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**1973/04/13**

## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet  
of France  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Friday, April 13, 1973  
1:18 - 2:12 p.m.

PLACE: The Map Room

Dr. Kissinger: You came back last night? The first day is always bad.

Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet: Yes, but it was a productive trip. I saw Jobert and the President Wednesday and Jobert again.

Dr. Kissinger: Who has taken Jobert's place? Anybody?

The Ambassador: Balladur.

Dr. Kissinger: What is Juillet?

The Ambassador: Juillet is mostly for internal politics.

Dr. Kissinger: I like him very much.

The Ambassador: Jobert had an official role, but the job was only for relations with Parliament and some Senators, such as some small things at the moment of elections.

Dr. Kissinger: I am surprised that my opinion was not asked before the selection of the Cabinet, but I am delighted with his appointments. He is the best man for Pompidou's ideas to be carried out.

The Ambassador: I agree.

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Dr. Kissinger: I have a very warm feeling for the way he has always handled my meetings in Paris.

The Ambassador: I told him you were delighted.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to talk to him, but no it is much more difficult for him to travel.

The Ambassador: He has some answers to your questions.

Dr. Kissinger: Would you like lunch? It will not be of the same quality as in the French Embassy, but at least it is better here than where I am. This is the President's staff.

I was mortified with the \_\_\_\_\_ to come up. One, because we were discussing how to fix the Brezhnev visit. They want me to come to Moscow before Brezhnev visits. We had two separate dates to discuss. I was, therefore, a little more than usually upset.

The Ambassador: Regarding the date, we checked very seriously with the President. He thinks the beginning of June would be possible. The very beginning of June.

Dr. Kissinger: Like the first or the second, any specific date?

The Ambassador: No, the 31st of May is fine.

Dr. Kissinger: He could do it the 31st?

The Ambassador: But not before the 31st and 1st. Or the 4th and 5th of June is also possible.

Dr. Kissinger: I will let you know next Monday, or the end of the day. Either one is possible, but I want to check and it will be before the Brezhnev visit.

The Ambassador: He wanted the beginning of July, but your argument convinced him to do it before.

Dr. Kissinger: What location?

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The Ambassador: I don't think France or the United States is possible. Martinique or Guadelupe is not possible either. It would have to be an official visit and he doesn't like too much this time of the year, the warm climates. He proposed Iceland.

Dr. Kissinger: Good idea. Do they have enough facilities?

The Ambassador: You have been to Iceland.

Dr. Kissinger: You are going again to wind up with the only good house on the island and we will have a military officer's house.

The Ambassador: Oh no.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you remember, that is what happened in the Azores. I think that's not a bad idea, a good idea, half way between.

The Ambassador: And not too warm, a fresh climate.

Dr. Kissinger: Not too many diversions, so we have to work. I think the Icelandic government would be glad to do it. It hadn't occurred to us. Let me again say tentatively yes. I see no reason why that shouldn't work. What do you think, two days?

The Ambassador: Two or three.

Dr. Kissinger: I think so too.

The Ambassador: I told Jobert you would like to see him. Of course I will discuss with him all the problems, but you should have a meeting with Jobert before the President.

Dr. Kissinger: The President has a violent objection to meeting Foreign Ministers but we can arrange that.

The Ambassador: The press covered the meeting between Jobert and Brandt. . . .

Dr. Kissinger: The discretion of the meeting is assured. He will have talks with the Secretary of State and private meetings with me. We could go up to Camp David for the morning in order not to be disturbed.

The Ambassador: Or some place for the weekend. . . .

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Dr. Kissinger: You think he might travel to other cities in America? Whatever he wants we will arrange. And we will be delighted to receive him here. Has he any date in mind?

The Ambassador: Not for the time being. But he would like to know from you also.

Dr. Kissinger: For me between May 4 - 11 will not be possible. And of course May 1 Brandt will be here. If it is at all possible to come before May 1.

The Ambassador: Not the first.

