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1973/11/20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 21, 1973

SECRET/NODIS

Secretary's Staff Meeting November 20, 1973

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The Secretary decided:

- p. 2, 3, 4
1. That now that his trip was over, we ought to push the Israeli part of the supplemental through the Congress since he would rather get it through before the Peace Conference opened.
- p. 10, 11, 12
2. That Mr. Stoessel should raise with the Danish Ambassador the question of why a bilateral Japanese-European declaration could provide greater concreteness than a declaration also involving the United States.
- p. 21
3. That so far as consultations with our NATO allies are concerned, he is prepared to offer them any consultation they want and a veto in many respects of our position but within the context of their willingness to have a common policy. He is not prepared to offer consultations so long as they are pursuing their current policies and, therefore, wishes to wait until the NATO meeting where he can make the right sort of presentation. Specifically, (page 16) the Assistant Secretaries are not to raise any of these questions, including that of reciprocity, in their meetings with allied representatives.
- p. 24
4. That we cannot yield on the number of Soviets who are in the UN Troop Supervisory Organization.

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
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5. That the Colombian Foreign Minister could see him next week (this said in context of Mr. Bowdler's reporting that Mexican Foreign Secretary Rabaza would like the meeting of Foreign Ministers to take place with the Secretary attending in the latter part of February).

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6. That Mr. Eagleburger should call General Scowcroft and tell him that both the NSC and State ought to be represented on the special group on oil policy.



Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

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By WDP NARA Date 5/31/01

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SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1973, 3:05 P.M.

PRESENT:

The Secretary of State: HENRY A. KISSINGER

- KENNETH RUSH
- WILLIAM CASEY
- CURTIS W. TARR
- WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR.
- JOSEPH J. SISCO
- ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, JR.
- ROBERT S. INGERSOLL
- WILLIAM G. BOWDLER
- CLAUDE G. ROSS
- WILLIAM DONALDSON
- WINSTON LORD
- THOMAS PICKERING
- GEORGE S. VEST

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P R O C E E D I N G S

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ken.

MR. RUSH: While you were away, as you know, we had some very good hearings, Bill Clements and I, before the Passman committee.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On what subject?

MR. RUSH: On the Foreign Assistance bill.

And this poses something of a dilemma. The good part of the thing is that the Foreign Assistance Bill now provides that the Defense Department draw down \$250 million, of which \$200 million of it can go to Cambodia. Well, this takes off the time urgency to get the money for Cambodia. As I understand your feeling, and I think it is correct, we don't want to push the Israeli part too much or too fast. Passman, however, is very anxious --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think if we are going to get the Israeli part -- my view is whatever we are going to do for the Israelis, I would rather have it done now, rather than send Faisal into orbit again.

MR. RUSH: All right. In that case, we don't have the dilemma. My reading of what you said was not to push the Israeli part of it. And we were in a dilemma, because we badly needed the Cambodian part. The Cambodian part is now

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taken care of. And Passman is hell bent for --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you mean by "push"?

MR. RUSH: Well, really get it through very expeditiously. Passman wants to push this thing very hard.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think there will ever be a good time to get it through. And I would rather get it through before the peace conference opens.

MR. SISCO: That is my sense of it. Look, we have taken the lumps -- let's get it over with as quickly as we can.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right -- because if we make it a new decision to push it, then it will have great significance. I think the way we will take less heat is to get it through now.

MR. RUSH: That resolves the issue.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I more or less said this to the Foreign Relations Committee today.

MR. RUSH: Then we are all right. The word we had was that you wanted to hold off on it -- make haste slowly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: From who?

MR. RUSH: This is what we got from you when you were on your travels.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It must have been Hummel.

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MR. HUMMEL: You had me drafting so many things I didn't understand, this could have been my fault.

MR. RUSH: Larry, how did we get the idea that Henry wanted to hold up on this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whosever misconception it was --

MR. RUSH: It is over.

