USNMR SHAPE
UNITED STATES MESSAGE
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE, PARIS, FRANCE
LAURIS NORSTAD, GEN, USAF

TO: CJCS
MR: ALO 225

08 March 62

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

Last night Secretary General Stikker discussed with me for
upwards of two and a half hours the following draft paper, which
he presented as the paper from which he would talk at the NATO
Council meeting this afternoon and which would then be circulated
on some basis. I requested that it not be used without further
study, confirmation and consideration, and at the end of our
discussion he agreed not to use it at this time. I suspect,
however, that the delay would only be for a few days and I am
therefore forwarding it to you for the consideration of the Chiefs
of Staff. In a separate message to follow, I will raise some
questions and make some observations on the Stikker draft.

QUOTE:

"NATO DEFENCE POLICY

"Draft Statement by the Secretary General for the Council
Meeting on Thursday 8th March.

"1. The U.S. Representative has indicated that the United
States will continue to place at the disposal of the Alliance
nuclear weapons adequate in number and kind to meet the needs
of NATO defense. I presume these will include warheads both for
any nuclear delivery systems incorporated into the forces of the
United States' NATO Allies, and for weapons systems in U.S.
forces assigned or earmarked for assignment to SAGNUR and SAGLIANT.
The precise number and types of nuclear weapons required at any
one time to implement this undertaking and the place of their
deployment would be determined by the current operational needs
of the Major NATO Commanders based on approved NATO plans."
"3. He has also recorded his Government's intention to ensure that its retaliatory power should grow faster than the Soviet striking power, and to continue to cover as fully as possible all key elements of the latter which could be used against the U.S. or its allies. To this end action is in progress to increase the capacity of the strategic forces to survive a Soviet nuclear strike and to improve the speed of retaliation.

"4. The U.S. Government is also, I understand, willing

"(a) to furnish to their NATO allies the fullest amount of information compatible with the requirements of security covering, as I understand it, types, numbers, striking power, deployment and targeting of nuclear weapons located within the NATO area and destined for the defence of NATO Europe;

"(b) to make comparable information available as appropriate, with regard to the plans and disposition of the strategic forces;

"(c) to participate with their allies in setting up a permanent system for the exchange and handling of the information referred to in (a) and (b) above. In anticipation of the establishment of suitable machinery for this purpose, the U.S. Government is willing, subject to suitable security arrangements to make all necessary information available in order to enable the Council to pursue its examination of the problems of overall NATO defence planning and control."
"5. These are all statements of the highest importance. The Council will, I am certain, share my appreciation of the clarity of the assurances indicated by Ambassador Finletter. These seem to me to correspond fully to the sense of paragraph 7 (a) and (b) of NDP/62/2 and to provide the indispensable basis for further progress in our discussions on NATO defence policy.

"6. In the meantime we received on the 2nd March the proposal for a Nuclear Committee in a note by the U.K. Delegation.

"As Permanent Representatives have not had the opportunity to express opinions of this document, I venture to make later on one or two comments myself in addition to those which I already made at the Council meeting of 2nd March.

"In order to bring the discussion a step further I would like to draw the attention of the Council to the following points which are based on opinions already expressed in the Council or on private discussions.

"7. In stating its willingness to make this information available to the Alliance, not only with regard to nuclear forces and weapons at the disposal of NATO, but also to the strategic forces which back them up, the United States has made clear its desire to associate its allies with its nuclear defence policies. It is equally clear that the sharing of responsibility would not be a reality if the United States' NATO Allies were not in possession of the requisite knowledge of the United States' nuclear capability and the basic plans and general arrangements for its use. Nor without such knowledge and possibility of reviewing the changing needs of the military situation would it be possible for the Alliance to ascertain what is the adequate level of nuclear weapons to which Mr. Finletter has referred.

"(a) This brings us then to the first question with which the Council is faced. We have to find a mean between the vital requirements of security and the need for the Council as a whole and for member countries individually to have all the information necessary to give them a proper insight into the problem of nuclear defence.
"(b) The second question which follows from the first is how far any collective mechanism set up for handling such information should also play an active consultative role in regard to the plans for nuclear defence.

