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France and NATO, 1949–1991

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What role, in the French view, was the United States to play in the defence of Europe? From the very outset, the feeling was that the NATO allies could not be totally dependent on the United States for their security. Even during the Fourth Republic, the French were interested in building a European counterweight to American power within the Western alliance, and during the Gaullist period the whole idea of an independent Europe seemed to play an even more prominent role in French policy. But an independent Europe would have to include a strong, and therefore nuclearised, West German state, something the French throughout the Cold War era could scarcely bring themselves to accept. That meant that there was no alternative to a continuing American military presence in Europe, and thus to a degree of political dependence upon the United States – a conclusion the French, with great difficulty, came to at the end of the Cold War.

Keywords: France; NATO; defence of Europe; US–European relations; Franco–American relations

How is the whole question of the relationship between France and NATO during the Cold War to be approached? The fundamental issue here has to do not with France's relationship to NATO as an institution, but rather with French feelings about the sort of political and military system that needed to be built – that is, with French policy on the general question of America's role in the defence of Europe. How central a role, in the French view, was the United States to play? Were there any viable alternatives to a US-dominated defence system? And what kind of relationship, political as well as military, should America have with her European partners? The basic problem, in other words, had to do not with a particular set of institutional structures, but rather with what might be called the 'NATO system' – a system based on the American military presence in Western Europe and on the American commitment to defend that part of the continent.

The point needs to be stressed because it is often assumed that the institutional framework – the 'integrated' NATO defence system – was of enormous political importance. Those structures, it was said, limited the freedom of action, the sovereignty, of the European forces that were 'integrated' into it. The Americans, the argument ran, essentially ran the show, and it was in large part thanks to those NATO structures that they were able to dominate Europe. But although the French government, especially in the 1960s, often argued along those lines, key French officials themselves did not really view the situation in quite that way. At the end of 1963, for example, Maurice Couve de Murville, foreign minister for most of the

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period when Charles de Gaulle dominated French policy (1958–1969), argued that even official NATO strategy decisions were not very important. The one thing that really mattered was whether NATO would go nuclear in the event of war. Whatever plans were worked out, he said, and whatever was decided at the NATO level in principle, the president of the United States would make the key decision – about the use of nuclear weapons – at a time and in a way which he thought proper. The NATO strategy documents would themselves be of 'purely academic' interest.[1]

This type of argument was perhaps a bit too extreme, but there is little doubt that Couve was essentially correct. The nuclear issue was by far the most important defence question the Western countries had to face during the Cold War period, and compared to that all other issues were of minor importance. And, for most of that period, that issue would be decided in Washington, and not by whatever strategy documents NATO adopted.

And as for the argument about NATO structures limiting the independence of the European countries that were part of the 'integrated' system, it is important to remember that in peacetime the NATO armies remained essentially under national control. As Henry Kissinger, then President Richard Nixon's national security advisor, put the point in early 1970: 'It is clear that much of the discussion of integration versus national freedom of action is artificial and theological. In the end, all NATO members retain the capacity for unilateral military action; at the same time, in practice, they are unlikely to use them unilaterally except under most unusual and extreme circumstances'.[2]

So the real question had to do with America's role in Europe – that is, with whether the NATO system, or something like it, a system based largely on US military power, was the only viable solution to Europe's security problem. And it is important to note that for the French, in the early Cold War years at least, the answer was clearly yes. Western Europe, in their view, was simply not strong enough to stand up to Soviet military power by itself, and indeed, as they saw it, German power could also be contained only within the framework of a strong US-dominated system. The French at that time were thus fervent supporters of the NATO system, and at times wanted to go further than the Americans themselves. They sought to deepen US involvement in Europe and pushed hard for the establishment of an integrated defence system and for the appointment of an American general as NATO commander. 'A common authority,' Prime Minister René Pleven said in 1950, would enable the United States to exercise the 'predominant role which it must play in the Atlantic defense effort.'[3] Or as the French chiefs of staff put it the following year: 'The notion of the integration of the French forces into an Atlantic whole, necessarily taking orders from the inter-allied authorities' had been 'understood and accepted.'[4] The French were even willing, in 1954, to accept the establishment of a system in which the NATO commander, an American general, could in effect start a European war on his own by ordering a pre-emptive attack on the enemy's forces even before hostilities had actually begun. They agreed – and this applied to both the French military authorities and to their political leadership – that a strategy of this sort, which placed such extraordinary power in the hands of an American general, was essential if Europe were to be defended in the event of war.[5]

