



[REDACTED]

McNamara in descending order of enthusiasm) joined in recommending that a serious approach be made \_\_\_\_\_

The third substantial voice raised on this side of the argument was that of General Taylor. In a visit \_\_\_\_\_ in the latter part of March, he was deeply impressed by the unanimity \_\_\_\_\_ with whom he talked, in passionate commitment \_\_\_\_\_

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Many others, at other times, have shared these same concerns about our relations \_\_\_\_\_ and had asked whether some new relation \_\_\_\_\_ might not be worth seeking. At the President's direction members of the staff had encouraged Paul Nitze's inquiries earlier in the winter, and the President himself had written a most tentative letter of explanation to \_\_\_\_\_ at the turn of the year. \_\_\_\_\_ cool response had discouraged the White House, but there was general recognition that the matter should in fact be reviewed once more.

Among those who believed that the subject should be reopened, there was some difference on ways and means. There was little support for an immediate decision to provide \_\_\_\_\_ information \_\_\_\_\_

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Most of those urging a new departure believed that we should initially seek an agreement in which \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Assistance would be dependent upon still further \_\_\_\_\_

[REDACTED]





[REDACTED] T

[Lined area for text entry]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





~~SECRET~~

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----- he would have had to overrule the Secretary  
of State -- which he did not often do. These considerations could  
well have been overbalanced if there had been a great end in view;  
each of them after all had a minor counterbalance of its own.  
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But no one could offer him a solid and substantive return for this  
major change in policy, with all its evident disadvantages. No  
one could tell him that  
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Among those who greeted this decision with approval, and with a  
renewed awareness of the practical clarity of the President's mind,  
there was little delight. The ----- problem remained, and the  
----- effort would almost surely continue in some form --  
with or without ----- It was no answer -----  
but what could be done?

Clear answers to this question had not emerged in early May. But  
a few preliminary points were plain:  
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[REDACTED]

Finally, we must increasingly press upon all our friends a deeper understanding of nuclear weapons as they look in the 1960's: numerous, deadly, and indivisible in their impact; costly, complex, and rapidly obsolescent in their technology; dangerous in their diffusion, and increasingly useless except in the single great goal of deterrence.

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Above and beyond these immediate actions, we must persevere on the broader course of assisting and encouraging the movement toward European integration and Atlantic partnership. If that movement goes forward, the disadvantages of an unaided effort can be contained and limited; we can still make progress toward our basic goals, despite that effort. And in the degree that the forces making for European integration and Atlantic partnership prevail, come to recognize that she can play a larger role by assisting than by hindering the prosecution of this basic policy. At least this course seemed -- in May of 1962 -- to offer a better chance of promoting US objectives than any other at hand.

McGeorge Bundy

[REDACTED]