



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
MINUTES
of
a
MEETING
between the
SECRETARY OF STATE
and the
GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER

NOVEMBER 21, 1957 at 4:00 P.M.

DEC 17 1957

United States

The Secretary of State
Mr. Murphy
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Elbrick
Mr. Gerard C. Smith
General Guthrie
Mr. Timmons
Mr. Reinstein
Mr. Reinhardt



Federal Republic of Germany

Foreign Minister
Dr. Heinrich von Brentano
Ambassador Blankenhorn
Ambassador Krekeler
Mr. Limbourg

Interpreters

Mr. Weber
Mr. Charlick

Reporting Officer

Jacques J. Reinstein

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contribution in this respect, but the individual European states were too small to do this by themselves. They should therefore agree on a program of common research going beyond national boundaries. The center of this effort must, however, be the United States. Herr von Brentano said that this proposal was not put forward for selfish motives. It was essential that research, both basic and applied, be carried on. However, the Europeans could carry it on only in cooperation with the United States. He knew that there were difficulties of a legal character in the United States, but difficulties existed to be overcome.

Herr von Brentano said he had discussed this matter with Signor Pella, who was in agreement. He believed that the Benelux Governments would also agree. The idea was to establish a European center of armament research, which could be directed to those matters of particular interest to European countries. He cited by way of example the development of an intermediate range missile with a range of 2000 kilometers. Herr von Brentano said that the Europeans did not wish to compete with the United States, but rather to relieve the United States of some of its burdens. However, they could only do this with the help of the United States. He realized that the matter could not be settled at the NATO meeting. There was for example the question of the protection of security, which was extremely important. However, agreement should be reached on the principle. Its application could be worked out in a meeting of Foreign Ministers at a later time.

NATO Military Organization

Herr von Brentano said that the third principal point which should be dealt with at the NATO meeting was the subject of military organization. We should try to reach a greater measure of integration in some fields. For example, there still are separate French, Belgium, and Dutch air forces. He said this was medieval. We could no longer afford to have separate forces. More should be done also in the way of standardization of weapons. NATO could make recommendations and put pressure on the Governments to do more. There could be sharing of tasks. There should also be greater integration in training.

Herr von Brentano said that another subject in this field was that of the Supreme Command. He did not doubt the competence of the members of the Standing Group. However, they were too dependent on their governments. The Standing Group should be given greater independence. As matters now stand, they do not think in terms of the alliance as a whole.

Nuclear Weapons

Herr von Brentano said he also wished to speak about atomic weapons. He said that the Federal Republic does not want either now or in the near future to be released from its treaty obligations. It does

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not want to produce ABC weapons. (On the other hand, it does want to participate in research in this field. He said he was not an expert, but he felt that there was only one area of research in the atomic field. No distinction could be made between military research and research for other purposes. A question arose as to the form in which this research should be carried on. This was also an area in which there could be cooperative action.

Another subject which should probably be dealt with in a restricted session at the NATO meeting was the question of storage and control of nuclear weapons. He recognized that in this respect also there were legislative difficulties in the United States. Such weapons should be under the control of NATO. He did not mean by this that they should be under the control of individual commanders but under political control. If the possession of nuclear weapons is confined only to some countries, other countries will want to produce weapons, which will then be outside the control of NATO. The development of such a situation would involve the risk of war. Herr von Brentano said there should be a frank discussion of how NATO would make decisions on the use of weapons.

Procedure at the NATO Meeting

Herr von Brentano said he would also like to make some comments on procedure to be followed at the NATO meeting. The Federal Republic thinks that the meeting should not take up the routine matters normally dealt with at the December Ministerial meeting. The Annual Review resolution should be approved before the meeting. He suggested that General Norstad should give a briefing on the present military situation and on the measures which needed to be taken. Finally, all member governments should give the Secretary General in advance of the meeting a basic outline of the proposals they would make.

Herr von Brentano said that he would give the Secretary on the following day a separate paper covering the points which he had outlined.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY

Declaration to be Issued at the NATO Meeting

The Secretary thanked Herr von Brentano for the expression of his views. He thought that his own thinking was very much in harmony with what Herr von Brentano had expressed. He said he would like to comment on some of the specific suggestions which had been made and perhaps to add a few thoughts of his own. The Secretary said he agreed it was of the utmost importance that the declaration to be made at the meeting should not deal exclusively with military matters and that it should indicate the great concern of the NATO Governments for the peace,

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of the Cabinet and of the National Security Council. He thought it was also sound to enlarge the powers of the Secretary General. He did not think we would have to do much on this subject. M. Spaak, who was a dynamic personality, would do it himself.

