The Past and Future of Arms Control

WHATEVER OTHER FUNCTIONS IT MIGHT HAVE, the primary purpose of arms control is to help prevent war. Indeed, it is often taken for granted that arms control is virtually equivalent to peace. The “arms race” is commonly believed to be a major cause of international tension; it follows that the “control of the arms race” is to be sought as a kind of end in itself. Similarly, there is a common fear that a great war can come about because the political leadership “loses control” of a situation, overwhelmed by forces arising from within the military sphere. If this risk is real, it makes sense to try to restructure the military system so that those forces are less dangerous in a crisis. Whether this is done unilaterally or mainly through negotiated arms control is really a secondary issue. The more basic problem relates to the fundamental assumption about what makes for war: Are military factors really so important? How dangerous is the arms race? How much should we worry about “inadvertent nuclear war”?

The point of departure for any real analysis of the question of arms control must therefore be an examination of basic assumptions about the role that military factors play in bringing about a war. What is at issue here is not the general question of the role that military power as such plays in international politics. It may be admitted that relative power, as measured by some rough standard, will always be of fundamental political importance. The real question is the degree to which the internal workings of the military system are really worth worrying about.

To analyze this issue, the “military” approach to war causation needs to be weighed against the main alternative theory, the ap-
proach that proceeds from the assumption that war is preeminently a political phenomenon—that armed conflict, if it does come about, is the result of a process that is essentially political in nature. From this point of view, it makes little sense to focus one's attention on the workings of the military system. What goes on in the military sphere may be a reflection of a more basic political conflict, but it cannot in itself be an important cause of war. To try to restructure or regulate the military system, this argument runs, is to deal with symptoms and not with causes.

If war is the outcome of a political process, the goal of policy should be to influence the way that process runs its course—especially to influence a rival's behavior in such a way as to make a political accommodation possible. This influence is exerted in principle through the manipulation of the incentive structure within which an adversary operates: peaceful, conciliatory behavior is rewarded and hostile behavior is punished. Given what states care most about, the strongest pressures in both directions are military in nature. If states understand that hostile behavior will provoke a military buildup on the part of their adversary, whereas conciliatory behavior will be rewarded with a relaxation of the military pressures directed against them, they will all have a great interest in avoiding conflict and in improving relations with each other. This, then, is a world in which the possibility of military competition—not as a self-propelled phenomenon, but as an instrument of and outlet for political competition—is not dysfunctional, but rather has an important, and indeed stabilizing, political role to play.

Is there anything that can be said in general about which basic approach to war causation should prevail—or, more precisely, about how the balance should be struck? First, with regard to the common assumption that arms races generate conflict, and that arms control is, therefore, almost by definition a force for peace, one is struck by the degree to which such ideas are simply accepted as articles of faith. Thus, it is often taken for granted that the Anglo-German naval race was a major cause of the First World War. This, in fact, is probably the most important historical example cited in support of the theory that arms races help bring on war. But historical research has made it increasingly clear that the naval race was not an independent cause of conflict, and that the real dispute was political in nature. The basic issue was quite simple: Would Germany replace
Britain as the world’s premier imperial power? Germany sought naval predominance not as an end in itself, but as a means to that end; the naval competition was simply the arena in which this political conflict was worked out.2

Second, with respect to the history of the nuclear age, there are many observers who like to point to various “lost opportunities” for arms control. It is often simply assumed that the world would have been a safer place if these opportunities had been seized—if some agreement for banning nuclear weapons had been reached in 1945 or 1946, or if thermonuclear weapons had never been tested or developed. But such claims cannot be accepted uncritically. The thermonuclear revolution, for example, certainly marked a watershed in the history of military technology, representing in some ways more of a break with the past than did the nuclear revolution itself. A ban on the hydrogen bomb, however, even if it could have survived the sort of political conflict that might have led to war, might have succeeded only in freezing the world in an era of fightable atomic wars, and it is by no means obvious that this would have been a good thing. Even a ban on nuclear weapons would probably not have ushered in a safer world. As Bernard Brodie pointed out in 1946, atomic bombs were more likely to be used in a war where “an international system for the suppression of bomb production” was in place at the start of the conflict, than in a war where both sides had significant stockpiles from the outset. The reasons were that the control system could not survive the coming of a major war, that both sides would then race for the weapon, and that “the side which got it first in quantity would be under enormous temptation to use it before the opponent had it.”3 The forty years that have passed since these words were written have done nothing to weaken the force of the argument and, looking back, probably the safest thing was to allow the nuclear revolution to run its course the way it did.

