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TELECON

Secretary Kissinger/Mr. McCloy  
February 8, 1974, 9:40 p. m.

K: I'm sorry I couldn't get back to you, but you have no idea how swamped I am. In this weather it's probably going to be tough to get down here.

M: It's hard, but I can try. I can't get down tonight, I don't believe.

K: Not tonight. Maybe tomorrow afternoon for half an hour?

M: I'll make a real effort.

K: Give me a call in the morning. I just wanted to talk to you for five minutes. I have reached the point, Jack, where I believe we have to take the French on.

M: Jobert's Damascus speech was terrible.

K: If this keeps on, we're going to see Europe \_\_\_\_\_. First we get eight Europeans telling us it's a good idea, and the next thing you know they're \_\_\_\_\_. I don't want this energy conference turned into another adversarial \_\_\_\_\_. If this keeps up, I am really afraid what's going to happen. I propose to tell Scheel and \_\_\_\_\_ on Sunday that if there's going to be a confrontation on this conference, we'll have to do a basic reassessment of our position.

M: I think you're almost to the point where you have to take them on.

K: I wonder -- and I say this as a friend. The dislike of this Administration is so great among the Establishment people, are they going to back us up?

M: Some of the Establishment -- there's a growing resentment against the French attitude, and I wouldn't think you'd have a backlash from that area.

K: Let me give you an example. First of all, at the NATO meeting, I wanted to meet with the Foreign Ministers of the Nine. It took three weeks of negotiation for a half-hour meeting. Unbelievable. But





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the next week at the European Summit four Arab oil Foreign Ministers showed up and were received like royalty. Now the Europeans \_\_\_\_\_ have a political directors meeting today and they have a political adjunct to this economic deal which they're going to vote on next Thursday at the Foreign Ministers' meeting of the Nine. \_\_\_\_\_ meeting is almost insulting. They have finally given Scheel the authority to brief me on this -- on Sunday, which is too late. Almost an adversarial relationship.

M: \_\_\_\_\_ suggestion in this memo. Helmut Schmidt is a bit at odds with Brandt. Helmut Schmidt is more favorably disposed to us. Very mad at the French; very mad at the British. What did you think of my suggestion that Doug Home

K: I liked it very much.

M: I don't know what the answer is.

K: I will do that on a personal basis.

M: I will give this thing some more thought. I'm quite aware that my approach may be quite naive.

K: Well, it may be naive, but it's exactly -- it's what I've been coming to.

M: I think we're at a very critical point because this can develop into a serious -- more serious thing -- if you don't confront it now.

K: That's what I feel. The reason I called you this morning is that \_\_\_\_\_ because I had come to the conclusion which you expressed in your memo, but I didn't want to get down

M: You can handle that perfectly well. The sentiment in Europe is that they're looking to the United States for reassertion of its leadership, and they do have a recognition of past history. But they got panicky over this last affair -- the energy affair -- and panicky over the French attitude. In everything you get out of Europe, the lowest common denominator is hostility.

K: And with provocation.

M: This is silly. I think you've got to remind them gently of past history. We've bailed them out a couple of times.

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K: I'm thinking of saying to Jobert on Sunday night -- if he turns this into a confrontation, we will \_\_\_\_\_ hostility to France.

M: That Damascus speech was terrible. \_\_\_\_\_ I'll call you tomorrow.

K: Can you call me at the White House between 11:00 and 12:00?

M: All right, Henry.

K: Many thanks, Jack.

END