FROM: PARIS
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1024, SEPTEMBER 10, 8 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 1024, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY BONN 45,
LONDON 176

NO FORN FROM THURSTON

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GENERAL NORSTAD GAVE ME FOLLOWING ACCOUNT HIS LUNCH YESTERDAY
IN ITALY WITH ADENAUER, SPAAK, STIKKER, DE STAERCHE AND
BLANKENHORN:

LUNCH AND DISCUSSION AFTERWARD LASTED FOUR HOURS. CHANCELLOR
WAS IN FINE FORM, AND HE SET SHARP, VIGOROUS TONE FOR EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS. HE OPENED WITH DETAILED ACCOUNT HIS RECENT TALKS
WITH DE GAULLE AT RAMBOUILLET AND CONFIRMED PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS
ABOUT HIS OWN IRRITATION OVER DEBRE'S EARLIER ALLUSION TO
"SATELLITES." HE SAID THAT DE GAULLE EMPHASIZED THE LACK OF
POSITIVE WESTERN ACTION AND OF CONSULTATION WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE CONGO. CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE CHALLENGED
DE GAULLE REGARDING TRIPARTITE DIRECTORATE. REPLY WAS THAT
IT WOULD OPERATE ONLY OUTSIDE THE SCOPE AND FUNCTIONS OF NATO.
(NORSTAD OBSERVED THAT THIS WAS MORE LIMITED THAN SEPTEMBER
1958 MEMORANDUM AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT). ADENAUER STRESSED
THAT NATO WAS ESSENTIAL AND MUST GET PRIORITY SUPPORT, AND
DE GAULLE AGREED; IT WAS IMPORTANT, THOUGH MENTIONING US
WEAKNESS IN SAME BREATH. ADENAUER SAID THAT HE BELIEVED IN
NATO PLUS CLOSER RELATIONS WITH US, AND DE GAULLE REACTED
AFFIRMATIVELY.
SECRET

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ALLUDING TO DE GAULLE'S POSITION ABOUT INTEGRATION, CHANCELLOR SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND HIS ASSERTION THAT FRENCH SOLDIER MUST BELIEVE HE IS FIGHTING FOR DEFENSE OF HIS COUNTRY. AS TO FRENCH FLEET, DE GAULLE HAD PROPOUNDED INTERESTING THOUGH UNFOUNDED CONCEPT THAT NORTHERN LITTORAL OF MEDITERRANEAN WAS NATO RESPONSIBILITY, WHEREAS SOUTHERN SHORE WAS FRENCH NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. DE GAULLE SAID HE WOULD LIKE HIS FLEET TO HAVE SAME STATUS AS US SIXTH FLEET (NORSTAD TOLD CHANCELLOR THAT DE GAULLE DID NOT CORRECTLY STATE THIS SITUATION SINCE SIXTH FLEET WAS COMMITTED TO NATO).

REGARDING EUROPE, DE GAULLE SAID THAT AT TIME OF US WEAKNESS EUROPE HAD TO BE STRONG, EVEN BEYOND ELECTIONS. EUROPE MUST LOOK TO ITS OWN ORGANIZATION. HALLSTEIN HAD EXTENDED HIS TERMS OF REFERENCE AND THIS TENDENCY HAD TO BE CROSSED. ADENAUER APPEARED TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE ANTI-HALLSTEIN SENTIMENTS.

WHEN ADENAUER REFERRED TO DE GAULLE'S UNHAPPINESS OVER US ATOMIC AND MISSILE POLICY— WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS CRUX OF PROBLEM— SPAAK TOLD STORY OF HIS EFFORTS REGARDING POLARIS MRBM PROGRAM AND SAID HE WAS SAD AT OUTCOME, THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE TO APPEASE DE GAULLE, ETC. HE THOUGHT DE GAULLE'S LAST PRESS CONFERENCE WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE.

NORSTAD INTERVENED TO CORRECT RECORD AT THIS STAGE GOING BACK OVER SIXTH FLEET QUESTION, US EFFORTS TO CONSULT WITH FRANCE ON AFRICAN PROBLEMS IN PAST TWO YEARS, AND FACT THAT INTEGRATION DID NOT VIOLATE NATIONAL UNITS. HE SAID IT WAS THE DELICATE POINT OF ATOMIC CONTROL THAT UNDERLAY WITHDRAWAL OF US STRIKE SQUADRONS FROM FRANCE. SPAAK COMPLAINED THAT NAC NEVER REALLY TOLD WHOLE STORY OF THIS.

