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1973/10/25



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/NODIS

October 29, 1973

Secretary's Staff Meeting, October 25, 1973

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The Secretary decided:


- p. 4 1. That Mr. Rush would provide him with names of those ambassadors who are due for retirement under Section 519.
- p. 6 2. That we should not let the Mexican proposal for a charter of economic rights get approved before things get settled in the OAS.
- p. 11, 12 3. That Mr. Hummel would prepare a memorandum for him regarding the two Soviet medical technicians that had been abducted in Burma. The memorandum to be used with Ambassador Dobrynin after the technicians had been freed.
- p. 14, 15 4. That he agreed with Mr. Hummel's view that we should hold tight a little longer before indicating to the Chinese that we would offer to engage in settling through the Security Council of the armistice and the demilitarized zone and other legal elements of the Korean situation.
- p. 21 5. That he agreed with Mr. Newsom's conclusion that we should close our embassy in Kampala.
- p. 24 6. That he would like an examination of what our options now are in respect to the Europeans and that Mr. Springsteen and Mr. Lord should take a new look at our assumptions with respect to Europe. The paper to be prepared in the next two or three weeks.
- p. 26 7. That he was satisfied with the language proposed by French NATO Representative Derosé and agree with Mr. Springsteen's idea that we should instruct Ambassador Rumsfeld to tell Derosé the language is acceptable and he should go ahead and table it.

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- p. 27, 28 8. That he agreed with Mr. Springsteen's plan to call in the Danish Ambassador next week and tell him that with regard to the Declaration with the Europeans we would like to see the economic portions of the draft and then meet with the Europeans on November 14
- p. 28 9. That he would like to pursue the question of the declarations at the NATO Meeting in Decembe
- p. 30, 31 10. That he is prepared to see the German Ambassador on Friday and consider a letter from the President to the Chancellor on the question of German cooperation regarding shipping of military supplies to Israel.
- p. 31 11. That he would see the French Ambassador that afternoon.


Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

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SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1973, 3:15 P.M.

PRESENT

The Secretary of State: HENRY A. KISSINGER

KENNETH RUSH
CURTIS TARR
JACK B. KUBISCH
WILLIAM J. CASEY
JOSEPH J. SISCO
ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, JR.
DAVID D. NEWSOM
GEORGE S. SPRINGSTEEN
WINSTON LORD
ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY
THOMAS R. PICKERING
LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER

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P R O C E E D I N G S

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ken.

MR. RUSH: My schedule today was entirely disrupted, so I can't report on it.

MR. CASEY: I have nothing.

MR. TARR: There is one thing that I would like to bring up -- and I don't know whether you have talked with Larry or anybody else about this.

There is a provision of the authorizing legislation for the Department that makes it possible for us to retire an Ambassador who has left his post -- this is a Foreign Service Officer -- if within three months of his retirement he has not been assigned to a new post.

MR. RUSH: You mean after he is recalled as Ambassador.

MR. TARR: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That gives me a whole new perspective on the Foreign Service. (Laughter)

MR. PICKERING: You have to make us all ambassadors to use that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But I can yank you out the day after.

MR. RUSH: One month.

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MR. TARR: Now, Secretary Rogers had already gone ahead on a proposal to begin to use this provision of the law in selected cases. I think it has been used only once in the past -- with Bohlen, wasn't it? It hasn't been used for some time. And the decision was made tentatively to go ahead. We had started the machinery at the time of the change -- we had started the machinery to use this.

Right now we have some cases that we should begin to look at. And my only reason for bringing it up is -- I don't want a decision right away, but I think it is something that you should keep in mind.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it is a good provision.

MR. TARR: It is a provision of the law.

MR. RUSH: We have a list -- about ten that agreed to retire. About six or seven refused to retire, even though it is in the provisions of the statute. The question is whether we want to have these others retire.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you mean -- they refused to retire?

MR. RUSH: They were asked to retire, and they did not want to. They stayed on.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They stayed on beyond the three months?