The Secretary said there was one suggestion on which he would welcome Herr von Brentano's views. It might be helpful if the Ambassadors of the NATO countries could meet with the Foreign Minister in a particular capital for consultation if a specific occasion for doing so arose. He said that if the need arose he would be prepared to meet with the NATO Ambassadors. No matter how capable the permanent representatives were, and in our case we had capable representatives, there was no substitute in some circumstances for getting information first-hand, since everything could not be conveyed by cable. He thought that this procedure might be particularly applicable in Washington, London, Bonn, and Paris. In Paris, of course, the French Foreign Minister could meet with the permanent representatives in the Council.

NATO Military Organization

The Secretary said he was a little at a loss as to what to say on military matters. He would ask Mr. Smith to speak on the question of basic and applied research, since he was somewhat better posted on this subject. He did not wish to comment on matters of military organization in the absence of representatives of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Nuclear Weapons

As to nuclear weapons, the Secretary said it seemed to us that it would be a very wasteful use of our combined assets if at this stage one country after another were to undertake the long and expensive process of trying to make such weapons. The United Kingdom had done this, and he would not undertake to say whether this decision had been wise or not. If the other NATO countries were not to make such weapons, the nuclear weapons produced by the United States needed to be assured of use to a greater extent than heretofore. This should be done on a basis of impartiality, in light of the military judgment of SACEUR. He thought that something of this character could be worked out, although there were legal problems involved. As far as we were concerned, we did not think it possible to contemplate a situation in which there were first and second class powers in NATO.

This was exactly what B had asked for - see above

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The Secretary said that he knew that at the time of the London and Paris Agreements, and to some extent still, atomic weapons were regarded as something apart, both from a political and moral viewpoint. He did not think this would always be the situation. Nuclear materials were

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now a source of power, and in five or ten years would be running cities. He could not conceive of this material being all around us and not being used in war. On the contrary, he thought it certainly would be used. In the course of time the distinction between nuclear and other weapons would gradually break down. Of course, if agreement could be reached with the Soviet Union, it might be possible to do away with such weapons. Even so, they would be produced if there were a war. During the last war we produced them, starting with nothing. With existing materials, nuclear weapons could be produced in a few months or even a few weeks. The Secretary said that a moral stigma had been attached to nuclear weapons by the Soviets. While this had some basis, conventional weapons were also highly destructive. He thought, for example, that it was questionable whether the inhabitants of Tokyo were better off at the time that it was subjected to fire bombing than were the inhabitants of Hiroshima.

Making these weapons is, of course, a very costly process. United States production was increasing both in quality and quantity. We were getting them clean and making them smaller. We were doing this at enormous cost and it would be folly for all the countries of NATO to attempt to do this. [The converse of this was that there must be confidence that the weapons would be available for our NATO Allies in time of war.

The Secretary recalled that Herr von Brentano had said that the decision to use nuclear weapons should be a political one. This was true in the case of the United States with one exception. If a military force were attacked, the Commander had authority to use whatever means were at his disposal to protect his force from destruction. This would not mean that he would have a right to drop a bomb on Moscow, but if he had small tactical weapons, he would have a right to use them. With this exception, in our case as in the case of most other countries, the use of weapons is and should be a political decision.

Procedure at the NATO Meeting

With regard to the procedure at the NATO meeting, the Secretary said that the question of acting on the Annual Review prior to the meeting would be discussed again on the following Tuesday. He hoped that it would be decided to dispose of the Annual Review before the Heads of Government meeting. He thought that Herr von Brentano's suggestion regarding General Norstad was a good idea. He believed that this sort of thing had been done before and thought we would go along with whatever the majority wanted. As to the declaration, it was important that work should be done in advance. The declaration could not be written in the last few hours of the meeting as is usually done with a communique. He

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thought that M. Spaak was perhaps preparing a draft for discussion by the permanent representatives. If it were to be done by one person, M. Spaak was probably the best choice. The Secretary said he hoped he could get to Paris a day or two before the meeting, perhaps on the previous Sunday. It might be useful if some of the Ministers were in Paris before the meeting and could work with Spaak.

Scientific Cooperation in NATO

The Secretary asked Mr. Smith to discuss scientific cooperation. Mr. Smith said that as he understood it, Herr von Brentano had referred to three principal areas: (1) basic research; (2) applied research; and (3) design of long-range missiles. He thought that these presented different degrees of difficulty. As to basic research, we were studying the report of the NATO Task Force. We were in general agreement with it and thought we could be quite forthcoming at the Paris meeting. The field of applied research involves problems of greater difficulty, but they were ones which we believed were manageable. He thought we would have proposals to make in this area. The third area presented even greater difficulties, although we felt that good results were well within the order of possibility. It would be quite ridiculous if we did not tap European and particularly German talent, in view of the role Germany had played in the missile field. On the other hand, there were other problems involving proprietary rights, for example. One should not expect too rapid progress. He said that the United States would approach this matter sympathetically at the meeting.

