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(a) use of atomic bomb in Korea in the event hostilities are initiated by the Reds;

(b) the advisability of my delivering the proposed talk before the UN on the afternoon of December eighth;

(d) possible visit by the Queen Mother to the United States in the fall of 1954. This was mentioned privately to me by Anthony Eden, and did not come up while the four of us were talking together.
They apparently cling to the hope (to us fatuous) that if we avoid the first use of the atom bomb in any war, that the Soviets might likewise abstain.

Our thinking, on the other hand, has come a long way past this kind of conjecture and hope. Specifically we have come to the conclusion that the atom bomb has to be treated just as another weapon in the arsenal. More important than this, we are certain in our own minds that the Soviets will do whatever they calculate their own best interests dictate. If they refrain from using the atom bomb, it will be for one reason only -- because they believe that their position would be relatively worse in atom warfare than if this type of warfare were not employed.

This is one point in which there seems to be no divergence of opinion whatsoever between Eden and Sir Winston. I told them that quite naturally in the event of war, we would always hold up enough to establish the fact before the world that the other was clearly the aggressor, but I also gave my conviction that anyone who held up too long in the use of his assets in atomic weapons might suddenly find himself subjected to such wide-spread and devastating attack that retaliation would be next to impossible.
BERMUDA (dictation 12/6/53) - 3.

The devastating effect to be expected from an all-out surprise offensive featuring the atom bomb, is something that must be regarded with the gravest concern by countries such as ours -- which themselves will never initiate the war.
Mr. Churchill had still not read the text of the draft we furnished to him the day we got here, but he has promised that by eleven o'clock today we would get from word as to his idea about the talk. So far as I am concerned this is not particularly annoying, because I am of two minds on the thing myself.
I told Anthony that we would at the White House be prepared to entertain the Queen Mother overnight or longer if she wanted to stay, and would do anything necessary to make her visit to Washington as comfortable as possible.
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(b) the advisability of my delivering the proposed talk before the UN on the afternoon of December eighth;

(c) opportunity of the British to manufacture planes with proper specifications to transport atom bombs of the type built by Americas. As a second part of this same question was the expressed hope that pending the time that the United Kingdom would have a satisfactory stockpile of its own, the United States government would maintain at appropriate bases of its own, an additional reserve in atom bomb equipment so that in the event of war, the British could drawn upon us to participate in the action. (This subject was primarily discussed during a morning conversation with Lord Cherwell and Admiral Strauss. It was mentioned only briefly at the dinner meeting.);

(d) possible visit by the Queen Mother to the United States in the fall of 1954. This was mentioned privately to me by Anthony Eden, and did not come up while the four of us were talking together.

With respect to the possible use of the atom bomb, the British thinking -- apparently both governmental and personal thinking -- still
BERMUDA (dictation 12/6/53) - 2.

looks upon the possible use of the atom bomb as the initiation of a completely new era in war. Even more than this, it looks upon any decision of this kind as a policy question of the gravest import. This feeling unquestionably arises out of the fact that up until this time the British have had no atom bombs and because of their experience in World War II, they see themselves as the initial, and possibly principal, target of a Soviet bomb offensive. They apparently cling to the hope (to us fatuous) that if we avoid the first use of the atom bomb in any war, that the Soviets might likewise abstain.

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Both the British stated time and again that they had no thought of recoiling from necessary decisions in this regard; their idea seems to be that there should be, probably will be, a sufficient time immediately after the outbreak of war to make necessary decisions. I carefully explained to Anthony (it has gotten to be almost impossible to explain anything to Mr. Churchill, who seems deliberately to use his deafness to avoid hearing anything he does not want to hear) that we must not ever forget for an instant that while a dictatorship has the power of instantaneous decision, the democracies normally have to act more slowly for two reasons: (a) within each country we have established processes that normally require some time to give validity to any serious decision, and (b) our coalition is bound together on the principle of equal partnership, which means that the formulation of any fixed decision usually takes quite a bit of time. Our feeling is that in view of these circumstances, such decisions as can be taken prior to the beginning of a war, should be taken, and that only minimum dependence should be placed upon opportunity for discussion and consultation after the initial attack against us takes place.

The talks on this point were long and my feeling is the British believe now that we should work out some agreed-upon code and understanding that would so operate as to place us in an embarrassing position of inaction in the event of emergency.
This is a subject that must be followed up because there must be no misunderstanding about it.

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* * * * * * * *

Admiral Strauss and Lord Cherwell are going to follow-up to discover whether it is not possible in the course of the legitimate exchange of information to give the British the data they need in manufacturing their new bombing types. They will follow up in all directions necessary so as to assure in the event of war we get the best possible use of British forces in the carrying on of atomic warfare, as well as conventional warfare.
BERMUDA dictation 12/6/53. - 5.


