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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**PARTICIPANTS:** Michel Jobert, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 Mr. Andronnikov, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
 President for National Security Affairs  
 Ambassador John N. Irwin, II  
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

**DATE AND TIME:** Friday, June 8, 1973  
 9:00 -- 11:15 a. m.

**PLACE:** Quai D'Orsay  
 Paris, France

Dr. Kissinger: I read all your ferocious statements, Mr. Foreign Minister.

Jobert: They are not so ferocious. You asked our Ambassador in Washington not to inform our colleagues at NATO about the Iceland meetings. I heard you informed your diplomats Saturday, and this was not favorable to us. At Luxembourg, it was very surprising that your Ambassador -- who is charming -- told Mr. Thorne that the bilateral talks would be among the four. If I was ferocious, it was because of that. I had to defend myself.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't even know who our Ambassador is in Luxembourg.

Jobert: She is a woman.

Irwin: Madame Farkas.

Dr. Kissinger: Secondly, I am always caught in this dilemma. If I tell the State Department something, they broadcast it all over the world. If I don't, they complain of being cut off.

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Jobert: I have the same problem here.

Dr. Kissinger: It is inexcusable that our Ambassador would make this as a formal statement. And that our Assistant Secretary would even find it necessary to tell the Ambassadors. There is no excuse.

Secondly, we were told that your Ambassador in Washington was briefing all the Ambassadors in Washington. We didn't ask you not to do it, but we thought after we met we could do it in a more amicable manner than before. It is somewhat unusual for an Ambassador in another country to brief all the NATO Ambassadors there. Irwin doesn't do it.

Jobert: There are some Ambassadors who talk a lot, and there are some who don't. Irwin is in the second category.

Dr. Kissinger: This procedure wasn't the reason for the delay. Why did our diplomatic posts know on Saturday? First, we didn't think there was a dispute between us. We didn't think we were doing anything contentious.

Jobert: At Luxembourg, our Ambassador didn't know anything.

Dr. Kissinger: At Reykjavik we should have discussed when we would inform our posts. In fact we told our NATO Ambassador to check with yours.

Jobert: That is the past.

Dr. Kissinger: And we didn't think it was disputed.

Jobert: Your Ambassador in Luxembourg made it seem like a French proposal to exclude others. It seemed like an effort to push us into some "concertation politique." I tried to speak in those terms, to develop a common European position. It developed into a sort of battle among the Europeans, though an amicable one. The Europeans saw it as a question of procedure.

Could I make a remark to clarify something? You are a great strategist, but you know that tactics exist too. This is the only remark I wish to make about our position.

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Dr. Kissinger: I would appreciate it.

Jobert: You gave a global strategy. It is natural for us to carefully study it and to react to it, we Europeans among ourselves. I think President Nixon and President Pompidou achieved a good talk and good comprehension between them. President Pompidou remarked a little sentence at the last Council of Ministers, that the future is promising. We said this Wednesday. Naturally, as to the ways to reach it, each should remain free.

Dr. Kissinger: Wednesday I was with my colleague Le Duc Tho.

Jobert: I was sure that your Ambassador would put that sentence before Mr. Kissinger.

There are problems among the Europeans and we need a certain space for maneuver, especially concerning the proposal of last Tuesday on consultation. Dr. Kissinger's proposal became a pretext for some Europeans to do certain things on the European plane in a certain sense. I thought it was agreed we wouldn't speed up things too much. We are not in too much of a hurry. We should go into the bottom of things. That is what we want to do on the 26th.

The Ministers said they couldn't respond right away; it had to go to the Committee first.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a bureaucratic problem. I am not interested in that.

Jobert: Today we have a bilateral consultation.

Dr. Kissinger: And amicable! And afterward we will have a multilateral one at a higher level.

Jobert: Are you going to continue your European tour?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am not seeing anyone else while I am here. I will speak to Bahr next week in Washington, and to the British next week.

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Jobert: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Incidentally, can we settle something about what we said in Reykjavik? As your interpreter will remember, I read to your President what I was going to say, and he agreed to it. Word for word, and he agreed to it. I said not one word more. That there would be bilateral consultations and then a meeting at a higher level.

Jobert: On bilateral, there was no difference between us.

Dr. Kissinger: But when I said the Deputy Foreign Ministers . . . .