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MR. RUSH: No, the three months is not up yet.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They were asked to retire, and now we are running out the three months.

MR. RUSH: No -- I'm sorry. Most of those who were asked to retire under this provision retired voluntarily, and they are gone.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Asked to retire under what provision?

MR. RUSH: Under the provision of the law -- a person can be involuntarily retired three months after he returns from his ambassadorial post. There are about five who said they do not want to retire, and we will have to resort to compulsory action against them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Will you share their names with me?

MR. RUSH: I will share their names with you, and we will go over them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay. But what is the problem?

MR. RUSH: The problem is -- there is no problem if we are going to say "Yes, you must retire."

MR. TARR: The only reason I brought it up is because I didn't know whether or not you knew about it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know about the provision

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of the law. I don't know against whom it is running right now.

MR. RUSH: Let us give you a list.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Jack.

MR. KUBISCH: If I may just add a footnote to that -- I understand that letters went to a number of these Ambassadors who were on the list saying "When you leave your present post, it is not our intention to assign you to another post." Therefore a number of them resigned. Some of them retired from the Foreign Service, stayed at their post -- like Bob McBride in Mexico. And the moment he leaves his post, he is retired from the Foreign Service. As of now he is retired from the Foreign Service but continued in a Presidential appointment.

So there are a few, I guess -- some retired and some didn't.

MR. RUSH: All those who have not left their posts have submitted their resignations.

MR. KUBISCH: I have a couple of things I might mention.

Foreign Minister Rabasa called from Mexico an hour or two ago just to tell me that the scenario that he discussed with you and me when we were in New York

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a couple of weeks ago on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties for the UN will begin to unfold next week.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Just make sure it is running while we still need his approval. Don't let the Charter get approved before we get the OAS -- as much as I love that guy --

MR. KUBISCH: It is love with a string attached. The way it is going to work -- they are going to come to the conclusion -- the Mexicans are going to propose themselves next week that they see no possibility of bringing it to a resolution before the current General Assembly. They are going to suggest it goes back to Geneva for two more sessions in February and July, with a requirement that it be returned next fall as a declaration, not a treaty.

So I will coordinate with E and L and Scali to make sure --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is L?

MR. KUBISCH: L is the Legal Advisor. As a matter of fact, Mr. Maw was in the building today.

Second, I want to make sure you were aware of a problem of a ship -- the Cuban ship that is now at anchor in Gatun Lake in the Canal Zone called the IMIS. The

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ship has been attached at the request of the Chilean Government. It is a problem I think we are going to work our way out of all right. But the problem is basically this. The Cubans were going to supply sugar to Chile. At the time of the coup, they turned their ships around and never fulfilled their contracts. The Chileans say that the Cuban Government owes them sugar or money and is trying to attach their ships wherever they can. One was going through the Canal Zone. We have a Circuit Court there, U.S. Circuit Court. The Chilean lawyers made a petition to the Court to attach the ship and its cargo. A U.S. Marshal went aboard and said "You are under attachment. Either put up a bond so you can sail, or wait until there is a judgment by the Court."

The Cubans, including Fidel Castro and others, have been quite exercised about this. And we have been working for some days here to try and figure a way out of it.

The way it looks like it is going to work out is as follows.

Chile recognizes even if they win the judgment, under concepts of international law and sovereign immunity they cannot attach the cargo. The ship will be allowed free. But they don't want to drop the suit. And the

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Cubans are not about to pay any judgment to Chile now. And it looks as though a suggestion by the State Department to the Department of Justice, through them to the Court, that this is a state-owned ship, the Cuban Government will allow it to claim sovereign immunity -- the Chileans will have to pursue their remedies some other way to recover almost five million dollars worth of sugar they say the Cubans owe them.

But it has been an incident that I thought you would be interested in.

Third and final, the Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack, who you talked to in New York, says he is going to go to the Foreign Ministers meeting in Bogota November 14 to 16, and asked if Ambassador Bunker can postpone his arrival in Panama until the 20th. This is quite convenient.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How many are going? Is Panama one of the larger nations attending?