MR. PICKERING: I think it was very valid while you were travelling in those countries. I sent no telegrams in your name, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whatever the reason was, there was a point in not pushing it while I was in the Arab countries.

MR. RUSH: Right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think now we have taken our lumps. I think we ought to push it through.

MR. RUSH: Good.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is going to do us less damage now than in the middle of the conference.

MR. RUSH: Good. Then there is one item that I want to call to your attention. I played golf with Senator Fulbright. He shot the finest game he ever shot. He shook hands with me four times while I was leaving.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I hope you managed to lose.

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MR. RUSH: I lost. So I think we can do anything we want to now.

MR. TARR: That would only work on Sunday.

MR. RUSH: No, it carries on over.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Fulbright has been very good. He was very good this morning.

MR. RUSH: He told me, though, he wanted to hold off on the bill.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I told him this morning that I would like it through.

MR. RUSH: Good. I am glad to have this clarified, because we were going the other way.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Joe.

MR. SISCO: Since I have seen you a few minutes ago, the British came in for just three or four minutes, and they reported an interesting message. "That the Syrian Government absolutely insisted that the United Kingdom take part in any peace conference, and France, and that --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With allies like this --

MR. SISCO: Yes. The British Government also believes that the Arab summit meeting in Algeria will consider a draft resolution to put before the Security Council incorporating the British and the French being the

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representatives of Europe at such a conference.

My suggestion is two-fold. One, that you do chat to the Syrians along these lines tomorrow night at six. Secondly, I would suggest if the state of play is such with the Russians that you feel you can do this, I would say to the Russians -- "Look here, this is one thing you people ought to be in a position to weigh in with the Syrians." Those are my two suggestions on that.

This just came in.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I see nothing good that can come out of a European participation. They will drive the Soviets further left. They will then place themselves between the Soviets and us. In every situation we have three Arab parties and the three-corner diplomacy among the outside participants. And I think we should then consider whether we would participate at all, or make a solo effort.

MR. SISCO: And also tell them point blank that the Israelis have swallowed U.S. and USSR auspices. They would have preferred exclusive U.S. auspices. But we begin to broaden this out, and we are in real trouble. And that is the reality. And what is at stake here is do you want a conference or don't you. Now, I think that the Egyptians are not quite on the same wicket. The Egyptians are a little softer.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think the Syrians are on this wicket, either, unless somebody puts them up to it.

MR. SISCO: I think there is a little of that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What conceivable interest could the Syrians have? We have to get across to the Arabs and to the Soviets that we are not going to play any games. If it is going to turn into a mob scene, we may not do anything. Then we will operate outside of this. We cannot tolerate this kind of diplomacy, where everybody puts us into a position where they get ahead of us, so that if it succeeds they will get the credit, and if it fails we will get the blame. And as the Japanese said to me yesterday, they are almost as worried that we will succeed as that we will fail, and that they have to take a position in opposition to us on the theory that we will succeed, because if we accomplish this without their having pushed us further, they won't get any credit with the Arabs.

MR. SISCO: That is where the consultation business comes in, as far as the NATO allies are concerned, in my judgment. I think the substantive line you outlined at the staff meeting yesterday is the line that we should continue to pump. But I think we should go ahead and go through the form of intensive SALT-type consultations with these Europeans,

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because that is the alternative to this business of participation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the theory that they want to cooperate -- not on the theory that they will milk everything we have to say to use it to leapfrog us. We get no information from them about their contacts in the Arab world, and we are going to insist on complete reciprocity. If they are going to get anything from us, we want to know what they are saying in Damascus and Cairo.

MR. SISCO: I agree with this. But I think you ought to call the NATO Ambassadors in and make that point just as decisively as you have made it right here.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Secondly, on the SALT consultation, that is where they are willing and eager to have a common position. In this, they have yet to show anything other than a desire to take a position different from us. I think as long as the Europeans do this -- as long as the Europeans, for example, refuse a trilateral declaration between us, the Japanese and themselves, and behind our back offer the Japanese a bilateral declaration, so that we are really almost in a situation where they deliberately attempt to isolate us, I do not see that we have any reason to do anything other than make them pay a price for this action.

