Memorandum of Conversation

Aspen Lodge
Camp David
DATE: March 20, 1959
3:60 – 4:140 p.m.

SUBJECT: Berlin, Summity, and Reply to Soviet March 2 Note.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Mr. Berter
Ambassador Whitney
General Goodpaster
Mr. Merchant

The Prime Minister
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Norman Brook
Sir Frederick Hoyat-Millar
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Bishop

COPIES TO:

S/S - 2
W - Mr. Dillon
G - Mr. Murphy
G - Mr. Reinhardt
S/P - Mr. Smith
EUR - Mr. Merchant

Ambassador London - Ambassador Whitney
Ambassador Bonn - Ambassador Bruce

The conversation then turned to Berlin. The President said that we would absolutely refuse to throw the West Berliners to the wolves.

The Prime Minister said that as he saw it there were two acceptable solutions for Berlin. First was to deal with the GDR on our access rights on the basis of an acknowledged agency relationship between them and the Soviets. The second was to negotiate a treaty that would be registered with the United Nations, which would guarantee our position in Berlin and the rights of access. This he would regard as an improvement over our present situation. There was some brief discussion as to what effect this would have on our fundamental rights acquired by conquest.

Reverting to the question of the relationship between a foreign ministers and a summit conference with the Soviets, the President suggested that Mr. Berter and Mr. Lloyd review the present language of our draft reply and see if there could not be inserted useful quotations from Khrushchev’s press release the day before to tie the Soviets to a commitment to genuinely attempt to achieve some progress at the Foreign Ministers level. It was agreed that this would be done though the danger was pointed out of relying on ticker reports of a press conference.

The President then said that a prolonged summit conference or a series of conferences would be impossible for him by reason of the requirements of our Constitution. It might be possible, however, he said, for him to go for two or three
three days at the opening and leave Vice President Nixon as his personal representative, returning himself at the conclusion of the conference if the results warranted it.

Mr. Macmillan then said, with general agreement, that we can't afford to have another show of the character of the last Geneva Summit Conference which was little more than an exchange of propaganda speeches. This is no way to approach serious negotiation. He felt that the foreign ministers should sharpen the issues and outline available choices. The Heads of Government could then negotiate in private with very few plenary sessions.

Mr. Harten pointed out that there were really two points at issue in our draft reply. One was the agenda and the other was the matter of a fixed date for the summit.

The President suggested that we stipulate that one of the duties of the Foreign Ministers was to explore opportunities for agreement and that dependent on their progress they could then agree on a date for the summit. He reiterated that he would not agree at this time to a fixed date and said that he thought "justify" was a good word to describe what was required of the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

Mr. Macmillan raised the question as to whether it would be possible to hold the summit conference in the United States presumably as a means of avoiding the constitutional difficulties of a prolonged absence of the President from the country. Specifically, he wondered if Newport wouldn't be a pleasant site.

The President indicated skepticism as to holding such a conference in the United States though he did mention San Francisco might be a possible location in light of its background as the scene of the foundation of the United Nations.

Mr. Harten raised the question of Czechoslovakian and Polish participation in the foreign ministers conference, and the Prime Minister replied that he liked our formula. The meeting thereupon ended at 4:40 p.m.