

**01073**

**1974/03/18**



Authority MND989755

By WSP NARA Date 3/28/74

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: March 18, 1974

TIME: 4:35 PM

PLACE: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: Relations with Europe

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary  
Robert McCloskey, Ambassador at Large  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the  
Department  
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for  
European Affairs  
William Hyland, Director, Bureau of  
Intelligence and Research  
Winston Lord, Director, Planning Staff  
Lawrence Eagleburger, Executive Assistant  
George Springsteen, Executive Secretary

Secretary: I wanted to get you together again to review for ten minutes or so where we are with Europe.

Sonnenfeldt: Who the hell wrote this? It is based on Jerry Warren's press conference.

Secretary: Jerry called Harris in and told him to kill the story. I want everyone to understand without any ambiguity whatever that there will be: 1) no Presidential trip in April, 2) that we are not pushing the declarations at all now and that they are no cureall anyway, and 3) we are going to see what the Europeans have in mind rather than take the initiative ourselves. Since our rather careful planning triggered us into this crisis, I am determined to gain maximum benefit from it. It would be absurd, stupid, not to take advantage of where we find ourselves now.

Sonnenfeldt: It is important for us, though, to have a positive focus when asked where we go from here.

Secretary: Hal, do you have those questions and answers for the President's press conference?

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

2

Sonnenfeldt: I will get those to you as soon as I finish one other thing. It seems to me that we are now on a good wicket. The issues have been raised, there is no doubt in the Europeans minds where we stand. Now it is up to them.

Secretary: That is what I told Von Staden. We have to have some idea of where they are going now, a timetable and if it is acceptable, then we will do it. But there will be no horsing around with the consultative paragraph of the EC declaration. We are now demanding a really balanced document and if the EC can't produce one, the declaration is dead.

Sonnenfeldt: That will please the British. Callaghan doesn't think much of the whole exercise anyway. Shouldn't we tell the British that the declaration is dead? Are you going to see Ramsbottom tonight?

Secretary: Maybe I should call Hal.

Sonnenfeldt: Hal? Just tell Ramsbottom to inform his government.

Secretary: No, I mean Harold Wilson.

Sonnenfeldt: It was Harold when he was the opposition. Now it's Hal.

Hartman: We need to get guidance to our missions.

Secretary: I don't want to tell the British at a dinner party.

Sonnenfeldt: I will call him.

Secretary: Give him the three points that I gave Von Staden. Leave no doubt in his mind where we stand.

McCloskey: Could I review the NATO declaration a minute? I think I missed a meeting and therefore a piece in the puzzle. Do we now expect a comeback from the Europeans on the EC declaration?

Sonnenfeldt: They will say let's continue to work on the EC declaration--say that a compromise can be worked out.

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

3

Springsteen: If we give guidance to our posts, we have to tie the EC and the NATO declarations together so they will understand the relationship between the two.

Secretary: There are three possibilities for the declarations. First, we can finish both but that will mean that the EC text is completely recast, that there is more balance and there is no double talk on the consultations issue. We cannot make a judgment on the NATO declaration until we see if the EC document is killed. If it is, then we can go ahead with the NATO declaration alone, provided it is balanced and there is no unilateral US defense guarantee.

Sonnenfeldt: Art will be coming up with a paper tomorrow with some alternative language for the NATO declaration.

Secretary: There is a cable in from Volpe where Moro weeped all over his shoulder and Volpe commiserated with him. Art, I have a draft cable here.

Sonnenfeldt: From whom?

Secretary: From Sisco, but it is not accurate. All of you were gone and I didn't know who to work with. Anyway, I want Volpe to go back to Moro, tell him he has reported his conversation, and then give Moro our position. I want our embassies to understand that they are to stop holding hands with the Europeans, that this is a damned serious process, that we are winning--that in fact we have won because the Europeans have no guts for a real fight. In fact, when I consider how much they screamed when we asked for cooperation and how quiet they are when we are kicking them around, it really makes me wonder. But you can bet our embassies are commiserating with them, telling them the President is under great strain, telling them I am exhausted. I want that to stop.

Hartman: Our posts need guidance.

Sonnenfeldt: Why don't we give them the text of our backgrounder in London. It is the most authoritative policy statement we have.

Secretary: Did you give a backgrounder?

Sonnenfeldt: Yes.

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

Secretary: With whom?

