UNICERCIFED LICE

March 22, 1962

SUBJECT: Suggested NATO Nuclear Program

After approval by the President, the United States should outline the following elements in NAC, at appropriate times and in suitable detail. These elements should be discussed in the context of revised strategy. Within this framework, the need for improved conventional forces should be stressed and elaborated in necessary detail, and the extent to which the nuclear proposals are dependent on an adequate conventional program should be made clear.

- 1. NATO Participation: Measures should be instituted to give NATO greater information about US nuclear strategy, and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy.

 (Specific actions to this end currently under study by the State and Defense Departments should be included, if they are found to be useful.) As part of these measures:
- (a) Procedures should be instituted under which we would share information about our nuclear forces and consult about basic plans and arrangements for their use in the NAC and the Standing Group Military Committee.

Decisesified/Released to Council

By the National Security Council

ander provisions of E.O. 12065

Decisesified/Released to E.O. 12065



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we can and should provide a considerable body of information, including targetting policy, nuclear force strengths, analysis of the force capabilities, some intelligence on Soviet Bloc strengths, and constraint policies.

2. US Forces Outside the Continent:

(a)

(b) The US should state that it is prepared to commit

to NATO

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to NATO US nuclear forces outside the European continent

(additional to those US forces already committed, in amounts to

be determined). This might be the force indicated under (c).


(c) To meet on an interim basis any political need for having MRBM's based in the European area which would come under NATO wartime military command, Polaris submarines should, as promised by the President in May 1961, be committed to NATO.



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3. Multilaterally Manned NATO Force: The US should indicate its willingness to join its allies, if they wish, in developing a modest-sized fully multilateral NATO sea-based MRBM force. It should not urge this course, and should indicate its view that MRBM forces are not urgently needed for military reasons, in view of already programmed U.S. strategic forces;

(b) <u>Participation</u>. The US should only be prepared to proceed if the venture had adequate allied participation,



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- The US should make clear that it would not be prepared to make a major contribution to the cost but would expect the greater part of the burden to be borne by the allies.
- (d) <u>Mixed Manning</u>. The US should require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the manning -
- of any vessel or of the missiles aboard any vessel in the multilateral force. Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national armed forces into the NATO MRBM force and would thereafter be under the control of that Force; for trial and punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their country of origin.


(f) <u>Centralized Command</u>. In presenting these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible and that a NATO Force, if one is created, could

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not fragment this unified task. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it would be employed in integral association with other alliance nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect. On the contrary, our willingness to join in creating such a force should be dramatic evidence of our unconditional commitment to the defense of the entire alliance.

(g) <u>Control</u>. The US should indicate that it wishes to ascertain the views of its allies concerning the control formula.



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In connection with NATO consideration of the multilateral force the United States should make plain that transfer of nuclear warheads or procedures for using the force without United States concurrence would require amending existing United States law and could well entail other obstacles depending on the character of the arrangements. The United States should indicate, however, that it is willing to consider any proposal which is put to us by a clear majority of the Alliance.

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