How then can the arms race issue be brought into focus? The claim is that a military rivalry can be an independent source of tension; but to the extent that it is independent, and not just a reflection of underlying political conflict, what kind of effect can it have on political behavior? It is certainly possible in theory that each side may have purely defensive goals and may be reacting in its military policy solely to what its rival is doing with its armed forces; if these military moves are misinterpreted, and one side or the other reads its
opponent’s military moves as evidence of aggressive intent and reacts by becoming more hostile or belligerent, then one could argue that the purely military competition was a source of tension. Such a dynamic is certainly theoretically possible; it is just hard to find any example from modern history that even remotely approximates this model. And even as a theory, it should be noted that the argument depends in a crucial way on misperception: If each side understood that the arms competition was devoid of political meaning and was just proceeding according to its own internal dynamic of action and response, there might be a certain general irritation about the waste of resources, but would a competition of this sort actually generate the kind of tension that could in itself be a powerful cause of war? If misperception is the crucial variable, then it, and not the arms race itself, should be identified as the source of tension—especially since the opposite kind of misperception, one which refuses to admit that a real threat is genuine, may also be a source of instability, as the case of the 1930s makes abundantly clear.

In other words, those who say that the nuclear arms race is “a serious threat in its own right” point above all to “the compulsions, the suspicions, the anxieties such a competition engenders.”4 But the assumption is that these are unwarranted suspicions, that the anxieties are artificially generated—that these tensions go far beyond what genuine political conflict can account for. Military policy may indeed have little to do with international political life: an arms buildup might essentially be the product of the play of bureaucratic interest. This may be true, but if it is true, and especially if it is obviously true, then what goes on in the military sphere could be discounted as resulting, for example, simply from bureaucratic rivalries within an adversary’s national security establishment. It might in that case be viewed as largely devoid of political meaning; suspicions need not be generated. But if the interpretation of the buildup is ambiguous, why is there any reason to assume a priori that the government will in all likelihood err on the side of hawkishness—that it will be overly suspicious, that it will read too much into these military measures—while its dovish critics will be much closer to the mark? The theory that arms races lead to war was thus never really satisfactory, either conceptually or in the light of historical experience.

The real breakthrough in thinking about arms control came only when this theory was put aside and the structure of military forces
emerged as the central problem. Now the goal was no longer force reduction as an end in itself, but rather "strategic stability," defined as a situation where neither side had any incentive to go first in a crisis. This implied that America's own forces had to be made secure, a condition that might be achieved only through increased military spending, higher force levels, and the introduction of new weapons systems—that is, through measures that from the traditional perspective would have been termed an "escalation of the arms race." But it also implied—and this was where the argument really broke new ground—that Soviet forces should also be secure against American attack.

The stability theory emerged quite suddenly at the end of the Eisenhower period, or more precisely in 1959 and 1960. Thomas Schelling's article in the Fall 1960 Daedalus issue was a particularly elegant exposition of the new thinking. To be sure, the idea had been expressed on occasion before. Bernard Brodie, for example, had argued along these lines as early as 1954, introducing a metaphor which was later to become quite common in the "stability" literature:

If, in the blunting-missing [counterforce] game, one side can make a surprise attack upon the other that destroys the latter's capability to make meaningful retaliation, then it makes sense to be trigger-happy with one's strategic air power. How could one afford under those circumstances to withhold one's SAC from its critical blunting mission while waiting to test other pressures and strategies? This would be the situation of a gunfighter duel, Western frontier style. The one who leads on the draw and aims accurately achieves a good clean win. The other is dead. But if, on the other hand, the situation is such that neither side can hope to eliminate the retaliatory power of the other, the restraint that was suicidal in one situation becomes prudence, and it is trigger-happiness that is suicidal.5

In 1959 and 1960 the idea was taking hold quite rapidly, largely eclipsing the more traditional approach to arms control in the process.

