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1973/11/27



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Authority NND 989505

By WDP NARA Date 5/31/01

REPRODUCED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 29, 1973

Secretary's Staff Meeting, November 27, 1973

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The Secretary decided:

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1. That on the question of future alternatives for security assistance, he wants to do what he thinks is right and defend that. (Said in the context of general discussion regarding strategy with the Congress. Consensus seemed to be that a detailed country-by-country analysis of security assistance will be prepared to form the basis for the Secretary taking a position on what is the right way to go about handling security assistance. That Mr. Donaldson should follow this up.)

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2. That (in discussion MBFR) we are stopping the compulsory reassuring of the Europeans on a nuclear guarantee. More specifically with regard to the questions raised by Dr. Ikle regarding the ceiling on nuclear weapons and the handling of the second stage of discussions, his instinct is that we not introduce any of these ideas but that we have a verification panel meeting soon and that we form a position and very early after that reassemble.

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3. That on the question of national liberation movements attending conferences (raised by Mr. Aldrich in the context of the conference on the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the conduct of warfare), we cannot accept such attendance at non-UN conferences; that this was the sort of thing he was prepared to raise the next day with the Norwegian Foreign Minister.


Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

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SECRETSECRETARY'S STAFF MEETINGTUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1973, 3:35 P.M.PRESENT

The Secretary of State, HENRY A. KISSINGER

KENNETH RUSH
WILLIAM J. PORTER
CURTIS W. TARR
FRED C. IKLE
SEYMOUR WEISS
GEORGE S. SPRINGSTEEN
MARSHALL WRIGHT
WILLIAM H. DONALDSON
GEORGE C. DENNEY, JR.
CARLYLE E. MAW
GEORGE H. ALDRICH
WINSTON LORD
GEORGE S. VEST
THOMAS PICKERING

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P R O C E E D I N G S

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are going to have these meetings hopefully twice a week -- while I am here -- which perhaps won't be too taxing on you all -- to go over these issues, the issues that are relevant to your agencies, or to your bureaus. What I want from the functional bureaus is some analysis, so that we can force the geographic bureaus which are concentrating primarily on the day-to-day issues to do a little bit more analytical work.

I understand, Sy, you have done some work and you have something on security assistance.

MR. WEISS: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What I would like each of the bureaus to do is to prepare something that is important enough to discuss for each meeting and not bring all the cats and dogs in here, as is happening too much in the other meetings, where, as I have said to somebody else, I can pass on the balance of power for the year 2000 and the use of lefthanded screws here. I would like something relevant to decisions that I have got to make.

Okay, Sy.

MR. WEISS: Well, I think this first one falls into that category. I don't want to overstate what we have done,

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but what we have tried to do is identify an issue which you yourself recognized in your testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee as one that you would have to face, and therefore I think it is important that we begin to get your feel for the direction in which you think you would like to go on security assistance programs.

All I have tried to do in this paper is to suggest two extremes on the spectrum without in any way suggesting that these are the only two alternatives or necessarily the best ones. But essentially they are typified by, on the one hand, an attempt to get continuing large grant appropriation for security assistance, designed to whatever it is we determine is required for U.S. policy purposes -- recognizing that that would somewhat fly in the face of the continuing pressures that we have had over the past several years for reduced programs. The alternative, which is suggested here, is a gradual phasing down and eventual phasing out of various grant programs as the countries are better able to handle it themselves -- but essentially in the shorter rather than the longer term moving towards larger foreign military sales on the assumption that we can in fact get that.

The advantage of the first approach, if we could get it, is that it would obviously give you and the President more flexibility to meet requirements. On the

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other hand, its primary disadvantage is that it would take a great deal of your personal time, lobbying with the Hill, to sell them on an approach that I think Senator Fulbright and others would have grave doubts about.

The principal advantage of the second approach is obviously the converse. That is to say, it would perhaps be more acceptable to the Hill and may even give you a longer term basis at a lower level of grant assistance, and therefore make planning with our allies easier, even though they will be less happy to receive lesser levels of aid.

