00533

1972/07/31
Discussions with Dr. Kissinger at Washington

I attach a record of my meeting with Kissinger. It took place in three instalments - two-and-a-half hours in the morning; half an hour with the President after lunch; and a further two hours with Kissinger himself until about 5 o'clock. H.M. Ambassador was present throughout.

As you will see, the record is in two parts, the first of which comprises the main discussion, while the second, which forms an annex, deals with a particular question which is regarded by Kissinger as so sensitive that knowledge of it in Washington is confined to the President and himself. He asked me with great emphasis to ensure that it would be treated with similar discretion in London.

I think that the journey to Washington was worth while. Kissinger was in top form and is clearly riding high. Although he is careful to speak in terms of "if the President is re-elected", he has not much doubt that, unless something goes very badly wrong, re-election is in the bag; and, although he talks from time to time about leaving his post thereafter, I doubt whether this is seriously in his mind. If he does go, he will not do so - to judge from one passing remark - until he has first ensured that the State Department is subjected to a really good shake-out! He seemed genuinely pleased that I had made the effort to go to Washington; and he went out of his way to give me a large part of his working day, followed by a visit to the theatre and a subsequent supper party which was almost embarrassing to somebody who was rather short of sleep! One always has to take what he says with several grains of salt; but I have little doubt that he is speaking sincerely and in earnest when he assures us - as he assured me several times - that, so far as the President and he himself are concerned, there is the maximum of basic goodwill towards the United Kingdom within the necessary limits imposed by United States interests and the realities of domestic politics.

The main points which emerged from our discussion are, I think, as follows:-
E.R.

TOP SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

(a) Kissinger remains deeply wedded to his modern version of the concept of the balance of power. He asked me to take particular pains to ensure that the proposition outlined in the annex was considered in London in this context.

(b) He remains as distrustful as ever - if not more so - of India and of Soviet intentions in the sub-continent.

(c) As regards nuclear policy I think that we made some headway, especially in so far as we established that what the President said to you at Bermuda about the continuing effectiveness of the British deterrent remains his view. Kissinger himself would like to help us with Poseidon. But he is not sure whether he can do so; and his doubts derive less from his fear of trouble in the SALT context than from his apprehension of domestic criticism if the United States Government appear to be helping one of their allies in a way which might set back the process of detente. Our exchange about Anglo-French nuclear co-operation was rather less satisfactory - mainly because Kissinger, like the President at Bermuda, does not really want to risk appearing to give us any encouragement to pursue a subject which, if it leaked, could be politically embarrassing to the President before November. But I am now quite clear in my own mind that our right course is to keep the French non-committally in play until the Election and to raise with the President immediately thereafter the extent to which he would give us authority to disclose to the French some of our United States-derived information. It was significant that Kissinger hinted that, when we reached that point, the President might prefer to deal with France via the United Kingdom rather than direct; and this encourages me to think that there may have been rather less than we feared in the recent meeting between Laird and Debre. Kissinger also fully took the point that we must get a price out of the French for whatever we give them.

(d) As regards the proposal in the annex we must clearly move quickly if we are to make some response within the next fortnight. Why this hurry? Is it because a further instalment of detente before the Election would be useful?). Kissinger allowed me to understand that, if you told the President that you thought that the proposal was too dangerous, he would reconsider it. But there is no doubt that Kissinger himself would welcome a green light in principle for the essentially "balance of power" reasons indicated at the bottom of page 12.
E.R.

TOP SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

We must now decide how to follow up this visit. The position is complicated by the fact that both Lord Cromer and Sir Denis Greenhill have gone on leave today. But I have left with Lord Cromer a draft copy of the main record; and, although I thought it wiser not to leave in Washington anything in writing about the annex, he is, of course, aware of its contents since he was present when it was discussed. He will therefore be able to put Mr. Tebbit sufficiently in the picture before he leaves Washington. I also managed to let Sir Denis Greenhill read the whole record, including the annex, before he left London. Otherwise, nobody has yet been told of what passed. Kissinger made the usual reservation that he was speaking for your ears only; but he clearly understands that what he said will have to be given a limited distribution in Whitehall. If you agree, therefore, I should like:-

(a) To circulate the main record to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence and to send an extract about CARIFTA to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, on the basis that they may have discretion to show the document to such of their most senior advisers as they judge necessary.

