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EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

Last night Secretary General Stikker discussed with me for upwards of two and a half hours the following draft paper, which he presented as the paper from which he would talk at NATO the/Council meeting this afternoon and which would then be circulated on some basis. I requested that it not be used without further study, confirmation and consideration, and at the end of our discussion he agreed not to use it at this time. I suspect, however, that the delay would only be for a few days and I am therefore forwarding it to you for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff. In a separate message to follow, I will raise some questions and make some observations on the Stikker draft.

QUOTE: "NATO DEFENCE POLICY

8

Mar 1962

LAURIS NORSTAD, General, USAF
4006 1

RICHARD H. FREE
Colonel, U. S. Army
Executive to SACEUR

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DECLASSIFIED with deletions
MR 2003-121#1
By Bbm 4/14/04

"Draft Statement by the Secretary General for the Council Meeting
on Thursday 8th March.

"1. The U. S. Representative has indicated that the United

States will continue

to meet the needs of NATO

defence. I presume these will include

"2. The U. S. Permanent Representative has further

indicated that the operational plans of U. S. [redacted] naval and air

forces provide for attacking all such [redacted]

[redacted] are

included in the top priority targets.

"3. He has also recorded his Government's intention to ensure that its retaliatory power should grow faster [redacted]

[redacted] and to continue to cover as fully as possible all key elements of the latter which could be used against the U. S. or its allies. To this end action is in progress to increase the [redacted]

"4. The U. S. Government is also, I understand, willing

"(a) to furnish to their NATO allies the fullest amount of information compatible with the requirements of security covering, as I understand it [redacted]

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"(b) to make comparable information available as appropriate, with regard to the plans and disposition of the forces;

"(c) to participate with their allies in setting up a permanent system for the exchange and handling of the information referred to in (a) and (b) above. In anticipation of the establishment of suitable machinery for this purpose, the U. S. Government is willing, subject to suitable security arrangements, to make all necessary information available in order to enable the Council to pursue its examination of the problems of over-all NATO defence planning and control.

"5. These are all statements of the highest importance. The Council will, I am certain, share my appreciation of the clarity of the assurances indicated by Ambassador Finletter. These seem to me to correspond fully to the sense of paragraph 7 (a) and (b) of NDP/62/2 and to provide the indispensable basis for further progress in our discussions on NATO defence policy.

"6. In the meantime we received on the 2nd March the proposal for a Nuclear Committee in a note by the U. K. Delegation.


"As Permanent Representatives have not had the opportunity to express opinions on this document, I venture to make later on one or two comments myself in addition to those

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which I already made at the Council meeting of 2nd March.

"In order to bring the discussion a step further I would like to draw the attention of the Council to the following points which are based on opinions already expressed in the Council or on private discussions.

"7. In stating its willingness to make this information available to the Alliance, not only with regard to



to which

Mr. Finletter has referred.

"(a) This brings us then to the first question with which the Council is faced. We have to find a mean between the vital requirements of security and the need for the Council as a whole whole

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and for member countries individually to have all the information necessary to give them a proper insight into the problem of

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"(b) The second question which follows from the first is how far any collective mechanism set up for handling such information should also play an active consultative role in regard to the

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
"(c) The third question, which also follows from the first, is just how to tackle the security problem, since an agreement on this is a pre-requisite to the receipt of any information at all -- and the nature of the arrangements made will determine the amount of detail which the U. S. and no doubt the U. K. Governments are ready to give about their strategic forces, and the Supreme Allied Commanders about their planning.

"8. (a) To deal with the first question, I believe that we are all agreed that a special group or committee should be set up to handle the information which has been promised. But we are not yet entirely agreed on how it should be composed and organised. As I see it, there are three distinct needs. First, to ensure that all member governments have enough general


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
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"If we follow this pattern of thought it seems to suggest that we should establish a committee of the whole which should have access to general information on





"If this general principle is agreed, we could work out later exactly which countries should participate in the sub-committees. But subject to the approval of the Council it might be the best arrangement if the Secretary General were to take the chair of the committee of the whole and also preside over the various sub-committees. On the other hand, I am not sure that in view of the overriding interests of security, that there is any reason why the International Staff should be privy to the highly sensitive information which would be transmitted bilaterally, whether by the U. S. Government or the Major NATO Commanders, to individual member governments.

"(b) The second question is of a different order. It raises the issue as to whether the main committee and the sub-committees should play a merely passive part, confined simply to receiving, handling and keeping up to date the information made available to them, or whether they should have a more positive role. This is a question on which I should like to hear further views expressed. In their paper of March 2nd, the U. K. Delegation

contributed some thoughts and suggestions on this. They foresaw,


for instance,

"I would appreciate it if Permanent Representatives would express their ideas on this suggestion. Personally, I do believe that, on receiving more information

"(c) On the third question I believe the whole problem of security to be so fundamental to the whole object of the present exercise that we should set up forthwith a working group to draw up a set of ground rules for the handling of the information which we are to receive. In earlier discussions a consensus of view seems to have emerged that any information transmitted to the


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committee should be restricted to the smallest number of individuals compatible with efficient operation. It was also agreed that



"But there is another whole series of questions of a practical nature which will have to be looked into, e. g. how information received should be processed; where it should be kept, exactly how it should be transmitted to member governments, whether some special staffing and classification arrangements are necessary, and so on. Some of these are relatively technical points and we may need security experts to advise us. If the Council would be agreeable to setting up a special working group on these lines, perhaps delegations would indicate which of them would like to participate. I would suggest that the chair might be taken by the Executive Secretary, who would have the Head of the Security Bureau present to advise him.


"9. Turning now to paragraph 13 of NDP/62/2, I would draw the Council's attention to Mr. Finletter's indication on March 2nd that his Government might agree to give an undertaking



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anywhere. I do not need to underline the significance of this statement, with the clear moral it contains that it is the desire of the United States that its NATO allies should share as widely as possible in the responsibilities which have hitherto resided so exclusively on the shoulders of one man.

"10. If we are to make this sharing of responsibility a reality, it is more important than ever that we should reach agreement on the guidelines which would govern the decision, in which the whole Alliance will have a part,



"11. Against this background, I have somewhat recast paragraph 13 of NDP/62/2 on the following lines, which I hope will make them more readily acceptable as a basis for discussion:

"(a)
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