Jobert: But we didn't like your Ambassador's interpretation that it would be limited to the four.

Dr. Kissinger: To the extent our Ambassadors did this they were wrong. Because your President made it clear he didn't want to give the impression of exclusivity and he didn't want to seem to speak for all Europeans.

We will correct that.

Jobert: On the question of the Deputy Foreign Minister's multilateral meeting . . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Here is where we have a difference.

Jobert: The question was discussed at Reykjavik; when it was proposed at Reykjavik, Mr. Pompidou said, "Yes . . . ." This was rather vague. We might send the Deputy Foreign Ministers. Although here, deputies means the directors of political affairs -- one man for NATO matters; a different person for economics, etc.

Dr. Kissinger: On the Deputy Foreign Ministers, it is senseless to conduct this as a legal case. When we said Deputy Foreign Ministers, your President said, "The North Atlantic Council; we could meet there." Then we said that on economic matters we could meet ad hoc. Your President said "yes." But we didn't catch an intonation.

Our design is really much simpler than what some French newspapers think. We are very concerned at the erosion of the distinction between friends and enemies. And we wanted the Year of Europe to correct this to some extent.

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Second, there is no public demand for the Year of Europe. The results of the Year of Europe will only bring us difficulties in the United States if we don't press our economic demands and if we try to keep our troops there -- both of which are our intention. Your President said keeping our troops in Europe was our necessity. This is true -- but the League of Nations was a necessity too.

We foresaw this before Watergate. We are going into an isolationist period. We could isolate you -- but it would destroy exactly what we are trying to bring about. Therefore if we can achieve our objective only as the result of a brutal struggle, it is senseless. We want to create an emotional commitment in America, not win a victory. So the manner in which we do it is important. I will be honest. Connally as Secretary of the Treasury recommended to the President that to be popular in America he should take on the Europeans. He was right.

We do it for a larger selfishness. In eight years, if Europe becomes obsessed with a sense of impotence because of isolation from us, both sides will have lost.

On NATO discussions, you will say, "Why should we raise strategic issues?"

Jobert: That is an important question.

Dr. Kissinger: We raise strategic issues because if we don't raise them, they will be imposed on us. If we raise them, we can give our own answers. I am talking about the pressures on us. We want to be able to say that "as a result of our review with the allies we came to this conclusion" -- which would be close to where we are. But we need some cooperation. If we want to take our forces out, we could let Congress do it.

Take the economic questions; we know you are concerned about the monetary problem. I tell you both the President and I are philosophically sympathetic to your position. We have moved in three years from a position in which we said there can never be a devaluation to a position close to permanent devaluation. We recognize this is highly unsettling to some of our friends. But given our system this can only be settled in a political framework. On the way to Reykjavik, there was a tremendous brawl between the economic agencies and the more politically concerned people -- who consisted of one! I can assure you, the President -- if there is a political framework -- would have a great deal of sympathy with President Pompidou's philosophy. But we

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can get control of this only in non-economic terms, so that the economic people won't dominate.

So why do we want a declaration of principles? There are two ways to interpret it: (1) it is a diabolical plot to wreck European unity, and the mere act of discussing it will do this.

Jobert: That is not our opinion, or our purpose.

Dr. Kissinger: I know. But some of your newspapers. I tell people that you and I get along. I don't know if this helps you!

And the second possibility is that we more or less mean what we say. And the second is correct. We would like this framework so we can then settle various issues in a more understanding manner, and also create an emotional basis in America.

And we would be prepared in the bilateral framework to discuss in advance what we introduce anywhere else in a multilateral framework. So you would have considerable influence on it. And we are prepared to have in these principles a strong affirmation of the European identity and personality. Because that is our conviction. So we have no intention of creating a new organizational framework.

You think you can maintain the status quo without the Year of Europe. That is where we differ.

You are in Europe, so for you every year is the Year of Europe!

Jobert: I see two explanations, (1) that you wish to divide Europe to strengthen your mastery, or that you are doing it for internal or budgetary reasons. Then I think that after your contacts with the Russians you are returning a bit toward the Europeans to reassure them a bit, to reinforce your position vis-a-vis the Soviets. I think this is not completely wrong.

Dr. Kissinger: No, you are right. But I think it reinforces everyone's position vis-a-vis the Soviets.