Still, it was quite clear even during this period that the NATO system was not entirely satisfactory from the French point of view. France was utterly dependent on America for her security, and thus did not have as much control over her own destiny

as she would have liked. This is not to say that the US government could do whatever it wanted, and that the European allies had no choice but to follow. The allies had a certain importance from the US point of view. NATO was very different, in terms of its political meaning, from a simple bilateral US–West German alliance, or from a simple unilateral American guarantee of West German territory. The Western countries, in the NATO system, would all be standing shoulder to shoulder; they would be defending Western civilisation as a whole. That kind of system seemed to be rooted in something very basic; it seemed relatively solid, relatively durable. But to bring it into being, the Europeans would have to go along with it voluntarily. The Americans could not simply dictate to them, but instead had to take their views into account on important issues. And indeed, on some key issues – like the framework for German rearmament in the 1950–1954 period – they ended up having to defer to the views of their allies.[6]

Even so, the French could not feel comfortable relying so heavily on American power, especially over the long run. A foreign power based thousands of miles away, no matter how well-intentioned, was bound to see things differently, bound to have its own interests which were not totally identical with those of France. And that power, being a democracy, changed administrations periodically. Would new American governments be as willing to defend Europe as their predecessors had been? The fundamental problem here was that America's willingness to play that role was almost bound to erode as the Soviet Union built up its nuclear capabilities. The Soviets could be deterred from attacking Europe by an American threat to retaliate with a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union itself, but would the Americans still be willing to do so once the Soviets had the ability to respond to such an attack by launching a full-scale nuclear counter-attack on the United States? Could the Europeans really rely on America for their defence in such circumstances? Wouldn't a very different sort of system have to be put in place?

It was clear very early on that this problem was bound to arise eventually. And what that meant, it seemed to many people, even in the 1950s, was that the Europeans sooner or later would have to provide for their own defence. Very few people thought that that could be done on a purely national basis. A German nuclear force, under purely national control, was not a very appealing prospect even in West Germany, let alone in the other West European countries. The basic goal (not just for France and America, but also for the West German government) was to anchor the Federal Republic in the Western world, and in particular to tie that country into some sort of West European community. This implied that if the West Europeans were to defend themselves, they would have to do it on a unified basis. A unified Western Europe could balance Soviet power on its own, without direct American support. It certainly had the resources to do so. It was therefore essential, for those who thought in these terms, to move ahead with the 'building of Europe'. And it was clear all along that a Europe that could defend itself – an independent Europe, a Europe that was not just an American military protectorate – needed a nuclear force under its own control. It obviously could not stand up to a great nuclear power like the Soviet Union on its own with just conventional forces.

It is often assumed that the Americans were against anything of the sort – that the United States liked being the dominant power in the West, found the NATO system quite congenial, and therefore was fundamentally opposed to the idea of a nuclear-armed Europe. And it is also commonly assumed that while the French, at

least from 1958 on, wanted to create a truly independent Europe – a 'European Europe', as Charles de Gaulle put it – they were unable to do so because the Germans especially were unwilling to pursue a policy which would put their vital relationship with America at risk.[7] The real story, however, is a bit different. In itself, the defence of Europe was a burden for the United States, a burden it would have preferred not to have to carry. The defence of Europe rested on a threat to go nuclear in the event of war, but nuclear escalation (once the Soviets had built up their retaliatory forces) could easily result in the destruction of American society. It would have been better, from the US point of view, at least in principle, if the Europeans could ultimately balance Soviet power on their own.

