

## THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND HOW TO THINK ABOUT IT

What do we mean when we talk about order in international politics? The term might refer to the idea that international political life is not totally chaotic and that there is instead a certain logic to how things work in this area. From that point of view, to grapple with the problem of order is to study how politics works in a world of sovereign states—that is, in what is by convention called an “anarchic” world, a world characterized by the absence of overarching authority. In the international relations literature, the term “order” is in fact sometimes used in this sense. Kenneth Waltz, for example, in his important *Theory of International Politics*, is interested in the question of how there can be “order without an orderer”—of how an anarchic world can have a certain structure, of how a world of sovereign states can be viewed as a system that works in a relatively orderly way.<sup>1</sup>

An *orderly* way, but not necessarily a *peaceful* way: there might be a certain logic to how things work, and certain regularities might be observed, but the world being analyzed might at its heart be highly prone to war. What if systemic forces—pressures generated by the basic structure of the system—push states into conflict with each other? The assumption that the system, if allowed to work in accordance with its own internal logic, might produce unending violence in fact leads many people to approach the issue of international order from a very different perspective. Order, as they see it, has to do with the way those pressures can be brought under control. It does not connote mere “pattern or regularity”; people who use the term in that sense do not have in mind (as Waltz does) the sort of order that emerges “spontaneously” from the free play of political forces—that is, from the sorts of policies states are led to adopt in an anarchic world.<sup>2</sup> Order instead takes shape only when some limit is placed on how political conflicts run their course—only when interstate

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relations are “domesticated,” when the sharp edge of international politics is dulled, when the free play of political forces is constrained in some way.<sup>3</sup> And the fundamental assumption here is that that happens only when a kind of “international society” develops. Indeed, from this point of view, international order basically means international society. The two notions are essentially conflated. When people talk about “international order” or “international society,” they have in mind the whole set of norms, relationships and institutions, political, economic and cultural, both international and cross-national, which in their view introduces a certain element of stability into what would otherwise be a violent, war-prone world.<sup>4</sup>

That whole way of looking at things is thus rooted in a certain set of assumptions about how an anarchic system in its purest form actually works. The basic premise here is that a system in which power is the only thing that matters, a system where no international society can be said to exist, is highly unstable: that in a purely anarchic world, everyone is in a “state of war” with everyone else. It is taken for granted that states, in such a system, are pushed into conflict with one another, no matter how peace-loving they fundamentally are. Peace can therefore not be based on the free play of political forces, not in the way that prosperity, as Adam Smith argued, can be based on the free play of economic forces. If there is an “invisible hand” in international politics, it plays a pernicious role. Order in the international realm thus means constraint; stability is possible only if power is not the only thing that matters.

It follows, therefore, that to get at the issue of international order, you first need to deal with the theoretical question of how politics works in the highly stylized world associated with the term ‘anarchy’—a world in which security, and thus power, are the only things that matter, a world in which no effective international society can be said to exist. The workings of such an idealized world are worth examining, not because the real world necessarily works the same way, but simply because that sort of analysis is a necessary point of departure for thinking about real-world problems. Only when one understands how a highly stylized world of this sort works can questions about the role of various factors—international law, for example, or economic interdependence—be posed in any meaningful way. If your goal is to understand what difference those factors make—that is, whether they contribute to order—you need to start with a



certain pre-existing frame of reference, and only that theoretical analysis can provide it.

The two sets of issues—the purely theoretical questions and the questions about how things work in the real world—are thus linked. The way you deal with various specific problems—the question, for example, of international law as a source of order—depends on how you answer basic questions about how a highly stylized anarchic system works. You might conclude that such a system is prone to war for certain particular reasons. You have thus identified various problems that something like international law might conceivably help solve. On the other hand, if you conclude that a system based on power does not in itself generate conflict, and that instead problems develop when states fail to act rationally in power-political terms, you will approach questions of that sort in a very different way. Note that I'm not making any substantive claim here. I'm just making a simple point about method—that to get at the general problem of international order, you first need to deal with the theoretical issue of how things work in a purely anarchic world, and that only after you've reached certain conclusions at that level will you be in a position to deal meaningfully with questions about the role of specific real-world factors—questions about democratic institutions, international organizations, economic interdependence, international law, and so on.

That might be the way the question of international order ought to be handled, but how has it actually been dealt with? What, in fact, are we to make of the way international politics as a whole has been studied? My own view is that there are real problems with this whole area of thought, but I should note that that's not a totally idiosyncratic judgment. For some time now, many people who work in the field have had the sense that something is amiss. If asked to assess this field of scholarship, they would certainly say that a lot of very interesting work has been, and is being, produced. But when they look at the larger picture, they are not particularly happy with what they see.

Martin Wight, an eminent British international-relations scholar, seemed to put his finger on the problem forty years ago in a widely-cited article called "Why is There No International Theory?"<sup>5</sup> By 'international theory', he meant "a tradition of speculation about relations between states, a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation about the state to which the name 'political theory' is appropriated," and he thought that in-

ternational theory in that sense could scarcely be said to exist.<sup>6</sup> There were great works of political philosophy—Plato and Aristotle, Hobbes and Locke and Rousseau. But “the only acknowledged counterpart in the study of international relations is Thucydides,” and Thucydides was a historian, not a philosopher.<sup>7</sup> What international theory there was, if you could even call it that, was “scattered, unsystematic, and mostly inaccessible to the layman. Moreover, it is largely repellent and intractable in form.”<sup>8</sup> It was marked “not only by paucity but also by intellectual and moral poverty.”<sup>9</sup> People who studied political issues, in Wight’s view, were obsessed with the state, and insofar as they were concerned with international issues at all, they focused on problems of foreign policy—that is, of a particular state’s foreign policy. “Few political thinkers,” he pointed out, “have made it their business to study the states-system, the diplomatic community *itself*.”<sup>10</sup>

Wight was not the only leading scholar in the field to express this sort of view. “Is theory in the field of international politics,” Kenneth Waltz asked a decade later, “thriving or moribund?” His answer was blunt: “Almost everyone who knows the field tends toward the latter view.”<sup>11</sup> Do scholars now take a fundamentally different view? People today would probably not be quite so negative, but still, looking around, you do detect a certain sense of unease, a sense that on core issues people often seem to be talking past each other. What passes for debate often comes across as an intellectually sterile “war of isms” that never seems to get anywhere.

If there is a problem, maybe it has to do with the way the core issues that define the field have been approached. I spoke before about the need, for analytical purposes, to separate the theoretical problem of how a highly stylized anarchic system works from questions relating to how things work in the real world. But this is something many people in the field find hard to do. They find it hard, that is, to deal with the theoretical issue on its own terms—to understand that a theory is not *supposed* to be an exact mirror of reality. Over and over again, those who have some sense for what a theory is supposed to be—Kenneth Waltz, most notably—are criticized for not taking this or that factor sufficiently into account, as though a theory should take account of every factor that comes into play in the real world. And over and over again Waltz has to explain that it is a mistake to think that the best model “is the one that reflects reality most accurately”—that explanatory power “is gained by moving away



from 'reality,' not by staying close to it."<sup>12</sup> Over and over again he has to point out that "to say that a 'theory should be just as complicated as all our evidence suggests' amounts to a renunciation of science from Galileo onward." But to Waltz's considerable frustration the point just never seems to register.<sup>13</sup>

The basic problem here has to do with what might be called the philosophy of the field, and above all with the fundamental assumption that the facts have a kind of elemental quality and that theories can be tested (and indeed built up) in a very straightforward way by looking at the empirical evidence. Philosophers of science, from Pierre Duhem to N. R. Hanson, Imre Lakatos and beyond, might have shown how problematic such assumptions are. But their arguments have not had much of an impact on how the field deals with issues of this sort.

The prevailing set of epistemological assumptions, above all about the relationship between fact and theory, has a strong hold. It is hard to escape its grip. Just how hard it is is perhaps best illustrated by the case of Waltz himself, probably the most prominent international-relations theorist in the United States today. Waltz's approach to these issues nowadays is quite sophisticated. He recently explained, for example, why he assigns Lakatos in his seminar on international-political theory. Students of politics, he wrote, should pay attention to Lakatos "for one big reason: Lakatos's assaults crush the crassly positivist ideas about how to evaluate theories that are accepted by most political scientists. He demolishes the notion that one can accept theories by pitting them against facts."<sup>14</sup> But Waltz did not reach that position overnight. In his most famous book, *Theory of International Politics*, he certainly had intelligent things to say about what a theory was, things based on what the philosophers of science had been saying. But in spite of that, he talked there about theory-testing as though that basic notion were in no way problematic, so much so that he later practically apologized for having sounded there "like a 'naïve falsificationist'."<sup>15</sup> The point here is simply that if it took even someone as sophisticated and intelligent as Waltz so long to develop his current views, it should not be surprising that most political scientists still approach this question of the relationship between theory and reality in a relatively naïve way.

So what is the solution? A first step would be to recognize the importance of these meta-issues. People in the field need to think more

deeply about what understanding is and how it can be developed, about what theory is and what role it plays in that process, about what “systemic” or “structural” explanations are and how they relate to other kinds of explanations—and in fact some serious thought has been given to issues of this sort.<sup>16</sup> Just not enough: international-relations scholars need to pay a lot more attention to the philosophy of science literature—and not so much to works like Lakatos’s famous but very hard-to-read article on “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” but instead works like that same scholar’s wonderfully clear and lively “Lectures on Scientific Method.”<sup>17</sup> And Hanson’s ideas, also very engagingly presented, should get a lot more attention than they do.<sup>18</sup>

But these philosophical issues, as important as they are, do not really lie at the heart of the problem. An even more serious problem has to do with the way the purely theoretical side of the question is handled—that is, with the way the workings of the highly stylized anarchic system are analyzed. The (to me surprisingly widespread) assumption here is that disorder, in the sense of a basic tendency toward conflict and interstate violence, is built into the fundamental structure of the system—that the “structure of the system” (as one leading contemporary theorist puts it) “forces states which seek only to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other.”<sup>19</sup> With no higher authority to provide for their security, the argument runs, states have to do whatever they can to provide it for themselves. They thus all try to make themselves more powerful—more powerful, that is, *vis-à-vis* each other. They thus are forced into competition with each other, and international politics—international conflict—is rooted in that struggle for power. States (in Robert Jervis’s phrase) are trapped by the logic of the system in which they find themselves; they are unable to cooperate, even when all would benefit from cooperation; they get involved in wars even when they would all prefer to avoid them. If wars break out, it’s the system, and not the individual states, that is fundamentally to blame.

It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this way of looking at things. It has a very long pedigree, going back to Hobbes and Rousseau, if not to Thucydides. Today it is accepted by all sorts of international-relations scholars—not just by realists of various kinds (and in this field a “realist” is simply someone who emphasizes the importance of power in international politics), but also by those deeply critical of the basic realist



approach to international politics. I don't mean to say that no one ever sees any of the ways in which an anarchic system can be self-stabilizing. Arguments that point in that direction are in fact made from time to time. I'm just talking about what I see as the prevailing view, a view that, moreover, does have a rather broad appeal, in large part, I think, because it has a certain counterintuitive edge. It purports to explain something real, "war's dismal recurrence through the millennia." And it explains war not just by discussing conflict in terms of the specific policies pursued by particular states at a given time, but by looking below the surface of events and pointing to the basic anarchic structure of international politics.<sup>20</sup>

I also do not mean to imply that realists and their critics see completely eye-to-eye on this issue. They differ most notably on the question of the real-world importance and intractability of this sort of problem. But the fact that they differ in that area should not be allowed to obscure the fact that they agree this is a core problem—that they agree that the anarchic structure of international politics is "a root cause of or explanation for the recurrence of war."<sup>21</sup> In other words, they answer the basic theoretical question the same way: in the highly stylized anarchic world, states are pushed into conflict with each other. And the basic theoretical framework serves as a point of departure for the analysis of real world problems. When problems of that sort are discussed, it is by and large simply assumed that order (in the sense of the ability of the system to avoid war) can only come if that core dynamic is brought under some kind of external control. It is simply taken for granted that order, in that sense, is not a product of the "system"—that it does not emerge spontaneously, *à la* Adam Smith, from the pursuit of power-political interest, and in fact can only come if those drives are constrained in some way.

But if the theoretical issue is of such fundamental importance, then the question has to be whether the common assumption that anarchy breeds conflict is in fact correct—or, more precisely in the present context, how well that absolutely central issue has been studied. And my basic point here—my basic point in this article as a whole—is that it has not been studied nearly as well as it ought to be, especially given the real-world importance of this issue.

Is there any reason, however, to study that issue in any depth—any reason, that is, to question that basic assumption? I tried to deal with the issue in a recent article and there is no point in repeating in detail here

what I said there.<sup>22</sup> But let me sum up the argument very briefly. The fundamental claim there was that a whole series of considerations point to the conclusion that a purely anarchic system is not inherently unstable. The basic idea was that policies that are rational in power-political terms—the policies states would adopt if their power-political positions were all that they cared about, the very policies states would be led to adopt in a purely anarchic world—were policies “in harmony with the existing structure of power” and were thus “in harmony with each other.” In a power-political world, the world posited by the pure theory, everyone would adjust to the same core political realities; those realities would constrain everyone’s political behavior. In such a world, states would profit in power-political terms from good relations with other states; they would be hurt when relations with other states deteriorate. A rational state would therefore want to have as many friends and as few enemies as possible, and since that logic applies to all states in the system, the upshot in a world where power-political considerations are decisive is a general tendency towards stability. To understand power, moreover, is to understand why other states’ interests normally need to be respected. The power-political approach is thus a source of moderation, and moderation is in turn normally a source of stability. The power-political approach implies that goals need to be limited, and in particular that states cannot allow themselves to get carried away pursuing policies—especially ideologically-based policies—that make little sense in power-political terms. Instead, states in such a world relate to each other on a more mundane level, accepting power realities for what they are, dealing with each other on a businesslike basis, reaching agreements relatively easily because they all speak the same language, the language of power and interest. And that basic argument was supported by a number of historical examples, which, taken as a whole, pointed to the conclusion that problems developed over the last couple of centuries not because states pursued policies that were rational in power-political terms, but rather because their policies were not cut from that cloth.

The problem with the prevailing view that anarchy breeds war, moreover, is not just that it fails to recognize dynamics of the sort I just mentioned—that is, that it fails to understand the ways in which an anarchic system is self-stabilizing. An even more basic problem has to do with the quality of the argument that is used to support those standard



views. The argument one finds in this area is relatively superficial. One comes away from the discussion with a certain sense of incompleteness—with the feeling that key issues had not been thought through nearly as well as they might have been.

Consider, for example, Hobbes's famous argument about how politics works in the absence of overarching authority, an argument that is in a sense the wellspring of this whole body of thought. "For want of a common power to keep them all in awe," Hobbes wrote, every man is an enemy to every man.<sup>23</sup> No purely voluntary agreement, in such circumstances, can make for a peaceful society: "covenants, without the sword, are but words."<sup>24</sup> In such a world, men, and indeed states, are pushed into conflict with each other. They become enemies, he says, principally because they all have to do whatever is necessary to provide for their own security, even if that means taking anticipatory action. They are in effect led to adopt aggressive policies for purely defensive purposes.<sup>25</sup> A world where there was "no common power to fear" was, in Hobbes's view, a lawless world, a world prone to war, a world in which every man was at war with every other man. The world of international politics was a world of this sort: states, "because of their independency," were "in continual jealousies," and in the "posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another."<sup>26</sup> It was not that the inhabitants of such a world were always actually fighting with each other. It was just that the system bred conflict, and violence was never far from the surface.<sup>27</sup>

What is to be made of the basic Hobbesian notion of the "war of every man against every man"?<sup>28</sup> What is to be made of the idea that in an anarchic realm, where there is "no visible power to keep them in awe," men, or sovereigns, are in a constant state of war with their peers?<sup>29</sup> When you think about that whole basic concept of the "war of every man against every man," it is hard to avoid saying to yourself: *it just can't be*, that it just doesn't make sense, even in purely theoretical terms. To take the simplest case: it makes no sense for one person to be in a state of war with two other individuals, each of whom is at war with the other. "The enemy of my enemy is my friend"—doesn't the sort of behavior based on that kind of calculation introduce a certain degree of order into the system? Doesn't the fact that actors can be presumed in an anarchic world to make that kind of calculation mean that something other than pure violence,

something other than brute force, comes into play in a major way? Doesn't all this necessarily introduce a certain *political* element into the equation, an element that perhaps introduces a measure of order into the system?