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Jobert: What is important, now that we have gotten these explanations, is to know where we are going from here. We should do as soon as possible, to avoid any dispute in public.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree completely.

Jobert: These journalistic aggressions aren't so bad. But there will be incidents, happenings, progress, uncertainties -- this may help your project because it will make it more important. Otherwise, it would be too simple; people would lose interest. Therefore we should maintain an appearance of a difficult dialogue.

If you want to speedup, tell me what you want finally in the long run. The importance of the bilateral conversations should be to explore in depth the content you want to introduce into your project. So that, if there is a multilateral part, these should be technical, to give it some polish, but not be a matter of confrontation.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with you on the relationship between the bilateral and multilateral talks. We don't think the multilateral should be a device for one party to impose its views on others. The bilateral should decide the issues of principle; the multilateral is to do the details, to polish it up.

Jobert: Yesterday I re-read the NATO treaty. With that treaty one can do anything. It is so vague. But it lacks breath.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it even has an article about economic and political discussion.

Jobert: I re-read it!

Dr. Kissinger: I have never read it!

Jobert: I have a copy on my desk. It is at your disposal!

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, we could do almost anything we have in mind with that. There are two drawbacks: (1) your general attitude toward NATO, and it might create the impression we are trying to force you back in the

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organization. Second, the NATO bureaucracy in Brussels; if we use that framework, they will turn it into a liturgical nightmare. Secretary General Luns asked to see me; I am having lunch with him tomorrow.

Jobert: When are you leaving Paris?

Dr. Kissinger: It depends on my Vietnamese colleagues. I will leave either Saturday or Sunday. We will today either agree on something, which we will sign tomorrow, or we will not agree, and I will leave Sunday.

If we can't put an end to the debate on multilateral versus bilateral -- if we agree in principle that as various things are finished they will be submitted to a multilateral forum, and if we and you agree that the multilateral will be used only for ratification of what we agree on . . . .

Jobert: It is best if the multilateral is reserved for polishing.

Dr. Kissinger: We agree with that.

Jobert: We had suspicions that you have a piece of paper in your pocket.

Dr. Kissinger: That is where you are wrong. I will tell you what we do have. It occurred to me you might want to come to Washington, after the Brezhnev visit, when I could give you a fuller outline of the studies we have made.

Let's first talk about the general aspect of the declaration.

We think of this in several parts. And I really don't have a paper. I want to discuss how we will produce a paper.

One part is rather general, which tries to give this breath to the Atlantic relationship which you say NATO lacks. What is the role of Europe and what is the role of the United States? In this part we would be prepared to give a strong affirmation of the European identity.

Jobert: There could be two presentations: the United States and Europe, and the United States and European countries.

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Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. But it could be a guide for the future. In that, the United States and French views wouldn't be too different.

The second part would discuss: What should the United States and Europe do jointly? It would certainly include defense. And a statement of our general economic objectives, which could help the economic negotiations in a constructive sense. Incidentally, that is the only part that concerns Japan. It was a mistake in my speech to imply that Japan had a global relationship with us.

This section could also include new problems, such as energy. We don't frankly believe that a consortium of buyers is appropriate. But a consortium of research and development is a possibility, and perhaps emergency procedures, and certain stockpiling policies should at least be studied.

In the first part, we would discuss general things that might be done together and it wouldn't be that specific.

A third part would concern external relations, and could be addressed to the condominium fears indirectly but also to the fears of a rigid structure of taking decisions in common -- which we don't believe is in our interest.

The second part could be more specific -- defense and other common matters. It may be hard to cover the political external relations in a document. Here, the bilateral discussions will be more important.

We are working on a declaration, but we are extremely reluctant to submit it as an American document. We would much rather work with you and the British and the Germans, perhaps if each of us works on a part. So each drafts a part, and when we submit it it isn't an American product. I can tell you that what our bureaucracy has produced is unspeakably bureaucratic and doesn't, as you said of your talk at Luxembourg, go to the heart of the matter.

We have done detailed studies which I haven't brought with me but you can see them if you come to America in two weeks. On agricultural policy, for instance, which shows we are not attacking the CPA. We have tried to show how our concerns can be met in a cooperative way. That is not for the declaration of principles. In the field of energy we have made some rather detailed studies.

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In fact if you are interested, I can have someone give a briefing to your Ambassador on the agricultural studies.