On the other hand, it obviously is going to give you much less flexibility for meeting those needs.

Now, what we simply propose as a procedural arrangement -- that is, that we sit down with Bill and with Marshall Wright and begin to identify in greater detail what these look like. But I think the essential point of this paper is to see whether you have some initial reaction as to the direction you would like to begin to see us plan.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I understand it, the choice you are proposing is do we want high levels, do we want discriminating levels. Is that the question that you are putting here?

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MR. WEISS: Well, no, that is a little oversimplistic, because it is the question of do you want to try for high levels, even if that means a considerable drain on both your time and maybe your political capital with the Hill, as contrasted to being prepared to accept lower levels which may conversely require less of you but which will give you less, obviously, if that is what we end up with.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But I would hate to make my personal energy the determination of national policy. I would like to know what the right thing to do is. I mean what is it we are trying to achieve with security assistance, and what are the levels that are indicated. I would like to relate what we are trying to do to some objective. Then I can make a judgment. As it is now, I find it very hard --

MR. WEISS: No -- that is right. And we are not asking you therefore to make that judgment now. As a matter of fact, what we are suggesting is --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will spend the amount of time that is needed to get a reasonable program. But what I need to know is what the program is. And above all, I need to know what it is we are trying to accomplish.

MR. WEISS: Right. And that is what we propose on page 7. The only way you can do this obviously is on

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a country-by-country basis, so that you could see what the objectives are in relation to the country and in relation to alternative levels of aid. That is what we in effect propose we do with Bill and with Marshall and lay before you.

I thought nevertheless that there was some value in at least having some consideration of your own instinctive reactions.

MR. TARR: Mr. Secretary, may I make some comments here, because I think I could be helpful to you.

You will recall in one of our meetings I talked with you about our security assistance budget for FY '75. You asked me to go ahead and put together a paper which unfortunately came to your office when you were gone, and so Ken signed it out and we sent it over to OMB, and they are already acting on the figures we sent over.

Now, as the paper --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought it fell under the three-hour rule, that anything on my desk for three hours Cambell sends on.

MR. TARR: I'm sorry -- I am not aware of that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They have got some rule that by osmosis it gets moved.

MR. TARR: But I think that the important thing

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to remember is that OMB is acting on the paper that we already have sent over. And the thing about that paper is that those levels are somewhat higher than we asked for this year, principally because --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I saw it yesterday. I mean I saw the paper that OMB is moving to the President, in my capacity as Assistant. And I was interested and not displeased that the State Department figures were higher than those of anyone else in almost every category.

MR. TARR: Well, the reason that we made those figures higher was because there are too many of these programs that we are just not clairvoyant enough to look at -- and when Ken and I talked about these things -- for instance, in Cambodia, we asked for \$500 million or something like that in Cambodia, because we don't know what is going to happen. Now, if you come to a situation where you say, "Well, you know, we are a lot better off in Cambodia than we thought; we don't have to ask for that much money" -- but at least at this part of the process we have to put our oar in for what we think is the worst eventuality that will befall us. We asked for half-a-billion dollars for sales credits for Israel. Now, we don't know where we are going to come out with respect to sales for Israel.

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But the one thing that I think I have learned on the Hill is that the people who want you to take a discriminating look at the program want you to get rid of it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.

MR. TARR: And what we tried to do this year -- we tried to bid for some of the people who might be swayed in the middle by knocking out some of our programs with the hope that we would mobilize more support. I really don't think that we mobilized any support. I think that the response of the Fulbright group was to come back with a program that was about one-half of what we finally had gotten out of the conference committee.

Now, if we really want to try to please people like Frank Church and Bill Fulbright, then what we really have to do is cut our hands in a way so you wonder what the utility value of the program is.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know. It would be interesting to see how hard Fulbright will tackle us now that we have got a somewhat different relationship with him. He will maintain his position. But whether he will fight as hard as he did previously -- you know, it is going to be a good test. But I think my position on the hill

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depends on the fact that I don't start negotiations -- that I stand for what is right, for what I think is right, and I defend the thing on its merits.