"(c) The third question, which also follows from the first, is just how to tackle the security problem, since an agreement on this is a pre-requisite to the receipt of any information at all — and the nature of the arrangements made will determine the amount of detail which the U.S. and no doubt the U.K. Governments are ready to give about their strategic forces, and the Supreme Allied Commanders about their planning.

8. (a) To deal with the first question, I believe that we are all agreed that a special group or committee should be set up to handle the information which has been promised. But we are not yet entirely agreed on how it should be composed and organised. As I see it, there are three distinct needs. First to ensure that all member governments have enough general information about plans for the deployment and use of nuclear weapons to enable them to appreciate the problems involved in their control and to fulfill their responsibility for the implementation of the defence plans of the Alliance. Second, to provide that members whose interests lie primarily in one geographical area, are fully aware of the operational plans for that area which may involve their own forces or those of their neighbours. And third, to provide countries which have nuclear weapons stored on their territories, not only for their own, but for the forces of other member countries, with relatively detailed information about the numbers and types of weapons in question and the arrangements for their physical control and possible use.

"If we follow this pattern of thought it seems to suggest that we should establish a committee of the whole — which should have access to general information on the whereabouts, quantities and striking power of nuclear warheads available to NATO; about over-all targeting arrangements; about the disposition of NATO nuclear forces stationed outside their own country; and about the nuclear capabilities of the strategic forces. This committee would be broken down into regional
sub-committees which would be the recipient and guardian of more
detailed information of the kind indicated above affecting the
particular area of interest of the participating countries.
Finally, even more detailed information about the exact location,
contents and handling arrangements in peace and war of nuclear
weapon stockpiles would be made available on a bilateral basis.

"If this general principle is agreed, we could
work out later exactly which countries should participate in
the sub-committees. But subject to the approval of the Council
it might be the best arrangement if the Secretary General were
to take the chair of the committee of the whole and also preside
over the various sub-committees. On the other hand, I am not
sure that in view of the overriding interests of security, that
there is any reason why the International Staff should be privy
to the highly sensitive information which would be transmitted
bilaterally, whether by the U.S. Government or the Major-NATO
Commanders, to individual member governments.

"(b). The second question is of a different order.
It raises the issue as to whether the main committee and the
sub-committees should play a merely passive part, confined
simply to receiving, handling and keeping up to date the informa-
tion made available to them, or whether they should have a
more positive role. This is a question on which I should like
to hear further views expressed. In their paper of March 2nd,
the U.K. Delegation contributed some thoughts and suggestions
on this. They foresaw, for instance, that the committee might
become a focal point for the exchange of information on nuclear
considerations underlying the defence of the free world as a whole,
and for assessments of Soviet nuclear dispositions and planning
and the effects on the Soviet Union of an attack by Western
strategic forces. The same paper also suggested that the committee
could have certain advisory functions with regard to the nature
and deployment of nuclear warheads and delivery systems.

"I would appreciate it if Permanent Representatives
would express their ideas on this suggestion. Personally, I do
believe that, on receiving more information of the dispositions
and plans for the use of nuclear weapons, members of the committee
will have their word to say on the subject of 'adequacy', which
I am sure is not intended to be a purely unilateral judgment."
"(c) On the third question I believe the whole problem of security to be so fundamental to the whole object of the present exercise that we should set up forthwith a working group to draw up a set of ground rules for the handling of the information which we are to receive. In earlier discussions a consensus of view seems to have emerged that any information transmitted to the committee should be restricted to the smallest number of individuals compatible with efficient operation. It was also agreed that information should only be transmitted to member governments by private letter or word of mouth, and that the number of individuals in capitals having access to it should be severely limited.

"But there is another whole series of questions of a practical nature which will have to be looked into, e.g. how information received should be processed; where it should be kept, exactly how it should be transmitted to member governments, whether some special staffing and classification arrangements are necessary; and so on. Some of these are relatively technical points and we may need security experts to advise us. If the Council would be agreeable to setting up a special working group on these lines, perhaps delegations would indicate which of them would like to participate. I would suggest that the chair might be taken by the Executive Secretary, who would have the head of the Security Bureau present to advise him."