MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 467th Meeting of the National Security Council, in Atlanta, Georgia on Thursday, November 17, 1960

Present at the 467th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; and the Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles commented that "Castro-itis" was affecting Central America and parts of South America. Castro propaganda had certainly played a part in the recent revolts in that area. There was no evidence yet that Cuban "bodies" had been involved but there was no doubt of Cuban intrigue. Somoza says that he has hard evidence of Cuban involvement.

Mr. Dulles stated that the Guatemalan revolt was largely by disaffected army officers. Also, it was not yet over. The government has control of a key city on the road to Puerto Barrios. The revolutionists held Puerto Barrios for awhile. However, they have now been driven out into the hills but are still a menace. The government air force is worn out; it is still needed. Ydigoras, while he has suppressed this revolt for the present, cannot be sure to keep the top on the Guatemalan political volcano.
Mr. Dulles then turned to the Nicaraguan rebels who were based in Costa Rica. This was a most severe revolt but the action was concentrated near the border. The revolt has generally been put down. It included extreme Leftists who had been in Cuba.

Mr. Dulles reported that in El Salvador Leftist elements have now entrenched themselves in the government and were being encouraged by the Cuban Embassy. In Honduras also the Cuban Embassy was cultivating Leftist groups. There is a strong pro-Castro element in Venezuela although it has suffered a set-back. Betancourt still has considerable opposition.

Secretary Herter commented that the overall picture presented by Mr. Dulles was accurate but not pleasant. Mr. Herter said that he planned to take up with the President, after the NSC Meeting, the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan requests for U.S. help to prevent outside assistance to the rebels. Mr. Herter said that the Communists were taking full advantage of recent developments in Latin America. The OAS may call a consultative meeting, probably to name an investigative group. Secretary Herter said he was hopeful that this process would lead to the OAS taking specific sanctions against Cuba. He said that the OAS Peace Commission was headed by a Mexican and had a number of Leftists on it. Therefore, the U.S. preferred the appointment of an investigative committee.

Mr. Dulles then turned to South Vietnam where a coup attempted by a paratroop brigade had failed. It was on the point of success and might have succeeded if it had been alert. However, the Vietnamese army has now moved in and taken over. Mr. Dulles said that this development had caused one OCB Member (subsequently identified as Secretary Merchant) to question whether the U.S. should stop training paratroops. Diem was now under pressure to broaden his government but he also had counter-pressures to take action against the leaders of the revolt. This was an unsettled situation which offered an opportunity for North Vietnam to step up guerrilla activities.

Mr. Dulles said that Laos seems to have reached a point of decision. The government has been somewhat weakened by Phoumi's take-over of Luang Prabang. Souvanna Phouma is now taking a more definite anti-American tone.
Secretary Herter commented that, regarding Diem, press statements promising reforms had unfortunately been made by his brother. This brother and his sister had been the target of many popular objections to the Diem government.

Mr. Dulles reported that in Thailand there are rumors that discontented army officers are planning a move against Sarit. Sarit, based on some false rumors, has recently attempted a more conciliatory attitude toward the USSR.

Regarding Algeria, Mr. Dulles said that De Gaulle's decision to hold a plebiscite probably would make the army very unhappy. Developments may be moving during the next two months toward a crisis in the Algerian situation which will bring things to a head. Mr. Dulles believed that De Gaulle's proposal would probably get support in both France and Algeria but it would definitely have the opposition of the colonists and of the army in Algeria.

Secretary Herter said that we have information that De Gaulle's attitude has changed radically and that he is now moving toward a realistic solution. However, he will not tell us just what he plans. In the UN there is a build-up of heavy support for a UN referendum in Algeria but we have not been given the information by De Gaulle which we need to support French plans. Mr. Herter said he was hopeful that before the UN situation comes to a head, we will have better material from the French.

In answer to the President's question as to why the U.S. delegation to the UN should not make a suggestion for a reasonable solution, Secretary Herter said we were doing this and had sent word about it to Couve de Murville.