The stability theory proceeded from the assumption that a great war could come even though nobody really wanted it. A "modest temptation on each side to sneak in a first blow," Schelling wrote in a famous passage, might lead to war, even if there was "no 'fundamental' basis for an attack by either side"—that is, no real
political basis for the war. The incentive to preempt combined with 
the fear of being preempted might precipitate a war that everyone 
might very much have preferred to avoid. A central goal of policy 
should therefore be to prevent such a situation from arising in the first 
place—that is, to minimize first-strike advantages all around.

But how realistic is this basic assumption about how a great war 
might come? Speaking very generally, and again in the light of 
historical experience, how great a risk is there that a war, not 
warranted by any basic political conflict, can be generated by the 
workings of the military system? The idea that this risk is to be taken 
quite seriously because of the general nature of the international 
system is still very common. Robert Jervis, for example, recently 
concluded an article in International Security by warning that “wars 
have broken out in the past between countries whose primary goal 
was to preserve the status quo. States’ conceptions of what is 
necessary for their security often clash with one another. Because one 
state may be able to increase its security only by making others less 
secure, the premise that both sides are basically satisfied with the 
status quo does not lead to the conclusion that the relations between 
them will be peaceful and stable.”

Brodie, on the other hand, in one of his last essays, ridiculed “the 
notion that two great nations which are conspicuously determined 
not to get into a war with each other, nuclear or otherwise, may 
somehow suddenly and unwittingly stumble into such a war, either 
through sheer accident or through some childish concern with losing 
face. . . . I know of no war in modern times,” he wrote, “that one 
could truly call accidental in the sense that it came despite both sides 
having a strong aversion to it, through not seeing where their 
diplomatic moves were taking them.” The “assumption that acciden-
tal war is an historical commonplace” had, he said, been “carried to 
ludicrous extremes in the further absurd belief that nuclear weapons 
have made it not less likely but rather more so.”

My own sympathies are with Brodie’s side of the argument. As a 
general rule, great wars do not break out because of forces generated 
from within the military sphere. The common idea that the First 
World War was in some sense caused by the mobilization system and 
the war plans in place in 1914 is simply a myth and cannot withstand 
a systematic study of the evidence. And yet the coming of the First 
World War is by far the most important historical example cited in
support of the theory that the military system might well bring on a
great war, even though the political leadership in every country very
much preferred to avoid it. As far as the nuclear age is concerned, the
historical evidence points in the same direction. The Cuban Missile
Crisis is often cited as an example of how great the risk of “accidental
war” is, of how easily statesmen might “lose control” of the situation
because of what goes on within the military sphere. And yet the
evidence for this case is to my mind quite clear. The arguments about
the threat of “accidental war” in 1962 do not stand up to critical
analysis; peace was not hanging by a thread during the crisis; the risk
of a nuclear holocaust was not nearly as great as many of us had
assumed at the time.10

Whatever the general validity of the “inadvertent war” theory, it
may well be that in specific situations there is a real risk of “strategic
instability,” and at such times this is a problem very much worth
thinking about. And indeed, if there ever was a time in which this
problem was real, it was the 1950s. It was not simply a question of
the vulnerability of strategic forces, then quite substantial on both
sides, but especially on the Soviet side. The problem of “instability”
was magnified by the fact that American strategy relied on striking
first: massive retaliation, as David Rosenberg says, was really massive
preemption.