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I am prepared to do full consultation, as long as we have some assurance that they are going to give up this competitive attitude. But until they do this, we are not going to do it.

MR. SISCO: Would you be willing to call in the NATO Ambassadors?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not so sure. I may wait until we get to the NATO Council.

MR. SISCO: And impress that then.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You have been around there. It has done not a bit of good. It hasn't changed any of their attitudes. If anything, we told them much too much on this trip. I just don't see any reason for it. You gave them a full account of the trip. There has not been any reciprocity. They haven't told us one thing. We have to learn from the Egyptians --

MR. SISCO: This represents a little reciprocity from the British here.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Only because there is no way they can advance their own. We had to learn from the Egyptians what () has been saying in Cairo.

MR. SISCO: You mean what he has been distorting in Cairo.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: What he has been saying. It is in addition not true. But we have never had a read-out of any of their discussions with any of the Arab countries. We have no knowledge of what they are discussing with the Algerians. And I see no need for it. On the contrary, I am going to tell any of them that come in to see me that until there is reciprocity, there won't be any consultation. After that, there will be full consultation.

MR. INGERSOLL: Did we get any advance notice of their efforts with the Japanese?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. The day that they delivered the message to the Japanese, the Danish Ambassador, I suppose in his capacity as the representative of the EC, delivered it here. Did we have any knowledge that they were contemplating it?

MR. STOESSEL: Well, we knew that this idea had been floating around.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But not that they were contemplating a formal demarche. This is a policy that directly undercuts something we had attempted to do, in which at least we were owed some advance discussion.

MR. STOESSEL: Yes. They know we are very concerned.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And moreover delivering it by

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the Danish Ambassador guarantees that we cannot discuss it.

I must say it is an intolerable situation.

MR. STOESSEL: On that, I am calling him in tomorrow and telling him -- the Danish Ambassador -- about this, that we did not like this way of proceeding. And also giving more of our views on the substance of the issue.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But above all, our objection as to procedure.

MR. STOESSEL: Right. We will make that very clear.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And to say two things in the note. One, that they would not put into any discussion with us any subject that is being discussed, that is objectionable; and secondly -- of course that really denies there is any special relationship between us and the Europeans; and secondly, that they are going to have a bilateral declaration with the Japanese, because having us in would reduce it to a set of platitudes, is really rather unfriendly.

MR. STOESSEL: Of course they may be saying with us they could do more than they could with bringing the Japanese into the same declaration, which was the Japanese Ambassador's --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why should they be able to do

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more with the Japanese alone than with the Japanese and us together? What is it about the Japanese-European relations that permits greater specificity than Japanese-European-American relations.

MR. STOESSEL: I didn't read it that way. I think with the Japanese it would probably just be platitudes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. The last paragraph of their message said that any declaration including the United States, Japan and Europe would be of a vagueness that would not be different from any other declarations that already exist, while presumably a Japanese-European one could have greater concreteness. Now, what I would like to know is what is it about Japanese-European relations, excluding us, that permits greater specificity than Japanese-European relations including us? Why don't you ask them that question?

MR. STOESSEL: I will. I didn't read it that way.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no other way to read it. They simply said that including us would turn it into a set of platitudes; excluding us makes it more concrete. In other words, they are prepared to offer the Japanese things in a bilateral context that they are not prepared to offer them in a trilateral context. And I would like to ask the specific question of what is it about American

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participation in that relationship that would deprive it of specificity.

MR. STOESSEL: We will pose that question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Walt.