Now, I have gone through this budgetary process every year at the White House, and every year it degenerates into a hagggle, first between the services -- that is, the Defense budget -- and then between OMB, State, Defense, and then the Congress. And after six months of this, nobody knows any more what he is trying to accomplish, and he is grabbing for a few million dollars here or there.

I think we ought to have a clearly articulated strategy. I think the contribution we can make to the Defense budget, Sy, is for us to try to relate their expenditures to some objective, which none of them are doing right now.

I think Schlesinger is going to be extremely sympathetic to this.

MR. WEISS: I am myself. Let me say -- I have not been involved in this process in recent years. I was in the past. And I can say that, from the past, that attempt was made. And my impression is that you have a Congress, at least very large segments of it, that are simply unpersuaded by the various arguments that have been made as to why these objectives are in the U.S. interest, or how

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the program --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I am going to allocate my time, I am just going to do what I think is right and defend that. And then let the Congress decide that it is not. But if I start adjusting myself to what will persuade Frank Church, I am playing his game. That is what he knows how to do. If I maintain the reputation that I let the chips fall where they may, then I can afford to take on Frank Church. I don't know whether they are all that eager to take me on right now.

MR. WEISS: You understand I was not recommending --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, no, you were not. So can we go over that security assistance. Well, it is gone already.

MR. TARR: We have to prepare, which we are in the process of doing, a detailed --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who represents us on this committee?

MR. WEISS: I think it will be Bill.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Bill, why don't you use your pressures in that direction? Why don't we in this group discuss it somewhat.

I have got to build some analysis into the Department

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so I don't get overwhelmed by the day-to-day stuff of whether you move rice by ship or by air to Phnom Penh.

MR. WEISS: In that connection, I think we should look at this over a few years and not just for '75, so you can articulate what you hope to accomplish over what period of time you think is a sensible one.

MR. PORTER: It is like any other kind of assistance. You have to have enough to give you flexibility in meeting foreign aid problems of a military character. And you have to know how much that is.

MR. RUSH: You have to know country by country.

MR. PORTER: The discriminators are those who want to cut it down and out, as Curtis said. But the amount you get is tied to the degree of flexibility to meet situations.

MR. RUSH: Bill should get up to date on what has been done, where we stand, and then look at it.

MR. PORTER: If it is below a certain level, everything gets smashed up, because everybody is dissatisfied, including our clients.

MR. WRIGHT: One thing we have to bear in mind to come up with any kind of strategy in security assistance is that we probably have the last year of a bill with both economic assistance and security assistance in it.

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I don't know this, but I believe it strongly enough to put money on it. That is how they got off the three bills they had in Congress this year. And next year the Foreign Affairs Committee will in all likelihood stand still for separate bills in the Senate and do the same thing in the House. So there will be a separate economic bill and a separate security assistance bill.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Will that hurt us?

MR. WRIGHT: You pay your money and you take your choice. This has been a question people have been knocking about for three years. Nobody really knows the answer. I think it will help us on security assistance and probably hurt us on economic.

MR. RUSH: I think it may hurt you all the way, because as of now you will get for security assistance help from the economic group and from the economic group you get help from the security assistance. So when you separate the bill, each stands on its own and you don't get the combined effect.

MR. TARR: It will depend on the week they vote.

MR. WRIGHT: There are a number of people up there who vote against the entire bill, although they are very much for the security assistance, because they hate throwing

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money down a foreign rat hole, which is what economic assistance is to them. There are conversely a number of people who do exactly the opposite. A number of liberals are so opposed to the whole idea of security assistance that they will vote against the whole bill, including the economic aid bill. There is a measurable vote this way in both houses, on both sides.

MR. RUSH: Oh, no. I think the logrolling you get from having the two together gets you more votes than you would get individually.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Fred. I think we have covered this one.

MR. WEISS: One more point. I just wanted to suggest that although I had not mentioned it, I think it would be a good idea if we could get Win to assist in this, too, particularly if you want to look at forward objectives, or somebody from his staff, to work with Bill and Marshall and myself.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Fred.