(b) To let the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence see the annex, on the basis that it is to have no distribution within their Departments other than to individuals whom you approve.

(c) To arrange further discussions in Washington on the following basis, which I agreed provisionally with Kissinger and Lord Cromer before I left:-

(i) As regards further exchanges about the next round of SALT, the European Security Conference, MBFRs, etc., we should select appropriate teams to visit Washington for a discussion of United States intentions in the near future. The United States will probably be ready to discuss MBFRs within ten days or a fortnight and SALT shortly thereafter; and if we can hold to this timetable, we shall have the opportunity of being slightly ahead of the rest of NATO. When our teams are ready we should make the arrangements with Kissinger personally.
E.R.

TOP SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

(ii) As regards our own nuclear programme Kissinger wishes to consider how the discussions about Poseidon might best be organised at the United States end. (I thought that his suggestion that the United States representative might be the head of the Atomic Energy Commission had a rather ominous ring about it!). I left it with him, therefore, that the Embassy will get in touch with him in about a week's time, when he has had a chance to reflect further on the problem; and we should aim to have ready by then a team of our own (small and very senior) to send across.

(iii) As regards the project in the annex I told Kissinger that we might find it rather difficult to comment in writing on so amorphous a proposition; and I asked him whether he would be prepared to receive an emissary, who would convey our views orally. He said that he would welcome this - provided, of course, that the emissary was very senior and not a mere "bureaucrat"! I have therefore made a provisional arrangement with Lord Cromer that we will tell the Embassy in about a week's time the name of the individual whom we choose; and this will be conveyed direct to Kissinger, who insisted that he must deal with this project personally at all stages. I have little doubt - and Sir Denis Greenhill entirely agrees - that our best emissary would be Sir Thomas Brimelow.

May I go ahead and make arrangements on the above basis?

31st July, 1972

Sure, I agree.
Record of Discussions with Dr. Kissinger at Washington on 28th July, 1972

The morning was devoted to a meeting at the British Embassy, followed by lunch at the Embassy, after which we moved to the White House where HM Ambassador and I were taken by Dr. Kissinger for a short interview with the President. A further discussion with Dr. Kissinger in his office in the White House occupied the rest of the afternoon.

**Morning Session 10.15-12.45**

2. I told K. at the outset that I had come to see him in accordance with his own suggestion at Bermuda in the previous December that it might be useful if we exchanged general views about the world situation from time to time. I had not come with any purpose of negotiation; nor did I regard this discussion as in any sense a "structured" occasion. It was simply an opportunity to talk over the way in which we both saw the world going. In particular, I had been reminding myself of what he had said to me at Bermuda about the balance of power as he saw it operating in the modern world. A mutual friend had asked me a few days earlier to convey a message to K. that he should not let his admiration for Metternich make him forget Talleyrand. What did he make of that?

3. K. said that he shared this view of our meeting and that he welcomed the opportunity to exchange views with us - on the understanding that what he said would be regarded as for the information primarily of the President and the Prime Minister and - on the British side - very senior advisers only. As regards the balance of power, nothing had come out of his recent journeys to Moscow and Peking to make him change his opinions in any radical way. He had found the Chinese still very apprehensive of the Soviet Union - and with good reason, since there were now about a million Soviet troops on the border and the Soviet forces were constantly improving their state of combat readiness, including the positioning of missiles on the frontier. The Chinese remained in a defensive position about 200 miles back from the border and were keeping a very sharp eye on Soviet intentions. What these were it was difficult to say. But perhaps the least improbable hypothesis
was that the Government in Moscow might be tempted to make a short sharp strike across the frontier, limited in its purpose to taking out the Chinese nuclear potential. If this was what they had in mind, they might well be ready to do it within the next two years.