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D.D.E.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AFTER DINNER WITH
CHANCELLOR ADENAUER (BONN)
(with only the interpreter additionally present)

I said that the question of financial relations with
France would probably be coming to a head very shortly as
far as the United States was concerned, and at the time of
the International Bank meeting, Faure and others would be in
Washington, and that we were debating what line to take. I
asked the Chancellor what his own ideas were. He recommended
that we should not give the French economy too serious a
shock by a total cut-off of aid. He felt that in this event
Mendes-France might feel that he had no recourse but to go
entirely into the Communist camp. The Chancellor said we
should turn the spigot so as to reduce the flow, but that
there still should be a flow which Mendes-France would realize
would be increased or decreased according to his own behavior.

I asked the Chancellor whether he thought I was doing
right by not going to Paris. He said he was convinced that
this was the right step. He said it was a rather bold
and courageous step and he felt that in the long run it would probably do good rather than harm, although probably Mendes-France would feel that there was something personal directed against him.

I asked the Chancellor what his impression was of Eden's visit and whether he got any impression that Eden was trying to build up a "third force" as between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Chancellor said he gained no such impression, but on the contrary got from Eden the impression that Eden was very much worried about the Soviet threat and the importance of building a solid resistance against it. He said that Eden had implied that Churchill's plans to meet with the Russians were now definitely off and he did not think that the "coexistence" theme would be developed by the British capital.

The Chancellor several times referred to the 1956 elections in France as an event to which he attached much hope in the belief that at that time there would be returned a much smaller number of Communists and de Gaulists, and that there would then really be a chance to consummate European integration as long as we could keep the idea alive in the interval so that it would be an issue in the French 1956 elections.

He referred in the warmest terms to my coming. He said that: I had been to him an "angel from heaven". It had helped a good deal in handling and minimizing the John case, and in general had been greatly welcomed by the German people. He contrasted the turnout and warmth in the reception he had observed as I drove from the airport to Bonn and said that this
was very different from Eden’s arrival. He said that everything was spontaneous and that nothing had been prearranged.

The Chancellor referred to the great importance he attached to what he referred to as "interim measures" looking toward German rearmament. He said that he had been very much concerned over the report brought back to him by Hallstein and Blankenhorn as a result of their talk with Mr. Merchant and Mr. Bowie. They had reported to the Chancellor that we would do anything along these lines unless the French concurred and that we accepted the French power of veto over any interim measures. I said I thought there must be some misunderstanding. At this point, I asked that Mr. Merchant be brought into the talks. Mr. Merchant then appeared.

Mr. Merchant stated that in the conversation he and Mr. Bowie had had before dinner with Hallstein, the point which he had tried to make was that in the past the United States had suffered its disappointments in making certain commitments and taking certain actions in advance of French ratification, and that he did not believe, assuming an agreement on German entry into NATO was reached with France, that the United States necessarily be the first to ratify. This point was not related to the matter of interim measures.

It was confirmed to the Chancellor that on the assumption the French agreed to the general program which had been discussed for restoration of German sovereignty and rearmament, there would be no problem concerning embarking at once on so-called interim measures in so far as the United States was concerned. On the other hand, if the French refused to agree to this program, then the United States was prepared, together with the British, to restore sovereignty to Germany to the extent it lay within their power, and to start immediately jointly with the British the interim measures looking toward rearmament.

Hallstein immediately asked whether or not the United States would be prepared to embark on interim measures if the French agreed in principle to the program, but objected specifically to taking any interim action prior to approval of the program by the French Assembly. In reply, he was told that, under the situation which he described, the United States would be prepared nevertheless to inaugurate the interim measures jointly with the British.

The Chancellor and Hallstein seemed relieved and extremely pleased with this explanation of our intentions.

S. JPDulles:ma

TOP-SECRET
Personal and Private
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AFTER DINNER WITH CHANCELLOR ADENAUER (BORM) (with only the interpreter additionally present)

I asked the Chancellor to give me frankly his estimate of Mendes-France. The Chancellor said that he thought that he was a man wholly without scruples, and that while he thought that he would try to get all the advantage he could out of playing with the Communists, he was doing this as a matter of expediency and not because he was himself a believer in Communism or a tool of the Communists. He thought that we should bear in mind that while Mendes-France was quite ready to double cross us, he would be equally ready to double cross the Communists. He had no doubt that Mendes-France had made a number of commitments or reached understandings with Molotov at Geneva, but that he did not think that Mendes-France would necessarily carry them out. He said that one element to be taken into account was that Mendes-France was very sensitive personally, and that he had in this respect certain of the Jewish characteristics. He emphasized that in saying this he did not want to imply that he himself had any anti-Jewish prejudice. Quite the contrary, he had been helped and befriended, he said, by certain Jews in his earlier days. He thought that Mendes-France was primarily susceptible to economic pressures.

I said that the question of financial relations with France would probably be coming to a head very shortly as far as the United States was concerned, and at the time of the International Bank meeting, Favre and others would be in Washington, and that we were debating what line to take. I asked the Chancellor what his own ideas were. He recommended that we should not give the French economy too serious a shock by a total cut-off of aid. He felt that in this event Mendes-France might feel that he had no recourse but to go entirely into the Communist camp. The Chancellor said we should turn the spigot so as to reduce the flow, but that there still should be a flow which Mendes-France would realize would be increased or decreased according to his own behavior.