This is a point that many people resist accepting, and for a variety
of reasons both the Left and the Right now like to argue that the
Eisenhower strategy was ultimately just a gigantic bluff. But the
evidence on this subject is quite compelling. In December 1954, for
example, President Eisenhower, in a meeting with top military
leaders, pointed out that with the new weapons the United States
“has reason to be frightened for its safety” for the first time in its
history. “He indicated,” according to the memorandum of the
meeting, “that the first priority must therefore be to blunt the enemy’s
initial threat—by massive retaliatory power and ability to deliver it;
and by a continental defense system of major capability.” Clearly, the
only way US retaliatory power could help blunt the initial attack was
by destroying enemy forces before they got off the ground, and later
in that meeting Eisenhower “indicated his firm intention to launch a
strategic air force immediately in case of alert of actual attack.”11
Note also his comments in a National Security Council meeting
earlier that year: “The President, at this point, referred to Clausewitz
and to one of the principles enunciated by him which, when applied to this situation, called for the capability of diminishing as much as possible the first blow of an enemy attack. He referred to our desire to have this capability, and stated in summary that for anyone to belittle or shrug off the situation which confronted us would be fatal.\textsuperscript{12}

This then was a situation in which “strategic instability” could quite properly be taken as an extremely serious problem. The odd thing, however, is that the stability doctrine, the basis for modern arms control thinking, took hold precisely at the time when, quite independently, “instability” was disappearing as a problem. With the introduction of Polaris and Minuteman, American strategic forces were becoming invulnerable to a first strike. This shift in the strategic environment might have been expected to lead to a corresponding shift in the focus of arms control thought. But oddly enough, the importance of the new weapons was played down. Brodie, for example, in a 1959 speech where he laid out some of the new arms control ideas, did ask whether “Polaris submarines and underground ICBMs” would solve the vulnerability problem. “The answer,” he said, “is that they will help, but we have to remember that the problem is at the same time also getting more difficult in many ways.” There was, he thought “always likely to be a considerable advantage in striking first, and it is up to us to see that such an advantage is at least minimized for the opponent.”\textsuperscript{13}

Is the risk of preemption still a serious problem? Given the present size of the arsenals, the most common view among people professionally concerned with these issues is that a full-scale first strike would be essentially suicidal—not just today, but for the foreseeable future as well. “Nobody seriously believes,” Schelling recently pointed out “that either side’s capacity to retaliate after receiving a nuclear attack is, or is going to be, in sufficient doubt to make preemption a preferred choice in any imaginable crisis.”\textsuperscript{14} The counterargument is that the military establishment still invests heavily in counterforce, and this suggests a certain willingness, in the final analysis, to strike first in a general war. But this argument is weak for a number of reasons. First of all, the sort of counterforce targeting embodied in the war plans does not necessarily reflect a real commitment to anything like a first-strike strategy. It can be explained in other ways—for example, in terms of traditional military
approaches to war fighting that were continued out of habit, well into the era of secure second-strike forces. Moreover, it is not up to the generals to decide whether to launch such an attack, and there is every reason to suppose that the political leadership is viscerally opposed to first-strike strategies. Even in the early 1960s, when the United States had something very close to a first-strike capability and public attitudes about nuclear war were very different from what they are today, even some of the most hawkish people in the government were very opposed to the idea of a first strike. At the time of the Berlin crisis, Paul Nitze, for example, thought the United States should “go to great lengths to avoid initiating war, general or limited, to hold on in Berlin,” and by this he meant that America should “yield” or even be “routed out” of her position in that city, rather than “venture war.”

Today, a nuclear first strike is even more out of the question then it was during the Kennedy period. And, finally, technical problems having to do with the vulnerability of command and control systems are sometimes alleged to be a source of crisis instability. This might in fact be the case if an attacker were able to paralyze an enemy’s strategic force by destroying his command and control system, but the bulk of the evidence indicates that an attack of this sort would lead to an all-out response.

