MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet of France
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Kathleen Anne Ryan, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:
Monday, May 14, 1973
4:50 - 5:25 p.m.

PLACE:
Dr. Kissinger's Office
The White House

Kissinger: I have a number of things to discuss with you. I wanted to ask for a special favor. Again you are being visited this week by Ismail, the Egyptian advisor to Sadat. He and I have arranged, subject to the approval of your government, a secret meeting.

We will make the arrangements for the meeting if you can report this to your President and to Jobert. In principle it is subject to your approval.

Ambassador: Yes.

Kissinger: Think of me having to deal with Le Duc Tho and the Egyptians on the same day.

I will meet with him on Saturday and Sunday morning.

Ambassador: After your meetings with the North Vietnamese?

Kissinger: I am sure, if my judgement of Le Duc Tho is correct, we will be barely through the introductions.

Ambassador: We have to arrange it?

Kissinger: No, I have arranged it. All we need is your approval. We feel it is not appropriate to meet him on French soil.
Ambassador: O.K. I don't think it will be a problem.

Kissinger: Let me talk about what I plan to discuss with Jobert and then a brief summary of Moscow.

First, in principle, we want to talk about the problems started by my speech and repeated in the President's report.

Ambassador: Of course.

Kissinger: And I must say, I am disturbed by Fritz saying it was the beginning of a super Yalta.

Ambassador: It was Peyrefitte.

Sonnenfeldt: The ticker tape.

Kissinger: The ticker tape said it was Fritz.

Ambassador: It could not have been.

Kissinger: Let me explain my views with respect to the role of France and Europe; they are a matter of public record. And it doesn't make sense from someone who liked De Gaulle to return to the Kennedy period, and the same for the President. If there is a brawl between France and the United States, you must start it. We don't disagree with your views.

With respect to the global role of Europe, the comment has been taken totally out of context. If Europe wants to play a global role, we welcome it. It was discussed on the principle that if Europe wants to, we would have to discuss its nature, not the fact of it. We would like Europe to play a larger role. Whenever Britain asked us whether it should stay in someplace like Singapore or the Persian Gulf, the advice we gave was to stay. It was an advice that was never taken.

On the basic conception, we have no view or no intention to create one undifferentiated Atlantic Community in which the Europeans have to follow Washington directly. We realize that the Europeans should develop their own view. But that doesn't exclude an agreement with the United States on other matters.

What we do believe is a danger is if they say there is the danger of a super Yalta.
All of our countries' foreign policy successes have become identified with
relations with the adversary. In our own internal relationships we have not
had the same. We would like an anchor in this country and in some Euro-
pean countries that relations are important.

It is interesting to me that the criticisms by our allies of our speech are
worse than those of Moscow.

I am saying these things to you in order for you to pass them on. So that
when I speak with Jobert he will know in what frame of mind I am in.

I gave you a preview of our policy. For us to pursue it without the French
would require inconceivable intransigence on your part. Our policy is to
pursue it with the French. We welcome a strong France. We would be
prepared to listen to your ideas in the nuclear field and the need to do it on
a triangular basis.

The principle is not being challenged by us. So what I would like—if your
President would like to see me, I am at his disposal. I am not making a
formal proposal.

Ambassador: I am sure if you tell Jobert.

Kissinger: How should I do it, through you or Jobert?

Ambassador: I will tell Jobert.

Kissinger: I would like to tell him the President’s ideas.

We have no intention to repeat the experience of the early 60’s. This is our
basic approach to the problem.

We consider the economic, political and defense matters related in two ways.
The first suspicion is that we are blackmailing Europe. If we wanted to
blackmail, we would keep the economic issues separate. If we had three
years of stalemate in the trade negotiations something would happen in Congress.
And if we wanted a stalemate we would leave it to the economic agencies.
I will speak about our economic agencies. I don't know yours. This is where
special interests have the most vested interest and I believe if at the Presi-
dential meeting a larger purpose could be established then both sides could
make concessions. We look on this as a gesture of conciliation.

Most important, we don't want the consciousness of our people to continue
to be petty wrangles, in the interval of our meetings with the Chinese and
the Soviets. We want to create a commitment, not in the 60's form, but
gthat which is adequate for the future. That way we can ease many of the
fears.

That is what we have in mind. I am not asking you to comment on it. But
if the Foreign Minister and I could have a dialogue. How we can embody it
in specific measures that could be taken this year. That is our approach,
Mr. Ambassador, the primary thing I think about.

Ambassador: I can't agree more. You know that. The last case—the state-
ments of my friend, Mr. Shultz, and the impact in Europe was very awful.

Kissinger: Shultz is a fine man. If we were aiming for something in the
fall we could handle this. To create a basis a lot easier.

