TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. McCloy
February 8, 1974, 9:40 p.m.

K: I'm sorry I couldn't get back to you, but you have no idea how swamped I am. In this weather it's probably going to be tough to get down here.

M: It's hard, but I can try. I can't get down tonight, I don't believe.

K: Not tonight. Maybe tomorrow afternoon for half an hour?

M: I'll make a real effort.

K: Give me a call in the morning. I just wanted to talk to you for five minutes. I have reached the point, Jack, where I believe we have to take the French on.

M: Jobert's Damascus speech was terrible.

K: If this keeps on, we're going to see Europe __________. First we get eight Europeans telling us it's a good idea, and the next thing you know they're ______. I don't want this energy conference turned into another adversarial _______. If this keeps up, I am really afraid what's going to happen. I propose to tell Scheel and ______ on Sunday that if there's going to be a confrontation on this conference, we'll have to do a basic reassessment of our position.

M: I think you're almost to the point where you have to take them on.

K: I wonder -- and I say this as a friend. The dislike of this Administration is so great among the Establishment people, are they going to back us up?

M: Some of the Establishment -- there's a growing resentment against the French attitude, and I wouldn't think you'd have a backlash from that area.

K: Let me give you an example. First of all, at the NATO meeting, I wanted to meet with the Foreign Ministers of the Nine. It took three weeks of negotiation for a half-hour meeting. Unbelievable. But
the next week at the European Summit four Arab oil Foreign Ministers showed up and were received like royalty. Now the Europeans have a political directors meeting today and they have a political adjunct to this economic deal which they're going to vote on next Thursday at the Foreign Ministers' meeting of the Nine. meeting is almost insulting. They have finally given Scheel the authority to brief me on this -- on Sunday, which is too late. Almost an adversarial relationship.

M: suggestion in this memo. Helmut Schmidt is a bit at odds with Brandt. Helmut Schmidt is more favorably disposed to us. Very mad at the French; very mad at the British. What did you think of my suggestion that Doug Home

K: I liked it very much.

M: I don't know what the answer is.

K: I will do that on a personal basis.

M: I will give this thing some more thought. I'm quite aware that my approach may be quite naive.

K: Well, it may be naive, but it's exactly -- it's what I've been coming to.

M: I think we're at a very critical point because this can develop into a serious -- more serious thing -- if you don't confront it now.

K: That's what I feel. The reason I called you this morning is that because I had come to the conclusion which you expressed in your memo, but I didn't want to get down

M: You can handle that perfectly well. The sentiment in Europe is that they're looking to the United States for reassertion of its leadership, and they do have a recognition of past history. But they got panicky over this last affair -- the energy affair -- and panicky over the French attitude. In everything you get out of Europe, the lowest common denominator is hostility.

K: And with provocation.

M: This is silly. I think you've got to remind them gently of past history. We've bailed them out a couple of times.
K: I'm thinking of saying to Jobert on Sunday night -- if he turns this into a confrontation, we will ________ hostility to France.

M: That Damascus speech was terrible. _________ I'll call you tomorrow.

K: Can you call me at the White House between 11:00 and 12:00?

M: All right, Henry.

K: Many thanks, Jack.

END