4. I asked K. what the United States Government would do in that event. He said that, if the attack took the form which he had suggested, there seemed to be very little that they could do. But, if it took a more conventional form and anything in the nature of a protracted struggle between the Soviet Union and China broke out, the United States could not, and would not, stand aside.

5. He could envisage an alternative hypothesis in the sense that the Chinese, who always looked very far ahead, might react to Soviet pressure by letting the Soviet Government have their way for a time - within reasonable limits - and waiting perhaps 20 years or more before trying to reverse the situation. But he clearly regarded this as a less realistic scenario; and he was emphatic that the Chinese would not in any event be prepared to become a Soviet client like the states of Eastern Europe. He has clearly been very impressed by the treatment which he has been given on his successive visits to Peking, particularly by the methodical and unhurried way in which the Chinese transact all business. He said several times that he was very glad that the Foreign Secretary intended to visit China in the autumn. It was very important that Sir Alec Douglas-Home should not let this opportunity slip; and, if he would be in Washington beforehand, the President would welcome the opportunity to talk to him about the kind of reception which he was likely to get in Peking.

6. We passed on to Vietnam. K. is clearly satisfied with the way in which the situation is developing. He said that Moscow and Peking were being relatively moderate and helpful in their attitude to developments. Neither had tried to thwart any of the United States attempts in the last year or so to bring the war to an end; and, in particular, there had been no sign that the Soviet Government would try to trade a settlement in South East Asia against United States concessions in Europe. Partly as a result the North Vietnamese, although still holding out obstinately, were now on the defensive. They would probably launch one more attack in Military Region I during the next week or so. But the United States expected to have dealt with it within a few weeks; and they judged that thereafter it might take Hanoi at least another two dry seasons to recover
E.R.

TOP SECRET

to the extent of being able to undertake another significant military offensive. Moreover, North Vietnam was now on the defensive politically as well as militarily. As a result of the United States policy in relation to Moscow and Peking Vietnam had become largely irrelevant internationally; and this, though very irritating to Hanoi, was something which the North Vietnamese were increasingly having to accept. K. no longer believed that, if and when the United States withdrew from Vietnam, Saigon would necessarily pass under Communist control more or less immediately. This might happen in the end; but perhaps not for some time - and before then the United States would have pulled out in an honourable fashion, leaving the people of Vietnam with a genuine opportunity to choose their own form of government for themselves. The one thing they would not do would be to betray the people of South Vietnam, whom they had protected for so long, by selling them down the river at the 11th hour. They would go on pressing Hanoi to accept a reasonable settlement; and K. himself proposed to pay a further visit to Paris during the following week, when he would put forward a definite proposition for a settlement. He was fairly sure, however, that it would be rejected, as all the earlier United States offers had been. It was tragic that at any point in the last two or three years the North Vietnamese could have had peace on terms at least as favourable as they were likely to get now. But they had always refused to compromise; and the most that could be hoped for now was that the United States would be able to keep them in play in Paris until the Presidential Election in November. If they had not settled by then, the President intended to deal with them once and for all immediately after the Election.

Short of using nuclear weapons he would not be inhibited by any degree of domestic or international criticism from finally liquidating the situation as rapidly and completely as possible.