ADENAUER THEN VERY SERIOUSLY DECLARED THAT "EUROPE MUST HAVE SOMETHING" IN THE ATOMIC FIELD. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CHARACTER OF US LEADERSHIP SHOULD CHANGE? NORSTAD EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT US PEOPLE ARE NOT GOING TO TURN OVER ATOMIC WEAPONS TO ANY COUNTRY FOR INDEPENDENT USE AND ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY...
PERSONALLY SHARED THIS POPULAR SENTIMENT. HE SAID THAT US COULD NOT BASE ITS POLICY ON THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION ON THE NATIONAL PRESTIGE OF THIS OR THAT COUNTRY. CHANCELLOR ASKED HOW THE EUROPEANS CAN ORGANIZE THEIR DEFENSE AROUND ATOMIC WEAPONS WHEN US HAD MONOPOLY OVER THEM AND CAN TAKE THEM AWAY IF IT WISHED.

AT THIS POINT NORGSTAD ALLUDED HIS PASADENA SPEECH OF LAST DECEMBER AND TO THINKING THAT LAY BEHIND IT, THAT IS, IDEA OF NATO AS THE FOURTH ATOMIC POWER. ADENAUER SAID EUROPE WOULD APPROVE AND APPLAUD A MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION. WHEN SPAAK RAISED QUESTION OF "WHO IN NATO" WOULD CONTROL THESE TRANSFERRED WEAPONS, CHANCELLOR WAS RATHER IMPATIENT WITH HIM AND CONTINUED DEMONSTRATE GREAT ENTHUSIASM FOR SCHEME. NORGSTAD POINTED OUT NATO HAD MADE MUCH PROGRESS WITHOUT ANSWERING UNANSWERABLE QUESTION OF EXACTLY HOW ALLIANCE GOES TO WAR AND THOUGHT STILL FURTHER PROGRESS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT DOING SO.

IT WAS OF INTEREST THAT ADENAUER THOUGHT DE GAULLE'S POWER POSITION (PRESUMABLY BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD) HAD SLIPPED ABOUT 50 PERCENT IN THE LAST TWO YEARS AND THAT HE (DE GAULLE) WAS AWARE OF THIS. HE SAID DE GAULLE HAD SHOWN HIM A PAPER AT THEIR RAMBOUILLET TALKS AND THAT HE HAD ADVISED DE GAULLE NOT TO SHOW IT TO NATO ALLIES. IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BASIS, HOWEVER, FOR HIS RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE.

ADENAUER SPOKE OF REFORMING NATO PRIMARILY BY STRENGTHENING MAC WHERE HE THOUGHT US VOICE PARTICULARLY SHOULD ALWAYS BE CLEAR AND FIRM. LUNCHEON GROUP TENDED TO AGREE THAT POLICY OF "LEADERSHIP BY GENTILITY" HAD FAILED. NORGSTAD TOUCHE ON INTEGRATION THEME AT END AND WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT 300,000 US TROOPS WOULD NOT MOVE OUT OF EUROPE MERELY BECAUSE DE GAULLE SAYS HE IS AGAINST PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRATION, NEVERTHELESS US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE WAS FIRMLY BASED ON THIS PRINCIPLE AS EMBODIED IN NATO MILITARY SYSTEM.

BERLIN
SECRET

4-1024, SEPTEMBER 10, 8 PM, FROM PARIS

BERLIN TOUCHED ON ONLY BRIEFLY BY CHANCELLOR WHO DESCRIBED CURRENT EAST GERMAN MEASURES AS MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO DATE.

NORSTAD'S OVER-ALL IMPRESSION WAS THAT ADENAUER REMAINS ESSENTIALLY SOUND IN HIS OUTLOOK ON NATO AND EUROPEAN PROBLEMS AND THAT IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH DE GAULLE HIS TACTICS ARE CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO PRESERVE THE OVER-ALL BENEFITS OF THE POST-WAR FRANCE-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT WITHOUT SELLING THE ALLIANCE OR THE UNITED STATES DOWN THE RIVER.

HOUGHTON

PLH

NOTE: Mr. Smith (EUR) notified 9/11/2:45 p.m., CWO-M