The President, reverting to the Central American situation, said that it seems to him that we have got to make strong representations to the governments there that each must make proposals within its country which will rival those of Castro. The President thought that Estensoreno and, he believed, Frondizi were trying to do this but they were not explaining their proposals to the people well enough for them to understand. The President thought that they should develop proposals which will break down Castro's influence among the more ignorant parts of the populace. Secretary
Herter said that Ydigoras is about to do this in Guatemala

... Mr. McConne suggested emphasizing the hardships of the Cuban people. The President said that the Latin Americans do not believe them, even the governments. The governments are now saying that Castro, as a revolutionist, still has tremendous prestige although as a statesman he has lost position. Even when you show the other Latin Americans the facts, they do not seem impressed.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to recent developments regarding Central and South America, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Algeria.

2. NATO IN THE 1960's
(NIE 20-60; SNIE 20-2-60; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO", dated November 10, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 2149, 2204-c, 2274, 2292 and 2323; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Increased Nuclear Sharing With Allies", dated August 23, 1960; NSC 6017; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "NATO in the 1960's", dated November 16, 1960; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Special NSC Meeting", dated November 16, 1960)

Mr. Gray briefly explained the background of the report on the subject which was being considered by the Council and asked Secretary Herter if he would like to summarize it. Secretary Herter suggested instead that the Council deal with the urgent issues since the paper as a whole would have to be reviewed further before being put to the President for final approval.

Mr. Gray then asked whether there was agreement on the proposal that the U.S. commit itself to maintain available for NATO those nuclear weapons required for approved NATO military plans. After a brief explanation of this proposal by Secretary Herter, no disagreement was expressed to this proposal.
Secretary Herter said that he thought everybody had the same objective in this matter. He, however, hesitated to put the plan forward as a firm proposal at the NATO meeting on December 15 because he felt that to make it effective, it would require (1) Congressional approval and (2) approval of the incoming administration. He thought it doubtful that you could get clearances on this matter in time. If such clearances could be gotten, he would be delighted but if we are to make specific proposals, these clearances should be obtained during the next two weeks so that our allies could have in the neighborhood of two weeks before the NATO meeting to consider it. The issue was really a question of presentation; namely, how do we answer the question as to whether the U.S. Government will feel the same way six weeks after the NATO meeting. Obviously, we will have to say that U.S. approval would be subject to Congressional action.

Secretary Gates said that, speaking philosophically, he felt that this administration had an obligation and an opportunity to wind up with a firm proposal on this subject with whatever caveats are necessary. Obviously, we cannot deliver because of the need for a change in the law. Besides, there are two separate phases anyway. He thought this was a very imaginative idea and he was afraid that, if we put this only in for discussion at NATO, we will not be clearing up our proper business. The next President may reverse anything we do, but we should present this proposal as the best opinion of the people who have been working in this field all these years.

The President commented that we almost always have to say to our allies that we will have to get legal authority for our proposals. He saw no reason why we should not say that, under certain assumptions, these are the things we think ought to be done.

Secretary Herter noted that the paper under Council consideration says that Congressional action would be required. This could go hand in hand with Executive action and he believed it provided enough of a caveat.

The President said that this administration should not hesitate to say what we think is good for NATO. After all, the next administration may not even agree to the general concept of NATO. Secretary Herter commented that it would not hurt his feelings if the President said we should make this a firm proposal.

Mr. Stans said that there was some ambiguity as to what is intended since the paper glosses over the question of financing.
He noted that we are proposing to deploy five POLARIS submarines by 1963 and not to withdraw them without North Atlantic Council agreement. Secretary Gates pointed out that our commitment not to withdraw was effective only if NATO agreed to the second phase.

Mr. Stans said that the five POLARIS submarines would probably cost about $500 million and then we were proposing 100 additional missiles. Secretary Gates noted that the latter missiles were to be bought by the NATO countries. Mr. Stans said that the paper still did not indicate what was meant by "multilateral financing" in Paragraph 3-b. The President noted that this would still have to be worked out.