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The Chancellor, in a way which was to me somewhat obscure and devious, said that he had had reports to the effect that the High Commissioner was making bad reports to Washington about his, Adenauer's, Government. He said that this had worried him very much. I said that what he said meant nothing at all to me; that I was not aware of anything of the kind nor could I imagine what it was that had thus been brought to Adenauer's attention.

The Chancellor several times referred to the 1956 elections in France as an event to which he attached much hope in the belief that at that time there would be returned a much smaller number of Communists and de Gaullists, and that there would then really be a chance to consummate European integration as long as we could keep the idea alive in the interval so that it would be an issue in the French 1956 elections.

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MEMORANDUM OF TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT

December 14, 1954

1. I spoke of the suggestion made by Lodge that the Department of Defense and the Military be asked to refrain from activities in relation to Communist-held U.S. prisoners without first clearing with the State Department. The President said he would send a memorandum on this to Wilson.

2. I reported to the President Aldrich's talk with Eden and then submitted a suggestion to the President as to how he might reply to the portion of Churchill's letter which related to a possible top-level meeting with the Russians. The President looked this over and was in accord with the general approach. He kept my draft for his own use.

4. I showed the President a proposed statement by him with reference to retention of U.S. forces in Europe, etc., if the London-Paris Accords were adopted. This was parallel to the statement he had made on EDC. The President read this and said that, while he agreed in substance, he doubted very much the wisdom of making this statement in advance of French and German action. It would look as though we were in effect trying to bribe them to take action which was in their own interest.
5. I then went on to discuss the Saar situation and I showed the President cable 1713 from Bonn. The President indicated his great concern that this Saar situation was breaking open again. He felt we could not desert the Germans on this issue. We could get along without France but not without Germany. He suggested, however, that he would be willing to have us make the statement on U.S. troops (see above) as a part of a bargain dealing with Saar matter.

6. I reported that I had been working on a paper on the possible distribution of FOA activities if it were liquidated and said that we might be discussing this with Humphrey, Stassen and Anderson on this trip. He approved.

7. I said that the Italian Foreign Minister wanted me to lunch with him Thursday. I said I had declined but would call on him. I expected that he would bring up the matter of a possible visit on the part of Scelba. After some discussion, it was agreed that this would be acceptable, although I raised the question as to whether it should not also be clear that the visit was approved by Fanfani, who might be an important rival and perhaps a more effective Prime Minister than Scelba.

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8. I said that I would be unable to comment on the draft State of the Union speech before Monday, and the President agreed to give me this extension of time.

9. The following appointments were approved:

Cooper for India.

Stevens for the Philippines if it was clearly developed by Wilson that Stevens wanted the position.

Holmes for Iran if Brownell would be prepared at the Foreign Relations Committee hearing to testify that he knew of no moral impediment which should prevent his confirmation.

Ferguson for some special assignment such as the job offered to Milton Eisenhower which he at the luncheon declined on the ground that it was too early.

Wilcox as Special Assistant on the Charter Review matter.

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3. I discussed the policy involved in the NATO MC 48 paper. I said that I doubted the wisdom of having a political fracas about this at the time when vitally important decisions were pending in France and Germany. I said I thought the important thing was not to get tied down by political machinery which might not work. I felt that, if in fact the military planning proceeded in accordance with this paper, events would take care of the political decisions, particularly if the United States was not bound to others and had its own freedom of action that would do the necessary because it would be our troops that would have the atomic weapons which they would be able to use in their own defense and that would be decisive.

The President agreed that this was a good approach and suggested I discuss it as promptly as possible with Gruenther.

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S JFDulles:ma
January 17, 1962

Outline for Talk to NSC, January 18, 1962

1. Object of the talk:

   a. to be sure that the senior officers of the Executive Branch, in National Security affairs, all have some understanding of our major policies. We are a team -- and it is essential that all of us work together in the same direction. You and your immediate subordinates have a real need-to-know what we are trying to do.

   b. to ensure that we are all clear about the basic positions we shall be urging and explaining with Congress and with public opinion. I know that each of you gets regular information on decisions and policies in his own area, but it is important for those of us who circulate among members of Congress and the press and foreign embassies to be sure we know the Government's policy.

2. Basic Foreign Policy

   It is not just talk when we say in the State of the Union message that our object is a world of free and interdependent states. That is exactly what we want and what the Communists cannot tolerate.

   Nor is it just talk that we can stand to have them choose for themselves. We are proud of our improved relations with countries like India, in spite of the Goa episode; and the annoyance of the Belgrade meeting does not prevent us from seeking useful connections even with noisy neutrals.