MR. KUBISCH: It is the one that has the most to say. Fourteen have accepted thus far.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Out of how many?

MR. KUBISCH: Out of 22. The Brazilian Foreign Minister cannot go but will send the Secretary General.

And it looks like the meeting will come off with either --

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Argentina won't come at all?

MR. KUBISCH: No final decision by Argentina yet. They feel it is untimely. They would rather have it sometime early next year, and in Buenos Aires instead of Bogota. But I would be surprised if they didn't go. The Foreign Minister of Paraguay said he will be guided by what Gibson Barboza does. If the Brazilian Foreign Minister goes, he will go; if he doesn't, he will send some representative. The Peruvian Foreign Minister made a statement that he would go if you went.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is a great love affair. He and I hit it off enormously.

MR. KUBISCH: He has been saying glowing things about you. You may be our secret weapon to Lima.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is that where you would like me to be Ambassador? (Laughter)

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MR. HUMMEL: Sir, if all goes well, the Soviets may --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: One more thing. Dobrynin keeps yelling at me about a Soviet ship that is in the Panama Canal. Is any ship that goes through that bloody Canal subject to attachment by the Circuit Court?

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MR. KUBISCH: Yes. There have been seventeen so far this year.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Excuse me.

(At this point, Secretary Kissinger was called out of the meeting room. Upon the Secretary's return, the meeting was resumed.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right.

MR. KUBISCH: I was just going to mention about the Soviet ship. There was a Soviet ship that was supposed to go through the Canal. It was allowed to go all the way through the Canal and get to the other side. And then, as it is now on the other side, a claim has been made against it. And the Soviet ships in the past, if I am not mistaken, have posted bond! Once they post bond, they are allowed to sail.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Joe, has the UN vote taken place?

MR. SISCO: Not yet.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What's holding it up?

MR. SISCO: Speeches. I hope somebody will tell us as soon as it is.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay.

MR. KUBISCH: That is all. If they post bond, they will be allowed to sail. If they don't post bond,

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they have to claim sovereign immunity.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Isn't it an absurd procedure, where every ship going through the Canal can be attached?

MR. RUSH: It is not international waters. And the Federal District Court says they have jurisdiction completely.

MR. KUBISCH: It is like the Baltimore or Philadelphia Harbor. That is one of our problems in exercising sovereignty over the Canal Zone, that the Panamanians and a good many countries in the world really protest.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is grotesque.

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MR. HUMMEL: If all goes well, sir, the Soviets may owe us a small favor, because some two-and-a-half months ago two of their medical technicians in Burma were abducted by a bunch of dissidents, and we have been working for the last month through intermediaries, because these dissidents originally wanted to blackmail the release of a dissident leader from incarceration by the Burmese Government -- and they have now decided these two Soviet medical technicians are more trouble than they are worth and are willing to release them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It has passed -- fourteen

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to nothing.

MR. SISCO: Did the French abstain or the Chinese?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: China not participating.

And the French wanted a separate vote.

All right.

MR. HUMMEL: The two Soviets may be released
by their captors --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can you send me a memo
on that, so I can tell it to Dobrynin.

MR. HUMMEL: Yes, sir. I think we had better not
jump the gun until they are actually free in Thailand.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay. Let me know whenever
you think I can tell him.

MR. HUMMEL: Yes, sir. We will have a memo
ready for you, to present to you, as soon as they are
in fact released.

There is nothing particularly different in
the Cambodian situation. The UN pressures for immediate
taking up of the Sihanouk resolution seem to have diminished
somewhat, and now the guess is that the debate won't start
until about November 20. The heat, in other words, seems to
be a bit off, I think quite possibly as a result of the
Middle East business.