Sonnenfeldt: The British press.

Secretary: It must have done a lot of good.

Sonnenfeldt: But the British press wasn't that great.

Secretary: Now that the President has made a decision, we must hold our course. We should rap Volpe on the knuckles-- he is not a Foreign Service Officer so that should be easy. And Hillenbrand should be brought into line too. Do all the posts have the text of the reply to the Brandt letter?

Sonnenfeldt: Yes. And the Von Staden memcon has gone to each post.

Secretary: George, what do you think about next steps?

Springsteen: I agree that our posts need guidance but I think you have to say something about both the EC and the NATO declarations.

Secretary: They will get comprehensive guidance which will tell them that an EC declaration will require a total recasting of that document and that if we don't get a declaration with the Community, then we have to recast the NATO declaration, including strengthening the language on the political and economic elements. If we can't get that then we will kill both.

Sonnenfeldt: I think there is going to be some confusion on the part of the Europeans and our posts. In the letter to Brandt we said we were going to hold the EC declaration in abeyance until experience showed that it was worthwhile to continue. We said we were going to let the relationship mature for a while but now we are holding open the possibility of recasting the EC declaration if the Europeans will come across. The Europeans are therefore interpreting the President's letter to Brandt in a more open-ended way than we originally envisaged.

Secretary: That is totally incorrect. The Europeans are purposely misinterpreting the President's letter to be open-ended. But I don't want our embassies to crawl in making excuses. This is not to be discussed with host governments.

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

5

Sonnenfeldt: But the Germans will give their partners both the text of the letter to Brandt and the substance of your Saturday conversation with Von Staden.

Secretary: That is fine with me. But if we refuse to consider an EC declaration and proceed with the NATO document, we will be accused of an attempt to blow up the Common Market.

Sonnenfeldt: So we demand that the EC declaration is more balanced, and has a commitment to real consultations. It will of course take time to negotiate those elements, if we can get them at all.

Secretary: Let it take time. I want them to think about what they are going to do. I want to avoid being the demandor again. If we veto the EC declaration out of hand we will be right back to a single Atlantic Charter. No, on reflection, we can either let both of them lapse; we can proceed with both of them, assuming that the EC declaration is more balanced and includes language on consultation; but if the Europeans don't want that, we will accept a NATO document, but with more political content. But the choice will be theirs not ours. And that decision will also cause dissension in their ranks.

Bill, what do you think?

Hyland: I agree. We should give them the choice.

Secretary: Get that guidance out to the posts. If there has been a slight inconsistency, I will square it with the President. So, we either put both in abeyance, allow the situation to mature; we complete both, saying the NATO document is generally satisfactory but the EC declaration will have to be substantially revised; if they want to stall on the EC declaration, then we can proceed with NATO, provided it's adequate.

McCloskey: What kind of message do we send to our embassies? The Germans will be talking to the rest of the Community and then our embassies are going to be asked questions.

Secretary: I want to get it into the system so that our God damned embassies understand that we are deadly

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

serious about this and they are not running a psychiatric social service for distraught Europeans.

Hartman: We'll get the instruction out.

Secretary: It is our only tenable position. We don't want to be accused of killing the EC; we want to avoid Rumsfeld's 14-1 situation; we don't want to be accused of going back to our original Atlantic Charter idea, although it may come to that. And these tactics will cause mischief among the Europeans.

Springsteen: Will this guidance tell them to go in and explain our position?

Secretary: They can explain it, but only if asked. They are not to volunteer it.

Sonnenfeldt: Brandt owes us a letter.

Springsteen: Brandt will send the President's letter all over Europe. I think we should head them off at the pass and go in and explain our position.

Secretary: So you think we should go in.

Springsteen: That is my instinct.

Secretary: What is your view Larry?

Eagleburger: I think if we go in it will look like a campaign. They won't all sing the same tune. There will be different lines of approach. If we do it at all, Art should do it here.

Hartman: I could talk to them one at a time.

Secretary: Let's wait until we see what the President says tomorrow night.

Hyland: Is he speaking in the Astrodome?

Secretary: Now that the embargo is lifted it will be in Rice Stadium.

Sonnenfeldt: I don't think we should run in all over Europe. We can make sure the Germans understand this and then volunteer our views to the rest if asked.

Secretary: Alright. We will make it on a background basis only. We will see what the President says tomorrow night. I will have a press conference on Thursday and can provide further explanation but make sure our missions understand what our position is.