MR. STOESSEL: Well, Joe has already made the point I was going to make, which was to recommend that you see the NATO Ambassadors.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am thinking about it. What would I tell them? What would I discuss with them? I have two possibilities. I can tell them my objections to their whole line of conduct, which I think is a mistake -- they will leak it out to the newspapers, they will prepare their Ministers, and I am going to be assaulted at NATO. It is only two weeks to the NATO meeting, and I would much rather make a presentation there, in which I tell them first the suicidal course of their energy policy on this basis; and secondly, my profound concern, in the interests of the whole west, not just of the United States, of this tendency of forming Europe in opposition to the United States and pursuing a policy whose deliberate point of attack is the United States. This is worse than what DeGaulle did. Now, he took American proposals and rejected them. But he did not aggressively pursue these policies. But even if he

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did, this is now Gaullism on a European level.

MR. STOESSEL: Well, I have felt that they obviously would be interested in an account of your trip.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course. I am interested in an account of their activities. They would be fascinated. They also want nuclear cooperation, and a monetary reform.

MR. STOESSEL: I think you could make some of these points, particularly on reciprocity of information.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But why in that forum?

MR. STOESSEL: Well, I think that --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Joe has travelled through Europe a week ago. And he certainly didn't give them inadequate information.

MR. RUSH: How many countries did you visit, Joe?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He spoke at the NATO Council.

MR. SISCO: The Italians, Germans, French, British, Dutch, Belgians, all the Foreign Ministers.

MR. RUSH : Not Norway.

MR. SISCO: Norway, just at the Council.

MR. STOESSEL: Some of these countries have told Joe, and I have heard it also, that they want to help.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have heard that since June.

MR. STOESSEL: And I think anything we can do to try

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and beef this up --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But why will getting them all together get them to help? What will they help us with? What concretely will they do?

MR. STOESSEL: Most of them here are sympathetic, and they appreciated very much your last briefing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Certainly -- it was unilateral. They are ambassadors. They get a unilateral briefing from the Secretary of State. Why shouldn't they appreciate it? They will be very grateful.

MR. SISCO: I think there is an advantage in expressing the reciprocity principle right away, rather than at NATO, because I think myself that you can make this pitch, and you have laid it on the line, and you can expect some kind of a reply at that particular juncture. I think the sooner you get this principle across to them, as firmly as you have expressed it here, the better.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: At the NATO meeting, two weeks from now. This is not the right forum. They will be blabbing it -- I will read it from David Binder the next day. In Europe I can speak at the NATO Council and I can make a public speech in which I can marshal my arguments, and then can dominate the discussion. But I may have a nothing meeting

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with the NATO ambassadors.

MR. SISCO: In case any of us meet with any of these people individually, are we free to express this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

MR. STOESSEL: Not the reciprocity.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

MR. STOESSEL: Another thing I am concerned about.

What is the possibility of getting out to our embassies in the countries of the Nine talking points about our policy on the Middle East -- the things we would hope they would avoid, the things we would like for them to do?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The European countries?

MR. STOESSEL: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You know, Walt, with all due respect, you are all still living in a world of cooperative relationships. Right now all the evidence indicates that any information you give to the Europeans will be used against us. If I understand the European policy, it is to establish a preferential position for themselves in the Middle East through some of the most short-sighted policies that I have ever seen -- because they don't have the means to make it effective. They cannot confront the Russians. I mean if there is any power play, they cannot

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confront them. And they cannot eliminate Israel. So on what basis are they going to do it -- except craven yielding to Arab demands, which in themselves are going to turn out to be empty, since they can't do anything about it.

So if you give the French and British information of what we are doing, what makes you think that that is going to lead you to cooperation? It isn't lack of understanding of our policy that is leading them on this course. They know very well what our preferred policy for the peace conference is.