Dr. Kissinger: But if the two Presidents meet on the 30th, when ~~we~~ will ~~be~~ come, the 15th?

The Ambassador: I am afraid we have the Saudi Arabians.... so it is impossible between the 4th and the 11th?

Dr. Kissinger: Say the 12th.

The Ambassador: And Brandt will be here the 30th and 1st?

Dr. Kissinger: No, the 1st and 2nd. Now again, for your information only, and we haven't told this to anybody. I am thinking, if I go to Moscow it will be around the 5th of May. I would prefer to see Jobert before I go.

The Ambassador: Is it possible the first of May?

Dr. Kissinger: For me, yes. I wouldn't like to do it as early as the 13th. I could stop back after Moscow. You know, everything being equal, if he could come before the 30th of April, it would be best.

Of course if this works well with you, otherwise from the 15th on. I think that would be the best solution.

The Ambassador: Before the first or after the 15th. Maybe this would be too short, between the 2nd and 5th.

Dr. Kissinger: You mean the 2nd and 5th of May? But I would have to leave the evening of the 3rd to be in Moscow on the 5th. Isn't it a little embarrassing while Schul and Brandt are still in town.

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The Ambassador: No, not really.

Dr. Kissinger: But I mean the speculation, why not wait a week. So you will let me know.

The Ambassador: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: But we want to stay in the closest touch with you.

The Ambassador: You let me know about the President, date and place.

Dr. Kissinger: I think Iceland is an excellent idea, but I am convinced you are doing it to punish Dobrynin. Now then, did you have any chance to discuss general approach?

The Ambassador: No. You were in favor of a global approach. It was a military defense problem. He agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: Should you and I have some private talks about this or should we wait until Jobert comes?

The Ambassador: You told me last night that we would have some topics. We can discuss them.

Dr. Kissinger: I will do that next week. I am assuming that now Jobert is in the Foreign Office he will not distribute the contents to the whole Foreign Office. It is embarrassing for me when one of the French comes up to one of our officials and they don't know what the French are talking about.

The Ambassador: No, Jobert said you could have a separate channel for private talks.

Dr. Kissinger: So what we discuss will only go to Jobert and the Prime Minister?

The Ambassador: Yes, only to those two.

Dr. Kissinger: Give him the impression that everything we do, we will discuss with him first.

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You are familiar with the nuclear treaty they offered us last year. They are now returning to it with great insistence. Here is the position we are taking. We will not make an agreement with them where we will not use nuclear weapons. The only thing we will discuss is something that states as an objective that ultimately nuclear weapons should be excluded. Renunciation of force and threat of force is something that is an obligation if we are to make any agreement. The text of which we will discuss with you. There is now no text. What we are trying to do... See, we all have this problem with the Soviets--to give enough to the detente-oriented people, if there are any, to keep the pressure going but not give up our substantive position. Our principle is that, to give up nuclear weapons, if renunciation of force and threat of force are conditions, then we would at least be willing to look at a draft. They now owe us an answer. We have not effectively rejected their draft, which you have seen. They have two desires; to be able to have an excuse to use nuclear weapons against China and to bring about a separation amongst the Allies. We are not willing because of China and our Allies. Our objective is to bring about a situation in which nuclear weapons would not be used, and to bring about other conditions.

Amb. K-M: These conditions are impossible.

Dr. Kissinger: Have the Soviets ever discussed this with you? This is where it now stands, and as it develops, I will keep you informed.

On the bilateral--European-American relations--our basic intention is the one I described last time. I know that even your President thinks that maybe some sort of condominium between the US and the USSR could emerge.

Amb. K-M: No, the President does not think that. Jobert, yes, it is true.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, some Europeans think this. To think this issue can even be discussed in the abstract is hopeless. If the subject develops in the abstract, our saying no won't reassure sophisticated people. How can we bring a practical situation where this becomes and looks to be untrue? If you look at the President's history and mine, it is not probable that we will downgrade Europe. But trends can occur. What we have to avoid is to get into a guerrilla type of situation between Europe and the United States in which the public considers we have endless disagreements and no common action.