Jobert: Yes. I am glad you have abandoned your attack on the Agricultural policy.

Dr. Kissinger: I keep saying the same thing; as long as the Agriculture Department runs this, these attacks will continue. That is why we need a framework. If, for example, we brought about a redirection of our agricultural focus to feed grains and meat, this would be less competitive.

Jobert: The principles should not be either too vague or too precise.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly correct. One also has to avoid that it becomes an exercise like the European Security Conference where tremendous battles are fought over dependent clauses that no one understands.

Jobert: You are following what is happening at Helsinki?

Dr. Kissinger: No. But apparently Gromyko follows it, and every once in a while comes to appeal to me for help. Then I have to study the problem. I have intervened only once.

Jobert: They are agreed on July 3.

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly our attitude toward the Conference is one of great indifference, that it doesn't do too much damage. They proposed July 15. We preferred July 3. I think they decided July 3.

Jobert: Good. An example of French-American cooperation, tacit.

Dr. Kissinger: Independent of this, we are prepared to have regular consultations with you -- now that we have this contact -- to keep each other informed of our contacts with the Soviets and the Chinese.

Jobert: It will be useful.

Dr. Kissinger: I think the Soviet strategy is to create an illusion of condominium.

How do we do this? Through your Ambassador?

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Jobert: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: It would help if you and I occasionally meet; perhaps take alternate visits to Washington.

Jobert: I would like to see the papers you have.

Dr. Kissinger: Could you come between the Brezhnev visit and the Security Conference?

Jobert: Perhaps. I am at Brussels the 25th and 26th.

Dr. Kissinger: Anytime after the 26th. I know the President would be happy to see you when you come.

Jobert: That will be possible, the 27th-28th.

Dr. Kissinger: You pick a date. If the President should be in San Clemente, which is possible, would you be willing to come there?

Jobert: It is a matter of time.

Dr. Kissinger: It is only three to four hours more if you come directly over the pole. We will bring your Ambassador out there. If necessary I will come back to Washington to see you.

Jobert: The 28th and the 29th. How long will you stay at Helsinki?

Dr. Kissinger: I luckily don't have to go there. The Secretary of State goes. Shall we agree we will make an effort to keep our participation as brief as possible? We have no interest in a long drawn-out meeting.

Jobert: You are in agreement with the idea of a Commission at Geneva?

Dr. Kissinger: This is a detail I haven't studied. Would you prefer Geneva?

Jobert: It makes no difference. Provided later on we go back to Helsinki. If the others want it, we won't oppose it.

Dr. Kissinger: If our people are for Geneva, this doesn't embarrass you? Would you prefer we take a neutral position?

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Jobert: Yes. Provided later on we go back to Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: You know the Soviets want a head of State meeting.

Jobert: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: And they don't want it in Helsinki.

Jobert: Yes. They want Paris, or else Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger: On this, we will let nature take its course.

Jobert: Nordic nature.

Dr. Kissinger: We won't push it.

Irwin: Geneva is much better.

Jobert: Helsinki is more expensive.

Dr. Kissinger: Should we attempt by the time you come to America to draft something?

Jobert: Would it be better?

Dr. Kissinger: You wouldn't want to draft something about the role of Europe, both of Europe and European countries? I think it would be better.

Jobert: As the diplomats say, we will consider that proposition.

Dr. Kissinger: We will keep this totally confidential. My idea is to have each of them draft something.

Jobert: Maybe the same thing.

Dr. Kissinger: The part on Europe?

Jobert: Why not?

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Dr. Kissinger: It should be a common text.

Jobert: There is some danger in having different parts done by different countries.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don't I ask the British and the Germans to work also on this part?

Jobert: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We will try to write something on how we see the Atlantic relationship. I think you will find the British will come very close to your point of view.

Jobert: I agree. The Germans will put on too much sauce.

Dr. Kissinger: On defense, we can do something. Unless you would like to do something. On the economic . . . . Your President promised us three papers. We could take the monetary paper just as an expression of your views in this. And we would be interested in your proposal of this OPEC of agricultural countries. It meets violent opposition from our agricultural people. But we don't see a problem.