Given all this, it is remarkable how much weight the stability theory continues to carry. This is no doubt due to the total absence of intellectually respectable alternatives. Indeed, as far as the official strategic arms control negotiations are concerned, the American effort since 1974, as Schelling noted, has apparently not been “informed by any coherent theory of what arms control is supposed to accomplish.” The focus in recent years has been on offensive weapons; but the “proposals and negotiations” in this area he judged “to have been mostly mindless, without a guiding philosophy.”

A situation where the central purpose of arms control is simply to reach arms control agreements is indeed unsatisfactory, not least because it diverts attention from more important problems relating to the stabilization of the great power peace. How then should the issue be approached? The answer is in principle quite simple and flows from a general understanding of the nature and meaning of warfare. If war is essentially a political phenomenon, military power exists for political purposes, so military measures, including arms control measures, should be judged essentially by a political yardstick. If
serious political conflict exists, then the threat of engaging in a military competition, and even the manipulation of a certain risk of war, may therefore have an important role to play. It is wrong to assume that ruling out these instruments of policy will necessarily result in greater stability: the political conflict will not just disappear, but will rather run its course in some way or other—through a competition in simple threat making, for example—and there is no reason to assume that such a system is more likely to lead to a peaceful settlement than one in which military policy plays a central role. It would have been better, for example, if the western countries had not been so attached to disarmament in the 1930s, if the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 had never been signed—or if the American government in the late 1940s had not been so reluctant to build up its military forces, to a certain extent out of the belief that some form of nuclear arms control had to be sought.18

On the other hand, in a time of improving relations, and especially in a period of deep peace, the situation is very different. Military competition no longer has a political function, whereas ending it and stabilizing the military relationship does have a positive role to play. Arms control is the reward the great powers give each other for friendly political behavior, the symbol of and natural complement to political accommodation. With political stability, military threats are pointless, and military behavior that might have made perfect sense in a time of conflict now becomes confusing and disconcerting; it thus should be ended, and in principle the transition to less threatening military structures can best be managed if both sides are talking to each other and cooperating in the transition. What is most needed here is a common understanding of the sort of military regime to be realized and a common understanding of the rationale for bringing it about. Informal conversations, aimed at bringing about a meeting of the minds about what should be going on, are probably more important than formal agreements.

Arms control is in this sense just the icing on the cake of political accommodation. The fact that it is of secondary importance, and that a stable political structure has to be the overriding goal, has to be made abundantly clear, even if it means swimming against the tide of popular preconception. The rhetoric that assumes that arms control equals peace clearly needs to be deflated; in an era of peace, arms control should be treated more as a technical problem than as a
life-or-death issue; the reports of arms control talks should be pushed off the front pages; and the issue should receive about as much attention in the media as, say, trade negotiations.

In one respect, however, arms control can be of enormous primary importance. This is the area where the construction of security regimes is really a way of dealing with important political problems. If war can be a continuation of politics by other means, then so can arms control, and political negotiations can be conducted in the guise of arms control talks.

Europe is, in this regard, by far the most important case. The political future of the continent is now a great question mark. The Cold War, whatever else one might think of it, certainly created a stable situation on the continent—a situation where American power and Soviet power stalemated each other so completely that neither state, and obviously no other state, had very much room to maneuver for basic change in the system. But if this is the case, the ending of the Cold War must once again raise the problem of stability in Europe. Will a stable structure of power take shape on the continent, or are we in for a new period of instability—not right away of course, but maybe ten or twenty years down the road?