We are looking for something we can do, maybe later this year, that

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could have a dramatic impact on the American public, some demonstrative effort between European relations. With Brezhnev there will be a tremendous publicity thing. We have to avoid a situation where when everyone hears about Europe it is always unpleasant news. We have to reconstruct the situation where we can get the conscious elite support in this country, and we have to use this Administration to do it. This is our general consideration, and it is to this end that we want to combine discussions of economic, political and military matters and on MBFR.

We have no intention of getting the maximum number of troops out of Europe. We need a common strategic doctrine. Reductions must not become an end in themselves. This is our general approach.

Amb. K-M: I agree that we have to show relations between the US and Europe, and I know there are many disagreements, and this is very natural. It is a world of competition. But to the public it appears there are more problems between the US and Europe than between the US and USSR.

Dr. Kissinger: It is easier to deal with European countries than European bureaucrats.

Amb. K-M: I don't think in the long run it will be useful to play.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we haven't done that. When I think of the past power of Germany... In Germany, at the back of his mind, he is trying to create a special security zone of the two Germanys and Poland. That would be a disaster for Europe and for Germany. The President and I have always liked Franco-German cooperation. We had many recommendations to isolate you on the financial front, but we refused to do it. The last crisis we had the possible option of just supporting the German mark. As a general rule we will not play among the European countries, unless as in the case of Finland, and we can be brutal. But we can avoid that.

Amb. K-M: There are a lot of possible agreements. The Foreign Service are a little late. They are in the era of George Ball.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and slow.

Amb. K-M: Some of them are in the year of '65.

Dr. Kissinger: Our Foreign Service State Department people, such as Springstein, are proteges of George Ball, as you say. As long as you and I can get in touch with each other... it is too time consuming. Let them continue what they are doing.

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Amb. K-M: A very practical problem is that of atomic energy. It is a vital problem for now and for the 20th century. We have made our own effort and are now able to produce our own nuclear energy. And we think it would be a mistake for the US to have a monopoly.

Dr. Kissinger: Diffusion?

Amb. K-M: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: You have your own separation plant?

Amb. K-M: Yes, I think it is typical. Of course nobody will contest that the US will have a major part of the market, 80% or something like that. But you have to accept a part from Europe, especially from France.

Dr. Kissinger: But what concrete way are we not accepting France?

Amb. K-M: If you try to keep a kind of monopoly... we have to discuss the matter and find an agreement. In the case of aviation industry we don't want to have more than 15%.

Dr. Kissinger: On the aviation industry, it is an inevitable consequence of free enterprise that our companies will never accept that you have even 1% of the market. All we can do in connection with that is to make sure that the government is not used to place obstacles in the way of competition and we will be respectful of that. Again in the context of an initiative of improved relations between Europe and the US, it has become a conscious high level policy objective.

In regard to nuclear energy, there are two obstacles. The first is that the government, through past experiences with the Common Market, feels that the more technology we give Europe the more they will make it difficult for us in later years. Therefore there is a reluctance to be cooperative. And the second obstacle with nuclear energy is that 9/10s of the State Department would like to throttle your whole nuclear program because they are in the year 1965, as you said.

Amb. K-M: And your proliferation?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, like Dave Packard, we have deliberately not made it a theoretical debate. We cannot win if a number of people focus on proliferation. Therefore, first, we are prepared on your nuclear weapons program to have discussions with your new Defense Minister and we are waiting for you to approach us. But we want to keep it on this channel.

Amb. K-M: Galley is a man of Pompidou, along the line of Debré.

