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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1160

April 16, 1962

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Minutes of meeting on April 16 at 10:30 a. m.

Present: The President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara,
and Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The meeting opened with discussion of the question of possibility of

Secretary Rusk explained that this is not essentially a matter of our
having a special policy.----- We have rather a standing
policy which-----is now trying to get us to change, although
neither he nor his Foreign Minister has ever asked.-----

Secretary Rusk believed that centrally-----
----- In his pursuit of this
objective he was standing alone among the-----

The Secretary believed we must recognize that if we go in-----
direction in these matters we will have very great difficulties with our
other Allies. -----

At the same time the Secretary believed that our existing policy should
be carefully delineated. He had restrained some of his own people
who wished to extend a policy-----

As for consultation, the Secretary felt that----- consulted only on
matters that were of primary interest to others. There had been no
consultation on such matters in his own sphere as-----

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BY SAJ NARA, Date 5/2/91

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In [REDACTED] he wished consultation without responsibility, since [REDACTED] himself had explained to the President that there would be no [REDACTED] in that part of the world.

[REDACTED]

Secretary McNamara, after remarking that he agreed that changing our attitude [REDACTED] would not change [REDACTED] advanced his position in terms of what he called a "narrow military view." The Defense Department believed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

At the same time, the [REDACTED] posture has three disadvantages from the point of view of the Department of Defense. First, there is a persisting weakness [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

There followed some discussion of what [REDACTED] might think. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The Secretary of Defense asked if we could not undertake a probing discussion to see what we might obtain. The Secretary felt that it would be disastrous to do this bilaterally since it would have a very heavy impact on our other allies.

The President indicated his own belief that it was wrong to move on this matter now. In the light of these conflicting considerations he was not prepared to authorize any change in our policy. He thought the only thing we could be sure of getting from _____ was money. He believed therefore that it was in our interest to have public speculation die down and he asked that guidelines be prepared accordingly.

The discussion then turned to the problem _____ policy. The Secretary of State, in urging adoption of the proposed policy, agreed with Mr. McNamara that _____

[REDACTED]

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Secretary McNamara believed for himself that there is no military requirement for such _____ but he pointed out that the Joint Chiefs and General Norstad disagree strongly. As to the cost of such a force, he thought it might run to about 2 billion dollars. The U. S. might contribute 600 million dollars, and _____ 400 million dollars, but he could not see who would pay for the other billion. Nevertheless, he was very enthusiastic about submitting the proposal for its political values.

Secretary McNamara then expressed his own preference for an American-manned and American-financed force which would be a genuine part of the American strategic deterrent. He thought such a force would be more justifiable in economic and military terms, and he believed that it might in the end meet the _____ political requirement too.

At the President's request, Mr. McNamara detailed the opposition of the Chiefs as follows:

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

It was agreed that each Secretary would explain these matters to his own subordinates, and later the President approved the attached guidelines as guidance for all concerned.

McG. B.