And in fact perhaps the most basic US goal during the Eisenhower period (1953–1961) was to make Europe into what the president called a 'third great power complex in the world'.[8] He felt that the United States could not go on defending Europe forever. America, he wrote, could not a 'be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions if for no other reason than that these are *not*, politically, *our* frontiers'. Sooner or later, the Europeans would have to defend themselves, and he very much wanted to help them create a common European defence system, a system which of course would have a strong nuclear component. And the existing NATO structure provided the framework within which this could be done. As Europe became stronger, the Americans could reduce their presence on the continent, perhaps down to the single-division level but conceivably down to zero. As that happened, NATO would devolve into an essentially European defence organisation, and indeed Eisenhower wanted NATO, even before that happened, to have a European (and in fact a French) general as its commander.[9]

And it was not just Eisenhower who felt that the Europeans needed to build a defence system of their own. The West Germans, especially during the second half of Konrad Adenauer's chancellorship – that is, from the mid-1950s to early 1963 – were also very interested in building a system of that sort. Adenauer in particular felt that West Germany, in the long run, had to be able to defend itself, and that meant that it had to have some kind of nuclear capability. But a European force in which the West Germans participated was vastly preferable, for all sorts of reasons, both foreign and domestic, to a purely national force. And it was quite clear also that a European force could only be built in cooperation with the French. The West Germans made a number of efforts along these lines and remained interested in this kind of arrangement even during the Brandt period (1969–1974).[10]

So the key point to note here is that, given those German and American attitudes, the path was open to a free-standing Europe, a 'European Europe', especially in the late 1950s. The ball essentially was in France's court. Were the French ever willing to go that route? Everyone knows what the French leader at that time, Charles de Gaulle, was saying about the need to create a 'European Europe', free of American domination. But were the French in fact ever willing to move ahead with the establishment of some sort of European defence system, and in particular of some kind of European nuclear force, which would have to lie at the heart of that defence system? If not, that would tell us something of fundamental importance about what their attitude toward the NATO system really was.

The French government at times seemed prepared to move in this direction. In 1957–1958, at the end of the Fourth Republic, France and Germany, joined by Italy, set off on the path of nuclear cooperation. The aim of the FIG (France-Italy-Germany)

agreements, as they were called, was to create 'a European strategic entity'. The three continental powers would develop a nuclear capability of their own. The Americans, it is important to note, were willing to support this plan. When de Gaulle came to power in France in June 1958, however, he put an end to the FIG arrangements. The French nuclear force would be built on a purely national basis.[11]

But de Gaulle had by no means closed the door on the idea of a purely European defence or on the idea of a European nuclear force. His basic philosophy – the idea that Europe had to be European, that it had to be independent of both East and West, and that it therefore had to be able to defend itself – implied that something of the sort could not simply be ruled out. If the Europeans could not defend themselves, if they were essentially dependent on America for their security, they would end up as American satellites. So some alternative to the NATO system had to be considered. And he did, at least at one point, seem to accept the idea that a European system, based on a close relationship between France and Germany, should be brought into being.

De Gaulle dealt with this issue at an important meeting with Adenauer at Rambouillet in 1960. France, he said, was building nuclear weapons because she could no longer remain in a 'state of dependence', and he understood that the same logic applied to West Germany as well. It was 'intolerable,' he said, 'for our two peoples … to accept that it is not up to them to defend themselves, and to accept instead that the Americans should have that responsibility'. The solution was to create a 'union between France and Germany', both of whom would be nuclear-armed. Indeed, he said explicitly that the whole situation implied that West Germany, like France, 'would not remain without nuclear weapons'.[12]

But despite all the rhetoric about a 'European Europe', de Gaulle never wholeheartedly embraced this kind of concept. Even in 1960, the whole notion of a nuclear-armed Germany was not a terribly appealing prospect, and after 1963 the French government opposed that idea, and indeed anything that pointed in that direction, in a very direct way. And it is also important to note that de Gaulle had not been willing to use the existing NATO structure as a framework within which an independent Europe could be built when that had been possible in the late Eisenhower period. When he met the US president at Rambouillet in December 1959, for example, he simply ignored Eisenhower's suggestion that the NATO commander should be a French general.[13] De Gaulle, in fact, by pursuing what was perceived early on as an anti-NATO policy, made it much harder for Eisenhower to cooperate with his country, especially in the key nuclear area.[14]

