

Message Text

PAGE 01 PARIS 29551 161306Z

46

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 012695

R 161156Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4820

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T PARIS 29551

EXDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, FR, NATO, MCAP, US

SUBJ: MEETING WITH CHIEF OF STAFF OF FRENCH ARMED FORCES MAURIN

STATE FOR THE SECRETARY

DEFENSE FOR SECRETARY SCHLISINGER

USNATO FOR AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD

USNMR SHAPE FOR GENERAL GOOD PASTER

1. SUMMARY. GENERAL MARUIN, CHIEF OF STAFF OF FRENCH ARMED FORCES, AND TWO OF HIS COLLEAGUES LUNCHEDED WITH ME AT RESIDENCE NOV 15. MAURIN STRESSED HIS CONCERN WITH EFFECT OF DETENTE ON WILLINGNESS OF WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DEFENSES IN FACE OF SIZEABLE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN EASTERN EUROPE. REFERRING TO DOD BRIEFING ON MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE, HE UNDERLINED FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT THAT FRENCH MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE WITH OUR DATA BASE AND CONCLUSIONS. MAURIN BRIEFLY MENTIONED LOC STAFF TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND PROBLEMS OF WESTERN CONSULTATION DEMONSTRATED DURING MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. END SUMMARY.

2. DETENTE. THROUGHOUT OUR DISCUSSION, MAURIN VOICED SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT EFFECT OF DETENTE ON WILL OF WESTERN NATIONS TO
SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 29551 161306Z

MAINTAIN DEFENSE FORCES ADEQUATE TO SOVIET THREAT. HE SAID THAT DURING RECENT VISIT TO PARIS, MARSHALLKOULIKOV (SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF) TOLD HIM THAT SOVIETS WERE SEEKING EQUIVALENCE WITH US IN STRATEGIC, TACTICAL NUCLEAR, AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

MAURIN IS CONVINCED FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH KOULIKOV AND FROM GREAT EMPHASIS SOVIETS ATTACH TO EXPANDING THEIR MILITARY POWER, THAT SOVIETS ARE BUILDING MILITARY FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT SOVIET POLICY OF EXPANSION AIMED AT DOMINATING WESTERN EUROPE, INCLUDING FRANCE. IN THIS REGARD, MAURIN SAID REDUCTIONS IN US FORCES IN EUROPE WOULD FUEL WESTERN EUROPE'S PERCEPTION THAT (A) THE SOVIET THREAT WAS DECREASED OR (B) IT WAS HOPELES TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET MILITARY POWER. IN EITHER CASE, THE RESULT WOULD BE THE SAME; REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE'S OWN DEFENSE. MAURIN SEES A DANGEROUS CYCLE PRO Pelled BY DETENT LEADING TO REDUCTION OF US FORCES IN EUROPE AND CONSEQUENT REDUCTIONS BY OTHER ALLIES WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE FURTHER US REDUCTIONS AND MORE EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS.

3. CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. MAURIN MENTIONED THAT WHEN FRENCH MINISTER OF ARMED FORCES GALLEY RETURNED FROM HIS RECENT TRIP TO US, HE TOLD MAURIN THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION ON MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAT DIFFERED SUBSTANTIALLY FROM FRENCH VIEW. MAURIN SAID THAT FRENCH MILITARY DOES NOT AGREE WITH DATA BASE THAT US IS USING IN ITS MILITARY BALANCE BRIEFING NOR DO THE FRENCH AGREE THAT NATO HAS CAPABILITY OF MOUNTING SUSTAINED CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. MOREOVER, SAID MAURIN, HE HEARS THAT NATO ALLIES (EXCLUDING THE FRENCH) MAY CONCLUDE FROM US BRIEFING THAT NATO'S DEFENSES ARE SO STRONG THAT THEY CAN BE FURTHER REDUCED WITHOUT RUNNING SERIOUS RISK. MAURIN REPEATED WELL-KNOWN FRENCH RESISTANCE TO POSSIBILITY OF RE-FIGHTING WORLD WARS I AND II IN EUROPE. I POINTED OUT THAT WE SHARE WITH FRANCE THE VIEW THAT DETERRENCE IS PRIMARY OBJECT OF WEST'S MILITARY POSTURE. OUR EMPHASIS ON IMPROVING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCE POSTURE (INCLUDING US CONTRIBUTION) IS BASED ON BELIEF THAT DETERRENCE MUST INCLUDE SUBSTANTIAL STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES AS WELL AS ADEQUATE IN-PLACE CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO BE CREDIBLE. ONLY BY MAINTAINING THIS COMPLETE RANGE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY CAN WE EXPECT DETERRENCE TO REMAIN CREDIBLE TO OTHER SIDE. MOREOVER, THERE WERE NUMBER OF SCENARIOS FOR POSSIBLE SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST THE WEST, SOME AT LOWER LEVELS OF INTENSITY WHICH WOULD NOT BE SECRET