7. I asked K. how he saw the future of South East Asia in the wider sense after the Vietnamese war was over and the United States had withdrawn. The President had told the Prime Minister that the United States had no intention of pulling out of Asia and that it was very important that all the Asian countries, from Japan downwards, should be made to realise this. But how were they going to give effect to this concept in South East Asia? K. was not very precise in his reply. In particular, he does not seem to have thought very far ahead about the role which Japan may play. He regards them as not very good at conceptual thinking. And,
although he has some regard for Tanaka, he sees Japan as becoming an increasingly nationalistic Power, whom it may be difficult to contain. For the rest he is clearly thinking over the possibility of creating some sort of neutralised bloc which would embrace Indonesia, Australia and the countries of Indo-China, together with the United States itself - and the United Kingdom, if the United Kingdom were prepared to help. A bloc of this kind would clearly need to be underwritten by some form of guarantee; and on this basis it would be a valuable contribution to the stability of the region. But it would have a further advantage in that it would interpose some degree of barrier against the eastward extension of Indian influence. K. is still very critical of the Indian Government. He is resentful of the way in which Delhi has treated the United States Ambassador; and he is suspicious of what may lie behind Delhi's recent offers to Thailand and Indonesia of Treaties of Friendship modelled closely on the Treaty between India and the Soviet Union. He is wholly unrepentant about United States policy during the war between India and Pakistan; and he warned us that, when the Foreign Secretary visits Peking, he is likely to hear some very pretty plain speaking from his Chinese hosts about the middle course which the United Kingdom has tried to steer between the two countries of the sub-continent. K. himself endorses the Chinese view. The British are being unwise to favour Delhi so much. What matters now is to rearm Pakistan and to do so quickly. The United States themselves intend to move in this direction, immediately after the Presidential Election if not before. Will not the British help? If so, the way will be open through Iran.

8. This distrust of Indian intentions leads the United States to endorse our own views about the gradual emergence of a new Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean. They seem as puzzled as we are to judge how far it need be taken seriously and to decide what, if anything, they can do about it. But in so far as K. has thought the problem through, he seems to envisage that, just as we ourselves used to regard Aden and Singapore as the two clasps which held the jewel of the Indian Empire, so the Indian Ocean nowadays must be regarded as something to be contained at its eastward end by the new Asian bloc which he had mentioned earlier and at its westward end by some similar arrangement built on the Gulf, Iran and Turkey. He said that the United States intended to reinforce their naval presence in the Gulf very soon; and that this in itself might provide the nucleus for some more permanent grouping of the Powers who were interested in the area.
E.R.  

TOP SECRET  

He did not elaborate this concept. But it is clearly something which he has turned over in his mind; and he would certainly welcome further discussions with us about the whole problem of the Indian Ocean in the near future. 

9. This led on naturally to the situation in Egypt. The United States had been as surprised as ourselves by Sadat's action in expelling most of the Soviet personnel. They shared our own intelligence assessment that this expulsion was a pretty comprehensive affair, probably extending even to the independent operational units which the Soviet Government had established in Egypt. But it seemed that at least the maritime reconnaissance squadrons would remain; and this in itself was perhaps significant. 

10. This latest development had, of course, set back the United States/Soviet long-term design for a settlement of the dispute between Egypt and Israel, which the President had mentioned privately to the Prime Minister at Bermuda. In any case that design might well have foundered of itself, since when it came to the point the Soviet Government seemed to have changed their minds and had put forward as the basis of agreement proposals which would have ruled a settlement out of court since they envisaged total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories; Israel would never have accepted this. It would now be necessary to wait and see how the Soviet Government would react to the Egyptian expulsion of their forces. K. was clearly uneasy that they might suspect that this move had been promoted by the United States. It was in fact no more than coincidence that it had followed closely after a visit to Washington by the Saudi Minister of Defence; but the Soviet Government might connect the two events and jump to the wrong conclusion. It was impossible to tell at the moment what they would now do. They might in due course try to reinstate themselves in Egypt; or they might look elsewhere probably to Iraq or even perhaps to Somalia. One had also to remember that the episode might have strengthened Brezhnev's critics within the Kremlin itself and have made it more difficult for Brezhnev to revert to a policy of trying to reach a reasonable settlement with Israel. The timing had been clumsy in so far as the move might have been designed to enable the United States to bring fresh pressure to bear on Israel, since it was clearly impossible for the United States Government to do anything of this kind before the Presidential Election, i.e. for at least another three months. 

11. At this point the discussion adjourned for lunch at the Embassy. After lunch we moved to the White House and had a short interview with the President. 