Mr. Stans said that he, nevertheless, thought that the cost to us and others ought to be indicated. Secretary Gates said that this was impossible except on the five U.S. POLARIS submarines because we do not know the configuration of the remainder and do not know whether they will be land or sea based.

In answer to Mr. Stans' question as to whether the five POLARIS submarines were within the approved POLARIS program, Secretary Gates said that he had asked the President this question and did not yet have a definite answer. Secretary Gates thought that we would be producing POLARIS submarines at the rate of about five per year for the next few years. He thought we could handle the NATO submarines by lending them as they are ready and then arranging to pay back the U.S. program. We might contribute one at a time and replace it in the budget as we go along. Technically, he admitted, that this meant the five submarines were additional to the present program. The President said he agreed with the proposal for the five POLARIS submarines being deployed to NATO.

In answer to Mr. Stans' question as to whether we were agreeing not to withdraw them, Secretary Gates said that there would be no conditions on that deployment (it would be the same as the Sixth Fleet) until NATO goes along with the second phase. Secretary Gates thought that if we could get a NATO MRBM force, we would probably want to be tied up in it.

Secretary Herter said that the basic problem was a fear of NATO that if the Soviets attack Europe only, we would not join with them. This proposal would give NATO its own deterrent strength.

In answer to Mr. Stans' question as to whether this constituted a precedent, the President commented that there was
no precedent in the first phase. He added, however, that he thought it would be a good deal if we could get the second phase force in being down the road. Mr. McConne said that he thought we would have to make a commitment to NATO regarding tactical missiles.

The President said that he had recently been listening to the views of Robert Bowie and others and he thought that we must have the right to sell nuclear weapons to our allies if we feel they needed them. The President asked Secretary Gates as to what the proportion of expense would be in the MRBM program over the years.

Secretary Gates said that we were not committing ourselves in principle until NATO agreed to a 100 missile force and made it subject to NATO control. Only then would we put our five submarines under NATO control. Meanwhile, we have no commitment affecting the freedom of our sovereignty until NATO agrees to the second phase. Mr. Gates admitted that he thinks there is a real question as to whether Congress will ever agree to NATO control as proposed in the second phase because it involves a constitutional issue.
Mr. Stans noted that Paragraph 6 of the proposal says that NATO should parallel the MRBM advances with strengthening of other forces. He felt that there was no request for a concession to reduce NATO requirements in any other respect if the MRBM proposal was agreed.

Mr. Irwin said that Defense did think it might be possible to reduce aircraft requirements. He pointed out, however, that NATO has no defense against missiles. If NATO knows that there is no such defense, the European members' support of NATO will deteriorate if we take the position that they can have no missiles with a 1000-1500 mile range. We would then be saying that they have no defense and no offense and we do not think it necessary for them to have either. Mr. Irwin thought this position would fracture the alliance.

The President said that as he sees it, until there is some basic change in the world situation, there is no escape from the arms race. What we ought to be talking about are the millions that we spend at home which cut into our budget as we strain for an adequate defense. We seem to be licked on the need not only for butter and eggs but also champagne while we continue to spend heavily for world defense.

Mr. Stans noted that as we do this, we and others are also being urged to build up our conventional forces. Secretary Gates said that he disagreed with any concept that conventional forces were needed for a limited war in Europe. Mr. Stans thought that if the MRBM proposal led to a reconsideration of conventional forces, we might achieve a better balance. He thought the U.S. had still made no judgment as to the effect of the planned Russian demobilization on our requirements. He thought that the Russian
demobilization would certainly change their mobilization potential. Secretary Gates thought that there was no real change in the threat to NATO. Mr. Dulles said that the Russian demobilization seemed to be slowing down. Mr. Stans said that if they, nevertheless, go through with it, they will be changing to a nuclear threat to NATO. He still felt we should study the implications of the proposed Russian demobilization.

