

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

9 July 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Adolf Heusinger, accompanied by an aide, Mr. Horst Krueger, and a press attache, Mr. Axel von dem Bussche-Streithorst, visited me on Thursday, 7 July, for the purpose of explaining in somewhat more detail the concept of a demilitarized zone in Central Europe, on which I commented in my memorandum to you of 17 June 1955. He stated that the purpose of the plan was to:

- (1) Establish a buffer between the opposing forces and thus reduce the possibility of military incidents and the danger of a surprise attack.
- (2) Effect an arrangement whereby Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Germany while U.S. and U.K. forces would remain in Continental Europe, preferably in their present locations in Western Germany.


Basic to this concept is a unified Germany allied with the West in the NATO.


General Heusinger stressed at the outset that the plan was presented with the full knowledge that it was lacking in precise definition and that many details remained to be clarified. He was not prepared to specify exactly how the restricted zones should be extended in Southern Europe, and stated that the status of Yugoslavia presented a special problem in this regard. Similarly, he was uncertain as to whether or how Greece and European Turkey should be included in the arrangement. He felt with respect to the solution of these problems that political advice would be essential.

General Heusinger then discussed the delineation of the demilitarized and restricted zones (depicted on the attached map):

The Demilitarized Zone

This would encompass the present territory of East Germany (exclusive of Thuringia and Saxony), the former German territory east of the Oder-Neisse and a part of Poland proper, the western half of Czechoslovakia, and the eastern half of Austria. In his opinion, the





en de la comparte de la comp

> establishment of a small demilitarized zone comprising a portion of northern Norway and northern Finland merits consideration (indicated on chart). The territory of Thuringia and Saxony must be excluded from the demilitarized zone and included in the Blue Zone I because it contains very strong positions which the Allies should hold to protect the Frankfurt area. Extension of the demilitarized zone to include a part of Poland was essential in order to provide a buffer of sufficient depth and to avoid border incidents. If the demilitarized zone were to be policed by the United Nations, thought should be given to the use of an international gendarmerie for this purpose. Such a force should then be recruited from neutral, non-NATO, and non-satellite countries. General Heusinger felt that the demilitarization of East Germany alone, as has been proposed, would not be an acceptable solution in that it would provide only a shallow buffer area through which Soviet forces could transit rapidly and reach critical areas in West Germany without much delay. Also, the danger of incidents on Germany's eastern border would always be present.

Zones I.

These are to be roughly equal in geographical area and be balanced as to strengths and composition of forces. In Red Zone I there are now approximately 40 satellite divisions. These would be balanced by approximately equivalent Allied forces in Blue Zone I (6 U.S. divisions, 4 U.K., 12 German, plus French and Belgian units). On this basis, should the USSR retain forces in Red Zone I, a corresponding reduction in satellite forces in that zone would be required. Queried as to the possibility that the USSR might insist on such low ceilings in Zones I as to require redeployment of U.S. and other Allied forces from Western Germany, General Heusinger said that, while this must be guarded against, he felt it would present a difficult problem to the Soviets since they would hesitate to reduce the satellite forces.

Zones II.

No restrictions are envisaged as to the type of forces in these zones, except that the strengths would be approximately equivalent. While not as much significance is attached to the establishment of these



TOP CECOTT

zones as to Zone F and Zones I, it would be highly desirable to have them in that they provide additional insurance. However, the plan would not be fatally defective if these zones could not be included. Admittedly, the extension of the restricted zones into the territory of the USSR would complicate the problem of inspection and make the plan less palatable to the Soviets. While Norway was not now included in the restricted zone, he felt that it might well be included in Blue Zone II if this were to be established.

I pointed out to General Heusinger that we were particularly interested in the details of the inspection and control system which would be required for the enforcement of the plan. He stated that this was a matter to which he would give considerable thought after he returned to Bonn. He felt that the inspection and control need not be too detailed and should be concerned primarily with major units and installations, such as airfields, barracks, training areas, etc., major items of equipment, and the output of key industrial plants. He said he would provide further information on this subject later. He was of the opinion that, in addition to the official inspection procedures, much information regarding military activities in the restricted zones might be derived from transient civilians. I agreed and stated that the plan should provide for unrestricted civilian travel in all of the zones.

General Heusinger stated he realized that negotiations in connection with the establishment of the demilitarized and restricted zones would be protracted and would involve the resolution of many intricate technical and political problems. He felt however that there was an urgency in the accomplishment of what he called the first step, which would consist of the unification of Germany and an arrangement which would leave both the U.S. and U.K. forces in their present locations in Western Germany. In closing his discussion of the plan General Heusinger stated that when he left Germany Chancellor Adenauer reiterated and impressed upon him that a reunified Germany must be a member of the NATO.

I asked General Heusinger as to when he expected the new German armed forces would actually come into being. He gave me the following estimate: In about two or three weeks the Bundestag should enact a law authorizing the recruiting of approximately 6,000 volunteers during this year. It was hoped that in October or November of this year the "Soldiers Law" would be passed which would authorize the recruiting of approximately 80,000 volunteers to complete the Regular Army



TOP SECTION

cadres. By May of 1956 a law should be passed authorizing the conscription of the quotas necessary to bring up to full strength the authorized German forces. The training of the cadres should be completed by the end of 1956. They will be so organized that, in the event of an emergency, they could be formed into combat units. In early 1957 the twelve divisions will be formed simultaneously. No attempt will be made to select and accelerate the training of a lesser number of divisions as a token force. By midyear 1957 all of the divisions should be fully organized and undergoing progressive training.

While the presentation by General Heusinger amplified and clarified somewhat the German proposal, it did not alter in any fundamental way the concept as originally outlined. I therefore feel that my previous comments remain generally valid. The proposal represents a somewhat unique and possibly profitable approach. It may prove to be overly ambitious for the acceptance in all of its aspects in the present international climate.

authu Rayha