The same basic point about de Gaulle not being willing to cooperate with the Americans to work out arrangements that met France's needs applies also to the Kennedy period (1961–1963). US leaders at that time were no longer thinking in terms of a freestanding Europe, even as a long-range goal. A Europe able to defend itself would have to include a Germany able to defend itself, and that meant a Germany armed with nuclear weapons. But that prospect the Kennedy administration found utterly unacceptable; it followed that there could be no purely European solution to the problem of the defence of Europe and that the Americans could therefore not withdraw from Western Europe. But the US government in this period wondered whether a continuing US presence would be enough for the Germans in the long run. Wouldn't the Federal Republic, sooner or later, try to build a nuclear capability? The Kennedy administration initially believed that the Germans would go

that route if Britain and France remained nuclear powers, so for a time it tried to get those two countries 'out of the nuclear business'. Relations with France especially went downhill, but relations with West Germany were scarcely better. So John F. Kennedy shifted course at the end of 1962. He now wanted to work with France and Britain, and indeed sought (as part of a general policy of political collaboration) to support their nuclear programs. His national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, went so far as to tell a French diplomat in August 1963 that 'the United States was ready, unconditionally, to help France manufacture bombs'.[15] But the key point to note here is that the US president was trying to build a certain political structure: Britain, France, and America, would work together; they would be the Western world's three nuclear powers; but West Germany would not be admitted into that charmed circle, and a Germany isolated in the West would have little choice but to follow the lead of the three dominant powers.[16]

This sort of system implied something less than full US control. It was the kind of arrangement one might have thought France would go along with, since (as President Kennedy pointed out) on fundamental issues America and France essentially saw eye to eye.[17] Indeed Kennedy had moved away from the idea of a highly integrated NATO system, at least in the all-important nuclear area, enraging some of his advisors in the process. But de Gaulle had no interest in seeing if something of the sort Kennedy had in mind could be worked out. Instead he broke with America in early 1963, and relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate during the Johnson period, culminating in France's withdrawal from NATO (although not from the Western alliance) in 1966.

The result was that France could accept neither an Atlantic system nor a European system. The Americans had to be kept at arm's length and France's contacts with NATO would be minimal, but given de Gaulle's feelings about Germany and nuclear weapons, there could be no purely European alternative to NATO: a 'European security community' was no longer in the cards, if, indeed, it had ever been. A purely national policy was the one remaining option, but the problem here, from the French point of view, was that France herself was not strong enough to play a major independent role in world politics: the Soviets, once they had a choice, would be much more interested in dealing with America or Germany than with France. So by holding herself aloof, France was limiting her own ability to influence events. Indeed, with no viable European alternative within reach, Germany was bound to remain dependent on America. But France's ability to influence American policy, and especially American defence policy, was fairly limited, if France remained unwilling to discuss defence issues in a serious way with America and the other NATO allies.

These problems were quite clear to de Gaulle's successors. The West Germans remained interested in seeing whether some sort of European defence system could be set up. Chancellor Willy Brandt raised the issue in a meeting with de Gaulle's successor as president, Georges Pompidou, in June 1973: 'If Germany,' he said, 'is in a common defense organization which is added to or replaces NATO, it is not possible that she will only play the role of an infantry.' A few months later the German foreign minister, Walter Scheel, met his French counterpart, Michel Jobert. Scheel wanted Western Europe eventually to be able to defend itself – that is, to liberate itself from dependence on America – and he took it for granted that a community that wanted to defend itself would have to have a nuclear capability. But

the French evaded those German overtures. They clearly were not interested in moving in that direction.[18] And this was in fact true of French policy under Pompidou's successors, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and François Mitterrand – that is, for the entire remainder of the Cold War.[19]

All these French governments were committed in one way or another to the 'construction of Europe', but their reluctance to move ahead in the defence area, and especially in the nuclear area, meant that there was a limit to how far that policy of building Europe could go. As Mitterrand himself put it: 'the idea of Europe cannot be dissociated from the idea of defence'.[20] If there were no unified defence policy, there could scarcely be a truly unified Europe. And it was quite clear that because of the German problem – that is, because of the reluctance of the French to allow the Germans to get any control over nuclear weapons – a genuine European defence system was simply not within reach. As a French official pointed out in 1972: 'One of the fundamental reasons why Europe [was] so weak' was that the nine Common Market countries could not 'work out a defence policy because of Germany'.[21]

What that implied was that there was no alternative to working with the Americans. A purely national policy – one that looked solely to the defence of the French homeland – was not really viable. It was not just that the particular defence strategy the French had adopted, which involved the use of short-range nuclear weapons on German territory in the event France were threatened – a strategy, that is, that essentially treated German territory as a buffer zone – was deeply distasteful to the Germans, and thus placed a burden on France's relations with that country.[22] The real problem here was more basic. The sense was that France could not cut herself off from her allies in that way. France was part of Europe; France had to be deeply concerned with what was going on beyond her borders, especially in the event of war; it was absurd to cling to a dogma (as François de Rose put it) that prevented the French 'from participating in the defence of our continent'.[23] And to participate, the French needed to talk with the Americans and see if a common strategic concept and possibly even common plans could be worked out.