The President remarked that at yesterday's press conference, he had been asked if the reduction in dependents overseas indicated that the U.S. was planning any redeployment of forces. He had reminded them that our deployment to Europe was originally considered an interim emergency matter. He thought it was high time that we should say to the Europeans that with their 225 million people, they should do more so that we could bring some of our troops out. The only flaw is the fact that De Gaulle is keeping 600 thousand French troops in Algeria. The President noted that Foster Dulles was always against any reduction in our forces in Europe because he thought it would break up the alliance. That is why the President had been obliged to remind the press conference yesterday that our deployment was originally an emergency measure.

Mr. McCone thought one way to solve that problem might be to give the Europeans their own nuclear deterrent. After all, they were only spending one-third to one-half of what we are spending on our military forces.

The President stated that he had no objection whatever to the proposed MRBM program. He thought it should be put forward but he thought we should put it in the context that we are going to cut down on some other things.

Secretary Herter said that the Europeans already suspect that we are going to cut down our forces in Europe. The President noted that State and Defense have always said that if we cut our European forces at all, it will result in the neutralization of Europe. Secretary Gates noted that we have recently been putting the pressure on the Europeans to live up to MC-70 and we have been pretty successful in getting them to build their forces. He agreed with the President, however, that we should not be locked in concrete on our European forces forever. Secretary Herter admitted that he could not visualize a war in Europe which would not lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Gates noted that the cost of maintaining U.S. forces at their present level was so high that it left only
about $5 billion in the Defense budget for modernization. He thought that there were still too many people in the military services and too many deployed overseas. The President thought that we should figure out a plan which was reasonable over the long term. At the time this was going on, we should also try to cut other expenses in Europe. Secretary Herter expressed the hope that we would not cut our forces while the Berlin threat remained.

The President commented that if Europe was going neutral, we had better find it out now. He said that he did not mean for us to deny our responsibilities because we had established our defense line in Europe but we should not have to do it all. He noted that the Europeans had built up their industry to the point where they can compete very successfully with us.

Mr. Patterson asked whether the MREM proposal would not put the pressure on the Europeans to put up more forces and Secretary Gates agreed. The President said that this sounded like the theory of giving a spoiled child ten more dollars to do what he should. Secretary Gates pointed out that we would not give up our control of our submarines until NATO agreed to build theirs. In answer to Mr. Stans question, Secretary Gates repeated that we would keep U.S. control of those POLARIS submarines until the second phase had been agreed upon. Mr. Stans said he thought it was wishful thinking to believe that NATO would also build up its conventional forces.

The President said that he wanted to leave a legacy of the finest ideas and plans this administration could develop. He thought that we must think what is the proper balance during the next six weeks. We should develop programs and plans that we think are feasible and that Congress would not feel it had to cut down.

Mr. Gray asked Mr. McConie if he wished to press the AEC proposal regarding Paragraph 2 of the MREM paper, that the U.S. should decide under what conditions it would be willing to release the POLARIS submarines for NATO use. Mr. McConie said that while he wanted that AEC view noted, he was enthusiastic about the MREM program. He thought that making the use of the submarines subject to North Atlantic Council agreed procedures left the question of conditions open. Mr. Gray pointed out that the bracketed phrase in Paragraph 2 was now to be deleted and Mr. McConie said that this made the proposal O.K. from his viewpoint.
Mr. Gray then asked whether the President felt that representatives of the next administration should be informed before the MREB proposal is made to NATO. The President thought that we should make clear to NATO that this is what we are suggesting but that the next administration may change it.

Mr. Scribner pointed out that Paragraph 6 says that the U.S. as well as other NATO nations should strengthen its conventional forces. The President said that the first sentence of Paragraph 6 should say that "the U.S. believes that other NATO nations" should strengthen conventional forces.

Mr. Gray then called on Mr. McCon to explain his view about the inadequacy of existing NATO stockpile arrangements. Mr. McCon said that he had recently examined bases in NATO and, realizing our heavy dependence on nuclear weapons, he believed that the procedures do not permit a proper response due to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. He thought this problem should be re-examined urgently, recognizing that any changes will require amendment of the law.

