughts expressed in Embtel 4371 of January 25, that the question of German unification in the light of the most recent exchanges on the subject could be made part of any exploratory conversations between the High Commission and the Federal Government prior to the CFM.

If the French Government desired to "sabotage" the agreed western position with respect to a German contribution to European defense, Sauvagnargues said, it would probably have encouraged the US in its proposal for reiteration of the HICOM position on German unity. In such a case, he said, there might be a further drift toward the kind of situation in which rejection of a possible Soviet acceptance of free elections would become even more difficult than it is at present. In such an event, Sauvagnargues said -- i.e., in the event that the French Government were favoring an "Austrian-type" solution to the question of German unity, which it does not -- the principal point would nevertheless not be the freedom of the elections preceding unification but the Allied control mechanism for a reunited Germany; for the Austrian pattern would only exist if the Soviets also agreed, at the same time, to a system of straight majority voting in an Allied Commission.

David Bruce

(11.91.)

cc: American Embassy, London
HICOG, Frankfurt (2)

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123

-2-26/9. Sep. 23, 8 P.M. Frankfurt

Mayor said Gers recognize hollowness of Grotewohl proposals and his own quick firm action in replying on Berlin phase of problem will be followed next Thursday in Bundestag, when Bonn govt will lay down precise terms and answers for all, Ger elections. Allies, Reuter believes, shld keep their powder dry, wait a few weeks and see what develops from East.

Nevertheless Reuter emphasizes that Ger unification urge is such that if Sov pushes we shall be facing serious problem. At present time he feels we shld go forward with our timetable for integration with West, but we shld recognize that events might interfere with that timetable. He admitted that, faced with serious choice between unification of Ger on democratic but neutral basis, and immediate integration into Western defense, Ger people wld find it difficult not (rpt not) to choose unification. He made pleas for patience and understanding on this point, emphasizing that reunited Ger wld be stronger democratic Ger than present Bundes Republic. Just as Berliners, who had been thru fire in recent years, were strongest democrats in Ger, so wld East Gers be firm and lasting democrats because their present experiences wld make them for decades bulwark against communism. Our goal shld be, he said, not (rpt not) only to include West Ger but also East Ger into program of Eur integration.

I pointed out dangers of trying to have it both ways in Ger. Amer people were impatient for action. They had spent time, effort, money in trying to strengthen Eur, including Ger, so that there wld be strength on continent to defend own freedoms. Amer people wld be likely to misinterpret delay on Ger's part at this late stage of proceedings. The Foreign Ministers had taken important decisions with regard to Ger sovereignty and Ger participation in defense. It was inconceivable that Amer people or other Eur peoples wld be interested in defending Ger unless Gers were willing to make contribution to common defense. Just as important in total Eur program of integration I added, was Schuman Plan. Gers must now (rpt now) give evidence of what si were on. World, including Amer and Eisenhower, cld not (rpt not) wait much longer for Ger decision. If Gers were now (rpt now) to delay, Amer reaction might be to wash hands of entire project and let Ger fend for themselves.

In short, I endeavored to point out the far-reaching significance (perhaps the collapse of the whole Eur defense system and consequently of US support) if real progress were not (rpt not) made this year. I reminded him that it was the sense of the growing strength of the US, as well as recent US policy, which has brought the Sov to the point of making this offer. Gers must not (rpt not) dissociate themselves from that policy if they are to continue to be in a strong position in relation to the Sov.

Reuter was evidently impressed with exposition. He repeated that

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3-26-45 8 p.m. 11th floor

that he saw no (rpt no) reason why at present we shld slow up program of integration. I pointed out that Schumacher was not (rpt not) exactly helpful. Reuter said Schumacher is beginning to recognize that there were limits he must not (rpt not) overstep in opposition to Allied plans. "I will do my best with him. Sometimes I can influence him a little though, to be sure, he will not (rpt not) change overnight."

We discussed Schumacher's antagonism toward Fr. Reuter replied that he too was suspicious of Fr in Berlin. I told him we had had recent assurances that Fr wld take more liberal attitude toward Berlin-Bonn relationships, particularly in regard to adoption of Bonn laws in Berlin. Reuter declared that a more favorable attitude on part of Fr in Berlin wld make a big difference and wld also influence Schumacher.

- Conversation with Reuter reemphasized the pull of Ger unification on Gers. Reuter said that neither he nor (rpt nor) anybody had found way thru complexity of situation. It is apparent however, that we are heading into a period where careful thought will be needed in Washington and Ger.

