March 22, 1962

8/3 SUBJECT: Suggested NATO Nuclear Program

After approval by the President, the United States should outline the following elements in NAC, at appropriate times and in suitable detail. These elements should be discussed in the context of revised strategy. Within this framework, the need for improved conventional forces should be stressed and elaborated in necessary detail, and the extent to which the nuclear proposals are dependent on an adequate conventional program should be made clear.

1. NATO Particitation: Measures should be instituted to give NATO greater information about US nuclear strategy, and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy.

(Specific actions to this end currently under study by the State and Defense Departments should be included, if they are found to be useful.) As part of these measures:

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
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•	(b)	An	attempt	should	be made	to work	out NATC	guidelin

(b) An attempt should be made to work out NATO guidelines, which the US President would agree to observe, regarding use of all US nuclear weapons in defending NATO.

2. US Forces Outside the Continent:

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- (c) <u>Costs</u>. The costs should be equitably shared.

 The US should make clear that it would not be prepared to make a major contribution to the cost but would expect the greater part of the burden to be borne by the allies.
- (d) Mixed Manning. The US should require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the manning and is not, in fact, in control of any vessel or of the missiles aboard any vessel in the multilateral force. Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national armed forces into the NATO MRBM force and would thereafter be under the control of that Force; for trial and punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their country of origin.

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⁽f) <u>Centralized Command</u>. In presenting these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible and that a NATO Force, if one is created, could

not fragment this unified task. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it would be employed in integral association with other alliance nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect. On the contrary, our willingness to join in creating such a force should be dramatic evidence of our unconditional commitment to the defense of the entire alliance.

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