-5-
12. The main points which the President wished to make were as follows:

(a) Northern Ireland. He was sure that the Prime Minister realised that during the forthcoming Presidential Election campaign the Democrats might try to make political capital out of the situation in Ulster. So far as the President himself was concerned he would try to steer clear of the whole business; and, if he was compelled to react to some extent, he hoped that we would understand and would disregard it. His view remained as it had been in Bermuda, when he had told the Prime Minister that the United States regarded Northern Ireland as Britain's business and merely wished the British Government every success in dealing with this intractable problem.

(b) Governor Reagan had returned from his visit to the United Kingdom with a report that the British Government were concerned that France and Germany might want a greater degree of participation in European nuclear policy. Was this really so? I said that I would certainly check what, if anything, had been said to Governor Reagan on this subject; but I thought that there might be some misunderstanding somewhere. As the United States Government knew, we had had some very general exchanges with the French about nuclear policy; and the French were certainly showing some signs of beginning to interest themselves more closely in the nuclear defence of Europe. But as regards the Germans there had been no recent development so far as I knew, although, as we all realised very well, there would be a problem about Germany at some stage if and when the concept of a European nuclear defence policy ever took more concrete shape.

(c) The European Security Conference. When the President raised this subject I told him that there was some concern on our part lest the preparatory discussions which the United States were promoting might merge imperceptibly into the conference itself and we might find ourselves confronting the Soviet Government in a position of substantive negotiation when we had not fully thought out what we wanted to achieve. The President replied that we need not be alarmed on this score. The United States Government themselves had never wanted the conference - it was some of the European countries, not least the United Kingdom, who had originally pressed for it. The wisest thing to do now, therefore, was to try to slow it down as far as possible; and this was what the preliminary discussions were intended to do. The United States Government would like to discuss the problem further with us in private; and perhaps something could be put in hand for this purpose in the near future.
(d) European defence. The President said that, over and above the specific points which he had mentioned, the main thing which he wished me to convey to the Prime Minister - here he spoke with great earnestness - was that the United States Government, if he remained in charge of it, were not going to go back on NATO or on their policy towards Europe in general. Without saying it in so many words, he clearly wished us to understand that we could continue to rely on a United States commitment to the defence of Europe and that he would welcome very close contact between London and Washington in this context. He said that he very much hoped to meet the Foreign Secretary in the autumn and that he would particularly welcome a further exchange of views with the Prime Minister immediately after the Presidential Election, probably in December. It was also important that we should keep in close touch as regards discussions on future international monetary co-operation. He hoped that the Ambassador would keep close to Secretary Shultz on the technical aspects of this issue; but, if and when it took on a political complexion, he should deal direct with K.

13. We then adjourned to K.'s own office. He picked up the point which the President had made about the United States commitment to the defence of Europe and, while repeating that this was meant seriously and in all honesty, he warned us that domestic opinion in the United States might eventually compel the United States Government to withdraw troops from Europe if the European countries themselves did not make a greater effort on their own behalf. He expressed considerable contempt for the haphazard organisation of NATO, instancing as one example the differing levels of reserve stocks which the member countries insisted on maintaining although they were supposed to be acting in pursuit of a common policy and an integrated strategy. Why could not the whole thing be put on a more sensible, organised and business-like basis? This was the more important in that the nuclear parity which had now been established between the United States and the Soviet Union had put a new premium on conventional defence.

14. We had to admit that this was so. But it seemed a convenient opportunity to remind K. that, both here and in a wider context, the United States could not have it both ways. They wanted a stronger and more coherent Europe; and we hoped, with their help, to create it. But they must not then complain if Europe developed policies of its own and pursued them with greater resolution and vigour than hitherto. This might be
particularly true as regards commercial negotiations. I think that K. took the point. We rubbed it in with a passing reference to the COCOM negotiations; and, although there was no time to pursue this in any detail, I told K. that we attached considerable importance to finalising the review of the COCOM list in September on the basis of the proposals which we had put forward. He made no direct reply, apart from professing to be not fully abreast of the latest developments.