MR. SISCO: I doubt it is going to lead to cooperation. One could hope, and it is only a hope, that at least you helped neutralize them to some degree.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is less than a week since you are back. You came back Friday. Now, what is it that they are lacking in information? Why is it they are not voluntarily telling the Syrians that the best forum is the United States and the Soviet Union --

MR. SISCO: Well, the British are here --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The British have been coming in for three weeks saying they don't want it -- but unhappily the Arabs are pushing them beyond what mortal flesh can stand. Now, why is it that the British are not telling

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the Arabs that it is in their view best for the United States and the Soviet Union to provide the auspices, and why don't they then come to us and ask us for the consultation. We would be prepared to adopt a common position with the Europeans. In fact, the only sensible course in these negotiations is for the Europeans and for that matter the Japanese and us to have a common position, so that the Arabs cannot drive the various elements of the oil-consuming nations against each other. I would eagerly embrace that course. What is intolerable is that they pursue totally autonomous policies, milk us for whatever they can get. And I just don't accept it. It is the same thing with that Security Council thing. When we wanted the British to put forward the Security Council resolution, when I saw their Ambassador in Cairo, he said, "The fact of the matter is I was never permitted to ask the only significant question," which was "Will you accept the Security Council resolution." All he was permitted to ask them is "Do you want us to put it forward." To that I knew the answer myself. And in this atmosphere, until the Europeans affirm to us that they want to adopt a common position and work for it, what do we gain by telling them everything we are planning to do? I mean if you can persuade me of this, I will be for maximum consultation.

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And therefore, by telling them this is what we want, and this is what you must stay away from, you may just give them a check-list of what you want, what they are going to do.

It is a very painful realization that they are close to an adversary relationship with us in the Middle East.

The Japanese at least are in petty, tawdry anguish. The Japanese are trying to save their skins domestically. I don't think that the Japanese are deliberately undercutting us. They are just trying to get by, in a rather stupid, unimaginative, desperate way. I think the British and French are systematically working against us. The Germans are sort of foundering.

That is my assessment of the British and French situation.

Is there any proof that they have done anything to support us since that war started? I mean after you gave them the briefing, what did they do? They go to Cairo and say the United States is trying to delay the peace conference, "Therefore you need us to drive an opening to the peace conference." I don't care what you said -- that you couldn't have said. That has never even been

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discussed. So that couldn't have been the issue.

MR. SISCO: No. I took it as a deliberate distortion.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course it is a deliberate distortion. Look at the British. This has been going on with the British. Now they go to Joe. For about a month they went to me and didn't get enough sympathy. I am sure they are not getting enough from you, either. But first it was the Egyptians who insisted on their participation, until I told them to come off it. Now it is the Syrians. I am certain they are going to talk to the Algerians and the others.

Under those conditions, I think we will just have to tell the Arabs -- "Fine, it is going to be a lovely conference, but without us."

I don't see how that forum can operate. We are going to have three votes against us among the sponsors on every issue. And if there is going to be a reasonable settlement, the moderate Arabs will have to find support for their position in the great powers. That is the only hope -- because if the great powers adopt a position of the radical Arabs, which is where we are tending now, then the moderate Arabs cannot settle. And if there are no moderate Arabs, then the Arabs can settle only if they have demonstrated to themselves that whatever settlement is proposed, it is the

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maximum attainable. How can they demonstrate that to themselves if Britain, France and Japan publicly drive us further and further? This is the total irresponsibility of the European position. If they want energy, then it is in their interest to get a rapid settlement. If they are going to get a rapid settlement, they have to close ranks with us.

Within the context of their willingness to have a common policy, I am prepared to offer them any consultation they want and a veto in many respects over our position. But not as long as they are pursuing this policy. And therefore I think we ought to think about what it is we want.

MR. STOESSEL: They should come to us, then.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't know. I do not see a great advantage in spelling out our whole position to the Europeans, who tell us nothing. I think their overture to Japan is not a friendly act. We have been slowing down our pressure on the Europeans for the trilateral declaration in deference to their wishes, because we didn't want a confrontation with the Europeans. The Japanese have been pressing us to help them, and we have been fairly slow. We have been just generally supportive. But we haven't done a lot. So then they turn around and try to cut us out.

