SANITIZED COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE '




May 7, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR


THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Action on
In March and April 1962, the question ofbecame active. The principal sources of concern and
advocacy were three.
First, there was————————————————————————————————————
believed, as Ambassadors————have characteristically believed, that a major improvement could be accomplished if only the United States would respond to the interests and desires——————————————————————————————————
The second main source of interest was in the Pentagon; it derived initially from a concern for practical relations within such fields as
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Pentagon (initially Paul Nitze and later Ros Gilpatric and Bob


SANITIZED E.O. 12350, Sec. 5,4 NULL - 85-23 By SF NARA, Date 5/21/91




McNamara in descending order of enthusiasm) joined in recommending that a serious approach be made
The third substantial voice raised on this side of the argument was that of General Taylor. In a visit in the latter part of March, he was deeply impressed by the unanimity with whom he talked, in passionate commitment
Many others, at other times, have shared these same concerns about our relations————————————————————————————————————
Most of those urging a new departure believed that we should initially seek an agreement in which Assistance would be dependent upon still further



concessions. But one of those in favor of a change in policy
Secretary Dillon, argued powerfully that it would not be possible
to make a step-by-step set of bargains
believed that the whole question should be opened by
the President himself on the broadest possible basis, with the US
laying out as part of a comprehensive package.
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





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	nt read and heard the arguments. He talked individually Taylor; he also heard
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Mr. Kenned	y made his decision firmly in a sense he simply never
unmade it -),
There were	other elements in the decision.
There were	other elements in the decision.
There were	other elements in the decision.
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of State which he did not often do. These considerations could well have been overbalanced if there had been a great end in view; each of them after all had a minor counterbalance of its own.
But no one could offer him a solid and substantive return for this major change in policy, with all its evident disadvantages. No one could tell him that
* * *
Among those who greeted this decision with approval, and with a renewed awareness of the practical clarity of the President's mind, there was little delight. The problem remained, and the renewed awareness of the practical clarity of the President's mind, there was little delight. The problem remained, and the renewed as a little delight.
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objectives than any other at hand.

Finally, we must increasingly press upon all our
friends a deeper understanding of nuclear weapons as they look
in the 1960's: numerous, deadly, and indivisible in their impact;
costly, complex, and rapidly obsolescent in their technology;
dangerous in their diffusion, and increasingly useless except in the
single great goal of deterrence.
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Above and beyond these immediate actions, we must persevere on the
broader course of assisting and encouraging the movement toward
European integration and Atlantic partnership. If that movement
goes forward, the disadvantages of an unaided
effort can be contained and limited; we can still make progress toward
our basic goals, despite that effort. And in the degree that the
forces making for European integration and Atlantic partnership pre-
vail,come
to recognize that she can play a larger role by assisting than by
hindering the prosecution of this basic policy. At least this course
seemed in May of 1962 to offer a better chance of promoting US

McGeorge Bundy