15. We then turned to the question of MBFR negotiations. The United States Government clearly regard these as an inevitable item on next year's agenda - to be pursued more or less simultaneously with, but preferably separately from the Security Conference. K. showed us a copy of the programme of technical studies which are being elaborated in the White House. They examine a range of options on which no policy decision has yet been taken; but K. himself seemed to regard the most realistic hypothesis as a percentage cut in NATO forces matched by a quantitative ceiling for the forces of the Soviet bloc, calculated in such a way as to establish a broad parity. The United States will be ready to discuss the principles of the negotiations with the NATO Council by next spring; but they would welcome some private discussion with us much earlier - probably in September, when we could exchange views about MBFRs at the same time as we did so about the Security Conference.

16. We moved on to SALT II; and this seemed a convenient opportunity to put to K. our own problem about the development of our nuclear deterrent. I told him that we thought it would be able to submit to our Ministers during the autumn the basic choice between the two ways of ensuring that we retained an effective deterrent - i.e., the hardening of the Polaris missile by the Super Antelope scheme (a name which K. did not seem to be familiar) or the substitution of Poseidon for Polaris. This choice would depend on several factors - the expenditure involved; the implications of SALT I and possibly SALT II; and the United States willingness and ability to continue to give us assistance. If we were to be able to present the case rationally to Ministers in the autumn, we ought ideally to know how far the United States would be prepared to help us with each of the two courses involved; and, in particular, we ought to have checked with them, if possible, whether our own tentative estimates of the costs and other implications of opting for Poseidon were realistic. It would be very helpful, therefore, if the United States Government could agree that discussions could take place for this purpose in the very near future.
TOP SECRET

17. K. replied that there would be no difficulty about the Super Antelope programme. Our application in connection with the next stage of the development programme, which I reminded him had been forwarded to the White House by the Department of Defense in the last few days, would certainly be approved if the Department endorsed it (as they had). Nor did he foresee any real difficulty about subsequent stages of the Super Antelope programme. There was nothing in the SALT so far which need be a barrier to its completion; and, even if there were, the United States Government would see that it was circumvented somehow. Nor need any obstacle necessarily be foreseen in SALT II. I reminded K., however, that there was a different sort of difficulty if we adopted the Super Antelope solution in the sense that we should continue to rely on United States assistance as regards a weapon which they themselves would be phasing out of production. He took this point but clearly did not wish to discuss it in detail. Instead, he emphasised that what he had said so far was, of course, on the assumption that we were not talking about a MIRV-ed weapon, because the position could be different when MIRVs came into the picture, as they would with Poseidon. As regards Poseidon the United States Government remained of the view which the President had expressed to the Prime Minister in Bermuda - i.e. that they wanted the British to retain an independent nuclear capability which was credible and, therefore, effective; and they would not be lightly deterred from this policy. There was no doubt that, if they helped us to acquire a MIRV-ed weapon, the Soviet Government would shirk their heads off about the breach of the spirit of SALT. The United States Government would not let this stand in the way, if they wanted to let us have Poseidon. But they would also have to reckon with Congress and public opinion in the United States. And here “blood would be spilt”. A great deal therefore would depend on the outcome of the Presidential Election; and, if President Nixon were re-elected by a substantial majority, particularly if he also had a Republican Congress to deal with, he could afford to be more co-operative. Even so, if anything of this kind was to be done, it would best be done pretty quickly, before SALT II had got too far.
18. K. said that he would need to think about all this further; and at one point he seemed disinclined to commit himself at all until he had procured an "assessment" which he undertook to have prepared during the following week. But, when we pressed him on our timetable and on the importance from our point of view of giving greater precision to our estimate of the implications of the Poseidon option, he agreed that discussions might take place for this purpose, provided that they were confined to very few individuals and that the detestable "bureaucrats" were kept out of the picture, at least at the Washington end. (He subsequently told me that he was inclined to think that the head of the Atomic Energy Commission might be the best United States spokesman for any exchanges of the kind which we had in mind.)