So the question then is: how would *politics* work in such a world? Would you, for example, find actors coming together, for purely predatory purposes, in simple, temporary, alliances of convenience? Even in a world of three actors, why would any two of them (call them A and B) gang up to destroy a third actor C? Why would the weaker member of that putative coalition (say B) agree to such a course of action? After the common enemy had been destroyed, that actor would be at the mercy of its partner. Wouldn't it be to B's interest, therefore, to keep C's power intact as a counterweight to the power of B's present ally? In such a world, as Fénelon said three hundred years ago, the rational course of action might be to avoid arrangements that would "prove too beneficial to your ally" and to take care "not to reduce your enemy too low."<sup>30</sup> And if that policy became known, wouldn't B be supported by whichever of the two remaining units would find its own security diminished by B's destruction? Conceivably that could mean both of them. And wouldn't this sort of thing—the sort of behavior that might emerge spontaneously in a purely anarchic world—automatically introduce a certain clement of stability, or order, into the system?<sup>31</sup>

That's how things might work in a simple three-actor system. Adding more actors would obviously increase the level of complexity. But the basic point here applies to more complex systems as well: there is a lot more to political life in an anarchic system than the simple Hobbesian view might lead you to expect. Politics is not a mere congeries of isolated one-on-one relationships, where everyone is in a state of war with everyone else. All relationships are interconnected, and even in a purely anarchic world things will sort themselves out in some way or other. Political calculations will be made. States, for example, will come to realize they cannot be enemies with each other if they are each threatened by a third party. That will lead to a kind of balancing, and balancing leads to a sort of order. So you can't talk about the "war of every man against every man" and just leave it at that, as though those notions about the instability of an anarchic system were in no way problematic. You really need to consider how stability—how order in the second sense of the term—might emerge spontaneously in a purely anarchic world. And to do



that, you need to put the kinds of calculations I've been talking about—that is, you need to put the political element—at the heart of the analysis.

Let me try to make the basic point here in a somewhat different and rather unconventional way—namely, by approaching the issue from the point of view of evolutionary biology. The key ideas here are quite familiar. Individuals within a species vary in terms of their genetic endowment; the genetic material best suited to produce traits that promote reproductive success in the organisms in which they reside will, practically by definition, spread throughout the species. Natural selection is a harsh process; reproductive success is the only thing that matters; any form of behavior that serves that goal will be favored, no matter how violent or distasteful it is. And even human evolution—and here I'm paraphrasing an argument a number of biologists have made—is to be understood in these terms. As humans became increasingly able to protect themselves from predators such as leopards and lions, their numbers expanded; given that resources were limited, they were thus forced to compete directly with each other. Darwin's "hostile forces of nature"—climate, predators, parasites, and so on—were no longer the fundamental forces driving evolution. A far more powerful force had come into play. Humans had "become so ecologically dominant that they in effect became their own hostile force of nature." Human beings were thus selected out for their ability to compete—and indeed to compete violently—with other human beings.<sup>32</sup>

This picture so far corresponds to the Hobbesian vision of the "war of every man against every man." So it is important to note, given the issue we are interested in, that this line of argument does not just stop at that point. The scholars who argue in this vein go on to point out that the ability of human beings to form increasingly large groups and to cooperate with each other more effectively within those groups was a major factor promoting reproductive success. The problems of social life, and especially the problems of cooperating as a group in order to prevail over other groups, are more complex and more difficult than the problems of dealing with the natural environment. The process thus generated a strong selective pressure favoring the growth of mental ability; and only this, it is argued, explains the extraordinary growth in the size of the human brain during a mere two- or three-million-year period. This body of thought, in other words, portrays a world within which recognizably

*political* behavior—indeed, conscious, deliberate, political calculation—had become adaptive. Political maneuvering—the formation of friendships and coalitions, the development of relations of trust, the counteractions taken against those who seem to be exploiting the cooperative system, the countermeasures taken by the putative exploiters to avoid punishment—all this would come alive in such a world. And those political abilities are to be understood not just in intra-group terms. This whole line of thought would seem to imply that those abilities would also be of value in terms of a group's relations with other groups.<sup>33</sup>

Again, the point here is that these *political* dynamics are of fundamental importance, and that it is thanks to them that a certain structure—a certain order—can emerge spontaneously even in an anarchic world. To ignore those dynamics—to assume that in the absence of overarching authority every group is at war with every other group—is thus (to use a phrase Waltz uses in a very different context) to take “the politics out of international politics.”<sup>34</sup> The anarchic realm, as Waltz himself points out, is a political realm *par excellence*.<sup>35</sup> It is the realm neither of pure violence, where every actor fights a war to the death against every other actor, nor of pure harmony, like a beehive or an ant colony.<sup>36</sup> It is instead something in between, a realm where interests overlap, but not totally, an area where relations are normally characterized by some mix of conflict and cooperation. That point is very basic, and many writers have made it. But the aim is to understand how such a world works; and to achieve that goal you cannot simply assume that the fundamental structure of the system makes for conflict, pure and simple. You need to take account of the ways in which an anarchic system might be self-stabilizing—the ways in which a degree of order might emerge spontaneously from the free play of political forces.

How then can this be done? This is essentially a theoretical issue, but you can only get so far by approaching the problem on a purely abstract level. You also need to study certain types of empirical problems. If your goal, for example, is to understand how an element of order can emerge in an anarchic world, you might want to study triangular conflicts—like Britain, France, and Germany around 1900, or America, China, and Russia in the 1960s, or Iran, Iraq, and the United States more recently—and see how they sort themselves out. Indeed, you might want to study what political life is like in areas where, for one reason or another, the writ



of civil authority does not run, like the Old West or even the Walled City of Kowloon.<sup>37</sup> The goal, in such exercises, is not to test any particular theory. You're just looking for some insight into the central theoretical issue. As Thomas Kuhn once put it, you're searching the empirical evidence for "clues" that might help you understand how things work at a more general level.<sup>38</sup>