MR. DENNEY: I would like to throw out the idea of a much more radical approach altogether. It seems to me this discussion and the paper has been more or less in a conventional context of our aid program in a

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normal world. But if you took the point of view that the great uncertainties and the dangers in the Middle East crisis are such that the oil squeeze could continue on Europe, on ourselves, and things could get very dangerous and perilous for everybody, that would suggest you could argue to the Congress that we need a much more flexible and open-ended approach. And in these perilous times of uncertainties, we really need much larger levels, with the idea that it is understood that we might need less, but we might need all of it. And just sort of open it up completely, based on the unknowns, if things go bad.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what does that mean concretely?

MR. DENNEY: I think it means either that you go up with a considerably larger program and you say that the uncertainties are such that you just cannot fill in the boxes here properly, but the dangers could be such that we would have different countries on the list for aid, and all sorts of radical things.

MR. PORTER: They will be at you on a blank check approach.

MR. RUSH: That is what we have been criticized for

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doing all through the years.

MR. PORTER: That would be nice, George. But that is a pretty tough one to get with some of that liberal element up there. I should say the anti-military assistance element. Anything that smacks of a blank check, even though you can point to recent crises, where it would have been advantageous to have had the funds and everything for reaction purposes, they are very reluctant to do anything like that, going into the future.

MR. RUSH: We are in the middle of that on the \$2.2 billion right now.

MR. PORTER: That is right. "What do you want money for the future for?"

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Fred, you have some issues on MBFR.

MR. IKLE: Yes. The question here is, briefly, how fast we should be moving in MBFR, whether we should be doing anything more before the Christmas recess, now that the two proposals have been tabled. The nuclear option will be raised by the UK and FRG and we will have bilateral discussions here.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Here?

MR. IKLE: Probably here. We have our view on

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the nuclear option.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which is what?

MR. IKLE: Roughly 20 percent reduction in F-4's
and --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The one thing we are stopping
is the compulsive reassuring of the Europeans. They cannot
request us to reassure them three times a week on the
validity of our nuclear guarantee. I mean I am serious.
We simply refuse to answer that.

MR. WEISS: That is not what this --

--SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know what this option is.
But it will work around to it.

MR. IKLE: The British question, which has been
given to us, raises a particular question -- the position we
would take in the second stage regarding nuclear weapons.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't followed those
cables. George, will you put me on the distribution list
of your cables. The Press Officer gets everything.

MR. IKLE: We have to prepare our position we
will take here in this discussion, which might take place --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What exactly is the nuclear
problem? I know what the planning paper was.

MR. IKLE: The problem with the allies is really

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answering their questions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What have we proposed -- the common ceiling.

MR. IKLE: In Vienna -- common ceiling, yes. We have not yet mentioned in Vienna anything about the nuclear reductions on our side. The Russians of course have raised questions about nuclear reductions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So the question is whether we are now prepared to introduce --

MR. IKLE: Introduce that in Vienna, before the recess or after; and secondly, how we want to discuss it with our allies, when they want to see us about it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They were given that, weren't they, when we discussed it at NATO.

MR. IKLE: Right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So the question is tactically when do we introduce it.

MR. IKLE: When do we introduce it and what further we say to our allies about how to handle Soviet pressures for nuclear reductions in the second stage.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Beyond the twenty percent we are proposing for the first stage?

MR. IKLE: The nuclear element that we discussed

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with our allies in Brussels is connected with the tank matter, which would be in the first stage in our proposal.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And then the question is what do we propose in the second stage.

MR. IKLE: That is the British question -- if indeed the negotiations move in the direction of this first stage and second stage.

MR. WEISS: Can I comment briefly on this in that respect. There really is a further question here, and that is when precisely in response to what Soviet initiative, or what point in the negotiations do you want to toss this in. As you know, what we have always described as the sweetener, i.e., to presumably induce the Soviets to accept an asymmetrical numerical reduction which favored us -- now, our own feeling --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I forget what the nuclear option is.