Hyland: I still think we should give some thought on how we will respond if the Europeans suggest compromise.

Hartman: I am seeing Von Staden this afternoon.

Secretary: Why?

Hartman: Because he asked to see me.

Secretary: Go over it with him again. Make sure he understands.

Hartman: I hope we can keep the economics out of all this. It just confuses the issue.

Secretary: I agree with you.

Lord: And the Japanese--we tell them this is all being sorted out?

Hartman: The Japanese are in a holding pattern.

Sonnenfeldt: And we postpone the Spanish declaration?

Secretary: Have we heard from the Spanish?

McCloskey: Not yet.

Secretary: Art, can you get me a telegram that suggests I see Thorn on the 11th or 12th of April?

Hyland: The other seven in the Community will try to get the French and Irish to agree to a compromise.

Hartman: You will have to convince Fitzgerald.

Secretary: I would like to see Fitzgerald. I like him but he is nuts.



Sonnenfeldt: Did they deliver the shamrock?

Secretary: What shamrock?

Sonnenfeldt: They always deliver a shamrock to the Secretary of State if he isn't Jewish.

Hartman: He is one of their greatest scholars.

Secretary: What is his field?

Hartman: I am not sure but he is coming here to get two degrees.

Secretary: I just don't understand what Jobert is talking about when he says I treated him so badly. Did you see the assertion that during our conversation here, after I had brutalized him, it took five minutes for him to compose himself and then the conversation resumed?

Sonnenfeldt: He gave that same story to a French journalist some time ago and said all you talked about was the theater in New York.

McCloskey: Scottie Reston said much the same to me on the phone last week.

Secretary: Jobert is totally out of his mind. Nothing remotely like that happened.

McCloskey: You heard the story that if Jobert died you would ask what his motives were.

Secretary: That of course comes from Metternich's supposed remark to Tallyrand at the Congress of Vienna when one of their colleagues dropped dead. Metternich said to Tallyrand, I wonder what his motives were. But I am not mesmerized with Jobert. The problem is that he is infatuated with publicity. But nothing like what he says happened really occurred.

Sonnenfeldt: He also told Reston you referred to France as a provincial country and said the President did the same.

Secretary: I think the guy may be going crackers.

Hyland: You remember the story last year in Newsweek. He sent his guy around to spread lies and when confronted he said he had never heard about it.

Secretary: And at Iceland after they had repudiated their concurrence in the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting, I said to Jobert, but your President agreed, and Jobert said, you didn't listen to his intonation.

Hartman: He is building up his own reputation for domestic political reasons.

Secretary: He also spent 15 minutes with Reston on how we were pushing France around and accusing it of blocking the Spaniards. Have we ever mentioned that to Jobert?

Hartman: Our general line is that we want Spain into Europe, but we aren't pushing it with anyone.

Sonnenfeldt: We have always thought the French were on our side on that question.

Secretary: His comment is totally insane. And our encounter at the French Embassy in Washington only lasted about 20 minutes. I told him I didn't like his remarks in Damascus and he said he needed to be theatrical to look good. I proposed a joint effort at the energy conference and he refused. I asked why and he said because that would mean US leadership of Europe. I said that would mean a showdown and he said that is what Pompidou wants; that he was trying to soften his instructions, but that Pompidou wanted a showdown. That is the essence of our conversation. There was no yelling. And remember we saw some of his stuff while he was here.

Hyland: We will be faced with an EC proposal within a couple of weeks.

Secretary: If they give us a proposal we will table our own draft. We will give them the choice of whether or not to accept our language and if not, we strengthen the NATO declaration.

Hartman: We can't leave the NATO declaration entirely in the EC's hands though. We will have to talk to Luns.

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

10

Secretary: Rumsfeld can tell Luns that what happens in NATO depends on what happens with the EC but he doesn't have to tell Luns that tomorrow; he can delay it a little while. But it would be a mistake to push NATO as our preferred option. Art, can you work on an EC draft, not too outrageous.

Sonnenfeldt: I expect we will hear from the EC before their April meeting.

Hartman: All this will be coming up in the Callaghan-Scheel talks in Bonn next week.

Secretary: I will be seeing Callaghan on the way back from Moscow.

Hartman: We will make our position clear to our embassies.

C:RDBlackwill:jgb

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY