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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 10, 1963


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

The President met with W. Averell Harriman in his office at 9:30 A. M. on July 10 for a final discussion of Governor Harriman's mission to the Soviet Union. Messrs. Bundy and Kaysen were also present.

The President opened the discussion by remarking on the relation of the Harriman exploration to U. S. -German ties. He felt that as a result of his visit the Germans and we had come to a better understanding, and they were less anxious about us. Further, this was reflected strongly in popular feeling, as well as on a governmental level. He was willing to draw on this feeling as much as seemed useful if there was something to be achieved by it. On the other hand, he thought it was futile to repeat the experience of the '61 discussions on Berlin. These lengthy talks with the Soviet Union had achieved nothing tangible, and aroused great suspicion in Germany.

The President then raised the question of whether or not he wished to meet at the summit with Khrushchev. He recognized that Macmillan would push strongly in this direction.



For his part, the President thought a summit, especially a summit involving Macmillan as well as himself, would create difficulties in the U. S., in Germany and France. A bilateral meeting between himself and Khrushchev, such as the one in Vienna, would be less troublesome in this respect. However, in spite of the troubles, the President would be willing to pay the price if it proved necessary. In response to Governor Harriman's question, he said, if necessary, he would go to a summit meeting just to sign the test ban treaty covering three environments, although he was concerned about the effect such an action would have on our relations with France.

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
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Governor ~~Harriman~~ raised the question of our trade with the Soviet Union, and ~~pointed out~~ that Khrushchev would like to increase it further. The ~~European nations~~ supply much of what they want anyway, but it was a matter of pride with Khrushchev. The President agreed that we should be forthcoming on this issue if it came up.

Our position on the ~~MLF~~ then came up. The President said that our first response to this issue should be to repeat our argument that it was consistent with the purposes of non-dissemination, in accordance with the agreed instruction. If, however, there seemed to be some purpose in going beyond this in terms of the China problem or otherwise, ~~Harriman~~ should be guided by his judgment of how useful it was to indicate to the Soviets that in certain circumstances we might not need to go forward with this proposition. But in no event should ~~Governor Harriman~~ give any specific assurances on the ~~MLF~~.

~~Governor Harriman~~ reported Secretary McNamara's views on how far McNamara thought it would be wise to go on a first stage disarmament proposal. The President thought it was rather unlikely

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that there would be any serious discussion on this point.

The President raised the question of Laos and indicated the importance of repeating our dissatisfaction with the present situation and our desire for the Soviets to live up to their commitments there. Governor Harriman responded that this of course brought up all the questions of Soviet-Chinese relations, and whether or not the Soviets were able to influence the situation in Laos. Again the President said that Governor Harriman's judgment should govern his action.

Carl Kaysen

- Cy 1 - Mr. Bundy
- 2 - Governor Harriman
- 3 - Mr. Kaysen
- 4 - Mr. Bundy

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