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The Thai foreign and domestic policy statement was issued today. It is very anodyne; for God and motherhood and cooperation with everybody, particularly with the ASEAN nations. General Kriangsak (?) has approached us in Bangkok for continuation of substantive talks on the situation in the area and the American presence. He has made it clear that all he needs is some appearance of substance in these talks, and that they are not going to push us at this time for further withdrawals. But he would like some situation reports -- situation in Cambodia, the situation in Laos and so on. Which I think we can supply to him without much pain as grist for these lower-level discussions, just so he can say they are going on, so that the Thai Government can say they are going on.

Lastly, we have a telegram here today from USUN which indicates some continued Chinese interest, quite deliberate, I am sure, in trying to resolve a compromise on the two Korean resolutions in the UN. Two staff members of the Chinese side approached --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is the compromise that is wanted.

MR. HUMMEL: The only compromise I think we should consider would have to be linked with separate action to be

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taken in the Security Council that would guarantee -- perpetuate the guarantees that are now inherent in the UN Command arrangement.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But that means abolishing the UN Command.

MR. HUMMEL: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the Chinese will finally settle for not abolishing the UN Command.

MR. HUMMEL: I think the impulse is to hold tight on this one, sir, I think at least for the time being. I don't think we would need to propose this compromise. The compromise would in fact mean our withdrawing backwards on the third of three items that we have been interested in and which we have already gone a long way in the first two.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which is what -- UNCIRK (?)

MR. HUMMEL: UNCIRK is gone. We are not trying to force North Korea into the United Nations in any way at all. It couldn't be done in any case. We have given way very substantially on that. The matter of the UN Command and U.S. forces, which is a different issue -- the Chinese would like us to compromise on. I would like to hold tight a little longer before we offer to engage

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in settlement through the Security Council of the armistice and the demilitarized zone and the other legal elements.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right.

MR. LORD: When is the vote?

MR. HUMMEL: Not before the latter part of November.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay.

MR. HUMMEL: That is all.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Dave?

MR. NEWSOM: Mr. Secretary, I was at a banquet in New York last night at which there were a number of executives of American oil companies --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to hear that. They are revolting. They are crying about the Middle East. Do they have a solution?

MR. NEWSOM: No, they don't have a solution. But the impression I come away with is that there is a reverberation of reinforcement of doom between them and the Arabs.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have been telling you this.

MR. NEWSOM: And I think that when you see them on Tuesday -- I am sure you will -- but I would just like to reinforce my feeling --

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can't somebody tell them to shut up -- that they are making their own disaster? What the hell do they want us to do?

MR. NEWSOM: I told Mr. Fulmer last night --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who is he?

MR. NEWSOM: He is the Texaco man, who is the principal spokesman --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do they have any idea of what we should do?

MR. NEWSOM: No, they don't.

MR. RUSH: They have some ideas, but they are not acceptable.

MR. NEWSOM: They don't stand still long enough to understand what we are trying to do, for one thing. I said to him: "You are sure you are not part of the problem, because you have a tendency to reinforce the Arab feeling that the United States doesn't know what it is doing in the Middle East?" And I tried to indicate what our basic objectives were. I cite this only to underline the face --

MR. RUSH: What you said is exactly what they all think. They all think our Middle Eastern policy is wrong.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is their solution? Since

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we cannot destroy Israel, what is it they want us to do?

MR. RUSH: That we should step in, make Israel withdraw to her own boundaries, and then the Arabs will be very nice and sweet to us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Countries in a monopoly position will use it.

MR. RUSH: Exactly.

MR. NEWSOM: One thing, Mr. Secretary. They tend to believe a lot of the more outlandish statements which come from Arab sources, largely about what we are doing. For example, one of them said to me seriously last night "Why are we letting the Israelis expand their enclave on the west bank of the Canal?" And I said "We are not. We are making every effort to try and get it stopped."

You are very much aware of the problem. I just wanted to reinforce it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They think I am part of their problem, too.

MR. RUSH: I don't think so.

MR. NEWSOM: They speak of Washington in a broad generic sense, which encompasses all of us. One of them came up to me and said "Don't you people know what you are doing in Washington?" I said, "Yes, we think we do."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are they being brought in here

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on Tuesday?