PAGE 03 PARIS 29551 161306Z

APPROPRIATE FOR AN EARLY NUCLEAR RESPONSE. IN ANY EVENT, SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE LEFT WITH ONLY THE CHOICE BETWEEN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR RESPONSE AND SURRENDER. MAURIN NOTED THAT CONSTANTLY IMPROVING SOVIET FORCES WERE LOCATED ONLY 200 KILOMETERS FROM THE FRENCH BORDER AND THAT HE COULD NOT CONCEIVE OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT IN EUROPE THAT WOULD NOT RE

QUIRE EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

4. LOC TALKS. DRAWING ON OUR DISCUSSION OF CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES, MAURIN REFERRED TO THE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOC) TALKS HELD LAST WEEK IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF AND US MILITARY AUTHORITIES. MAURIN SAID THAT US REPRESENTATIVES

HAD TALKED IN TERMS OF NEEDING 40 DAYS TO ESTABLISH AN LOC ACROSS FRANCE ONCE DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO ACTIVATE LOC. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THIS LENGTH OF TIME DEEPLY TROUBLED MAURIN. HE WAS PESSIMISTIC THAT THE WEST WOULD RECEIVE ANYTHING LIKE 40 DAYS OF ADVANCE WARNING BEFORE SOVIET ATTACK. HE ALSO REJECTED THE IDEA THAT A CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT COULD LAST 40 DAYS WITHOUT ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WAR. MAURIN MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT AN LOC BASED ON EITHER ASSUMPTION WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH FRENCH STRATEGIC THINKING.

5. CONSULTATION. MAURIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT US AND SOVIETS WOULD CONSULT BILATERALLY ON MATTERS PERTAINING SOLELY TO THEIR INTERESTS. HE DID NOT SEEM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT CONSULTATION WITH NATO ALLIES ON SUCH SUBJECTS MIGHT NOT BE DETAILED OR TIMELY. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT ON ISSUES WHERE VITAL INTERESTS OF ALLIES WERE CONCERNED (SUCH AS MIDDLE EAST CRISIS), SITUATION WAS QUITE DIFFERENT AND US COULD NOT EXPECT TO HAVE SUPPORT OF ALLIES UNLESS CONSULTATION WAS BOTH TIMELY AND COMPLETE. HE MENTIONED THAT THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS FRENCH TELEVISION AND NEWS TICKERS REMAINED HIS BEST SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON EVOLVING MILITARY SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST. EVEN THE NATO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE NETWORK PRODUCED NOTHING OF REAL VALUE, ACCORDING TO MAURIN.

6. COMMENT: MAURIN'S COMMENTS ACCURATELY REFLECT TRENDS IN SENIOR FRENCH MILITARY THINKING, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF DETENTE ON EUROPE'S DEFENSES, AND TO STRONG FRENCH CONVICTION THAT ANY POSSIBILITY OF SUSTAINED CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE BE VIGOROUSLY
SECRET

PAGE 04 PARIS 29551 161306Z

RESISTED. IRWIN

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic DecapTIONing: Z
Capture Date: 11 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, COMMITTEE MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 NOV 1973
DecapTION Date: 28 MAY 2004
DecapTION Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973PARIS29551
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P750020-2178
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731166/abqceglp.tel
Line Count: 144
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS NOFORN
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS NOFORN
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <03-Oct-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MEETING WITH CHIEF OF STAFF OF FRENCH ARMED FORCES MAURIN
TAGS: PFOR, US, FR, BE, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO NATO
USNMR SHAPE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005