Let me again stress the fact that I haven't spent all this time talking about the theoretical issue—the question of how a purely anarchic world works—because I think the fundamental goal of the field is to develop a theory of international politics as an end in itself. Theory-building has to be understood as a means to an end. The real aim is to understand how international politics works. The theoretical analysis provides us with a kind of springboard—a framework for thinking about real-world issues, a way of getting a handle on them, a way of bringing them into focus so that they become intellectually manageable. If you assume that anarchy breeds war—that a world in which power political considerations shape policy is inherently unstable—then you are going to approach the problem of international order in a particular way. You are going to be looking for things that might introduce some element of order into what you assume would otherwise be an inherently war-prone system. If the free play of political—meaning power-political—forces is the problem, then stability would depend on whether those forces can be brought under control—on whether the harshness of international politics in its pure form can be softened in some way. Order, in that case, would be identified with constraint. The presumption, in this case, is that things that limit the free play of political forces play a positive role—that things like the development of international law, the spread of democratic or free-market institutions, or the establishment of organizations like the United Nations, provide the basis for whatever international order there is. This way of approaching the problem in effect loads the analytical dice. Because of the way the questions are framed, the answers are in effect virtually pre-determined.

On the other hand, if you think the anarchic system is at its heart self-stabilizing and that problems develop only when its workings are thwarted in some way—that is, only when policies are *not* based on cool, power-political calculation—then those questions will be viewed in a very different light. The "intrusion" of ideology, even democratic ideology—the "intrusion" of values, even liberal values—might then be seen as

sources of disorder and instability in what would otherwise be a relatively stable system.

Note that this is not a right-versus-left issue. The left, of course, certainly does tend to assume, without giving the matter all that much thought, that power politics is bad and that the institutions and values that tend to keep it within bounds play a positive role. But on the right, the reaching for empire or its equivalent—the talk, for example, about the need for American “leadership” or for an American-led “world order”—is also rooted in the assumption that stability is not natural and that without a hegemon there is no order. And the idea that order depends on the existence of a hegemonic power is by no means the exclusive property of the right. E. H. Carr, for example, was one of the first major writers to argue along these lines, and Carr was certainly no conservative.<sup>39</sup>

This is basically an intellectual and not a political problem, and the key point here is that unless the analysis is framed the right way, these issues will not be brought into focus the way they need to be. If we think we know the answers in advance, in large part because we have reached overly simple or perhaps even fundamentally wrong conclusions on the core theoretical issue, we are not going to approach the real-world questions the way they need to be approached. The issue will be, for example, “how does international law make for a more orderly world?” and not “what impact, whether positive or negative or even both, does international law have on international political life?” For it is by no means inconceivable that legal constraints, to the extent that they influence political behavior, can play a negative role, shackling the law-abiding power and thus empowering would-be aggressors, as in the 1930s.<sup>40</sup> The point here is not, of course, that international law is essentially a source of disorder in international affairs. It is simply that if you are serious about dealing with these issues of international order, the questions have to be framed in such a way that answers turn on what the evidence shows—that is, in a way that might allow you to see beyond your own preconceptions.

The goal, in other words, is to do the kind of empirical work that will enable you to deepen your understanding of what makes for order in international political life. In doing that work, you’ll be looking for “clues,” in Kuhn’s sense. Your aim is to see important things you might not otherwise have seen. You might, for example, be interested in the role the United Nations played during the Cuban Missile Crisis. What difference



did it make, you wonder, in terms of the way the crisis ran its course, that the United Nations organization existed? Studying the crisis with that question in mind, you might notice things which most scholars who have examined the crisis (or, indeed, who have studied the U.N.) haven't noticed. President Kennedy, it turns out, wanted to settle the crisis by entering into a negotiation with the Soviets; the settlement he had in mind involved a withdrawal of the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. But while these negotiations were going on, in Kennedy's view, work on the missile sites in Cuba was to be suspended. That proposal for negotiations *cum* standstill, however, was not actually presented to the Soviets. As a result, there were no real negotiations, and the Soviets instead gave way in the end to what amounted to a kind of ultimatum—which, arguably, from the point of view of international order, was not the best way of settling the crisis. And it wasn't presented to them because the U.S. government, instead of approaching them directly, chose to go through U.N. Secretary General U Thant, who basically bungled the job. Instead of bringing the matter up with the Soviets, as the Americans wanted, he brought it up with the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who rejected it out of hand.<sup>41</sup> But it was not an accident that the Secretary General, coming from a relatively weak third-world country (Burma), would behave in this way, and it was not an accident that the Secretary General would come from such a country. What you see going on in this particular episode is the sort of thing you would want to take into account when thinking about the role institutions like the U.N. actually play in international political life, and it might not have occurred to you that the U.N. could have this kind of effect if you had not done this sort of empirical work—that is, if you had not taken the time to study this particular issue with a more or less open mind.

Why are such issues worth studying? Why, more generally, does it make sense to invest intellectual resources in this area of study? It is not just that we want to understand the world we live in as a kind of end in itself. We are also interested in these issues in large part because they relate directly to questions of policy, questions above all about the kind of international system we would want to live in. Questions of that sort are never far below the surface when we deal with these matters.

But should international relations scholars concern themselves directly with policy issues? It is sometimes argued that not only is it legitimate for scholars in this field to be concerned with such matters, but that questions

about policy should lie at the intellectual heart of the discipline. Bernard Brodie, for example, a giant in the area of strategic studies, could not understand how theorizing could be cut off from the real-world problems. "Strategic thinking," he argued, "or 'theory' if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a 'how to do it' study, a guide for accomplishing something and doing it efficiently."<sup>42</sup> But that sort of attitude makes many people uneasy. They doubt whether the "science of international relations" can ever become "operational." "If we expect a theory of international relations to provide the equivalent of what a knowledge of construction materials provides the builder of bridges," Raymond Aron wrote, "then there is no theory and never will be."<sup>43</sup> Many scholars, moreover, take it for granted that getting too involved with policy issues might do more harm than good in analytical terms—that identifying with the powerful and cozying up to them might affect the kind of work that is done, and not in a very positive way.