It is important to note (since the evidence now available contradicts some of the conventional wisdom about this period) that even under Pompidou the French government was prepared to move ahead in this area. The great fear at that time was not that America would weigh too heavily on Europe, but that the United States was pulling back from the nuclear defence of Europe.[24] America and the Soviet Union, it seemed, were moving toward a certain understanding, based on the idea that no matter what happened in Europe, neither superpower's homeland would be subject to nuclear attack. But whether that would be possible turned, in large measure, on the question of how a European war would be fought, and in particular on the question of how and when, if it all, nuclear weapons would be used in such a war. Perhaps, French officials had come to think, the old strategy of simply threatening massive retaliation was no longer viable; perhaps nuclear weapons, if they were used at all, needed to be used in a more discriminate way, first in the theatre and then beyond; perhaps a more subtle strategy of controlled escalation was now in order.[25] But since the Americans were bound to play a fundamental role in this area, it made sense to try to work closely with them on these matters – to try to think through with them all of the problems relating to the use of nuclear weapons, and especially tactical nuclear weapons, in a European war. And top French officials in 1973 tried hard to talk with the Americans about these issues – an effort that failed at the time, not because the

American military authorities did not favour talks of this sort, but because political relations between the two countries had deteriorated so dramatically that year.[26]

Under Pompidou's successors, however, these issues were discussed and in fact an agreement with the NATO authorities relating to the use of tactical nuclear weapons was reached in 1979.[27] Basic strategic questions of this sort, however, were hard to deal with, and it is not clear whether agreements of that sort were rooted in a real meeting of the minds in this area. But the key point to note here is that the French could scarcely avoid the conclusion that a purely national strategy was not very satisfactory, for both military and political reasons. And despite all the 'European' rhetoric, a 'European' approach was not really viable either, essentially because of the German problem. Giscard d'Estaing, for example, made it clear that he was not interested in moving in that direction – in part, to avoid offending the Soviets (presumably because of its implications about Germany and nuclear weapons).[28] As for Mitterrand, he placed even greater emphasis on the importance of building an independent Europe, and he and his collaborators certainly understood that that would be possible only if Europe was strong enough to defend itself.[29] But he and his government were deeply opposed to any notion of France sharing her nuclear weapons with Germany.[30] It thus seemed that the French were marching along a road – the road to a truly unified Europe – whose endpoint, full German participation in the nuclear defence of Europe, they could scarcely bring themselves to accept.

What all this meant was that there was no real alternative to the NATO system. That conclusion the French had tried hard to resist. The NATO system, with all it implied about American predominance and the subordination of the Europeans to US power, was profoundly distasteful not just to Mitterrand but to most of his predecessors from de Gaulle on. And yet the basic logic of the situation could scarcely be ignored. In the end, even Mitterrand had to accept it. He had tried to pursue a policy based on the 'gradual affirmation of Western Europe's autonomous personality', a policy aimed at freeing Europe from dependence on America and at enabling Europe to stand up to both the United States and the Soviet Union.[31] But at the moment of truth, at the very end of the Cold War, he opted for a continuation of the NATO system and indeed played a key role in making sure that that system survived into the post-Cold War world. And the main reason had to do with France's great neighbour across the Rhine: Mitterrand, as Frédéric Bozo points out, 'did not want to take the risk of precipitating the evolution of a more autonomous Germany'.[32]

France's most basic political interests were on the line, and core political realities had asserted themselves: as the Cold War drew to a close, the French finally made their peace with the NATO system.

Notes

1. Couve meeting with Bohlen and Finletter, 30 November 1963, *Documents diplomatiques français* [DDF] 1963: 2, 576.
2. Kissinger memo for Nixon on Military Relations with France, 23 February 1970, National Security Council Files [NSCF], box 916, Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA.
3. Bruce to Acheson, 1 August 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [FRUS] 1950: 3, 171.

4. 'Avis du Comité des chefs d'état-major du 23 août 1951', quoted in Pierre Guillen, 'Les militaires français et la création de l'OTAN', in Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Melandri and Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l'OTAN 1949–1996* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1996), 78; see also ibid., 87–8.
5. See Marc Trachtenberg, 'La formation du système de défense occidentale: les Etats-Unis, la France et MC 48', ibid., 118–20.
6. The British and French, for example, had to take the lead in working out the arrangements that were embodied in the Paris Accords of 1954. The Americans, who under Eisenhower had very much preferred the plan for a European Defence Community – because the EDC, in their view, would lead to a unified Europe, and that in turn would make it possible for Europe to defend itself and thus for the United States to eventually withdraw from the continent – accepted the 1954 arrangements grudgingly. For the story, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 121–5.
7. See, for example, Pierre Melandri, 'La France et l'Alliance atlantique sous Georges Pompidou et Valéry Giscard d'Estaing', in Vaïsse *et al*., *La France et l'OTAN*, 553.
8. Eisenhower to Gruenther, 2 December 1955, in *Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, ed. Alfred Chandler *et al*. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 16, 1919–20.
9. See Trachtenberg, *Constructed Peace*, 147–56. The quotation about a modern Rome can be found on p. 147. For Eisenhower's views about a European (and in fact a French) NATO commander, see ibid., 213–15, 224–6.
10. See especially Georges-Henri Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine: les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996* (Paris: Fayard, 1996).
11. See ibid., chapters 3 and 4, and Trachtenberg, *Constructed Peace*, 205–7, 235.
12. De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting, 29 July 1960, DDF 1960: 2, 165–6. These passages were first quoted (in German translation) in Georges-Henri Soutou, 'De Gaulle, Adenauer und die gemeinsame Front gegen die amerikanische Nuklearstrategie', in *Politischer Wandel, organisierte Gewalt und nationale Sicherheit*, ed. E.W. Hansen, G. Schreiber, and B. Wegner (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 498–9. The account of this meeting, based on German sources, in Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann, 195–1967* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), 566, is also quite revealing.
13. De Gaulle–Eisenhower–Macmillan meeting, 20 December 1959, 21, PREM 11/2991, British National Archives, Kew, and DDF 1959: 2, 772; see also, ibid., 761.
14. See Trachtenberg, *Constructed Peace*, 228–9.
15. De Leusse to Couve de Murville, 7 August 1963, DDF 1963: 2, 161.
16. See Trachtenberg, *Constructed Peace*, 355–70.
17. See Kennedy–Couve meetings, 25 May and 7 October 1963, FRUS 1961–63: 13, 771–2, 785–6, and DDF 1963: 2, 355, 357. De Gaulle himself told Ambassador Bohlen in 1965 that 'he did not think our differences were really very much a matter of principle'. FRUS 1964–68: 12, 95.
18. See Georges-Henri Soutou, 'Willy Brandt, Georges Pompidou et l'Ostpolitik'; Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Willy Brandt, Georges Pompidou und die Ostpolitik'; and Wilfried Loth, 'Willy Brandt, Georges Pompidou und die Entspannungspolitik', all in *Willy Brandt und Frankreich*, ed. Horst Müller and Maurice Vaïsse (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005), 147–8, 156, 163, 175–9. The German record of the key meeting between Brandt and Pompidou was published in *Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* [AAPD] 1973, esp. 1024–5. See also AAPD 1973, doc. 367, esp. 1794, and docs. 274, 390, 393.
19. See Georges-Henri Soutou, 'L'anneau et les deux triangles: les rapports franco-allemands dans la politique européenne et mondiale de 1974 à 1981', in *Les années Giscard: Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et l'Europe, 1974–1981*, ed. Serge Berstein and Jean-François Sirinelli (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005), 55; Maurice Vaïsse, 'Valéry Giscard d'Estaing de la défense de l'Europe à la défense européenne', ibid., 212, 214; Melandri, 'La France et l'Alliance atlantique sous Georges Pompidou et Valéry Giscard d'Estaing', 544; and Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine,* chapters 10 and 11, esp. 383, 389.