MR. WEISS: A thousand warheads, fifty-four --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. WEISS: And our sort of feeling is that this is just very early on in the negotiations. You know, at some point it will be necessary to do that. But I think myself that if you did it this early, you would be sort of frittering away some leverage.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is your view?

MR. IKLE: The broader judgment is that by holding out to spring and summer we improve the outlook for an agreement of the kind we like.

MR. RUSH: If we in essence agree on what we will do in the second stage before we agree on the first stage -- and we have only one stage -- we have a timing problem.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is the British question -- what we will do with nuclear weapons in the second stage?

MR. IKLE: That is one of the questions -- how it might relate to FBS, whether it would impose a ceiling on nuclear weapons.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course it imposes a ceiling on nuclear weapons.

MR. IKLES: Right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is an idiotic question. If you reduce your weapons by twenty percent, you obviously reduce it to a ceiling. But why do we have to commit ourselves now?

MR. IKLE: We do not. The question is whether we should or not.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have two questions. One

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is when to introduce the nuclear part of it. And I am clear that we shouldn't do it before the NATO meeting. We are going to have trouble enough there as it is. The next question is what do we answer to the Europeans. And I am trying to understand the purport of their questions. Why should we be in a position to answer now what the second stage of our reductions would be on nuclear weapons before we have even formulated an overall package for the second stage. Can't we answer that this cannot be --

MR. WEISS: I think we are unintentionally slightly misleading you because only part of the British questions -- and we have a short cable from them here -- direct themselves to the second stage. Some of them direct themselves to the present. For example, just to take one here that they raise. "The relationship of nuclear reductions in MBFR to FBS and SALT. We wonder whether the Russians will accept that for technical reasons that nuclear systems in the NATO guidelines area cannot be regarded as FBS. In any case, by indicating that they intend to raise the question of F-4s, they have already given us notice that we will have to discuss dual capable aircraft, including the F-4s whose range enables them to strike the Soviet Union on a one-way mission." They are simply raising a complexity

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which we ourselves have not yet totally grappled with and thought through, and they are simply saying we ought to air this more and try to come to grips with it. So it is not all second stage from their point of view.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What the purpose of this question is, is to get us to put all of the nuclear discussions into the MBFR and therefore not commit ourselves not to raise it as part of the FBS.

MR. WEISS: Whatever their motives are, ours would be not to get hit on this twice by the Russians, once in SALT under FBS --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is clear.

MR. WEISS: That is why we need to have some discussion.

MR. IKLE: First we want to have our own position that we want to take with the British.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are you going to share your position with others? Are we going to get a clue of what our position is?

MR. IKLE: We are putting it into the back-stopping committee discussions, and have other agencies come in and have a review.

A related question is whether we want to say anything

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about a second stage fairly soon or want to wait until January when we discuss the linkage between the first and the second stage.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When is the recess?

MR. IKLE: Probably mid-December.

MR. WEISS: Here again, we would caution that if you get into the second stage you are going to do a number of things, including deflecting attention from the first stage, which is after all the one that we are primarily interested in, because we are trying to get those forces out. Moreover, we are sort of using the second stage and holding it open in order to tell the allies whenever they raise a question that we find we don't really want to handle now -- "Well, that is something we can talk about in the second stage." If we begin to get too specific and focus on that now, you have a real problem. For example, it brings up the question of indigenous force reduction versus U.S. force reduction. As you know, you still have a problem within the Alliance with the British saying "We prefer not to have indigenous" which is the position that we ourselves have essentially adhered to, the Germans and others saying they prefer to have some indigenous in.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But the Germans

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say in order to get a handle on the pressures in their country for unilateral --

MR. WEISS: I understand that very well. We have of course agreed that in the second stage there would be some indigenous. But now the question comes -- do you want at this time to be overly specific on the second stage, when you begin to --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Fred, what is your view?

MR. IKLE: It really amounts to making a forecast when we can get the best outcome on MBFR -- either early next spring or later during the coming year -- as to the speed with which you want to proceed.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is your view about the second stage?