MR. RUSH: Yes. I am waiting for a date from Larry. Larry, do we have a date for Tuesday?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: A date or a time?

MR. RUSH: A time is what I mean -- an hour.

MR. EAGLEBURGER: I will check.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Just give an hour. Shift something out.

MR. NEWSOM: Coming to other parts of the African scene, Mr. Secretary, very significant negotiations have started in Brussels between the Africans and the Europeans on what their relationship will be after the expiration of the Yaounde Convention. And the interesting thing at the moment is that the Africans seem generally united on what they want, and the Europeans are still in some disarray. This is the beginning of what will be a long --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know what the issues are.

MR. NEWSOM: The main issue of interest to us is the issue of whether in a renewal of the arrangements between the African states, the widened group of African states, as a result of the British entry and the members of the Common Market, there will continue to be preferential arrangements benefitting the Common Market members, and

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working to the detriment of non-Common Market members -- reverse preferences primarily. And the Africans, with really only one exception, have now taken a position opposing any further reverse preferences, that is preferences for goods from the European Common Market countries. But the European countries have not yet reached a unified position on this.

This is something that we have been interested in for a long time and made numerous representations, both to the Europeans and to the Africans.

Secondly, Nigeria today broke with Israel. That was expected after Ethiopia's break.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With a weird justification.

MR. NEWSOM: Yes, sir -- that Israel expanded its enclave after the cease-fire --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Beyond its '67 frontier -- which I don't know what the hell they were talking about. I think their geography is a little weird.

MR. NEWSOM: In that connection, Ambassador ~~W~~air had a talk with the Israeli Ambassador in Addis about the possible evacuation of some up to 300 Israelis in Ethiopia -- said they were going to try to get them out by Israeli planes, but if this were not possible, they might make an approach to us to provide aircraft to fly the

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Israelis from Addis to Tel Aviv. I just alert you to the possibility of such a request, if they cannot manage it themselves.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is our position?

MR. NEWSOM: Well, my own feeling would be -- I haven't had a chance to talk to Joe on this, but it is probably something we should do if the aircraft are available, on a commercial charter -- help them to arrange it.

Finally, we have a combination of the sublime and the ridiculous in Africa in General Amin's latest declaration. At his UN Day speech, after finishing his speech, the General picked up another piece of paper and declared that "At nine a.m. this morning, East Africa Time, which is six a.m. Greenwich Time, I had an inspiration from God." The inspiration was that there ought to be a cease-fire in the Middle East.

But more seriously, this illustrates --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's how Rush conducts his staff meetings.

MR. RUSH: By inspiration.

MR. NEWSOM: We feel increasingly that this man is totally unbalanced and poses a threat to our citizens in Uganda.

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We have now reduced our Embassy to fourteen people, which is a hard core of the necessary officers for an Embassy in that country. However, we do now feel that there is really no purpose to be served by keeping our people there, and we have reached the conclusion in AF that we should get our people out -- not break off diplomatic relations, but close the Embassy, leave it to them as to whether they keep their Embassy in Washington open. But the last thing that General Amin did was to announce that any American who did not have an identity card would be arrested.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, I saw that.

MR. NEWSOM: Unless you have other feelings on this, Mr. Secretary, I think we will move in that direction.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no other feelings.

George, I think you and Win ought to take a new look at our assumptions on Europe. I think really the time has come -- maybe we will come up again with the same answers as we have done before, but when I look at the European behavior in this crisis, I ask myself what in God's name is this alliance. They assert the indivisibility of our interest in defense and in every other respect conduct themselves as neutrals. Now, in order to have the

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indivisibility of our interests in defense, we can do that with a unilateral declaration. That is no longer a partnership -- that is a protectorate. And I would like to have an examination. I am not prejudging it. All my emotional inclinations are in the tradition of the fifties and sixties. So I would be delighted if an examination showed that we do have a partnership. But I would like to see examined just what the hell we are doing and where this thing is going to evolve. And if it is going to evolve the way it seems to in every single crisis -- when you cannot get Britain to introduce a simple cease-fire resolution, as we tried on October 13; when on every issue the British and French have given us more trouble on this than the Russians almost; and when I can think of almost no instance in the last year where we have had any support from the Europeans, I ask myself where are we going.