   We do not recognize any flat priority as between one group of friends and another. Circumstances will have to guide us in individual cases. Nevertheless we do rate very highly the problem of

3. Unity and Strength in the Atlantic Community

   You all know of the trade fight that is ahead, and you know also of the standing test in Berlin. Let me just say that these are obviously of the first importance.
At the same time, we must all be alert against the self-interested noises made by even friendly governments from time to time. We must not be pushed around by German or French or British propaganda, and we must be careful to frame our policies in terms of American interests and American leadership. We are bound to pay the price of leadership -- we may as well have some of its advantages. So it is American policy that we must work for. Fortunately, in Europe, it is pretty clear. We mean to hold our own in Berlin; we mean to work for increased European unity; we mean to strengthen conventional forces; we mean to keep the nuclear deterrent up-to-date. This last one, I know, opens complex problems, and I am glad that many of you are at work on them.

4. Basic Military Policy

(This is an edgy one, but I believe a few sentences would be enormously helpful in setting the stage for further work by others)

We have, as you know, greatly reinforced the national defense forces. We have done this both in conventional and in nuclear forces. But you should understand that I do not believe in general war as the answer to every situation in which we have a temporary or local inferiority. I believe in maintaining our nuclear forces: first, as a deterrent against any nuclear madness by the enemy and, second, as a restraint upon adventures that would be so important as to require drastic response from us. But I do not believe in any "full first-strike capability," and I do not subscribe to the doctrine of long-term "nuclear superiority." I am always ready to hear argument on these matters, but what I have heard so far convinces me that in the long run we are headed for a nuclear stalemate -- always assuming we can avoid a nuclear holocaust. It is for this reason that I am so strong a supporter of revived and reinforced conventional forces. And for similar reasons I am a strong believer in a really drastic increase in our counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency, anti-subversive military and para-military capabilities. I have just signed a memorandum giving special duties in this area to an interdepartmental group under General Taylor, and I expect urgent effort here by all concerned. This is the real threat we face today -- as long as we maintain effective deterrent strength we need not worry about general war, in my judgment -- and on this one we need to do a lot more than we yet have.
This military policy is likely to involve us in some combat with the Congress this year. Sentiment for more missiles and more nuclear weapons is pretty strong -- I don't think such sentiment can be rationally defended, but there it is. You should all know that Mr. McNamara and I have set our force goals after a most careful analysis of all that the potential enemy is doing or may be able to do. The totals we have set are all we need -- with a comfortable margin of safety. To be honest with you, we would probably be safe with less -- but we believe in an ample safety factor. The United States is in no danger whatever of falling "behind" in this area. Our intelligence reports, and our accelerated programs, give ground for confidence on this vital matter. We plan to keep ahead -- as far ahead as it makes any sense to try to be, in the thermonuclear age.

5. Basic Economic Policies

This Administration is strongly in favor of foreign aid -- and we are asking a lot of it this year. Let me emphasize, however, that our whole position on this one is a cool and practical one. I do not want to find any of us backing programs that just cannot be defended in Congress, and I think our whole policy on AID should be to show that businesslike, hardheaded, energetic, and practical administration is not only what we intend -- but what gets results.

Just as an example of what I mean: I think that as far as possible our Development Loans should carry some visible rate of interest. It is not the money that matters; it is the evidence of hard-headed seriousness. It is easier not to charge interest, but it is shortsighted from the point of view of long-term Congressional support.

On the other hand I do not expect our Administration to shy away from all unpopular decisions in the AID field on domestic political grounds. It is a matter of judgment. Training Yugoslav pilots turns out to be more trouble than it's worth -- we can and will stop that, with the full support of Ambassador Kennan. But modest development loans for Yugoslavia are another matter; I believe we should go ahead with them. When you are in doubt on a matter of this sort, take the time to send the question upstairs -- that is the sort of judgment I get paid to make, and the White House is now geared to arrange prompt decisions. (FYI, this is said by the old hands to be a major change from the olden times.)
But our biggest problem is TRADE. Here we have a major set of proposals to put through, and the whole Administration will be needed. But rather than make a speech about that today, I am asking Mr. Ball and Mr. Petersen to make very sure that all of you -- and many more of our senior officers -- are fully informed so that you can bear a hand whenever you get a chance.

6. Some Specific Current Problems

a. The Congo

We have every reason to be clear and proud about our Congo policy, but we also need to speak about it with one voice. The object has not been to "crush Tshombe," or to back every last action of the UN. The object has been to find a decent path toward peace and to prevent Soviet infiltration. In this the UN has been indispensable, unless we were to have a dangerous great-power confrontation, or a split between Europeans and blacks. Adoula has proved himself our best hope and we strongly back him; we are now making real progress with Tshombe, and Gizenga is at a low point. We must avoid recrimination with Struelens or with anyone else. We shall support the UN, without at all giving up our own independent right of judgment and counsel. We should see to it, however, that our case in the Congo is strongly and continuously put forward. It is a clear and practical policy, and at the moment it seems to be working.

b. Laos

When we say that we are working for a "neutral and independent Laos," we mean just that. This policy implies a Souvanna government -- but a Souvanna government with a strong Vientiane participation. We will not support Boun Oum and Phoumi in what we consider to be unreasonable intransigence.