The Chinese understand, even the Russians understand,

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there must be no competition for the Japanese because the Japanese system cannot stand it. The only people that don't seem to understand it seem to be the Europeans.

What do you think, Bob, about the effect of this note on the Japanese?

MR. INGERSOLL: I agree. I couldn't believe it when -- they didn't even tell us and went direct. They told us a little bit afterwards.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Nothing, except bring in the note. The Danish Ambassador doesn't know enough to tell us anything.

MR. SISCO: As I say, I agree a hundred percent, and I think you can make the argument either way. I was pleading procedurally to do it as soon as possible, because I think this line is so damned important.

Did they leak anything out of this last meeting? Weren't they on the whole pretty good?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But I told them what they wanted to hear. They never leak things they agree with.

MR. RUSH: I think the impact is lost if you bring them in here.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you leak to them what they want to hear, then they are supporting it by not leaking it and they won't leak it. They will leak it only if they

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disagree.

MR. SISCO: It is only a question of timing -- now or two weeks.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Art.

MR. HUMMEL: It looks as if the Korean problem in the UN is jelling and will be completed in the next few days for wiping the whole thing off, wiping the problem out, along the lines of the compromise solution and a compromise declaration. There are still a couple of loose ends, but it looks very good. The Soviets are still making problems.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are they making problems?

MR. HUMMEL: Malik -- a telegram I haven't seen, but it was described to me by IO -- Malik is so furious at being excluded from these compromise negotiations that he is threatening to take the whole thing up in the Security Council and then refer it again to the General Assembly under the guise of uniting for peace, or something. But we don't think this is serious.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How could he have been excluded?

MR. HUMMEL: They have known about it, but the way the other people, particularly the Chinese, have been managing the opposition co-sponsors, has in effect produced an illusion

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that the Soviets have not really participated much. That makes them furious. It is a neat parallel to how furious the Chinese were about the Middle East resolutions.

Anyway, I think the problem is likely to be entirely buttoned up --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Dobrynin tells me Malik's instructions are to agree to anything the Koreans agree to.

MR. HUMMEL: Well, I will see that you get this telegram, with perhaps a little background on it, in case it would be useful to say something to Dobrynin about it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It may cost me a number of interpreters on the UN floor.

MR. SISCO: If it is in lieu of the observers, that is all right. The trouble is they are additional.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, we can't yield on that.

MR. SISCO: No, we must not.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is this a team effort now?

MR. INGERSOLL: Ambassador Yaskawa came in this morning to follow up the meeting of yesterday afternoon -- not to change anything, except to say he looked into this supposed leak about your statements, and he can't find out where it came from at all. He is very upset and concerned about it. And he talked to Tokyo, but he can't find out.

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MR. ROSS: I don't have anything.

MR. BOWDLER: The Foreign Secretary Rabaza indicated he would like to have the meeting of Foreign Ministers with you attending the latter part of February.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And you can have the Colombian Foreign Minister come in next week.

MR. BOWDLER: All right, fine.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Bill.

MR. CASEY: I have nothing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Curtis?

MR. TARR: Nothing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This Department is getting into great shape.

MR. STOESSEL: Mr. Secretary, one point. We are very interested in this proposed joint declaration with the Romanians.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I approved it yesterday.

MR. STOESSEL: All right. It hasn't come back to me yet. I will talk with them about it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Winston, do you have anything?

MR. LORD: No.

MR. PICKERING: Mr. Secretary, can I raise one thing. Are you aware of the fact that you are not participating either, I guess, on the NSC side or the State side in the

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special group on oil policy which is mainly domestic but it has a lot of international ramifications.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I wrote something on a slip of paper to make sure we would be participating.

MR. PICKERING: I think it is important that you be represented somewhere, in some fashion.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think both the NSC and State ought to be represented. Larry, would you call Scocrow and tell him it is to be done -- both NSC and State ought to be represented.

Okay. Thank you.

(Whereupon at 3:40 P.M. the meeting was adjourned.)

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