My own feeling, however, is that it makes sense for people in the field to be concerned with policy issues, provided they do not overdo it. Such concerns can play an important role, even for those who, like myself, rarely write on such issues. The international relations field can, in fact, be viewed as a kind of triad. Theory, history, and policy are its three component parts, and they are more tightly connected to each other intellectually than you might think. Historical analysis and policy analysis, for example, are quite similar in some ways. The historian makes claims about cause and effect: a particular course of action is chosen, and the claim is that it had certain consequences. Implicit in that claim is the notion that if different choices had been made, the effect would have been different. But to make assumptions about what would have happened if different policies had been adopted, you have to draw on a kind of theory, a certain sense (in the present case) for how international politics works. A policy analysis has to do much the same thing—namely, speculate about what would happen if various alternative policies were adopted by drawing on a kind of theory, and in fact by also drawing on a certain general sense for how things work. And thinking about concrete issues, both historical issues and policy issues, helps bring the theoretical questions into focus. It is much easier to get a handle on those questions when you are dealing with them in some concrete empirical context than when you are approaching them on a purely abstract level.



When you study historical problems, moreover, you in fact often end up thinking not just about theoretical questions but also about policy issues of a certain sort. To analyze what was done at a given point in the past, you need to consider what, even in theory, the alternatives to a particular course of action were. And to think about what else *could* have been done often spills over into thinking about what *should* have done. That type of thinking might have both a certain theoretical taproot and a certain general policy relevance.

Consider, for example, the case of British policy during the July Crisis in 1914, the crisis that led to the outbreak of the First World War. Many people say that Britain should have made it very clear to Germany from the start of that crisis that if war broke out, Britain would come in on the side of France and Russia. That point of view is linked to a certain general approach to strategic issues, an approach that makes deterrence the be-all and end-all of strategy. My own view, however, is that if the goal was to avoid war—and for a country like Britain in 1914 that goal would certainly have made sense—a strategy of siding very clearly with France and Russia and against Germany would not have been optimal. It would have been better, I think, not just to warn Germany that if she went to war prematurely—that is, say, before Russia had ordered general mobilization—Britain would almost certainly come into the conflict on the side of France and Russia, but at the same time also to warn Russia if she took the decisive step of ordering general mobilization without first getting British consent, Britain might then well stay out of the war. The aim would have been to avoid war by holding both sides back. Such a policy, a policy of balancing between Russia and Germany, would have been based on the idea that Britain could not profit from the destruction of either of those powers, each of whom served as a kind of counterweight to the other. An analysis of that sort, one should note, is rooted in the classical balance-of-power tradition—a tradition that leads you to be almost reflexively critical of the idea that strategy should be based essentially on simple deterrent threats.

But one could push this type of thinking a bit further. For such a balancing policy to be viable, Britain and France together would have had to free themselves from dependence on Russia—that is, from the implicit Russian threat that if the western powers did not give Russia a blank check, the Russians might work out an accommodation with Germany,

and the western powers would then have to deal with Germany all by themselves. The threat could carry weight only because the western powers, mainly because of Britain's unwillingness to deploy large forces in northern France, were not in a particularly good position militarily *vis-à-vis* Germany. It would have made sense, therefore, for them to build up their defensive military power to the point where they could withstand a German onslaught without help from Russia—not just because that effort would be of direct value in military terms, but even more because that effort would increase their political freedom of action by making them less dependent on Russia and thus better able to balance between Germany and Russia. This is somewhat at variance with the way military issues are normally analyzed, but it is typical of the kind of insight you get by thinking about historical issues of this sort. The insights you get from grappling with the historical issue have a certain theoretical resonance—in this case, the historical analysis both draws on and gives you a sense for the value of the kind of classical balance-of-power thinking you associate with Fénelon. But these historical ruminations also have a policy relevance—a bearing, in this case, on the way issues of both military and foreign policy ought to be approached, and indeed on the way military and foreign policy need to be related to each other.

Let me give a second example, this one relating to U.S. policy during the Vietnam War. Both right and left tended at the time to approach the subject in moral terms, but in fact the policy issue could have been approached in a very different way. You could have looked at how an American victory would have affected the global structure of power—of how in that case the Chinese heartland would have been largely surrounded by an arc of American power, from South Korea and Japan down through Taiwan and the Philippines, and reconnecting with the Asian mainland in South Vietnam. In that event, the Chinese would probably have felt more inclined to mend fences with the Soviets, and a Sino-Soviet rapprochement would have weakened America's position in the world. On the other hand, a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and a reunification of that country under Communist auspices would probably have had the opposite effect. A unified Vietnam would be less dependent on China for support and more inclined to look to the Soviet Union as a counterweight to the great power to its north. As the unified Vietnam moved closer to the USSR, China would feel surrounded not by American but by Soviet



power, and would in fact have an incentive to look to the United States as a counterweight to Russia. Such a turn of events would have been to America's interest. Wouldn't it have made sense to approach the issue, at least in large part, from that point of view? And yet you wouldn't even think of analyzing the problem in that context unless you had come to think about international politics in general in a certain way. Grappling with those theoretical issues can thus enable you to see things you otherwise would not have seen. It can give you a valuable framework for thinking about these issues of policy. And, conversely, grappling with policy problems can help you develop that framework. When you try to come to grips with a certain policy issue, you're virtually forced to think about which general principles apply. And in the process you're able to take your measure of those principles—that is, you're able to see how much real-world resonance they have.