Here again it is fundamental that all parts of the government speak with one voice. I count on each department and agency concerned to support this policy in every way. The alternative was a losing war, in which we should have been without allied support. Governor Harriman in Washington, and Ambassador Brown in Laos -- under my direction -- are the center of our policy and I expect the fullest support for them.
c. South Viet-Nam

We are embarked on a major effort here, and it is not going to be an easy one. I particularly urge on all senior officers the liveliest attention to day-to-day action in this area. I am glad to see that Bob McNamara is visiting Honolulu at frequent intervals, and I hope that at all levels, and in all fields, our officers in South Viet-Nam will have prompt and active support. Initial reports from the Vietnamese task force show that we are making progress in this area -- but we need to make more.

d. West Irian

We are putting a lot of heat on both parties to get together and reach a peaceful solution through the good offices of U Thant. There are difficult men on both sides. But I think we all have to understand that the real issue here is not West Irian; it is the future of Indonesia.

Our real purpose must be to prevent Indonesia from slipping toward Communism. This may involve us in "unfairness" to the Dutch -- but the stakes here are very high indeed, and the interests of freedom would not be served by a narrow policy of abstract virtue which resulted in turning the rich prize over to the Communists.

e. Cuba

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makes for a test of wills. Our will is strong, and our will, not that of our Allies, is what counts. The Germans, who count most, next to us, will follow our lead.

We will continue to insist on our basic rights; we will react very strongly to any harassments of them. We will also continue to keep talking with a view to an honorable settlement. Since the Soviets do not want a war, I do not expect one. But we must leave them in no doubt of our own determination. At the moment the talks in Moscow are getting nowhere, but we think it well to keep talking.

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7. Some Problems of Administrative Practice

We have been at work for a year now, and I think all of us are doing our jobs better. We know each other better; we are more familiar with the problems. I myself am getting better help and response from all the Departments concerned with National Security affairs.

But there are three practices that I want to warn against. Several times in recent months I have asked for recommendations on a problem and had to wait for weeks -- or even months -- for a proper response. The reason, I think, has been disagreement among participating agencies. Let me emphasize to all that I do not mind divided recommendations; I much prefer them to compromises that hide the real issues. I am asking my own staff to keep prodding so that such issues are forced up where I can see them -- and I count on all of you to see to it that the temptation to keep such matters away from the White House is resisted. It is much better to lose a case or two over here than to hide your problems in compromise.

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Outline for Talk to NSC, January 18, 1962

1. Object of the talk:

   a. To be sure that the senior officers of the Executive Branch, in National Security affairs, all have some understanding of our major policies. We are a team -- and it is essential that all of us work together in the same direction. You and your immediate subordinates have a real need-to-know what we are trying to do.

   b. To ensure that we are all clear about the basic positions we shall be urging and explaining with Congress and with public opinion. I know that each of you gets regular information on decisions and policies in his own area, but it is important for those of us who circulate among members of Congress and the press and foreign embassies to be sure we know the Government's policy.

2. Basic Foreign Policy

   It is not just talk when we say in the State of the Union message that our object is a world of free and interdependent states. That is exactly what we want and what the Communists cannot tolerate.

   Nor is it just talk that we can stand to have them choose for themselves. We are proud of our improved relations with countries like India, in spite of the Goa episode; and the annoyance of the Belgrade meeting does not prevent us from seeking useful connections even with noisy neutrals.

   We do not recognize any flat priority as between one group of friends and another. Circumstances will have to guide us in individual cases. Nevertheless we do rate very highly the problem of

3. Unity and Strength in the Atlantic Community

   You all know of the trade fight that is ahead, and you know also of the standing test in Berlin. Let me just say that these are obviously of the first importance.
At the same time, we must all be alert against the self-interested noises made by even friendly governments from time to time -- we must not be pushed around by German or French or British propaganda, and we must be careful to frame our policies in terms of American interests and American leadership. We are bound to pay the price of leadership -- we may as well have some of its advantages. So it is American policy that we must work for. Fortunately, in Europe, it is pretty clear. We mean to hold our own in Berlin; we mean to work for increased European unity; we mean to strengthen conventional forces; we mean to keep the nuclear deterrent up-to-date. This last one, I know, opens complex problems, and I am glad that many of you are at work on them.

4. Basic Military Policy

(This is an edgy one, but I believe a few sentences would be enormously helpful in setting the stage for further work by others)

We have, as you know, greatly reinforced the national defense forces. We have done this both in conventional and in nuclear forces. But you should understand that I do not believe in general war as the answer to every situation in which we have a temporary or local inferiority. I believe in maintaining our nuclear forces: first, as a deterrent against any nuclear madness by the enemy and, second, as a restraint upon adventures that would be so important as to require drastic response from us. But I do not believe in any "full first-strike capability," and I do not subscribe to the doctrine of long-term "nuclear superiority." I am always ready to hear argument on these matters, but what I have heard so far convinces me that in the long run we are headed for a nuclear stalemate -- always assuming we can avoid a nuclear holocaust. It is for this reason that I am so strong a supporter of revived and reinforced conventional forces. And for similar reasons I am a strong believer in a really drastic increase in our counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency, anti-subversive military and para-military capabilities. I have just signed a memorandum giving special duties in this area to an interdepartmental group under General Taylor, and I expect urgent effort here by all concerned. This is the real threat we face today -- as long as we maintain effective deterrent strength we need not worry about general war, in my judgment -- and on this one we need to do a lot more than we yet have.
This military policy is likely to involve us in some combat with the Congress this year. Sentiment for more missiles and more nuclear weapons is pretty strong -- I don't think such sentiment can be rationally defended, but there it is. You should all know that Mr. McNamara and I have set our force goals after a most careful analysis of all that the potential enemy is doing or may be able to do. The totals we have set are all we need -- with a comfortable margin of safety. To be honest with you, we would probably be safe with less -- but we believe in an ample safety factor. The United States is in no danger whatever of falling "behind" in this area. Our intelligence reports, and our accelerated programs, give ground for confidence on this vital matter. We plan to keep ahead -- as far ahead as it makes any sense to try to be, in the thermonuclear age.