20. François Mitterrand, *Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France*: *introduction à vingt-cinq discours, 1981–1985* (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 101; also available online at http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/867003600.html.
21. André Bettencourt (Ministre délégué auprès du ministre des Affaires étrangères), meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State Irwin, 23 October 1972, Pompidou presidential papers, box 117, *fonds* 5AG2, Archives Nationales, Paris. Note also Jean François-Poncet's comment (in a discussion of the question of whether Giscard d'Estaing was truly committed to building an autonomous European defence system) in *La Politique extérieure de Valéry Giscard d'Estaing*, ed. Samy Cohen and Marie-Claude Smouts (Paris: FNSP, 1985), 243. François-Poncet served as secretary-general in the Elysée from 1976 to 1978, and as foreign minister from 1978 to 1981.
22. See Melandri, 'La France et l'Alliance atlantique', 543–4.
23. François de Rose, *European Security and France* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 51. See also Melandri, 'La France et l'Alliance atlantique', 540–1, and Soutou, *L'Alliance incertaine*, 359–64.
24. See especially Irwin to Kissinger and Schlesinger, 6 October 1973, reporting the views of French armed forces minister Robert Galley's diplomatic advisor Seillière, Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files, Electronic Telegrams (1973), Record Group 59, US National Archives, retrieved from http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-list.jsp?cat=WR43. Document number 1973PARIS26207, henceforth cited in the form: DOSCFPF/Telegrams(1973)/1973PARIS26207.
25. Irwin to Kissinger, 16 November 1973, reporting a conversation between Seymour Weiss, an important State Department official involved in nuclear issues, and Jacques Martin, Deputy Secretary General of the French Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, DOSCFPF/Telegrams(1973)/1973PARIS29553. The French official outlined his government's thinking in this area in some detail; Ambassador Irwin commented that his exposition was 'one of the most detailed and authoritative we have received'. On French nuclear strategy in the 1960s, see especially de Gaulle's note on the 'Défense atomique de l'Europe', 1 May 1963, Couve de Murville Papers, box CM8, Centre d'Histoire, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, discussed in Jeffrey Vanke, 'An Impossible Union: Dutch Objections to the Fouchet Plans, 1959–62', *Cold War History* 1, no. 2 (2001): 95–112.
26. See Irwin to Kissinger, Rush and Schlesinger, 21 September 1973, DOSCFPF/Telegrams(1973)/1973PARIS24957; Rush–Galley conversation, 25 September 1973 (doc. dated Sept. 26), DOSCFPF/Telegrams(1973)/1973STATE191313; and Irwin to Kissinger, 8 October 1973, DOSCFPF/Telegrams(1973)/1973PARIS26222. The NATO Commander, General Andrew Goodpaster, also wanted to move ahead in this area. The whole question of tactical nuclear weapons, he told President Nixon, had 'been stagnant for 10 years. He feels we are now at the point where we have done enough preparatory work that we can begin to take a new position on this troublesome issue. Goodpaster also noted that he was trying to extend the areas of cooperation with the French and he felt the French military were very much in favor of closer cooperation'. Nixon–Goodpaster meeting, 15 February 1973, available at http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/dmemcons.asp. The Defense Department more generally was very much in favour of closer cooperation in this area and been disappointed by French defence minister Michel Debré's reluctance to pursue this issue when we met with his American counterpart in July 1972. See Defense Secretary Melvin Laird to Nixon, 5 July 1972; talking points memo, p. 4, attached to Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, 5 July 1972; and especially Defense Department response to NSSM 175, 11 May 1973, pp. 7, 30; all in NSC Files, boxes 678 and 679, France – vols. IX and XI, Nixon Presidential Library.
27. See Melandri, 'La France et l'Alliance atlantique', 539–40.
28. See Soutou, 'L'anneau et les deux triangles', 55; Vaïsse, 'Valéry Giscard d'Estaing', 212, 214; and Melandri, 'La France et l'Alliance atlantique', 544.
29. Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 14, 66, 245.

30. Ibid., 13, 59, 245.
31. Mitterrand, *Réflexions,* quoted in ibid., 14.
32. Ibid., 195.

Notes on contributor

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