Jobert: I don't think one should insist on dealing with these questions globally; we can deal with all the problems, but not necessarily globally. I also don't think we should now introduce the dramatic element of a summit. If it is necessary, we will see later. We will start by dealing with issues precisely. If we make progress, we can see afterwards about a possible summit.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me say two things. If the European Security Conference should win up in a summit, it would be hard if the Western leaders would be unwilling to meet together. This is a philosophical problem.

Jobert: I don't think the ESC Summit is such a good idea.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not for it. We will cooperate with you to prevent it.

As for a summit between the President and European leaders, first, this was a German idea, not our idea. It is a mistake to gear all actions to it.

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We agree -- if we can agree on a document, and if it is all agreed, conceivably we could ratify at a summit. But not for a discussion of the points.

Jobert: I was asked at Luxembourg about the summit by journalists. I answered, as one said in France after the 1871 war and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, "Always think of it, but never speak of it." Then I found it was a German journalist. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: One lacuna now in our discussion is at what point we put some of our bilateral discussions before a multilateral forum -- not a summit but the Deputy Foreign Ministers or political directors. Can we decide in principle that if our bilateral discussions with all the others lead to a result that we all agree should be put into a multilateral forum, that we can then have the Deputy Foreign Ministers discuss it. Is this understanding correct? We will proceed first, bilaterally and in existing multilateral forums. When these have reached a certain point, we will then decide . . . . Can we stop the debate in principle? So we will not insist there must be one, and you will not insist there cannot be one.

Jobert: Leave the future open. Afterwards, we will see if the idea explained by you at Reykjavik will be useful.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me ask you a frank question, because it will affect both our bilateral and our multilateral discussions. What we have said now can be interpreted two ways: that you will make a serious effort, or that you are trying to absorb it in order to kill it. Because if it is the second, later on it will affect many other things and will lead to a serious loss of confidence.

Jobert: I am going to report fully on that to the President of the Republic. He will see that I told you I didn't have a crooked or tortuous mind, but a prudent one, a wary one. And if I wish to give priority to the bilateral according to my view, it is to see where we stand. And I also said I am prepared to go to Washington to see your papers. I wouldn't refuse to contribute myself to the drafting. With the understanding that each bilateral part should not take to itself a part as belonging to it. As to the part on Europe and the United States, that would be the most relevant to us.

I won't start any filibustering.

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Dr. Kissinger: You of course cannot guarantee agreement, but if you make some effort. If we get nowhere, there is no need for a multilateral meeting. If we get somewhere, there is a necessity for a multilateral meeting. But it is important to know your intention.

Another question: Your President didn't think much of a meeting of the four. What if later we had a meeting on the three?

Jobert: It is very dangerous for you and for us. Because we are nine. It would be misinterpreted. That is why we insist it be bilateral to start with.

Dr. Kissinger: Except it is extremely time-consuming.

Jobert: That is right.

Dr. Kissinger: What shall we say after this meeting?

Jobert: Just what you said a few minutes ago. We are going to stick to bilateral.

Dr. Kissinger: We will continue the bilateral talks and the multilateral talks in the existing forums. Depending on the results of these, we will then decide the utility of a multilateral meeting at the Deputy Foreign Ministers level.

Jobert: In French, "apprecisera la necessité."

Dr. Kissinger: Your press, and perhaps your briefers, will portray this as a great victory of French diplomacy. We would portray it as cooperation.

Jobert: Let me remind you of three things. At Reykjavik, President Pompidou said American troops have to stay. Yesterday I was asked in the Senate by Jacques Duclos if it was true. I said yes. He looked very satisfied!

Second, President Pompidou in Reykjavik said also that we were in perfect accord, and that that would be seen afterwards.

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Third is a phrase said in the Council of Ministers last Wednesday, that Reykjavik "opens a bright Franco-American future."

So I am not going to pay cat and mouse with you.

Dr. Kissinger: To be honest, our press . . . .

Jobert: Your presentation suits me fine.

Irwin: I agree. I think there is a danger of how the press would interpret whether there was a victory for the United States. The impression for your press is that the French don't wish to meet on a multilateral basis. If we say this is possible, it may look like an American victory.

Dr. Kissinger: "If we make progress in these, we will then decide."

Jobert: On the summit.

Dr. Kissinger: This will be decided after further progress. What we should do now is avoid the impression that you have killed the summit. Our press is so afraid that something may succeed in our policy that they have an interest in failure. Your briefer in Reykjavik, frankly, was provocative.

