MEMORANDUM OF CONCLUSIONS OF WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE RE BERLIN

1. We do not acquiesce in the substitution of GDR for Soviet officials as regards the Western occupying powers' movements to and from West Berlin.

Mere identification of the vehicles as those of one of the Western occupying powers will be provided to GDR officials on demand, and will not be construed as acquiescence in substitution. However, no stamping of papers or inspection will be acquiesced in.

2. Begin promptly quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures in West Germany and Berlin, to be taken during the period between now and May 27, of a kind that would be detectable by Soviet intelligence but which would not create public alarm.

3. After the attempted or announced substitution of GDR for USSR, the next unit to go through would be a truck or trucks accompanied by a scout car or some other vehicle with a capability for shooting. This unit, subject to the conditions mentioned in 1 above, would attempt to make the transit from Berlin. If the GDR or the Soviets interposed physical obstructions, then the effort would be discontinued and in no event would the armament be used unless it were fired upon, in which case it would take whatever defensive action seemed necessary.
(Consideration would be given to the possibility of the stationing of Western allied inspectors in lieu of the withdrawn Soviet inspectors at the check points.)

4. After the physical obstruction occurred, transit would be suspended for the time being and parallel efforts would be made to increase pressure on the Soviets and the GDR, along the following lines:

   a) Seek to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet Union as a violator of agreements, a user of force and a threat to the peace. The situation could be taken to the Security Council and, in the event of veto there, to a special session of the General Assembly. Consideration could also be given to further forms of diplomatic pressure, including withdrawal of our Ambassador from Moscow;

   b) Military preparations would be intensified and at this point could include measures which would be observable, as, for example, the evacuation of dependents from West Berlin, and possibly from Germany.

5. The decision to apply further military pressures by the use of additional force would be subject to governmental decision in the event that the double barreled effort mentioned above was not successful.

6. Concurrently with the development of the foregoing program an effort would be made to bring about around the middle of April a Foreign Ministers' meeting with the Soviet Union on the various aspects of the
German question. These talks might provide a cover which would facilitate the indefinite postponement or modification by the Soviet Union of their present "ultimatum" as regards Berlin.

(It is assumed that allied agreement would be obtainable along these lines. If not the question of U.S. action would have to be considered in the light of the allied position.)

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