In addition, Mr. Smith said that reference had been made to a joint venture with the French and Italians. As to this point, he could only echo what the Secretary had said. He did not think that this would be an economical use of resources. He suggested that agreements under Section 144(b) of the Atomic Energy Act might be a more practical approach. He pointed out the problem of designing warheads for ballistic missiles was extraordinarily complex. It had taken the United States ten years to develop a warhead for the intermediate range missile. The Secretary asked how much money it had cost us, remarking that it was probably between ten and twenty billion dollars. Mr. Smith said that we would have to take our entire investment into account. He thought that the cost could reasonably be estimated at \$12 billion.

AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN HERR VON BRENTANO AND THE SECRETARY

German Military Build-up

The Secretary said that Herr von Brentano had spoken of the Annual Review. He had been frank enough to recognize that the Federal Republic had been delinquent to some extent in connection with its own build-up. He hoped that some reassurance could be given to the NATO meeting on this point. This was something which was always being thrown at NATO and at us, because we were to some extent partners of the

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Federal Republic. He hoped that something could be said on this subject by the Chancellor. A good many countries, including the United States, would want to hear what the Federal Republic was proposing to do.

Herr von Brentano said that General Norstad was satisfied with and agreed with the plans for the build-up of the German forces. However, the new German Minister of Finance had drawn a very serious picture of the German financial situation when the matter had come up. Herr von Brentano suggested that Herr Etzel should come to the United States and talk with the Secretary and with the Secretary of the Treasury on the subject. When the German build-up had been discussed in the Defense Council, it had been estimated that the cost for 1958 would be DM 14 billion, for 1959 DM 17 billion, and for 1960 DM 21 billion. This was to be compared with an existing budget level of DM 9 billion. It was not clear how these sums could be raised. They would have to be raised in part by increasing taxes. This might cause difficulties with Parliament, but the Federal Government was resolved to push forward with the build-up, not only because of its treaty obligations but because it felt there was an urgent need for doing so.

Nuclear Weapons; Limited War

Herr von Brentano said he would like to raise two other points. The first was that he himself did not think that one could speak of a difference between conventional or nuclear war, nor could one draw a distinction between local and general wars. He could not conceive of war with conventional weapons with the Soviets because of their overwhelming superiority in this area. They would overrun Europe in a very short time.

The second point related to a decision to use nuclear weapons, which he previously had said should be a political decision. The Secretary had said that one exception must be made to this principle. He was in agreement with what the Secretary had said. However, one must not allow a feeling of discrimination to arise. If United States forces were to have the possibility of defending themselves with nuclear weapons, other Allied forces must have this possibility as well. Furthermore, if they did not have such weapons, the Russians might be tempted to start attacks in areas where they know the forces do not have such weapons. NATO could be strong only if people knew that all could defend themselves with the same weapons.

The Secretary said the whole purpose of what for convenience has been called the NATO atomic stockpile is to create conditions in which all will have an opportunity to get these weapons in case of need.

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The Secretary said that Herr von Brentano had remarked that no distinction could be made between local and general wars. He thought it was possible to envisage local wars. Herr von Brentano said he had not intended to generalize. If war broke out on the Soviet-German boundary, it could not be localized. However, not every local conflict need become a general war. The Secretary said that it was possible to envisage conflicts in the Far East with atomic weapons which need not involve general war.

Relations between Regional Security Organizations

The Secretary said one suggestion we were thinking of was some way of interlocking the various regional security organizations. This could perhaps be done by having observers from the various organizations attend meetings of the other organizations. This would have both advantages and disadvantages. The fact of the matter was that the world is becoming interlocked. While it is possible to have local wars, there is a danger that a local war would give rise to a general war. The idea of observers had been suggested by one of the organizations. We had reached no conclusion about it and had mentioned it to no one else. In fact, it had not yet been carefully considered in our own Government. The Secretary said he did not know whether it was wise or not, but he thought it was worth considering.

Herr von Brentano said that this was a new proposal on which he was not prepared to comment. In general, he thought it was useful to have contacts between the organizations and to exchange information. Some of the areas involved overlap. He thought the idea of observers was perhaps a good one.

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

The Secretary said he should perhaps say something about the question of supplying IREMs to other NATO countries. As he had said in his conversation with Herr von Brentano at his home, long-range bombers will be the most effective means of delivery until 1960. The United States has marked superiority over the Soviets in this field. Our missile program will be making good progress in 1960. We could accelerate it somewhat. If this were done, it would be more for psychological than for military reasons. By extreme effort, we could accelerate it to a point where the missiles would be in production in a little over a year. This would be extremely costly, however, and whether it would be worthwhile to spend the necessary money to accelerate to that degree had not yet been decided.

The Secretary said that these missiles involve two aspects. One is the production of the missile itself and the other is the creation of an ability to use it, which involves both establishing necessary installations and training people in its use. The second matter is extremely expensive in itself.

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