The President said that his idea was that we must get every single modification in the law that will allow a quick response but not delegate it to someone who would inadvertently start a war. He thought we should get the change in the law and then provide regulations which will prevent unfortunate accidents.

General Lemnitzer said that our missile bases are distributed and not concentrated. He said that the present arrangements were satisfactory to General Norstad. However, General Lemnitzer said he would like to go into this matter further with Mr. McCon.
Mr. McCone said he was not critical of what our military were doing in Europe. They were only living up to the requirements of the law.

Secretary Hertel noted that the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was going over to Europe and that this trip might prove helpful. He thought, however, that it would be desirable if Mr. McCone could join the Committee on the trip. Mr. McCone indicated that he might be able to do so for a few days.

Mr. Gray suggested that the Record show that Defense and JCS and the Chairman, AEC, should re-examine NATO stockpile arrangements in order to see what changes in the law might be required to give assurance of prompt and proper response. The President agreed and thought we should leave a legacy of thought about all such restrictive laws which we think are very bad. He cited the requirement of notifying the Joint Committee on certain decisions 60 days before they could be put into effect. The President thought possibly Mr. Kennedy could get some of these changed during the "honeymoon" period with Congress.
Secretary Herter asked if the MIBM proposal could be worked out and made available to NATO about ten days in advance of the December 15 meeting. The President agreed. General Lemnitzer reported that the Joint Chiefs were in full agreement on the MIBM proposal, noting that the U.S. in the first phase keeps control of the submarines. General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs feel very strongly that the proposal should be put forward to NATO as a firm proposal.
As the President was leaving the meeting, Mr. Gray recommended to him and the President approved that the remainder of the State-Defense report (NSC 6017) be referred to the Planning Board for further study and recommendation.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed certain issues contained in a report on the subject (NSC 6017), prepared by the Departments of State and Defense, in response to the reference NSC Actions calling for reports on (a) The Future of NATO; (b) The Roles and Contributions of the United States and Other NATO Nations; (c) Future NATO Nuclear Capabilities and the Problem of Nuclear Sharing; on the basis of a presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of certain policy issues (identified by the reference memoranda of November 16, 1960) connected with U.S. planning and guidance required for U.S. participation in the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meetings, as indicated below.

b. Noted the President's approval of the presentation at the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meeting of the following firm U.S. proposals, subject to the caveat regarding necessary U.S. Congressional action:

(1) The United States will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area (including Turkey), under U.S. custody, such U.S. nuclear weapons as are furnished for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans.

(2) The NATO MREM proposal (contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum on the subject, "Special

*See NSC Action No. 2336-c for a further agreement on the procedure to be used at the forthcoming NAC meeting.
f. Referred the subject report (NSC 6017) and related memoranda to the NSC Planning Board for further study and comment on policy issues not covered by the above actions, with particular reference to consideration of studies looking toward a long-term plan to reduce U.S. force deployments and expenditures in Europe.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, JCS, and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate implementation.

The actions in d and e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
NSC Meeting", dated November 16, 1960), subject to the following amendments:

(a) Paragraph 2, page 1: Delete the bracketed phrase and the footnotes thereto.

(b) Paragraph 3, page 1: In the third line insert the words "buy and" between "therefore" and "contribute".

(c) Paragraph 3-a, page 2: Delete the Defense version; include the State version, deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto; and add a new footnote reading as follows:

"As indicated above, the multilateral financing of the 100 additional MREMIs will be exclusive of U.S. participation."

(d) Paragraph 3-c, page 2: Delete the footnote thereto.

(e) Paragraph 4, page 3: Revise the third and fourth lines to read as follows:

"would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement by sale of POLARIS missiles and of the required equipment".

(f) Paragraph 6, page 3: Revise the first line to read as follows:

"6. The United States emphasizes that other NATO nations should undertake".

In the third line, substitute "their" for "its".

c. Noted the President's directive that the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, arrange for a re-examination of present NATO stockpile procedures in order to indicate what legislative changes might be required to give assurance of a prompt and proper response within the short reaction times of missile warfare.