5. Basic Economic Policies

This Administration is strongly in favor of foreign aid -- and we are asking a lot of it this year. Let me emphasize, however, that our whole position on this one is a cool and practical one. I do not want to find any of us backing programs that just cannot be defended in Congress, and I think our whole policy on AID should be to show that businesslike, hardheaded, energetic, and practical administration is not only what we intend -- but what gets results.

Just as an example of what I mean: I think that as far as possible our Development Loans should carry some visible rate of interest. It is not the money that matters; it is the evidence of hard-headed seriousness. It is easier not to charge interest, but it is shortsighted from the point of view of long-term Congressional support.

On the other hand I do not expect our Administration to shy away from all unpopular decisions in the AID field on domestic political grounds. It is a matter of judgment. Training Yugoslav pilots turns out to be more trouble than it's worth -- we can and will stop that, with the full support of Ambassador Kennan. But modest development loans for Yugoslavia are another matter; I believe we should go ahead with them. When you are in doubt on a matter of this sort, take the time to send the question upstairs -- that is the sort of judgment I get paid to make, and the White House is now geared to arrange prompt decisions. (FYI, this is said by the old hands to be a major change from the olden times.)
But our biggest problem is TRADE. Here we have a major set of proposals to put through, and the whole Administration will be needed. But rather than make a speech about that today, I am asking Mr. Ball and Mr. Petersen to make very sure that all of you -- and make more of our senior officers -- are fully informed so that you can be a hand whenever you get a chance.

Some Specific Current Problems

a. The Congo

We have every reason to be clear and proud about our Congo policy, but we also need to speak about it with one voice. The object has not been to "crush Tshombe," or to back every last action of the UN. The object has been to find a decent path toward peace and to prevent Soviet infiltration. In this the UN has been indispensable, unless we were to have a dangerous great-power confrontation, or a split between Europeans and blacks. Adoula has proved himself our best hope and we strongly back him; we are now making real progress with Tshombe, and Gizenga is at a low point. We must avoid recrimination with Strueblens or with anyone else. We shall support the UN, without at all giving up our own independent right of judgment and counsel. We should see to it, however, that our case in the Congo is strongly and continuously put forward. It is a clear and practical policy, and at the moment it seems to be working.

b. Laos

When we say that we are working for a "neutral and independent Laos," we mean just that. This policy implies a Souvanna government -- but a Souvanna government with a strong Vientiane participation. We will not support Boun Oum and Phoumi in what we consider to be unreasonable intransigence.

Here again it is fundamental that all parts of the government speak with one voice. I count on each department and agency concerned to support this policy in every way. The alternative was a losing war, in which we should have been without allied support. Governor Harriman in Washington, and Ambassador Brown in Laos -- under my direction -- are the center of our policy and I expect the fullest support for them.
c. South Viet-Nam

We are embarked on a major effort here, and it is not going to be an easy one. I particularly urge on all senior officers the liveliest attention to day-to-day action in this area. I am glad to see that Bob McNamara is visiting Honolulu at frequent intervals, and I hope that at all levels, and in all fields, our officers in South Viet-Nam will have prompt and active support. Initial reports from the Vietnamese task force show that we are making progress in this area -- but we need to make more.

d. West Irian

We are putting a lot of heat on both parties to get together and reach a peaceful solution through the good offices of U Thant. There are difficult men on both sides. But I think we all have to understand that the real issue here is not West Irian; it is the future of Indonesia.

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March 22, 1962

SUBJECT: Suggested NATO Nuclear Program

After approval by the President, the United States should outline the following elements in NAC, at appropriate times and in suitable detail. These elements should be discussed in the context of revised strategy. Within this framework, the need for improved conventional forces should be stressed and elaborated in necessary detail, and the extent to which the nuclear proposals are dependent on an adequate conventional program should be made clear.

1. NATO Participation: Measures should be instituted to give NATO greater information about US nuclear strategy, and greater participation in the formulation of that strategy. (Specific actions to this end currently under study by the State and Defense Departments should be included, if they are found to be useful.) As part of these measures:

(a) 

--------------------------------------------
(b) An attempt should be made to work out NATO guidelines, which the US President would agree to observe, regarding use of all US nuclear weapons in defending NATO.