We really ought to look at what would happen if we made them rely more on themselves in defense; whether that would not force them back into a more reasonable appreciation of political relationships.

But you take the situation today. We are confronted with a Soviet threat to put their forces in

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unilaterally. We are trying to pass a UN resolution that permits a UN force to be created without the participation of the major nations. You would have thought that it cannot be in the European interest to have a resolution that permits the Soviets to go in there. Yet when the final crunch came, we had almost more trouble with the Europeans than we did with the Soviets, who had finally yielded when we started bringing pressure on them.

You know it is just spiteful. There isn't any point in it any more. Why the Europeans would want a UN resolution that would permit their forces to go in together with the Russians, when the Russians had seven of their eight airborne divisions mobilized and all their air transports stood down, so they were ready to go at a moment's notice -- why should it be in the European interest to pass a resolution that would have permitted the Soviets to appear there first with six paratroop divisions as a UN force, just so that they could maintain the principle that they could get forces in when they don't have any forces nor had any intention to put forces in, nor have known what to do with their forces if they did get them in. It is almost beyond my comprehension. And it is not an isolated instance.

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I don't want a nit-picking of individual decisions. I would like an examination of what our options now are in respect to the Europeans.

Can we do that in the next two or three weeks?

MR. LORD: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mean the whole thing is weird -- when they won't put partnership into a declaration. I could not care less whether this EC Declaration -- it is a farce as it is. There is not a thing you can do with that declaration except get headlines for one day. And the grudging way in which they are negotiating it, it is depriving it of all meaning anyway. It is not like the Marshall Plan, where you have a sense that this is the beginning of a new era. It is a sort of a way of getting the President to Europe.

But it is these symptoms that I would like looked at.

What else is going on?

I notice the French on the NATO Declaration are really quite cooperative now.

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: Yes. I have a couple of things.

I thought I would review briefly the status of both declarations.

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Since the French introduced their draft earlier this month, NATO has been engaged in a general discussion of the whole concept of the declaration, focusing pretty much on the French draft. They intend to complete this general discussion next Wednesday. And then they will turn to formal drafting.

I think it is quite clear from the discussion so far that all countries will accept using the French draft as a basis. I think this in large measure stems from the fact that the French have been very forthcoming in their willingness to take into account the views of others -- like the Canadians, for instance, wanted something on economics, as well as the Danes. They wanted something on democracy and human rights. And the French are prepared to put something in on this.

What this means is that the French will produce a second draft, which will include a lot of these points.

There was a lot of talk by both ourselves and other allies of putting in something on burden-sharing and on mutual and balanced force reductions. And as you know, we have been working with the French on this. They have now come back to us with an alternate draft, which, as far as I am concerned, I think we ought to tell them is

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acceptable to us and have them go ahead and table it along with their other revisions in the text.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I saw the cable. It looked pretty good to me.

MR. RUSH: I thought it looked pretty good.

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: Far better than I was anticipating.

MR. RUSH: I think part of this arises from the fact that we accepted their draft as a basis for negotiating.

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: There was a telegram yesterday in which Derosé said he didn't think Jobert was going to give one bit, because he was going to have to go back to Pompidou. And twenty-four hours later he comes in and says Jobert has approved this particular language, which Derosé construes this to mean he thought Pompidou's acceptance of it.

But it is not all that we want. But I think it is more than we normally would have expected.

So if it is all right with you, I would think we should instruct Rumsfeld to tell Derosé it is acceptable and go ahead and table it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was satisfied with it. I thought there might be an aspect that I had missed.

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MR. SPRINGSTEEN: Well, it doesn't tell anything about balance of payments or anything like that. But I don't think we can push that far and get anything that is worthwhile on it.