So all three areas of international relations scholarship—theory, history, and policy—are closely interrelated. It thus makes sense for people doing work in each of these three areas to interact with each other, to engage each other intellectually, and to draw on and react to what people in other parts of the field have to say about the problems they're concerned with. That's one of the ways people can develop a certain sense for what the core questions are, for whether they are being dealt with in the right way, and for whether the whole enterprise is in any sense more than just the sum of its parts.

All of which brings me to the question of what this area of scholarship can reasonably hope to achieve. I referred before to Martin Wight's well-known article, "Why Is There No International Theory?" But I didn't tell you then how he answered the question posed in the title. His answer, in fact, was a little bizarre. He thought the problem had to do with a "kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being theorized about." And the reason for that, in his view, was "that the theorizing has to be done in the language of political theory and law."<sup>44</sup> But theorizing can obviously be done in whatever language is appropriate to the subject at hand or in new language developed for that purpose. So the answer Wight gave is not particularly strong.

But couldn't it be, you might wonder, that his question has a very simple answer? Maybe there is just not much to philosophize about. Maybe the issues here are just not intellectually challenging enough to

produce high-level work of the sort Wight would have called “international theory.” It might make sense to study individual conflicts, but maybe there is simply not much of a general nature to be said about the larger issue of how international politics works.

I think, however, that there are serious issues here, intellectually demanding issues, issues which we haven’t yet been able to deal with entirely adequately. Brodie once said that the nuclear revolution has posed problems of “great intellectual difficulty, as well as other kinds of difficulty,” and my sense is that most scholars who have tried to grapple with those problems would say “amen” to that point. I think, however, that what Brodie said about the nuclear revolution applies also to international politics as a whole. Many of the issues we deal with here are profoundly puzzling, and sometimes you only realize how difficult they are when you go into them in some depth. But that does not mean that the issues that lie at the heart of this field of inquiry are essentially unanswerable. There are points of a general nature that can be made—points that go well beyond, and in some respects even run counter to, what people tend to believe before they study the subject seriously. You can, in fact, identify a whole series of such points; you can see a whole variety of dynamics at work in the international sphere. The problem is seeing how they all fit together, seeing how much weight each of them carries in the real world, and seeing how to reconcile those points when they are in some ways at odds with each other. Dealing with that problem is not in principle an impossible task. But to deal with it effectively, we have to think more deeply than we have about how the larger problem needs to be tackled—about what the larger intellectual enterprise we are engaged in is, about how it needs to be organized, about how we should go about studying the fundamental problem of war and peace.

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## NOTES

1. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), esp. pp. 88–93. For the phrase quoted here, see p. 89; see also p. 77. Note also the title of ch. 6 in this book: “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power.” And indeed the basic notion of the “balance of power” plays a key role in this kind of approach to the question. Note, for example, Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, *Force, Order, and Justice* (Baltimore,



MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 96: "The prerequisite of order among autonomous states is that force be restrained by countervailing force within a balance (or equilibrium) of power."

2. For people like Waltz, economic theory was, of course, the great model here. On the point about order not meaning mere "pattern or regularity," see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 3. On the general idea of order emerging "spontaneously" in social systems without direct state intervention, see also Robert Ellickson, *Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), esp. p. 4, and Robert Axelrod's famous book, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

3. Note, for example, Jürgen Habermas's reference to the "civilizing achievement of legally domesticating the state of nature among belligerent nations" in an interview published in *The Nation*, December 16, 2002.

4. For the basic distinction between the two senses of the term 'order', see Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 3–5, and Dennis H. Wrong, *The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides Society* (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 37–38. Note also the discussion in Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in *International Regimes*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 98–101. Young distinguishes between three "types of order": spontaneous, negotiated, and imposed. For the reference to order emerging "spontaneously" in an anarchic system, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 90–91. The notion that international order depends on the existence of "international society" is associated with the "English school" of international relations theorists, and especially with Hedley Bull and Martin Wight. Note also Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order* (London: Profile Books, 2000), p. 16: "The history of Europe was henceforward [from the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 on] to be shaped by the relations between its states, and the international order depended on their ability to create among themselves an effective international society." The basic idea, however, has deep roots, and the notion that the European state system was a "kind of society" or a "sort of republic" played a particularly important role in eighteenth-century balance-of-power thought. See, for example, the extracts published in Moorhead Wright, ed., *Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power, 1486–1914* (London: Dent, 1975), pp. 39, 41, 71–72, and also F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 57–58, 162–63, and Bull, *Anarchical Society*, pp. 23–38.

5. Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?" in *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 17–34.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22. Emphasis in original text.

11. Kenneth Waltz, "Theory of International Relations," in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 8, *International Politics*, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 1.

12. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 7.

13. Kenneth Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," *American Political Science Review* **91**, no. 4 (December 1997): 914; the internal quotation is from a well-known book on method, Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 20. Note also the tone of Waltz's comments in a 1993 interview: "I am tired of people who say, 'You've got a theory of international politics; you need to include domestic politics.' Well, don't these people understand anything about what a theory is? A theory has to be *about* something. It can't be about everything. So you have to figure out what it is you're trying to explain, what is this domain you're trying to deal with." "Interview with Ken Waltz," conducted by Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg, May 7, 1993, *Review of International Studies* **24** (1998), p. 379.

14. Kenneth Waltz, "Thoughts about Assaying Theories," in *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fenius Elman (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 2003), p. xii. See also Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," pp. 913–17.

15. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 13–16. Not also his use of terms like 'falsification' in a piece he had published a few years earlier, a sort of forerunner to that book. Waltz, "Theory of International Relations," p. 42. For the later view, see Kenneth Waltz, "Reflections on *Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics*," in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 334.

16. See, for example, James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* **1** (1998): 289–313.

17. Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Imre Lakatos, "Lectures on Scientific Method," in Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, *For and Against Method: Including Lakatos's Lectures on Scientific method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence*, ed. Matteo Motterlini (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

18. See especially N. R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), and N. R. Hanson, *Perception and Discovery: An Introduction to Scientific Inquiry* (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper, 1969).