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Dr. Kissinger: Good. As you know I liked Debre and believed in his foreign policy in the field of nuclear energy. You should bring to my attention what is bothering you. DeGaulle was basically right. The President and I have no intention of withdrawing from Europe. It is too dangerous to have one country as the repository of nuclear weapons. We would like France to be a possessor. We will not place obstacles; that is usually done by the bureaucrats for bureaucratic reasons. I think when the two Presidents meet they should agree on cooperation in a number of fields, and the problem of advanced technology will settle itself.

Amb. K-M: We have this problem of the Concorde. That means the first generation of supersonics. It is technologically a great success, but there have been great obstacles and the competition... I am sure the other supersonics will win. The Russians.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a disgrace that the other advanced nations are restraining themselves. And this talk about the environment... nonsense.

Amb. K-M: I am sure that in the next ten years there will be a super-Concorde. I am sure we will have to build something, maybe through cooperation.

Dr. Kissinger: The idea that the USSR should have a monopoly is unthinkable. I think this was not excluded in the Azores. The President saw the Concorde and he was very impressed. I don't think it is impossible at all. It would also give us a good excuse for a French, British and American effort.

Amb. K-M: Why not?

Dr. Kissinger: Very good idea. We must still have the technology of our supersonic transport.

Amb. K-M: I think it is good food for public opinion.

Dr. Kissinger: Would your government cooperate?

Amb. K-M: It is certainly possible to think about it.

Dr. Kissinger: We should make a list of the possible outcomes of the meeting. This is definitely one of the items to come out. We have never thought of doing it jointly with you.

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Amb. K-M: You know it is a personal idea.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know what our Congress would say.

Amb. K-M: How could they refuse?

Dr. Kissinger: Precisely what I was saying. A symbol of doing things together. Are the Chinese actually buying the Concorde or have they cancelled their order?

Amb. K-M: They were very interested. So can you give me a list of topics?

Dr. Kissinger: I am thinking of making a speech on April 23, not to France but to Europe, to invoke a response. What do you think?

Amb. K-M: It is a question of timing.

Dr. Kissinger: In terms of what European - American relationships should be like, not a detailed outline.

Amb. K-M: Certainly we will have to discuss monetary problems, the balance of dollars, convertibility.

Dr. Kissinger: If we had done what Rueff proposed 10 years ago, we would have been saved much agony.

Amb. K-M: Then there is the problem of the Russians, how will they pay? There is no barter system. We will have to see.

Dr. Kissinger: To have your President discuss economics with our President is not fair.

Amb. K-M: I have doubts about the competence of the experts.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree, but your President knows and studied economics.

Amb. K-M: Better than Giscard, who knows only theory.

Dr. Kissinger: What was your background in getting into the diplomatic corps?

Amb. K-M: First I was Professor of the Univeristy. I participated in the underground liberation of Paris, after I was with DeGaulle and then

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I have been called to be an advisor. And little by little I left the University. I have also been a member of the Council of State.

Dr. Kissinger: When were you Ambassador for the first time?

Amb. K-M: In '57, I was Ambassador in the Trusteeship Council to take care of African Affairs.

Dr. Kissinger: The first time I met you was at a UN dinner for Monnet.

Amb. K-M: No, it was in Brussels.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, you are right. You were the one that made sense. Is my friend Durot still there? Fine man.

Amb. K-M: Good, then you will give me an answer for place and time. And I will ask Jobert about his visit, and the same topics we will go on discussing.

Dr. Kissinger: I will give you an hour next week. I will show you to your car.

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April 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM TO HENRY A KISSINGER

FROM:

Kathleen Ryan

SUBJECT:

Checklist from your meeting with Ambassador  
Kosciusko-Morizet

There were a few points on which you wanted to be reminded:

- 1) Date and place for President Nixon's meeting with President Pompidou.
- 2) Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet wants Jobert to meet with the President, which you said you would have to arrange.
- 3) Your meeting with Jobert--Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet will let you know.
- 4) You said that a list of the possible outcomes of the meeting between the two Presidents should be made. Checklist of topics: nuclear energy, cooperation in building a supersonic transport, and monetary problems.

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