One can already see the basic outline of the problem. It is as though two paths have opened up. The first, in a sense the more "natural" path, leads to an American withdrawal from Central Europe—whether because the Germans want the United States out, or because the Americans no longer see any need to stay in—and to the resurgence of a unified Germany as a great power. After decades of division, after being treated for years as a pawn in international politics, in no real sense master of her own fate, Germany would be sorely tempted to reassume her natural status as a great power. But in the nuclear age, true great power status implies a substantial, independent nuclear capability: no longer really protected by America, but relatively free for the time being from Russian power, it would be a question for the Germans of "now or never." Whatever happens to the Soviet Union, Russia will always be a great power, and it would be intolerable for a nation like Germany to be naked to military pressure from the East. In that case, international politics in Europe will be dominated by the triangular relationship between Germany, Russia and the Western powers—as indeed it has been, in one form or another, since the beginning of the century.
The other path leads to a more “constructed” political system. Germany will certainly be reunified, but may remain nonnuclear. The condition for this would have to be a continued American presence, and perhaps also a continued Soviet presence, in Central Europe. But there would have to be a rationale for this: if the security structure is no longer to be based on the Soviet threat, it would have to be based on something else. But on what? The goal is to create a stable structure of power. But since the language of power politics is not politically acceptable, especially in the United States but also in democratic cultures quite generally, one has to talk the language of arms control—of negotiated security regimes, of nuclear-free zones, and so on. If talk of the balance of power sounds distasteful, archaic, and maybe even a little too academic, one can instead speak of a “European security system,” or an “organized peace” in Europe.

A multilateral framework is needed to legitimate, and thus to further stabilize, a settlement of this sort. NATO itself, Pierre Hassner once argued, had to be understood in these terms:

To balance Russian power and provide a Western framework for Germany’s energies, to protect Germany both from Russia and from herself, to prevent both from attempting, either jointly or individually, to gain hegemony over the continent; this is the essence of the Atlantic alliance. This is why the presence of American troops in Germany in their double, primarily protective but also, discreetly, controlling function is the one tangible expression of the alliance whose disappearance would directly and fundamentally transform the structure of the continent.

He went on to point out that it was “precisely the ambiguous nature of the German-American relationship that puts it in danger of becoming unacceptable to either of the two partners or to both, and, even more, of provoking fears of joint hegemony in the rest of Europe.” This then provided the rationale for a formal European security regime: “Some kind of multilateral or collective framework is then a necessity both as legitimation and as a counterweight.” But the same sort of point will apply to any future security regime for Europe.

The issue of arms control in Europe turns largely on how these two alternatives stack up against each other. How much of a risk is there in letting events take their own, “natural” course? How much of an
effort will be required to prevent events from moving in that direction? If the potential gains are high, and the effort needed to realize these gains is within reason, then it may make sense to try to construct a new political regime in the guise of an arms control settlement.

What then are the risks that a full resurgence of German power would entail? Is it to be assumed that because in the past a strong Germany was linked to an unstable political system, this pattern will reemerge in the future? The answer is no, partly because the imperialist aspirations which played such an important role in driving German policy before the two world wars have been discredited by historical experience, and partly because the hope of radical territorial revision is absurdly out of place in a world where one's potential adversaries are armed with substantial nuclear forces. To be sure, the sharp line of demarcation that characterized the Cold War period is being replaced by a zone of political uncertainty in East Central Europe, and the unclear political status of that area might well lead to a certain degree of instability, as Germany and Russia compete for political advantage there.

The risks, though limited, are real enough to warrant a certain effort to create an even more stable system. Maybe Germany will be content to remain under American protection; maybe new arrangements can be worked out, at least nominally through the arms control process, that will provide for continuing stability in Europe. If arms control has a future, this, I think, is where it lies.

Note: This article was written in December 1989.

ENDNOTES

1Some of Jerome Wiesner's comments in his Foreword to the 1960 Dædelus arms control issue may be taken as representative of this very common point of view.


See Marc Trachtenberg, “New Light on the Missile Crisis?” *Diplomatic History* 14 (4) (Spring 1990).


Discussion at the 208th Meeting of the National Security Council, 29 July 1954, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 5, Eisenhower Library.


Nitz to Lippmann, 26 October 1959, Acheson Papers, Box 23, folder 295, Yale University Library; and, using very similar language to refer to his attitude in 1961, Paul Nitz, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision* (New York: Weidenfeld, 1989), 196.

See, for example, Harold Brown, *Thinking about National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), 79.

Schelling, “What Went Wrong with Arms Control?”: 224–25.