19. We then had a brief exchange about possible nuclear collaboration with France. K. referred to the recent meeting between Secretary Laird and M. Debre, of which we knew already; but he allowed us to understand that this had not gone very far. As regards collaboration between France and ourselves he reminded us that, as the President had told the Prime Minister at Bermuda, there would be no United States objection to our exchanging views with the French on this subject, provided that these were not allowed to leak before the Presidential Election. When we pointed out to him that this might involve our wishing to discuss with the French technological information which we had acquired from the United States, he accepted that this would be so. But did not seem to think that this need inhibit us unduly in the initial stages, provided that the United States position was reserved; and he said at one point that, if United States approval was forthcoming, the President might in fact prefer the information in question to be transmitted to the French via the United Kingdom Government as intermediary. He also took the point that we should exact from the French some price for whatever we gave them - preferably in the form of greater French commitment to an integrated European defence policy. Little by little the French would have to be brought back to collaboration with the rest of Europe.

20. As regards the rest of SALT II we went over the ground of the principal British anxieties - "no transfer"; no "obligations"; FBSS, etc. K. was reassuring on all these points - especially perhaps the "no transfer" issue - in so far as he told us that the United States would certainly not go into the next stage of SALT with the intention of
E.R.

TOP SECRET

prejudicing the position of the Alliance on any of them, whatever might have to be conceded during the negotiations. He agreed that restricted discussions in advance between the United States and ourselves would be very valuable; and he would certainly be prepared to receive a United Kingdom team for this purpose in a few weeks' time. It seemed best to leave it at that for the moment rather than to try to pursue it in greater detail at this stage.

21. The discussion, which had been punctuated by frequent interruptions, had to be brought to an end at this point. But I managed to get in a final reference to the Caribbean, reminding K. that the President at Bermuda had asked the Prime Minister for our co-operation in ensuring political stability in the area. The Prime Minister had told the President then that one of the most helpful things which the United States themselves could do in this context would be to waive their insistence on no reverse preferences in relation to their own generalised preference scheme. As we approached the point at which CARIFTA would have to decide whether to accede to the EEC this became even more important. It would be in their interests to accede; and their accession would contribute significantly to the greater political stability in the Caribbean to which the United States Government attached so much importance. But their decision would depend largely on the no reverse preference issue. K. took the point; and, although he said that he was not familiar with the question in detail, he asked his assistant to let him have a note about it. It might be worth following this up in a week or so.
E.R.

**TOP SECRET**

ANNEX

At the end of our discussion K. said that there had been a recent development in United States relations with the Soviet Union on which the President was particularly anxious to have the Prime Minister's views. A short time ago the Soviet Government had asked the United States Government whether they would consider a Nuclear Non-Aggression Treaty between the two Powers. In its original form this had been the simple proposition that they should agree that neither of them would use nuclear weapons against the other. When the United States had pointed out the obvious objections, not least the interests of their allies, the Soviet Government had been prepared to modify the proposal in a way which would protect the interests of third parties in so far as they were existing allies of the two principals; and they would probably be content if it finally emerged as a declaration of intent rather than as a formal Treaty. These changes had led the United States Government to give rather more serious consideration to the offer. If they went forward with it, they would clearly have to consult the Alliance formally when some kind of definitive document was beginning to take shape; but as an initial step they wanted to know - wholly privately and informally - how the United Kingdom Government would react to the suggestion in principle. And if they could be told within the next fortnight they would be very grateful. As K. himself saw the proposal China would be outside its scope unless she was already an ally of the United States when the agreement was finalized; and this is an aspect of it which he is clearly thinking about very carefully. Personally, he is inclined to go along with the proposition if only for the tactical reasons that, if he can find some "bone" to give the Soviet dog, he can thereafter redress the balance by finding some compensating "bone" to give to the Chinese dog without being open to the accusation of being provocative; and this may also bring the Chinese dog rather more closely to heel. He would not be drawn about the nature of the "bone" for the Chinese dog; but when I asked him whether it might, for example, take the form of some United States guarantee of a new neutral bloc in South East Asia which might help to contain the Soviet drive to the East via India, he nodded his head and indicated that this might be so.
2. K. emphasized the extreme secrecy of this matter. In Washington, only the President and he himself knew of it; and he asked us to guard its confidential nature very carefully.