MR. IKLE: The second stage has precisely this danger that Sy mentioned. Given the Soviet pressure for German reductions, they will be exploited for that. And the question is can we get an agreement on U.S.-Soviet reductions alone in the first stage.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I understood it, unless there have been some refinements since I last addressed this issue -- as I understood it, we were proposing a common ceiling to be achieved in effect in two stages -- a first

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stage reduction of more or less equal percentage of U.S. and Soviet forces, into which we were willing to throw in the nuclear package, as a sweetener, because our proposal was too one-sided, in terms of numbers, and also probably in terms of -- and certainly in terms of equipment. Therefore, the second stage is inherent in our proposal already.

Now, the second issue is that as I understand Leber, the reason he wants some specificity about the second stage is not in order to accelerate reduction of German forces, but precisely to prevent a reduction of German forces, by creating an obligation for a reduction that would enable him to say that since it is internationally agreed that this can only happen by consensus, a unilateral German reduction would be a violation of their agreements. This is as Leber has explained it to me -- and he is one of the few German cabinet ministers I trust! And that is not a trivial argument. And it is an argument that actually might carry weight in Germany.

Well -- they are going to adjourn about the middle of December?

MR. IKLE: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My instinct is that we not introduce any of these ideas, but that we have a

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verification panel meeting soon, and that we form a position, and that very early after that reassemble, and we make our position clear.

My own preference for negotiating styles is to take a position very close to where you want to come out and stick with it rather than get into an endless hagggle, which confuses everybody.

Aldrich was with the negotiation when neither side moved for months.

MR. ALDRICH: Years.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It only seemed like years.

All right.

George.

MR. ALDRICH: Given the time pressures, I think all I would say is to alert you to one problem that has been illustrated in this effort to negotiate amendments to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Conduct of Warfare, which I think relates to a lot of our efforts to develop new conventions, in developing international law. And this is the propensity of a lot of countries, particularly the Afro-Asians, to use these conventions for short-term political gains, with really total disregard to the substance of the convention. We saw it in Rome in the

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aircraft hijacking negotiations, where we just ended up getting out with nothing. And recently in the Teheran Red Cross Conference I saw it again -- pressures to invite national liberation movements to participate in the diplomatic conference, which will begin in February in Geneva, on the amendments to these conventions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But do we agree to that?

MR. ALDRICH: No. In fact, what I said to the rest of the conference was if they invited them to participate, I would have to recommend to my government we not participate, and I thought a lot of other governments would feel the same way. But what this represents is a feeling on the part of developing countries that there is nothing in this law for them. They say it is the law of the developed world, and that they might as well seek to use it for their own short-term political gains. And even in some cases where there may be something in it for them for the long-run, the pressures for the short-term political gains seem to be overwhelming.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What can we do about it?

MR. ALDRICH: One of the things we can do -- this will be reflected I trust in a briefing memo for you in your talks with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, which I gather

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will take place fairly soon -- our friends in some cases, the Norwegians being the outstanding example, are leading this charge. The Egyptians, for example, with whom we had very good relations at the conference, told us they would not have raised this question of national liberation movements but the Norwegians raised it, pushed it, and made it an amendment.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But why would they do that?

MR. ALDRICH: It has great appeal, I gather, politically in Norway. At least so the present government thinks.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is the sort of thing on which we would be perfectly prepared to make representations.

MR. ALDRICH: I feel we should. I feel we probably ought to take it up in NATO.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am seeing him tomorrow.

MR. ALDRICH: I think we need to do something -- not just for this convention, but for a whole series of future conventions. If we once get these national liberation movements here at this conference, we will have them at every conference thereafter.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We can't accept that, because it also would be a precedent in every non-legal conference.

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MR. ALDRICH: They have made a little bit more of an inroad in the UN. But to have them at some non-UN function, where the task is for governments to form new conventions --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, it absolutely cannot be accepted.

MR. ALDRICH: Okay.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right.

Well, I think we are swearing in a new legal adviser. You are all invited upstairs.

(Whereupon at 4:15 p.m. the meeting was adjourned.)

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