In sum I inclined to think we now (rpt now) confronted with the well-designed and planned reaction of the Sov to the San Francisco and Washington decisions. Response of West Ger al already indicates very careful preparation. I urge strongly that in view of the real delicacy this situation that no (rpt no) comments be made until we are sure we have uniform and solid position.

MCCLOY

BA:VIM

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TO

Department of State

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11 P.M.

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to ensure that its contents do not leak.

After reviewing situation created by Grotewohl proposals of Sept 15, we feel we have no rpt no alternative except to take some public position on GER unification. Neither silence nor QTE standing on the record UNQTE will suffice because too many people have forgotten what record is.

Consider it excluded that we ourselves take any initiative to propose talks either by GERS or by four occupying powers and must seek by every means our power to prevent such talks occurring at this time. Consider that talks wld inevitably prevent GERS from concluding either contractual or defense not arrangements and that/only our GER policy but our defense plans and entire policy of EUR integration wld suffer severe setback.

In these circumstances believe we must hammer hard at three points. First, we must make clear our support for ultimate GER unification and our record of such support. Second, we must make clear that GER COMMIES and SOVS have been obstructing force because unwilling rpt unwilling to consider unification except on terms which wld endanger West GERS freedom. Third and most important, GER unity can only be sought through EUR integration and consequent snowballing of strength. Believe we must bend every effort to arouse enthusiasm for EUR idea

PA:PLaukhuff:erk 9/27/51

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Perry Laukhuff
~~Henry Byroade~~

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as only way to gain strength and thus assure eventual GER unification under
tions of freedom. We realize our task more difficult than that of COMMIES because
dea more involved. Believe, however, we have no choice but to make maximum effort
foregoing lines.

BUR of GER Affairs has accordingly drafted statement which cld be made by Acting
or Dept. Statement reads as follows:

QTE There are several things I wish to say about the reunification of the SOV
of GER with the main part of the country.

First, we want to bring about the unification of GER and we will vigorously pursue
plan genuinely calculated to achieve it. We will not accept a plan calculated to
GER into a no-man's land, make a football of the liberties of the GER people and
at the creation of a free and united Europe. On at least thirteen separate
ions since FEB 1950, the highest US, FR, BRIT or GER FED authorities have proposed
lorsed the holding of free GEN elections throughout GER. The record is crystal
and it is impressive. We have sought by the most specific and detailed
als to advance the freedom frontier from the Elbe to the Oder, as a first step
peaceful reunion of Eastern Europe with Western Europe.

FE The second thing I wish to say is that if there is not GER unity today in the
these exertions by us, it is because GER COMMIES and SOV imperialists have
ed to prevent it. They wish their own brand of INNER QTE unity, END INNER QTE
it it is the unity of the concentration camp, of the chain gang, of the police

GEN Chuikov, Commissioner of the SOV Zone, has failed to this day to reply to
posals made to him for all-GER elections. The East GER COMMIES have rejected
ingle proposal for elections under free conditions and have countered with

generalities

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generalities and fuzzy variations designed to bring West GER into the Eastern slave camp rather than to permit East GERS to express their undoubted longing for reunification with their free fellow-countrymen. The GER COMMIES want two things. Ultimately they want to extend their iron control over all of GER. Immediately, they want to entrap the free world into endless talk about GER unification in order to arouse false hopes in men's minds and thus hinder the consolidation of strength in the West. We have seen many examples of COMMIE ability to conduct a talk-fest, most recently at the Paris Deputies Conference last Spring and at Kaesong. With these experiences in mind, we do not believe the free GER people will knowingly suffer themselves to be caught on that fly-paper.

QTE The GER COMMIES now talk of INNER QTE free END INNER QTE elections and of INNER QTE democratic END INNER QTE parties and suggest that a little friendly palaver will easily settle everything. Unfortunately, we and the GER people know by now what the COMMIES mean by INNER QTE free END INNER QTE elections and INNER QTE democratic END INNER QTE parties. In other words, no talks about elections will ever be profitable until the GER COMMIES and their Russian masters substitute hard facts for soft words. We wait for them to abolish their polit police, to guarantee normal personal and POLIT freedoms, to restore the independence of the judiciary, to permit democratic parties to operate freely, to renounce their unbridled ECON looting, and to allow full and unfettered INTERNATL supervision before, during and after election. On the day Herr Grotewohl, under instructions from GEN Chuikov, takes specific measures to accomplish these things, a conference to prepare for elections can easily be arranged, and the way cleared for GER POLIT and ECON unity. We all know that we will wait in vain for GEN Chuikov to issue such instructions and for Herr Grotewohl to execute

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te them because for them to do so wld mean that Eastern GER wld be lost to
m. Nowhere in the world has communism been strong enough to tolerate true

What then is our policy, since every effort for GER unity is rebuffed? A
vement is a-foot today in Europe, a movement which has been a dream for
s, and which at last seems to be on the verge of realization. It is the drive
consolidation and unity. Through the Council of Europe, the OEEC, the Schuman
a EUR coal and steel community, and the Paris Conference for a EUR Defense
y, the urge of free EURS for the creation of a prosperous, safe and united
is finding expression. GERS are joining Frenchmen in this drive. ITALS
ing Scandinavians. The world has hardly begun to realize the revolutionary
f what is happening. But we see enough to know that it must not fail. No
alk, no blandishments, no threats, no dishonest proposals merely to INNER
END INNER QTE about GER unity can be allowed to obscure or obstruct the
object now under way. Realization of a united Europe will bring great strength.
ree world. Without strength in the free world all efforts to unite with it
rts of countries and countries now pinned under the iron heel of COMMIE
ism will fail.

GER unity will come, bgt it must be GER unity with GER freedom. There can
sting GER freedom without EUR unity and the strength that flows therefrom.
y and that of our BRIT, FR and other EUR partners is to build that unity
speed and at the same time to fuse it with the strength of our Atlantic
. We are completely convinced that the GER people also believe in the
of this course and will drive with us towards the common goal. On THUR the
voice of

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voice of free GER spoke through Chancellor Adenauer and the elected representatives of the people in the Bundestag, to demand that freedom be guaranteed to Eastern GER before elections can be held. We are convinced that the suppressed voice of Eastern GER would be in that demand if it could.

QTE : The frustrated and frightened ones today are the masters of the Eastern world, who see a great idea of unity and freedom beginning to take form and triumph. They seek desperately to stop it by every kind of maneuver. They cannot stop it and we believe the day will come when the peoples of the East will rise up and join

UNQTE

Foregoing statement not yet cleared but under discussion in Dept to be issued if agreed. Urgently request your opinion as to its advisability. Would release same time list of 13 occasions on which Western support for unification has been expressed, as stated in text. Would probably seek to have statement subsequently reported by PRES in brief comment. Would also consider it advantageous if ~~it could~~ ~~be made~~ for you to follow up within 24 or 48 hours with statement listing in detail specific measures demanded in Eastern GER, probably along lines of Adenauer's Bundestag statement today.

Believe we ^{have} ~~had~~ no choice but to support GEN line taken in Bundestag today, including support for specific proposal that UN supervise eventual elections. This is consistent with our past record of demand for QTE INTERNATL UNQTE supervision.

Do you think statement would be strengthened by inserting ~~and~~ after fourth line of fourth para something like following : qte As Berlin's Lord Mayor Reuter and Chancellor Adenauer have suggested, let them agree to immediate elections in Berlin as a touchstone of their sincerity. UNQTE ?


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(P.R.)

12/5/51



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SECURITY INFORMATION

Notes on S/P meeting December 5, 1951

Messrs. Ridgway Knight and J. L. Barnard were invited to join the Staff. Mr. Ferguson asked Mr. Knight to report briefly on the activities of the Paris Conference on the European Defense Force and the European Defense Community.

Mr. Knight said that progress since July had been virtually nil. He said that when he arrived in Paris recently Mr. Tomlison seemed pleased that 91 of 98 articles of a draft EDC treaty had been agreed to, but that the 7 remaining articles directly or indirectly related to national sovereignty. He was shocked, he said, to find that the Deputies themselves didn't seem to realize that the relinquishment of national sovereignty was entailed in these 7 articles. He felt that all of the information with respect to the activities of the Conference had been held much too close to the chest. He believed that Ambassador Bruce and Mr. Tomlison had originally been committed to full relinquishment of national sovereignty but now felt that a simpler rather than full formula concept should be adopted.

The forthcoming report of the TCC was discussed. Mr. Nitze said he felt that this report may point the way toward solving, for a short period only, the problems of production, force requirements, etc., but that it won't be able to answer the basic question of a German force contribution. It will leave unanswered what type of German agency will be required for handling logistic support, recruitment, court marshals, etc.

Mr. Nitze said he still felt that the Secretary's formula of German forces coordinated with the NATO forces on a national basis was best. Mr. Knight felt that the French Government and Assembly were not ready to accept a German agency which in effect would be a reconstituted German General Staff.