Another thing which I understand, we are not looking for a meeting of the
Heads of State within the context of a European Community, we want it
either on a NATO or an ad hoc basis.

Ambassador: It could be with NATO.

Kissinger: Or ad hoc.

Ambassador: With respect to the Atlantic Charter, if I understood you, what
you would like is to write not a new charter, but an agreement in principle
to help relations with Europe and the United States. Such as we have with
the Russians.

Kissinger: That is right, something more specific than that which we have with
the Russians.

Let me run over quickly...first, on the document which Hal [Sonnenfeldt]
discussed with you. We further discussed it on our trip and put in additional
safeguards with respect to third countries. For example, where is it?
[He looks for it.] I will discuss it and leave a copy with Jobert.

Ambassador: You came to an agreement?

Kissinger: Yes, if we proceed.

Ambassador: During the visit?

Kissinger: This is a good chance. Don't put this into a cable to Jobert.
We are trying to elaborate a legal basis for resisting encroachment on third countries. The observation is never bilateral between the United States, the Soviet Union and third countries. The object is to exclude war between the United States, the Soviet Union and third countries.

The other was the renunciation of force and the consultation of force. We have modified the risk of nuclear war between the United States, the Soviet Union and third countries. Thus there is no general right of intervention between third countries.

This I would like to discuss with your President and explain what we have in mind. I would be at his disposal. I would arrange my meetings with the Vietnamese at his convenience. If he wanted to see me Friday, I could meet with the Vietnamese in the afternoon. And if in the afternoon, I could arrange for earlier meetings.

The other matter we discussed was the European Security Conference. It is mostly a German-Soviet problem. The issue is the inviolability of frontiers. In the general order...this is not an issue where we have bilateral problems.

With respect to MBFR, the only thing discussed of substance was the opening of the negotiations. We agree that it should be no later than thirty days after the ending of the European Security Conference. We said it should begin by October 30. The Soviets said this was stupid because the Conference will have been finished a month before then. They said this was a moot question. I happen to believe they are wrong. We have to say the date is disagreed.

I don't think Brezhnev will break relations if we don't start the conference on October 30.

Ambassador: What I am interested in; there is a shift in your military strategy. You leave more and more the use of nuclear weapons and tactical.

Kissinger: I would like to know why you say this.

Ambassador: Now the strategy of nuclear weapons are frozen. And now according to your last document, it seems to be that you try to rely more and more on conventional weapons.

Kissinger: And the tactical weapons?

Ambassador: And tactical...
Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador: It was in your document.

Kissinger: MBFR.

Ambassador: In the use of nuclear weapons document you didn't mention if the case is about tactical or strategical.

Kissinger: All uses of force are excluded in this document. This document says war should be avoided, including nuclear war. We thought that to elaborate the categories of nuclear war would be a mistake. It says if you want to avoid nuclear war you have to avoid all war.

The Soviet's move has been to generate just the idea you have said.

We want to use this document to put a restraint on the Soviet's actions of war with respect to the third countries. And we want to have them consult us.

Ambassador: That is the most important point.

Kissinger: That is our intention, not to draw distinctions between nuclear and conventional war. We spent 1-1/2 hours with Brezhnev who wanted to take out third parties.

Thus I can not say this leaves open a nuclear possibility. It says they will act in such a manner to achieve this.

Sonnenfeldt: It enables you to use nuclear weapons if other weapons are used, which is important in NATO.

Kissinger: Yes, that is right.

How are we going to conduct this meeting with Jobert? Can I segregate the meetings into what I discuss with him in the capacity of Foreign Minister and then as Presidential advisor?

Ambassador: First he will see you alone.

Kissinger: Then we are in good shape. I don't have to worry.

Sonnenfeldt: The subject for the Presidential meetings.
Ambassador: Yes.

Kissinger: I think it would be helpful if I could explain it to your President. The other things that the Soviets were concerned about were the Middle East and China.

Ambassador: Maybe Jobert will speak to you about Cambodia.

Kissinger: I will welcome that. At least Jobert will not go out like his predecessor and say he has solved everything himself.

Ambassador: The party which will follow the President to Iceland?

Kissinger: The Secretary of State will be there. What are your views?

Ambassador: Jobert will be waiting to discuss this with you.

Kissinger: [to Sonnenfeldt] Let's get some proposals.

Do you want the Finance Ministers along?

Ambassador: I am not sure what Pompidou has in mind. For the time being I have no news of him. I know he likes very restricted meetings.

Kissinger: Our President prefers meetings with only one advisor. That would be our approach. If there are others they could meet in specific groups.

Sonnenfeldt: As done in the Azores.

Ambassador: Jobert is you and Mr. Rogers combined. This will present a problem. [said smilingly]

Kissinger: That is a problem.

Ambassador: I will speak about it with them.

Kissinger: I will discuss that also.