2. US Forces Outside the Continent:

(a) The US should indicate to its allies that an appropriate portion of US external forces will be directed against targets of special concern to Europe.

(b)
(a) **Targetting and Weapons.** The question of the targetting for a multilateral force, and the question of the kind of missile and vessel to be used in the force, should be determined in the light of NATO's continuing consideration of strategy, the role of the force in that strategy, and other relevant factors.

(b) 

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(c) **Costs.** The costs should be equitably shared. The US should make clear that it would not be prepared to make a major contribution to the cost but would expect the greater part of the burden to be borne by the allies.

(d) **Mixed Manning.** The US should require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the manning - and is not, in fact, in control - of any vessel or of the missiles aboard any vessel in the multilateral force. Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national armed forces into the NATO MRBM force and would thereafter be under the control of that Force; for trial and punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their country of origin.

(e) ____________________________________________________________

(f) **Centralized Command.** In presenting these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible and that a NATO Force, if one is created, could not
not fragment this unified task. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it would be employed in integral association with other alliance nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect. On the contrary, our willingness to join in creating such a force should be dramatic evidence of our unconditional commitment to the defense of the entire alliance.
The position on the paper "NATO Nuclear Policy" is as follows:

1. U.S. policy on MRBM's will be governed by the provisions of this paper except that paragraph 2(d) should not be volunteered by the U.S.

b. In handling this issue in the NAC, the U.S. should outline its views in accord with the contents of this paper, not as a U.S. proposal, but as a U.S. contribution to the resolution of the issues involved in this question.

c. The Secretary of State will have the responsibility for handling tactics on this topic, consulting with the Secretary of Defense as appropriate.

The President has approved the recommendation of the Secretary of State and Defense that U.S. policy on MRBMs not be governed by the provisions of their April 17, 1962 paper entitled "Suggested NATO Nuclear Program" dated March 22, 1962, except that Par. 2(d) should not be volunteered by the U.S.
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(a) Procedures should be instituted under which we would share information about our nuclear forces and consult about basic plans and arrangements for their use in the NAC and the Standing Group - Military Committee.
we can and should provide a considerable body of information, including targeting policy, nuclear force strengths, analysis of the force capabilities, some intelligence on Soviet Bloc strengths, and constraint policies. In putting forth this information, the US would stress the extent to which planned uses of this US strategic force are devoted to European as well as North American interests, the importance of responsible, centralized control over nuclear forces, the strength of the present and future nuclear capabilities of the US, and the probable consequences if a nuclear war were to occur. To facilitate this enlarged participation by NATO in over-all nuclear planning and operations, increased functions regarding these matters could be assigned to appropriate bodies, such as a small special group and the NATO Standing Group—Military Committee.

(b) An attempt should be made to work out NATO guidelines, which the US President would agree to observe, regarding use of all US nuclear weapons in defending NATO.

2. US Forces Outside the Continent:

(a) The US should indicate to its allies that an appropriate portion of US external forces will be directed against targets of special concern to Europe.

(b) The US should state that it is prepared to commit
to NATO US nuclear forces outside the European continent (additional to those US forces already committed, in amounts to be determined). This might be the force indicated under (c).

(c) To meet on an interim basis any political need for having MRBM's based in the European area which would come under NATO wartime military command, Polaris submarines should, as promised by the President in May 1961, be committed to NATO. The US should furnish NATO with a schedule calling for the progressive commitment of Polaris submarines as the total Polaris force grows.

(d) To meet on an interim basis any political need for multilateral political control over MRBM's based in the European area, the US should indicate its willingness to consider proposals for some form of multilateral NATO control (such as indicated under 3, g, below) over the Polaris submarines committed to NATO, if this is strongly desired by our allies. It should make clear that it could not consider proposals which would limit the operational effectiveness of this vital element of the free world deterrent or prevent the US from using these submarines in self-defense whenever it felt compelled to do so. The US should also make clear that the timing of any institution of any agreed multilateral control would have to be determined by the
by the US in the light of operational considerations at the
time the proposals were made. Any multilateral control over
these Polaris submarines would lapse when they were replaced
by a multilateral MRBM force.

3. Multilaterally Manned NATO Force: The US should
indicate its willingness to join its allies, if they wish, in
developing a modest-sized (on the order of 200 missiles) fully
multilateral NATO sea-based MRBM force. It should not urge this
course, and should indicate its view that MRBM forces are not
urgently needed for military reasons, in view of already
programmed U.S. strategic forces; it should make clear that
it would be prepared to facilitate procurement of MRBM's
only under multilateral ownership, control, and manning.

(a) Targetting and Weapons. The question of the
targetting for a multilateral force, and the question of the
kind of missile and vessel to be used in the force, should be
determined in the light of NATO's continuing consideration of
strategy, the role of the force in that strategy, and other
relevant factors.

(b) Participation. The US should only be prepared
to proceed if the venture had adequate allied participation,
so that
so that it did not appear to be a thinly disguised US-German operation.

(c) **Costs.** The costs should be equitably shared.