19. John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 3.

20. For the quotation: Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 43–44. On these points in general, see Marc Trachtenberg, "The Question of Realism: A Historian's View," *Security Studies* **13**, no. 1 (Autumn 2003), esp. 156–59, 170–72, 174–76.

21. James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* **49**, no. 3 (Summer 1995), 384.

22. This is the article on the "Question of Realism" cited in n. 20 above.

23. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1955), p. 95 (ch. 15). See also pp. 82–83, 110, 112 (chs. 13 and 17).

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 109 (for the quotation), 111–12 (ch. 17).



25. *Ibid.*, p. 81 (ch. 13): "And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him." One is amazed, the archaic language notwithstanding, by how modern-sounding this whole line of argument is. Hobbes applies this sort of argument explicitly to interstate relations in ch. 17 (p. 110). "For their own security," he writes, cities and kingdoms "enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, and endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly: and are remembered for it in after ages with honour."

26. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

27. *Ibid.*, ch. 13, and esp. p. 82.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 82–83.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

30. François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon, supplement to his *L'Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté*, originally written around 1700, and published in many editions of Fénelon's work. For this extract, see Wright, *Theory and Practice*, p. 43.

31. For a similar argument, see Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, 2nd ed'n. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 68.

32. Richard Dawkins's *Selfish Gene* is still the best introduction to this body of thought. For the theory of human evolution sketched out here, see especially R. D. Alexander, *How Did Humans Evolve? Reflections on the Uniquely Unique Species* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Museum of Zoology, Special Publication no. 1, 1990) (the quotation is on p. 4). Note also Alexander's *Darwinism and Human Affairs* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1979), pp. 222–33. Given W. D. Hamilton's importance in the field, two articles of his are worth noting in this context: "Innate Social Aptitudes of Man: An Approach from Evolutionary Genetics," in *Biosocial Anthropology* ed. Robin Fox (New York: Wiley, 1975); and "Selection of Selfish and Altruistic Behavior in Some Extreme Models," originally published in *Man and Beast: Comparative Social Behavior*, ed. J. F. Eisenberg and Wilton S. Dillon (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971), pp. 57–91, and republished, with a long introduction, in W. D. Hamilton, *Narrow Roads of Gene Land: The Collected Papers of W. D. Hamilton*, vol. 1: *Evolution of Social Behavior* (Oxford: Freeman, 1996), pp. 198–227.

33. See especially Robert Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism," *Quarterly Review of Biology* 46, no. 1 (March 1971), 35–57, and especially the final part of that paper, dealing with the "psychological system underlying human reciprocal altruism," and above all the section (pp. 52–53) on multiparty interactions. Note also Nicholas Humphrey's seminal article, "The Social Function of Intellect," in *Growing Points in Ethology*, ed. P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976). For the relevance of the Humphrey approach to the body of thought we are

concerned with here, see the discussion of his ideas in Alexander, *How Did Humans Evolve?*, pp. 4–6, and in Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, pp. 280–81.

34. Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” *International Security* 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000), 8.

35. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 113.

36. See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 111 (ch. 17).

37. A number of scholars who studied the Old West were surprised to discover, given its reputation, how little crime and violence there was. Crimes against women, for example, were generally unheard of, and even theft and burglary were rare. The explanation often given, both by residents of those areas at the time and by later scholars, is that retaliation was swift and severe. “Crime was of rare occurrence,” according to one miner, “because punishment, like an avenging nemesis, was sure to follow.” See Roger McGrath, *Gunfighters, Highwaymen and Vigilantes: Violence on the Frontier* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 157, 181, 190, 261–70 (reviewing some of the work done in this area); Mary Ellen Jones, *Daily Life on the Nineteenth Century American Frontier* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998), pp. 145–46; Thomas Stone, *Miners’ Justice: Migration, Law and Order on the Alaska-Yukon Frontier, 1873–1902* (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), pp. 58, 142–43. For a survey of the literature on the subject, see Richard M. Brown, “Historiography of Violence in the American West,” in *Historians and the American West*, ed. Michael P. Malone (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 234–69 (p. 267 for the quotation given above).

38. Thomas Kuhn, *The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard History of Science Department, 1991), p. 6.

39. See E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 2nd ed’n., esp. pp. 232–35. For the role that Carr’s book (and in particular this argument) played in the development of the so-called “hegemonic stability” theory, note what Robert Gilpin, one of the main architects of that theory, recently wrote about that book. “My interest in the relationship between the structure of the international political system and the nature of the international economy was first aroused,” he remembered, by his reading of Carr’s book. “In this classic study of the collapse of the open world economy at the outbreak of World War I and the subsequent inability of a weakened Great Britain to re-create a liberal international economy after the war, Carr demonstrated that a liberal world economy must rest on a dominant liberal power.” Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 100–101, n. 52. As a characterization of Carr’s argument, this leaves much to be desired, but it does throw some light on the question of the origins of the “hegemonic stability” argument. On Carr in general, see Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr 1892–1982* (London: Verso, 1999).

40. See Marc Trachtenberg, “The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance,” in *The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress*, ed. David Andrews (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 201–31.

41. The evidence (some of which was from the U.N. archives) can be found in a little piece I wrote included in the *Proceedings of the Hawk’s Cay Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, March 5–8, 1987*, ed. David Welch (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1989), and is also available online at:

<http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/cmc.1.pdf>



42. Bernard Brodie, "Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 5 (Winter 1971–1972), p. 151.
43. Raymond Aron, "What Is a Theory of International Relations?" *Journal of International Affairs* **21**, no. 2 (1967), 201–204.
44. Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?" p. 33.