TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Helmuth Sonnenfeldt
2/8/74  10:08 a.m.

K:  Hal, where are you

S:  I'm just in the office

K:  I see. Now I was sent the EC Nine draft communique. Would it overstrain the department to make an analysis of it for me?

S:  I didn't know that you got it. We sent them ours yesterday. To Soames. We will go to work right away, I didn't know we had it.

K:  Can you see it to it that when something like that comes it, they would give me the courtesy of analysis automatically.

S:  I didn't know--Did you read my message last night that we sent to the plane

K:  About whom I should see?
   And also that we have to put the arm on them. What does putting the arm on them mean?

S:  We only discovered late night before last that they [REDACTED] was drafting a communique, so yesterday I got--our draft sent to Soames to tell him we don't want a confrontation, we expect them to exercise influence on the [REDACTED] community drafting exercise. Now that obviously has been too late. But I think from the way the British and Germans are talking that we have had here, and we are going to have a very rough time.

K:  On what particular issue

S:  The big issue comes down to the question of what kind of machinery follows--the whole tendency is to throw this into the OECD and humor us at most with saying something like--it isn't excluded and [REDACTED] and there might be another meeting of this group, or something like that. So the question of the follow-on machinery to the conference or followon activity=

K:  What is their picture, why?

S:  Their picture is that they are scared of the French. This is why I said in the message last night to you that we don't know whether they would risk a break with the French, but they certainly won't try unless confronted with a break with us.

K:  What is the break with us?
K: What is the break with us?

S: The break with us, I think, is to tell them look, if you don't want to--[end tape]

S: [begin tape] I think we have to talk about it more coherently, but I think that is where the issue comes--and you can probably get some generalities in the communique on general philosophy that is in there--but the part, paragraph 15 or 20, I guess, in our draft communique--

K: I've read it, it is a good communique--

S: Is where the really kicker comes and as far as I can tell you---Sheel(?) you are really going to have to talk turkey with him and tell him if necessary to convene a caucus of his nine and tell them to change their position. Actually I think the mandate can be stretched not to be incompatible with the idea of some specific work after this conference, with another ministerial conference

K: Do you think I should have a press conference today?

S: Well

K: What do I say, if I state our goals too ambitiously, it will be a defeat. If I don't state them ambitiously, then the Europeans will weasel off it.

S: You stated them at the Harvard/Yale/Princeton thing the other day

K: And why do I have to state it again?

S: You don't have to. I think if you could avoid a press conference on other grounds today, I think there is nothing to be gained in any further public statement.

K: That is what I think. Have sent my comment around.

S: To the Harvard thing

K: Have we told them to give it to the host or have we just done it for the edification of the goddamn ambassadors? Have we told them to give it to the host

S: I will have to look at the telegram--I can't honestly tell you.

K: My recollection is that we told them it is for them to draw on. Why that was done, I don't understand.
S: That is why the State Department does things.

K: I am now in charge of the State Department, Hal, and for whatever limited time I may be there, but it is going to work the way I want it--

S: Sure, and I spend my entire day chasing down these things and telling people how to do it--it was incredible to get this damn communique sent to Soames yesterday--it took me half a day to get the damn thing out. I'll have to dig the telegram out and see what we sent them. I can't see any benefit in your saying anything further publicly.

K: That is why I am afraid of. Because if I say very ambitious goals, then it will be a failure. If I say very unambitious goals, then all the Europeans will shout hurray.

S: I think it has to be done privately.

K: Now what is the business of the Brezhnev letter on EEO, did we get one too?

S: We didn't get a letter--we got on the 7th of Jan, an oral note which

K: But it is amazing that those sons-of-bitches will not even discuss that sort of thing in NATO anymore.

S: Evidently the British, Germans and French got the same sort of thing--but now we have to dig ourselves out of that whole by--did you see the telegram I drafted?

K: No.

S: There is a telegram that tells Rumsfeld to say that we did some time ago that we did get a routine oral note stating the Soviet position which didn't call for a response and we didn't respond to it, and anyway it is overtaken by your conversation with Gromyko on which we fully briefed them and which they were deliriously happy with. I think we have to do that to protect ourselves. Let me ask you--the Secretary Morton and others are interested in doing so work with the Pols but coal? classification and they want the Polish minister in charge of that over here. I've held the thing up until I had a chance to talk to you and see whether you ever gave the Soviets an oral reply to their oral note on energy--

K: Yeh, I talked to them, they are willing to talk them.
S: If he has done that, I think we can go ahead with the Poles. I wasn't going to let it out of here, until I was clear that we had done something the Soviets. So we wouldn't offend them by going ahead with the Poles and not with them.

K: Yeh

S: So we will move on that. Well I guess I better get this social schedule of yours started up, if you have approved it.

K: Yeh, it is all right.

S: We will make those calls and get these people lined up

K: Where do we have breakfast--State Department?

S: I think so.

K: Who sits in?

S: It is up to you. The meeting starts at 10:00

K: No, I'm not talking about that--who sits in?

S: I think it probably out to be Donaldson and

K: You better sit in with the Europeans

S: And myself and Hartman and then some people may have to leave

K: We' are talking about Sunday

S: But the pre-meeting starts at 10:00 on Sunday

K: Oh I see.

S: It is important to get Sheel beforehand?

K: Then let us meet at 8:30

S: I'll try, he is coming in very late

K: No, then let's do it 9:00 (?)

S: We gave P____le the communique also and/ them we expected the Germans to see to it that --
K: There is no way to give it to Soames without it's leaking to everybody

S: We didn't give the text to Soames—we told our guy to talk to him from it and give the points of it. And since Greenwald had left already for Washington, I called Rumsfeld and told him to tell Soames we are really serious about this—that it comes from you and we expect him to be helpful.

K: I'm coming over and would like to meet with you, Hartman and McCloskey.

S: Yeh

K: And I think we have to decide what our policy is with the Europeans. If they are going to do to us in this what they are doing in the Atlantic declarations, *I have every reason to believe they are, we better reconsider—*

S: The question is how far we want to push it with the French

K: Let's not say it is the French, because the others are getting all the benefits of the French, plus the benefits of cowardice.

S: I understand that, but on the other hand, I think some of them would be willing to move more than they are

K: Why don't they move individually

S: Because they are committed to the community and they are scared to risk that, and I don't understand the French—I don't understand the French and I think if you can get over your quiet infatuation with Jobert, I think you ought to get him in and really read him the riot act. Tell him he has jeopardized the military stuff, we have spent five years, trying to get great sacrifice here within, the government to straighten out our relations with the French—we have gone a long way with them and this just pulls the rug out.

K: When do I do it—before the conference?

S: No afterwards. Or some time during—it doesn't make all that difference because it is a pretty basic massage—and tell them there are so many babies you can throw off the sled to feed to domestic politics

K: Why don't I see him for 5 minutes before the conference and put him

S: I'd have to find out when he is arriving actually—but I think you ought to take him in your back room
K: And tell him I want to tell him formally that we are ready to have a public confrontation with the French and that we are ready to end all cooperation and make every forum a contest between them and us and let's see where that leaves us.

S: Well, let me get to work on some of these things

K: I'll be in and I'd like to meet with you and Hartman and McCloskey

S: Okay.