TO: CJCS
MR: ALO 225
08 March 62

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

Last night Secretary General Stikker discussed with me for upwards of two and a half hours the following draft paper, which he presented as the paper from which he would talk at the NATO Council meeting this afternoon and which would then be circulated on some basis. I requested that it not be used without further study, confirm and consideration, and at the end of our discussion he agreed not to use it at this time. I suspect, however, that the delay would only be for a few days and I am therefore forwarding it to you for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff. In a separate message to follow, I will raise some questions and make some observations on the Stikker draft.

QUOTE:

"NATO DEFENCE POLICY"

"Draft Statement by the Secretary General for the Council Meeting on Thursday 8th March."

ALO 225
(08 Mar 62)
5. These are all statements of the highest importance. The Council will, I am certain, share my appreciation of the clarity of the assurances indicated by Ambassador Finletter. These seem to me to correspond fully to the sense of paragraph 7 (a) and (b) of NDP/62/2 and to provide the indispensable basis for further progress in our discussions on NATO defence policy.

6. In the meantime we received on the 2nd March the proposal for a Nuclear Committee in a note by the U.K. Delegation.

As Permanent Representatives have not had the opportunity to express opinions of this document, I venture to make later on one or two comments myself in addition to those which I already made at the Council meeting of 2nd March.

In order to bring the discussion a step further I would like to draw the attention of the Council to the following points which are based on opinions already expressed in the Council or on private discussions.

7. (a) This brings us then to the first question with which the Council is faced. We have to find a mean between the vital requirements of security and the need for the Council as a whole and for member countries individually to have all the information necessary to give them a proper insight into the problem of nuclear defense.
"(b) The second question which follows from the first is how far any collective mechanism set up for handling such information should also play an active consultative role in regard to the plans for nuclear defence.

"(c) The third question, which also follows from the first, is just how to tackle the security problem, since an agreement on this is a pre-requisite to the receipt of any information at all — and the nature of the arrangements made will determine the amount of detail which the U.S. and no doubt the U.K. Governments are ready to give about their strategic forces, and the Supreme Allied Commanders about their planning.

"8."