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on NATO Nuclear Strategy”<sup>1</sup> presented to him jointly by the Secretaries of State and Defense at the meeting at 12:30 on 3 November 1954.<sup>2</sup> He has also indicated broad agreement with the concept and major points of the proposed Military Committee Report relating to the “new approach” as outlined by General Collins at that meeting.

2. During the meeting of November 3, the President indicated his readiness to consult with Congressional leaders on this matter at an early date, and indicated further that he will expect specific recommendations as to such consultation to be made to him by the Department of State in consultation with Defense.

3. With respect to concern expressed by Admiral Radford lest the impression be gained erroneously that the U.S. might assume the entire effort required to bring forces into position to accomplish the new concept, the President has indicated that he interprets the statements relating to U.S. support, through military assistance, of “agreed NATO plans to accomplish the new concept” to refer instead to a *reorienting* of present and future U.S. military assistance in such manner as to assure that this assistance is geared into and contributes toward the development of forces prepared for integrated action generally as called for in these studies.

A. J. GOODPASTER  
Colonel, CE, US Army  
Staff Secretary

<sup>1</sup> Dated Nov. 2, p. 529.

<sup>2</sup> See Merchant's memorandum of conversation, Nov. 3, *supra*.

740.5/5611

*Memorandum by the Presidential Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) to the President*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. State and Defense suggest that, in tomorrow's meeting with the Congressional leaders,<sup>1</sup> you open the discussion on *endorsement of NATO nuclear strategy* by making these points:

a. Necessity and desirability of basing NATO military plans and preparations on the concept that an effective atomic capability is indispensable to a maximum deterrent and essential to defense in Western Europe. General Gruenther developed the basic NATO study through eight months' work; State and Defense have worked out proposed U.S. action on it during the past four months.

b. First element of proposed action is to secure NATO-wide approval of the concept of the capability to use A-weapons as a major

<sup>1</sup> A record of Eisenhower's meeting on Nov. 17 with 19 Congressmen is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Staff Secretary records.

clement of military operations in event of hostilities. For this purpose, the U.S. should be prepared, if required subject to constitutional limitations, to give assurances that A-weapons would be available in the hands of U.S. forces for such operations.

c. Second element is to reorient the pattern of NATO military forces toward the new type of operations. To this end, the U.S. should be prepared to give assurances, if required, that present and future U.S. military assistance will be geared into and make an appropriate contribution toward the development of forces prepared for integrated action generally as called for in the NATO studies. It would be understood, of course, that Congress retains its full power to act upon proposals for military aid programs.

A. J. GOODPASTER  
*Colonel, CE, U.S. Army*

740.5/11-2054

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for  
European Affairs (Merchant)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1954.

Subject: NATO "New Approach"

Participants: Premier Mendes-France <sup>1</sup>  
Ambassador Bonnet  
The Secretary  
Mr. Merchant

The French Premier referred to the "new approach" studies of NATO and said that they had been discussed at length in the French National Defense Council which had agreed to the proposals as put forward by General Gruenther and the Standing Group. He said, however, that the subject matter was too serious to be left exclusively in military hands. Political decisions of the highest level would be required in an emergency. He then referred to an arrangement during the war whereby all great military questions were decided personally between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. He felt that similar arrangements, but including France, should be established to deal with questions of this nature in the event of war or its imminent threat. In other words, what was needed was a high level political Standing Group. He went on to say that he was not making a formal proposal at the moment but wanted to notify us that we would be receiving a proposal in the near future along these lines.

There was then some discussion of the NATO alert system and its

<sup>1</sup> Mendès-France was in Washington between Nov. 17-20 primarily for discussions with officials of the United States and United Kingdom on Vietnam. Further documentation on the Mendès-France visit is presented in volume VI and in vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 2264 ff.

1/8/59

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TEXT OF MESSAGE


Dear Foster,

I saw Selwyn last night and found him better but he is still not back at work. In his absence, I have been reading the accounts of the discussions which our officials have been having both with and without the French. I am bound to say I think we have got a little bogged down by the old question of which comes first - the egg or the chicken, the making of a plan or the decision to carry it out. In my view we ought to study the implications of all kinds of military plans without necessarily deciding upon them. In this country a decision cannot be taken without a full Cabinet. However, I think the firm line that the great Powers and NATO took has clearly had some effect upon the Russians and I am all for a strong posture in public.

All the same I do not think that it has been the Russian intention to impose a blockade at the end of the six months. Their intention has been to make us choose between imposing a blockade on ourselves or dealing with the East Germans, whether as their successors or their agents. But they now seem to be a little alarmed that their Note should appear to the Western world as having directly threatened a blockade. I was most grateful to you for sending me such a long account of what Mikoyan said to you.

A strong posture in public and the study of plans to support it is a good thing, but you and I should be seriously considering how we can get, as I believe we may, two advantages:

(a)



- (b) Being able to force the Russians by negotiation, or at any conference, to accept responsibility to see that the West's military and civil supplies do in fact get through. In other words, if they hand over to the D. D. R., as successors or agents, they must still see to it that the D. D. R. behaves properly. In the Note I think they threatened that they would support the D. D. R. if we attacked them. But if they stand behind the D. D. R. in this way, the corollary surely is that the Russians should see to

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NLE Case	88-159-4
By	MS
NLE Date	12/21/98

Staff Secy / Int / 6 / Berlin - VOTD (2)


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-2-

it that the D. D. R. carry out their obligations including those which the Russians purport to hand over to them.

I should be very grateful for your views.



As ever,

Harold

This letter was sent under cover of a letter from Chargé d'Affairs Hood dated January 8, 1959.

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