On the EC Declaration, I commented briefly on this last Friday. Walt Stoessel has come in to you with a separate telegram which says that on the paragraphs that were discussed at Copenhagen, which was only one half of the draft, he thinks we have gone as far as we can go at that particular level. What is missing are the economic sections of the draft. This I think curiously reflects a rivalry between various elements of the European Community. The Political Directors have been doing the political stuff. The permanent representatives of the EC missions in Brussels have been doing the economic. And they cannot get themselves together on it.

The Danish Ambassador called me yesterday and said that he is under instructions to come in and ask us what we want to do next, particularly with a view towards another meeting. I thought that if it met with your approval, I would have him in and say that, one, we would like to get the economic portions of the draft, so we can see those; and then meet with them on about November 14,

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because they are meeting I think on the 12th and 13th themselves, the Political Directors, to consider other subjects. We meet with them the day after, and work those over. This would have the advantage -- because I think by that time both the NATO and the EC draft may be more or less in parallel as far as coming down towards --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree with this -- except that I don't accept the proposition that we have gone as far as we can go on the political thing.

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: Well, I think Walt's points are that at the Political Director level he doubts that we can get much more out of them. And I think what he has in mind is that at your level, with your Foreign Minister colleagues, that we put that off until we get the whole thing into some kind of a frame and then you can take it up with them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can one take this up at the NATO meeting -- if we can ever get the dates straight?

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: If we ever get the dates straight and have enough time.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Where do these dates stand now? Why can't they do it the 13th and 14th?

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: They have a Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg the 13th and 14th.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: But the 11th and 12th they can do it?

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: The 11th and 12th they could, but as things stand now, since we have not heard back from Oslo yet --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I saw an Oslo thing which suggests that I could probably leave at lunchtime in Oslo. I could give my lecture in the morning, and then I am supposed to go to lunch. And I could leave right after, so I could be there in the late afternoon.

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: We could do it on the 11th and 12th then. And then we could also schedule -- there is normally a tripartite dinner which would take place the day before. But we could schedule that early enough. The Germans would be the hosts for the 11th. And that would give you the opportunity to see the German, the French and the British.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Good.

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: My piece of bad news is Germany today. They having been fairly forthcoming the last week on the resupply business --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is another one of those outrages.

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: I think we are down to a point

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where we have got to make further representations. What we are up against basically is that there are still pending shipments of something like a hundred trucks and 75,000 rounds of ammo picked up by ship -- and the airlift out of Ramstein is supposed to continue through Saturday. Now the Germans do not know officially about the airlift out of Ramstein. But they have gone on public record as having asked us to stop all these shipments out of Germany from and over the FRG, which means by both air and sea. They are adamant on this. Hillenbrand went in on instructions sent out last night to see Franke again. He got absolutely nowhere. He reports by phone the atmosphere is very nasty, compounded by the fact of the alert today, which has made them more nervous. And they claim they don't have any facts as to what this is all about -- the Germans claim that. The Ambassador feels he has run out the diplomatic line in Bonn and feels it has to be moved to a high political level if we want to continue to use Germany as a supply route. Now, we construe this to mean first an approach by you to the German Ambassador here, where you lay it on the line; and secondly, a letter from the President to the Chancellor.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's all right.

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MR. SPRINGSTEEN: Will you see the German Ambassador, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. SISCO: Stretch it out over three days.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Under protest, but I will see him.

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: Can you do that today?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No -- tomorrow.

I have to go over to the White House.

MR. SISCO: The rupee negotiations are moving along. I would say they are close to the ninth inning.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You can't lose if you give up everything.

MR. SISCO: Secondly, in Greece the political framework that has been announced a month back is moving along fairly well in the concrete. Anything you want me to say to the French Ambassador? I am seeing him at four o'clock.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He wants to see me sometime today, doesn't he?

MR. SPRINGSTEEN: I think he wants to see you, to give you a letter from Jobert about the Copenhagen meeting.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay. He can come at six.

(Whereupon at 3:55 p.m. the meeting was concluded.)

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