Jobert: Our briefer has been changed. It was his last show.

Dr. Kissinger: I will probably have a press conference here on Vietnam. I will say something, when asked, as we said. Why doesn't your briefer say the same thing?

Jobert: Yes. On the summit.

Dr. Kissinger: On the summit, I will say we agreed to end the theoretical debate on forums. We will continue the bilateral and existing multilateral discussions. Then we will decide on the desirability if there is progress. The question of a summit will be left until all these other stages . . .

Jobert: It is premature now.

Dr. Kissinger: It is premature. The question of a summit will be left open. The U.S. position has always been that a summit makes sense only if there is concrete progress.

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Jobert: And I will say, as a little joke, "Always think of it but never speak of it."

Dr. Kissinger: You can say it first.

Jobert: Or you can say it when you leave here.

Irwin: You say you will continue the multilateral in existing forums. But there won't be much progress in these this year, so we might be in fact going directly to the multilateral meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: If we agree on a declaration, it would be appropriate. There is no need to wait for the end of the monetary negotiations.

Jobert: No. When you leave, you can say it was constructive.

Dr. Kissinger: Two other bilateral things. We and the Soviet Union have tentatively agreed for the summit on some principles on SALT. If they say anything, it will be an accident. We have eliminated the clause on non-transfer of nuclear knowledge. It took several weeks. After Reykjavik, we withdrew the clause about "new agreements." Secondly, they want a clause about FBS, which we will attempt -- we will succeed -- to drop.

I am having the text sent from Washington. If you are interested, I will send it to you this afternoon.

Jobert: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I will send it. Please let me have your comments by Monday. [A draft of the SALT Principles, At Tab A, was delivered to Mr. Jobert that afternoon. His reply is at Tab B.]

On the nuclear thing discussed between the Presidents -- we don't do it on the basis of reciprocity, because it is in our interest. Some of our experts think you don't appreciate the characteristics of Soviet defenses. If you wanted, you could send quietly some of your technical experts to Washington, so our experts could explain this and how you could deal with with it. Warhead design, and some suggestions. Without changing your program.

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Jobert: It would be a careful approach.

Dr. Kissinger: You let me know. We will take no other initiative.

I have no other points. So I will say we had a constructive and useful talk.

Jobert: I will say "constructives donc utiles."

Dr. Kissinger: To go back to the Ambassador's point: We are not going to use legalistic devices to determine when things are useful. My understanding is, if we reach an understanding on the declaration, then it would be useful to go to a multilateral forum, even if GATT is not yet finished.

Jobert: Certainly. Progress from the bilateral.

Dr. Kissinger: We won't be able to take each other to court; it depends on the spirit in which we deal with each other. Can I tell them you are coming to America?

Jobert: Yes.

Irwin: There will be no reporting of this conversation.

Dr. Kissinger: From now on, whenever we discuss with other governments our discussions with you, we will discuss it with you first.

Jobert: I think this was constructive. It is not just a formula.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and since we are interested in the results and not the form, it was useful.

Jobert: We have our public opinion too; so we have to keep our guard.

Dr. Kissinger: I have consistently had the position there was no disagreement in principle between us. Frankly, our press -- even some who are not friends -- had the impression that your briefer was deliberately provocative, looking for nuances of difference.

The situation with the Vietnamese is this; we have agreed with the North Vietnam on a text.

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Jobert: But now the South!

Dr. Kissinger: Now the South found points of such complexity -- four or five points of this nature. The obstacles now are the South Vietnamese. The suicidal impulse of the Vietnamese, North and South, must never be underestimated.

Jobert: It is something oriental.

Dr. Kissinger: Usually when you have an agreement in principle, details are easy. They have a tendency to think words are a reality.

Jobert: It was a great pleasure to see you.

Dr. Kissinger: It is always a personal pleasure.

Jobert: Your spokesman [Mr. Ziegler] wanted to see me.

Dr. Kissinger: He admired you in Reykjavik, and wanted to see how you handle me. Shouldn't you speak first now?

Jobert: They will rush you, so you will have to speak first!

Kissinger: I will say that they were constructive and useful, and that I have invited you to visit the United States.

[The meeting adjourned at 11:15 and Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Jobert spoke briefly to the press in the front hall.]

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