Mr. Nitze asked what would happen if there should be no solution of the EDF-EDC problem by the January 15th deadline. Mr. Knight felt that there was some possibility of getting a compromise--a watered-down formula. Mr. Nitze reiterated that he thought that something along the lines of the Secretary's formula would be possible which would get an EDF but not an EDC and that the EDF could be handled through coordination between German units and Eisenhower's forces. Mr. Knight said he felt that this might be saleable to the French although it really gave Germany a general staff in disguise.

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Mr. Tufts

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Mr. Tufts objected to the creation of institutions and arrangements which have no relationship to the sources of power. He felt that we should move less precipitously and stop our attempts to formulate stratagems and devices. We should do only those things that the political situation permits. He felt that if the EDC Ministers had accomplished nothing by January 15th, the matter should be put up to the French in the bluntest terms and that we should put heavy pressure on them to do something about getting German units into the EDF. We should go ahead with the contractual arrangements in any case. Mr. Knight felt that this would shake France and might take the pressure off the whole rearmament plan for NATO. Mr. Knight suggested that Embassy officials in Paris could probably do some very effective missionary work with members of the French parliament to get them to accept some form of EDF-EDC.

Mr. Ferguson said that our policy in Europe, which is pivoted on France, needs very careful scrutiny. It is possible that we may wish to change our pivot to Germany and the British. There appears to be a great apathy in France and we may be unrealistic about the forces which the French will be able to raise. We should review, he said, our own strategy in Europe in relation to the continent's defensibility. We have maintained right along that the continent cannot be adequately defended without German units. The French have fuzzed this up by putting their own capabilities first and by making the creation of German units secondary. It now becomes apparent that the French are not going to have the capabilities that were expected a year ago.

Mr. Nitze, in summarizing the discussion, said the main points seemed to him to be:

1. The January 15th deadline and what should be done if no draft treaty for an EDC were agreed to by that date.
2. There is no magic to the January 15th date but we must have a firm position by that time.
3. Our policy in Europe should be reconsidered if it appears that our estimate of obtaining sufficient NATO forces is unreal.
4. Our

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4. Our position should be either that we favor an EDF-EDC as the French suggest or a national approach with coordinating machinery along the lines of the Secretary's formula. If neither of these can be obtained, then we should review our whole European policy.
5. Strong overt pressure should be brought to bear on the French to find a solution to the EDF-EDC problems.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

F020007-0647

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ✓ EUR - Mr. Williamson
FROM : EUR - Herbert W. Hill
SUBJECT: German Unification.

DATE: April 3, 1952.

The United States is undoubtedly quite unwilling to accept German unification on Soviet terms, yet these terms are on the surface not unreasonable, and hence are attractive to many Germans. The Soviet reply to the late U.S. note may be awkward to handle, and will probably have considerable propaganda value. There is one excellent base from which to handle the whole Soviet offer, and that is the position that Germany must be a part of an integrated Europe. More immediately, and without raising such a large issue, the Schuman Plan can be used. If the Plan is accepted, or even close to acceptance, by the time the Soviet reply is received, it would be quite easy to raise objections on the ground that the situation had changed, West Germany had become a part of a European organization, and the matter of German neutrality must be looked at differently.

In order for this approach to be possible, the Schuman Plan ought to be closer to acceptance than it is now. The French approval this week is a help, but Italy and the Benelux countries ought to act now, also. This may require some strong representation to them by the United States, and unless this has already been considered, I suggest it be looked over by EUR now for prompt decision.

7402017 Stearns 19 SEP 1980
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public per McNamara

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cdc

The prob. II
OK as one step
but it does NOT
answer the
problem of the
approval of
nationalism &
national unity
to the Germans
in

This might be
described as itself
FW

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JCS Review 27 Feb 1974
By JCS NARS, Date 2/11/88

13 NVA HRS

DATE 30 OCT 74
100 DEC 74

b. The security of Berlin has no dependent since airlift days that the requirements have risen sharply. I have no measurement or data on the increase of this factor.

c. That air logistics support for the Far East Command would not, if maintained, give us the capability of providing again an airlift to the level previously established.

At the request of Mr. Hickey and the concurrence of Mr. Bush, a copy of this memorandum is being furnished to the head of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State. Other copies are being distributed as below indicated.

(Signed) Karl R. Bendetsen

Karl R. Bendetsen
Under Secretary of the Army

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Frank Bush
Chief of Staff, Army
Assistant Secretary of Defense
CDA, USA
US/A Files
Colonel Shirley

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