The US should make clear that it would not be prepared to make a major contribution to the cost but would expect the greater part of the burden to be borne by the allies.

(d) **Mixed Manning.** The US should require a sufficient degree of mixed manning to ensure that one nationality does not appear to be predominant in the manning - and is not, in fact, in control - of any vessel or of the missiles aboard any vessel in the multilateral force. Members of the mixed crews would be recruited from national armed forces into the NATO MRBM force and would thereafter be under the control of that Force; for trial and punishment of major crimes, they would be returned to their country of origin.

(e) **Custody.**

US custodians could remain aboard any multilaterally manned NATO vessels, with standing orders to release the warheads in case a properly authenticated order to fire was received through agreed channels (see g, below).

(f) **Centralized Command.** In presenting these views, the US would stress its belief that the defense of the NATO area is indivisible and that a NATO Force, if one is created, could not
not fragment this unified task. Planning for its use should, therefore, assume that it would be employed in integral association with other alliance nuclear forces. Construction of such a Force along the lines suggested above would thus not imply that the separate defense of Europe was its purpose or likely effect. On the contrary, our willingness to join in creating such a force should be dramatic evidence of our unconditional commitment to the defense of the entire alliance.

(g) Control. The US should indicate that it wishes to ascertain the views of its allies concerning the control formula. In the ensuing discussion, it should be receptive to a control formula along the lines of that on which they are most likely to agree:
In connection with NATO consideration of the multilateral force the United States should make plain that transfer of nuclear warheads or procedures for using the force without United States concurrence would require amending existing United States law and could well entail other obstacles depending on the character of the arrangements. The United States should indicate, however, that it is willing to consider any proposal which is put to us by a clear majority of the Alliance.
Minutes of meeting on April 16 at 10:30 a.m.

Present: The President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The meeting opened with discussion of the question of possibility of giving in to France. Secretary Rusk explained that this is not essentially a matter of our having a special policy. We have rather a standing policy which de Gaulle is now trying to get us to change, although neither he nor his Foreign Minister has ever asked.

Secretary Rusk believed that centrally in his pursuit of this objective he was standing alone among the others.

The Secretary believed we must recognize that if we go in the direction in these matters we will have very great difficulties with our other Allies.

At the same time the Secretary believed that our existing policy should be carefully delineated. He had restrained some of his own people who wished to extend a policy.

As for consultation, the Secretary felt that de Gaulle consulted only on matters that were of primary interest to others. There had been no consultation on such matters in his own sphere.
In he wished consultation without responsibility, since himself had explained to the President that there would be no in that part of the world.

Secretary McNamara, after remarking that he agreed that changing our attitude would not change, advanced his position in terms of what he called a "narrow military view." The Defense Department believed

At the same time, the posture has three disadvantages from the point of view of the Department of Defense. First, there is a persisting weakness

There followed some discussion of what might think.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 16, 1954

The Congress may very well be concerned in the wisdom of making such a decision. Such a proposal involving fundamental United States foreign policy must be made in consultation with Congress. The President is hereby informed of the following alternatives in planning for defence in Western Europe:

1. State and Defense suggest that, in tomorrow's meeting with the Congressional leaders, you open the discussion on endorsement of NATO's nuclear strategy by making these points:

a. Necessity and desirability of basing NATO military plans and preparations on the concept that an effective atomic capability is indispensable to maximum deterrent and essential to defense in Western Europe. General Groenweder developed the basic NATO study through eight months' work. State and Defense have worked out proposed U.S. action on it during the past four months.

b. First element of proposed action is to secure NATO-wide approval of the concept of the capability to use A-weapons as a major element of military operations in event of hostilities. For this purpose, the U.S. should be prepared, if required, subject to constitutional limitations, to give assurances that A-weapons would be available in the hands of U.S. forces for such operations.

c. Second element is to reorient the pattern of NATO military forces toward the new type of operations. To this end, the U.S. should be prepared to give assurances, if required, that present and future U.S. military assistance will be geared to and make an appropriate contribution toward the development of forces prepared for integrated action generally as called for in the NATO studies. It would be understood, of course, that Congress retains its full power to act upon proposals for military aid programs.

2. There is some likelihood that the Congressmen will ask what the U.S. gets in return for these assurances--specifically, whether we shouldn't receive from the European countries authority to conduct atomic operations from bases in their territory. General Groenweder feels, and State and Defense strongly support him, that it would be unwise to press for categorical commitments--rather that the Europeans should be led into the atomic era gradually and tactfully.

3. Some release of atomic information--for example letting NATO commanders know how many weapons they should base their plans on--

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MB 77-109 #61

By [Signature] Date 2/20/79
will be required. The Congressmen may challenge the wisdom of making such a release, prior to receiving formal agreement that A-weapons can be used from foreign soil. There are two basic points: first, commanders must have at least minimum essential planning data, if they are to conduct effective operations, and second, the "goal proper" is in the acceptance by NATO of the new concept, not in seeking formal commitments for automatic use of a nature the U. S. would not itself be prepared to give.

A. J. Goodpasture
Colonel, CE, U. S. Army